tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post6521060104168452556..comments2024-03-28T03:20:15.940-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Nagel and his critics, Part IEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger63125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-60270363801676973462012-10-26T21:32:45.190-07:002012-10-26T21:32:45.190-07:00@Anonymous (10-25 8:52pm)
"First of all, we p...@Anonymous (10-25 8:52pm)<br />"First of all, we posit the existence of a wave-function because things appear to behave as if there were a wave-function."<br /><br />If I wanted to hit my head against the brick wall of phenomenology, I could express doubts as to the existence of the moon, because I had never actually seen it (only the light bouncing off of it). By using a phrase like "things appear ...", you are giving a special place to light (as well you should). <br /><br />Yet light is a collection of massless bosons, and your experience with it is broad enough that you have first person experience of its unusual properties. This object, this wave function, actually struck you directly in the eye and you have seen it! It's even more real than the moon.<br /><br />Now of course, if what you mean by "wave function" is just the abstract mathematical construction then your point is legitimate. Must we really go down that path? When I say "wave functions are real things" I am not wearing my Platonism. I am simply stating that the Greek letter Psi in the Schrodinger equation refers to something in the real world. Whether the equation is a true statement or not, the thing which the equation is !about! is POKING YOU IN THE EYE RIGHT NOW!reighleynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33002851310339905492012-10-26T13:36:35.278-07:002012-10-26T13:36:35.278-07:00@ Adam
I am a philosophical nOOb but I believe Fe...@ Adam<br /><br />I am a philosophical nOOb but I believe Feser answers your question re: the immateriality of the intellect on pg. 153 ff in Aquinas.<br /><br />Here is the argument:<br /><br />1. "When the intellect grasps the form of a thing, it is necessarily one and the same form that exists in both the thing itself and in the intellect." So when you think about "Cats" "the form of "catness" that exists in our intellects when we think about cats is one and the same form that exists in actual cats. If this weren't true, we wouldn't be thinking about cats at all.<br /><br />2. Suppose the intellect is a material thing. Then, when you think about "Cats" the form of "catness" would exist in a material thing (your intellect). But as Feser puts it "for a form to exist in a material thing is just for that material thing to be the kind of thing the form is a form of." (yes, I find this sentence to be very confusing too). In other words "for the form of 'catness' to exist in a certain parcel of matter is just for that parcel of matter to be a cat."<br /><br />3. Step 2 leads to an absurdity, since if the intellect were really a material thing, then it follows that your brain would literally become a cat when you grasp the form of "catness." <br /><br />It took me a couple of reads for that argument to click, but it makes sense to me now, so long as one takes hylemorphism for granted.<br /><br />Feser also makes a second argument for the immateriality of the intellect in the next few pages.Jon Hizmihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17998977765496981127noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-89561189776564598192012-10-26T07:02:45.386-07:002012-10-26T07:02:45.386-07:00@Anonymous:
"A few comments: First of all, w...@Anonymous:<br /><br />"A few comments: First of all, we posit the existence of a wave-function because things appear to behave as if there were a wave-function. Nobody has ever observed a wavefunction, so to speak. My question is, what obligation do we have to treat the theoretical objects of science as if they actually exist?"<br /><br />Your question is a very good one.<br /><br />For the case of the wave function (something of an historical misnomer), If we take the Copenhagen interpretation seriously (cough cough), then the wave function is *not* observable and is indeed just a theoretical construct. Other interpretations will treat it differently.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6670569929314263262012-10-26T00:32:10.433-07:002012-10-26T00:32:10.433-07:00@reighley
"hard for me to imagine something...@reighley <br /><br />"hard for me to imagine something that could be more concrete than forces."<br /><br />I love the use of the word 'hard' there.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3757271356448554102012-10-25T20:52:31.948-07:002012-10-25T20:52:31.948-07:00I'm not sure that the concreteness of a "...I'm not sure that the concreteness of a "force" is misplaced at all. "Actually hard for me to imagine something that could be more concrete than forces.<br /><br />"wave function" has a pretty good claim on reality too. You must forgive the misleading terminology, as the hapless creatures would seem to be neither waves exactly or functions exactly, but things they very well might be."<br /><br />A few comments: First of all, we posit the existence of a wave-function because things appear to behave as if there were a wave-function. Nobody has ever observed a wavefunction, so to speak. My question is, what obligation do we have to treat the theoretical objects of science as if they actually exist? Given the contingency of science as a whole and scientific theories, and given the recurring problem of underdetermination, I would argue that it's best to act as if these are just useful constructs.<br /><br />An alternate method of argument is that, if you're arguing against those who believe in the kind of epistemological radicalism that those like the Churchlands subscribe to, you could point out we have no reason to believe that any of the objects we believe in right now will survive the march of scientific progress. Even electrons have been reduced.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-63248458821528228042012-10-25T05:48:28.632-07:002012-10-25T05:48:28.632-07:00Anonymous 10:19PM 10-24,
Agree with all you say. ...Anonymous 10:19PM 10-24,<br /><br />Agree with all you say. I hope none of the Aristotelian-Thomists here have been asserting that science qua science is unaffected by the metaphysical picture it is working with (implicitly or explicitly), or that mathematical concepts have real being (as opposed to mental being dependednt on the existence of a real intellect). <br /><br />-Paxmonk68https://www.blogger.com/profile/02718257273640738688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-45208513499829190142012-10-25T04:12:28.074-07:002012-10-25T04:12:28.074-07:00@Anonymous:
"Allow me to play the devil'...@Anonymous:<br /><br />"Allow me to play the devil's advocate. Why is it that there can be no infinite chain?"<br /><br />A slightly different way to formulate what rank sophist said: if per se ordered infinite chains existed you whould have what amounted to a vicious explanatory regress in your hands.<br /><br />For in such series, not only every link is instrumental, that is, you cannot omit it without interrupting the series, but the *explanation* for the causal operations of link n is explained link by n + 1. So, identifying numbers with the links in the chain, if we ask why did 0 happened (or exerted its causal power), the answer is because of 1. Why did 1 happened? Because of 2. And etc. and etc. We end up never explaining anything at all but just keep defering the explanation backwards and backwards.<br /><br />Yet another way to see the problem in such series is to invoke Kalam style type of arguments on the impossibility of traversing the infinite, suitably reformulated in terms of ontological priority instead ot temporal priority. But in end, it will not be much different that then previous considerations.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-90119419384775281432012-10-25T02:35:52.163-07:002012-10-25T02:35:52.163-07:00Well... Where is a thomist when you need one huh X...Well... Where is a thomist when you need one huh XD.<br /><br />U_U, you guys could show up like ... Today!Eduardonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80416598033406640342012-10-24T23:47:24.878-07:002012-10-24T23:47:24.878-07:00Eduardo,
I would have thought so, and I certainly ...Eduardo,<br />I would have thought so, and I certainly found some cursory references, but I struggled finding anything directly answering that question. <br />But yeah, generally, it was one of those things I'm thinking would have been answered at some point, and I just couldn't find it. Adamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04800567329386469456noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55698367623964045342012-10-24T23:29:24.616-07:002012-10-24T23:29:24.616-07:00Anonymous,
"I don't really care about t...Anonymous,<br /> <br />"I don't really care about the latter, but the former, besides contradicting the latter, is also a prime example of Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness."<br /><br />I'm not sure that the concreteness of a "force" is misplaced at all. Actually hard for me to imagine something that could be more concrete than forces.<br /><br />"wave function" has a pretty good claim on reality too. You must forgive the misleading terminology, as the hapless creatures would seem to be neither waves exactly or functions exactly, but things they very well might be.reighleynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61192600662603578662012-10-24T22:52:51.835-07:002012-10-24T22:52:51.835-07:00Adam, Dr Feser has spoken of that before, I am cer...Adam, Dr Feser has spoken of that before, I am certain that the search bar could come in handy.<br /><br />Without saying.... The thomist geeks around here.Eduardonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25243904241632984602012-10-24T22:19:00.202-07:002012-10-24T22:19:00.202-07:00Hey guys. Long time admirer, first time commenter,...Hey guys. Long time admirer, first time commenter, coming from a non-theistic but also non-naturalistic perspective.<br /><br />I'm a bit baffled by some of the odd claims being made. Considering that Gould and Eldredge cited Feyerabend and Kuhn in their first punctuated equilibrium paper, how does it make sense to say scientists don't care about philosophy? In fact, one could pull up dozens of examples of how philosophical arguments have shaped research programs. Look at Dreyfus's influence on the turn toward connectionism in AI. Sometimes research programs go awry, and careful conceptual analysis can often right that. Science is pragmatic (thank goodness!) but metaphysical assumptions do affect how it works.<br /><br />Besides, we need to insulate the world from some of the bad metaphysics produced by pop scientists. :P<br /><br />Other bizarre claims: People claiming that such objects as wavefunctions and forces have concrete reality and causal powers because of their mathematical nature, and then denying that mathematical objects have concrete reality. I don't really care about the latter, but the former, besides contradicting the latter, is also a prime example of Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27973735672154036072012-10-24T21:44:45.525-07:002012-10-24T21:44:45.525-07:00Dr. Feser,
Greatly appreciate the blog.
I have pe...Dr. Feser,<br />Greatly appreciate the blog. <br />I have perused it quite a bit today, mainly to gain as good of a grasp on A-T metaphysics as I could, particularly as they pertain to the philosophy of the mind (not to say I've tried to do it all in one day :) Just done a whole lot of it today) However, I have been unsuccessful in finding a response to one question in particular:<br />How do you define the intellect as immaterial, and thereby, subsistent after death?<br />I realize this somewhat defers to the basis dualist/monist point of debate - That is, the question of" how do you defend that there is more to the intellect than the physical brain?" I realize that, and I am relatively familiar with the arguments from both sides. I am no expert by any means, but I would at least say I have a comfortable knowledge of the topic. Anyway, I am mainly asking you, or someone on here familiar with A-T thought, because it does seem a crucial point so far as Christian theology is concerned. <br />I suppose what I mean comes from two angles <br />1 - Though this is very much the BASIC point of difference for atheists and theists, and therefore may be 'old hat,' I am simply curious as to whether or not there is a place where you deal with this question directly. After reading the 'immateriality of the intellect' so many times, I was hoping to find a post or further explanation for that particular point. I say that because, though I am not a monist, I am still inclined to believe one could argue that the brain generates the intellect, or that the intellect cannot function without the brain. Again, I am not saying I am ignorant to the points of difference on either side. I suppose I would simply say that, for the sake of argument, let's say I grant the plausibility of monism. Or more specifically, what if I grant the real possibility of A.I. being developed some day? Could not such a being represent what we call the intellect although they are not human? And again, I am not even convinced that would/could happen. What I'm concerned with is even HYPOTHETICALLY, if it could, what sort of philosophical implications would that have? Or maybe more importantly, what sort of implications would that have for Christian theology? Which leads to my second query <br />2 - I saw a few comments asking about the problems, from a Christian theologian's perspective, that could arise were something other than a human (animal, robot, what have you)to develop what appears to be an intellect. I know that when faced with this there seem to be two options <br />1 - Deny that such occurrences are possible<br />2 - Accept that they are possible, and by extension, that souls that seem equivalent to humans can be had by those who are not humans. <br />I am sorry if that summation sounds crass. I am not persuaded by those ideas. But I am saying that I at least feel compelled to grant them at least hypothetically. And that it seems, when granted, restraining the soul to the intellect produces layers of potential problems. But, ultimately, that is why I am asking. As of now I only have ambiguous hunches for which I'm more than willing to find some clarity.Adamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04800567329386469456noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25850250018606996272012-10-24T18:59:14.937-07:002012-10-24T18:59:14.937-07:00RS and Patrick H,
Thanks for pointing out the iss...RS and Patrick H,<br /><br />Thanks for pointing out the issues in Hugo's objections.Chrishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04865413665629644313noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55500970143443266582012-10-24T17:24:15.528-07:002012-10-24T17:24:15.528-07:00Thanks again Rank for clearing it up. Thanks again Rank for clearing it up. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-1801371706707611832012-10-24T17:09:54.982-07:002012-10-24T17:09:54.982-07:00Anonymous: Are you arguing that mathematical obje...Anonymous: <i>Are you arguing that mathematical objects are physical objects? No? Are they some form of energy? So if they're not matter, energy or chance, then they are.....? </i> <br /><br />Philosopher David Stove, 3 of his 40 "different ways in which thought can go irretrievably wrong": <br /><br /><i>15 Three is a real object all right: you are not thinking of nothing when you think of three.<br /><br />16 Three is a real material object.<br /><br />17 Three is a real spiritual object.</i> <br /><br />Anonymous: <i>Philosophy has approximately zero impact on the practice of science, which, as you noted, is pragmatic. </i> <br /><br />That's really funny, since 4 of the most influential men who were responsible for starting modern SCIENCE and MATH were men who had very strong views of, and published works that took very strong views of, philosophy. Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, Newton. Add in Einstein, who had such views but was perhaps somewhat more reserved in expressing them. These men didn't think that philosophy had zero impact on their own thinking. <br /><br />To think that "success in predicting" or "pragmatic results" matters is philosophical thought, not a scientific one.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28207062532398736522012-10-24T15:51:09.565-07:002012-10-24T15:51:09.565-07:00At this point the atheist might choose to claim th...<i>At this point the atheist might choose to claim that the world is accidentally ordered. How does one respond to that? Is there a way to demonstrate that the world is in fact essentially ordered?</i><br /><br />If all things were accidentally ordered, then it would follow that all effects could continue on independently of their causes. But this is manifestly false. To use an example from Prof. Feser's Aquinas:<br /><br />"In the case of the broken window, the key point in the causal series would be something like the pushing of the brick into the glass and the glass's giving way. These events are simultaneous; indeed, the brick's pushing into the glass and the glass's giving way are really just the <i>same</i> event considered under different descriptions. Or [...] we might think of a potter making a pot, where the potter's positioning his hand in just such-and-such a way and the pot taking on such-and-such shape are simultaneous, and, again, the same event described in two different ways."<br /><br />It is incoherent to suggest that the effects in these cases could continue independently of their causes. Further, as Prof. Feser states, causal links are not temporally but metaphysically ordered. Temporal events presuppose metaphysical events. So it does no good to say, as one opponent I debated in the past said, that there is a "split-second delay" in which a monitor, say, keeps getting power after the powerlines are downed. This does not show that the chain was really accidental all along, because the point here is logical and metaphysical, not an <i>a posteriori</i> consideration of temporality.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40877087320939587112012-10-24T13:52:40.087-07:002012-10-24T13:52:40.087-07:00It's also important to really hammer home that...It's also important to really hammer home that Aquinas thinks that saying "what is changing can change itself" lands one in an outright contradiction. Aquinas makes it clear in the First Way why he thinks that claiming that "what is changing can change itself" entails "something can both be and not be in the same respect at the same time" (last part very important!).<br /><br />If something is changing, it is in potency to that toward which it is changing, to that which the something is NOT yet. So insofar as it is in potency it is NOT yet a certain way. But to make or effect a change, something must be in act at the time and in the manner or respect in which it is functioning as an AGENT of that change ("agent" being derived from the same latin as "action", "actual" and "act"). <br /><br />So to Aquinas, something is changing insofar as it is NOT in a certain respect at a given time, but something can be effecting that change at that time only insofar as it IS at precisely the same time (but not in the same respect as that which is changing). Aquinas says something can be a changer and the changed in the same respect only at different times and (explicitly) in the First Way, can only be the changer and the changed at the same time in different respects. <br /><br />So if what is changing is making <i>itself</i> change, it must be both changer and changed, and therefore both BE and NOT BE in <i>the same respect at the same time</i>, and that's impossible. That's the contradiction.<br /><br />Hugo does not seem to get that at all. But Aquinas gives his reasoning right there in the First Way. He spends the first two thirds laying out why he thinks the above. He's not shy about it at all.PatrickHnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-38012964984717410952012-10-24T13:52:39.538-07:002012-10-24T13:52:39.538-07:00Thanks Rank,
At this point the atheist might cho...Thanks Rank, <br /><br />At this point the atheist might choose to claim that the world is accidentally ordered. How does one respond to that? Is there a way to demonstrate that the world is in fact essentially ordered? Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-64282536417027932672012-10-24T13:00:12.145-07:002012-10-24T13:00:12.145-07:00Allow me to play the devil's advocate. Why is ...<i>Allow me to play the devil's advocate. Why is it that there can be no infinite chain?</i><br /><br />I've just been reading Prof. Feser's Aquinas, so the answer is fresh in my mind. The reason that there cannot be an infinite chain is fairly simple. There are two kinds of causal chains: accidentally ordered and essentially ordered. Accidentally ordered is something like a man building a house. The effect can exist after the cause is done working. Essentially ordered is like the chain involved in displaying this message: the monitor takes its power from the tower, which takes its power from the wall, which takes its power from the wiring in my house, and so on. This process is simultaneous, and the loss of an earlier link in the chain (say, downed power lines) results in the impossibility of the later ones, given the principle of causality.<br /><br />Now, an essentially ordered series cannot be infinitely long. If it was, then it would be impossible to explain the later effects. If the power lines were not outside, then the power in my monitor could not be explained. Hence, if there was no first actuality, then no change at all could be explained. Whereas accidentally ordered series are self-contained in their explanations (this caused that, and that's the end of it), essentially ordered chains always defer to some further cause; and so to say that the chain is infinitely long is to state either A) that nothing changes at all or B) that the principle of causality is wrong. Neither of these is defensible--not even Hume pulled it off, as Prof. Feser explains in his book.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46731483060037826652012-10-24T12:41:48.577-07:002012-10-24T12:41:48.577-07:00Rank,
Allow me to play the devil's advocate. ...Rank,<br /><br />Allow me to play the devil's advocate. Why is it that there can be no infinite chain? Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42949862213711939912012-10-24T12:25:53.123-07:002012-10-24T12:25:53.123-07:00I was just over at a blog where the First Way is n...<i>I was just over at a blog where the First Way is nicely laid out for the lay person. Some atheists arrived there with their claws out, attacking in particular the meaning of change. Perhaps someone might take a look at the exchange. I'm not sure if the objections hold water.</i><br /><br />I'll bite. <br /><br />Hugo's objections attack a strawman of the first way. Here's his verison:<br /><br /><i>Premise 1) Some things are in state X<br />Premise 2) All things that are in state X are being Xed by something that is not in state X<br />Premise 3) The chain of things in state X cannot be infinitely long</i><br /><br />He finds obvious problems with this. For example:<br /><br /><i>The problem is that the argument claims that 'some' things are in state X and other are not, but without ever explaining exactly what it means to be in state X. It is an analogy that refers to nothing specific.</i><br /><br />Considering that the crappiness of the argument is his fault, it's understandable.<br /><br />The first way must always be understood in terms of act and potency, which in turn must be understood in terms of the paradox offered by Parmenides. Hugo does not see this and so strawmans the argument. Here's a more proper formulation:<br /><br />1. Some things change from being potential to being actual.<br />2. Nothing potential can actualize itself.<br />3. The chain of actualities cannot be infinitely long.<br />4. Therefore, there is a first actuality without any potentiality.<br /><br />When "actuality" and "potentiality" are properly defined, and understood in their historical context, Hugo's objection vanishes. He says further:<br /><br /><i>The point is that we cannot prove that the chain is infinitely long, so we are not justified in believing that it is; but we also cannot prove that it is not infinitely long, so we are not justified to believe that either.</i><br /><br />This begs the question regarding epistemology and ontology. <i>Why</i> is this the reason that we cannot infer from cause to effect? He never tells us. Also, under Aquinas's ontological and epistemological structure, if there was no first actuality, then nothing else could possibly be actual; and so nothing would change, which is absurd.<br /><br /><i>For the sake of discussion, even if we are to grant that there must be a 'non-X' at the source of all 'X', then we get to know absolutely nothing about this 'non-X'. The only thing we can say is that it is not in state 'X'.</i><br /><br />This fails to understand the entire argument. The point is not that "change" or "motion" is some state on its own, but that it <i>just is</i> the reduction of potency to act. Every change in fact breaks down into these two separate elements, which is how the argument gets its power.<br /><br /><i>The argument tries to trick the reader into accepting a premise that seems true, because 'change' has a common meaning in our everyday life, only to change the meaning of the words used in order to come up with a conclusion that does not follow from the premises.</i><br /><br />Here, he again misunderstands what "change" really means. If he can come up with an alternative to act and potency that <i>also</i> escapes Parmenides' paradox, then he can make this argument. But there is no such alternative.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-10455764775022291922012-10-24T11:19:51.035-07:002012-10-24T11:19:51.035-07:00Taking a reductionist approach to the metaphysical...Taking a reductionist approach to the metaphysical status of mathematics:<br /><br />- The structures and operations of mathematics are reducible to the structures and operations of the mind.<br /><br />- The structures and operations of the mind are reducible to the structures and operations of the brain.<br /><br />- The structures and operations of the brain are reducible to the structures and operations of biological macromolecules.<br /><br />- The structures and operations of biological macromolecules are reducible to the structures and operations of organic chemicals.<br /><br />- The structures and operations of organic chemicals are reducible to the structures and operations of atoms.<br /><br />- The structures and operations of atoms are reducible to the structures and operations of mathematics.<br /><br />- The structures and operations of mathematics are reducible to the structures and operations of the mind... <br /><br />Sean Robsvillenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-59289901424135152992012-10-24T07:55:30.140-07:002012-10-24T07:55:30.140-07:00To any charitable Thomist,
I was just over at a b...To any charitable Thomist,<br /><br />I was just over at a blog where the First Way is nicely laid out for the lay person. Some atheists arrived there with their claws out, attacking in particular the meaning of change. Perhaps someone might take a look at the exchange. I'm not sure if the objections hold water. <br /><br />Rocketphilosophyblogspot<br /><br />"The Argument from Change in Plain English" posted on Oct 15th.<br /><br />Thanx!!Chrishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04865413665629644313noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-48930804581828003552012-10-24T07:26:06.647-07:002012-10-24T07:26:06.647-07:00Someone tell that anon that the vast majority of m...Someone tell that anon that the vast majority of mathematicians are Platonists in regards to mathematics. Since he wants to play the populist type arguments. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com