tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post5472202319299230344..comments2024-03-18T15:57:33.286-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Causality, pantheism, and deismEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger219125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7379258801830637392017-05-10T10:54:20.270-07:002017-05-10T10:54:20.270-07:00I think a proton is a good example to give to chal...I think a proton is a good example to give to challenge that assumption. For example, a proton is made up of three quarks; however, the mass of a proton is orders of magnitude greater than three times the mass of a quark. This is due to the binding energy of the quarks (E = MC^2). Furthermore, a quark cannot exist on its own except possibly in Big Bang type conditions (hypothetically). This demonstrates that an object is sometimes "greater" than the mere sum of its parts, and you cannot merely reduce something to its constituents. One could say that the causal interactions between sub-components give a macro level object real causal power due to this synergy. Therefore, "real objects" do exist.<br /><br />I also think it's a bit insulting to Aristotle and Aquinas (as well as ignorant on the part of moderns) to state that philosophers didn't know what they were talking about back in the day because now we know about "atoms". Democritus and the Atomists lived 100 years before Aristotle, so I cannot imagine Aristotle not having at least considered this objection before.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00481589239954065668noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-30912491813674681582015-01-11T09:23:16.198-08:002015-01-11T09:23:16.198-08:00To put it another way: We don't know all about...To put it another way: We don't know all about the essence of ducks just because we've seen two ducks.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26350518805841445342015-01-11T09:19:26.703-08:002015-01-11T09:19:26.703-08:00Is monk68 still around? I know he's a great ad...Is monk68 still around? I know he's a great admirer of Ashley, so if he's reading this, maybe he can confirm, deny, or tweak the understanding I expressed in my previous post.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55296784845144067922015-01-11T09:16:48.100-08:002015-01-11T09:16:48.100-08:00@Daniel:
"[M]y main issue with that book des...@Daniel:<br /><br />"[M]y main issue with that book description is why the experience of natural scientific praxis should be considered more fundamental than the ‘prescientific’ experience it arises out of. Hence my remark about ‘what’s wrong with abstraction from sensible experience?’."<br /><br />Exactly what the reviewer himself goes on to say: "[Ashley] understands science as the explanation of empirically perceived sensible reality by the discovery of underlying causes, insisting that properties of a subject under discussion be established by observation, not by deductive reasoning from some putative abstract essences."<br /><br />The point, as I take it (and the reviewer in question has captured it fairly well though I wouldn't say he's expressed it altogether felicitously), is that we discover the essences of things through <i>a posteriori</i> processes of inquiry, and only <i>after</i> discovering them do we summarize our knowledge in syllogistic, <i>a priori</i> form. The former processes don't simply consist of more or less Lockean "abstraction from sense experience" (they go beyond, say, recognizing "redness" as a property common to all things that appear red to us) and they are fallible (in a way that such "abstraction" is not) in the sense that we might in the future discover addition evidence that we got an "essence" wrong. In other words, Ashley is mainly concerned to deny an oversimplified account of knowledge according to which we "abstract" from some handy bit of sense experience and thereafter are in a position to deduce the real properties of real things from the resulting abstractions.<br /><br />(Caution: I've read the book just one time and it was early last year, so don't count on my summary to be spot-on in every respect. I did flip through the book in order to support these points, but the book is not unlarge and there is much that I may have not unmissed.)Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28485424801738414142015-01-11T07:36:47.146-08:002015-01-11T07:36:47.146-08:00Daniel,
Actually, I'm confused on a point fro...Daniel,<br /><br />Actually, I'm confused on a point from that conversation. <br /><br />During it, you wrote that uninstantiated mathematics in propositions refer to the Divine Nature. But I'm not sure this works. For example, it's plausible there are uninstantiated universals of strange, other-worldly creatures God could have instantiated, but we wouldn't say when using words referring to them in a sentence, that we're able to quantify over something. We would consider them fictions. Perhaps I'm just unknowingly tied to an unexamined linguistic theory, but because of concerns like these I'm still not convinced grounding uninstantiated mathematicals in God gives the ontological stuff required for true mathematical propositions.<br /><br />Assuming I'm not making some philosophy of language mistake, I'm hoping Peterson's <i>Introduction to Scholastic Realism</i> will clear some of these concerns.<br /><br /><i>I wouldn't deny that concerns about Parsimony should be and have always been important for metaphysical considerations; it’s only that Quinean methods, whatever their conclusions, strike me as leading to ontologies which fallaciously prioritise the Depictive over the Descriptive.</i><br /><br />I wonder if you could expand on this last point. It sounds like you're more concerned by Quinean indispensability's use of a so-called canonical language than by confirmational holism.<br /><br /><i>A classic example of metaphysical procrusteanism re Logic might be Quine's essay 'The Case for Psychologism'.</i><br /><br />He would have to be procrustean to defend psychologism after Frege's air strike on it. I must go find this now.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-480741624299655072015-01-11T03:24:51.949-08:002015-01-11T03:24:51.949-08:00@Scott,
You are too reasonable good sir! God, hea...@Scott,<br /><br />You are too reasonable good sir! God, health and finances permitting an historical overview and critique of Thomist criticisms of the Ontological Argument has potential PHD material written all over it…<br /><br />On a more serious (or at least relevant) note my main issue with that book description is why the experience of natural scientific praxis should be considered more fundamental than the ‘prescientific’ experience it arises out of. Hence my remark about ‘what’s wrong with abstraction from sensible experience?’.<br /><br />@John West,<br /><br />No, sorry I didn't make that very clear. I certainly wasn't suggesting that metaphysics should be more fundamental than/informative of Logic. I am heavily inclined towards the view that at least some of the basic principles of Logic and Ontology are identical i.e. Identity and Non-Contradiction (that should be uncontroversial though), and that trying to bury this metaphysical parallel in an allegedly 'neutral' system is counter-productive.<br /><br />Indeed some of the most importance developments in modern Ontology i.e. those of Husserl, Frege and early Russell came about precisely as a result of an attempt to extricate Logic and safeguard its objectivity from prior Empiricist or Hegelian commitments. A classic example of metaphysical procrusteanism re Logic might be Quine's essay 'The Case for Psychologism'. <br /><br />This ties into something I ought to have posted when we spoke about the methodology of Indispensability Theses. I wouldn't deny that concerns about Parsimony should be and have always been important for metaphysical considerations; it’s only that Quinean methods, whatever their conclusions, strike me as leading to ontologies which fallaciously prioritise the Depictive over the Descriptive.<br />Danielnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-89681762176115153402015-01-10T09:42:42.901-08:002015-01-10T09:42:42.901-08:00Daniel,
I said I wanted to reply a bit more:
I h...Daniel,<br /><br />I said I wanted to reply a bit more:<br /><br /><i>I have always seen philosophy as a science of science, a kind of ‘metaknowledge’ that encompasses and unifies all other fields of knowledge within itself. There's no way 'outside of' philosophy, particularly philosophy as ontology, since taken as a whole it’s just the science of reality. This is why calls for a ‘metaphysics-neutral’ logic are a waste of time </i><br /><br />You mentioned something along the lines of your last sentence before. Maybe I misunderstand and you're referring to something specific. Otherwise, I agree. Obviously, having logic somehow apart from reality would be silly. <br /><br />But I wouldn't want to take it too much further than that. I would be skeptical about attacking the concept of an objective logic, that is still much more basic than <i>most</i> of our other metaphysical claims. After all, metaphysics are based on and justified by reasoning, which presupposes correct logical forms, and I'm sure even the old Greeks had metaphysical presuppositions they risked reading into their logic. In short, I wouldn't want to go too far and send metaphysics spinning into the bog of relativism.<br /><br />We couldn't even formulate arguments about the importance of logic without logic.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-31247797279115806202015-01-10T07:51:21.045-08:002015-01-10T07:51:21.045-08:00Why is this book a good read?
Because the atoms w...Why is this book a good read?<br /><br />Because the atoms were arranged in such-and-such a wise, of course.Timocrateshttp://catholic.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35116945138068921582015-01-09T13:25:29.747-08:002015-01-09T13:25:29.747-08:00@Daniel:
Ashley's "empiricism" is b...@Daniel:<br /><br />Ashley's "empiricism" is broader than you might think. It would be more correct (though this isn't his own way of putting it) that his interest is in ferreting out the absolute presuppositions of experience.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77018234525830107872015-01-09T13:05:30.324-08:002015-01-09T13:05:30.324-08:00Scott and Brandon,
They had a copy at the univers...Scott and Brandon,<br /><br />They had a copy at the university library. Thank you.<br /><br />Daniel,<br /><br /><i>Prior to empirical verification, a-prioristic lines of argument yield only hypotheses, which can at best serve as guides for empirical investigation.</i><br /><br />My professional area is mathematics. Don't look at me. <br /><br />Though, I do think correct metaphysical presuppositions help empirical investigation, like having correct coordinates helps strike an unseen target when firing a cannon.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-22583092253302423372015-01-09T12:42:50.765-08:002015-01-09T12:42:50.765-08:00Causality and Scientific Explanation has been on m...<i>Causality and Scientific Explanation</i> has been on my watch list for some time...<br /><br />I admit, in a move which may well be overhasty, I view Ashley's book with extreme suspicion. One of the reviews, which looks quite informed, gives ample example of why this may be. <br /><br /><i>Ashley sees Metaphysics as being firmly rooted in empirical natural science, rather than in some intuition of being or some abstraction from sensible experience.</i><br /><br />I fail to see what is wrong with the standard Thomist approach of starting from the latter.<br /><br /><i>Prior to empirical verification, a-prioristic lines of argument yield only hypotheses, which can at best serve as guides for empirical investigation.</i><br /><br />God, it's like channeling Karl Popper isn't it...<br /><br />Of course those are both paraphrases so I shan't jump to conclusions on those alone. Danielnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27946103277283785282015-01-09T11:26:12.938-08:002015-01-09T11:26:12.938-08:00I second the recommendation of Wallace on this poi...I second the recommendation of Wallace on this point. The Modeling of Nature is a work that anyone interested in scholastic approaches to philosophy of science should read at least once.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75254905381220269282015-01-09T10:40:32.927-08:002015-01-09T10:40:32.927-08:00(Wallace's two-volume work Causality and Scien...(Wallace's two-volume work <i>Causality and Scientific Explanation</i> is also quite good, but it's out of print and not available cheaply. I was fortunate enough to find an inexpensive used copy some time ago.)Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86510467071073412072015-01-09T10:37:36.444-08:002015-01-09T10:37:36.444-08:00@John West:
"I will not be surprised if I fi...@John West:<br /><br />"I will not be surprised if I find that the Scholastic metaphysic is not only contiguous with science, but largely indispensable to it."<br /><br />With that in mind, please allow me to recommend <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Way-toward-Wisdom-Interdisciplinary-Intercultural/dp/0268020353" rel="nofollow">this</a> and <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Modeling-Nature-Philosophy-Science-Synthesis/dp/0813208602" rel="nofollow">this</a>.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-62092151495350274352015-01-09T10:24:24.409-08:002015-01-09T10:24:24.409-08:00(But I see now why you might think I had. The pare...(But I see now why you might think I had. The parenthetical list of terms was meant as Shakarian synonyms for "God", and not as Shakarian synonyms for "something other than God". My phrasing could have been clearer; sorry for the confusion.)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-21990848656117173122015-01-09T10:18:29.130-08:002015-01-09T10:18:29.130-08:00Jeremy,
Atman is not other than God in Shankara&#...Jeremy,<br /><br /><i>Atman is not other than God in Shankara's thought.</i><br /><br />I hadn't said that it was.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-34924741138770086052015-01-09T09:46:11.344-08:002015-01-09T09:46:11.344-08:00than many claiming scientism^than many claiming scientism^Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52119850144520444802015-01-09T09:45:04.787-08:002015-01-09T09:45:04.787-08:00Daniel,
I would like to reply further later, but ...Daniel,<br /><br />I would like to reply further later, but just to clarify. <br /><br />I agree that philosophy should be used to rule on philosophical matters within fields. I also agree that those practitioners often fail to realize when they are making philosophical presuppositions not technically part of their fields. That's one reason I disowned much of Lewis's quote. As I ended that comment by writing, my main issue there was with needless insistence on crippling other fields' practices.<br /><br />Indeed, I think one of the strengths of the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition is that it pays more attention to the first-order knowledge of other fields than any metaphysic I have encountered. I will not be surprised if I find that the Scholastic metaphysic is not only contiguous with science, but largely indispensable to it.<br /><br /><br /><br />*Even more than many claiming scientismists, who upon closer examination turn out to (for example) deny the reality of change.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-76540141287852127962015-01-09T09:44:01.495-08:002015-01-09T09:44:01.495-08:00Glenn,
Atman is not other than God in Shankara...Glenn,<br /><br />Atman is not other than God in Shankara's thought. <br /><br />Anyway, I'm not sure this matters. My only point is that on his own terms his gripes about terminology are not absurd or inconsistent, though they may be wrong and they may even be a little bit pedantic. Jeremy Taylornoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74319443008778603182015-01-09T09:36:31.786-08:002015-01-09T09:36:31.786-08:00I agree his views are not just terminological. I agree his views are not just terminological. Jeremy Taylornoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69769726446614052602015-01-09T09:35:32.054-08:002015-01-09T09:35:32.054-08:00Obviously, this latter claim is terminological, bu...<i>Obviously, this latter claim is terminological, but the former one is conceptual.</i><br /><br />It has been said that Guenon's "thought is essentially Shankarian" (though not exclusively so). One work for which Shankara is well-known is the Crest-Jewel of Discrimination. And we find in this work, or at least in a variety of English translations of it, that 'infinite' is used for something other than God (Atman, Eternal Self, Supreme Brahman, One without a Second, etc., etc., <i>ad infinitum</i>), and that, indeed, the term 'infinite' is attributed to things of our world. For example, Atman is compared to our infinite sky, the Eternal Self is said to be outside the infinite universe of the manifested world in which we live, the shining moon of our world is said to give infinite delight, and so on.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28316876162633942952015-01-09T09:34:09.468-08:002015-01-09T09:34:09.468-08:00And I'm emphasizing that his views are not mer...And I'm emphasizing that his views are <i>not</i> merely "terminological" even if he's right about transfinite numbers—and still less so if he's wrong. Indeed, whether he's right about transfinite numbers is itself a pretty substantive issue.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12439694511337113862015-01-09T09:25:33.003-08:002015-01-09T09:25:33.003-08:00Well, I did think he had a point at the beginning ...Well, I did think he had a point at the beginning of the discussion. But in the latter discussion I was just defending him against claims of inconsistency and absurdity as regards his terminological views based on his own perspective, though not necessarily agreeing with him. But, anyway, I'm not sure there is much more to be said on that score. It is not an especially interesting discussion anyway.Jeremy Taylornoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58860015949205750602015-01-09T09:21:21.441-08:002015-01-09T09:21:21.441-08:00Scott,
My point was not to judge whether Guenon w...Scott,<br /><br />My point was not to judge whether Guenon was correct or not on that condition. Jeremy Taylornoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-76389853564957497502015-01-09T09:16:19.448-08:002015-01-09T09:16:19.448-08:00@Jeremy Taylor:
"I think, if Guenon is right...@Jeremy Taylor:<br /><br />"I think, if Guenon is right about the fact that no infinite numbers and the like can exist, the use of the term infinite is a little improper, but I don't see such usage as that important."<br /><br />Well, that's a pretty big <i>if</i>, isn't it? Not only that, but it's precisely the <i>if</i> that you've repeatedly said you're not competent to judge.<br /><br />At any rate the term "infinite" is <i>not</i> "improper" for what mathematicians mean when they use it; the term "indefinite" simply doesn't capture what they intend to say. A Euclidean line is infinite in length, not "indefinite." If Guénon thinks they're wrong to mean what they mean, then he really needs to engage their thought rather than just brush it off breezily with an inept comment or two.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.com