tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post6597104092910855246..comments2024-03-18T15:57:33.286-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: A gigantic book royalty check from nothingEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger274125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77478513125930786552013-09-24T05:05:30.411-07:002013-09-24T05:05:30.411-07:00If your floor guy wanted an unfurnished room he sh...If your floor guy wanted an unfurnished room he should have said so. Generally speaking, an empty room is like an empty mind: the furniture is there, but no one is using it. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80578461601032741792013-09-21T07:32:45.604-07:002013-09-21T07:32:45.604-07:00@urban jean:
"I am trying to figure out Aris...@urban jean:<br /><br />"I am trying to figure out Aristotelianism, or perhaps I should say Thomism, by considering it to start with as an axiomatic system over undefined terms."<br /><br />Since Thomism does define its terms, this approach seems unlikely to succeed. But I see this thread has become old enough that Ed has to moderate the comments, so this will be my last post in it.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35512079332761958492013-09-20T17:22:08.823-07:002013-09-20T17:22:08.823-07:00Apologies, guys, I have been distracted elsewhere ...Apologies, guys, I have been distracted elsewhere trying to understand Mr Crude. Thank you for your lengthy and helpful contributions. I hope to get back to you over the weekend. In the meantime here is an outline of my project. I am trying to figure out Aristotelianism, or perhaps I should say Thomism, by considering it to start with as an axiomatic system over undefined terms. Think Hilbert on geometry or just abstract groups. I read Kenny's <i>Aquinas on Mind</i> a while back and more recently Ed Feser's <i>Aquinas</i>, but I find it next to impossible to think in the Thomistic language. So I thought I'd try to piece together the vocabulary and grammar---what are the kinds of entity being talked about, what relations can be said to hold between them, and so on. Maybe when I've got the overall shape I can try out various interpretations into my usual concepts.urban jeanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17765918850885411258noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-66995767828473039872013-09-19T07:49:37.732-07:002013-09-19T07:49:37.732-07:00@urban jean:
"I'm at a loss to see just ...@urban jean:<br /><br />"I'm at a loss to see just what role the metaphysical account plays."<br /><br />It tells us what an explanation looks like. It therefore also helps us understand/interpret the relevant physics so that the latter is explanatory rather than merely descriptive. It doesn't <i>replace</i> the physics, as you seem to be expecting it to do.<br /><br />(It also refutes the argument that modern science has somehow done away with formal and final causes and that certain arguments for theism have therefore been discredited. In that sense it also helps to preserve theism itself as an <i>overall</i> explanation—for why there's anything at all, rather than why there's this or that specific thing.)Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80930536161729976582013-09-19T06:39:21.585-07:002013-09-19T06:39:21.585-07:00@urban jean:
grodrigues has already hit the main ...@urban jean:<br /><br />grodrigues has already hit the main points, so I'll just address this:<br /><br />"But this analysis doesn't seem to 'fit' with the four-fold picture of causation in the sense that it's not in the terms contained in that picture---matter, form, substance, etc, so that can't be right either."<br /><br />Of course it fits with the four-fold account of causation; that was the whole point of my reply. The rubber is the material cause of the ball, the shape and microstructure and so forth are its formal cause, the maker of the ball is its efficient cause, and being a bouncy toy is its final cause. The ball is an artifact rather than a natural substance, but it clearly has both form and matter. What doesn't "fit" here?<br /><br />I'm also not seeing that your (a) and (b) are genuinely in conflict. What has Glenn said that you think I might disagree with?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40210941494334508442013-09-19T04:15:08.837-07:002013-09-19T04:15:08.837-07:00@urban jean:
Getting back to the fray, hopefully ...@urban jean:<br /><br />Getting back to the fray, hopefully to shed some light.<br /><br />"To answer the question Why is the ball bouncy? metaphysics 'hands off' as it were to physics."<br /><br />There are a couple of different ways to interpret your question, but the natural answer is "of course it does!" To answer "why the ball is bouncy?" is to ask why objects with a *specific* form (e.g. rubber ball) have certain properties, or why certain specific universals are co-instantiated in the same form -- and the answer can only be discerned by a combination of observation and reasoning. Let me go back to a question you made earlier.<br /><br />"My difficulty with this scheme is that I can't see how to explain that when the ball is bounced very hard against a wall its shape temporarily changes from spherical to near hemi-spherical. We have sphericity and bounciness locked up inside a box labelled 'formal cause' and no account of how the two interact when so cohabiting. Where, if you like, is the 'algebra of forms' which would give us an explanation of this?"<br /><br />It seems to me, once again, you are going about it the wrong way and asking the wrong questions. Let me start by the end: What does it mean for an "algebra of forms" to exist? The only way I can understand it is to say that forms *themselves* have a form in virtue of which they stand in relations that could be "encoded" in a would-be "algebra of forms". But forms are not substances; they are not composites of form and matter; they do not exist apart of the beings in which they inhere (except in the mind of God as the archetypes of creation). So what could this mean?<br /><br />Going back to your example of the ball. What does it mean to ask how sphericity and bounciness "cohabit" or "interact"? Each substance has only *one* substantial form (*) from which flow certain essential properties, and which can be the bearer of certain accidents, e.g. ball is potentially certain (range of) colors, actually red. But the relation between substantial form, properties and accidents is not one of "interaction" or even "cohabitation".<br /><br />The other implied questions seem to be questions of what actually happens in our universe, and thus are answered as pretty much all such questions are answered: some combination of observation and reasoning. The ball changes shape because of its "deformable" atomic structure under sufficient stress. Now, we can take this several ways: either the ball has gone out of existence and a hemi-ball came into existence, and in such case the same with the form (this option seems just wrong though, for one, because it seems to mess up identity conditions), or we did not have a ball to begin with but a "quasi-ball". Or possibly some other option. The example is merely illustrative and the exact details depend, as one would expect, on the exact details of what we are dealing with.<br /><br />By the way, in response to another comment ("First of all let me say that I have never considered matter, form, the four causes, etc, as hypotheticals to be used to explain things. I had seen them more as the basic elements of a certain 'style' of thought. Mr G's account of the four causes as definitions rather reinforces this."), allow me to note that form plays a seemingly dual role: definitional and explanational, and that the two are *intrinsically* related. What probably is confusing you is that definition is used in the sense of *real* definition, not in the (usual) sense of nominal definition.<br /><br />(*) This was a subject hotly debated in the Middle ages; I am taking Aquinas' stand that argued for the answer: each substance has only one substantial form.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80317628906479177412013-09-19T02:19:33.773-07:002013-09-19T02:19:33.773-07:00Hi Scott. I'm a bit confused. I can see two ...Hi Scott. I'm a bit confused. I can see two possibilities.<br /><br />(a) To answer the question <i>Why is the ball bouncy?</i> metaphysics 'hands off' as it were to physics. This leaves metaphysics as a kind of elaboration of physics, or a showing how it applies to everyday objects, or just a way of organising a story, as Glenn's journalism metaphor suggests. Call this the <i>superficial</i> view. I don't think you will agree with this. Alternatively,<br /><br />(b) what you offer above is a kind of analysis of the form <i>bounciness</i> or possibly of the matter <i>rubber</i>. Call this the <i>fundamental</i> view. But this analysis doesn't seem to 'fit' with the four-fold picture of causation in the sense that it's not in the terms contained in that picture---matter, form, substance, etc, so that can't be right either.<br /><br />I'm at a loss to see just what role the metaphysical account plays. Can you help?urban jeanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17765918850885411258noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-62947614825528542672013-09-18T09:33:29.178-07:002013-09-18T09:33:29.178-07:00And of course if you want to know more about those...And of course if you want to know more about those physical properties and their relationship to the microstructure of rubber and so forth, the thing to do is to look more deeply into the physics (starting perhaps with the link Glenn provided). When you do, you'll be exploring the ball's formal cause in more detail whether you use that phrase or not.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4739289635586906592013-09-18T09:04:46.677-07:002013-09-18T09:04:46.677-07:00@urban jean:
"Does the question Why is the b...@urban jean:<br /><br />"Does the question <i>Why is the ball bouncy?</i> fit into this scheme?"<br /><br />Of course, and quite easily. It's bouncy because it's made out of rubber, and so it has a certain microstructure that gives it suitable values of physical properties like deformation resistance and springback, given to it deliberately by someone who wanted it to serve as a toy.<br /><br />There. We've just identified the ball's material, formal, efficient, and final causes without ever calling them that.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28497419311953239342013-09-18T02:27:22.601-07:002013-09-18T02:27:22.601-07:00That's an intriguing reply, Glenn. The ball i...That's an intriguing reply, Glenn. <i>The ball is bouncy</i> looks to be an answer under question heading (b). Does the question <i>Why is the ball bouncy?</i> fit into this scheme?urban jeanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17765918850885411258noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35983936407592041752013-09-17T08:07:40.037-07:002013-09-17T08:07:40.037-07:00(Some errata: 1) the journalism questions s/b lett...(Some errata: 1) the journalism questions s/b lettered; 2) "the 'algebra' of forms" s/b "the so-called 'algebra' of forms"; and, 3) "loss of 'sphericity'" s/b "loss of full 'sphericity'".)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-73378498086920895992013-09-17T07:46:38.839-07:002013-09-17T07:46:38.839-07:00urban jean,
In the interest of conveying a genera...urban jean,<br /><br />In the interest of conveying a general idea (as opposed to, say, dumbing things down, or endeavoring to be 100% accurate and correct (though legitimate critiques of whatever stripe are welcomed from those already well-acquainted with the subject)):<br /><br /><b>1.</b> In journalism, there are six questions which fully and completely account for a story:<br /><br /><i>1)</i> Who?<br /><i>2)</i> What?<br /><i>3)</i> Where?<br /><i>4)</i> When?<br /><i>5)</i> Why?<br /><i>6)</i> How?<br /><br />When it is said that there six questions which <i>fully or completely account</i> for a story, what is meant is that any detail of the story (which has been or may be brought to light) comes under the purview of one or more of the six questions.<br /><br />These questions are <i>umbrella</i> questions, and all things having to do with the story are such as to fit under the umbrella questions.<br /><br /><b>2.</b> In Aristotelian metaphysics, there are four questions which fully and completely account for a (material or substantial) 'it':<br /><br /><i>a)</i> What is it made out of?<br /><i>b)</i> What is its, e.g., form, structure or pattern?<br /><i>c)</i> How did it come into being?<br /><i>d)</i> What is its end, goal or purpose?<br /><br />(Note that each of these four questions has a more technical version: <i>a)</i> What is its <i>material</i> cause? (That is, "What is it made out of?"); <i>b)</i> What is its <i>formal</i> cause? (That is, "What is its, e.g., form, structure or pattern?"); <i>c)</i> What is its <i>efficient</i> cause? (That is, "How did it come into being?"); and, <i>d)</i> What is its <i>final</i> cause? (That is, "What is its end, goal or purpose?"))<br /><br />When it is said that there four questions which <i>fully and completely account</i> for a (material or substantial) 'it', what is meant is that any detail of the 'it' (which has been or may be brought to light) comes under the purview of one or more of the four questions.<br /><br />These questions are <i>umbrella</i> questions, and all things having to do with the 'it' are such as to fit under the umbrella questions.<br /><br /><b>3.</b> To get some very general ideas regarding the 'algebra' of forms, see, e.g., <a href="http://www.acs.psu.edu/drussell/bats.html" rel="nofollow">Physics and Acoustics of Baseball and Softball Bats</a> (where the deformation of a baseball, i.e, its temporary and minor loss of 'sphericity', may be read about under the question, "What Happens when Ball Meets Bat?").Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3533193535081802392013-09-16T16:05:34.873-07:002013-09-16T16:05:34.873-07:00This is in response to Mr. Green's very helpfu...This is in response to Mr. Green's very helpful comments starting <a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2013/09/the-return-of-final-causality.html?showComment=1379204546503#c6326058215599706879" rel="nofollow">here</a>.<br />First of all let me say that I have never considered matter, form, the four causes, etc, as hypotheticals to be used to explain <i>things</i>. I had seen them more as the basic elements of a certain 'style' of <i>thought</i>. Mr G's account of the four causes as <i>definitions</i> rather reinforces this. An ordinary statement like 'the ball is spherical' becomes something like 'sphericity is part of the formal cause of the ball', paraphrasing Ed's example in <i>Aquinas</i>, p16. Likewise we get 'possibly, providing amusement for a child is a final cause of the ball', and, since the ball is also bouncy, 'bounciness is part of the formal cause of the ball'. Statements like this are supposedly 'explanatory' of the ball. Ed says 'the four causes are completely general, applying throughout the natural world and not just to human artifacts'. My difficulty with this scheme is that I can't see how to explain that when the ball is bounced very hard against a wall its shape temporarily changes from spherical to near hemi-spherical. We have sphericity and bounciness locked up inside a box labelled 'formal cause' and no account of how the two interact when so cohabiting. Where, if you like, is the 'algebra of forms' which would give us an explanation of this?urban jeanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17765918850885411258noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-1269829280244262442013-09-16T09:52:22.040-07:002013-09-16T09:52:22.040-07:00I kinda figured it was. And I know how tiresome an...I kinda figured it was. And I know how tiresome and irksome it can be having to frequently make pit stops in order to address nits; I had some time and energy to spare, so figured I'd pick it up and dust it off. :-)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5117860762144692212013-09-16T09:27:55.443-07:002013-09-16T09:27:55.443-07:00@Glenn:
"While not the most important thing ...@Glenn:<br /><br />"While not the most important thing re the present point, it might help make the present point more palatable to urban jean were it made known that a formal cause is not an abstraction."<br /><br />That's one of the nits I considered picking. In retrospect I think you're right that it's helpful to bring it out explicitly.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-60779401049828387002013-09-16T09:05:39.506-07:002013-09-16T09:05:39.506-07:00While not the most important thing re the present ...While not the most important thing re the present point, it might help make the present point more palatable to urban jean were it made known that a formal cause is not an abstraction. <br /><br />We may indeed consider it as if it were -- in which case it would exist only in the intellect. But how we consider it and what it is in itself are two different things. And what it is in itself is not a something separate from the relevant thing, but a something 'in' that relevant thing. <br /><br />Or so I surmise from the following found in Dr. Feser's <a href="http://www.amazon.com/The-Last-Superstition-Refutation-Atheism/dp/1587314525" rel="nofollow">TLS</a>:<br /><br />o The view that universals, numbers, and/or propositions exist objectively, apart from the human mind and distinct from any material or physical features of the world is called <i>realism</i>, and Plato's Theory of Forms is perhaps the most famous version of the view (though not the only one, as we will see). p 41<br /><br />o Like Plato, Aristotle is a realist in the sense we've been discussing. But he thinks Plato needs to be brought down to earth a bit. For Aristotle, universals or forms are real, and they are not reducible to anything either material or mental. Still, he thinks it is an error to regard them as objects existing in a "third realm" of their own. Rather, considered as they are in themselves they exist only "in" the things they are are forms of; and considered as abstractions from these things, they exist only in the intellect. p 50Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-73941850202738363412013-09-16T07:46:34.482-07:002013-09-16T07:46:34.482-07:00@urban jean:
"If formal causes are abstracti...@urban jean:<br /><br />"If formal causes are abstractions, and abstractions lie outside the causal nexus, in what sense can they have effects?"<br /><br />Well, I could pick nits about those <i>if</i>s, but for the present point what's most important is this. Had I been speaking more precisely, I'd have referred to (a) the logical consequences entailed by the proposed formal cause, and (b) the effects of the substance that had that proposed formal cause. In the present context, either will do for testing the hypothesis that the formal cause is present.<br /><br />"Incidentally, over here 'Jean' is a girl's name."<br /><br />Heh. Sorry about the "his," but I meant it in the gender-neutral sense. I had actually wondered which way you intended "jean" to be pronounced (and of course it might not have been your real name anyway).Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53263225702793162962013-09-16T07:32:43.375-07:002013-09-16T07:32:43.375-07:00Incidentally, over here 'Jean' is a girl&#...<i>Incidentally, over here 'Jean' is a girl's name.</i><br /><br />I suspected all along that you're not living in France.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33571521509695927102013-09-16T06:25:29.633-07:002013-09-16T06:25:29.633-07:00Thanks for the replies, guys. I can buy the disti...Thanks for the replies, guys. I can buy the distinction between an abstraction like a house design and its concrete representation as ink on paper. Likewise between equations as constraints on mathematical structures and their symbolic representation. I can't seem to be able to do without abstractions. What I'm a bit uncomfortable with, however, and this carries over into a general criticism of Aristotelian and Scholastic thinking, is the ease with which we slip into hypostatising language. Scott asks,<br /><br /><i>is it fair to say . . . that the purpose of the experiments and observations is to test whether or not a certain formal cause is present (by finding out whether its expected effects occur)?</i><br /><br />If formal causes are abstractions, and abstractions lie outside the causal nexus, in what sense can they have effects?<br /><br />This ties in with what Mr. G says in the later comment thread, which has given me much food for thought. I hope to respond to that later.<br /><br />Incidentally, over here 'Jean' is a girl's name.urban jeanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17765918850885411258noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-37319791938692150702013-09-15T11:06:37.044-07:002013-09-15T11:06:37.044-07:0059 frmousl@Mr. Green:
"Oops, I actually mean...59 frmousl@Mr. Green:<br /><br />"Oops, I actually meant 'formal causes' there..."<br /><br />Heh. Well, I still agree with both versions.<br /><br />I've never seen a proposed "Gettier counterexample" involving mistyping or using a word one didn't intend, but that's a pretty good one: <i>Scott had the justified true belief that Mr. Green was right</i>, but his belief was based on a mistake as to what Mr. Green intended to say—and what Mr. Green <i>appeared</i> to have intended to say <i>also</i> happened to be right.<br /><br />Anyway, good, I'm glad you think the discussion is on solid ground so far. Let's see what else urban jean has to say about it; it's possible that we've made some headway in addressing his question(s).Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15387223499807857252013-09-14T22:51:29.470-07:002013-09-14T22:51:29.470-07:00Urban Jean: I addressed you in a thread in a diffe...Urban Jean: I addressed you in a thread in a different thread that raised some related points — see my Sept. 14 posts under <a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2013/09/the-return-of-final-causality.html#c6326058215599706879" rel="nofollow">The Return of Final Causality</a>.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52442188142417350312013-09-14T22:44:18.566-07:002013-09-14T22:44:18.566-07:00Scott: So far I've been focusing mainly on for...Scott: <i>So far I've been focusing mainly on formal causes, but I don't think there's any way to cash out "behaving in accordance with these equations" without invoking final causes.</i><br /><br />Oops, I actually meant "formal causes" there... though of course final causes aren't far behind. If you have anything that is described as actual "behaviour" or "tendency" or "nature" or "action", etc., then — again resorting to my simplified cry of "it's the definition" — we just <i>are</i> talking about finality.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9711044520602395662013-09-14T22:39:16.780-07:002013-09-14T22:39:16.780-07:00Scott: the equation-as-expression has an explanato...Scott: <i>the equation-as-expression has an explanatory purpose that the equation-as-formal-cause does not, the latter being itself the underlying mathematical structure at issue and the former being our way of understanding and communicating it.</i><br /><br />Agreed.<br /><br /><i>In particular, do you think we're making progress toward understanding how the hypothetical-deductive method can be understood in terms of Aristotelian causation without invoking any new accounts of "explanation"?</i><br /><br />I think your comment about <i>modus tollens</i> was spot-on. In fact, I don't think there is anything new at all in science or the scientific method when it comes to accounts of explanation. "Try it and see if it works" is obvious to any human of normal intelligence. The scientific "revolution" is of course more a historical sound-bite (we have to chop up the facts into bite-sized pieces or it's too hard for us to digest and remember them!) than a literal event. In reality, of course, there was a long, slow progress over centuries in which science developed — or continued to develop, I should say. Some of the big influences had nothing to with science or philosophy! ... such as building a civilisation in which enough men had enough leisure to go around doing scientific experiments instead of growing food to put on the table or staving off barbarian hordes. And there is of course the Judeo-Christian mindset in which modern science flourished — with an early start among the Arabs (back when Aristotle was popular), and then in the West (also influenced by Aristotle). Roger Bacon was a contemporary of Thomas Aquinas, after all! And of course better understanding of how to apply mathematics to science (such as linking Cartesian co-ordinates to geometry) was vastly important in letting scientists work more effectively. So regardless of whether early modern scientists thought they were overturning Aristotelian fundamentals — and let's face it, lots of them understood Aristotle no better than many present-day scientists — the scientific method actually supports Aristotelian metaphysics. I think it's not too much of an oversimplification to say that the big deal about the scientific method was refining the methodology, i.e. the way of applying these well-known metaphysical principles in "assembly-line" fashion, by making an old thing more efficient rather than making a new thing.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-79940791244335287282013-09-14T18:06:28.779-07:002013-09-14T18:06:28.779-07:00@Mr. Green:
"[I]f math's involved, then ...@Mr. Green:<br /><br />"[I]f math's involved, then we've got final causality no matter how the details play out when we investigate them more closely."<br /><br />Agreed. So far I've been focusing mainly on formal causes, but I don't think there's any way to cash out "behaving in accordance with these equations" without invoking final causes.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58416325504316212712013-09-14T17:31:48.373-07:002013-09-14T17:31:48.373-07:00@Mr. Green:
"I'd say that the word '...@Mr. Green:<br /><br />"I'd say that the word 'equation' can refer to the abstract mathematical relationship, as well as to the <i>expression</i> thereof in symbols, etc."<br /><br />Yeah, I pretty much figured that was what you had in mind, and I'm happy to be in agreement with you. thanks for clarifying.<br /><br />My main purpose was just to bring out a point that such arguably loose or metaphorical usage tends to hide: that the equation-as-expression has an explanatory purpose that the equation-as-formal-cause does not, the latter being itself the underlying mathematical structure at issue and the former being our way of understanding and communicating it.<br /><br />What do you think of this general line of approach to urban jean's questions? In particular, do you think we're making progress toward understanding how the hypothetical-deductive method can be understood in terms of Aristotelian causation without invoking any new accounts of "explanation"?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.com