tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post6476829183250105278..comments2024-03-19T00:20:18.049-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: William Lane Craig on divine simplicityEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger55125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35307104341694998162023-06-24T15:32:20.755-07:002023-06-24T15:32:20.755-07:00Both.Both.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-73339216891150650502021-05-26T03:26:04.856-07:002021-05-26T03:26:04.856-07:00I think the doctrine of divine simplicity is still...I think the doctrine of divine simplicity is still problematic, especially when considering God's Omniscience and Knowledge.<br />My objection is somewhat related to the freewill vs Omniscience argument.<br /><br />Firstly,to say that God if God knows what exactly we will do,there are only two options,either we have freewill and our actions are in the realm of possibility,or that which he knows necessarily happens,and we have no freewill.<br /><br />The first option seems plausible of course,but it's not.This option means one thing–that God doesn't know what exactly we will do till we do it,and remember if he knows exactly what we do,and we do otherwise,his knowledge fails.<br /><br />But in this case,our actions would appear to God as a roll of a die. He may know the outcomes of the die,but he doesn't know which outcome would appear.<br /><br />With that in mind,let's get back to God,God by definition has non of his properties contigent on anything.<br />..... But,...,if we are free,then God's knowledge of what we'd actually do depends on us.<br />And this is a logical contradiction,it's either we're not free or God depends on something (which goes against classical Theism)<br /><br />And remember,we can't seperate God's knowledge from God's being,given divine simplicity,by entailment it follows that God's being is dependent on us .<br />Even if we breakdown knowledge down into categories like Natural,Middle,Free Knowledge.<br />We still have a category of God's knowledge dependent on something.<br /><br />Conclusively,If God is a simple, Necessary Being, then he could not create free creatures.<br />If he could,the collorary of that his knowledge would be contigent on the actions of those creatures,a contradiction of him being Necessary.<br />Metro Manuelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06315032922019631268noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-8656848283613321302019-07-20T13:14:57.639-07:002019-07-20T13:14:57.639-07:00You mentioned that God is His Truth. Is God His T...You mentioned that God is His Truth. Is God His Truth or is He Truth itself.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10546820453154820603noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58527327136639643512019-07-15T15:26:59.553-07:002019-07-15T15:26:59.553-07:00@Blitch 66
Precisely. As Craig's comments at ...@Blitch 66<br /><br />Precisely. As Craig's comments at the recent symposium on simplicity indicate, he doesn't appear to clearly understand the underlying metaphysical arguments in favor of simplicity. He just doesn't like the conclusions it draws due to his opinion that they are discordant with the biblical record.<br /><br />His comment that the distinction between essence and existence is merely a mental construct shows that he hasn't fleshed out the implications of that position. He took umbrage at the suggestion that he didn't understand what he was critiquing and replied that he studied it thoroughly and simply disagrees with the conclusions A-T proponents draw.Billhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08001130202947985336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-48983800678694288592019-01-05T11:06:16.607-08:002019-01-05T11:06:16.607-08:00JC: "The point is that He must relate to this...JC: "The point is that He must relate to this choice as a contingent one less Creation be as necessary as God, metaphysically." And arguably it is, for a pan-en-theist like myself.Andy Smithhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02905082780004094805noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14638751393326764302017-05-17T01:14:42.649-07:002017-05-17T01:14:42.649-07:00Craig doesn't deny that God is simple. He deni...Craig doesn't deny that God is simple. He denies the doctrine of DS and the apologetic of Aquinas et al. I still can't figure out WHY he does, but that much has been made clear. "This is not to say that the doctrine of divine simplicity is wholly bereft of value. On the contrary, I have elsewhere defended the view that God's cognition is simple. But I do think that the full-blown doctrine in all its glory is philosophically and theologically unacceptable."<br /><br /><br />Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/divine-simplicity#ixzz4hK19fmLhAnonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12849056558866400722noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-59180789418287816312017-04-26T20:28:34.393-07:002017-04-26T20:28:34.393-07:00Well, to be fair, with someone like Craig getting ...Well, to be fair, with someone like Craig getting numerous questions coming in from laymen (Like myself), it would make sense why he probably didn't answer your question. He probably didn't even see it. <br /><br />As for your argument, what made you argue that a being with one or more parts requires a cause of it's existence? Just wondering.<br /> Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06025448218064471185noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-76200397363186020492017-02-19T21:23:30.591-08:002017-02-19T21:23:30.591-08:00Dr. Craig didn't reply when I argued against h...Dr. Craig didn't reply when I argued against his theistic personalism in a not I emailed him at his Q&A page at http://www.reasonablefaith.org. I'm a Thomistic classical theist like Dr. Feser. So I'm not criticizing classical theism. The point is that his theistic personalism contradicts his Anselmian belief that God is the greatest conceivable bring. Here's the argument.<br /><br />Suppose that Dr. Craig is right when he tells us that God is the greatest conceivable being. Then the doctrine of divine simplicity that God has no parts of any kind. Since Dr. Craig denies that doctrine, he implies that God has one or more parts. Anyone or anything with one or more parts needs a cause. If God has one or more parts, then God needs a cause. God does have one or more parts. So God needs a cause. Since any cause must be at least as great as its effect, and since God is an effect, His cause must be at least as great as He. Since, therefore, God’s cause is at least as great as He, God is not the greatest conceivable being.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14051707091618161781noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67263729090467311542016-07-21T20:05:53.100-07:002016-07-21T20:05:53.100-07:00I agree with JC. This is the main argument against...I agree with JC. This is the main argument against simplicity - the killer as it were. It makes Gods essence dependent on creation, basically. JC, what's your email address?Malcolmhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10382011787747422995noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91651138210628927202016-06-21T21:34:08.256-07:002016-06-21T21:34:08.256-07:00Doesn't creating the world affect God at least...Doesn't creating the world affect God at least in his self-understanding as coming to know (eternally) that He created the world. And if God's decision to create the world is truly contingent, that is not metaphysically necessary, then He could have not created the World but know that He could have. So, creating the World brings a potency (the knowledge of whether or not He Created) into Actuality thereby "changing" or "determining" something about God that is not necessarily "pre-determined" in his own epistemology. (Perhaps God always created from eternity...fine. The point is that He must relate to this choice as a contingent one less Creation be as necessary as God, metaphysically.) JChttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01963992811527633405noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26538318485344132902016-04-12T10:01:18.795-07:002016-04-12T10:01:18.795-07:00Dr. Feser got name dropped in William Lane Craig&#...Dr. Feser got name dropped in William Lane Craig's latest podcast. He goes after Thomism in general, and simplicity specifically, while responding to the label "theistic personalist." He sounds like he's reacting to a caricature of Thomistic Theology, but far be it from me to claim Dr. Craig doesn't understand it.<br /><br />I'd love to see a friendly reply to the podcast from you, Dr. Feser, but I'm sure there are a million things to blog about. I can dream though! :)Davidhttp://testing521.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26530587719756613262014-07-08T16:49:53.552-07:002014-07-08T16:49:53.552-07:00Doctor Feser, I've recently been studying the ...Doctor Feser, I've recently been studying the doctrine of divine simplicity, and I noticed that he writes that God is "whatever is predicated about him." Do you think Aquinas would count states as part of nature of God, since they can be predicated about him? For example, happiness seems to be a state rather than a trait, just as "good being in the Temple" seems to be a state rather than a trait. Do these still count as what God <i>is</i> Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-30398655236754496062013-08-28T15:28:14.058-07:002013-08-28T15:28:14.058-07:00Dr Craig, who denies Divine Simplicity, and holds ...Dr Craig, who denies Divine Simplicity, and holds a "B" theory of time, holds to the belief that when God created the universe he himself "entered" time and became a temporal being. This is the logical conclusion if one denies simplicity. <br /><br />He also must conclude that God is a "complex" being. If God is complex he must be composed (of matter). If temporal he must be in space (since you cannot have time without space)and if he's temporal composed of matter and in space he must be "running down" as the 2nd law of thermodynamics asserts. <br /><br />But Dr. Craig uses the argument from entropy in his very defense of his Kalam Cosmological argument which says that everything that had a beginning had a cause. The Universe had a definite beginning, therefore the Universe had a cause.<br /><br />Dr Norman Geisler gives the best arguments on Divine Simplicity and thoroughly dissects arguments against this most essential of Christian Doctrines in his book on Thomas Aquinas.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40832438990060496772013-04-13T20:07:18.940-07:002013-04-13T20:07:18.940-07:00It seems to me that in order for any sort of analo...<i>It seems to me that in order for any sort of analogy to work there has to be some univocal element to be found in the analogy, if not, analogies don’t work. Consider your consideration of the different uses of “see,” particularly the perceptual vs. intellectual “see.” Yes, there are indeed differences here, that is, they are not completely univocal, but even in being analogical they certainly have an element of being univocal. If they don’t, I have no idea how to even understand the analogy. You even admit this in the article. </i><br /><br />I think you are a bit mistaken here and I do not think Dr. Feser claims what you say he claim.<br /><br />In an analogy two things bear some similarities but are different, so they are not univocal nor equivocal.<br /><br />Like 'see'. To see with eyes is not the same as to 'see' a concept in your mind.<br /><br />there is <i>some</i> similarity, ie receiving some sort of understanding (eg about color and shape for eye-seeing and about some abstract concept for mind-seeing), but the are two different things all together.<br /><br />Seeing with the mind is not literally seeing (i.e. receiving photons on your retina and all the processes afterwards) but is a mind-only process that even a blind person can undertake.<br />Ismaelnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54495092051382619912013-04-13T19:55:57.229-07:002013-04-13T19:55:57.229-07:00(3) Also, I think there are good reasons to believ...<i>(3) Also, I think there are good reasons to believe that God bears some relations to the world and its inhabitants. Yes, these might be nothing more than Cambridge properties, but as I said above, these seem to entail that the thing in question stands in certain relations. I think the incarnation is a perfect example of God standing in a relation to the world. </i><br /><br />In the incarnation Jesus is God, yes... but he is also fully human.<br /><br />The human nature of Jesus was actualized by the purely actual God.<br /><br />Hence while God remains purely actual the human nature is a contingent one.<br /><br />So the relation between the Divine Jesus and the Human Jesus, altough they are ONE person, but with two nature, is also a Cambridge one.<br /><br />That is why Jesus must be fully human and not only divine...<br /><br /><br />Also I am not sure what you exactly mean by relation... I suppose you intende some kind of 'exchange' ...Ismaelnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-56898779271946598652013-04-13T19:43:42.043-07:002013-04-13T19:43:42.043-07:00(2) Your distinction between real properties and “...<i>(2) Your distinction between real properties and “Cambridge” properties is well taken. But even for a thing to have a Cambridge property the thing in question must stand in some relation to another thing. Your example is case in point. For Socrates to have the property of being shorter than Plato, he must stand in the shorter than relation to Plato. So, even if we want to say God only has Cambridge properties, we must be willing to claim that God stands in some relations. If not, this distinction is not helpful to your case, since to even understand Cambridge properties we must invoke relata and relations.</i><br /><br />Not sure what this mean.<br /><br />Suppose I write a best seller and then go live in a cabin in the mountain with no TV, radio, internet etc.<br /><br />Let's assume the best seller is a HUGE success... sells more than the Bible (the most sold book in the world) so to speak.<br /><br />Ok I live my simple life in the mountain and have no contact or relation to anyone.<br /><br />Yet my name would become extremely popular, people wpould cite me, make fan pages about me, love me, etc...<br /><br />In me, however, there would be no real change during the time, but i would aquire a 'Cambridge propertý' of being hugely famous. The change occurs in OTHERS not in us. The change in others might regard us, and be actualized by us (through out book), but we would not change.<br /><br />So I think you can see it that way.<br /><br />God changes us and we might acquire properties related to God (eg knowlegde about God) but God does not change.Ismaelnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-78788675753121961742013-04-13T19:33:11.359-07:002013-04-13T19:33:11.359-07:00@ Craig
"(4) Last, I am not sure that your u...@ Craig<br /><br /><i>"(4) Last, I am not sure that your unmoved mover argument you use in TLS calls for a purely actual being. God may not need to be actualized by anything, but must he be a purely actual being in the sense you claim. In order to end the series can we not postulate a being that is actual enough to bring about motion in the series. For to even create the Universe there would have to be some actualization of a potential in God, namely, the potential to create a Universe. "</i><br /><br /><br />You confuse here what potentiality is... it is NOT intended as 'he can do X if he wants to'.<br /><br />The relation between actual an potential is CHANGE.<br /><br />Potentiality means that some being could change into something else or acquire some property IF something <b> actual</b> acts on it'.<br /><br />For example: ice has the potentiality to be liquid water, but heat/energy must actualize such potentiality, i.e. changing the ice by melting it.<br /><br />God is PURE ACTUALITY, i.e. God does not change.<br /><br />He is the 'ultimate actualizer' you can say, he can bring change in things but does not need change since God is already 'all He can be', to put it in bery basic terms.Ismaelnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11040004498467405132010-10-15T10:10:30.090-07:002010-10-15T10:10:30.090-07:00Prof. Feser, can you please answer the above objec...Prof. Feser, can you please answer the above objections posted by others?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52273414203153076732010-01-26T15:25:30.310-08:002010-01-26T15:25:30.310-08:00The Church Fathers (and even non-Christian thinker...The Church Fathers (and even non-Christian thinkers before them) recognized simplicity as essential for guaranteeing God's identity as the transcendent creator. Denying simplicity is the philosophical and doctrinal equivalent of sawing classical (mono)theism off at the knees.<br /><br />It is too bad so many contemporary Christian philosophers are ok with whistling past the graveyard of incoherence in their philosophical theology. <br /><br />Thank youAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29823695123930764792009-11-11T15:19:34.786-08:002009-11-11T15:19:34.786-08:00P.S. As should have been clear from the article I...P.S. As should have been clear from the article I linked earlier, the question of predication in this context is not regarding *whether* there is a difference between form and act but how that difference is formulated. For that reason, I think that Dr. Feser's point stands. There may be variances on how one explains that properties are not read into God <i>a la</i> Eunomius, but the fact that one cannot do it is common to all of classical theism.CrimsonCatholichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16296428813377886542009-11-10T19:32:10.079-08:002009-11-10T19:32:10.079-08:00Even if the East didn’t pick the correct conceptua...<i>Even if the East didn’t pick the correct conceptual target, the East still does not adhere to the Augustinian concept. Further, if the East got the target wrong, Western writers certainly failed to communicate it adequately.</i><br /><br />John didn't say "The East has a different view." John didn't say "the West didn't communicate its own view accurately." What John said was "It is derived from the pagan Plotinos and his Neoplatonism via St Augustine and Aquinas" and "It is refuted by the 6th Ecumenical Council and your own Pope St. Agatho's letter to that council." Both statements are false. Arguing that Protestants like Prof. Craig might be driven away because they share the false interpretation does not strike me as a particularly compelling argument for abandoning it. Nor does the observation that the view originated in a Western theological background rather than an Eastern theological background or the ahistorical assertion that those backgrounds had to be identical.<br /><br />I don't trash the Eastern view. I just think it doesn't speak to every possible case or every metaphysical view, and dogmatizing it is effectively cutting off the ability of Eastern theology ever to speak meaningfully to the West at all. If John is so worried about us cutting off Protestants, then maybe he should concern himself as much with cutting off the entire West with even worse arguments.CrimsonCatholichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81056663920727905792009-11-10T13:35:46.994-08:002009-11-10T13:35:46.994-08:00Jonathan,
Like most anti-Eastern Catholics ( ;) )...Jonathan,<br /><br />Like most anti-Eastern Catholics ( ;) ) you picked up on what was not relevant. Even if the East didn’t pick the correct conceptual target, the East still does not adhere to the Augustinian concept. Further, if the East got the target wrong, Western writers certainly failed to communicate it adequately. As for Platonic predication, well, distinguishing act from form isn’t particularly Aristotelian, but Platonic.<br /><br />John got some of his facts wrong, but the overall thrust correct-the East does not adhere to the doctrine so that glossing “classical theism” as monolithi on this point is not accurate.Acolyte4236https://www.blogger.com/profile/06247421363309732839noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-73549873219228477682009-11-10T13:30:40.593-08:002009-11-10T13:30:40.593-08:00Dear Dr. Feser,
The claim that the doctrine is ab...Dear Dr. Feser,<br /><br />The claim that the doctrine is absolutely essential to the classical theistic tradition I think is overstated at best and probably false. As mentioned by others here, the Eastern Orthodox tradition doesn’t adhere to the Augustinian-Thomistic concept. John of Damascus as well as Maximus the Confessor advocate a metaphysical distinction between the divine essence and energies or activities, with the former being huper ousia or beyond existence. Hence God is not ad intra, pure actuality. “Classical Theism” is wider than the Catholic and Protestant traditions.<br /><br />Second, since analogical predication is a consequence of simplicity, it is hard to see how it can be employed to defend it in a non-question begging way. The same is true of divine timelessness in terms of simultaneity. <br /><br />As to an actual argument for the idea of a necessary creation, I have articulated something like what Craig seems to have in mind here.<br /><br />http://energeticprocession.wordpress.com/2005/01/17/perrys-logical-argument/<br /><br />All arguments in terms of theistic proofs may tend to the conclusion that the ultimate explanation of the world can only possibly lie in what is purely actual, but I fail to see how that implies that God is all and only actus purus.<br /><br />Geach’s Cambridge facts don’t seem to help here. First, it isn’t clear that all forms of efficient causality entail an extrinsic relation to their effects. If it does in this case, then Catholic claims to adhere to the patristic view of theosis will be undermined since it will preclude God being the formal cause of creatures. Moreover, if God’s actuality is necessary and his act of creation is the same as God’s actuality of existence, then whatever kind of property that is, it won’t be capable of the kind of extrinsic relation that Cambridge facts entail. On top of that, metaphysically speak, however we may have to think about the matter, it is difficult to see how the modality of God’s existence isn’t transitive to his act of creation, since they are the same act. With respect to the Incarnation, God is not extrinsically related to human potentcies, which seems to imply that God is not either simple or purely actual. Cambridge properties are therefore not adequate to defend against all objections to the Augustinian view of simplicity.<br /><br />As for the Thomistic arguments that if there were genuine pluralities in God then God would no longer be the first cause since these potencies would need either a further explanation or another cause to actualize them, this seems to wrongly assume that the divine persons are the divine essence. But if this is not so, then the persons can actualize their essential powers without entailing some further principle of unity or cause to actualize them. This implies that the persons, or more specifically the Father is the principle unity or the monarchia. The argument also turns on the assumption that God is being, but if God is not being, but beyond being, then the argument will not go through, since only things that be can be said to be composed, actual, etc.<br /><br />From the other direction, Protestants like Craig who reject the doctrine (or even those who don’t) face a special problem with relation to Sola Scriptura. I’d argue it is impossible to garner this doctrine from scriptural exegesis even with the most dramatic gymnastics. Yet the doctrine is contained in practically all of the major Protestant confessions and defended in all of the major Protestant theologians well into the last century.<br /><br />Furthermore, if Craig rejects it, this will also entail the rejection of the Filioque, since without the assumption that the economic processions are identical with those of the theologia by virtue of God’s simplicity, the inference from the economic to the theologia simply won’t follow.Acolyte4236https://www.blogger.com/profile/06247421363309732839noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40713173511980413892009-11-10T04:13:25.857-08:002009-11-10T04:13:25.857-08:00I was responding to the absurd notion put forth in...I was responding to the absurd notion put forth in the post that God is good. Presumably perfectly good as a perfect-being. Carly, since we are obviously talking about Judeo-Christian God given the context of the post, what exactly makes me an idiot when I bring up an obvious contrary example?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39053793641493716722009-11-09T17:54:34.313-08:002009-11-09T17:54:34.313-08:00"This stiff is priceless. Faser is one of tho..."This stiff is priceless. Faser is one of those people who amazes in his ability to deceive himself. Perhaps he's like to discuss sometime the part of the Old Testament where this perfect God of deluded philosophers punishes the Israelite King (Saul) for refusing to obey a command to exterminate another tribe."<br /><br />W.illiam<br />T.imothy<br />F.rank<br /><br /><br />Just found an idiot even greater than Ildiot. Wow. Simply. Wow.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com