tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post6313493811052938102..comments2024-03-28T03:20:15.940-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Philosophy of nature and philosophy of [fill in the blank]Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger68125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42684476403450006332012-06-26T06:47:50.628-07:002012-06-26T06:47:50.628-07:00Mr. Green,
Your scenario does seem to be metaphysi...Mr. Green,<br />Your scenario does seem to be metaphysically possible, which is more that I can say for the rest of the evolutionary hypotheses out there. However, it still seems to me to be physically impossible. It’s sort of like saying that it’s possible for a man to run the Boston Marathon in four minutes. True, it’s metaphysically possible, but it can never happen, except by some miracle. <br /><br />The reason that I say it’s physically impossible is that, just as it’s not in the nature of a man to run twenty-six miles in four minutes, it’s not in the nature of living organisms to generate different species. And the main reason why it is not in their nature is that, although one may conjecture on a living substance whose essence is to generate that which has a different substantial form, the determinate matter into which the new substantial form is to be received will not be disposed to receive the new form; for in the real world it’s the genetic package, the genes and chromosomes, i.e., the genome of the generating substance which serves as the determinate matter into which the form is received, and the genome of the generating substance is only disposed to receive the same kind of form as the generating substance. Therefore, it looks as though your thesis would have to posit some kind of miraculous mechanism by which the genome of the generator would be transformed into a genome disposed to receive a completely different substantial form. <br /><br />From this we can see that the reason why living things can only reproduce their own kind is not a question of form but of matter. Since the matter of the generated organism must be taken from the generator, it can only receive a form that latter’s matter is disposed to receive.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-31947524802538351882012-06-25T09:08:07.537-07:002012-06-25T09:08:07.537-07:00Michael: What about an A that has the power to pro...Michael: <i>What about an A that has the power to produce both A's and B's?</i><br /><br />That's the obvious response. Of course, even if we reject that possibility (wrongly, I say), it's still possible that A₁ generated B₁ and B₁ generated C₁, etc., if the essence of each of those is to produce some different substance. That means every step in an evolutionary development of species could proceed with a new species for every generation, which feels rather "busy" but is hardly impossible. This sort of change could reach the end of the line if we hit an organism X₁ that generates only other Xs. God could have made the world such that life burned through zillions of forms that each produced new substances, at least until the earth had enough variety. (Maybe by now all species have hit this like-generates-like "dead end", which is why we don't see new ones turning up any more!)<br /><br />At any rate, since everyone seems to accept this limited possibility, that's enough to show that some sort of special evolution is possible, and in a way that fits with modern biological theories (assuming one accepts that interpretation of the biological evidence).Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5846274233340691292012-06-23T13:12:06.565-07:002012-06-23T13:12:06.565-07:00for primary matter is pure potency and, therefore,...<i>for primary matter is pure potency and, therefore, possesses no determining qualities.</i> <br /><br />That's quite fine. It possesses no determining qualities, only determining quantity: this-ness as opposed to that-ness of the same species.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91450018242155070622012-06-23T12:25:00.889-07:002012-06-23T12:25:00.889-07:00Tony, I was agreeing with you right up to this:
M...Tony, I was agreeing with you right up to this:<br /><br /><i>Matter is the principle of individuation of composite material things. When a dog Benji exists really, its dogginess is individually distinct from that other dog Fido's dogginess: their substantial forms are individuated forms, the same in every sense except for being Benji's form versus Fido's form.</i><br /><br />And here I almost agree with you, but I’m going to have to tweak your words a little. I agree that the substantial forms of the two dogs are individuated forms. And, yes, insofar as their forms are individuated, that is, insofar as they inform determinate matter, they are different. However, insofar as their substantial forms actualize primary matter, (which constitutes substance <i>per se</i> according to A-T philosophy), they are absolutely identical; for primary matter is pure potency and, therefore, possesses no determining qualities.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3119329461533558882012-06-23T09:27:22.996-07:002012-06-23T09:27:22.996-07:00Tony: Doesn't generation have something to do ...Tony: <i>Doesn't generation have something to do with the nature reproducing its own kind?</i><br /><br />It would seem so etymologically (coming from <i>genus</i>), but a man can generate not only offspring, but also income or electricity. I'm not sure what the full range of <i>generatio</i> is in Latin, but clearly it is used in phrases like <i>generatio spontanea</i>, and in general as the counterpart to <i>corruptio</i>. So the term is used of coming to be, without necessarily meaning that the substance that comes about is the same as something else.Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-47939755667507321002012-06-23T03:58:48.363-07:002012-06-23T03:58:48.363-07:00My argument has been that said generation does not...<i>My argument has been that said generation does not have to necessarily entail generation of the same species. I used the sun as an example of this in the primary sources. The fact that chance as well as defects exist in the A-T cosmos could account for variations.</i><br /><br />Assuming, for the sake of A and T, that the sun could have been classified as a higher-order material being, and assuming that the sun could be the "cause" of a lower-order animal, why would it be that the correct term for the coming-to-be of the lower-order animal would be "generation"? If man were to accomplish that, we would not call it generation, but manufacture, or something like that. Doesn't generation have something to do with the nature reproducing its own kind? <br /><br />I think that the formation of a monster by the reproductive faculty of an animal is not a question that adds anything to understanding the issue of causing different species: the monster is of the same nature as the parent, but is a failure because of accidental impediments expressing that nature. You don't EVER get examples of humans generating apes, or lions generating hyenas, or elephants generating walruses. Or even lions generating a half-lion, half-hyena. That sort of monster doesn't exist.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11458975423043202562012-06-22T18:01:07.653-07:002012-06-22T18:01:07.653-07:00@Tony
What I am suggesting is that without that i...@Tony<br /><br /><i>What I am suggesting is that without that intentionality, and outside of degeneration, no living thing produces the substance of a lower kind of organism. Do we have a clear reason to think that this could happen, even if it never does? Maybe it never does because it cannot.</i><br /><br />Well, God is ultimately the source of all intentionality found in nature, whether it be found in intelligent creatures or not.<br /><br />Just some comments on your previous post:<br /><br />The substantial form via the active and passive qualities of the composite generator are what generate the effect (e.g., the animal; cf. SCG 3.69). Due to the intention placed in nature by God, that form is also the final cause because the directedness of generation is to produce a like being. But it is important to note that the form in the thing generated is not *numerically* the same form (as you mention), only specifically the same (i.e., of the same species). I do not have my father's numerically same substantial form; only the same nature. My argument has been that said generation does not have to necessarily entail generation of the same species. I used the sun as an example of this in the primary sources. The fact that chance as well as defects exist in the A-T cosmos could account for variations.<br /><br />As for the nature of forms' existence, yes, for Aristotle they only exist in the things of nature or in the mind (albeit in a different mode, as abstracted from matter -- it might be more accurate to talk about essence here). For St. Thomas, forms also exist in the mind of God regardless of whether any instances exist in nature. In that sense, St. Thomas holds a view similar to Platonism, though he, like Aristotle, deny their existence as separated species or universals existing on their own.Sobieskinoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49537942678833678202012-06-22T16:28:11.238-07:002012-06-22T16:28:11.238-07:00@George R.
I think your new tack about the distin...@George R.<br /><br />I think your new tack about the distinction about the generation of composites vs. substantial forms or essences is a red herring. I've never claimed that the substantial form is generated and further, fail to see why that point is relevant to the discussion at hand. Whatever composite is generated has a substantial form and matter as intrinsic principles. According to Aristotle and St. Thomas (cf. SCG 3.69), the sun generates lower animals (composites), which have different substantial forms. That flatly contradicts your thesis. <br /><br />You say, however, that it fits in with your assertions, and this is presumably so because you make an unsubstantiated distinction between "essential" generation and ??? generation. A perfect division of terms would be essential vs. non-essential generation, which translates into essential vs. accidental generation. What is not of the essence is accidental. Yet, you said you didn't understand what I was talking about (seems pretty clear to me) and took a pass on substantiating your distinction in the primary sources.<br /><br />As for defective seed, it is quite relevant to the discussion, just like the fact that equivocal generation, chance causality and other factors potentially involved in generation are relevant. They can give an account for variation. They are not in your interpretation of A-T philosophy of nature, but I am not granting that.Sobieskinoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28687269622284039212012-06-22T15:47:45.498-07:002012-06-22T15:47:45.498-07:00The point is that on their principles, they didn&#...<i>The point is that on their principles, they didn't see a problem with the Sun playing a role in generation. This shows that your account is only partly correct. Further, would you claim that life could exist on Earth and thus generation without the action of the Sun even by today's science?</i> <br /><br />In their view, the sun and the celestial spheres included within themselves all the perfections of the lower bodies, so that their causality of the coming to be (act) of a lower being was an operation that springs forth from that act as pre-existing in the sun. That part of their thesis I don't have much problem with. <br /><br />What I question (and yes, it is merely a question) is whether ANY material being can produce (be the cause or) a lower living material by generation rather than by degeneration or in per accidens causality. For instance, (a) when a man cause a horse to "sire" another horse via artificial insemination, the man is clearly a cause, but he is clearly a per accidens cause: the new horse comes to be properly through the generative faculty of the prior horses as present through their seed. (b) when man uses the egg of a sheep and clones a new sheep without a male's input, he is still using the generative power of the egg, which is clearly alive in some real sense. He is not the root source of the generation, the female sheep is. (c) If man were to formulate (via good gene science, math, and biology) a completely new bacterium's genome not based on another genome, and then take raw materials of amino acids and put them together (via nanotechnology) without using any living organism as an instrument, then one might suppose that man is the true, proper cause of the substantial form of this new bacterium. But in any case, man can only do this by having the form exist <i>intentionally</i> first. What I am suggesting is that without that intentionality, and outside of degeneration, no living thing produces the substance of a lower kind of organism. Do we have a clear reason to think that this <i>could</i> happen, even if it never does? Maybe it never does because it cannot. <br /><br />We can easily say that life could exist here on earth without the sun: there are organisms in the deep ocean trenches that depend on the heat of the inner earth and vulcanism, for war conditions, and depend on other sources of energy than photosynthesis or any sun-based operation.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51496695499389072722012-06-22T15:26:30.226-07:002012-06-22T15:26:30.226-07:00George, I didn't know you had a sense of humor...George, I didn't know you had a sense of humor! Nice going :-).<br /><br /><i>The formal cause and the final cause are one. That's how the substantial form exists in act prior to the existence of the thing in reality, as the final cause of the process of generation.</i> <br /><br />Agreed, but with a stipulation.<br /><br /><i>My argument is that generation has no effect whatsoever on substantial form, for substantial form is not the result of generation but rather the cause of it. Neither substantial form nor matter are generated, only the composite.</i><br /><br />Agreed, but with a suggestion that you may be using the term "substantial form" and "exist<br /> equivocally. <br /><br />Plato thought that forms (say, dogginess) existed really in an ideal state even without any specific instance of dog anywhere ever in the world. Aristotle denies this: unless there is there is some dog, to say the form dogginess "exists" is to equivocate. It exists in a sense, but it does not exist simply. For the form of a material thing, its "existence" is only in a sense except if it is instantiated in an actual, concrete individual composite being. <br /><br />Therefore, there is a meaning of "exist" that belongs to the form when it is the form of an actual living dog that does not belong to dogginess if there have never been any real dogs. The substantial form does not pre-exist the first dog when we use "exist" in the simple, whole, unqualified sense. It only exists <i>intentionally</i> before it is instantiated in a concrete living dog. <br /><br />Matter is the principle of individuation of composite material things. When a dog Benji exists really, its dogginess is individually distinct from that other dog Fido's dogginess: their substantial forms are individuated <br />forms, the same in every sense <i>except</i> for being Benji's form versus Fido's form. <br /><br />Thus, although the form of dogginess pre-exists Benji, it is not true that Benji's substantial form as a real existent "exists," simply, before Benji exists. And although the form of dogginess "exists" intentionally before any and all dogs existed, it didn't exist <i>really</i> before some specific dog existed.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-89037957682422816612012-06-22T11:37:46.920-07:002012-06-22T11:37:46.920-07:00@Rank Sophist
Yes, I agree with you except that I...@Rank Sophist<br /><br />Yes, I agree with you except that I would say it is an ontological impossibility as well (vs. logical which pertains to the mind). In your previous post, it seemed like you were over-extending the potentiality in question.<br /><br />Thanks for the reference.Sobieskinoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67771910956333117032012-06-22T11:20:58.865-07:002012-06-22T11:20:58.865-07:00Sobieski writes:
I see you've provided no cita...Sobieski writes:<br /><i>I see you've provided no citations from primary sources to back up your assertions.</i> <br /><br />I believe that the elements of my entire argument can be found in Metaphysics, Book7. Citing the exact passages, however, would require too much effort on my part, so I’m not going to do it.<br /><br /><i>Also, you didn't make a distinction between essential and non-essential generation earlier. Nevertheless, you contradict yourself. "Essential" means pertaining to the essence or nature; what is intrinsic or per se. Non-essential would then mean what is not per se, namely what is accidental. Yet you don't hold that generation can be accidental.</i><br /><br />I’m afraid I haven’t the slightest idea what you’re talking about here.<br /><br /><i>How does this statement from St. Thomas fit into your scheme?</i><br /><br />My <i>scheme</i>? That’s a little tendentious, don’t you think?<br /><br />Besides, I have already admitted that spontaneous generation as A and T saw it is theoretically possible. So I would say that the passage you quote fits quite nicely into my nefarious plans. [Cue maniacal laughter.] <br /><br /><i>In A-T philosophy of nature, apparently only the sun is responsible for the generation of lower animals. In higher animals, it is the sun and the generating animal. That seems to flatly contradict your thesis.</i><br /><br />Fool! He has no idea my thesis is capable of! [Cue more maniacal laughter.]<br /><br /><i>Regardless of the validity of this account of generation by today's standards, the point is that there is more than one factor involved in generation. So on current scientific understanding, why couldn't other environmental factors (formalities) besides the generating animal possibly be involved in generation?</i> <br /><br />Let me see if I can (finally) make myself understood here. My argument is not that accidents (environmental factors) do not have any effect on generation. On the contrary, they have a tremendous effect. My argument is that generation has no effect whatsoever on substantial form, for substantial form is not the result of generation but rather the cause of it. Neither substantial form nor matter are generated, only the composite. Therefore, it is the composite, not the substantial form, that is affected by accidental conditions. <i>Capice</i>?<br /><br /><i>Further, St. Thomas holds that the seed can be defective (e.g., De Malo 1.3)</i><br /><br />Sobi, do we really need St. Thomas to tell us that seeds can be defective? I don’t think so. Besides, it's a completely irrelevant point. (See above.)George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72842879128949939412012-06-22T11:12:19.922-07:002012-06-22T11:12:19.922-07:00Sobieski,
A gnat does not have the potential to g...Sobieski,<br /><br />A gnat does not have the potential to generate a whale. There are strict limits placed on potentiality when a substantial form (the thing-in-essence) actualizes prime matter (infinite potentiality)--the form "sections off" prime matter, giving the completed substance a specific set of potentials. For example, water boils at certain temperatures and freezes at others, but it cannot naturally boil or freeze at all temperatures, and it cannot boil and freeze at the same time. Likewise, because of the metaphysical structure of a gnat, it necessarily cannot produce a whale. It is a logical impossibility. However, a gnat might produce offspring with a different substantial form, as long as it was a speciation event and not merely a defective gnat. I recommend David Oderberg's Real Essentialism for more information on Aristotelian philosophy and evolution.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-63059347892403406022012-06-22T10:39:29.165-07:002012-06-22T10:39:29.165-07:00@Chardanac
Yes, I agree that ultimately whether t...@Chardanac<br /><br />Yes, I agree that ultimately whether there is one variation or a number of them, eventually there would be a translation from substance S1 to substance S2. So the number of accidental variations along the way seems irrelevant from that viewpoint. But I suggested earlier that an analogy could be helpful for understanding this as in the case of death where a substantial change is proceeded by a number of accidental changes. E.g., as an animal ages there is a series of changes in the composite over time such that the substantial form can no longer abide and death results. Another analogy might be found with generation itself, at least in humans, because it's my understanding that St. Thomas held that the seminal material was not initially suitable matter for the infusion of the human soul by God (the human soul being a unique kind of material form requiring infusion by God vs. eduction by a generator) and was only made so after suitable accidental and substantial changes entailing lower animal form(s) had occurred. So on the assumption of macro-evolution, maybe an analogous process could happen in nature over time.<br /><br />A detailed account on A-T grounds is probably not possible given that we don't know whether or how evolution occurs. But generally speaking, if the animal is not the only factor in generation and thus, other conditions are required (e.g., the heat of the sun, the proper matter, etc.) and given that nature can fail (e.g., monstrosities or mutations) and there is chance and equivocal generation, then maybe another substance could result given the proper circumstances. I agree that the formality of the substance generated must exist in some manner in the educing agencies prior to generation, but on A-T grounds that does not seem to mean that said formality must exist in the same specific formality of the generating animal.<br /><br />Maybe my reasoning ultimately fails. I would have to do more research in the primary and secondary literature to come to a fuller determination, but I think the objections presented thus far offer an artificially limited and overly rigid and fragile account of generation in the A-T view of nature. They also do not line up with the actual statements of Aristotle or St. Thomas on the matter. Instead of writing their views off as erroneous, it would be better to understand why they thought them compatible with the general principles of nature they articulated. With a more comprehensive grasp of their principles and the application in their time(s), we might be able to see how they could be applied in the case of science as it understands things today.<br /><br />@Michael and Rank Sophist<br /><br />Yes, but like does generate like. The question is whether the same specific formality must always generated. Further, the actuality has to exist in some way in the generating agencies. There has to be some middle ground between A generating A only on the one hand and gnats generating whales on the other. Evolution as I understand entails gradual changes over long periods of time resulting in the emergence of new species, which are nonetheless similar to their predecessors.Sobieskinoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-66356279387482758442012-06-22T09:59:12.039-07:002012-06-22T09:59:12.039-07:00Michael has it right. We're talking about pote...Michael has it right. We're talking about potentiality here. A has the potential to generated countless other entities, because its actual state contains the potential to have B through Z50 offspring. Just like A has the potential to float in space, get sucked into a black hole, die to a meteor strike and so forth. There's absolutely no problem with A generating a B.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-82338770864688283492012-06-22T07:56:00.827-07:002012-06-22T07:56:00.827-07:00What about an A that has the power to produce both...What about an A that has the power to produce both A's and B's?<br /><br />:)<br /><br />The hylemorphic analysis seems to be attached very closely to capacities. And if that's the case I can only see errors arising in natural philosophical classification and not a contradiction with any evolutionary theory that is indeed science (and doesn't overstep its bounds).<br /><br />Though as others have noted, biology doesn't classify things the same way as natural philosophy. So this whole "debate" is doubly misguided in my opinion.Michaelnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39321457638281985322012-06-22T07:25:47.689-07:002012-06-22T07:25:47.689-07:00Sobieski,
Your points are well made. Do you think...Sobieski,<br /><br />Your points are well made. Do you think this account shows how it is in principle possible for something with substantial form A to generate an offspring with substantial form B?<br /><br />It seems like it certainly makes the case for an A to generate an A with some sort of change in accidental form, but I have trouble seeing how this could result in an offspring with a new substantial form B.<br /><br />Furthermore, it seems like the point was made earlier that after 29 changes in accidental form, that some A^29 could generate a B^1. To me, this sounds like saying that after enough changes in accidental form, a new substantial form could become present through successive generations. This does not appear correct, if I have understood correctly.Chardanacnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74293000048237385922012-06-22T06:42:44.252-07:002012-06-22T06:42:44.252-07:00No, Tony. The point is that on their principles, t...No, Tony. The point is that on their principles, they didn't see a problem with the Sun playing a role in generation. This shows that your account is only partly correct. Further, would you claim that life could exist on Earth and thus generation without the action of the Sun even by today's science?<br /><br />I am not arguing against Thomism in any way and am an ardent supporter. I tend to think macro-evolution does not occur, but think it does not necessarily present a problem for the A-T view of nature.Sobieskinoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75989782083191291232012-06-22T05:29:01.372-07:002012-06-22T05:29:01.372-07:00Sobieski, would it be possible to suggest that bec...Sobieski, would it be possible to suggest that because Aristotle and St. Thomas were in error about the sheer <i>fact</i> of lower animals being "generated" from putrefaction, they erred in trying to model a philosophical account of that change, and in fact that their attempt introduced an unnecessary and harmful theoretical metaphysical element (i.e. an error) into an otherwise coherent account? It is not just that we now know today that the maggots are not generated from putrefaction, but more that we know that the sun (and all celestial bodies) do not and cannot help account for the change the (either in man or in lower animals) the way they tried. They introduced a foreign element into the theory to account for something that they could not otherwise explain. Their attempt was a hypothesis that didn't work.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-31734191109239515212012-06-21T21:43:41.122-07:002012-06-21T21:43:41.122-07:00@George R.
I see you've provided no citations...@George R.<br /><br />I see you've provided no citations from primary sources to back up your assertions. Also, you didn't make a distinction between essential and non-essential generation earlier. Nevertheless, you contradict yourself. "Essential" means pertaining to the essence or nature; what is intrinsic or per se. Non-essential would then mean what is not per se, namely what is accidental. Yet you don't hold that generation can be accidental.<br /><br />How does this statement from St. Thomas fit into your scheme?<br /><br />"In the case of animals generated from putrefaction, the substantial form is caused by a corporeal agent, namely, the celestial body [equivocal generator] which is the first agent of alteration; and so all things that produce a change of form in these lower bodies do so by its power. And for this reason the celestial power is enough, without a univocal agent, to produce some imperfect forms. But to produce perfect forms, like the souls of perfect animals, there is also required a univocal agent together with the celestial agent. In fact, such animals are not generated except from semen. And that is why Aristotle says that "man and the sun generate man [Physics II.2 (194b14)]." (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 3.69)<br /><br />In A-T philosophy of nature, apparently only the sun is responsible for the generation of lower animals. In higher animals, it is the sun and the generating animal. That seems to flatly contradict your thesis.<br /><br />Regardless of the validity of this account of generation by today's standards, the point is that there is more than one factor involved in generation. So on current scientific understanding, why couldn't other environmental factors (formalities) besides the generating animal possibly be involved in generation? Further, St. Thomas holds that the seed can be defective (e.g., De Malo 1.3) leading to monstrosities, which is a variation. Again, nature acts always or for the most part.Sobieskinoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54625221336764294202012-06-21T18:02:02.071-07:002012-06-21T18:02:02.071-07:00Tony writes:
The reason A, a living thing, can hav...Tony writes:<br /><i>The reason A, a living thing, can have a power to generate a new one like A is that A has the nature of A-ness in act. It takes actuality to reduce potential to act, and in particular it takes A-ness in act to reduce matter of a new entity to A-ness. A can generate a new one like to A precisely because it has A-ness.</i> <br /><br />This is true, but it’s not exactly what I was getting at. Strictly speaking, it’s not the A-ness of the generator that causes the A-ness of the progeny, but rather it’s the A-ness of the progeny that causes the A-ness of the progeny. For the formal cause of that which is generated is nothing other than the final cause of its generation. The formal cause and the final cause are one. That's how the substantial form exists in act prior to the existence of the thing in reality, as the final cause of the process of generation.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35499653077976412962012-06-21T14:58:36.864-07:002012-06-21T14:58:36.864-07:00Sobi:
"You contradicted yourself earlier...&q...Sobi:<br />"You contradicted yourself earlier..."<br /><br />No, I didn't. <br /><br />I accept that it's metaphysically possible that an organism generate another of a different kind, but I deny that an organism that essentially generates its own kind can change into one that generates another kind. That A's might be B-generators is possible, at least theoretically. That A-generators generate B's is not possible, except in the case of hybrids, which are theoretically possible (and have nothing to do with evolution). <br /><br />But you seem to be suggesting in your post that accidental causes help determine essences. I hope you are not saying that, because if you were, you would be very, very wrong.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53921072337656737602012-06-21T10:59:15.152-07:002012-06-21T10:59:15.152-07:00@George R.
You're making another straw man ar...@George R.<br /><br />You're making another straw man argument. Unproven assumptions:<br /><br />1) Generation entails that the generator and generated have the same specific formality. The generator, for example, cannot be of a more generic formality or virtually contain the formalities of its effect(s).<br /><br />2) Only the generator is involved in generation. <i>Per accidens</i> causality does not exist or cannot occur in certain scenarios which could entail variations in effect (e.g., a chance occurrence in which another cause interferes with generation, a defect in the matter of generation, etc.).<br /><br />You contradicted yourself earlier when you granted (1): "I accept that it's not metaphysically impossible that an organism generate another of a different kind. In fact, in the case of the elements we see it all the time: e.g. hydrogen and oxygen generate water. Hybrids are also possible, and so is spontaneous generation as Aquinas understood it, metaphysically speaking anyway."<br /><br />Aristotle and St. Thomas both give an account for chance and <i>per accidens</i> causality, hold that nature acts always or for the most part, and hold that generation does not require generation of the same specific formality. We aren't interested in Aristotelian or Thomistic philosophy of nature and metaphysics according to George, so please give us examples where they deny (1) and (2).Sobieskinoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4633425305128032292012-06-21T10:45:29.872-07:002012-06-21T10:45:29.872-07:00I think George already said it, but let me add it ...I think George already said it, but let me add it in my own way. <br /><br />If A has a nature that includes the power of "generating", then what we mean by this is that A has the power of making (from A) a new individual entity that _has_ the same kind, because it is "like in kind" to A, and that means that they are identical in form: they are both instances of A-ness. For A to have the power to make a B, something not like A in kind, we normally would not call this generation properly, because generation (in A) is making a new one like to A. <br /><br />The reason A, a living thing, can have a power to generate a new one like A is that A has the nature of A-ness in act. It takes actuality to reduce potential to act, and in particular it takes A-ness in act to reduce matter of a new entity to A-ness. A can generate a new one like to A precisely because it has A-ness. <br /><br />For A to produce a B, A would have to have the actuality of B-ness, which means that it is not defined by A-ness. (Not if A-ness and B-ness are distinct species). It makes no sense to suppose that A can make a B <b>by generation</b>. If it can do it at all, it can only do so by something else. <br /><br />One other options is degeneration: if A-ness includes within its own ratio B-ness as a virtual component thereof, A can undergo a degeneration and thus result in a B. A living tiger can die and degenerate into component stuff, like proteins. The proteins were included virtually in tigerness. <br /><br />Another option is that A can act as an instrumental cause, outside itself, helping reduce C to D: if A applies heat to the stuff that turns into rubber, that doesn't imply A holds rubber-ness as a virtual aspect of A-ness. But then the cause of the form rubber-ness in the rubber must be found not in A but elsewhere. <br /><br />But for A to form a new entity of B-kind, the actuality of B-ness must be found in act somewhere A can lay its hands on it. If B-ness is different in kind from A-ness, A can't have B-ness as its own nature in act, by definition. Then A can only be an instrumental agent cause of B, not a true generator of B. Thus, neo-scholastics who try to save evolution suppose that the "father" A of the offspring B is the source of the matter of B, but not the full proper cause, and that God or an angel or something superior to B must use A as an instrumental cause of the form B-ness being in B.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40473839383415775952012-06-21T06:26:27.739-07:002012-06-21T06:26:27.739-07:00Mr. Green writes:
However, the idea is that As do ...Mr. Green writes:<br /><i>However, the idea is that As do not generate other As until one day they suddenly wake up and start generating Bs; rather, only As of a certain kind (with certain accidents) will have the potential to generate Bs, and these accidental differences will occur or accumulate gradually over time.</i><br /><br />Here’s the problem with all this: If A generates A, it is either because it is essentially an A-generator or only accidentally an A- generator. Let’s first assume it’s the former. If A is essentially an A-generator, and if it at some point ceases to generate A and instead generates B, then A will have essentially been changed from an A-generator to a B-generator. In other words, an A that generates B will no longer be an A. Thus, the essential change of A must be explained. Did it occur at its own generation? Then the parent (generator) of the pseudo A must also not have been a true A. And there is an infinite regress.<br /><br />Now if we assume that A is not essentially an A-generator but only accidentally so, all kinds of problems arise. For if A is not essentially an A-generator, then it is not essentially a generator at all, for powers are specified by their ends, and the end of generation is a specific form not a generic one. Therefore, if the power of generation is from the essence of the thing, so is the specific thing it generates. To put it another way, if A generates A only accidently, then so is A’s power of generating anything at all merely accidently. But if the powers of things to generate things are merely accidental, what can possibly be considered essential?<br /><br />But all this is merely foreground. The real question is where does the substantial form come? Or, perhaps, a better way to put it is how does the substantial form exist in act (for forms qua forms are act) prior to its existence in reality? And prior existence they must have, for the principles of substance are primary matter and substantial form, and these two principles must exist somehow, not only prior to the composite of which they are constituents, but also prior to process by which the composite is generated. <br /><br />That is the question that the evolutionists can’t answer. So instead they monkey with the traditional thomistic understandings of primary matter and substantial form, describing the former as some kind of energy and the latter as somehow skulking around in matter waiting to be pulled up by the ears by some educing agent.George R.noreply@blogger.com