tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post5227885767859460592..comments2024-03-28T13:39:03.094-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Putnam and analytical Thomism, Part IEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger40125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54879992319942584302016-05-26T01:38:58.006-07:002016-05-26T01:38:58.006-07:00@Mr. Green
“I'll make one point since I thi...@Mr. Green<br /><br /><br /><br />“I'll make one point since I think it gets at the crux of the matter: Is Ross in fact arguing about mathematical objects? Or just mathematical reasoning? He talks explicitly about judgements:<br /><br />"But now let us look at the argument: Some thinking (judgment) is determinate in a way no physical process can be."<br /><br />This is surely why he keeps referring to functions — the problem for materialism is not mathematical objects per se but mathematical operations. Even if there were laws of physics that allowed for perfect triangles, there would be no way to instantiate an operation or an argument, which is all Ross needs (and, as far as I can see, all he explicitly argues for).”<br /><br /><br /><br />You make a fine point.<br /><br /><br />Let me begin by stating the dialectical point I made earlier: Feser accepts Ross’s argument for the formal indeterminacy of the physical. In defense of Ross’s argument from an objection made by Peter Dillard, Feser responds by suggesting that what applies to geometrical objects or figures applies to mathematical and logical forms (say, functions) in general, and what applies to geometrical figures is that (1) they cannot be determinately realized in matter and (2) we know this. This is why Feser retorts by saying that to claim that mathematical functions might be realized determinately in matter, but that we just don’t know it, is as silly as suggesting that geometrical objects or figures, say, a triangle, is determinately realized in matter, but that we just don’t know it. So, on Feser’s own account, yes, the argument concerns both mathematical functions and objects. (Perhaps Feser would say that it does not concern all mathematical objects, but only a subset of them, namely, geometrical ones. But that is sufficient for my objection to Feser. In addition, he would also have to give an account as to why it is applicable to only these but not other mathematical objects.)<br /><br /><br />Now, in my opinion, I think Feser is right in that the formal indeterminacy of the physical concerns all mathematical and logical phenomena, and that Ross’s argument can be shown to be extendable to all of them––even to music scores. (And mathematical and logical objects are per se indeed a problem for materialism, since one can argue that if we were entirely material, we would not even be able to think and grasp them, let alone carry out determinately functions over them. Also note that by "abstract" I do not mean "Platonic". I am leaving this open, although I am inclined to think that both the Platonic and Augustinian ways of understanding the metaphysical status of mathematical "objects" are mistaken.) There's also the further question of what exactly is the relationship between mathematical objects and mathematical functions, but that's a huge and difficult issue. So yeah, Ross is primarily arguing about mathematical reasoning but his argument applies mutatis mutandis to all mathematical structures (actually, Ross thinks that mathematical structures are in se constituted by human intellectual activity or at least dependent on it, in part because of his argument for the formal indeterminacy of the physical. This is already crossing over to the field of philosophy of mathematics, but the point is that Ross' argument if sound has implications far greater than what has been hitherto acknowledged.)<br /><br />Cheers! A. R. Diazhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12261209970933947071noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69252374424701159962016-05-24T03:28:57.497-07:002016-05-24T03:28:57.497-07:00A. R. Diaz: Sorry for misspelling your name, and f...A. R. Diaz: <i>Sorry for misspelling your name, and for the long response. I shall probably leave it at that. [...] I am using it in exactly tin he same sense in which Ross used it (that is, “form” is restricted to the pure abstract structure of mathematical and logical objects and relations. </i><br /><br />No worries, on either account. I'll make one point since I think it gets at the crux of the matter: Is Ross in fact arguing about mathematical <i>objects?</i> Or just mathematical <i>reasoning?</i> He talks explicitly about <b>judgements</b>:<br /><br />"But now let us look at the argument: Some thinking (judgment) is determinate in a way no physical process can be."<br /><br />This is surely why he keeps referring to <i>functions</i> — the problem for materialism is not mathematical objects <i>per se</i> but mathematical <b>operations</b>. Even if there were laws of physics that allowed for perfect triangles, there would be no way to instantiate an operation or an argument, which is all Ross needs (and, as far as I can see, all he explicitly argues for).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18517114977528545222016-05-24T03:24:42.277-07:002016-05-24T03:24:42.277-07:00George LeSauvage: Much of the time, it seems to be...George LeSauvage: <i>Much of the time, it seems to be the latter; that Ed is using the argument to show the inadequacy of the modern view, rather than putting forward his own.</i><br /><br />Yes, I think which one will differ in different contexts. In this case, I think the context indicates that he's using "triangle" in the everyday sense (as applies to traffic-signs, etc.) rather than the mathematically perfect sense.<br /><br /><br /><br />Zach: <i>I'm curious, though, about how we go from thinking generally about triangles, say, to thinking about this specific triangle that is made in red ink on a piece of paper. Does my intellect have to somehow interact with a specific thing's matter/existence/whatever individuates a substance to be able to think about that thing?</i><br /><br />It is by the imaginative part of your mind that you can be aware of the individual particular; but of course you can also narrow down abstractions: from an abstract platonic triangle or abstract redness, you can form the concept of an abstract red triangle, or a red inky triangle, or a red inky paper triangle, and so on. You can add more (abstract) detail to your concept of something but it still remains — insofar as you are contemplating or reasoning about it conceptually — a form in your intellect.<br /><br /><br /><br />The Masked Chicken: <i>At when point does the one form end and the other one begin? Is this a continuous change</i><br /><br />Since the forms we're referring to here are the (accidental) forms of shape, then whenever the shape or structure changes, even by the slightest amount, then a different form applies. Which is really just to say that when the shape changes, then the shape changes.<br /><br /><i>3. What about the case where three piles of sand form an enclosure in the shape of a triangle?</i><br /><br />It's a real triangle in the sense that sand is real, and in the "everyday" sense of more or less approximating a mathematically perfect triangle. (And it's unreal in the sense that piles of sand are not <i>a</i> thing at all, that is, not a single substance. But that's probably getting into a different area from the one you are interested in here.)<br /><br /><i>4. What about the case where the triangle sits on top of a mound with very gradually sloping sides that asymptotically approach infinity</i><br /><br />I'm afraid I didn't follow this.<br /><br /><i>What I am getting at is can one actually make a simple, pure definition of a triangle.</i><br /><br />In the pure mathematical sense, certainly. But if you mean in the "everyday", practical, material sense, we run into issues of vagueness: when does an approximate triangle (like a traffic sign) get too approximate and not triangular enough? Well, a practical answer is good enough: when Quality Control at the traffic-sign factory says so!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35622832403189111872016-05-22T00:00:24.135-07:002016-05-22T00:00:24.135-07:00See here:
"IT IS POPULAR AMONG AQUINAS SCHO...See here: <br /><br />"IT IS POPULAR AMONG AQUINAS SCHOLARS to present esse intentionale as the mode of being that distinguishes cognizant from noncognizant beings. St. Thomas says something is cognizant just in case it is able to possess, in addition to its own form, the form of some other thing."<br /><br />Robbie Moser, <i>Thomas Aquinas, Esse Intentionale, and the Cognitive as Such,</i> https://www.questia.com/read/1G1-261632110/thomas-aquinas-esse-intentionale-and-the-cognitive<br /><br />And from St. Thomas:<br /><br />"To prove this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower."<br /><br />St. Thomas, <i>Summa Theologica, Part I, Question 14, Article 1,</i> http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1014.htm#article2<br /><br />This agrees with what I said about the mind being principally a form that contains other forms.<br /><br />And here:<br /><br />"To cut a long story short, for Aquinas, intentionality or aboutness is the property of any form of information carried by anything. If we look at his remarks about <i>esse intentionale</i> in this way, all will make good sense. After all, it is not only my perceptions and my thoughts that carry information about my environment, but also the medium carrying this information to my senses. Furthermore, even if I never receive any of this information, the information is there, and <i>qua</i> information it certainly <i>is about</i> the thing that produces it, when the information is encoded by a natural effect of the thing. This is how, for example, the tracks, the scent, or the sounds of an animal, or the light reflected from its body carry information about the animal whether these are actually perceived by another, say, its predator, or not. Or, to use Aristotle‟s famous example, this is how the impression of a signet ring in a piece of wax encodes information about the shape of the ring itself."<br /><br />Gyula Klima, <i>Three Myths of Intentionality vs. Some Medieval Philosophers,</i> http://faculty.fordham.edu/klima/FILES/3M.pdf<br /><br />This agrees with what I said about things that are not mental (like signs) having intentionality.Jackhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13858873453982708283noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75665159663174793332016-05-20T19:29:41.095-07:002016-05-20T19:29:41.095-07:00Dr. Feser,
I have a problem with reducing the men...Dr. Feser,<br /><br />I have a problem with reducing the mental to intentionality, as it seems to me that intentionality is not the essence of the mental. Non-mental things can participate in intentionality, e.g. a sign. It may be the "final cause" of the mind, but the formal cause of the mind seems to be something else - the best definition I have heard is that the mind is a form that can hold other forms without losing its own form. This seems to get right to the essence of the mind. No other form is like this, it exhibits the peculiar form of the mind. My mind is not a mind because it is "about" or "directed" to something, but because it contains forms that are not itself and, indeed, potentially contains all forms other than itself; my mind can hold the form of a fish without becoming a fish, the form of a number without becoming a number, the form of an idea without becoming an idea. So the mind in effect reproduces the world by holding it within itself while retaining its own form.Jackhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13858873453982708283noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4334922323410608562016-05-20T12:55:20.106-07:002016-05-20T12:55:20.106-07:00Has anyone actually interpreted on a computer the ...Has anyone actually interpreted on a computer the neuronal firings associated with conceptualizing a geometric shape? If so, could you provide a link. That has a distinctly piscene aroma to me.Frednoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86890514121816323832016-05-19T15:27:44.891-07:002016-05-19T15:27:44.891-07:00Should read:
Well, it can be encoded in your brai...Should read:<br /><br />Well, it can be encoded in your brain. We know this because computers can decode the spike trains that always fire whenever the concept of a triangle is brought to thought. The encoding is not a triangle, of course, but is it a proxy for the concept?The Masked Chickennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52077364779198832352016-05-19T15:24:25.994-07:002016-05-19T15:24:25.994-07:00I'm wandering into this discussion to ask a fe...I'm wandering into this discussion to ask a few questions, since I am doing work on quantifying incongruity between objects as part of my research in humor. Be kind.<br /><br />1. Vincent Torley writes:<br /><br />"What happens when I entertain the concept of a triangle is that my mind grasps the universal rule that defines something as a triangle: being a closed plane figure with three straight sides. The rule is not "in" my mind, even metaphorically; it only exists in real-world triangles themselves."<br /><br />Well, it can be encoded in your brain. We know this because computers can decode the spike trains that always fire whenever the concept of a triangle is brought to thought. The encoding is not a triangle, of course, but it is a proxy for the concept.<br /><br />2. What about topological deformations? An inner tube can be smoothly deformed into a coffee cup. At when point does the one form end and the other one begin? Is this a continuous change or does it occur catastrophically (in the mathematical sense) at some threshold?<br /><br />3. What about the case where three piles of sand form an enclosure in the shape of a triangle? Technically, it is not a closed figure, because sand has holes in it and the straight lines are an illusion. Is this a real triangle or not?<br /><br />4. What about the case where the triangle sits on top of a mound with very gradually sloping sides that asymptotically approach infinity, so that the plane is only enclosed in the limit of infinity and, in fact, there is no outside of the triangle?<br /><br />What I am getting at is can one actually make a simple, pure definition of a triangle. If so, what are the essential attributes?<br /><br />The Chicken<br />The Masked Chickennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77404945736925877022016-05-18T08:30:14.103-07:002016-05-18T08:30:14.103-07:00Putnam doesn’t have “the foggiest notion of what [...<i>Putnam doesn’t have “the foggiest notion of what [such talk] is supposed to mean” otherwise.</i><br /><br />A vector can be interpreted as a directed line segment from point A to point B. You are point A, the mind is the vector, and the thought you are thinking about is point B. Just like how the vector doesn't "become" the point even though the point determines its orientation, likewise the mind doesn't "become" the thought even though the thought determines its orientation.HolyKnowinghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06109864288446595298noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-48688728463481534112016-05-18T07:55:27.757-07:002016-05-18T07:55:27.757-07:00@Mr. Green,
Sorry for misspelling your name, and ...@Mr. Green,<br /><br />Sorry for misspelling your name, and for the long response. I shall probably leave it at that. <br /><br />I am sure Feser knows what is at stake here, since he knows Ross' argument better than anybody else probably. Hopefully, he will address the problem (either in this blog or in print), since it seems to me to be of paramount important.<br /><br /><br />CheersA. R. Diazhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12261209970933947071noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81790172305826923732016-05-18T07:49:55.455-07:002016-05-18T07:49:55.455-07:004. Your example of a quadruped person is likewise ...4. Your example of a quadruped person is likewise subject to the consideration of formal indeterminacy. Ross’ argument can be run with numbers as well, not only with functions, since these are likewise pure asbtract forms (is it a case of four or of quafour? Cf. Kripke’s ‘plus’ and ‘quus’ considerations).<br /><br />Now, let us use Feser’s criterion with your case. It entails that what it is for something to be (a genuine instance of) the number 4 is for it to materially realize the pure abstract form or object referred to by the numeral ‘4’. To this I would simply respond by saying that that makes no sense (and if it did, it is plainly and demonstrably false.) The number four, not even a genuine instance of the number four, does require matter for it to be what it is. Your legs are like numerals, or dots on a sheet of paper, with respect to formal entities and realities: mere approximations, even if very good ones. Body parts qua physical are both semantically and formally indeterminate. A genuine instance of a pure form contains that form (to the exclusion of any other incompossible one), together with all the properties that come with having that form. But is a quadruped the square root of 16? Can it be given a prime factorization? Is a quadruped the four-hundredth part of four-hundred? Is it a member of the set of all the positive integers? Of course not. But regardless of this, we know from Ross’ argument that a material realization of the number four (or any other pure form) cannot be anything more than an approximation (an probably a very good one) of that formal reality: that’s the most matter can do. If material objects realized determinately mathematical and logical forms, then both mathematic and logic could be studied and assessed by means of the study of the material processes that purportedly realize them. Again, we know this is false.<br /><br />At any rate, from Ross’ argument we know that what it is for something to be of a determinate pure form is not a matter of having matter, for matter cannot possibly partake in the formal determinacy of any formal reality. That is the objection I raised.<br /><br />Lastly, you say:<br /><br />3. “So triangular things do exist (traffic signs, pyramids, musical, er, triangles) in the everyday, practical, triangular-ish sense; and triangles do not exist (physically) in the strict mathematical platonic sense.”<br /><br />Then this is precisely the point. Feser’s criterion for what it is for something to be a triangle was not in terms of the “everyday, practical, triangulari-ish sense” (which is nothing but a placeholder for “in an approximate and observer-dependent way”) but rather in terms of what makes an object, intrinsically and really, a triangle (as opposed to a thought of a triangle). Otherwise, if he were using it in the “everyday, practical, triangulari-ish sense”, then he would not be answering Putnam’s objection, which was that A-T metaphysics does not have the resources to distinguish between something’s being, intrinsically and really, a triangle from something’s being a thought about a triangle. Feser answered that it did have the resources because what it is for something, intrinsically and objectively (i.e. in an observer-independent way) to be a triangle is for the geometrical form to be realized in matter. But this is inconsistent with the results of Ross’ argument. And this is far for being a “harmless” problem.A. R. Diazhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12261209970933947071noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-70310940683341382622016-05-18T07:49:27.881-07:002016-05-18T07:49:27.881-07:00@Mr. Greem
I am absolutely sure that Feser would ...@Mr. Greem<br /><br />I am absolutely sure that Feser would not give your response (or even find it remotely plausible). <br /><br />Let me clarify something. My objection to Feser’s characterization of what it is for something to be a triangle (and mutatis mutandis any other abstract, pure, form) presupposes a proper understanding of Ross’ argument. Since Feser knows this argument as well as anybody, there was no need for me to go into the details of how it works, how it establishes what it establishes, and what exactly is it that it establishes. For example, there should be no confusion as to what I mean by “formal indeterminacy”, since I am using it in exactly tin he same sense in which Ross used it (that is, “form” is restricted to the pure abstract structure of mathematical and logical objects and relations. The distinction logicians make between the “form” of an argument and the “content or semantics” of argument is but one instance of this use of “form”. Ross’ argument shows that no physical thing can be a genuine case of a determinate logical form, say, AAA-1 Barbara or modus ponens. Mutatis mutandis for mathematical forms). All of this is well known to Feser. I do not plan to rehearse it. <br /><br />I will not re-hearse Ross’ argument. I will only, on the basis of it, point out the main problems with your response:<br /><br />1.. “So it follows just from the fact that physical objects have forms, that they are determinate with respect to those very forms…” Ross’ argument does not gainsay this. It is obvious that he is not talking about material forms. As I said before, this is not even the issue at hand.<br /><br />2.. “…including any mathematical forms that may apply.” This is where you beg the question, since the whole question is whether any mathematical forms apply DETERMINATELY to material objects (approximately, of course; no one denies that. Ross’ point is that they only apply approximately, which means non-intrinsically and non-observer-independent. Your talk about it being “metaphysically possible that other material worlds” so different from ours that they might intrinsically realize geometrical forms seems to me (a) to make no sense (what content would “material” then have?) and (b) to be a conceivability thesis; but, of course, A-T philosophers reject that conceivability is a guide to real, metaphysical, possibility, so this is not a response Feser could make). For the problem of formal indeterminacy of the physical is that nothing physical can exclude its being a case of an indefinite number of incompossible pure forms (plus or quus? triangular or qutriangular?), and thus since realizing intrinsically in a given case a determinate form means that in that case a unique form is realized to the exclusion of any other incompossible one, physical things cannot consistently be said to determinately realize any such forms. (Again, I would refer you to both Ross’ writings on the matter and Feser’s ACPQ article).<br /><br />3. The fundamental problem here is that according to Feser, at least in this post, in order for something to be a triangle it must be materialized, that is, the pure geometrical form or figure “triangle” must be realized in matter in order for something to be a triangle. But this is impossible, as shown by Ross’s argument, for no material object realizes intrinsically a determinate and unique pure (i.e. mathematical and logical) function or form. (It is also proven false by the fact that geometrical forms are complete without matter, which is why we can carry out such things as the axiomatization of geometry. But this is a separate objection. My objection here was purely dialectical: that Feser’s comments here are inconsistent with his Rossean argument for the formal indeterminacy of the physical.). If this is the case, then being a triangle cannot be a matter of being materially realized; otherwise, there would be no such a thing as a triangle since no material thing can determinately realize it. <br /><br /><br />Continued...<br />A. R. Diazhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12261209970933947071noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4098419193127234932016-05-18T06:14:51.057-07:002016-05-18T06:14:51.057-07:00A question on the indeterminate nature of matter a...A question on the indeterminate nature of matter and material things: When Ed is speaking of this, is he referring to material things as he regards them (under hylomorphism), or as the standard modern view does, mechanically? Much of the time, it seems to be the latter; that Ed is using the argument to show the inadequacy of the modern view, rather than putting forward his own. (OK, strictly, as prelude to putting forward his own.)<br /><br />In any case, doesn't this question entail two different answers to Diaz's question. Or at least, the possibility of two different answers?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11487741602028158172016-05-18T06:08:38.663-07:002016-05-18T06:08:38.663-07:00Thanks for the reply, Tony, but it leaves me puzzl...Thanks for the reply, Tony, but it leaves me puzzled as ever. I don't see how forms themselves can be "identical in species and distinct in number." That is how we describe the substances themselves. And it is the identity of form which makes them identical in species, is it not? Equally, it is their matter which individuates, making them distinct in number, no?<br /><br />If that it correct, it doesn't seem to make sense to refer to the matterless forms as distinct in number. The only way forms can be said to be "distinct" is in being different forms entirely, as cat and dog, etc. Or so it seems to me. The alternative seems to me to be making of forms little particulars, secondary substances of a sort, one for each substance and the form it exemplifies. (And of course, it looks as if these forms, as secondary substances, would have their own forms - tertiary substances of a sort - which makes them resemble the similar but not really identical forms in other members of the species. Harry Lyme returns.)<br /><br />It also seems odd to call them identical in species, as being identical in species just means "having the same form", or so I thought.<br /><br />When I gave up Plato for Aristotle, the single biggest reason was the point that Plato had made his forms out as, not really universals, but another kind of particular. I still remember in class when that came up. I didn't like it, but could find no answer. And I still cannot.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58469474641268464612016-05-17T18:10:51.123-07:002016-05-17T18:10:51.123-07:00Young and Rested: It sounds like he's saying t...Young and Rested: <i>It sounds like he's saying that we cannot simultaneously hold that<br />1. Triangles exist [...]<br />3. Matter can only approximate the form of a triangle<br />He then seems to say that all 3 have been defended by Dr. Feser. Is this correct?</i><br /><br />Yes. …and no. Really, there is a pragmatic equivocation going on. When we say, "triangles exist", we really mean "approximate triangles exist" — but usually it's not necessary to elaborate on the approximation in ordinary context. For example, the correct answer to "What shape is the letter delta?" is "triangular", even though the most careful scribe could not draw a perfect triangle. A pedant might want to describe it as "roughly triangular", but that would make it sound like the Cyrillic letter de (Д), which has a deliberate flat top and tails. (Hm, sounds like a Fred Astaire song!) Of course, the letter de in fact evolved from the triangular delta, but a carefully-drawn delta would make a sloppily-drawn de, and vice versa. So triangular things do exist (traffic signs, pyramids, musical, er, triangles) in the everyday, practical, triangular-ish sense; and triangles do not exist (physically) in the strict mathematical platonic sense. So you're right that a thing cannot by definition lack its essence, as long as we're precise about exactly what that essence is.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61374018602718603502016-05-17T18:03:39.894-07:002016-05-17T18:03:39.894-07:00A. R. Diaz: what follows from Ross' argument (...A. R. Diaz: <i>what follows from Ross' argument (which Feser accepts and defends) is that physical things are not formally (i.e. mathematically and logically) determinate[...] A triangle, like any other geometrical object, is precisely an abstract form (unlike material forms). </i><br /><br />Well, there are two different matters here: one is the determinateness of material things, and a given substance certainly is formally determinate according to whatever forms it happens to have — if it's green, then it is determinately green, not some unspecified generic colour; in fact, this is an example of a form that a material object must have determinately, as opposed to an intellectual abstraction which can be indeterminate (e.g. my understanding of a dog is not determined to some specific colour, even though any actual instance of a dog must be some colour or other). And this applies as much to mathematical forms as any other: a physical quadruped is quite determinate as to number of legs.<br /><br />So it follows just from the fact that physical objects have forms, that they are determinate with respect to those very forms, including any mathematical forms that may apply. Or perhaps it would be better to say "qualitative forms", since "mathematical" implies abstraction as opposed to material instantiation. And that brings us to the other point, which is I think the one you're thinking of: when I talk about "a triangle", I don't mean a physical thing that is triangularly-shaped, I mean an abstract platonic triangle. And one of the reasons I mean this is because there's no such thing as a (perfect) physical triangle. Our lumpy, quantised matter just can't match the delicate mathematical fineness required for perfectly one-dimensional lines and zero-dimensional points, etc. But that's just our universe! There is no metaphysical reason why a different world might not allow for inking lines with no width at all, for example. (Dunno how you'd see a perfectly width-less line of ink, but hey, the laws of physics would have to be completely different in such a world, so who knows.) This isn't a problem for Ross's argument, because even a perfect triangle can represent something <i>else</i> only indeterminately (and of course abstractions like <i>modus ponens</i> couldn't be physically instantiated at all, no matter how queer the laws of physics were).<br /><br />I actually thought of this when reading Prof. Feser's article, and would have preferred a different example just because there is no such thing as a "material triangle", but the objection is minor; partly because it's metaphysically possible for there to have been material triangles (if only God had made a somewhat different kind of universe), but mainly because it's a convenient simplification for the sake of example. If we want to be pedantic, we can simply substitute for "triangular" some rough, wiggly shape that a real physical object has — mathematically, or rather, formally speaking, a jagged irregular shape is just as much as shape as a simple triangle. It would make the text a bit more cumbersome, but it doesn't affect the point Ed is making either way.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-17298349090301174822016-05-17T17:08:48.104-07:002016-05-17T17:08:48.104-07:00George L, I thought the standard A-T distinction i...George L, I thought the standard A-T distinction is that the form "cat" in this cat and the form "cat" in that cat are identical in species and distinct in number. This works also - somewhat - for this cat and my thought of cat: they are the same in species. My thought of cat is not, precisely, different in number, for my thought of cat is not instantiated in a physical cat to be enumerated properly speaking. My thought of cat, and Ed's thought of cat, are the same in species and distinct as to the individual person's doing the thinking. My thought of cat today and my thought of cat yesterday are the same in species and, I would guess, quasi-distinct as to distinct operations of thought. There is no need to *enumerate* them as they are distinguishable even without material differences. Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23934586538841237672016-05-17T13:46:57.874-07:002016-05-17T13:46:57.874-07:00@Zach
My guess would be that somehow perception p...@Zach<br /><br />My guess would be that somehow perception plays a role in this story because perception lets one get in contact particulars. So while the intellect can think about universals, perception lets on get acquainted with particulars. So maybe the intellect plus perception could be how one gets to think of a particular triangle. This is jut a guess so take my answer with a grain of salt.SKnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91992966163232939672016-05-17T12:33:58.085-07:002016-05-17T12:33:58.085-07:00Ed,
Thanks for the enlightening post.
I have a q...Ed,<br /><br />Thanks for the enlightening post.<br /><br />I have a question about the intentionality of thoughts that I do not think I have seen an answer to in your other popular writings on the mind (I must confess I have not read your book <i>Philosophy of Mind</i>, just <i>Aquinas</i> and many of your blog posts on the subject). Your explanation of <i>formal identity</i> really made me understand how we can think about things in general. That makes sense to me. I'm curious, though, about how we go from thinking generally about triangles, say, to thinking about <i>this specific triangle</i> that is made in red ink on a piece of paper.<br /><br />Does my intellect have to somehow interact with a specific thing's matter/existence/whatever individuates a substance to be able to think about that thing?<br /><br />I am a philosophy newb so feel free to school me if I've gone off the rails here.<br /><br />Zachhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12583158296665208271noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23567092257250143512016-05-17T07:01:00.331-07:002016-05-17T07:01:00.331-07:00Hi Anonymous,
In answer to your question: No, I&#...Hi Anonymous,<br /><br />In answer to your question: No, I'm not a materialist. Acts of understanding are non-bodily acts.Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-82563038504168908822016-05-17T03:33:55.245-07:002016-05-17T03:33:55.245-07:00@Vincent Torley:
Thoughts, I would suggest, are ...@Vincent Torley:<br /><br /><i> Thoughts, I would suggest, are not things, but actions: they are verbs (acts of thinking, or "thinkings," if you like) rather than nouns. There is no such thing as a thought.</i> and <i>Are we all being misled by a spatial metaphor here?</i> and <i> They are spatial metaphors for intelligence, but I don't think they succeed in capturing its very essence.</i><br /><br />I'm puzzled at this. Of course they use of "in my mind" is only analogous to "in my car". But don't we deal with that sort of thing all the time? We can be in our houses, in class, in the navy, in a quandry, in a flood of tears and a sedan chair. I don't see how that is a problem, per se, and I don't see where you've shown that it is.<br /><br />Take the thought you are expressing here. Your thinking it, and expressing it here in the combox are activities, as are my reading and (I hope) understanding it. But note that over 10 hours passed between your second, and my activities. As I read and type, it is highly likely you aren't thinking about it at all, yet it is presumably the same thought we are speaking of. (Even if it's not the same - if I've gotten it wrong - it is still your argument I've misunderstood.)<br /><br />Granted, I've never yet seen that Pegasizing gets us much of anywhere. But it really would need some sort of case made that it is so, rather than just a suggestion that it is. Surely (at a minimum), the presumption is in favor of Socrates's point that the universal is used in the rule, rather than being the rule itself.<br /><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-89114917096872976702016-05-16T22:12:39.665-07:002016-05-16T22:12:39.665-07:00Hey, Dr. Feser! I'm stuck in the filter again....Hey, Dr. Feser! I'm stuck in the filter again. Thanks in advance. I'll go on a diet, I swear...laubadetristehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17742748003334437454noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-84498059319576442312016-05-16T20:21:05.578-07:002016-05-16T20:21:05.578-07:00I would also note that a universal is a kind of ru...<i>I would also note that a universal is a kind of rule, and "receiving," "containing," "extracting" and "grasping" are not rule-following activities as such. They are spatial metaphors for intelligence, but I don't think they succeed in capturing its very essence.</i><br /><br />I don't think it makes much sense to argue that receiving, containing, extracting and grasping are normally spatial terms and thus should be jettisoned (because the mind is not spatial), but then to object that they aren't rule-following activities while universals are "a kind of rule". Why is linguistic looseness allowable with a thing that is not a rule (a universal) but not with a thing that is not spatial? Especially when we all know that the mind isn't literally a box with ideas spatially located inside of them. Call it a categorization if you prefer. Comprehension.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51804297253622444812016-05-16T20:08:35.046-07:002016-05-16T20:08:35.046-07:00VJTorley,
Are you a materialist regarding the min...VJTorley,<br /><br />Are you a materialist regarding the mind?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-62863784274898925612016-05-16T16:07:28.329-07:002016-05-16T16:07:28.329-07:00Hi Mr. Green,
Thank you for your response. You wr...Hi Mr. Green,<br /><br />Thank you for your response. You write: "If my mind grasps a universal [rule], then yes, that universal, or form, is in my mind." <br /><br />Are we all being misled by a spatial metaphor here? I know it's a common and natural-sounding way of talking, but I can't help wondering if it's a mistaken one - especially in view of the fact that the intellect is immaterial. Perhaps we should jettison the notion of the mind as a container of ideas.<br /><br />I would also note that a universal is a kind of rule, and "receiving," "containing," "extracting" and "grasping" are not rule-following activities as such. They are spatial metaphors for intelligence, but I don't think they succeed in capturing its very essence.<br /><br />I haven't resolved this question in my own mind, so I would welcome suggestions.<br /><br />Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.com