tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post6616980719738001198..comments2024-03-28T13:39:03.094-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Stop it, you’re killing me!Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger87125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83013555336495715502014-03-21T14:45:06.413-07:002014-03-21T14:45:06.413-07:00I thought humanism was devoted to improving the hu...I thought humanism was devoted to improving the human condition. Why should they care how people identify? Last I heard the BHS was also doing billboard ads trying to get people to identify as atheists for the census. Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11189663754905839463noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-47564426252951675632014-03-20T22:28:17.013-07:002014-03-20T22:28:17.013-07:00Parsons posts another response.Parsons posts <a href="http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2014/03/20/response-to-prof-fesers-response-to-etc-part-ii/" rel="nofollow">another response</a>.Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54065028354070000902014-03-20T18:23:44.285-07:002014-03-20T18:23:44.285-07:00@Jeremy Taylor:
"I can't remember if it ...@Jeremy Taylor:<br /><br />"I can't remember if it was Peter Hitchens who originated the comment or if he was just quoting someone else, but he described Fry very well as the stupid person's idea of what a clever person is like."<br /><br />He <a href="http://hitchensblog.mailonsunday.co.uk/2012/04/stephen-fry-a-stupid-persons-idea-of-what-an-intelligent-person-is-like.html" rel="nofollow">credits the quote</a> to a headline in the "Dictionary of National Celebrity." But it's the single funniest and aptest description of Fry I've ever seen (and I don't say that because I dislike him; I generally at least enjoy him on "QI").Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49609877926674350332014-03-20T17:28:56.098-07:002014-03-20T17:28:56.098-07:00Daniel Joachim,
our all beloved Stephen Fry.
I c...Daniel Joachim,<br /><br /><i>our all beloved Stephen Fry.</i><br /><br />I can't remember if it was Peter Hitchens who originated the comment or if he was just quoting someone else, but he described Fry very well as the stupid person's idea of what a clever person is like.<br /><br />Fry is irritating on a number of levels, not least because he pretends to be some iconoclastic anti-establishment rebel whereas, here in Britan at least, his views are the most bien pasant establishment fare.<br /><br />With secular humanists the first thing to remind them is that they stole the term humanists deliberately from the New or American humanists to try to neutralise that movement. The American humanists represented actual humanism whereas the secular humanists represent just what the American humanists fought against - and what is not very humanist - like monistic materialism and determinism. <br /><br />Real humanism, in its historic sense that someone implies when they use terms like renaissance humanism, implies a great focus on human indivility and personality, human agency and free will, human responsibility and moral effort, and, often, the importance of classical, liberal education and learning. This is what the American humanists defended and this is what the secular humanists, for the most part, disliked and do dislike.<br /><br />That someone like Susan Blackmore could be a distinguished member of the British Humanist Associations should tell us what their humanism amounts to. Paul Elmer More, Matthew Arnold, or Erasmus she is not.Jeremy Taylornoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88272646123352209572014-03-20T17:15:32.142-07:002014-03-20T17:15:32.142-07:00@Paul
if life can be defined merely as immanent ca...@Paul<br /><i>if life can be defined merely as immanent causation towards growth, where growth isn't defined in terms of life, then you could have a non-circular definition.</i><br /><br />I also want to be clear here that life is not being defined as immanent causation towards <i>growth</i> but immanent causation towards perfections (of which growth is one). The example of growth just demonstrates as false the intuition that the goods of living things need to be specified in life-involving terms.<br /><br />One could say that cats and crystals only <i>analogously</i> grow, so perhaps it is still possible that the <i>growth of cats</i> must be specified in life-involving terms. But the only sense (for the scholastic) in which growth for cats is life-involving is that it is achieved through immanent causation.<br /><br />In short, the scholastic definition of life looks at perfection/goodness globally, and defines as living those things whose perfections are attained through immanent causation.Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7663082591091908762014-03-20T14:17:06.170-07:002014-03-20T14:17:06.170-07:00@Paul
Sure, if life can be defined merely as imman...@Paul<br /><i>Sure, if life can be defined merely as immanent causation towards growth, where growth isn't defined in terms of life, then you could have a non-circular definition. But this definition seems too permissive, as I pointed out with my example of a computer with immanent causal powers. The response to that case turned on additional scholastic claims which seemed unmotivated and arbitrary. E.g., something has to be simple to have immanent casual powers, and, if the causal power was bestowed from without, then it isn't immanent. But why couldn't a computer be simple—a simple thing that computes? And why don't human beings fail the "power bestowed from without" test, since presumably on this view God bestowed human immanent causal powers?</i><br /><br />A scholastic would deny that a human could create an artifact with immanent causal powers (cf. Oderberg's article cited by Feser). More specifically, the general scholastic view of artifacts is that they have accidental forms, and their integral parts retain their own natural ends. So a computer could not properly perform immanent causation unless its parts do. (These are all, of course, rather strong claims. But then the question is the truth or falsity of the scholastic definition.)<br /><br />I don't know what sort of computer would be simple. In any case, I don't think the scholastic response would be that only simples can have immanent causal powers; you'd have to clarify what sort of simple you mean. (Only God is ultimately simple, although various other entities are analogically simple.) Oderberg explicitly argues that immanent causation cannot emerge from transient causation, so if he at any point claims that only simples (at some specific level of simplicity) can act immanently, then that is probably consequent upon his other arguments.<br /><br />Since there isn't a "power bestowed from without" test even for artifacts (ie. the reasons artifacts fail to demonstrate immanent causation does not have to do with the fact that their powers are bestowed from without, full stop), such a test doesn't apply to humans either.Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77882676653245582332014-03-20T13:59:13.019-07:002014-03-20T13:59:13.019-07:00@Paul Ned:
The Scholastic definition of life is i...@Paul Ned:<br /><br />The Scholastic definition of life is in terms of immanent causation and nothing else—end of story. Even if we take immanent causation to be in some way aimed toward the "good" of the relevant substance, this "goodness" is not defined in any way that presupposes a definition of life, no matter how often you "explain" (that is, repeatedly assert) otherwise.<br /><br />As a couple of us have troubled to explain to you, the Scholastic understanding of "good" is that it has the same scope as "existence" or "being," so if you don't like the reference to "goodness" in (some) definitions of life, you can replace it by something like "perpetuation in being." Living things are those exhibiting a kind of causation that has, as its effect, the perpetuation in being of the thing itself. Where's the circularity in that?<br /><br />Sure, for any particular thing, "goodness" will in fact be "goodness as the kind of thing it is." So what? A foot is defined (non-circularly) as twelve inches even though a foot-long plank is twelve inches of wood and a foot-long hot dog is twelve inches of beef.<br /><br />I don't have anything much else to add, so I'm done here unless something genuinely new comes up.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-64604538322444414942014-03-20T12:35:57.950-07:002014-03-20T12:35:57.950-07:00Daniel,
From the people that gave you buses with ...Daniel,<br /><br /><i>From the people that gave you buses with "there's probably no God, so stop worrying and live life", hereeeeee's.... <br /><br />http://humanism.org.uk/thatshumanism/</i><br /><br />Interesting. <br /><br />At about 1:19 in the "How can I be happy?" video, the narrator mellifluently says, "...every person will have many different meanings in their life", and the hand hastily writes "s i n".<br /><br />Ed McMahon: Sin.<br />Carnac the Magnificent: How can I be happy?<br /><br />Quipping aside...<br /><br />If it is true that behind all sin is a misguided sense of the meaning of 'good', and it is true that each person likely will commit a number of different sins in his life, then it is also true that every person likely will experience a number of different (misguided) meanings of 'good' during their life.<br /><br />- - - - -<br /><br />o <i>[T]he cause of sin is some apparent good as motive[.]</i> <i>ST</i> I-II Q 75 A 2 (<a href="http://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/FS/FS075.html#FSQ75A2THEP1" rel="nofollow">here</a>)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75797118899783006842014-03-20T12:30:23.365-07:002014-03-20T12:30:23.365-07:00Too many defenses of the First Way seem to collaps...Too many defenses of the First Way seem to collapse immanent causality into transient causality. Oderberg is really the only one I've seen who's avoided the problem. I'd be interested to see how Prof. Feser solves it, given his defense here of immanent causality.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51120134981226603792014-03-20T10:11:21.300-07:002014-03-20T10:11:21.300-07:00Off topic again, but I would love to see some revi...Off topic again, but I would love to see some reviews on the new campaign by the British Humanist Association with four new videos, all narrated by our all beloved Stephen Fry.<br /><br />It's just an astounding collection of popularized false dichotomies, caricatures and question-begging. From the people that gave you buses with "there's probably no God, so stop worrying and live life", hereeeeee's....<br /><br />http://humanism.org.uk/thatshumanism/<br /><br />It seems very popular among their supporters. Go figure!Daniel Joachimhttp://www.danieljoachim.orgnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-64695731602083367052014-03-20T09:43:53.929-07:002014-03-20T09:43:53.929-07:00@Glenn:
You are, pretty much, the Andy Kaufmann o...@Glenn:<br /><br />You are, pretty much, the Andy Kaufmann of this website. <br /><br />But, lest you get a big head, know that that is only half a compliment.Untenurednoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-76393289443048211252014-03-20T09:41:33.055-07:002014-03-20T09:41:33.055-07:00@Paul Ned:
"Rather, my point is that Feser&#...@Paul Ned:<br /><br />"Rather, my point is that Feser's definition of life includes goodness, the definition of which includes life."<br /><br />That's not right. I think you have it backwards. Life is a special case of goodness, not vice-versa. An entity can exhibit goodness without exhibiting life, but it cannot exhibit life without exhibiting good.Untenurednoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69261610542139378092014-03-20T08:55:27.234-07:002014-03-20T08:55:27.234-07:00(Re the dogs and 'speech allowing headsets'...(Re the dogs and 'speech allowing headsets'... Mr. Green notes the lack of anything interesting from a metaphysical perspective. I think, however, that there is a practical puzzle which may be of some interest. The headsets are available in models ranging in price from $65 to $1,200, and it is alleged that each model will translate dog thoughts into human language. But here is the practical puzzle: why would anyone shell out money to "hear them English", when everyone can watch them Basque for free?)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-84375747797069789442014-03-20T08:17:15.498-07:002014-03-20T08:17:15.498-07:00Might have something to do with artifacts vs subst...Might have something to do with artifacts vs substances.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-1927278548412550072014-03-20T06:48:58.008-07:002014-03-20T06:48:58.008-07:00@Scott and Gary
" Your objection to the defi...@Scott and Gary<br /><br />" Your objection to the definition of "life" at issue here is not that it makes direct reference to life (it doesn't), but that, by making reference to "goodness," it entails something that in turn entails life. Where does the analogy fail?"<br /><br />My point is not that Feser's definition of life entails goodness and thus entails life, though that follows from my point. Rather, my point is that Feser's definition of life includes goodness, the definition of which includes life. Your analogy fails because it is terms of entailment or merely necessary relations, whereas mine doesn't because it is terms of definition or essence. Your triangle example illustrates why mere entailment or necessary relations don't imply definitional relations. But my point is specifically about definitional relations.<br /><br />"A reference to goodness doesn't include any sort of "essential reference" to the goodness of any particular species (living or otherwise), and goodness for a species/kind is not defined even partially in terms of "life.""<br /><br />As I've explained several times now, the sort of goodness in terms of which life is defined—according to the scholastics on this thread—is species-relative. This means that the goodness that figures in any given definition of life for a given species is relative to that given kind. The goodness for a given species is defined in terms of the goodness for that species, and since the goodness of any species includes life, the goodness for that species is partially defined in terms of life. I don't know how to put this any more clearly.<br /><br />The thing about circular definitions is that it doesn't take many oysters to make a stew. It only takes one: if a definition for F makes ANY appeal to F, no matter how "small", then it's circular. I don't make the rules.<br /><br />" That being is "convertible" with goodness just means that being and goodness are distinguished conceptually but are not different in reality: anything that exists is, thus far, good, and vice versa."<br /><br />Well this might explain some of the disagreement we've been having, because I don't care about definitions that diverge from reality. The sort of definition I'm talking about is that which accurately captures the identity of the thing defined. I'm talking about real definitions. Consequently, on your view of the relationship between goodness and being, being cannot be really defined without reference to goodness. <br /><br />If you (and the other scholastics on this thread) merely have in mind the sort of inaccurate, merely conceptual notion of definition at work in your "different in concept but not in reality" idea, then, sure, such a definition of life need not be circular. Because such a definition need not accurately reflect reality. But then who cares? <br /><br />@Greg<br />Sure, if life can be defined merely as immanent causation towards growth, where growth isn't defined in terms of life, then you could have a non-circular definition. But this definition seems too permissive, as I pointed out with my example of a computer with immanent causal powers. The response to that case turned on additional scholastic claims which seemed unmotivated and arbitrary. E.g., something has to be simple to have immanent casual powers, and, if the causal power was bestowed from without, then it isn't immanent. But why couldn't a computer be simple—a simple thing that computes? And why don't human beings fail the "power bestowed from without" test, since presumably on this view God bestowed human immanent causal powers?Paul Nednoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-84603602305842092672014-03-20T02:24:05.124-07:002014-03-20T02:24:05.124-07:00At heart, all are one.
At heart, a human being is ...At heart, all are one.<br />At heart, a human being is not the slightest bit different from the reptiles, the birds, the former dinosaurs, the elephants, the plants, the trees, the wind, the sky, the microbes.<br />Apart from their function in conditionality, all beings are the same.<br />Human beings are not uniquely to be Saved.<br />It is not that only human beings are full of "soul" and everything else should be chopped up and eaten for lunch! If you examine beings other than the human, feel them, are sensitive to them, enter directly into relationship with them prior to the separative thinking mind, you discover that they are the same - and not just the bigger ones, but the mosquitoes,too, which you swat out as if they were nothing.<br />At heart, human beings are manifesting a potential that is in all and that is inherent in conditional existence itself. Whether this potential is exhibited or not, whether it is made human or not, makes no difference whatsoever to the Divine Condition.<br />All is One.<br />All are the same.<br />All equally require Divine Compassion, Love, and Blessing, the thread of Communion with the Divine made certain and true and directly experienced. AllAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-32654122433465772642014-03-19T23:14:37.722-07:002014-03-19T23:14:37.722-07:00Tom: I'm going to assume that, as usual, the n...Tom: <i>I'm going to assume that, as usual, the neuroscience and the biology doesn't actually affect the metaphysics, but any response would be appreciated.</i><br /><br />As usual, there doesn't seem to be anything that interesting from a metaphysical perspective. Indeed, giving dogs human voices is <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jz6CAHDFIdo" rel="nofollow">nothing new</a>, they've just come up with fancier technology for doing it. And the brain-scanning part is cool, but it's also pretty vague. In fact, referring to dogs' "thoughts" is a bit misleading — it's not as though a dog has actual intellectual abstractions about taco joints, etc.; as the article points out, an observant human can draw the same conclusions based on the dog's behaviour — and behaviour is all it is.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40804791953479572922014-03-19T20:39:22.448-07:002014-03-19T20:39:22.448-07:00A quote from another philosopher in Parson's r...A quote from another philosopher in Parson's response:<br /><br />"... is just as unclear how we get from the action of this and the action of that as how we get from the Being of this and the Being of that to Being qua Being."<br /><br />Isn't this glossing over the first and second ways?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-60880741989065012742014-03-19T19:27:45.398-07:002014-03-19T19:27:45.398-07:00I'm a big fan of this blog and all the comment...I'm a big fan of this blog and all the commenters here, as I've been reading for a few months, but I've just come across an article about a mind-reading, speech-allowing headset for dogs that can be found here: http://geekologie.com/2013/12/mind-reading-headset-for-dogs-allows-the.php<br /><br />I'm going to assume that, as usual, the neuroscience and the biology doesn't actually affect the metaphysics, but any response would be appreciated.Tomnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12620874596287644282014-03-19T19:11:53.681-07:002014-03-19T19:11:53.681-07:00Parsons has responded to Ed's first question.Parsons <a href="http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2014/03/17/response-to-prof-feser-part-i/" rel="nofollow">has responded</a> to Ed's first question.Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-293503176915934842014-03-19T07:55:07.999-07:002014-03-19T07:55:07.999-07:00Paul,
Thank you for directing me to that post. I...Paul,<br /><br />Thank you for directing me to that post. I think the point I ignored is when you said the "metaphysical nature of things".<br /><br />Now let us assume life is the type of thing that increases various goods - including life! There is nothing in that idea that seems irrational. However, there is a sort of metaphysical circularity there. The assumption you seem to be working off is that if this metaphysical circularity exists, any definition that captures the nature of the object will necessarily be circular. I would disagree with that proposition. I would find it a challenge but I think the challenge has been met.<br /><br />It would be interesting to consider whether life can be increased in anything more than a metaphorical sense, because if it cannot it also avoids your metaphysical circularity.<br /><br />Open to correction,<br />GaryGary Blackhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13873731132589302938noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72829941272492176052014-03-18T17:00:34.525-07:002014-03-18T17:00:34.525-07:00I'm sure I won't; I have a pretty good ide...I'm sure I won't; I have a pretty good idea what quality to expect!Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-37448908390368641952014-03-18T16:09:32.553-07:002014-03-18T16:09:32.553-07:00I was lucky to have got it on Amazon.co.uk pre-ord...I was lucky to have got it on Amazon.co.uk pre-order for £15.17! Anyway I'm sure you'll not be disappointed when May comes around.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19001492720463122152014-03-18T15:50:44.858-07:002014-03-18T15:50:44.858-07:00Glad to hear it. The book doesn't come out her...Glad to hear it. The book doesn't come out here (in the US) until the end of May, but then again the US price is only about $20 right now (as opposed to the UK price of about £30, which at current exchange rates is about fifty bucks!).Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81406794340111865352014-03-18T15:27:05.168-07:002014-03-18T15:27:05.168-07:00After weeks of anticipation Scholastic Metaphysics...After weeks of anticipation Scholastic Metaphysics arrived today - and so far my high expectations have been more than justified. It is typical of the lucid prose and forceful argumentation readers of this blog and his other works have come to appreciate. I'm trying to pace myself but the book is a page-turner.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com