tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post5798812572679181159..comments2024-03-28T03:20:15.940-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Aristotle and Frege on thoughtEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger13125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71700645026011016702021-04-13T12:34:16.403-07:002021-04-13T12:34:16.403-07:00This is the 3rd and final installment:
BUT: The ...This is the 3rd and final installment:<br /><br />BUT: The existential continuous substance, called "snow" by English speakers or "schnee" by others above, existed long before human beings existed and the fact/accident that it scattered all colours of the visible spectrum was certainly true. But neither snow, nor the existential attributes of snow, are any of ideas, propositions or sentences. No humans = no discursive thinkers = no speakers = no languages = no sentences = no propositions. Agreed, that thinking is as abstract and immaterial as conceptualization. But sentences and propositions are thinking made sensible by means of symbols. Hence neither sentences nor propositions are either abstract or immaterial. They are as materially sensible, and concrete, as either sound or sight to speakers/hearers or writers/readers or touch to braille "readers/writers". As Aristotle says, in On Interpretation:<br /><br />ARISTOTLE: Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images. [On Interpretation, Chapter 1. 16a lines 3 - 7 approximately.]<br /><br />So, to Aristotle, mental experiences and those things of which our experiences are the images are the same for all human beings. The symbols, whether visual, auditory or tactile, are different. But the mental experiences, images (phantasms when recalled; or existential when sensed), sensory experiences (phantasms when recalled/remembered) and things are the same for "all men" above. In short, symbols are entirely material and concrete. So, too, are the sentences and propositions they symbolize. Thus we have:-<br /><br />FESER: propositions are abstract and immaterial.<br /><br />BYRNE: propositions are concrete and material symbolizations.<br /><br />Who's in error? Who is telling the truth according to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas?<br /><br />Kevin Byrne [elenchuskb@yahoo.ca]Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16849976067807393105noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-24739734730691603862021-04-13T12:00:40.250-07:002021-04-13T12:00:40.250-07:00I am replying to myself since there is a word limi...I am replying to myself since there is a word limit on posts. This is Part II of a 3 part post. I continue:<br /><br />Now that I have actually read Frege's translated thesis, he never seems to use the translated word proposition. Thus Feser's thesis that Frege distinguishes thought from sentences, as above. But there still seems to be the same sort of "disturbing" ambiguity among and between the terms sentences, truth and thought, with Frege. [With Feser the ambiguity was between and among propositions, sentences and thought.] Just because moral sentences, which Frege describes as "imperative" sentences, are, very arguably, neither true nor false, it certainly does not follow that they don't express thoughts. Much serious deliberative thinking went into law making "imperatives" in the past. Similarly a lot of very bad thinking goes into present "imperatives" or law making. But, according to Frege above, requote: "Therefore I shall not call the sense of an imperative sentence a thought."<br /><br />Similar to Feser, above, Frege should be saying something to the effect of: "Therefore I shall not call the sense of an imperative sentence true (or false)." given that imperatives/commands certainly express thoughts. Thus Frege is simply in error above. Apparently it wasn't his only error, given Russell's refutation of his thinking on Arithmetic. Feser continues:<br /><br />FESER: To use a stock example, the English sentence “Snow is white” and the German sentence “Schnee ist weiss” both express one and the same thought or proposition, namely the thought or proposition that snow is white. That users of different languages can assert the same proposition using different sentences is one mark of the difference between sentences and propositions.<br /><br />QUESTION: Why are the English and German propositions allegedly "different sentences"? The words are definitely different and distinct SYMBOLS. But does it follow that they are different sentences? The things which the words symbolize are identical for both German and English speakers, to wit the white stuff that falls from the sky to the ground in winter and the fact/accident that this same stuff equally reflects/scatters all colors of the visible light spectrum into both German and English eyes, symbolized as "white" by English speakers and "weiss" by German speakers. Again the same question: Why does Feser call them "different sentences"? They both would be "Alpha is Beta" in Aristotle's version of symbolic logic, or a single letter variable in modern versions of symbolic logic, courtesy of Frege, Peirce, Russell, Boole etc., etc., as so-called "atomic" sentences, where neither subjects nor predicates are symbolized. So I'd say, different symbols, but the same things and, hence, the same sentences and especially identical thought. But Feser apparently disagrees, quote<br /><br />FESER: Another mark often cited by philosophers and logicians is that a proposition remains either true or false, and thus in some sense exists, regardless of whether any sentence we might use to express it exists. The proposition that snow is white was true long before English, German, or any other natural language ever came into existence, and thus before any sentence in any of these languages ever came into existence. Furthermore, like the concepts whose abstract and immaterial character is emphasized by A-T, propositions are abstract and immaterial.<br /><br />REBUTTAL: Every proposition is a sentence. (True) Conversely, Some sentence is a proposition (True). Refute either one and I may believe what you write above (which, of course, I do not believe).<br /><br />Kevin (contd.)<br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16849976067807393105noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42058172902657482502021-04-11T17:16:08.052-07:002021-04-11T17:16:08.052-07:00The following assertions of Professor Feser are so...The following assertions of Professor Feser are somewhat disturbing to anyone who knows that both Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle thought that truth and falsity were in the way that intellects compose and divide the concepts (a.k.a. ideas; or forms), which they abstract from their sensory experiences of the so-called "outer world". In short, truth and falsity are in minds. Then, humans may express such mental compositions and divisions by means of some grammatical art form, in diverse languages.<br /><br />To be certain:<br /><br />AQUINAS: "On the Contrary, the philosopher says, 'The true and false reside not in things but in the intellect.' [Summa I, Q. 16., Art. 1; Sed Contra]"<br /><br />Anton Pegis who quoted from The Summa, in his Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas, footnoted Metaphysics Book V., Ch. 4., 1027b line 25, for Aquinas's quote of "the philosopher" (Aristotle). The cited line is actually in Metaphysics Book VI, Ch. 4. Quote:<br /><br />ARISTOTLE: (... by 'together' and 'apart' I mean thinking them so that there is no succession in the thoughts but they become a unity); for falsity and truth are NOT in THINGS --- it is not as if the good were true and the bad were in itself false --- but in THOUGHT; <br /><br />Aristotle also goes on to say that quote:<br /><br />ARISTOTLE: "; while with regard to simple concepts and 'whats' falsity and truth do not exist even in thought --- this being so we must consider later..." [Book IX Ch. 10 referenced by Richard McKeon] ... what has to be discussed with regard to that which is or is not in this sense. But since the combination and separation are in thought and not in things ... etc." [Metaphysics 1027b lines 27 - 30 approx.]<br /><br />So what seems to be "disturbing"? Quote:<br /><br />FESER: By a “thought,” Frege means what contemporary logicians call a proposition, and he distinguishes thoughts from sentences.<br /><br />QUESTION: From where did the term "sentences" come?<br /><br />Feser should be saying that Frege distinguishes propositions from sentences (rather than thoughts from sentences), which Frege clearly does along with Aristotle. Or, perhaps, Feser might have distinguished thoughts from propositions. For example when I think of a triangle, I see either the word 'TRIANGLE' or a 3-sided enclosed image badly drawn on an ancient green board, in an ancient school-room, in yellow or white chalk, in my mind/head. Neither the image nor the word are either true or false. Nor are my mental images of either the word (triangle) or a green-board, 2 dimensional, 3-sided object, either sentences or propositions. But they are both thoughts and images, which I have, now, expressed electronically by means of some sentences.<br /><br />So why am I disturbed by Feser's sentence above? Because there seems to be some sort of ambiguity between thoughts, propositions and sentences. Does Feser mean that "Every thought is a proposition."? or that Frege thinks that "Every thought is a proposition.", because Frege clearly does not think, along with Aristotle and Aquinas, that "Every thought is a sentence." For example:<br /><br />FREGE: In order to work out more precisely what I want to call thought, I shall distinguish various kinds of sentences. One does not want to deny sense to an imperative sentence, but this sense is not such that the question of truth could arise for it. Therefore I shall not call the sense of an imperative sentence a thought. Sentences expressing desires or requests are ruled out in the same way. Only those sentences in which we communicate or state something come into the question.<br /> <br />[p. 293 The Thought: A Logical Inquiry Author(s): Gottlob Frege; Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 65, No. 259 (Jul., 1956), pp. 289-311; Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251513.]Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16849976067807393105noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-36026982809163868822014-11-18T23:53:35.456-08:002014-11-18T23:53:35.456-08:00Hi Dr. Feser! I really hope you can answer this, ...Hi Dr. Feser! I really hope you can answer this, but does the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in anyway undermine what Frege says or the immateriality of the intellect? Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-41836612403793663492009-03-12T12:45:00.000-07:002009-03-12T12:45:00.000-07:00Ed, have you read any of Edward Pols' work? I'm cu...Ed, have you read any of Edward Pols' work? I'm curious to know what you think of his work Mind Regained, in particular. He makes some recognizable Aristotelian moves, but also denies that he is simply 'going back' to Aristotle. He's also defended direct realism and an interesting view of free will, but it was the mind stuff that made me think of you.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-41159299629406949732009-02-17T05:43:00.000-08:002009-02-17T05:43:00.000-08:00Ed, your blog only confirms what I have discussed ...Ed, your blog only confirms what I have discussed with you elsewhere--that Aristotle's four causes can also be applied to speech acts. In this case, the propostional content of the speech-act would be the formal cause and the particular sentence--involving the language, the words used and how they were said or written--would be the material cause. Any speech act is an irreducible composite of (the analagous) formal and material causes. Likewise, there is an ontological hierarchy of formal cause over material cause.Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17960690437564874549noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4124639476231901122009-02-13T21:12:00.000-08:002009-02-13T21:12:00.000-08:00Nice post. Slightly tangential, but I include a b...Nice post. Slightly tangential, but I include a brief discussion of why Averroes' Aristotelianism had far more influence in Christendom than in Islam <A HREF="https://www.quadrant.org.au/blogs/warby/2009/02/belief-and-the-text" REL="nofollow">here</A>Lorenzohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00305933404442191098noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-92030818401770014512009-02-10T04:36:00.000-08:002009-02-10T04:36:00.000-08:00Sigh, kids these days. http://veniaminov.blogspot....Sigh, kids these days. <BR/><BR/>http://veniaminov.blogspot.com/2009/02/always-remember.html#commentsCodgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-62385522978401243082009-02-08T10:43:00.000-08:002009-02-08T10:43:00.000-08:00Hello Rafe,Thanks for that. World 3 is yet anothe...Hello Rafe,<BR/><BR/>Thanks for that. World 3 is yet another of Popper's unjustly neglected ideas (neglected by "mainstream" philosophers, anyway).<BR/><BR/>Hello Cogitator,<BR/><BR/>Yes, your "nerves" analogy seems exactly right to me. I haven't seen Reimers's book, but I will look at your review.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-32921505810499125122009-02-07T21:50:00.000-08:002009-02-07T21:50:00.000-08:00Keep up the good work, Dr. Feser. I'm two-thirds t...Keep up the good work, Dr. Feser. I'm two-thirds through TLS, and, as expected, find it winsome and cogent. As for all the hubbub about the "polemical" tone, I keep waiting to hit pay dirt. I mean, sure some rebuttals are barbed, but, well, that's part of what makes for good writing and good reading. <BR/><BR/>Regarding this post: <BR/><BR/>1) Mortimer Adler made the point on numerous occasions that we cannot grasp our ideas directly, but only grasp the intelligible world BY our ideas. This I accept but I am looking for a better way to "get my mind around" it, since it is extremely abstract. A stab: we cannot introspect upon our ideas in an analogous way that nerves cannot "feel" themselves; in both cases, they are means by which we conceive and perceive, respectively, but not objects themselves of conception or perception. An eyeball can't look itself, but can look at a mirror to see itself, etc. <BR/><BR/>2) Have you read Adrian Reimers's _The Soul of the Person_? (My review here: http://veniaminov.blogspot.com/2008/05/review-of-reimerss-soul-of-person.html ) <BR/><BR/>I think Reimers makes an interesting connection between Peirce's abduction and the hypothetical syllogism and the power of the intellect as a materially *mediated* but immaterially operative power to form habits based on rational desire. Standard in quo vs. in quod (?--darn my terrible Latin) argumentation, as James Ross notes in his essay on immaterial thought, but with interesting connections to Peirce's interests in science as a form of rational progress. <BR/><BR/>Thoughts?Codgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14408351236558370542009-02-06T14:31:00.000-08:002009-02-06T14:31:00.000-08:00Whoops...The Tanner Lecture.The html code for the ...Whoops...The <A HREF="http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/popper80.pdf" REL="nofollow">Tanner Lecture</A>.<BR/><BR/>The html code for the Austrian strand has not been accepted.Rafehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06278597438041685633noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58849759507963190562009-02-06T14:25:00.000-08:002009-02-06T14:25:00.000-08:00The realm of objective knowledge was a popular con...The realm of objective knowledge was a popular concept circa 1900 and Bertrand Russell wrote about "unversals" to avoid the mentalistic connotation of "ideas". He was very impressed by Meinong at the time but later took fright when he was forced into a "foundational turn" (possibly by contact with Wittenstein in his anti-metphysical stage) and insisted that all knowledge of real things had to be rooted in sense exeprience and talk of "golden mountains" had to be dismissed as nonsense.<BR/><BR/>Karl Popper revived the line of thought that came from Brentano, Meinong and Frege with his talk of "world 3" objective knowledge. <BR/><BR/>Some applications of the idea:<BR/>http://www.the-rathouse.com/popobjectknow.html <BR/><BR/>Popper's Tanner lecture on the topic. http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/popper80.pdf<BR/><BR/>Some of the modern history in the Austrian context - Brentano, Meinon, Husserl, Heidegger.<BR/>http://www.the-rathouse.com/EvenMoreAustrianProgram/EMAThreeAustrianStrands.htmlRafehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06278597438041685633noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6488668880615275092009-02-05T13:40:00.000-08:002009-02-05T13:40:00.000-08:00Good post Dr. Feser.Good post Dr. Feser.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com