tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post6383072525451856258..comments2024-03-28T21:43:44.433-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: The straw man that will not dieEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger189125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71662557303443682662014-09-30T11:42:21.041-07:002014-09-30T11:42:21.041-07:00Kantian naturalist writes:
It's often thought...Kantian naturalist writes:<br /><br /><i>It's often thought that the Darwinian shift from typological to populationist conception of a species is inconsistent with Aristotelianism.</i><br /><br />Have to say that thought never occurred to me!<br /><br />Just glancing through <i>De Partibus Animalium</i> (available on line <a href="https://archive.org/stream/worksofaristotle512aris#page/n19/mode/2up" rel="nofollow">here</a><br />I'm struck by Aristotle's prescience in his efforts at classification, with his talk of "bifurcations" which is how we now talk about the trend of increasing diversity as bifurcation as the origin of species. Reading his work (albeit in translation), one gets a much more rounded impression than through the lens of later developers of his work. I am beginning to suspect the same of Aquinus.Alan Foxhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16470368958109056177noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9038855084379054832014-09-30T09:58:44.346-07:002014-09-30T09:58:44.346-07:00Those potential apples itching to become actual ap...<i>Those potential apples itching to become actual apples.</i><br /><br />Yeah, those are called seeds. :)<br /><br />It's often thought that the Darwinian shift from typological to populationist conception of a species is inconsistent with Aristotelianism. Ernst Mayr thought that. So did Jacques Monod. But I'm genuinely puzzled as to why they thought so. <br /><br />I'm not entirely sure about this suggestion, but it doesn't seem implausible to say that the <i>morphe</i> or Form of a living thing is its genotype. Kantian Naturalistnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-20937855964606113002014-09-30T03:58:01.721-07:002014-09-30T03:58:01.721-07:00Can you explain how concepts of 'set' and ...<i>Can you explain how concepts of 'set' and 'succession' acquire meaning outside the experience of sets and succession? and do so without appealing to yet another concept that hinges on experience? An appeal to platonic forms has the same problem, imo.</i><br /><br />For some reason you seem to think that a concept is <i>a priori</i> only if it is not acquired through sense-experience. In other words, the very notion of the <i>a priori</i> commits us to some kind of Platonism. I disagree, because I think that pragmatic naturalists such as myself can think about <i>a priori</i> concepts in a very different way. <br /><br />I would say that the a priority of a concept has nothing to do with how we acquire the concept in question. Instead, it is about whether the inferential role of the concept in our discursive practices is constrained by perception and by action. <br />Kantian Naturalistnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-17707861045963344932014-09-30T01:46:52.310-07:002014-09-30T01:46:52.310-07:00I also specifically said no apples were the same.
...<i>I also specifically said no apples were the same.</i><br /><br />But what about apple essence? Those potential apples itching to become actual apples. Striving to achieve the status of essential apple!<br /><br />Biological entities vary in much more interesting ways than protons.Alan Foxhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16470368958109056177noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16894268017994823812014-09-29T21:54:11.169-07:002014-09-29T21:54:11.169-07:00Kantian Naturalist,
"'Four' can be d...Kantian Naturalist,<br /><br /><i>"'Four' can be defined in terms of the empty set and the rule of succession."</i><br /><br />Can you explain how concepts of 'set' and 'succession' acquire meaning outside the experience of sets and succession? and do so without appealing to yet another concept that hinges on experience? An appeal to platonic forms has the same problem, imo.<br /><br />Glenn,<br /><br />By 'billions of' I didn't give a fixed number. I used it as a generic totality. Maybe I should have said 'countless'. I also specifically said no apples were the same. I did that to meet your objection before you made it. We categorize those things that grow on trees -- things that are not actually identical -- as a general category of 'apple'. That's us making one category out of similar but nevertheless unique items that grow on trees. I hope it's clear I'm not suggesting there are no apples. I'm suggesting <i>a priori</i> knowledge has to exist outside of us which includes outside of categories and sets we create out of our interests.Don Jindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05550378223563435764noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-78209271813709497422014-09-29T17:40:39.627-07:002014-09-29T17:40:39.627-07:00Well, unless "magical brain-fluid" is a ...<i>Well, unless "magical brain-fluid" is a conciliatory euphemism for "immaterial intellect." ;-)</i><br /><br />Indeed! But my point rather was that Field was able to trap Katz into making what is frankly an absurd remark because Katz, as a modern philosopher, had no choice but to rely on contemporary neuroscience in order to explain our mode of epistemic access to meanings, quasi-Platonistically conceived. <br /><br />It's certainly a virtue of Scholasticism that it avoids this entire problem by virtue of having a different account of causation altogether. <br /><br />Kantian Naturalistnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39740834264483614542014-09-29T16:01:44.646-07:002014-09-29T16:01:44.646-07:00@Kantian Naturalist:
"[W]hen you have to end...@Kantian Naturalist:<br /><br />"[W]hen you have to end up positing magical brain-fluid to get your philosophy of language off the ground, <i>something</i> has gone very badly wrong!"<br /><br />Well, unless "magical brain-fluid" is a conciliatory euphemism for "immaterial intellect." ;-)Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42355044577947316292014-09-29T15:44:38.437-07:002014-09-29T15:44:38.437-07:00@ grodrigues:
I see your point about the shift in...@ grodrigues:<br /><br />I see your point about the shift in terminology, but I hadn't understood my own remark as being anachronistic in content, only in terminology. I happily acknowledge your point that if we adopt the contemporary conception of "abstract objects" as not having any causal relations with anything spatio-temporal, then neither Plato's <i>eidos</i> nor Aristotle's <i>morphe</i> are "abstract".<br /><br />A Scholastic, after all, <i>does</i> have a way of specifying our mode of epistemic access to the Forms -- it's a <i>causal</i> relation, and it looks 'odd' to modern ears because the Scholastic conception of causality is quite different from the modern one. <br /><br />If anything, it is the contemporary analytic metaphysician who is unable to answer the question, "what is our epistemic access to abstract objects?" <br /><br />Here's a story -- as reported to me by someone who was there. Jerry Katz was defending his account of semantic platonism about meanings, and Hartry Field called him out on it. He wanted to know how we could ever become aware of meanings thus construed. "Is there some magical fluid in the brain?" he asked Katz. Katz, of course, said "yes" -- and he <i>had</i> to, given all of his other commitments. And when you have to end up positing magical brain-fluid to get your philosophy of language off the ground, <i>something</i> has gone very badly wrong!Kantian Naturalistnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18683019715943817682014-09-29T08:40:23.754-07:002014-09-29T08:40:23.754-07:00@Kantian Naturalist:
"And it precisely here ...@Kantian Naturalist:<br /><br />"And it precisely here where we see the stark divide between the Scholastic commitment to realism about universals and modernity's implicit nominalism."<br /><br />From SEP's entry on abstract objects, historical remarks, beginning of the first paragraph:<br /><br />"The contemporary distinction between abstract and concrete is not an ancient one. Indeed, there is a strong case for the view that despite occasional anticipations, it plays no significant role in philosophy before the 20th century. The modern distinction bears some resemblance to Plato's distinction between Forms and Sensibles. But Plato's Forms were supposed to be causes par excellence, whereas abstract objects are generally supposed to be causally inert in every sense."<br /><br />and from the last paragraph of historical remarks:<br /><br />"Philosophers who affirm the existence of abstract objects are sometimes called platonists; those who deny their existence are sometimes called nominalists. This terminology is lamentable, since these words have established senses in the history of philosophy, where they denote positions that have little to do with the modern notion of an abstract object. However, the contemporary senses of these terms are now established, and so the reader should be aware of them."<br /><br />The way you framed the problem is a typically modern one, and it is anachronistic to project it into the Scholastics.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-37404257856472130942014-09-28T19:16:44.473-07:002014-09-28T19:16:44.473-07:00(s/b "...general types of things which grow o...(s/b "...general types of things which grow on trees...")Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3937173945879268912014-09-28T19:01:57.293-07:002014-09-28T19:01:57.293-07:00Glenn,
We classify by sets. Those sets have numbe...<i>Glenn,<br /><br />We classify by sets. Those sets have numbers and qualities both of which are of interest to us. That interest is the basis for our classifying. Those unprofound statements are not anywhere inconsistent.<br /><br />Scott,<br /><br />Let me see if I can better explain. Blue, red, marble and button have no meaning outside experience. I'd like someone to tell me what meaning 4 has outside experience? If 4 has no such meaning outside experience, how can 2+2=4 have meaning?</i><br /><br />If you're going to contemplate whether the character string "2+2=4" might not have any meaning, you might as well also contemplate whether the character string "Don Jindra" might not have any meaning.<br /><br />Hold on there, not so fast: <br /><br />I've responded under the pretense of responding to what you said (to Scott), when in fact I've responded to something you didn't say. For you were not treating "2+2=4" as a character string, and you did not say that that character string might not have any meaning,; rather, you were treating "2+2=4" as an equation, and said that that equation might not have any meaning outside of experience.<br /><br />But, you see, what I did is known as "tit for tat".<br /><br />For you have responded under the pretense of responding to what I said, when in fact you responded to something I didn't say. That is, I did not say that your assertion about members of one species possibly classifying things differently from members of another species was inconsistent. Rather, my statement about your inconsistency was made prior to your comment about members of different species classifying things in different ways, and in fact had to do with two (2) things: <br /><br /><i>1)</i> that you claim there is not any such thing as "two apples" yet assert that there is such a thing as "billions of apples"; and, <br /><br /><i>2)</i> that whereas you acknowledge that there are general quantities of apples (e.g., "billions of apples") yet deny that there are specific quantities of apples (e.g., "two apples"), you do not deny that there are specific types of things which grow on trees (e.g., apples) even though there also are general types of things which grow on tree (e.g., fruits).Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-10766417014392654802014-09-28T16:01:21.892-07:002014-09-28T16:01:21.892-07:00Blue, red, marble and button have no meaning outsi...<i>Blue, red, marble and button have no meaning outside experience. I'd like someone to tell me what meaning 4 has outside experience? If 4 has no such meaning outside experience, how can 2+2=4 have meaning?</i><br /><br />Why ever would one think that "four" has no meaning outside of experience? "Four" can be defined in terms of the empty set and the rule of succession. Frege pointed this out at the beginning of the 20th century., and maybe it was known before then. <br /><br />I don't have any firm views on the ontology of numbers. The more interesting question is, "if there are abstract objects, then how could we know it? what is our mode of epistemic access to abstract objects?" <br /><br />And it precisely here where we see the stark divide between the Scholastic commitment to realism about universals and modernity's implicit nominalism. <br /><br />I think we can all agree on this much: if we have any epistemic access to abstract objects, that access is not described by anything in our contemporary neuroscience. <br /><br />The question is, does that mean "so much the worse for our neuroscience!" or "so much the worse for abstract objects!"<br /><br />As the old saying goes, one person's <i>modus ponens</i> is another person's <i>modus tollens</i>!Kantian Naturalistnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3600161539345885252014-09-28T14:47:28.402-07:002014-09-28T14:47:28.402-07:00Scott,
Let me see if I can better explain. Blue, ...Scott,<br /><br />Let me see if I can better explain. Blue, red, marble and button have no meaning outside experience. I'd like someone to tell me what meaning 4 has outside experience? If 4 has no such meaning outside experience, how can 2+2=4 have meaning?Don Jindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05550378223563435764noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-38763586655794888212014-09-28T14:18:53.732-07:002014-09-28T14:18:53.732-07:00Glenn,
We classify by sets. Those sets have numbe...Glenn,<br /><br />We classify by sets. Those sets have numbers and qualities both of which are of interest to us. That interest is the basis for our classifying. Those unprofound statements are not anywhere inconsistent.<br /><br /><br />Scott, <br /><br /><i>"Also not profound is the implication that because there's more than one way of classifying things, none of them is objective."</i><br /><br />That objectivity is based on empirical data -- experience. Nobody claims <i>a priori</i> truths about blue buttons and red marbles so I don't see how it's relevant. The subject is <i>a priori</i> truth.Don Jindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05550378223563435764noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52272905963878548322014-09-26T12:57:50.168-07:002014-09-26T12:57:50.168-07:00(For example, a box containing a red button, a red...(For example, a box containing a red button, a red marble, a blue button, and a blue marble could be regarded as containing "two red things and two blue things" or "two buttons and two marbles." Both are correct.)Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-68309388185434288572014-09-26T12:56:02.354-07:002014-09-26T12:56:02.354-07:00Also not profound is the implication that because ...Also not profound is the implication that because there's more than one way of classifying things, none of them is objective. In fact, that's not only un-profound but demonstrably flat-out wrong.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-70981328160407146112014-09-26T10:56:29.179-07:002014-09-26T10:56:29.179-07:00(s/b "...who does the classifying.")(s/b "...who does the classifying.")Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77039060176741542014-09-26T10:54:31.584-07:002014-09-26T10:54:31.584-07:00Btw, whether members of one species might classify...Btw, whether members of one species might classify things differently from members of another species isn't a profound insight. Different members of one species not infrequently classify things differently from other members of the same species. And the same member of a given species might classify one thing one way at one time, and the same thing another way at another time. Again, not profound. Also not profound is the equally true, though less often noticed, fact that that which is classified remains what it is regardless of how it is classified, as well as regardless of who does the classification.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-85665524252670637092014-09-26T10:38:09.752-07:002014-09-26T10:38:09.752-07:00I'm pro-classification of the world so I'm...<i>I'm pro-classification of the world so I'm glad you mentioned this.</i><br /><br />You're glad I mentioned your inconsistency? Well, then, there may be hope for you yet.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-66783185937557808162014-09-26T10:16:26.167-07:002014-09-26T10:16:26.167-07:00Tommy,
Yes, I believe 1) "The physical world...Tommy,<br /><br />Yes, I believe 1) <i>"The physical world is primary, and so our arithmetic had better match it (otherwise it -- the arithmetic -- is little more than a game, albeit a beautiful one.)"</i><br /><br /><br />Kantian Naturalist,<br /><br /><i>"But one can deny that there's non-empirical knowledge of particular domains of reality while still affirming that there is non-empirical knowledge of general aspects of reality. For example, we know a priori (by transcendental argument) that there is a mind-independent reality to be experienced and known by us at all."</i><br /><br />I agree we have to assume a mind-independent reality -- for purposes of sanity if nothing else. We have to assume order too. But is this really what we mean by <i>a priori</i> knowledge? A mind-independent reality seems to be solidly true but I don't know how I'd prove it's true. (I did formulate a tongue-in-cheek proof once but it relied on experience.) <br /><br /><br />Glenn,<br /><br /><i>Aren't you being inconsistent when asserting that there are such things as apples and oranges?... in lieu of being consistent by asserting, e.g., that in reality there are just "things that grow on trees"?</i><br /><br />I'm pro-classification of the world so I'm glad you mentioned this. I wonder how a caterpillar would classify things that grow on trees? For at least the past two centuries we've been interested in origins. Discovery of evolution and DNA have been treasures for us. But I wonder if dogs, with their keen sense of smell and probable disinterest in history (which manifests itself in their interest in butts but their disinterest in the origin of the smell), would classify the world in the same manner we do?Don Jindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05550378223563435764noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52547412841695378312014-09-25T19:34:50.653-07:002014-09-25T19:34:50.653-07:00Yikes.
But the heck with the sundial-- I'm b...Yikes. <br /><br />But the heck with the sundial-- I'm booking passage on the midnight train to Georgia. It's 10:34 here, so I've still time to catch it.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9590801003682994162014-09-25T17:52:41.568-07:002014-09-25T17:52:41.568-07:00@Glenn:
Oh, yikes, I thought you meant apple pips...@Glenn:<br /><br />Oh, yikes, I thought you meant <i>apple</i> pips. I'm afraid I don't have good news for you…<br /><br />But look, hurry home and place the remaining papers on the sundial. Maybe it will be all right.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81341687711974655532014-09-25T17:13:15.849-07:002014-09-25T17:13:15.849-07:00Scott,
(Been away til now; sorry.)
Nit picking f...Scott,<br /><br />(Been away til now; sorry.)<br /><br />Nit picking for fun is always... well, fun. ;)<br /><br />As for the answer to the question "how many pips", I am quite relieved to hear that the answer is three. There was a mysterious looking envelope in the mail today, so I was more than a little concerned that the answer might be <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1661/1661-h/1661-h.htm#5" rel="nofollow">five</a>.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88647906924899128512014-09-25T13:06:30.855-07:002014-09-25T13:06:30.855-07:00@Glenn:
"(Yeah. But how many pips are there....@Glenn:<br /><br />"(Yeah. But how many pips are there.)"<br /><br /><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LdN27HzoyO4" rel="nofollow">Three</a>.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23805860681885825012014-09-25T13:01:02.548-07:002014-09-25T13:01:02.548-07:00@Glenn:
"Btw, if there are billions of apple...@Glenn:<br /><br />"Btw, if there are billions of apples, or billions of oranges, then isn't it true that there are either 2X pairs of apples (or oranges) or 2X + 1/2 pairs of apples (or oranges) in the world (where X > 500 million)?"<br /><br />I think you've multiplied by two where you wanted to divide, and I think you have a + where you want a -.<br /><br />If there are X apples, then they can be sorted into either X/2 or (X-1)/2* [which is X/2 - 1/2, not X/2 + 1/2] pairs according to whether X is even or odd, respectively.<br /><br />I'm just nitpicking for fun here; your point is perfectly sound. If there are either 2<i>n</i> or 2<i>n</i>+1 apples (for some nonnegative integer <i>n</i>), then they can be sorted into <i>n</i> pairs. Of course there are lots of ways of doing this, but you're not talking about combinatorics here, just a count of the grand total of unordered pairs. ("Hey, I didn't order pears. I ordered apples!") It's perfectly acceptable to say that there are therefore <i>n</i> pairs of apples.<br /><br />It's also, in a way, acceptable to say that each such pair of apples is a "human construct," but not if this is <i>contrasted</i> with what there "is in reality."<br /><br />----<br /><br />* Because, of course, if the number of apples is odd, then there will be one left over.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.com