tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post6425837580944735314..comments2024-03-29T08:19:26.011-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Nature versus artEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger85125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11890245644773662892016-12-16T08:16:09.633-08:002016-12-16T08:16:09.633-08:00I've heard it claimed that Aristotle doesn'...I've heard it claimed that Aristotle doesn't think "artifacts" are substances. This doesn't seem right. Are not "artifacts" substances, even if they are not produced naturally?<br /><br />cf. the <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/artifact/" rel="nofollow">"Artifact" <i>SEP</i> article</a> and <a href="http://www.sunypress.edu/p-3042-aristotle-on-artifacts.aspx" rel="nofollow">this book</a>.Geremiahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11812810552682098086noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4271513511123259192011-05-23T16:13:33.977-07:002011-05-23T16:13:33.977-07:00This is good stuff. My beef with ID is that for it...This is good stuff. My beef with ID is that for it to be true, God would have to be a bumbling idiot, incapable of creating a universe that can evolve on its own without his having to come in and fix the direction of things. That's no God I believe in.Troy Camplinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16515578686042143845noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33739085235685679712011-05-09T11:00:44.768-07:002011-05-09T11:00:44.768-07:00Lee,
I don't think I'm taking the Scotti...Lee, <br />I don't think I'm taking the Scottist position at all, since I would say that Scotus does not appreciate enough the unity of the individual whole. In my opinion, “bones and organs” are not merely “ORDERED to higher levels of form,” but in fact ARE the highest level of form, i.e., the substantial form of the whole, but only insofar, however, as it is received in determinate matter disposed to receive it. It is the latter qualification alone that causes them to be accidents.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11379075222885652082011-05-08T19:48:36.135-07:002011-05-08T19:48:36.135-07:00George, perhaps what you mean is that the soul is ...George, perhaps what you mean is that the soul is accidentally extended? In any case, your views as expressed on this thread are far closer to A-S metaphysics than A-T metaphysics. After all, Scotus thinks that bones and organs and whatnot all have forms that are all ordered in act-potency relationships to higher levels of form,, ultimately to the form of corporeity, the substantial form of the body (which in turn is in potency to the intellective soul).Lee Faberhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00476833516234522602noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-38761051094813332582011-05-07T12:52:40.617-07:002011-05-07T12:52:40.617-07:00It is certainly true that substances are only acci...<i>It is certainly true that substances are only accidentally divided according to extension and not per se; but that's merely a trivial result of the fact that quantity is an accident of substance. Obviously substances are only divisible quantitatively because they have the accident of quantity and not because they are substances; it doesn't follow from this that quantity rather than substance is divisible in these quantitative divisions.</i><br /><br />I’m having a hard time understanding this argument. You seem to be denying that substance is divisible per se, which I also deny. Then you seem to affirm that substance is divisible insofar as it has quantity, which I also affirm. If this is the case, then we are in agreement, and there’s nothing left to add. But then you go on to accuse me of denying that substance is divisible -- but in fact I completely agree with what you just said: that substance is indivisible <i>per se</i> and divisible <i>per accidens</i>. Where’s the conflict? Moreover, why do you consider these things to be trivial? <br /><br /><br /><i>Your mistake seems to consist in thinking that integral parts of a substance are simply divisions of extension itself. But this is certainly not true; to take just the obvious example, rational soul and body are integral parts of a human being, but they are not parts through a division according to extension.</i> <br /><br />Now you’re rolling out the heavy artillery, the dreaded “rational soul.” Surely I’m not going to try to argue that the rational soul depends on extension and is, therefore, accidental to the human subject. Am I?<br /><br />Why the hell not?<br /><br />Yes, I say that insofar as the soul is the form of the body determined by extension, it depends upon this extension and is, therefore, an accident. The apparent difficulty, of course, is that if the soul is accidental with respect to the substance, and substance is being in the truest and most unqualified sense, then that would seem to mean that something in the person other than the soul has a higher mode of being than the soul itself. This would be absurd. Of course, the solution is that the soul insofar as it is the form of the extended body is the immediate consequence of the soul insofar as it is that which actualizes primary matter, i.e., substantial form. Therefore, I see no problem with considering the soul, in a certain way, as an integral part, depending on extension and accidental to substance.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75748517641213121902011-05-07T12:51:09.400-07:002011-05-07T12:51:09.400-07:00This is certainly not consistent with much of Aris...<i>This is certainly not consistent with much of Aristotle's, and thus much of Aquinas's, argumentation on the subject of substance and accident; your claim would mean that the many arguments about the snubness of noses are all simply irrelevant to the point.</i> <br /><br />First of all, Brandon, it’s good to see that there’s somebody still reading The Commentaries these days.<br /><br />Yes, Aristotle and Aquinas refer to the nose as substance, or subject, with respect to the accident of “snubness.” As I said above, the term “substance” can be used in several senses and be applied to certain things that are not strictly speaking substance. In this example, “nose” is fittingly called substantial, for it is immediately caused by substance, whereas “snubness” is the result of accidents, to wit, the genetic make-up of the person. Moreover, “snubness” depends on “nose” as accident depends on substance. So Thomas and Aristotle spoke well. <br /><br /><i>The integral parts of the substance are simply not the same as the accidents by which they are known, for precisely the same reason the substance is not the same as the accidents by which it is known.</i> <br /><br />True, substances are known by their accidents; but when you say that integral parts are also known indirectly through their accidents, I am guessing that you would like to argue that integral parts are known by their sensible objects, which are accidental to the parts themselves. If this is your drift, then I would say that you are cutting the bologna a little too thin. That which we know by sensible objects we can say we know directly, and must be distinguished from those things we can only know indirectly because they have no sensible objects.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81180492897818656892011-05-07T08:55:06.291-07:002011-05-07T08:55:06.291-07:00"If natural objects are 'artifacts,' ..."If natural objects are 'artifacts,' then they have no immanent final causality or teleology."<br /><br />Feser has gone through many paragraphs in preparation for this assertion yet he has still not laid the foundation to make much sense of it. The assertion seems to be based on the semantic game Feser plays with the word "artifact." That seems to boil down to yet another semantic assertion: Whatever God makes, that thing cannot ever, ever, not ever be labeled a mere "artifact." Attaching the "Made In Heaven" label to artifacts is apparently something no self-respecting god would permit. But are these non-artifacts made off-shore? Of course not. Feser won't dispute acts. He will not dispute the designer or the blueprints. Feser prefers managing labels, that's all. That's the depth of this particular dispute. Pure semantics. Pure image. It's not hard to see why Bacon had no patience with the Scholastics. It's not hard to see why modern philosophy rejected such trifling.Don Jindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05550378223563435764noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71224100110553532552011-05-07T08:30:33.593-07:002011-05-07T08:30:33.593-07:00Here's how I explain it. Before the consecrati...<i>Here's how I explain it. Before the consecration, the bread and wine reflect light, enabling us to see them. After the consecration, the bread and wine are gone, so God reflects the light in their stead. God does what the bread and wine would normally do. The result is that all the appearances remain.</i><br /><br /><br />VJ,<br /><br />Very ingenious. <br /><br />The problem is that not only are all the parts of the bread still perceptible to sight, they are also perceptible to the other senses as well. The bread still smells like bread, feels like bread, and tastes like bread. Moreover, it will still behave like bread under scientific observation. It seems to me that if you were to try to explain all these facts, you would inevitably have to adopt some form of Descartes’ ‘hallucination” theory. <br /><br />However, the real weakness in your thesis that integral parts are not accidents is not theological, but rather metaphysical. Metaphysically speaking they simply must be accidents, because they are ontologically posterior to extension, which is an accident. Now I repeat, they are not accidents by reason of the cause of their form, which is substance itself, but by reason of the matter in which their form is received, which is matter determined by quantity and other properties. Remember, the definition of substance is the composite of form and <i>primary</i> matter. As soon as you’re talking about a composite of form and <i>non-primary</i> matter, you’re not talking about substance strictly speaking.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71858237381784452012011-05-06T19:12:02.688-07:002011-05-06T19:12:02.688-07:00It is in this sense that integral parts are exclud...<i>It is in this sense that integral parts are excluded per se from substance.</i><br /><br />This is certainly not consistent with much of Aristotle's, and thus much of Aquinas's, argumentation on the subject of substance and accident; your claim would mean that the many arguments about the snubness of noses are all simply irrelevant to the point. The integral parts of the substance are simply not the same as the accidents by which they are known, for precisely the same reason the substance is not the same as the accidents by which it is known. It is certainly true that substances are only accidentally divided according to extension and not per se; but that's merely a trivial result of the fact that quantity is an accident of substance. Obviously substances are only divisible quantitatively because they have the accident of quantity and not because they are substances; it doesn't follow from this that quantity <i>rather than</i> substance is divisible in these quantitative divisions.<br /><br />Your mistake seems to consist in thinking that integral parts of a substance are simply divisions of extension itself. But this is certainly not true; to take just the obvious example, rational soul and body are integral parts of a human being, but they are not parts through a division according to extension. An integral part is merely that which makes for the completeness of the whole, such that the whole is not found in each part (as with subjective parts) and such that the whole is not present in each part (as with potential parts), but instead in all the parts taken together. (Likewise, division of extension does not automatically make for integral parts, for the simple reason that all parts are parts of wholes, and it depends simply on the wholes themselves.) It's the <i>things</i> that have integral parts, and integral parts need not even be extended. It's as if one insisted that really substances are located nowhere because only accidents have location.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-10591113304198418392011-05-06T14:49:41.331-07:002011-05-06T14:49:41.331-07:00George R.
Thank you for your post. I am indeed su...George R.<br /><br />Thank you for your post. I am indeed suggesting that after the consecration the extension of the bread remains, but the parts do not. Integral parts are indeed perceptible, as you correctly point out, but that is because of their accidental properties - namely, their tendency to reflect light - and not by virtue of their substance per se. Wholes are perceptible for the same reason. You argue that if the integral parts were absent, their absence would surely be noticed, and you ask how mere extension can make a thing visible to the senses. I agree that extension alone cannot.<br /><br />Here's how I explain it. Before the consecration, the bread and wine reflect light, enabling us to see them. After the consecration, the bread and wine are gone, so God reflects the light in their stead. God does what the bread and wine would normally do. The result is that all the appearances remain.<br /><br />This explanation is different from Descartes', in that Descartes thought God causes us to perceive the shape, color etc. of bread and wine, effectively by causing us to hallucinate. In my account, nobody is hallucinating; God is just continuing to do the things that bread and wine would normally do. After all, SOMEONE or SOMETHING must still be reflecting light, after the consecration. And if it's not bread or wine, it must be God.Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81202348872160473802011-05-05T13:34:03.520-07:002011-05-05T13:34:03.520-07:00VJ,
You seem to be arguing (although I may be wron...VJ,<br />You seem to be arguing (although I may be wrong) that after consecration the extension of the bread remains, but the integral parts of the bread do not. This thesis is highly problematical, to say the least. It seems first of all to imply that integral parts are not perceptible to the senses; for all the perceptible aspects of the bread obviously remain unchanged after consecration. So if integral parts are perceptible, as I think they surely must be, their absence would be noticed. Secondly, how can you explain how it is that bare extension would look just like bread, or like anything for that matter? Clearly, if integral parts are substance, I see no reason to believe that the substance doesn't remain.<br /><br /><i>The thesis does not show that substances have no parts.</i><br /><br />I never said that substances did not have parts. In fact natural substances MUST have parts. My argument is that they are not THEMSELVES parts. Just think of them as non-part part-possessors.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-37646349668054092512011-05-05T09:22:39.871-07:002011-05-05T09:22:39.871-07:00By the way, Thomistic Thesis #10 reads:
"Alt...By the way, Thomistic Thesis #10 reads:<br /><br />"Although extension in quantitative parts follows upon a corporeal nature, nevertheless it is not the same for a body to be a substance and for it to be quantified. For <i>of itself</i> substance is indivisible, not indeed as a point is indivisible, but as that which falls outside the order of dimensions is indivisible. But quantity, which gives the substance extension, really differs from the substance and is truly an accident" (italics mine).<br /><br />The thesis does not show that substances have no parts. Rather, what it shows is that they only have parts for an accidental reason: they are quantified and hence extended.Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86100154148360552172011-05-05T09:15:51.787-07:002011-05-05T09:15:51.787-07:00George R.
If integral parts are accidents which i...George R.<br /><br />If integral parts are accidents which inhere in the quantitative accident of extension, and if the accidents of bread and wine remain after the consecration, then you are claiming that the integral parts of bread and wine (i.e. pieces of bread and drops of wine) remain after the consecration. I don't think that can be right. It surely makes no sense to say that after the consecration, bread is no longer present but pieces of bread are still there; or that wine is absent but that drops of wine are still present.<br /><br />Parts are by definition things you can put together to make a whole. If all the parts of bread remain after the consecration, then so does the bread.<br /><br />I agree with your point that parts presuppose the accident of extension. However, it does not follow from this that if the accident of extension is still present, the parts are still present. Rather, what follows is that if bread and wine had no extension, they would have no parts.Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19297699508616223592011-05-05T07:58:57.483-07:002011-05-05T07:58:57.483-07:00I think I can see what you're getting at. Exte...<i>I think I can see what you're getting at. Extension is indeed an accident, but the parts of a body are parts of a substance. Thus a part is not an accident, but its extension is.</i><br /><br />VJ,<br />The problem is that extension is a precondition for there to be any integral part at all. Therefore, an integral part cannot even be conceived of prior to extension. <br /><br />Let’s take as an analogy a seal and the impression it makes in wax. Now the form of the seal, which we will compare to the substance, in no way depends on the wax, which we will compare to extension. However, the impression in the wax (the integral part) made by the seal depends completely on the wax for its being, and cannot even be conceived of without it. In a similar way do integral parts depend on extension. Therefore, since that which depends on an accident is an accident, integral parts must be accidents.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71804799749296865632011-05-05T05:59:52.549-07:002011-05-05T05:59:52.549-07:00It is in fact obviously false. Integral parts of s...<i>It is in fact obviously false. Integral parts of substances are substances, albeit in a secondary way; that is, they are the substances themselves, incompletely considered.</i> <br /><br />Brandon,<br />Certainly the term “substance” can be used in different senses and be applied to different things. But I’m talking about substance in the primary and unqualified sense, that which is called “first substance” by Aquinas and Aristotle, that which occupies Aristotle’s first category of being. It is in this sense that integral parts are excluded per se from substance. <br /><br />Now I believe that I have demonstrated this to be the true position. I quote again from Thesis #10: “A substance is by definition indivisible.” But it is evident that integral parts, even the smallest, are divisible. Therefore, integral parts are not substance. The logic is obviously sound. So if you reject the conclusion, you must either deny the major or the minor premise. Which is it?George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-64865977653032397942011-05-04T19:18:19.088-07:002011-05-04T19:18:19.088-07:00Small interruption, pardon me: Crude and Bilbo, I ...Small interruption, pardon me: Crude and Bilbo, I have made a few replies to the thread about natural selection and finality.Codgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-84550327682944837512011-05-04T16:54:47.356-07:002011-05-04T16:54:47.356-07:00Mr Green: "Is it more fruitful to find out wh...Mr Green: <i>"Is it more fruitful to find out what powers the ingredients have (regardless of whether it's the power to form a living substance or a fancy machine)? That, as you point out, we can discover, by trying to activate their potential and seeing what happens."</i><br /><br />Yes, exactly. It would tell us whether these elements have <i>active</i> potential or <i>passive</i> potential for life - with the latter (according to Aquinas at least) only able to be actuated by God.Daniel Smithhttp://pulse.yahoo.com/_UXEGANXFFXZBLJT5ZVUGPNWJOA/blognoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44310962090094963862011-05-04T16:11:51.576-07:002011-05-04T16:11:51.576-07:00Also, back to the robocow, if there are no empiric...Also, back to the robocow, if there are no empirical differences between the living cow and the robocow, then what exactly is meant by "substantial form"? Would the robocow have sentience? Would a robohuman have consciousness?Bilbohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06231440026059820600noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-78881942125907568572011-05-04T16:08:32.474-07:002011-05-04T16:08:32.474-07:00Mr. Green: "Once God has set up those nature...Mr. Green: "<i>Once God has set up those natures, the things can indeed make living things out of themselves — that is, God does not need to intervene directly but can let objects act in their ordinary natural way. (In Thomistic terms, God is the primary cause, but creatures would be the secondary causes.) Or at least, things could be that way — obviously God could instead have chosen not to create a world with such powers, meaning that it would be necessary for Him to intervene miraculously. But Aquinas says God could do it either way.</i>"<br /><br />Then I would say that the empirical evidence suggests that God has chosen the second alternative for our world -- there's no evidence that the physical elements of life have the ability to come together and form a living organism without help from an external agent. If it's true that Aquinas could accept this, then shouldn't Prof. Feser? <br /><br />Mr. Green, I'm curious what you think of my final question: <br /><br />"<i>Would it help if we said that the final cause of the pre-existing material is to be the material that is made into a living thing? And this would distinguish it from a liana vine, whose final cause is not to be a hammock?</i>"<br /><br />But speaking of liana vines, suppose it were possible to breed a species of liana vine that as it grows, shapes itself into a hammock. Would the final cause of this new breed be a hammock? <br /><br />Also, if there is a block of marble that has the form of David in it, and Michelangelo's function was merely to reveal that form, then did that block of marble have the final cause of being the stature of David?Bilbohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06231440026059820600noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-45560464335454455812011-05-04T14:18:17.109-07:002011-05-04T14:18:17.109-07:00George R.
I think I can see what you're getti...George R.<br /><br />I think I can see what you're getting at. Extension is indeed an accident, but the parts of a body are parts of a substance. Thus a part is not an accident, but its extension is.<br /><br />In the Eucharist, the extension of the bread and wine remain, but the bread and wine do not. Also, the parts of the bread and wine are no longer present, as parts belong to a substance. What is a "part" of bread? It's a piece of bread. What is a "part" of wine? It's a drop of wine. So after the consecration, there are no longer any pieces of bread or drops of wine.<br /><br />Hope that helps.Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-32485646457662938472011-05-04T08:27:59.170-07:002011-05-04T08:27:59.170-07:00First of all, I’m glad to see you acknowledge that...<i>First of all, I’m glad to see you acknowledge that integral parts of natural things are in fact accidents, which is, of course, true. </i><br /><br />It is in fact obviously false. Integral parts of substances are substances, albeit in a secondary way; that is, they are the substances themselves, incompletely considered. Aquinas is very explicit about this in a number of places (e.g., In Meta. 898 and 1263, for just two of many examples). Pretending that the integral parts of substances are accidents turns substances into Lockean unknown-somethings, not genuine Aristotelian subjects, and thus is an early modern aberration.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-2309734966959160082011-05-04T07:01:02.185-07:002011-05-04T07:01:02.185-07:00Ed writes:
“You are equivocating on the word ‘acci...Ed writes:<br />“You are equivocating on the word ‘accident.’" <br /><br />No I’m not. Allow me to explain.<br /><br />First of all, I’m glad to see you acknowledge that integral parts of natural things are in fact accidents, which is, of course, true. You are also correct when you say they are what are known as “proper” accidents, for they immediately follow from substance of the thing. However, (and this is a crucial point, as I will show later), they are not themselves the substance of the thing, but are related to the latter as effects are related to their proper cause. I believe to this point we are in no disagreement. <br /> <br />Now let’s turn to artifacts. Artifacts are accidental forms imposed on pre-existing matter, as you say in your article. They are also, as you argue, in no way proper to the natural substances in which they inhere. So, even up to this point we completely agree.<br /><br />But here’s where things become contentious: I argue that artifacts are not called “accidental forms” because they are in no way proper to the substances to which they belong, but because, as opposed to substantial forms, which inhere in primary matter, they inhere in determinate matter, i.e., secondary matter, i.e., matter insofar as it already possesses extension and its own properties. However, the proper accidents of natural things, to wit, eyes, legs, cells, etc, also inhere in determinate matter, i.e., matter insofar as it already possesses extension and its own properties and, therefore, are also called “accidental forms” in the same sense as artifacts are. In other words, any form received by determinate matter in ipso facto an accidental form, whether it be a proper attribute or not. So, from my point of view there is no equivocation whatsoever. <br /><br />All that being said, however, I do acknowledge that there is a conceptual distinction between an attribute insofar as it is considered as an accident belonging to a substance and insofar as it is considered as an accidental form inhering in determinate matter. But the latter sense is compared univocally with artifacts.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71731033346303625822011-05-03T18:20:12.897-07:002011-05-03T18:20:12.897-07:00Bilbo: From what I can tell, you [Feser] think tha...Bilbo: <i>From what I can tell, you [Feser] think that it is problematic (impossible? undignified? unnecessary?) if God immediately takes pre-existing material and makes a living thing out of it. </i><br /><br />No, there are two different questions here: one is by what manner something came into existence, and the other is whether the thing is a substance or not. God can cause substances to come into being any way He wants: He can create them directly out of nothing; he can create some natural substances of the same kind that act in such as way as to generate the being (e.g. an animal generating offspring), or he can create some natural substances of a different kind that generate it (e.g. some chemical soup that eventually evolves into that being); or He can take some existing matter and slap a new substantial form onto it (e.g. taking some mud and making Adam), etc. The being in question can be a living organism no matter which method God chooses. <br /><br />On the other hand, God can also create a machine in any way too. Directly <i>ex nihilo</i>, or indirectly (e.g. by letting man assemble the parts), or whatever. So even if we were around before robocow and saw robocow come into being, we still wouldn't know whether it was an organism or a machine. At least, if I've got the Thomism right (I'm still waiting for Ed to tell me there's something unaristotelian about my robocow hypothesis!). When metal and plastic are manipulated in the right way, you get a machine. When acorns and dirt are manipulated the right way, you get an organism. It all depends on the natures of metal and acorns and dirt, etc. In another universe, with different laws (i.e. with different things that have different natures), putting stuff together would have different results.<br /><br /><i>The only point ID makes is that the pre-existing material didn't have the ability to make a living thing out of itself. Somebody had to make it happen. </i><br /><br />This is one way where ID differs from Aquinas, then: for Thomas, all substances trace their powers and abilities back to the natures given them by God. (A cow is in this respect no different from a rock or an electron.) Once God has set up those natures, the things can indeed make living things out of themselves — that is, God does not need to intervene directly but can let objects act in their ordinary natural way. (In Thomistic terms, God is the primary cause, but creatures would be the secondary causes.) Or at least, things <i>could</i> be that way — obviously God could instead have chosen not to create a world with such powers, meaning that it would be necessary for Him to intervene miraculously. But Aquinas says God could do it either way. <br /><br />Note that the salient feature here is the intrinsic final cause, which is why Thomas's Fifth Way works fine with rocks, and doesn't require something more complex like cows. The important thing is the intrinsicality, not the complexity. On the other hand, ID reverses that: it wants to argue based on complexity (well, and specificity and whatever else), and not on intrinsicality — in fact, by treating organisms like machines, it actually <b>denies</b> the intrinsic cause, imagining instead that organisms have machine-like external forms. So it gives up the part that Thomists really want (so that they can apply the Fifth Way) and gets something they don't want (hence the Profeser's warning about how, taken to its logical conclusion, it could even bring down the human mind and morality!). <br /><br />(P.S. It just occurred to me to add a reminder that the "cause" in "final cause" has nothing to do with making something happen, or bringing something into being (that would be an "efficient" cause). "Cause" in this sense is something that a being has, as part of its nature. It has to do with where it's going, not where it came from.)Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-65222445599522491242011-05-03T17:52:08.368-07:002011-05-03T17:52:08.368-07:00Bilbo: From what I can tell, you [Feser] think tha...Bilbo: <i>From what I can tell, you [Feser] think that it is problematic (impossible? undignified? unnecessary?) if God immediately takes pre-existing material and makes a living thing out of it. </i><br /><br />No, there are two different questions here: one is by what manner something came into existence, and the other is whether the thing is a substance or not. God can cause substances to come into being any way He wants: He can create them directly out of nothing; he can create some natural substances of the same kind that act in such as way as to generate the being (e.g. an animal generating offspring), or he can create some natural substances of a different kind that generate it (e.g. some chemical soup that eventually evolves into that being); or He can take some existing matter and slap a new substantial form onto it (e.g. taking some mud and making Adam), etc. The being in question can be a living organism no matter which method God chooses. <br /><br />On the other hand, God can also create a machine in any way too. Directly <i>ex nihilo</i>, or indirectly (e.g. by letting man assemble the parts), or whatever. So even if we were around before robocow and saw robocow come into being, we still wouldn't know whether it was an organism or a machine. At least, if I've got the Thomism right (I'm still waiting for Ed to tell me there's something unaristotelian about my robocow hypothesis!). When metal and plastic are manipulated in the right way, you get a machine. When acorns and dirt are manipulated the right way, you get an organism. It all depends on the natures of metal and acorns and dirt, etc. In another universe, with different laws (i.e. with different things that have different natures), putting stuff together would have different results.<br /><br /><i>The only point ID makes is that the pre-existing material didn't have the ability to make a living thing out of itself. Somebody had to make it happen. </i><br /><br />This is one way where ID differs from Aquinas, then: for Thomas, all substances trace their powers and abilities back to the natures given them by God. (A cow is in this respect no different from a rock or an electron.) Once God has set up those natures, the things can indeed make living things out of themselves — that is, God does not need to intervene directly but can let objects act in their ordinary natural way. (In Thomistic terms, God is the primary cause, but creatures would be the secondary causes.) Or at least, things <i>could</i> be that way — obviously God could instead have chosen not to create a world with such powers, meaning that it would be necessary for Him to intervene miraculously. But Aquinas says God could do it either way. <br /><br />Note that the salient feature here is the intrinsic final cause, which is why Thomas's Fifth Way works fine with rocks, and doesn't require something more complex like cows. The important thing is the intrinsicality, not the complexity. On the other hand, ID reverses that: it wants to argue based on complexity (well, and specificity and whatever else), and not on intrinsicality — in fact, by treating organisms like machines, it actually <b>denies</b> the intrinsic cause, imagining instead that organisms have machine-like external forms. So it gives up the part that Thomists really want (so that they can apply the Fifth Way) and gets something they don't want (hence the Profeser's warning about how, taken to its logical conclusion, it could even bring down the human mind and morality!). <br /><br />(P.S. It just occurred to me to add a reminder that the "cause" in "final cause" has nothing to do with making something happen, or bringing something into being (that would be an "efficient" cause). "Cause" in this sense is something that a being has, as part of its nature. It has to do with where it's going, not where it came from.)Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-17671647235895412642011-05-03T17:45:20.000-07:002011-05-03T17:45:20.000-07:00Bilbo: Is the robocow alive? If it isn't alive...Bilbo: <i>Is the robocow alive? If it isn't alive, could we know that it isn't alive?</i><br /><br />Depends on your definition of alive. I'd probably define life as something organisms have and machines don't. But the only difference between robocow and a living cow is that one has a single substantial form, and the other has an external form applied to a bunch of separate substances — and since you can't see forms, and since the properties or actions of both of them work out the same, we couldn't know. Since for Thomists, an organism by definition has a single substantial form, then the answer to <i>"Could something be alive and not have a single substantial form?"</i> is no.<br /><br />Daniel Smith: <i>We can try to take non-living elements and combine them ourselves to see if we can activate their potential to live. If so, then these elements have active potential, if not, then they may not (or we may not be doing it right.)</i><br /><br />Suppose we combine some elements and get something that moves around and does whatever we were hoping for. How do we know that we've activated the potential of those elements to generate an organism, vs. activating their potential to make a machine? Since machines can be exceedingly complex, I don't see any way to tell the difference based on sensory or empirical observations. (And all human knowledge starts from the senses, though obviously we could get around that if God came and told us, say.) <br /><br />However, you raise an interesting distinction there: maybe organism vs. machine isn't what we <b>want</b> to know in this case. Is it more fruitful to find out what powers the ingredients have (regardless of whether it's the power to form a living substance or a fancy machine)? That, as you point out, we can discover, by trying to activate their potential and seeing what happens.Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.com