tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post5957797552241106947..comments2024-03-19T02:00:34.750-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Scientism roundupEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger161125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-32013049787971183002020-10-19T02:55:57.029-07:002020-10-19T02:55:57.029-07:00Dr Feser ,
How do you respond to people who say th...Dr Feser ,<br />How do you respond to people who say that philosophy is dead , like Stephen Hawking ?<br />Plus i heard Jerry Coyne accuse you of being dishonest by saying that the atheists who supposedly "refute" Aquinas's arguments are actually honest and know what Aquinas is saying and therefore they are not making caricatures.<br />Saw it in a youtube channel called Rationality Rules who tried to attack Ben Shapiro and you in that interview you had with him.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15464298969989623285noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51934693141198087292015-05-07T19:55:28.192-07:002015-05-07T19:55:28.192-07:00Hi Dr. Feser!
I intend to read the entire series,...Hi Dr. Feser!<br /><br />I intend to read the entire series, so I can have a good grasp of the topic. (I also plan to do this with the other roundup posts you have on this blog. Thank you so much!)<br /><br />I have a question regarding the first article, "Blinded by Scientism," in the fifth to the last paragraph:<br />___<br /><br />Why is it that the "manifest image" and the "scientific image" of the [material] world "cannot be reconciled"? Is the idea that the [material] world is composed of "colorless, soundless, meaningless particles in motion" false, and that the explanations taught in high school about how color and sound work also wrong?<br /><br />Can qualitative sense perceptions never be accounted for with quantitative explanations? (Meaning and purpose definitely cannot be accounted for with measures, but what about color, temperature, and sounds?)<br />___<br /><br />Concerning the first question, I'm thinking what you mean is that the explanations for color, sound, etc. in terms of quarks does not convey the whole of reality, but only material reality. (Am I right? I'm sorry that I may have misunderstood the text.) With the second question, I don't have an idea...<br /><br />Thank you, Dr. Feser!Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04846055498202862359noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-2420964216840443502011-04-23T21:59:14.078-07:002011-04-23T21:59:14.078-07:00@ dguller
Though I strongly agree with you that t...@ dguller<br /><br />Though I strongly agree with you that the scientific method has been wonderfully successful at helping us to achieve a better understanding of the Universe(w.r.t. physical sciences especially), I would have to disagree with scientism's premise regarding scientific knowledge as being the only mode for achieving any sort of "real" knowledge of the world. <br /><br />Would you regard mathematics and logic (which you admit are methods for achieving knowledge distinct from the scientific method) as being the only methods, apart from the scientific method, which provide us with any real knowledge or do you happen to be aware of any others? I mention this because I'm curious as to your thoughts on Hayek's point regarding the limits of the scientific method in achieving an accurate description of the social orders (e.g. market economies in particular) which correspond to "real" phenomena, yet do not lend themselves to the usual methodology. Specifically his point mentioning the dangers inherent in misapplying said methods in achieving inaccurate, even erroneous descriptions of reality.<br /><br />http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1974/hayek-lecture.html<br /><br />Admittedly Hayek is not arguing against the use of science in studying the economy, he's merely arguing against its misuse. So do you at least agree that the methods of physics are, say, different from the methods of biology, and those of the latter two are different to paleontology, archaeology and geology? Would you say that it's important to distinguish between the specific methodologies of these various scientific fields, lest we fail to obtain what we're looking for? So that there is no one scientific method but varying degrees of a method, some more promising at helping us to achieve knowledge than others?<br /><br />Lastly, math may be distinct from the more empirical sciences in helping us to achieve knowledge but I do not think it needs to eventually be verified through empirical science as you claim earlier. Godel & Tarski's metamath should be sufficient to dissuade anyone from believing this. Or merely contemplating Cantor's infinite sets will get you to see that the mind can achieve knowledge independent of the usual empirical sciences. <br /><br />Personally (and I'm no philosopher) I believe there are various methods for obtaining knowledge, some more suitable to certain scenarios than others. This is a meta-statement and I'm fine with that. I also believe that science is the most successful method humans have come up with for obtaining knowledge, though its reach is not allencompasing. I do believe that science will continue to astonish us with revealing more truth but that its approach to truth is asymptotic. Kinda like the onion Feynman once mentioned peeling away. The asymptote is "the way things really are" and science can only get closer, but never reach it for reasons Bronowski points out very clearly.<br /><br />Anyway, sorry if I rambled. I have much faith in science but am aware that it has limits in (and degrees of) applicability, and is incapable of providing us with answers to questions like: is there a God? For these specifically hard to get to topics I think intuition and imagination are good places to found our knowledge on. Math makes a lot of use of these too.complexphenomnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-70937426905711078792011-03-20T18:01:55.359-07:002011-03-20T18:01:55.359-07:00Al:
Thanks for your reply.
>> The evidence...Al:<br /><br />Thanks for your reply.<br /><br />>> The evidence for God is accessible within our space-time from His divine revelation, and from the evidence that we see around us -- at the least the apparent design of our universe and features of the human mind that necessarily transcend physicalism, as I suggested in my post and in the background section of my cosmological article.<br /><br />First, which divine revelation? There are many.<br /><br />Second, what aspects of the human mind “transcend physicalism”?<br /><br />>> How can logical relations, if they are to be universally true, and ideas associated with them, 'jump' from mind to mind if they are physical (spatio-temporal) entities?<br /><br />First, logical relations are abstracted from our experience in the world. We subsequently treat them as immutable and incorrigible, but they are rooted in our natural experience. When one is trying to decide whether a logical rule of inference works, what does one do? One tries it out with different premises and conclusions and sees if it leads to a false conclusion. All the examples in textbooks of logic are from our empirical experience.<br /><br />Second, they do not have to “jump” from mind to mind at all. We all have the same basic structure of our mind, and thus similar processes can be activated when we interact with one another. Why can’t logic be one of them? After all, we all live in the same world, which operates according to the same regularities and patterns, which we are able to reflect upon and abstract from to generate logical relationships. However, I fail to see that these logical relationships exist outside of space-time. I mean, just because we happen to treat them as indubitable and immutable does not mean that we are thereby touching beyond space-time.<br /><br />Again, all of this is taking our cognitive capacities to reach beyond space-time, which I find highly suspicious and grandiose. In the empirical world, we can test our rational deductions by testing them. Beyond the empirical world, we are stuck with the rational deductions themselves with no way of knowing whether they actually refer to anything real, except that they really, truly feel like they do. Is this feeling enough? What about a fiction writer who feels like they are contacting a real world in their fiction, populated by real individuals with real lives, and so on? Does that feeling of inspiration mean that they are really contacting some other realm?dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-66202490912755636282011-03-20T09:57:12.162-07:002011-03-20T09:57:12.162-07:00dguller:
How can reasoning based upon our experie...dguller:<br /><br /><i>How can reasoning based upon our experience of natural phenomena be able to bootstrap us out of the natural world into the realm beyond space-time? Just because it is highly effective in helping us to understand the natural world does not imply that it is equally effective beyond it. I guess that this is the core of my problem with this whole issue,</i><br /><br />First, remember what I had said in my post March 15, 7:24 pm:<br /><br /><i>There is enough evidence, we do not start from something forever completely outside space-time. The evidence for God is accessible within our space-time from His divine revelation, and from the evidence that we see around us -- at the least the apparent design of our universe and features of the human mind that necessarily transcend physicalism, as I suggested in my post and in the background section of my cosmological article.</i><br /><br />See also my previous post.<br /><br />Second, not only is evidence for God accessible from within our space-time, we already know that certain things must be valid by necessity independent of our space-time. As Victor Reppert recently wrote:<br /><br />http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2011/03/naturalism-without-materialism.html<br /><br /><i>Hiero5ant: You make the claim that all causal relations must involve spatio-temporal relations. This means, I take it, that anything that plays a causal role must have a particular location in space and time.<br /><br />Yet, if you draw a rational inference, you draw it in virtue of logical relations between the premises and the conclusion, and logical relations have no particular location in space and time, since they hold good regardless of spatiotemporal location. Yet those logical relationship are supposed to have an effect on what you conclude when you draw a logical conclusion. So I am not sure that this constraint is consistent with the possibility of rational inference.</i><br /><br />You might of course say, well, logical relations are only embodied in physical minds, and these are restrained to space-time. But this would be a tenuous argument. How can logical relations, if they are to be universally true, and ideas associated with them, 'jump' from mind to mind if they are physical (spatio-temporal) entities? <br /><br /><i>because I think that just because something is implied by reason does not necessarily mean that it refers to something real.</i><br /><br />I have answered this in my previous post, outlining different kinds of knowledge. It is not clear to me why you keep repeating it.Al Moritzhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17422697770654047870noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46837883353995227632011-03-19T09:18:07.960-07:002011-03-19T09:18:07.960-07:00Al:
How can reasoning based upon our experience o...Al:<br /><br />How can reasoning based upon our experience of natural phenomena be able to bootstrap us out of the natural world into the realm beyond space-time? Just because it is highly effective in helping us to understand the natural world does not imply that it is equally effective beyond it. I guess that this is the core of my problem with this whole issue, because I think that just because something is implied by reason does not necessarily mean that it refers to something real. That is the core assumption behind natural theology and metaphysics, and I wonder why anyone would believe it.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42411202200608947612011-03-18T17:48:05.455-07:002011-03-18T17:48:05.455-07:00(cont.)
Just like judging by plausibility is a fa...(cont.)<br /><br />Just like judging by plausibility is a fact of life in many areas, and daily life itself, as I just pointed out, also on the issue of theism vs. atheism it comes down to plausibility. And to me an unmoved mover that is a necessary being makes a whole lot more sense than a contingent wider universe that by chance exists as a perpetuum mobile that is just cranking out universes, for no other reason than that's just the way it is (our local universe cannot be all there is, it had a beginning with the Big Bang). Add to that the cosmological fine-tuning argument, against which all naturalistic arguments fail (see my article), and it is simply no contest. Also, to me philosophical arguments for a mind that goes beyond the brain make a lot more sense than the argument that the mind *is* the brain just because mental activity happens to correlate with brain activity (something that Aristotle and Aquinas would have predicted, as Feser points out, thus mind = brain on a correlation basis is a pseudo-scientific argument). Throw in divine revelation, and we arrive at a convergence of evidence that to me is highly plausible. <br /><br />Certainly far more plausible than atheism. I have pondered all the arguments for and against atheism far more thoroughly than the vast majority (though not all) atheists will ever do in their lifetime, and upon digging deeper, below the attractive surface, I found that the whole atheistic construct of naturalism rests on rather feeble foundations. My opinion of course.<br /><br />God left enough finger pointers in His creation *) and through divine revelation that I don't think scientism would be a good excuse not to take a leap of faith once the evidence is judged as being plausible. After all, faith is still required; if you had scientific proof, there would be certainty, not faith. If after death you discover that there is a God, but you say "you know what, I could never believe in you because I had no scientific proof' , I do not think God would appreciate that. He might view it as a pretty lame excuse, I am afraid.<br /><br />*) not just the cosmological fine-tuning argument and the argument from reason, but also the classical philosophical arguments start with observations from His creationAl Moritzhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17422697770654047870noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86979436161874035672011-03-18T17:41:41.710-07:002011-03-18T17:41:41.710-07:00Al:
Does anything that is concluded by reason nec...<i>Al:<br /><br />Does anything that is concluded by reason necessarily have to be true in reality?</i><br /><br />Certainly not, dguller. Also Feser is cautious about that. If I remember correctly, he says two or three times in <i>Aquinas</i> something to the effect of "if those premises (or argumentation) are true, then this and that follows by necessity". Yes, we can find the Thomistic arguments plausible or even convincing, but there is nothing like a mathematical or scientific proof for God.<br /><br />Also, I believe you have mentioned examples from science where what was concluded by reason turned out not to be the case in reality, and I support that. Science does not live from reason alone, but from checking against observation and experiment. As I write in my cosmological article:<br /><br />(http://home.earthlink.net/~almoritz/cosmological-arguments-god.htm)<br /><br /><i>Indeed, as Alexander Vilenkin, one of the ‘fathers’ of quantum cosmology which deals with this kind of scenario, wrote in his paper Quantum Cosmology and Eternal Inflation: "sadly, quantum cosmology is not likely to become an observational science." But if it cannot become observational science, what kind of science is it then? The natural sciences are founded on observation and experiment. Shifting the foundations of the natural sciences towards an exploration of the world by pure thought alone would throw us back to – well, the pre-scientific world (even if the concepts and the mathematics are now more sophisticated).</i><br /><br />After all, as a scientist I dislike confusion of science with philosophy (while I love both).<br /><br />However, all this does not mean that we should throw our hands in the air and blindly follow scientism, the idea that scientific knowledge is the only real knowledge. If scientific knowledge was the only real knowledge, how could we believe anything? First of all, even science changes. For example, we had this beautiful edifice of Newtonian mechanics, and along came Einstein. Second, most of the knowledge that we go by in daily life is not scientifically tested knowledge. I do not, even cannot, scientifically test the idea that I can walk out the door to go to work and not be shot on the spot. I just assume it, as I assume thousands of things during any given day, as you do too. Third, if someone decides to marry his girlfriend, he cannot be scientifically certain that she truly loves him and will always keep on loving him. Yes, he can rigorously check for background and compatibility, but this cannot give absolute certainty. In the end it is about trust and taking the leap of faith that the marriage will be successful. <br /><br />In all these cases, we deal with knowledge and decisions based not on proof, but on plausibility. <br /><br />(cont.)Al Moritzhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17422697770654047870noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40370485043030791192011-03-17T13:07:27.952-07:002011-03-17T13:07:27.952-07:00Al:
Does anything that is concluded by reason nec...Al:<br /><br />Does anything that is concluded by reason necessarily have to be true in reality?dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44411081040942455422011-03-15T19:24:49.555-07:002011-03-15T19:24:49.555-07:00dguller:
Now, can you comment on what I wrote at ...dguller:<br /><br /><i>Now, can you comment on what I wrote at March 10, 2011 8:24 AM? Maybe you will understand my position better.</i><br /><br />I think I have answered this already with my post from March 11, 10:12 am. There is enough evidence, we do not start from something forever completely outside space-time. The evidence for God is accessible within our space-time from His divine revelation, and from the evidence that we see around us -- at the least the apparent design of our universe and features of the human mind that necessarily transcend physicalism, as I suggested in my post and in the background section of my cosmological article. <br /><br />I had said:<br /><i>There are only two possibilities for the naturalist that can be taken seriously: the creation of the universe from eternal matter or from eternal fields. Some principle must have been there forever (again, it cannot simply ‘at some point’ have come out of nothing) and since the naturalist negates an eternal God, these are the logical choices.</i><br /><br />You replied:<br /><i>I would add a third option. We do not know. Your dichotomy may be a false one. There may be other options that we do not know at this time. Furthermore, we do not know anything about eternity. All we know is what happened after the Big Bang, and what subsequently unfolded over space-time. Anything else is just speculation, which is not knowledge.<br /><br />And none of this contradictions naturalism or science.</i><br /><br />And what if the other option is God? That was my third option. And it is the one that, given the evidence in the post that I just mentioned, March 11, 10:12 am, appears the most plausible to me -- certainly far more plausible than an "option that we do not know at this time". I think you hide behind something 'science one day might uncover' -- while there is little reasonable expectation from what we *do* know that there might be something that we do not yet know which could explain a naturalistic origin of the universe. You stated earlier that you want to get to the truth. I am afraid that instead you are just putting up smokescreens and hide from the truth, because finding the truth might be uncomfortable.Al Moritzhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17422697770654047870noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27702514961711247942011-03-14T09:53:30.688-07:002011-03-14T09:53:30.688-07:00dguller,
A question that is not meaningful is, as...dguller,<br /><br />A question that is not meaningful is, as far as I'm concerned, not a question at all. e.g. What's the perimeter of a line?<br /><br />I accept bizarre truth because I accept truth absolutely. Large truth, small truth, common-sense truth, useless truth, mathematical truth, bizarre truth... the list of qualifiers is potentially endless. I'm interested in truth whatever its flavor. Perhaps if we have another conversation some day, I might try to convince you to accept truth unconditionally rather than restricting yourself to certain flavors of it. <br /><br />The absurd is false. Things that are bizarre are often absurd and therefore false, but not everything that is bizarre is absurd and false. Dr. Feser can speak for himself, but I suspect he rejects the doctrines of modern intellectuals because they false, not because they are bizarre. If not, then we part ways on this. (Anyone who rejects the bizarre because it is bizarre will find himself rejecting quantum mechanics.)<br /><br />Anyway, enjoyed the conversation and I wish you the best.dmt117http://www.lifesprivatebook.blogspot.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81806581513633817982011-03-13T19:15:56.630-07:002011-03-13T19:15:56.630-07:00Dmt:
>> It does not follow, however, that b...Dmt:<br /><br />>> It does not follow, however, that because philosophical questions are not necessary to make things work, that they are not worth asking, or that they can't be answered, or even that the answers aren't valuable. <br /><br />I agree with you, but you have to also realize that just because a question can be asked, it does not necessarily mean that it is meaningful.<br /><br />>> Personally, I don't do philosophy to make things work; I make things work so I can do philosophy.<br /><br />I don’t know what this means.<br /><br />>> As far as bizarre metaphysical conclusions go, they do not worry me. What worries me would be turning away from pursuit of the truth for fear that I might find it bizarre or, even worse, because I can't find a utilitarian purpose for it. If the truth is bizarre or useless, so be it. I pursue it for its own sake. In any case, I am quite familiar with the conclusions of Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy, and I find them refreshingly lucid.<br /><br />That is fine. You are certainly free to do whatever you want with you life, and if holding bizarre and useless truths is something that you find valuable, then more power to you. With regards to my concerns about bizarre metaphysical beliefs, I would quote Feser: “the bizarreries and absurdities to which contemporary intellectuals have been led by their rejection of the four causes have been embraced as further surprising “discoveries” or “results” of philosophical inquiry, rather than recognized for what they are: a reductio ad absurdum of the premises laid down by their intellectual ancestors” (TLS p. 72). So, be careful that you do not embrace a philosophical position that results in bizarre beliefs, because that position may have been reduced to absurdity.<br /><br />>> Our difference then, seems to not be so much about metaphysics, but philosophy itself. If useless questions that may have bizarre answers are out of bounds for you, then we may not have much to discuss, because they are just the sort of questions I like to ask (which is why I haunt philosophy blogs like this one).<br /><br />That is fair. Anyway, thanks for the conversation. As you can see, I have begun TLS, and am enjoying it a great deal, although there are some points that I disagree with.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40709228014502450412011-03-12T23:33:02.575-08:002011-03-12T23:33:02.575-08:00dguller,
I agree that we do not need to ask or an...dguller,<br /><br />I agree that we do not need to ask or answer this question - or any other philosophical question - to make things work in our daily lives. This is why Aristotle wrote that philosophy is the most noble but least necessary of endeavors, and why the perennial charge against philosophy since the time of Socrates is that it is useless. <br /><br />It does not follow, however, that because philosophical questions are not necessary to make things work, that they are not worth asking, or that they can't be answered, or even that the answers aren't valuable. Personally, I don't do philosophy to make things work; I make things work so I can do philosophy. <br /><br />As far as bizarre metaphysical conclusions go, they do not worry me. What worries me would be turning away from pursuit of the truth for fear that I might find it bizarre or, even worse, because I can't find a utilitarian purpose for it. If the truth is bizarre or useless, so be it. I pursue it for its own sake. In any case, I am quite familiar with the conclusions of Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy, and I find them refreshingly lucid.<br /><br />Our difference then, seems to not be so much about metaphysics, but philosophy itself. If useless questions that may have bizarre answers are out of bounds for you, then we may not have much to discuss, because they are just the sort of questions I like to ask (which is why I haunt philosophy blogs like this one).dmt117http://www.lifesprivatebook.blogspot.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-807662641971849762011-03-12T20:42:46.989-08:002011-03-12T20:42:46.989-08:00Dmt:
>> The quality of four that you say th...Dmt:<br /><br />>> The quality of four that you say the sides of a rectangle have: Is this the identically same four across rectangles, and is it the identically same four we have as a concept? I'm not talking about the sides of a particular rectangle, which are not identically the same across rectangles, but the quality of four that we both agree those sides possess.<br /><br />It is very tempting to talk about four as if it is some independent entity that is involved in both rectangles and our concept of “rectangle”. I would caution against this, because it leads to bizarre metaphysical conclusions. I would rather say that a rectangle has four sides, by definition, and so if we come across a shape that meets this criteria in the world, then we can call it a rectangle. I honestly do not know what else you need to make this work in our daily lives.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-37945358655698247002011-03-12T17:27:26.463-08:002011-03-12T17:27:26.463-08:00Daniel:
Thanks for the kind words. I certainly ha...Daniel:<br /><br />Thanks for the kind words. I certainly have no ability to predict what is in store for me in the future. My life has already taken a number of twists and turns that my earlier self would never have anticipated. So, you never know.<br /><br />>> The cause of this world cannot be something within the world - else it would be the cause of itself; a logical absurdity. So the cause of this world must be something not of this world. You don't need to extrapolate much beyond that.<br /><br />I’ve just started Feser’s TLS, and then will read his Aquinas, and maybe Philosophy of Mind. After that, I will be in a better position to comment on what you said. Right now, what you said just seems wrong, but I’ll first let the good professor educate me on the full meaning of your claims.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55615818075520308942011-03-12T17:25:20.342-08:002011-03-12T17:25:20.342-08:00Dmt:
>> The quality of four that you say th...Dmt:<br /><br />>> The quality of four that you say the sides of a rectangle have: Is this the identically same four across rectangles, and is it the identically same four we have as a concept? I'm not talking about the sides of a particular rectangle, which are not identically the same across rectangles, but the quality of four that we both agree those sides possess.<br /><br />It is very tempting to talk about four as if it is some independent entity that is involved in both rectangles and our concept of “rectangle”. I would caution against this, because it leads to bizarre metaphysical conclusions. I would rather say that a rectangle has four sides, by definition, and so if we come across a shape that meets this criteria in the world, then we can call it a rectangle. I honestly do not know what else you need to make this work in our daily lives.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39118462619816218412011-03-12T09:49:51.440-08:002011-03-12T09:49:51.440-08:00dguller: "There was a time when I was devout ...dguller: <i>"There was a time when I was devout and religious. It just never worked for me, and I simply lost my faith in a particular God, but still adhered to something higher and beyond, along the lines of deism, but even that was lost over time. It just became too hard to believe."</i><br /><br />Perhaps God is calling you back? Only this time it will be based on a firm foundation of real discovered truth rather than on tradition, upbringing, feelings or whatever else it may have been based on before.<br /><br />I was raised religious, but didn't really discover God until I came to him on my knees as a sinner in need of redemption. Thomism, which I've only recently discovered, just confirms the truth I already knew. Maybe you need the confirmation first?<br /><br />Let me leave you with this to ponder: The cause of this world <i>cannot be</i> something within the world - else it would be the cause of itself; a logical absurdity. So the cause of this world <i>must be</i> something not of this world. You don't need to extrapolate much beyond that.<br /><br />All the best to you in your search.Daniel Smithhttp://pulse.yahoo.com/_UXEGANXFFXZBLJT5ZVUGPNWJOA/blognoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72227903771841857992011-03-12T05:26:55.168-08:002011-03-12T05:26:55.168-08:00dguller,
No, that's fine. The quality of four...dguller,<br /><br />No, that's fine. The quality of four that you say the sides of a rectangle have: Is this the identically same four across rectangles, and is it the identically same four we have as a concept? I'm not talking about the sides of a particular rectangle, which are not identically the same across rectangles, but the quality of four that we both agree those sides possess.dmt117http://www.lifesprivatebook.blogspot.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88116322430073158832011-03-11T20:31:56.776-08:002011-03-11T20:31:56.776-08:00Dmt:
>> I'm puzzled at the reluctance t...Dmt:<br /><br />>> I'm puzzled at the reluctance to simply talk straightforwardly about the what makes a rectangle a rectangle... especially as your approach is supposed to have the advantage over Aristotelianism of an admirable straightforwardness and simplicity. As an Aristotelian, I have no problem speaking straightforwardly about the properties of things, how they have them, and why we are justified in saying they have them.<br /><br />I don’t think I was being reluctant. If you want more specifics, then I can say that a rectangle has four sides and a triangle has three sides. We can get into more specifics about the features of rectangles and triangles, too.<br /><br />I’m not too sure what else you want.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-84004019776441550482011-03-11T20:05:13.484-08:002011-03-11T20:05:13.484-08:00dguller,
It turns out I don't have to do toni...dguller,<br /><br />It turns out I don't have to do tonight what I thought I would, so I can get into it again...<br /><br /><br />"If A1 meets criteria for a rectangle, then it is a rectangle.<br /><br />If A2 meets criteria for a triangle, then it is a triangle.<br /><br />And the criteria are what we learn when we join the community of language users by interacting with rectangles and triangles, and being instructed in how to use the words “rectangle” and “triangle”."<br /><br />Of course if A1 meets criteria for a rectangle, then it is a rectangle. This is just a restatement of the premise on which we both agree. We both agree that rectangles meet criteria to be rectangles. Where we differ is exactly what those criteria are and how A1 meets them, which was the point of the question.<br /><br />And, of course, we learned the criteria through our interactions with the community of language users. No one could possibly disagree with this. Nonetheless, we disagree, perhaps because my community of language users has long included Aristotelians and yours hasn't. An interesting historical point, perhaps, but of no philosophical relevance that I can see.<br /><br />I'm puzzled at the reluctance to simply talk straightforwardly about the what makes a rectangle a rectangle... especially as your approach is supposed to have the advantage over Aristotelianism of an admirable straightforwardness and simplicity. As an Aristotelian, I have no problem speaking straightforwardly about the properties of things, how they have them, and why we are justified in saying they have them.dmt117http://www.lifesprivatebook.blogspot.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-63559473771778879342011-03-11T17:28:33.322-08:002011-03-11T17:28:33.322-08:00Daniel:
>> You seem to want to equate real ...Daniel:<br /><br />>> You seem to want to equate real properties: "triangularity", "redness", "rectangularity", etc with the language we use to describe those properties - as if the properties themselves don't exist or cease to exist if there is no one around to talk about them. I don't understand this line of reasoning. Could you explain this to me - how you arrive at this conclusion, (do I even have it right?)<br /><br />Triangular objects, red objects, and rectangular objects do not depend on us for their existence. Our description of them as triangular, red and rectangular does depend upon our ability to perceive triangles, redness and rectangles, as well as upon the language that we use, because the concepts “triangular”, “red” and “rectangular” are rooted in our language. <br /><br />That’s all.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5496179496247089142011-03-11T16:46:28.643-08:002011-03-11T16:46:28.643-08:00dguller: "If A1 meets criteria for a rectangl...dguller: <i>"If A1 meets criteria for a rectangle, then it is a rectangle. <br /><br />If A2 meets criteria for a triangle, then it is a triangle.<br /><br />And the criteria are what we learn when we join the community of language users by interacting with rectangles and triangles, and being instructed in how to use the words “rectangle” and “triangle”."</i><br /><br />If I might take up where dmt117 left off (I probably won't do his arguments justice but here goes...)<br /><br />You seem to want to equate real properties: "triangularity", "redness", "rectangularity", etc with the language we use to describe those properties - as if the properties themselves don't exist or cease to exist if there is no one around to talk about them. I don't understand this line of reasoning. Could you explain this to me - how you arrive at this conclusion, (do I even have it right?)<br /><br />Thanks.Daniel Smithhttp://pulse.yahoo.com/_UXEGANXFFXZBLJT5ZVUGPNWJOA/blognoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53759374532901530912011-03-11T11:48:23.725-08:002011-03-11T11:48:23.725-08:00Al:
>> And please don't come with the o...Al:<br /><br />>> And please don't come with the old atheist standard reply that there is no real difference between agnosticism and agnostic atheism. True agnostics, with whom I had the pleasure to discuss and who are usually very well informed in philosophy, would vehemently disagree. Agnostic atheism weighs probabilities, agnosticism does not.<br /><br />I won’t.<br /><br />Now, can you comment on what I wrote at March 10, 2011 8:24 AM? Maybe you will understand my position better.<br /><br />Thanks. And don’t worry about the misspelling.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-10669059796105605042011-03-11T11:03:36.116-08:002011-03-11T11:03:36.116-08:00Sorry for misspelling your name in the last post.Sorry for misspelling your name in the last post.Al Moritzhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17422697770654047870noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52124598728327461282011-03-11T11:02:52.583-08:002011-03-11T11:02:52.583-08:00dugller,
you are too fast pulling the trigger eac...dugller,<br /><br />you are too fast pulling the trigger each time (which also makes me wonder how much you actually think about what others say before you reply). I said that this will be continued, but you interrupted the series (I had to wait a bit each time if my post will 'stick' in the system before posting the next part).<br /><br />I will post the last bit nonetheless, even in danger of you replying that you answered already (which I am not sure you did):<br /><br />And please don't come with the old atheist standard reply that there is no real difference between agnosticism and agnostic atheism. True agnostics, with whom I had the pleasure to discuss and who are usually very well informed in philosophy, would vehemently disagree. Agnostic atheism weighs probabilities, agnosticism does not.Al Moritzhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17422697770654047870noreply@blogger.com