tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post6534442871869681199..comments2024-03-28T21:43:44.433-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Gelernter on computationalismEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger158125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-22289596911011687992014-03-29T14:38:21.902-07:002014-03-29T14:38:21.902-07:00In short, if there genuinely is such a thing as re...In short, if there genuinely is such a thing as <i>really having a color</i>, it seems to me that it should be something intrinsic to a colored object and not just a relational property that vanishes when the other <i>relatum</i> happens not to exist.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28031988436847675122014-03-29T14:34:47.634-07:002014-03-29T14:34:47.634-07:00@DavidM:
"Hmm... So would you say that to be...@DavidM:<br /><br />"Hmm... So would you say that to be colored just means to have the causal power to appear colored <i>to observers</i>?"<br /><br />No, I wouldn't say that it <i>just</i> means that.<br /><br />Let me unpack my statement a bit. I said this: <i>I think that if we deny that objects have the causal power to appear colored to observers even when there are no observers, then we're also denying that the objects are "really" colored.</i><br /><br />What I mean by this is not that being colored <i>just is</i> the power to appear colored to an observer. I mean that even in the absence of observers, an object has whatever inherent causal powers it has, and if these are such that it <i>would</i> appear colored to an observer if there were one, then some color is (at least) virtually present in those causal powers, even when no observers exist.<br /><br />Let's return for a moment to something Mr. Green said earlier. I take it as read that God knows all possible colors (they subsist in the Divine Intellect) and <i>could</i> make an object that "has" any of those colors. If He makes an object that "has" color X, then—<i>whatever</i> "having" a color really consists of, internally to the object—that object "has" color X even if there's no one to observe it. No matter what we mean by "having" a color, this object <i>really has</i> color X, and <i>therefore</i> has the power to appear to be color X to a hypothetical observer.<br /><br />I'm saying, then, that I think to deny that the object has any causal power to appear as color X to a hypothetical observer if no such observer exists is <i>also</i> to deny that it <i>really</i> "has" color X, whatever that turns out to mean.<br /><br />That's a bit clumsy but I hope it's clear enough to explain my point.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74691188299638319482014-03-29T13:06:55.354-07:002014-03-29T13:06:55.354-07:00@Scott:
"I think they have causal powers suf...@Scott:<br /><br />"I think they have causal powers sufficient to shoot unicorns if there were any, just as I think they have the causal power to shoot even if they're never in fact fired."<br /><br />It would be hard to deny either of those propositions.<br /><br />"Or to put it the other way around, I don't think the inherent causal powers of guns change every time a new species—or even an individual animal—comes into existence."<br /><br />Indeed.<br /><br />"If I don't have a dog, do guns lack the causal power to kill my dog and then suddenly acquire it when I get one?"<br /><br />Yes, they do. The (very specific) 'causal power to kill Scott's dog' is not a 'causal power' that is purely inherent to any gun. (It is a causal power that is extrinsically dependent on the existence of your dog.)<br /><br />"I'd tell him that there aren't any unicorns, but accept his word that if there were any, the gun in question could kill them with no change to its present causal powers."<br /><br />I also would accept as probable that if unicorns existed they could be killed by guns.<br /><br />"On the other hand, I also don't think unicorns exist virtually in guns just because guns have the power to shoot them if there are any; the gun just has the power to shoot, period."<br /><br />Agreed.<br /><br />"So that's arguably a disanalogy with the case of color. - As for color specifically, though, I think that if we deny that objects have the causal power to appear colored to observers even when there are no observers, then we're also denying that the objects are "really" colored."<br /><br />Hmm... So would you say that to be colored just means to have the causal power to appear colored <i>to observers</i>? IOW, colors have the causal power to appear colored <i>to things which have the power to see colors</i>? But in this case, <i>which things actually are colored</i> will be a matter of <i>whichever things the things with the power to see colors are actually able to see (as colors)</i>.DavidMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4202535783801005032014-03-29T08:36:37.136-07:002014-03-29T08:36:37.136-07:00I also don't see how a pre-modern, common-sens...I also don't see how a pre-modern, common-sense view of perception could escape (some version of) qualia anyway. Surely such a view would have to be able to accommodate such common-sensical statements as <i>The apple looks brown in this light, but it's really red.</i> (Of course that brings us back to the question of what it means to be "really" red, but that's another issue.)<br /><br />So in the end I don't see qualia as any sort of threat to the advantages Feser claims for a pre-modern account of perception. Those advantages, again, are primarily that what we perceive is the object itself and not just some internal representation of it, and correspondingly that the object itself is in some sense really (e.g.) colored (and in general mind-directed in at least some suitable causal sense).<br /><br />Whatever remains to be worked out in this account (and of course there's a lot), it really is a genuine alternative to the modern view and the problems associated with it, not the first step on a slippery slope back to it.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-60853295934821620632014-03-29T08:15:34.658-07:002014-03-29T08:15:34.658-07:00I don't think qualia pose any particular risk ...I don't think qualia pose any particular risk as long as we don't try to use them to argue for representationalism (or slide toward representationalism accidentally) by saying that the qualia themselves are the objects of our perception.<br /><br />When we see a red ball, the object of our perception is the ball itself, even if a red quale is one of the means <i>by which</i> we perceive it. As I said a while back, the apple really is red, and "red" is also (part of) the way the apple appears to us.<br /><br />I also don't see any reason why admitting qualia at all would commit us to their immateriality. On Feser's view, at least, if I understand him correctly, sensory qualia are entirely material in the A-T sense of that word.<br /><br />Incidentally, for more on Feser's view of the place of the mind in the natural world (though having more to do with intellect than with sensory perception), see <a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/03/fodor-and-aquinas-on-extended-mind.html" rel="nofollow">here</a>.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-89049841959362134112014-03-28T04:37:21.063-07:002014-03-28T04:37:21.063-07:00Hi David, Please don't think that I'm cla...Hi David, Please don't think that I'm claiming that the view you and Scott are developing is contrary to common sense. What I think I am claiming is that it cannot be the same view as the pre-modern picture from which Ed says that the modern diverges. For Ed claims that the pre-modern picture of matter, which he labels as common-sense, has the great advantage of escaping the slide towards dualism and immaterial qualia by virtue of its greater conceptual richness compared with the modern, and it's not clear to me how your view avoids this slide. To admit qualia is to step on the slope, I think. Ed has claimed this advantage in several posts, and I guess I am hoping that he or a commenter will explain how it comes about.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-43124734066447039192014-03-27T14:18:41.807-07:002014-03-27T14:18:41.807-07:00On the other hand, I also don't think unicorns...On the other hand, I also don't think unicorns exist virtually in guns just because guns have the power to shoot them if there are any; the gun just has the power to shoot, period. So that's arguably a disanalogy with the case of color.<br /><br />As for color specifically, though, I think that if we deny that objects have the causal power to appear colored to observers even when there are no observers, then we're also denying that the objects are "really" colored.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-62328618645081466312014-03-27T08:04:15.524-07:002014-03-27T08:04:15.524-07:00@David M:
"Do you think, then, that guns hav...@David M:<br /><br />"Do you think, then, that guns have the causal power to shoot unicorns or dinosaurs?"<br /><br />I think they have causal powers sufficient to shoot unicorns if there were any, just as I think they have the causal power to shoot even if they're never in fact fired.<br /><br />Or to put it the other way around, I don't think the inherent causal powers of guns change every time a new species—or even an individual animal—comes into existence. If I don't have a dog, do guns lack the causal power to kill my dog and then suddenly acquire it when I get one?<br /><br />"I'd tell him that until such time as unicorns exist, a gun can't possibly have the power to kill unicorns."<br /><br />I'd tell him that there aren't any unicorns, but accept his word that if there were any, the gun in question <i>could</i> kill them with no change to its present causal powers.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23043013351650254262014-03-27T05:55:21.121-07:002014-03-27T05:55:21.121-07:00@Scott: "a gun still has the causal power to ...@Scott: "a gun still has the causal power to kill even if everybody is already dead"<br /><br />Do you think, then, that guns have the causal power to shoot unicorns or dinosaurs? Say you walk in the gun store and the guy tells you, "Buy this one, it's special: with it you have the power to hunt unicorns." I'd tell him that until such time as unicorns exist, a gun can't possibly have the power to kill unicorns.<br /><br />@DB: There is nothing anti-common sense about recognizing the difference between sensible and sensation. This distinction is thoroughly Aristotelian.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14928828462917515272014-03-26T17:04:56.588-07:002014-03-26T17:04:56.588-07:00Gentlemen, Forgive me but it looks to me as if yo...Gentlemen, Forgive me but it looks to me as if you have conceded a great deal to the modern view. I read Ed's remark as saying that the traditional view was that 'secondary qualities like color, sound, odor, etc. as common sense understands them (that is to say, as we “feel” them in conscious awareness) really [are] out there in matter itself.' And this is explained as the form of the perceived thing informing the soul of the subject so that the self-same properties of the object are also in the subject. A London bus really is red and our senses are such as to bring us to direct awareness of this redness. But you now appear to be happy to contemplate and distinguish between actual qualia (ie, transient sensations) and virtual qualia (powers to produce the former). Surely you have lost the battle by conceding qualia? Shouldn't you rather reject talk of sensation altogether and talk only of knowledge of properties? For isn't that the common sense view: the bus really is red and the so-called 'sensation' is our awareness of it? Further, any theory that grants even the possibility of unseeable colours, unhearable sounds, odourless smells, textureless feels, etc, when these terms are understood in Ed's common-sense way, seems to have gone badly off the rails. Shouldn't these be metaphysical impossibilities?David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-34106496618653588832014-03-26T11:30:18.728-07:002014-03-26T11:30:18.728-07:00@David M:
"But supposing there never were an...@David M:<br /><br />"But supposing there never were any eyes? Then it would only have been a logical possibility that they might have produced color-qualia."<br /><br />I see your point but I think the causal powers in question are more firmly grounded than that. A rock that never <i>in fact</i> breaks a window still has a <i>causal power</i> to do so; a bit of thin glass is still fragile even if it's the only object in the universe; a gun still has the causal power to kill even if everybody is already dead. In each case the causal power seems to involve more than a hypothetical or conditional fact even if its actual exercise is only a logical possibility. I'm inclined to say likewise of the power to produce sensory <i>qualia</i>.<br /><br />At the very least I'd say that even in a universe with no eyes in it, there's a significant difference between an object that <i>would</i> look red if there were eyes and an object that <i>would</i> look blue (and for that matter an object that would have no color at all), and that this difference is grounded in the respective causal powers they already have. It would seem wrong, I think, to say that they simply have no powers to produce such <i>qualia</i> at all.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-89203902479721067822014-03-26T08:25:08.769-07:002014-03-26T08:25:08.769-07:00to clarify: "...by reference to (counterfactu...to clarify: "...by reference to (counterfactual possibilities inherent only within) the pure actuality of the creator (as opposed to the actual created order)."David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91703744352988504532014-03-26T08:21:56.514-07:002014-03-26T08:21:56.514-07:00@Scott:
"The objects that existed in the un...@Scott: <br /><br />"The objects that existed in the universe before there were any eyes to see them still had the causal power to produce color-qualia in the experiences of beings who did have eyes; we know that because, once there were eyes, they did so."<br /><br />Right. But supposing there never were any eyes? Then it would only have been a logical possibility that they might have produced color-qualia. But if we are to speak of the real powers of created things, then those powers must not reside wholly in counter-factual possibilities. We are only justified in speaking of real powers by reference to some actual exercise thereof. Act is (absolutely) prior to potency. Potencies have no being independently of act. And a <i>created</i> potency can't be grounded as 'real' (except by equivocation) by reference to the pure actuality <i>of the creator</i>.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74418005250898793862014-03-25T11:47:20.701-07:002014-03-25T11:47:20.701-07:00@David M:
"So actual qualia do not exist apa...@David M:<br /><br />"So actual qualia do not exist apart from actual acts of sensation."<br /><br />Right, <i>actual</i> qualia don't, but <i>virtual</i> qualia do, in the causal powers of the things that have the power to cause them (just as heat exists virtually in a match that has the power to cause fire even if no one ever in fact lights it).<br /><br />"You might say, 'there could have been more sensible qualities than there actually are,' but I don't think you should say that such qualities are 'real' (or 'really sensible') or exist any more than you would say that about unicorns."<br /><br />The objects that existed in the universe before there were any eyes to see them still had the causal power to produce color-<i>qualia</i> in the experiences of beings who did have eyes; we know that because, once there were eyes, they did so. Likewise, there could be other causal powers to produce other <i>qualia</i> in the experiences of beings who have other sensory organs, even if no such organs in fact exist or ever in fact even come into existence. For that matter, perhaps there's a specific color that no one has in fact ever seen or ever in fact will see, but there's an object somewhere that <i>would</i> appear that color to someone who looked at it.<br /><br />I would say in all of those cases that there are <i>qualia</i> that exist virtually in the objects capable of causing them (under the right conditions), while agreeing with you that they were not in fact <i>actualized</i>. In the latter sense, I concur, they would not be "real." I would also say, with you, that there could have been more sensible qualities than there <i>actually</i> are, but I'd add that some of them existed not "actually" but <i>virtually</i>.<br /><br />And please note that this is different from a Platonic they-subsist-in-the-Divine-Intellect approach. I think that's true as well, but that would still be the case even if nothing in the universe had any causal powers to produce color-<i>qualia</i> at all. I'm speaking here of a universe in which there <i>are</i> such causal powers even if (some of) the <i>qualia</i> are never in fact actualized. In that sense, those <i>qualia</i>, though virtual, are more real than unicorns.[*]<br /><br />It could also be that there are in the Divine Intellect colors for the production of which our universe does <i>not</i> include any causal powers. In that case I'd say that there could have been more sensible qualities than there actually are—and indeed even more than there virtually are.<br /><br />----<br /><br />[*] More real, that is, on the unstated assumption that the universe doesn't have any thus-far-unexercised causal power to produce unicorns!Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54388197417506766292014-03-25T11:01:59.291-07:002014-03-25T11:01:59.291-07:00that is: "...but I don't think you should...that is: "...but I don't think you should say that such <i>hypothetical</i> qualities are 'real' (or 'really sensible') or exist..."David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16428794978145958912014-03-25T10:59:55.312-07:002014-03-25T10:59:55.312-07:00@Scott:
"Well, I think it is, but I wasn'...@Scott:<br />"Well, I think it is, but I wasn't sure you did, in view of what looked like your identification of "real colors" with "colors that are actually distinguished by us.""<br /><br />Well I did specify 'real colors' <i>in relation to the concept of multiplicity</i>...<br /><br />"I certainly agree that colors, and sensory qualia generally, are best understood as the objects of certain sorts of sensory organs (possessed, by implication, by substances with sensitive souls). But I don't think I'd require the organs actually to exist, just to be in some way possible."<br /><br />My understanding is that 'qualia' refers to intrinsically mental phenomena, and as such are different from sensibles, i.e., the actual objects (things-sensed) of the senses. So actual qualia do not exist apart from actual acts of sensation.<br /><br />Regarding 'sensible qualities' which are <i>never</i> actually 'sensible' (since no organ will ever actually be able to sense them), that somehow smacks of contradiction to my mind. You might say, "there could have been more sensible qualities than there actually are," but I don't think you should say that such qualities are 'real' (or 'really sensible') or exist any more than you would say that about unicorns.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-1688297903077800192014-03-25T09:10:25.596-07:002014-03-25T09:10:25.596-07:00@Mr. Green:
"I'd think it just means tha...@Mr. Green:<br /><br />"I'd think it just means that there is such a quality, whether any person or creature actually can see it."<br /><br />That's my view as well, but I think both of us are thinking of sensory <i>qualia</i> rather than (like David M) of colors as enumerated in a conceptual scheme.<br /><br />I think I'd be a bit more ontologically profligate than David M in one respect, though. He writes: <i>I take it that 'colour' is properly defined as the proper object of 'visual' sensory organs. I don't think there is any absolute definition of 'colour' as such, independently of the standard perceptual capacities of some actual colour-sensing organs (which are part of some colour-sensing organism).</i><br /><br />I certainly agree that colors, and sensory <i>qualia</i> generally, are best understood as the objects of certain sorts of sensory organs (possessed, by implication, by substances with sensitive souls). But I don't think I'd require the organs actually to exist, just to be in some way possible.<br /><br />I'm comfortable, that is, with the possibility that there might[!] be <i>qualia</i> that no one will ever in fact have the organs to sense and yet that are virtually present in certain objects (even though we can never know it), so that the right sort of organ <i>would</i> see them if such an organ existed—in somewhat the same way that (in my view) a rock would still have the causal power to shatter glass even in a universe with no glass in it.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5675285198725755812014-03-25T08:56:52.059-07:002014-03-25T08:56:52.059-07:00@David M:
"Is this problem not answered by y...@David M:<br /><br />"Is this problem not answered by your initial proposal: it may be <i>virtually</i> real?"<br /><br />Well, <i>I</i> think it is, but I wasn't sure <i>you</i> did, in view of what looked like your identification of "real colors" with "colors that are actually distinguished by us."<br /><br />But your further explanation on that point settles my misgivings on that score. I think we're fine as long we distinguish—as you seem to be distinguishing—between, on the one hand, a color as a sensory <i>quale</i> (which <i>can</i> be in something "virtually") and, on the other, a color as identified as part of a spectrum or ordering scheme by a rational mind (which is a being of reason only). It's the latter you had in mind in saying that general color-blindness would mean fewer "real colors," yes?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-82813627194945042132014-03-25T07:48:10.133-07:002014-03-25T07:48:10.133-07:00Scott: "At the other extreme, though, I'm...Scott: "At the other extreme, though, I'm not sure I'm persuaded either. Suppose that at some moment in the history of the universe, no one was actually distinguishing some precise shade of red. Would that mean it was in no sense "real"? That somehow seems mistaken as well."<br /><br />Is this problem not answered by your initial proposal: it may be <i>virtually</i> real? In any case, it is also real in the actual colored thing, but my contention is that it is not identified as such, as a countable shade of color, in the actual colored thing. I.e., the <i>enumeration</i> of shades of color is a <i>res rationis</i>, and is not essential to the reality of the colored thing itself, or the sensing of it.<br /><br />Mr. Green: "...I extrapolate to the possibility of colours that no creature ever sees..."<br /><br />Well I take it that 'colour' is properly defined as the proper object of 'visual' sensory organs. I don't think there is any absolute definition of 'colour' as such, independently of the standard perceptual capacities of some actual colour-sensing organs (which are part of some colour-sensing organism).David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46310224457239640752014-03-24T20:53:38.567-07:002014-03-24T20:53:38.567-07:00David Brightly: But this is just to ignore the pro...David Brightly: <i>But this is just to ignore the problems Descartes etc found in pre-modern ideas. And subsequent investigations have hardly diminished these difficulties.</i><br /><br />I think it's more that the problems are not where they are commonly alleged to have been. It's not as though introducing problems about qualities and dualism actually ended up making any scientific or philosophical issues more tractable (other than in an eliminative sense).<br /><br /><i>Regarding 'real colours', it would seem that the powers in the objects remain constant while the powers in sentient creatures can change, and the checkerboard illusion suggests it's the latter that do the greater 'causal work'.</i><br /><br />The illusion seems to me to be a matter of interpretation (as Scott mentioned earlier). We can understand what we're seeing better by being able to compensate for variations in light and shadow, and it's interesting from a psychological or neurological standpoint as to the different stages in this process, but I don't think we should read much back into the metaphysical aspect of the colours themselves. <br /><br />DavidM: <i>I feel inclined to say yes, fewer 'real colours': that is, fewer colours that are actually distinguished by us, since in relation to the concept of multiplicity, I don't see what other sense the notion of 'real colours' could have.</i><br /><br />I'd think it just means that there is such a quality, whether any person or creature actually can see it. It doesn't seem strange to me to say that some animals can see colours that we cannot see — presumably animals are actually perceiving visually when they see colours that we can also see, so why would it be different when they (apparently) see things we cannot? And from there, I extrapolate to the possibility of colours that no creature ever sees (although one might argue that it would be pointless for God to create unseeable colours, but I don't think that's compelling).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-87202702653550814862014-03-24T20:49:48.133-07:002014-03-24T20:49:48.133-07:00Scott: I'm sure what Mr. Green has in mind is ...Scott: <i>I'm sure what Mr. Green has in mind is something more like this: computers can't think; therefore beings who are simulated by computers can't think; we can think; therefore we're not such beings.</i><br /><br />Yup.<br /><br />Of course, the way Bostrom phrases his conclusion that we almost certainly won't become 'posthumans who run ancestor-simulations, unless we are currently living in a simulation' still follows if it is already completely certain that we won't run such simulations because they are impossible.... Interestingly, you can run almost the same argument more soundly by supposing that "we" are real persons, but living in a simulated environment. In other words, even if you resort to accepting immaterial intellects but not God, there's still no way to argue that the world as we experience it was not designed. <br /><br /><i>We might expect the number of simulation levels to bottom out somewhere owing to physical limitations on computing, but if we might ourselves be in a simulation, how would we know those physical limitations applied at the top level?</i><br /><br />Exactly. Dennett made that mistake claiming that computers weren't (yet) capable of simulating the world we experience around us... which is a bit like Super Mario protesting that he couldn't possibly be a computer character because it's physically impossible to build an eight-bit video game out of bricks and frowny mushrooms!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-60018462176734626642014-03-24T13:18:10.353-07:002014-03-24T13:18:10.353-07:00@DavidM:
"I feel inclined to say yes, fewer ...@DavidM:<br /><br />"I feel inclined to say yes, fewer 'real colours': that is, fewer colours that are actually distinguished by us, since in relation to the concept of multiplicity, I don't see what other sense the notion of 'real colours' could have."<br /><br />Well, it could mean colors that <i>would</i> be distinguished by beings with the right sort of sensory apparatus given the real existence of objects with the causal powers to produce the relevant sorts of sensory experience in such beings. But in that extreme case those colors would exist only virtually, in the causal powers of the objects, and so we might not want to say they were "real."<br /><br />At the other extreme, though, I'm not sure I'm persuaded either. Suppose that at some moment in the history of the universe, no one was <i>actually</i> distinguishing some precise shade of red. Would that mean it was in no sense "real"? That somehow seems mistaken as well.<br /><br />I think part of the problem here is the term "real," which in this context seems deucedly hard to apply unequivocally. On the one hand I'm inclined to think that all "possible" colors (along with their necessary relations to one another) subsist in the Divine Intellect and are thus "real" in some (quasi-)Platonic sense; on the other, I'm inclined to think that if nothing in the physical universe could possibly give rise to an experience of a color, then the color is <i>not</i> "real" in some other, more Aristotelian sense. And there seems to be a lot of room in between.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28065779801928590372014-03-24T12:29:28.342-07:002014-03-24T12:29:28.342-07:00@David Brightly:
"Suppose everyone to be lik...@David Brightly:<br /><br />"Suppose everyone to be like me. Would that mean there were fewer real colours?"<br /><br />I feel inclined to say yes, fewer 'real colours': that is, fewer colours that are actually distinguished by us, since in relation to the concept of multiplicity, I don't see what other sense the notion of 'real colours' could have. (Colour is not primitively defined by reference to a specific spectrum of wavelengths/frequencies of EM radiation, but rather the 'colour spectrum' will refer to whatever range we can sense using our visual organs.) At the same time, it seems obvious enough that there is no such thing as <i>the actual number of 'real colours'</i> - obviously there will be some arbitrary conventionality involved in any such counting of the discrete kinds of a continuous spectrum of quality.<br /><br />As for Ed ignoring problems Descartes found, could you be more specific about what you are referring to?DavidMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-36471346087095504932014-03-22T17:20:01.435-07:002014-03-22T17:20:01.435-07:00To the extent that the early moderns swing to the ...To the extent that the early moderns swing to the opposite pole from their predecessors I'd have to part company with them too. The fragment of analysis we have done here points towards a shared contribution between object and subject.<br /><br />I would say that the modern account pushes all the bump of incomprehension into one salient place in the carpet. The pre-modern system spreads the bump out evenly so it can't be seen.David Brightlyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06757969974801621186noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72144660790621355162014-03-22T14:18:17.426-07:002014-03-22T14:18:17.426-07:00@David Brightly:
Thank you as well. It's a fa...@David Brightly:<br /><br />Thank you as well. It's a fascinating subject and one to which I haven't had occasion to give any sustained attention for some years.<br /><br />I must say that I think Ed is right to at least the following extent: Descartes and Locke landed us in some trouble when they effectively ascribed secondary qualities <i>only and exclusively</i> to sensing subjects and denied that they provided any real knowledge of external objects or were "in" those objects in any way (even "virtually"). I'd probably lay some of the blame at the feet of their concept of causation rather than just that of matter, but the former obviously affects the latter.<br /><br />I also don't think Ed is claiming that a return to a pre-modern account would simply <i>solve</i> every problem associated with sensation and qualia. The real point, I take it, is that the modern account renders the solution of such problems impossible in principle rather than merely difficult in practice.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.com