tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post6170201791919594028..comments2024-03-19T02:00:34.750-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Mind and Cosmos roundupEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger83125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86418690899036869932016-11-09T01:11:42.810-08:002016-11-09T01:11:42.810-08:00I am just writing to record the thought I have had...I am just writing to record the thought I have had about this, which is that Thomas Nagel is indeed an authentic representative of the Western philosophy traditon, and that in this book, he explains why 'philosophical materialism' is incommensurable with that tradition; and that he is saying that, not on the grounds of religious belief, per se, but on the grounds of the basic irrationality of materialism, from a philosophical point of view. That is why I believe this book is a real landmark in the Western philosophical tradition.wayfarerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04102461128980478006noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39210531950202989572015-10-30T08:24:58.165-07:002015-10-30T08:24:58.165-07:00Comment\Questions: Since we understand from psych...Comment\Questions: Since we understand from psychology that perceptions are actually predictions about what a sensation might be, rather than the direct sense of something, couldn't we say that to perceive something is only to make a stream of predictions? And if we could categorize the perception of one's self, or that the "feel" of anything is also a perception, then couldn't consciousness be easily lumped in as well? If consciousness is a perception, and perceptions are always predictions, than doesn't that help answer Nagel's neo-darwinist criteria? For example, rather than resort to Nagel's idea that it is emergent, we could follow part of his criteria for demonstrating that it follow's necessarily from evolutionary conditions (it is linked to a type of thing that all creatures must do to compete), and that we may even expect its lineage to become such a thing (a further sophistication should lead to self-awareness)? Predictive sophistication seems just the sort of adaptive category to answer both questions.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01250254551341192363noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52277929658640873222013-06-27T18:06:12.014-07:002013-06-27T18:06:12.014-07:00Well, if we start tracing causality backwards in t...Well, if we start tracing causality backwards in time in a non-per se fashion, I'm not sure how we would distinguish the kalam cosmological argument (the philosophical ones) from the first way. Obviously there has to be a difference however, since Aquinas didn't think kalam worked. But, as you have stated, it seems like a non-per se causality chain is a possibility in the argument as you have left it.<br /><br />I have a feeling that we're missing something crucial here, but something also simple and easy to miss. Perhaps Feser will just have to educate us (if he can ever find time in that type-A+ personality schedule of his).Timotheoshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09848027239405239382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-31334863210892777102013-06-27T07:43:13.421-07:002013-06-27T07:43:13.421-07:00Oops: emphasies = emphases.Oops: emphasies = emphases.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23151035793423421242013-06-27T07:42:23.566-07:002013-06-27T07:42:23.566-07:00@Timotheos:
"I know in other places Feser ha...@Timotheos:<br /><br />"I know in other places Feser has said that the first way dosen't rely on simultaneous causation, and that showing that causes and effects are simultaneous is a secondary worry. I just didn't know if they were a worry at this point in feser's presentation of the first way."<br /><br />And they may not be. Feser seems to be saying (and of course I agree) that we can argue back to a pure act based on just the existence of the series. In that case, of course, simultaneity is perhaps irrelevant—even to a <i>per se</i> causal series, which, as both rank sophist and Mr. Green have said in different ways, is all about instrumentality rather than simultaneity.<br /><br />(As you say, Feser himself has of course <a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/08/edwards-on-infinite-causal-series.html" rel="nofollow">elsewhere</a> agreed that "it is <i>arguably</i> possible at least <i>in theory</i> for there to be a <i>per se</i> causal series in which some of the members were not simultaneous" [emphasies his]—although his own counterexample involves nothing less than time travel, and he's careful to say that he's not saying it's really possible.)<br /><br />The problem (and it's a small one) is just that the series of causes from pure act to any member of the series may <i>not</i> be "instrumental" in the sense required for a <i>per se</i> series.<br /><br />Suppose, as in your own example, that somewhere down the chain of causes, A causes B to exist <i>and then stops acting on B</i>, but B continues to exist. The causal link between A and B is still part of the causal chain, but there still seems to be a break in the <i>per se</i> causal chain since at the time B is acting, it's no longer being actively (instrumentally) caused to exist by A. And I'm not sure whether Feser intends this in his argument.<br /><br />It's also possible, of course, that I'm just missing something about the nature of instrumentality and the causal series is <i>per se</i> after all.<br /><br />Either way, though, I think we've gotten at the main argument Feser is making in his reply to MacDonald's objection—namely that not just the operation but the very existence of any element of the series can be traced back to an immovable mover (pure act). Whether the causal series "is <i>per se</i> all the way back" doesn't seem to matter much to the point.<br /><br />What do you think?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16982224259896963952013-06-27T04:27:43.704-07:002013-06-27T04:27:43.704-07:00@ Mr. Green:
Well Thomas Aquinas probably would h...@ Mr. Green:<br /><br />Well Thomas Aquinas probably would have considered showing that the unmoved mover was an unmovable mover just showing that the unmoved mover had some attribute. I'm pretty sure he knew the difference because the 16th question he considered in summa contra Gentiles was entiltitled "Is There Any Passive Potency In God?" (I'm assuming passive means unactualized in this context). In Summa Theologica, he assumes that once you have shown an unmoved mover exists, you've shown that an unmovable mover exists. I think he further considers the question briefly while he considers whether God is eternal or not. <br /><br />That being said, the time based argument is interesting, the only problem I might be seeing is whether or not you exist in time really means you change (haven't really thought that objection through, just an intuitional worry). <br /><br />I know in other places Feser has said that the first way dosen't rely on simultaneous causation, and that showing that causes and effects are simultaneous is a secondary worry. I just didn't know if they were a worry at this point in feser's presentation of the first way.Timotheoshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09848027239405239382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-56901709297453804632013-06-27T01:19:08.037-07:002013-06-27T01:19:08.037-07:00Scott: According to Feser, the First Way is about ...Scott: <i>According to Feser, the First Way is about causal series ordered per se, and such series are indeed simultaneous. I strongly doubt that you're saying Feser is wrong about what per se causal series are ("paradigmatically hierarchical with their causes acting simultaneously").</i><br /><br /><i>Per se</i> causality can indeed be spread out over time (and conversely, causes that aren't <i>per se</i> might be simultaneous). They are "paradigmatically" simultaneous meaning "the easiest or most common or most self-evident" example, that's all. (Hence the irrelevance of objections that are periodically raised about "nothing really being simultaneous in physics", etc.) But that kind of example certainly is the most obvious way to get at the kind of causality in question.<br /><br />><i>I’m having trouble . . . seeing how Dr. Feser shows that the first way requires an immovable mover, aka a being of pure act. . . . </i><br /><br />A few thoughts: being an argument "from" motion, just means it <i>starts from</i> motion or change; where it ends up is an entirely different matter. Now, Thomas just stops his first argument when he reaches a First mover (which must be unmoved in the series or it wouldn't be first). He doesn't talk about unmovability; but then again, it's a brief summary, so it can't cover everything. Certainly once the question is raised we can follow it through; whether that counts as "implicitly" part of the First Way or as something extra.... well, it's purely a question of labelling — the philosophy doesn't care what you call it. (Feser does call it a "further question" on p. 74.)<br /><br />Anyway, if something, however actualised, causes X, then it is in motion, because it changed from not causing X to causing it. Well, suppose this being exists outside of time (so it's only a "Cambridge change"): then there's no question of its being caused to exist at some point in the past — it simply either is or isn't; it "is" caused [in the eternal "now"] or it is eternally uncaused, which is to say, is Pure Act. But anything that is being caused to exist by something else is not the first cause in a <i>per se</i> chain, which I take to be the Profeser's point.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-48776159419288747862013-06-26T18:21:24.491-07:002013-06-26T18:21:24.491-07:00Well, now that peace has officially broken out, le...Well, now that peace has officially broken out, let's see whether we can resume the (sub)discussion where it left off. Here's where we were:<br /><br />I proposed the following argument. Suppose the first mover at the present time were something whose existence required actualization by something else but was in fact actualized at some earlier time. In that case we'd still need to continue the causal series backward in order to account for its existence at all—which, according to our supposition, wouldn't have been actualized unless actualized by another. The regress still has to end somewhere in order for anything to exist at all, so eventually we have to reach a being of pure act. And we know that <i>that</i> mover exists at the present time, because a being of pure act can't go out of existence.<br /><br />Now, if that argument is sound, then one question is whether it actually amounts in some way to a <i>reductio ad absurdum</i>. Does the fact that this pure act exists at all times (indeed positively eternally) somehow show that our initial supposition of an unmoved-but-movable mover must have been incorrect and the <i>per se</i> series extends all the way to the pure act?<br /><br />If so (or if there's some other similar argument/consideration that I'm overlooking), then it's possible that Feser's brief statement on p. 77 of <i>Aquinas</i> is an elided version of something along those lines.<br /><br />So: does the existence of a being who is pure act somehow imply that that being must be at the head of every <i>per se</i> causal series?<br /><br />Anybody? Bueller? Bueller?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67633500436251645312013-06-26T17:37:58.568-07:002013-06-26T17:37:58.568-07:00Yeah, I'm a long time reader, but this is my f...Yeah, I'm a long time reader, but this is my first time to post, so I can see where rank sophist is coming from. Most people that haven't ever commented before are completely new to the material and make stock or downright stupid objections or questions. I'm familiar with thomism and feser, so my questions are a little more specific and technical.<br /><br />Sorry for the confusion guysTimotheoshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09848027239405239382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6495842644106202002013-06-26T16:05:05.841-07:002013-06-26T16:05:05.841-07:00"This is why I have repeatedly attempted to e..."This is why I have repeatedly attempted to explain the First Way in such a way that his concern is answered."<br /><br />Which is a valuable thing, and I'm sure it's been helpful to Timotheos in its own right. I haven't objected at all to your explanation itself, only to its relevance to the specific argument on p. 77 of <i>Aquinas</i>. Timotheos has never has a problem with the main argument of the First Way—only with Feser's own step from the unmoved mover to the immovable mover.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51572149725133013922013-06-26T15:59:09.569-07:002013-06-26T15:59:09.569-07:00@rank sophist:
"If this wasn't his inten...@rank sophist:<br /><br />"If this wasn't his intention, then I suddenly understand why my comments haven't been making sense to Scott."<br /><br />Aside from the fact that Timotheos has confirmed it a couple of times himself, it's certainly what <i>I</i> took his intention to be. So I'm glad it's all becoming clear now. (And again, it's not that your comments haven't made any sort of sense; it's that they simply haven't addressed the point I thought was at issue.)<br /><br />Sorry to have come across as antagonistic. Again, just frustrated because I've been taking Timotheos to be asking for an explanation specifically of Feser's argument and you've been offering an alternative (which is fine) instead of an exposition (which is what you appeared to be claiming to offer).<br /><br />I call truce. ;-)Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-21831056400726501572013-06-26T15:46:23.969-07:002013-06-26T15:46:23.969-07:00Scott,
According to Feser, the First Way is about...Scott,<br /><br /><i>According to Feser, the First Way is about causal series ordered per se, and such series are indeed simultaneous. I strongly doubt that you're saying Feser is wrong about what per se causal series are ("paradigmatically hierarchical with their causes acting simultaneously").</i><br /><br />We've already agreed that simultaneity doesn't exist in the necessary sense. (This is a point that Prof. Feser has acknowledged as well, if memory serves.) Which works, because essentially ordered causal series aren't necessarily simultaneous: they're just instrumental. That is, one thing only moves to the extent that it is moved by another, and no farther. What Prof. Feser said should be taken as an illustration. A real per se series operates along the lines of Oderberg's pizza example in the article I linked before, which is not simultaneous in the way we generally use that word. Nevertheless, the disappearance of pizza from Fred's mind would cause him to stop seeking it, just as the disappearance of Fred's soul would cause his body to stop seeking pizza, and the disappearance of his brain would cause his limbs to stop seeking it.<br /><br /><i>But when you claim to be addressing Timotheos's question and you answer some other question instead, you are indeed changing the subject in the sense I meant—not, that is, somehow diverting the discussion generally, but answering a different question from the one you say you're answering.<br /><br />[...] <br /><br />I'm merely frustrated by your contradictory attempts to present your own argument as what Feser really meant while acknowledging that you have no idea why he "switches to ontology" in the very part of his argument that you claim to be trying to expound.</i><br /><br />I'll let Timotheos speak for himself, but it never seemed to me that he was interested in Prof. Feser's description <i>as such</i>--just with the First Way as he (Timotheos) understood it after reading Aquinas and TLS. This is why I have repeatedly attempted to explain the First Way in such a way that his concern is answered. Further, although I don't claim to understand exactly what Prof. Feser meant, I've been trying to put his statements and the argument itself into their proper context in hopes of clearing up confusion. I admit that I've probably caused more confusion than I've cleared up, but that wasn't my intention.<br /><br />Glenn,<br /><br /><i>In light of the more general, albeit inaccurate, rendition of the issue raised by Timotheos, your comments in general make sense.</i><br /><br />That's what I thought Timotheos was saying. I saw that he mentioned Prof. Feser's work, but I didn't think that he was interested in dissecting Prof. Feser's text <i>in particular</i>. I just thought he was only familiar with the argument from Prof. Feser's work, and so he was basing his question on his current knowledge. If this wasn't his intention, then I suddenly understand why my comments haven't been making sense to Scott.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-63081422677504283132013-06-26T13:52:34.492-07:002013-06-26T13:52:34.492-07:00@Glenn: You've nailed it as far as I'm per...@Glenn: You've nailed it as far as I'm personally concerned. I emphasize again that I apologize (to rank and anyone else who cares) if I seemed aggressive rather than merely frustrated.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-87625918314322804052013-06-26T13:16:50.081-07:002013-06-26T13:16:50.081-07:00Rank,
...on the other hand, I could just be total...Rank,<br /><br /><i>...on the other hand, I could just be totally wrong, which has happened many times before.</i><br /><br />As a bystander, it doesn't appear to me that you have been totally wrong, only inadvertently off-base.<br /><br />Timotheos had specifically said (with emphases now added), <br /><br />"I know this is off topic, but I’m having an issue with understanding the first way <b><i>as presented in TLS\Aquinas</i></b>. I accept that the argument demonstrates the existence of an unmoved mover. I’m having trouble, however, seeing how <b><i>Dr. Feser shows that</i></b> the first way requires an immovable mover, aka a being of pure act."<br /><br />But perhaps in its eagerness to be helpful (which is a good thing), your mind skirted over a thing or two, and had you commenting as if Timotheos had only written the more general, <br /><br />"I know this is off topic, but I’m having an issue with understanding the first way. I accept that the argument demonstrates the existence of an unmoved mover. I’m having trouble, however, seeing how the first way requires an immovable mover, aka a being of pure act."<br /><br />In light of the more general, albeit inaccurate, rendition of the issue raised by Timotheos, your comments in general make sense. <br /><br />In light of the actual, specific issue raised by him, however, your comments, while still in general making sense on their own, miss the nub of what Timotheos and Scott have been discussing.<br /><br />But I'm speaking as a bystander here, so maybe there is something I have overlooked.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-85935974573602793922013-06-26T12:49:27.851-07:002013-06-26T12:49:27.851-07:00@rank sophist:
"I never denied that the caus...@rank sophist:<br /><br />"I never denied that the causal series was per se."<br /><br />I said you did so "in effect." What you expressly denied was that the causal series in the First Way had to be (absolutely) simultaneous.<br /><br />According to Feser, the First Way is about causal series ordered <i>per se</i>, and such series are indeed simultaneous. I strongly doubt that you're saying Feser is wrong about what <i>per se</i> causal series are ("paradigmatically hierarchical with their causes acting simultaneously"). So if you're saying the only other thing that could make your statement pertinent—that the causal series in the First Way can be "spread out" over time in some relevant sense—you're <i>in effect</i> denying that the causal series in the First Way has to be ordered <i>per se</i>.<br /><br />[Me:"The question is why, <b>according to Feser</b>, the unmoved mover has to be pure act . . . "]<br /><br />"You don't seem to be reading my posts. Let me explain this again."<br /><br />You don't seem to be reading the words "according to Feser." Let me rephrase. The original question, which is still at least partly unanswered and which you claim to be addressing ("I'm just trying to explain what Prof. Feser most likely means"), is what <i>Feser</i> means in the argument he makes on p. 77 of <i>Aquinas</i> that the unmoved mover has to be pure act.<br /><br />Your own argument on that point is a welcome contribution to the discussion and I've already acknowledged that it has merit <i>as</i> an argument. My point is that you keep presenting it (and presenting it and presenting it) as some sort of summary of the portion of <i>Feser's</i> argument that posed a problem for Timotheos, even though you seem also to be aware that it's no such thing.<br /><br />[Me: "<b>Timotheos's question</b> is precisely why Feser does that very thing."]<br /><br />"No, it isn't. You were both talking about what Aquinas really intended."<br /><br />Yes, it is. Here's Timotheos's question: "I’m having an issue with understanding the first way as presented in [Feser's books] TLS\Aquinas. . . . I’m having trouble . . . seeing how Dr. Feser shows that the first way requires an immovable mover, aka a being of pure act. . . . My problem is that I don’t know what Dr. Feser is trying to suggest [in the portion of his argument on p. 77 of <i>Aquinas</i>."<br /><br />Yes, in discussing possible answers to this question, we later talked about what Aquinas really intended, and I didn't say otherwise. But the question is exactly what I said it was.<br /><br />I don't object in the slightest to your following the topic wherever it leads, taking side trails, following up on other thoughts and ideas, or whatever. But when you claim to be <i>addressing Timotheos's question</i> and you answer some other question instead, you are indeed changing the subject in the sense I meant—not, that is, somehow diverting the discussion generally, but answering a different question from the one you say you're answering.<br /><br />"Your aggressiveness toward my attempts to help remains a mystery to me."<br /><br />I apologize for sounding aggressive. I'm not, and I'm not trying to give you a hard time. I'm merely frustrated by your contradictory attempts to present your own argument as what Feser really meant while acknowledging that you have no idea why he "switches to ontology" in the very part of his argument that you claim to be trying to expound.<br /><br />I don't expect you to read his mind. But reading his words would be nice, at least if you're going to try to tell us what he meant by them.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46400807541105224742013-06-26T11:49:03.188-07:002013-06-26T11:49:03.188-07:00Also,
You yourself say that you don't know wh...Also,<br /><br /><i>You yourself say that you don't know why Feser switches to ontology at this point in his argument, so you're obviously not telling us what he "most likely means" on p. 77 of his book; you're telling us, at most, what you think he should have argued instead.</i><br /><br />I don't claim to be able to read Prof. Feser's mind. Studying Aquinas's primary texts has made me realize that even seemingly straightforward language can have an unexpected meaning. All I know is that A) Aquinas argues X and B) Prof. Feser knows his Aquinas. From there, I apply a liberal dose of the principle of charity. I don't see why the switch to ontology is necessary; but, then, Prof. Feser may not even intend the argument that way. The book is a <i>beginner's guide</i>, after all: it uses friendly language and metaphors, and it doesn't get bogged down in the countless, extremely technical distinctions for which Thomism is notorious. Or, on the other hand, I could just be totally wrong, which has happened many times before.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14913029862519634992013-06-26T11:00:43.157-07:002013-06-26T11:00:43.157-07:00Scott,
His question is about why that mover must ...Scott,<br /><br /><i>His question is about why that mover must be not merely "unmoved" but immovable</i><br /><br />Which I have explained several times, now.<br /><br /><i>The question is why, according to Feser, the unmoved mover has to be pure act, and all you've done so far is assert that it must be.</i><br /><br />You don't seem to be reading my posts. Let me explain this again. If something moves something else, then it must be drawn by a final cause <i>other than itself</i>. Its motion is therefore brought about by another (i.e. the final cause), as Oderberg confirms in his article "<a href="https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B7SKlRTfkUieN3dGVkhNTi1SQUU/edit?usp=drive_web&pli=1" rel="nofollow">Whatever is Changing is Being Changed by Something Else</a>"--an article that Prof. Feser <a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/03/oderberg-on-first-way.html" rel="nofollow">has praised</a>. The only thing that can cause change <i>without</i> relying on a goal higher than itself is pure and immovable act, since pure and immovable act--as the highest thing--contemplates only itself. It is therefore a contradiction to suggest that there could be an unmoved and yet potentially movable mover, because any potentially movable mover is by definition incapable of having itself as its own goal.<br /><br /><i>Except that you did so by in effect dropping the hypothesis that the causal series was ordered per se</i><br /><br />And again you seem not to be reading my posts. I never denied that the causal series was per se. I simply said that per se causal series were something different from the metaphorical description used by many Thomists. <br /><br /><i>Then once again, you are indeed changing the subject, because Timotheos's question is precisely why Feser does that very thing.</i><br /><br />No, it isn't. You were both talking about what Aquinas really intended. Here's what Timotheos said:<br /><br /><i>Now I think your interpretation of the argument is powerful, but I'm not sure if Aquinas would accept it. The reason I'm not sure he would accept it is because we're staring to trace things backwards in time, and I'm not sure he would approve of that.</i><br /><br />And this was what you said in response:<br /><br /><i>One obvious problem (equivalent, or very nearly so, to what you've already said) is that Aquinas is concerned in the First Way with per se causal series, whereas my own argument appears to allow for the possibility that the per se series stops at some unmoved-but-not-immovable mover whose existence needs to be accounted for by causes that are prior in time.</i><br /><br />Then you said:<br /><br /><i>Let's see whether anyone else has anything to say.</i><br /><br />And so I thought that I would explain why an unmoved (<i>and immovable</i>) mover was necessary even without the switch to ontology, so as simultaneously to defuse the problem raised by Timotheos and the problem of being unfaithful to Aquinas's argument. Your aggressiveness toward my attempts to help remains a mystery to me.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4669407890561343442013-06-26T10:30:24.491-07:002013-06-26T10:30:24.491-07:00Oops. "This is a pretty good argument as far ...Oops. "This is a pretty good argument as far as it goes, <i>but</i> as you yourself acknowledge, it isn't Feser's."Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6261499844134857422013-06-26T10:29:37.333-07:002013-06-26T10:29:37.333-07:00@rank sophist:
"I'm just trying to expla...@rank sophist:<br /><br />"I'm just trying to explain what Prof. Feser most likely means by describing what Aquinas says."<br /><br />Except that you're clearly not doing any such thing with regard to the question at hand:<br /><br />"Anything that moves other things must move them either by appeal to another or through itself. Only pure act can move through itself, because only pure act can cause motion without appealing to any goal higher than itself. Therefore, there cannot be a first mover with unactualized potencies--or whatever--that at one time was created by another."<br /><br />This is a pretty good argument as far as it goes, as you yourself acknowledge, it isn't Feser's. You yourself say that you don't know why Feser switches to ontology at this point in his argument, so you're obviously <i>not</i> telling us what he "most likely means" on p. 77 of his book; you're telling us, at most, what you think he should have argued instead.<br /><br />There's nothing wrong with that, but it would be more helpful if you distinguished between the two.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74084859057111013412013-06-26T10:17:34.430-07:002013-06-26T10:17:34.430-07:00@rank sophist:
"I'm not changing the sub...@rank sophist:<br /><br />"I'm not changing the subject, here[.]"<br /><br />Yes, you are. Neither Timotheos nor I needs to be walked through the argument to an unmoved mover time and again. As Timotheos made clear in the first place, as I've explained, and as he's confirmed, his question is not about why there's an <i>unmoved</i> mover at the head of a <i>per se</i> causal series. His question is about why that mover must be not merely "unmoved" but <i>immovable</i>, as Feser argues it must be in response to an objection from Scott MacDonald (who says the First Way doesn't rule out a first mover that is <i>capable</i> of motion even though <i>in fact</i> unmoved).<br /><br />If MacDonald's objection were sound, Aquinas would have failed to show that the unmoved mover was pure act. Timotheos is trying to work out what Feser says is wrong with MacDonald's objection, in order to see why Feser says Aquinas <i>has</i> shown that the unmoved mover is pure act.<br /><br />So it's not only unnecessary but <i>irrelevant</i> to keep rehearsing the argument to a merely "unmoved" mover. We all get that part. The question is why, according to Feser, the unmoved mover <i>has to be pure act</i>, and all you've done so far is assert that it must be.<br /><br />"I explained why MacDonald's and Timotheos's argument (that there could be a first mover "capable of motion even if, qua first mover, it does not in fact move") makes no sense."<br /><br />Except that you did so by in effect dropping the hypothesis that the causal series was ordered <i>per se</i>, even though a <i>per se</i> causal series is precisely what's at issue in <i>Feser's</i> argument and his reply to MacDonald. It also happens to be what Feser says is at issue in <i>Aquinas's</i> argument, so I'd say that's a pretty serious change of subject.<br /><br />"I personally don't understand why Prof. Feser switches to ontology to counter the objection, because it isn't necessary."<br /><br />Then once again, you are indeed changing the subject, because Timotheos's question is precisely why Feser does that very thing.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77442344542786100072013-06-26T10:00:46.855-07:002013-06-26T10:00:46.855-07:00Scott,
We're not talking about what some othe...Scott,<br /><br /><i>We're not talking about what some other argument might have said instead; we're talking about what Feser has in mind in a part of his argument that comes shortly after the bit I've just quoted.</i><br /><br />How are we supposed to understand what Prof. Feser is saying unless we appeal to Aquinas's actual argument? I'm not changing the subject, here; I'm just trying to explain what Prof. Feser most likely means by describing what Aquinas says. Similarly, it's helpful to appeal to Aquinas's real text to explain Prof. Feser's reductionist metaphor for the First Way, which would have been incoherent to Aquinas but which is helpful for explaining the argument to modernists.<br /><br /><i>On the other hand, if all you mean by "absolutely simultaneous" is "occurring at the very same durationless mathematical instant," then of course I agree; neither Aquinas nor post-Einsteinian physics would accept that sort of simultaneity. But it's still beside the point. The argument in question here does require all the causes in the series to be acting now, even if we have to understand this "now" as a sort of specious present rather than as a mathematical instant (as I think we do anyway on other grounds).</i><br /><br />By the very fact that nothing is, as you said, capable of occurring in the "very same durationless instant", it is impossible for absolutely simultaneous causality to exist. If the process of one thing moving another is not timeless, then it automatically follows that all causal series extend back in time. But this does not mean that all causality is suddenly accidental. Like I said, if the spheres stopped moving, then entities would stop coming into relations very quickly, which would end all change. Thus it still fits the bill as a "simultaneous", per se series, even though it isn't absolutely simultaneous. Each member is still brought to motion by a past member that was in some way more actual, which was in turn brought to motion by another more actual member.<br /><br /><i>I know you said you don't have the book at hand, but we've reproduced the relevant passages in this very thread.</i><br /><br />I know. And I explained why MacDonald's and Timotheos's argument (that there could be a first mover "capable of motion even if, qua first mover, it does not in fact move") makes no sense. Anything that moves other things must move them either by appeal to another or through itself. Only pure act can move through itself, because only pure act can cause motion without appealing to any goal higher than itself. Therefore, there cannot be a first mover with unactualized potencies--or whatever--that at one time was created by another. It's a flat contradiction: such a mover would have to move through itself, which is impossible. I personally don't understand why Prof. Feser switches to ontology to counter the objection, because it isn't necessary.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51965233108567312052013-06-26T07:06:03.485-07:002013-06-26T07:06:03.485-07:00@rank sophist:
"But even an omnipotent angel...@rank sophist:<br /><br />"But even an omnipotent angel, because of its composition, would have to be moved by a goal or purpose other than itself--which leads us back to the Unmoved Mover."<br /><br />Again, though, the argument under discussion here is Feser's, and Timotheos is specifically trying to understand why <i>that</i> specific argument switches from "operations or activities" to "existence or being" when Feser is replying to Scott MacDonald's objection. At this point in the argument it is the very existence of that hypothetical angel that is at issue, not its movement now that it <i>does</i> exist.<br /><br />I know you said you don't have the book at hand, but we've reproduced the relevant passages in this very thread.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52864969596320124232013-06-26T06:44:56.801-07:002013-06-26T06:44:56.801-07:00@rank sophist:
On the other hand, if all you mean...@rank sophist:<br /><br />On the other hand, if all you mean by "absolutely simultaneous" is "occurring at the very same durationless mathematical instant," then of course I agree; neither Aquinas nor post-Einsteinian physics would accept that sort of simultaneity. But it's still beside the point. The argument in question here does require all the causes in the series to be acting <i>now</i>, even if we have to understand this "now" as a sort of specious present rather than as a mathematical instant (as I think we do anyway on other grounds).Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46331526705690314872013-06-26T06:30:47.312-07:002013-06-26T06:30:47.312-07:00@rank sophist:
"The First Way doesn't re...@rank sophist:<br /><br />"The First Way doesn't require a chain of absolutely simultaneous causes."<br /><br />According to the argument as Feser is presenting it in the passage under discussion here, it most assuredly does. The argument is supposed to involve causal series ordered <i>per se</i>, in which "if any member higher up in the series ceases its causal activity, the activity of the lower members will necessarily cease as well. . . . Causal series ordered per se are paradigmatically hierarchical with their members acting simultaneously[.]" [Feser, <i>Aquinas</i>, pp. 70-71].<br /><br />Now, that may be <i>wrong</i>, but it's most certainly what the argument we're discussing <i>says</i>; it's precisely that point that gives rise to Timotheos's question. We're not talking about what some other argument might have said instead; we're talking about what <i>Feser</i> has in mind in a part of <i>his</i> argument that comes shortly after the bit I've just quoted.<br /><br />@Robert:<br /><br />Thank you as well.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61207896142314025832013-06-26T01:30:26.980-07:002013-06-26T01:30:26.980-07:00@Scott
Thank you for the exchange.
A cause tha...@Scott<br /><br />Thank you for the exchange. <br /><br /><b><br />A cause that isn't in any way directed toward an effect simply makes no sense to me.</b><br /><br />I can understand this within a certain metaphysical framework, but I am not sure how metaphysics alone can actually provide the correct answer to this question. <br /><br />I suppose that it could be true, but sometimes there is a huge gulf of possibility between could be and actually is.<br /><br />Anyway, thanks again for the stimulating discussion. It gives me a lot to think about. <br />Robertnoreply@blogger.com