tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post6221370995883653302..comments2024-03-19T02:00:34.750-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Deus ex machina?Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger21125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58984383607946944652012-07-08T12:16:41.193-07:002012-07-08T12:16:41.193-07:00Is the theory of ID compatible with A-T philosophy...Is the theory of ID compatible with A-T philosophy? I believe so, but we can't start with a mechanistic worldview (that concedes too much), and we certainly cannot abandon the concept of analogy (which is fundamental to A-T philosophy). Instead, a significant reformulation of ID is required. Current defenders of ID typically formulate it in mechanistic terms. It should instead be formulated in Thomistic terms.<br /><br />Because ID is usually considered to be an inference to God's action in the world on the basis of biological complexity, the logical place to start reformulating is in terms of God's action in A-T philosophy. Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophers believe that God has two modes of action in the universe, one in common with the mechanistic conception of God's action held by ID, the other unique to A-T philosophy. Both include conceptions of God's miraculous intervention in the world. As a Catholic, Professor Feser believes that Mary conceived Jesus without ever having lain with a man, that Jesus performed miracles while on the earth, and that Jesus was Resurrected three days after His death. As a protestant, I also believe those things (as a side note, does one have to be a Catholic to ascribe to A-T philosophy?). But ID theorists either do not believe in, or do not explicitly mention, that God has a second mode of action in the world: He is currently and actively sustaining the existence of everything. Matter does not go out of existence, matter retains its form, entities are directed to their final causes, the laws of physics hold constant, all because God is currently and actively causing them to do so.<br /><br />The question posed by our reformulated version of Intelligent Design, then, is whether God created complex specified information and irreducibly complex systems in living things exclusively by means of the latter mode of causation (sustaining the existence of things and the stability of the laws of physics/final causes), or whether the former mode of causation (miraculous intervention) is required as well.<br /><br />This formulation evades the charge that it uses a mechanistic worldview beecause it admits both formal and final causes, and because it treats the physical universe as something that is completely dependent upon God's action, not as a thing that has any sort of independent existence. It also evades the charge of using univocal terms as opposed to analogical terms because it is in no way an argument from analogy, that argues from certain traits of the natural world that are shared with man-made machines to traits that must be shared by men and the Designer of the natural world. Instead, it recognizes that humans and God aren't intelligent in the same way, but instead that humans <i>have</i> the property of intelligence, while God <i>is</i> intelligence itself; intelligence made concrete; intelligence unified with goodness, existence, etc.<br /><br />This also transforms ID from a "god of the gaps" argument for the existence of God into a genuine scientific inference to the best explanation.OmneVivumExVivonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19440148079572573922011-10-21T15:00:22.107-07:002011-10-21T15:00:22.107-07:00What I usually interpret "mechanism" to ...What I usually interpret "mechanism" to mean in these discussions is something like "elementary particles plus laws of motion derived from the fundamental forces". Your previous posts have indicated that even particle motion through fundamental forces must be understood as involving final causation. The ID theorist would want to claim, contra the Darwinist, that a living being couldn't come about just by particles coming together in the correct configuration under only the influence of these fundamental forces - that some additional cause must be postulated. Would A-T agree with the ID theorist contra the Darwinist, or is this claim an empirical one, not a metaphysical one?S Jilcottnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77503512234244409952010-05-21T09:35:31.429-07:002010-05-21T09:35:31.429-07:00>Note, though, that what I say in this post has...>Note, though, that what I say in this post has nothing to do with Darwinism, as I've consistently emphasized. Even if Darwinism were 100% false, that wouldn't make ID's mechanistic approach even 1% correct.<br /><br />I reply: Let me put it too you this way. How can one defeat Young Earth Creationism? Well you could disprove the existence of God OR you could show Genesis need not have a Young Earth Creationist interpretation to be true.<br /><br />The ID need Darwinism to be false in order for their Mechanistic neo-theism to be true. But if Thomism is true then their Mechanistic neo-theism can't be true but Theism itself is safe & it doesn't matter if Darwinism is true or not.BenYachov(Jim Scott 4th)http://www.hebrewcatholic.orgnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16685728582840614942010-05-16T17:28:06.067-07:002010-05-16T17:28:06.067-07:00"The problem, for A-T, is to think of these p...<i>"The problem, for A-T, is to think of these parts as having no more inherent or built-in tendency to function together to fulfill a common end than the parts of a watch or a mousetrap do."</i><br /><br />I'm still having trouble with the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic ends. There apparently is no observable difference physically, so there must be a metaphysical difference. Is it that the mouse participates in the form of mousiness (its substantial form), while the mousetrap participates only in the forms of having-a-spring-here and having-a-catch-there, etc. — i.e., the "form" of the mousetrap really is no form at all, but a mere collection of the forms of its parts (in other words, the mousetrap <i>is</i> reductionist, but the mouse isn't)? But surely there is such a thing as the form of mousetrappiness (I can think of it! and if I can, God can too). <br /><br />Or again, is the moon an eclipse-making machine? An eclipse-generating "organism"? Since it does have that function, doesn't it have to be one or the other? I can understand an extrinsic final cause in the sense of a stick lying on the ground that I pick up and then use as a walking cane, or as a weapon, or as a hobby-horse. (I think a platonist might say that the stick was always all of those things; presumably the aristotelian says it is potentially those things, and only actually so while I have it in my hand and use it thus.) So the final cause of being a cane/weapon/etc. is not something in the stick itself, but is external because left to itself, when I drop the stick on the ground again, it loses that function and goes back to being a plain stick.<br /><br />A watch is not like that, however. If I drop my watch in the forest and nobody hears, it still really actually literally continues to tell the time. Its final cause as a timepiece does not depend on my holding it in front of my face and reading the dial and interpreting it as a temporal measure! It occurs to me that in the case of the stick, I have to "conserve" it in being as a sword (as the "creator", so to speak, of its swordiness in this story, the stick is a sword only while I use it thus, or rather while I think of it thus). Similarly, on the mechanistic view, wouldn't mouse and trap alike requiring extrinsic finality require God to conserve them all the more, not less?Davidnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35563808182589316002010-05-16T16:28:36.598-07:002010-05-16T16:28:36.598-07:00"But the weighing of probabilities vis-à-vis ...<i>"But the weighing of probabilities vis-à-vis whether this or that structure could have come about through known natural processes can never get you one inch closer to the God of classical theism"</i><br /><br />That might be true philosophically, but it's not true psychologically. Switching from one false concept to another still leaves you in the wrong, but at least it shows you that you can be wrong; once you've admitted it the first time (which is often hard for people to do), it's easier to admit you might be wrong the second time, and eventually work your way to the concept that is true. And it's clear that a lot of ID-talk in this area is meant to be pragmatic, not to claim any new theological discovery.Davidnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-45974190160176391402010-05-16T15:13:43.453-07:002010-05-16T15:13:43.453-07:00Prof. Feser: It is because theistically-inclined m...Prof. Feser: <i>It is because theistically-inclined mechanists deny such inherent tendencies no less than naturalists do that they focus on questions of probability</i><br /><br />I don't think that's entirely fair: they focus on probabilities because that's how science works, and ID is an attempt to formalise the intuition of design in a scientifically rigorous manner. If a scientist talks probabilistically about gravity, that doesn't mean gravity is incompatible with A-T; reality is not statistical, but the scientific method is, that's all.Davidnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12510746344911510542010-05-13T17:40:57.660-07:002010-05-13T17:40:57.660-07:00JT,
A-T arguments, or at least the ones I have be...JT,<br /><br />A-T arguments, or at least the ones I have been giving in the post above and will allude to in the post responding to your question, <i>are</i> philosophical arguments.<br /><br />BTW, as I've already indicated, simplicity per se isn't really what is relevant here, since simplicity is consistent with God's having attributes like power, knowledge, will, etc. What you should be asking is how God can appropriately be described in masculine terms given that He is incorporeal and thus has no bodily organs, including sexual organs. That's the question I will be addressing.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6823061142718665862010-05-13T16:40:08.323-07:002010-05-13T16:40:08.323-07:00JT said:
“Ed
I think it would be very enlighteni...JT said:<br /><br />“Ed<br /><br />I think it would be very enlightening to read how a concept of God that is simply being can be assigned a particular sex. This is an ontological question in philosophy, and a matter of revelation in religion. <br /><br />Can one do this within philosophy alone?”<br /><br />Ed said:<br /><br />“Just Thinking,<br /><br />I'm going to write up a separate post on the subject. Keep in mind, though, that to say that God is absolutely simple does not mean that we can't say more about Him, e.g that He has power, intellect, etc. It means that in Him power, intellect, etc. are one in a way they are not for us, which entails (for A-T) that when we predicate these things of God we are using language in an analogous rather than univocal sense. I say more about this in an earlier post on divine simplicity which you can find using the blog's search function.”<br /><br />Ed<br /><br />Please do this independently of A-T arguments – philosophy only. We all understand what A-T says about divine simplicity and analogy, by now. A further delving into how Aquinas says God must be male is redundant.<br /><br />If God is ontologically simplicity itself, please argue why it must be that it is male from a non-theological basis.Just Thinkingnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61522187298300171002010-05-13T13:19:15.853-07:002010-05-13T13:19:15.853-07:00Anonymous,
Yes, the richarddawkins.net combox see...Anonymous,<br /><br />Yes, the richarddawkins.net combox seems to be a complete intellectual slum. I'm sure Dawkins is embarrassed. Or not.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18568802912528287722010-05-13T13:15:08.037-07:002010-05-13T13:15:08.037-07:00Just Thinking,
I'm going to write up a separa...Just Thinking,<br /><br />I'm going to write up a separate post on the subject. Keep in mind, though, that to say that God is absolutely simple does not mean that we can't say more about Him, e.g that He has power, intellect, etc. It means that in Him power, intellect, etc. are one in a way they are not for us, which entails (for A-T) that when we predicate these things of God we are using language in an analogous rather than univocal sense. I say more about this in an earlier post on divine simplicity which you can find using the blog's search function.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-70353491585500765742010-05-13T13:12:02.325-07:002010-05-13T13:12:02.325-07:00Daniel asks:
When God creates ex nihilo, doesn...Daniel asks:<br /><br /><i>When God creates ex nihilo, doesn't he still impose form and purpose from outside?</i><br /><br />No, not in the relevant sense, because that would be possible only if there was such a thing as material stuff that existed on its own without form, waiting for form to be imposed on it. And there is and can be no such thing -- prime matter (i.e. matter without form) is just pure potential, and thus never even in principle actual or existent on its own. Hence e.g. if God creates a stone ex nihilo, what He creates is precisely the stone itself, not the prime matter by itself or the form by itself, not even while simulataneously combining them. <br /><br /><i>Why would the scripture specify "dust" if God is essentially destroying the dust and making man from prime matter? Wouldn't any prime matter do? Why "dust"?</i><br /><br />No doubt to emphasize our dependence on humble matter, which ancient readers would have thought of primarily on the model of "earth," "dirt," or the "dust of the ground."Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-8791421789151566132010-05-12T15:45:06.520-07:002010-05-12T15:45:06.520-07:00Ed
I think it would be very enlightening to read ...Ed<br /><br />I think it would be very enlightening to read how a concept of God that is simply being can be assigned a particular sex. This is an ontological question in philosophy, and a matter of revelation in religion. <br /><br />Can one do this within philosophy alone?Just Thinkingnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-89875570858304234952010-05-12T13:11:31.455-07:002010-05-12T13:11:31.455-07:00This sounds very similar to something David Bentle...This sounds very similar to something David Bentley Hart stated a while back at First Things, in response to an ID-ist named Luis.<br /><br />"Luis Caso needs to consider at a somewhat deeper level what the difference between transcendence and immanence is. The reason many believers object to intelligent-design theory is precisely because it fails to understand the distinction. In place of the creator God—whose one transcendent act of creation donates being to all that is, and sustains everything in being, and underlies the rational order of creation—ID deals with some sort of large, immanent cosmic technician who acts as a discrete cause among the discrete causes of nature.<br /><br />From a purely theological point of view, it is a repellant idea: a universum that is not causally complete in itself (a defective whole, that is) and a God reduced to the role of a finite demiurge. The other problem with ID theory, alas, is that it is logically—not just empirically—impossible to verify. That said, Caso will, I hope, be glad to learn that I share his belief that a purely materialist account of the existence of the universe, of cosmic order, and of consciousness is quite absurd."<br /><br />It's strange how Dr.Hart and Dr.Feser, who have probably contributed the most to my recent attraction towards classical philosophy and theology, agree on so much. Or maybe it's to be expected.<br /><br />(just as a side note, and for anyone interested, Hart has recently written a scathing article on the New Atheism: http://www.firstthings.com/article/2010/04/believe-it-or-not . It received over 380 comments after someone linked it at richarddawkins.net, and most of the comments from the new atheists are a real hoot. Anyway, just thought I'd share.)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53296991932045881162010-05-12T11:47:15.145-07:002010-05-12T11:47:15.145-07:00The difference between what God does and what we d...<i>The difference between what God does and what we do is that we use preexisting materials with already-inherent natures, and God does not. He creates ex nihilo.</i><br /><br />Thank you Dr. Feser for your answer.<br /><br />Would you indulge me two more questions? (No that was not one of them!)<br /><br />1. When God creates ex nihilo, doesn't he still impose form and purpose from outside? <br /><br />2. In another thread I had a follow up question about your comments on the scripture "God formed man out of the dust". I'm hoping you'll allow me to ask it again here.<br /><br />You said: <i>What would be perfectly Thomist is saying that it involved causing the prime matter underlying the dust to lose the form of dust and take on the substantial form of a man.</i><br /><br />I replied: Thank you for making the Thomist position clearer to me. One thing I don't quite get: Why would the scripture specify "dust" if God is essentially destroying the dust and making man from prime matter? Wouldn't any prime matter do? Why "dust"?<br /><br />I see now that that last one is actually three questions. I hope I'm not over the limit!<br /><br />Thank you.Daniel Smithnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54222530398327734622010-05-12T08:40:48.676-07:002010-05-12T08:40:48.676-07:00Just Thinking,
Maybe I'll write a post on why...Just Thinking,<br /><br />Maybe I'll write a post on why God is not appropriately referred to as "It" or "She."<br /><br />John,<br /><br />Thanks, I haven't read Brooke, but I will.<br /><br />feser_fan,<br /><br />Exactly.<br /><br />BenYachov,<br /><br />Note, though, that what I say in this post has nothing to do with Darwinism, as I've consistently emphasized. Even if Darwinism were 100% false, that wouldn't make ID's mechanistic approach even 1% correct. <br /><br />Crude,<br /><br />Well, sometimes they say that, and sometimes they say that a material designer generates a regress that will take us to a divine one. <br /><br />Daniel,<br /><br />Yes, a rubber ball is an artifact. It's a useful example to introduce the four causes, but it's not a true substance, so its formal and final causes are not immanent.<br /><br />The difference between what God does and what we do is that we use preexisting materials with already-inherent natures, and God does not. He creates ex nihilo.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-63578500840931785002010-05-12T06:04:20.016-07:002010-05-12T06:04:20.016-07:00Mechanists who are also theists hold, accordingly,...<i>Mechanists who are also theists hold, accordingly, that any final causality, teleology, essences or natures that exist in the world are extrinsic to it, imposed from outside in a fashion comparable to the way the function of serving as a mousetrap is imposed by an artificer on bits of wood and metal that have no inherent tendency to kill mice specifically.</i><br /><br />Dr. Feser, in The Last Superstition and elsewhere, you use a red rubber ball as an example of Aristotle's four causes (including formal and final causes).<br /><br />Isn't a red rubber ball an artifact - with formal and final causes imposed by an artificer from the outside?<br /><br />Isn't it also true that whatever God creates has its form and purpose imposed on it "from the outside" (i.e. by God)? God is not "in" his creations - correct? He is separate from, i.e. "outside" his creation. Am I right so far?<br /><br />I guess I'm still unsure of the distinction you draw between "natural" and "artifact" as they pertain to God.<br /><br />I really appreciate your efforts to make these things clear and I look forward to your response.Daniel Smithnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-30776050932450077662010-05-11T19:17:47.453-07:002010-05-11T19:17:47.453-07:00Not to get too deeply into this again (Man, I admi...Not to get too deeply into this again (Man, I admire Ed's resolve - even I'm somewhat tired of the ID topic by now) but...<br /><br /><i>And the point, as I cannot repeat too often, is not that such arguments don’t get you all the way to the God of classical theism, but that they get you positively away from the God of classical theism. You can get a god from a machine, but never the God.</i><br /><br />Every ID proponent I'm aware of would agree with exactly this (save for the 'away' part). Dembski, in his recent response, flat out said ID doesn't get one to God. VJTorley's take was a bit more complicated, but he was going beyond ID and right into theology and philosophy. Behe and others have mentioned the limitation too. ID's proponents say they can infer 'an intelligence' from their methods, and that's about it.<br /><br />At most, the ID proponents are trying to insist that ID is not in ultimate conflict with thomism. I know Ed argues even that much doesn't stand, but it's a pretty meager claim compared to offering (even a probablistic) proof of the God of classical theism.Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14544940125867440602010-05-11T16:43:19.121-07:002010-05-11T16:43:19.121-07:00The ID people are by nature heavily invested in po...The ID people are by nature heavily invested in polemics against Darwinian Evolution as the mechanism for teleology in nature vs an Intelligent Designer. If we reject Mechanistic philosophy & look at evolution threw the eyes of Thomism & teh four causes then all of a sudden Darwin is not a treat to Theistic belief. Thus why oppose Evolution (mind u even if we concede on Thomistic grounds evolution is compatible with Christianity & a Divine Designer doesn't mean we must make Darwinism a dogma).BenYachovhttp://www.catholic.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6151240429197361652010-05-11T15:40:46.959-07:002010-05-11T15:40:46.959-07:00Just thinking-
Just had a thought to share. I th...Just thinking- <br /><br />Just had a thought to share. I think from the Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective Spinoza's pantheism would be impossible. If the AT arguments work they show the existence of a God that (as Ed mentioned in his post) utterly simple, with no distinctions whatsoever. Such a Being could not be identified with the physical world because everything in the world is a component of essence and existence act and potency etc. Since no such divisions exist in the AT conception of God, that God could not be the same as Spinoza's. <br /><br />Personally I think Aquinas gets the perfect balance, by having a God that is intimately connected to the world and sustains it in existence (unlike Paley's designer that seems to manipulate the world from the outside but not really sustain it in being) without simply being identical to the physical world.feser_fannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-84897459746445422382010-05-11T08:21:41.028-07:002010-05-11T08:21:41.028-07:00Apropos your mention of Boyle et al in the context...Apropos your mention of Boyle et al in the context of the design argument, Ed: Have you read John Hedley Brooke's <i>Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives</i>? Fascinating to go back and read just how Boyle, Bacon, Newton, and later English scientists viewed the purpose of science, or natural philosophy as it was still known. <br /><br />Great post.John Farrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18280296574996987228noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35564494936359686632010-05-11T07:30:51.767-07:002010-05-11T07:30:51.767-07:00Just how well defined is God – in any era, classic...Just how well defined is God – in any era, classical or otherwise? Spinoza saw God as nature itself – a monism with modes of appearance.<br /><br />The Hebrew God, Yahwen, announces “I AM Who Am.’<br /><br />The God of classical theism is, as you say, simply ‘Being itself.’ We could logically shift the emphasis from capitalized ‘Being’ to a capitalized ‘Itself,’ since being is neither male nor female, (which are essences or modes of being). So the well understood God of classical theism is not a ‘He,’ but an ‘It.’ Quite a shocker to many, I suppose. <br /><br />Consider the modern day existential Thomist, Gerald Phelan, who saw God as pure existence, with his specific components (essences) as merely unique modes of the exercise of existence.<br /><br />All of these examples are saying much the same thing about a transcendent God, yet followers of any one of them would radically disagree with the other. <br /><br />Nobody has a monopoly on God.Just Thinkingnoreply@blogger.com