tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post5089498861088190644..comments2024-03-18T21:06:42.546-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Lacordaire on the existence of GodEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger249125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15705906108852945712021-03-28T21:15:26.701-07:002021-03-28T21:15:26.701-07:00I would say yes. That would be the principal probl...I would say yes. That would be the principal problem that classical theists have with neo-classical theism(or theistic personalism). You see people like Ed and David Bentley Hart making that point a lot. The ideia is that you either have a ultimate reality like the God of classical theism or you have no explanation at all, for anything less can't be the ultimate explanation of things. <br /><br />Take Dr. Craig Kalam, for instance, since whatever begins to exist has a cause, he(correctly) reasons that the cause of the universe can't have begun to exist as well, for if it did it would need a cause too. The classical cosmological arguments aim to use similar reasoning to show that the cause of things can't have potentiality, be composed, have a existence separate of its essence etc(it depends on the argument). So, if any of these arguments work, God would have to be closer to what classical theism describe. Talmidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04267925670235640337noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-64938126461604179462021-03-28T01:36:44.133-07:002021-03-28T01:36:44.133-07:00I'm new here. Is it a problem if I make up ten...I'm new here. Is it a problem if I make up ten names and hold debates? If anyone else wants to take part, join in, please do. I'm a very professional writer but not many people want to talk to me, plus I don't want people who know me to make rash judgements. The blog also needs bigger comment stats.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23780389338605800832021-03-27T22:03:52.564-07:002021-03-27T22:03:52.564-07:00Please forgive me for my ignorance because I proba...Please forgive me for my ignorance because I probably am beginner joining a group of experts.<br /><br />I've heard Dr. Craig say that God is timeless sans creation and inside time after creation. If each possibility needs something actual to actualize it, does that mean that Dr. Craig's theistic personalism imply that God needs a cause?<br />Bill McEnaneynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40096550133015840342021-03-27T06:00:47.821-07:002021-03-27T06:00:47.821-07:00Good points, David. To start with your last questi...Good points, David. To start with your last question, "what have most people really been naturally inclined to want to be true about God?", the answer must surely be that he be personal and, the more ultimate, the better. But as you also mention, desire follows cognition; as most men until after the Council of Trent did not hear a correct account of God, as far as we know, their natural inclinations were stifled by the false notions that surrounded them. <br /><br />We do know that two religions that do insist on the personal and ultimate nature of God, Christianity and Islam, when put alongside the other ideas of divinity you have mentioned, have proven much more attractive. But the cause of this ignorance was not just the absence of revelation.<br /><br />The statement in the post that led to your comment, that "we cannot be directed by nature toward some end unless it is possible to achieve it" is nevertheless true. However, what is possible is not necessarily probable, as history shows. Without revelation, it is difficult for individuals to have a clear idea (and free from error) of God. No society known to us has ever existed on such a basis. There is of course what we call baptism of desire, but this is something we are not in a position to make observations about. <br /><br />Why isn't the possible more generalised when it comes to knowledge of God? Original sin. The Council of Trent declared that Adam was constituted in the state of justice. The fall had effects on human nature which cannot be made equivalent to any fictitious "state of nature" in man. Catholic tradition has never considered original sin to be a "return" to a state of "nature". On the contrary, it has always taught that the result was a disorder and wounding that also affected the ability to reason, among other things. <br /><br />The resulting confusion might see people develop surrogates for God in all sorts of things, but that only shows the effects of original sin on man's nature. With revelation comes the greatest certainty, as St. Thomas said. Chesterton was talking about the same thing when he said: "Take away the supernatural and what remains is the unnatural". Miguel Cervantesnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15644479367703178292021-03-26T12:13:43.519-07:002021-03-26T12:13:43.519-07:00Feser: "What Lacordaire sketches out here see...Feser: "What Lacordaire sketches out here seems to me best read as a version of what is sometimes called an “argument from desire” for God’s existence. Such an argument first tries to establish that the inclination to believe in and desire God is built into our very nature. The appeal to what most people have thought historically functions as evidence for this thesis. The argument then appeals to the Aristotelian thesis that a natural inclination cannot be in vain – that is to say, that we cannot be directed by nature toward some end unless it is possible to achieve it. The argument then concludes that given our natural desire for God together with this Aristotelian thesis, we can conclude that God really does exist."<br /><br />Okay, but our "natural desire" for what God (for which God/for God how conceived)? For whatever God people believe in, since desire follows cognition. <br /><br />So two glaring questions: What have most people believed historically about "God" (ultimate reality)? (And would determining that really be a sound way of adjudicating between competing conceptions of the ultimate reality? It seems not.) And how "natural" is any of these conceptions? (Is there any relevant sense of the term "natural" in which any of the competing senses could plausibly be termed "natural"?)<br /><br />And I would also ask whether the "argument from desire" wouldn't work just as well for the pantheist as for the theist, not to mention the monopolytheist personal theist. The argument from desire seems to invite the question, what have most people really been naturally inclined to want to be true about God/ultimate reality? As a starting point for serious investigation that question seems hopelessly unconstrained.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40752050125995530042021-03-26T11:44:15.609-07:002021-03-26T11:44:15.609-07:00*solution to which
P.S.
Obviously, a lot depends...*solution to which<br /><br />P.S.<br /><br />Obviously, a lot depends on what motives of credibility one admits. Here I'm presupposing the historical argument commonly cited by Thomists (including Dr. Feser)<br /><br />À propos, a link referenced above.<br /><br />http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/05/pre-christian-apologetics.htmlThomas Gavisushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15291566449128189887noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27333365976367793412021-03-26T11:37:46.957-07:002021-03-26T11:37:46.957-07:00Feser: "Lacordaire points out that skepticism...Feser: "Lacordaire points out that skepticism about God’s existence and about the objectivity of truth and of justice have, historically, largely been confined to a small minority of society – namely the powerful and educated elite, who out of pride delude themselves into thinking that they have no need of such ideas, and are able to develop clever sophistries to rationalize their rejection of them."<br /><br />Daniel: "So material prosperity and its distractions leads to skepticism about the objectivity of truth, justice, and the existence of God. And the comforts and sense of self sufficiency leads to sloth (acedia)."<br /><br />These claims remind me of Feser's post about the dangers of narrative thinking in relation to conspiracy theories. Probably worth reviewing and pondering what he said there.<br /><br />@Daniel: <br />It seems you make an unwarranted transition from Feser's "powerful and educated elite, who out of pride delude themselves..." to something completely different, namely "material prosperity and its distractions." Interesting.<br /><br />I think the notions of "powerful" and "educated" are probably worth dwelling on some more if you want a plausible historical understanding of the rise of atheism. It may be "hard for the rich man," but prosperity itself is surely not evil and you'll have a hard time proving a strong correlation between material prosperity and godlessness (atheism). And note, the rich man's difficulty entering the kingdom need not be related to atheism. <br /><br />A more promising explanation for the rise of atheism in society, I would hazard, is the rise of "universal education" divorced (in its curriculum) by those in "power" from theism, and instead wed to secularism. And this historical development occurred together with Maritain's/Vatican II's endorsement of a secularized state, which is to say an avowedly "non-theistic" state, which is but a short step to a de facto atheistic state, and a society of increasing atheism.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75901767048894030232021-03-26T11:33:29.402-07:002021-03-26T11:33:29.402-07:00The reason I'm going into some detail on this ...The reason I'm going into some detail on this topic is simple: you seem to think that the difficulties with Scripture, Biblical inspiration and possibly God's goodness follow upon Catholicism being true. I respectfully submit that none of these difficulties follows upon this, as the grounds for the difficulties adduced by you are form no part of Catholic doctrine. <br /><br />Without supposing duties on the part of God with regards to positive elimination of diffuculties whose solution is not required for the establishment of the fact of revelation, I see no way to convert the difficulties of the sort mentioned by you so far into tensions of the 1) or 2) type (see above), and hence no way to undermine the certainty in relation to the motives of credibility and Catholicism, no matter what their – mere – number. <br /><br />Thomas GavisusThomas Gavisushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15291566449128189887noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-85425333326160718892021-03-26T11:24:14.719-07:002021-03-26T11:24:14.719-07:00However, on a Catholic understanding, at least, He...However, on a Catholic understanding, at least, He has never promised to prevent any and all difficulties, in fact, quite the contrary. His exhortation to us was: <br /><br />[24] Then Jesus said to his disciples: If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me. [Matthew 16:24]<br /><br />You might object, distinguishing moral difficulties and epistemic difficulties. However, the parallel is exact: God, who desires us to be saved, certaintly could've made it much easier for us.<br /><br />Moreover, Our Lord, in a way, specifically chose to remain difficult at times, as with the parables: <br /><br />And his disciples came and said to him: Why speakest thou to them in parables? [11] Who answered and said to them: Because to you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven: but to them it is not given. [12] For he that hath, to him shall be given, and he shall abound: but he that hath not, from him shall be taken away that also which he hath. [13] Therefore do I speak to them in parables: because seeing they see not, and hearing they hear not, neither do they understand. [14] And the prophecy of Isaias is fulfilled in them, who saith: By hearing you shall hear, and shall not understand: and seeing you shall see, and shall not perceive. [15] For the heart of this people is grown gross, and with their ears they have been dull of hearing, and their eyes they have shut: lest at any time they should see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and be converted, and I should heal them. [16] But blessed are your eyes, because they see, and your ears, because they hear. [17] For, amen, I say to you, many prophets and just men have desired to see the things that you see, and have not seen them, and to hear the things that you hear and have not heard them.”<br /><br />Needless to say, in principle, God could've made everybody see, jut as He could've satisfied the wishes of the prophets and the just. He was, however, under no such obligation, as He certainly did not make expertise in exegesis, or even decent Biblical knowledge as such, necessary for salvation.<br /><br />The Church has never taught the – let's just say, amusing – doctrine of the perspecuity of Scripture, a teaching of Protestant provenance. Again, God inspired, according to the Church, the following verse concerning, prima facie, almost 30% of the New Testament: <br /><br />As also in all his epistles [those of St. Paul] , speaking in them of these things; in which are certain things hard to be understood, which the unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do also the other scriptures, to their own destruction. [2 Peter 3:16] <br /><br />I respectfully challenge you to find one instance of the Church promising you some consistent level of personal Biblical comprehension. I cannot find any, and the reason is not you, obviously. To my knowledge, the Church never taught that Sacred Scripture, qua Scripture, is addressed by God to any individual as such; the Church Herself receives it, and individual Catholics get to participate in any benefits conferred on the Church – including Scripture and its interpretation etc. – according to their station. Now, the Church has never been overwhelmed by these difficulties, and hence God cannot be said to have failed to keep His promise.Thomas Gavisushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15291566449128189887noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75880445191670021152021-03-26T11:20:01.992-07:002021-03-26T11:20:01.992-07:00You write: „God could have easily avoided such a b...You write: „God could have easily avoided such a bizarre arrangement and, as rational people, we should think that He would want to. If one comes to absurdities when drawing conclusions the logical course of action is to re-examine the premises to see what went wrong. If we do this, perhaps it turns out that we were mistaken in thinking we were morally certain that God has spoken.”<br /><br />I feel compelled to challenge any argument proceeding from “God could've easily avoided...”. I submit, respectfully, for the sake of the piety of all Catholics and others (including our two resident pagans) that any discussion of ease or difficulty with regards to God, Who is omnipotent, is absurd. For all we know, God “could've easily” created us in full possession of the Beatific Vision, prevented all sin and suffering, made the universe infinitely greater and marvelous etc. etc. with exactly the same difficulty, that is, none at all. If effort to be expended by God is your standard, literally any evil, the slightest inconvenience, is a difficulty sufficient to challenge God's goodness. <br /><br />Permit me an important digression: on the Thomistic account (see, e.g. „The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil” by Fr. Brian Davies, O.P., which I – but most importantly, our gracious host, I recall – cannot recommend enough), and on the privation theory of evil in general, any “evil” is a lack of a good requisite to a created nature that God allows to remain. Hence, the problem of evil, of which your argument now clearly seems to be a particular iteration, can be translated into “God should've created more being”. To which the sensible reply is: “He need not have created even this much”. <br /><br />[Judging by your other comments below, you may not agree with this. But this issue should then be relegated to a discussion of the preambles of the faith, rather than difficulties that follow upon the truth of Catholicism, as you put; the Church certainly does not teach anything contrary to this conception.]<br /><br />Now, to be sure, in creation, He respects His reflections in creation, and hence “keeps His promises”, being free from any contradiction. If He sets goals, the promise of the means is implicit in that, as you correctly note. Thomas Gavisushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15291566449128189887noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-36861960655657757642021-03-26T11:17:22.345-07:002021-03-26T11:17:22.345-07:00And hence I would grant such majors as „If the Gos...<br />And hence I would grant such majors as „If the Gospels are historically probable, then God has revealed Catholicism”, and „If Catholicism, then Exodus”, but not „If Exodus is historically improbable, then Gospels are historically improbable” and hence not „If Exodus is historically improbable, Catholicism is improbable”. The same goes for „If pretorism is exegetically improbable, then Catholicism is improbable” etc.<br /><br />Please contrast with 1) „If there is dogmatic contradiction, then Catholicism is false”; 2) „If the Gospels are most probably 5-th century fiction novels and the aliens staged all of the miracles, then Catholicism is false” or „If Anabaptism is probably true, Catholicism is probably false”; all of which I would accept.<br /><br />You write: „The problem with this, though, is that it makes the Divine Inspiration of Scripture artificially unfalsifiable. Does it not seem odd that God would arrange things such that we must simply accept a priori (on account of the motives of credibility) that nothing in Scripture can call Divine Inspiration into question no matter how much the textual evidence itself might scream to the contrary?” <br /><br />As Divine Inspiration of Scripture is not and has never been held by the Church to be an emprirically established truth, speaking of artifice and demanding falsifiability seems odd and question-begging. It's not even clear how could it be empirically established: by what standards could you possibly judge a text to be Divinely Inspired, specifically, rather than it being insightful, riveting, a page turner etc. etc.? <br /><br />I also have to propose a correction: the “a priori” reason for such acceptance is the authority of God revealing, and hence the proposion, for all you know in light of the motives, is necessarily true. And although the fact of revelation is accepted on the basis of the motives, which are only probably true, you cannot resolve the conclusion back into them for purposes of comparison, unless the hypotheses being weighed against each other concern the same explanandum.<br />Thomas Gavisushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15291566449128189887noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40087169677264298132021-03-26T11:14:35.436-07:002021-03-26T11:14:35.436-07:00You write: „If God wishes our belief in Catholicis...You write: „If God wishes our belief in Catholicism to be reasonable then he necessarily must provide us with a total set of evidence that points to Catholicism rather than against”.<br /><br />I agree if by „a total set of evidence that points to Catholicism rather than against” you mean „enough evidence to make denying the truth of Catholicism objectively irrational” and by „us” you mean „persons of good will in a sufficiently perfect epistemological situation”, that is, excluding bad faith, mental incapacity and environmental (including societal) hazards (the Church recognises the possibility of invincible ignorance), certaintly. <br /><br />You write: „We should expect God to arrange things such that the evidence we observe isn't in tension with what He has revealed. At the very least, we need sufficient motive that to any reasonable person would outweigh the tensions.”<br /><br />If by evidence here you mean “a total set of evidence”, I agree with the first part of the sentence; with regards to “tension/tensions”, I distinguish. If tension(s) means: 1) contradiction – this I concede; 2) falsification (in the Popperian sense) of the motives of credibility, or their neutralisation (e.g. a rival revelation possessed of greater or equal credible support, or a rival claimant to the same revelation enjoying the same) – this I concede; 3) mere lesser probability of a thesis entailed by Catholicism relative to alternatives in accordance with evidence internal to the discipline, e.g. any reading of Matthew 24:33-34 apart from exclusive futurism, if we assume you're right on that – this I deny: all God needs to make his revelation credible is provide sufficient evidence to establish the probable truth of the fact of revelation.<br /><br />Unless such tensions somehow amount to 1) or 2), I fail to see why God would have to prevent any of them, irrespective of their number. If, say, you think – as I do – that, for example, with A-T in mind (please see the link at the end of this comment), that the only reasonable conclusion is to view the New Testament as a historic account, you have to conclude that some sort revelation by God ocurred (let's assume it is Catholicism, at least for the sake of argument). This provides sufficient reason to believe in its contents as necessarily true, per the syllogism adduced above.<br /><br />To take my example of motive, the initial judgement concerning the factual nature of the Gospel account is not at all impacted by, say, the historical improbability (that is, in case of a lacking reconstruction hypothesis based on the available archaelogical and source-evidence) of Exodus from Egypt, because the two cases (and hence) judgements are not relevantly related. If it is not in the nature of things to leave the same amount of evidence for posterity, there is no reason to expect, ceteris paribus, judgements based on said evidence in different cases to positively converge on the components of some meta-phenomenon. This concerns any reconstructive, context-dependent subject matter and hence respective disciplines, including exegesis.<br />Absence of (in this case, positive and/or internal to the discipline) evidence is not evidence of absence (non-occurrence, in this case). In our case there is positive evidence for the historicity of Exodus – God's testimony to that effect. A demand for internal evidence against the background of of indubitable external evidence is, I submit, question-begging.Thomas Gavisushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15291566449128189887noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-43716009703875677282021-03-26T11:11:57.578-07:002021-03-26T11:11:57.578-07:00@ Albinus
I apologise for my tardiness!
You writ...@ Albinus<br /><br />I apologise for my tardiness!<br /><br />You write: If one can be morally certain that God has revealed X then any difficulties that follow upon X can be waved away. We can either come up with good solutions to the difficulties, or failing that, simply say "it's a mystery".<br /><br />And that's fine....if one truly is morally certain. <br /><br />It's unfortunate if your experience as a Catholic has involved waving difficulties away or seeing others do that, but that hasn't been my experience, nor am I not proposing that, and neither does the Church.<br /><br />You write: “I concede that nature doesn't give a hill of beans over preserving consistent evidence. But I deny that the God of Catholicism can be unconcerned about it.”<br /><br />Unless you are prepared to maintain the existence of nature as a substance on its own, „Nature” seems to be a fitting name only for a pattern of governance by God (if not Him, in certain contexts). I think it odd to say that nature is indifferent towards our knowledge. „She” seems to me to provide us with at least just enough to make the all-important inferences with regards to God, the cosmos and also the possibility of revelation, and that should tell you something, I believe.Thomas Gavisushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15291566449128189887noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28500334697707531202021-03-23T09:40:08.627-07:002021-03-23T09:40:08.627-07:00JoeD 2.17pm
I have tried to respond to your post...JoeD 2.17pm<br /><br /> I have tried to respond to your post on numerous occasions, but for some reason my reply vanished into the either every time. I will now have another go. <br /><br /> What do I think? Well, not a great deal at the moment i'm afraid , because I did not understand much of what you said! That is not to impugn your content though - it is probably a terminological deficiency on my part.<br /><br /> Some time ago I acquired most of Fesers books, and a bunch of standard metaphysics text books without a Thomist axe to grind, but have been too busy with life's contingencies to study them. I have every hope that this will change in the near future.<br /><br /> Thanks for responding positively to.one of my posts. I trust that it was genuine, and not a deliberate attempt to blind me with metaphysics!FreeThinkerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12542926199146156167noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-90038918663646894722021-03-22T21:31:13.456-07:002021-03-22T21:31:13.456-07:00Cont.
Notice that i only mean to turn the evidenc...Cont.<br /><br />Notice that i only mean to turn the evidence against christianity weaker, i agree that they are still dificulties that have to be considered.<br /><br />Finally, about the way you evaluate catholicism, i can understand the method, it is the rational way of judging a position one does not hold. You don't want to change before judging things right. Two things that come into my mind: <br /><br />1. I agree with Dr. Feser that the preambles of the faith are pretty much necessary before one will evaluate Christianity truth. The pressuppositions that one brings to the table will change a lot how one looks to the evidence for and against it. I think that this post of his is perfect in explaining this: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/05/pre-christian-apologetics.html?m=1<br /><br />So my first advice is: before judging the religion take some time to evaluate the philosophical positions that are pressuposed by it. Dr. Feser, Dr. Pruss, Dr. Josh Rasmussem and many others have pretty interesting defenses of they. If you end up agreeing with the christian philosophy them the religion will probably look more interesting for you. If you end up disagreeing them it likely will be a waste of time to judge it alone.<br /><br />I mean, part of me still wants christianity and even monotheism to be false, much to my shame, agreeing with Aquinas and others in most things is a large part of why i entered in it and why i stay. Maybe you have a contrary philosophical disposition, that is possible. <br /><br />2. This is harder to you that was to me because you said that you are from a catholic background, sure, but why not drop catholicism for now and evaluate something like Mere Christianity? Maybe you are setting the bar too high. <br /><br /><br />Anyway, evaluating a position that touches in so many things is not easy, so hope that this can help a bit. <br />Talmidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04267925670235640337noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74202975183198568262021-03-22T21:22:50.475-07:002021-03-22T21:22:50.475-07:00@Albinus
"If we do not take this approach, t...@Albinus<br /><br />"If we do not take this approach, then it implies either that Divine Inspiration of Scripture is false or else that God doesn't really care all that much about ensuring we have proper Faith"<br /><br />Well, Dr. Feser did mention some times that in his atheist days he thought something similar: if God exists, should it not be obvious? And guess what, it seems like it IS obvious to him now.<br />(Not saying that you are a atheist, btw)<br /><br />What i'am saying is: you don't really know if you die as a non-catholic or not, you don't know the consequences that your views right now can have on others on ten, twenty years. And that is only about you, how much could history be diferent if Scripture was diferent?<br /><br />As someone who looks at Christianity from the outside, i can understand your worry. But i think that it has less weight in the scale that it looks. If Christianity is true, them God actions would sure look bizarre to us sometimes, pretty much everytime i learn something from the history of the Church i get a bit suprised. One still has to remember that peoples actions usually are weird, so while it does not make christianity look good, it does not make it looks horrible :)<br /><br />About the transfiguration, the little patern continuing in the three gospels when Matthew and Luke like to change the order of things seems to me enough evidence that a relevant part of the early church came to understand it that way.<br /><br /> I was suprised that you did know that reading, that is cool, but i don't see the objections as that strong. Looking at the text:<br /><br />"Then Jesus said to his disciples, “Whoever wants to be my disciple must deny themselves and take up their cross and follow me.(AD) 25 For whoever wants to save their life[f] will lose it, but whoever loses their life for me will find it.(AE) 26 What good will it be for someone to gain the whole world, yet forfeit their soul? Or what can anyone give in exchange for their soul? 27 For the Son of Man(AF) is going to come(AG) in his Father’s glory with his angels, and then he will reward each person according to what they have done.(AH)<br /><br />28 “Truly I tell you, some who are standing here will not taste death before they see the Son of Man coming in his kingdom.”<br /><br />Notice that Jesus does not say "some of you will be alive when X happens", if that where the case, them He would not be talking about a event from days latter, that is true. He says that some will not die before seeing His coming, a diferent thing. On the transfiguration reading He would be saying something like "Look, none of you guys will be alive when i actually come to judge this world, but some of you guys will see my glory before death". That is a plausible reading to me, so this prediction is not that strong of a problem to christians. <br /><br />Talmidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04267925670235640337noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18795195405295833212021-03-22T10:18:38.438-07:002021-03-22T10:18:38.438-07:00Talmid,
Thanks.
My argument is not that the Scri...Talmid,<br /><br />Thanks.<br /><br />My argument is not that the Scriptural text must be able to be perfectly understood or that it *cannot* be understood in heretical ways but simply that as rational creatures we should expect God to structure the text in such a way that interpretations with dire ramifications are excluded from the text (for example, Jesus being a false prophet). If we do not take this approach, then it implies either that Divine Inspiration of Scripture is false or else that God doesn't really care all that much about ensuring we have proper Faith. It's the same logic by which one can conclude that Pope Francis doesn't care very much about the traditional teaching of the Church on capital punishment.<br /><br />I was actually aware of the transfiguration as a potential response to Matt 16 when I brought it up. This idea goes back to at least Chrysostom IIRC. However, I believe it is a problematic response because it's implausible that Jesus, knowing the future, would say "Some of you will be alive when X happens" and then X happens merely a few days later. Further, I don't think this does justice to "render everyman his due". JoeD had a creative take on this, but again as I've mentioned, merely being able to give a plausible reading doesn't directly address the heart of my difficulty.<br /><br />To clarify in response to your last paragraph: I attempt to approach the text as an unbiased observer, not as one assuming that Catholicism is false. As I've mentioned before, I believe the only rational way to evaluate a religion is to attempt to view it from the outside, taking ALL of the evidence at ones disposal into consideration before making a verdict. Putting aside difficulties until one has "proven" Catholicism through miracles, martyrs, etc and then proceeding to seek a solution to the difficulties seems contrary to reason to me (though for most of my life that is exactly what I did, without being conscious of the fact.)Albinushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03569576207090703708noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39414597409930279812021-03-22T05:14:36.210-07:002021-03-22T05:14:36.210-07:00Tony (19/3/21 1.05 pm) "While God may have pr...Tony (19/3/21 1.05 pm) "While God may have provided revelationary suggestions / urgings on a broadcast basis throughout all mankind, there is no a priori reason to ASSUME he did, which would then be found in world-wide religions. It might be the case that any commonality in world religions is more due to the natural theology truths that come from nature itself than in any above-nature self-revelation by God. If this were so, we would expect to find that the differences in world religions are as wide and as deep as different cultures' grasp on natural theology itself - and that is (more or less) pretty much what we DO find: that there are plenty of religions that are wholly incompatible with each other because (in part) they take wholly incompatible WRONG pathways in their solutions to natural theology questions."<br /><br />To explain the traces of monotheism found in pagan cults, the traditional idea of very ancient revelation being corrupted over time seems to make more sense. The Old Testament account shows this. Pagan religions have tended to become more and more corrupted over time and with distance from the source of revelation, from our point of view. The monotheistic traces which still remain are not justified by these cults on the grounds of reason, and classical philosophers never imagined converting their speculations into a religion. Well did our missionaries venture forth.<br /><br />Chris, there can only be a traditionalist unity of religions if you exclude Christianity. The pagan worldview especially, is diametrically opposed to the Faith, from beginning to end; none of them had any notion of the material and spiritual world being created from nothing by a spiritual being. One cannot "innocently" revert to this naturalism after having had contact with true revelation. "Traditionalism" of this sort is therefore one the most unnatural, evil cults on offer today. Miguel Cervantesnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-56312746682271714532021-03-20T15:01:32.363-07:002021-03-20T15:01:32.363-07:00@Albinus,
"Thanks. Yes, that is a good point...@Albinus,<br /><br /><i>"Thanks. Yes, that is a good point on the witnesses/martyrs. The skeptical side of me has several plausible objections on this, but the other side of me (the old me I suppose) still sees something beautiful in this as well as in other aspects of Catholicism.</i>"<br /><br />Keep in mind though that martyrdom was only the more final aspect of early Christian persecution. Even without being martyred, early Christians would still have faced massive pressure in the form of social persecution and shaming as a result of some key aspects of Christianity (i.e. the Crucifixion being seen as ridiculous and insane, rejecting state gods which could bring backlash, undermining the importance of social status in Christ, preferring loyalty to God even over family to the point of exile which is basically like a death sentence, etc.)<br /><br />St. Paul even wrote a letter encouraging those who started wavering in the faith due to that pressure to persevere and keep going - one doesn't strictly need the threat of death to be discouraged from doing something.JoeDnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-20798146215912167142021-03-20T11:37:47.018-07:002021-03-20T11:37:47.018-07:00What kind of Brute Facts are being discussed here?...What kind of Brute Facts are being discussed here? Epistemological brute facts or Metaphysical Ones? A brute fact is a fact that has no explanation. <br /><br />An Epistemological one is one whose explanation is unknown to us.<br /><br />A metaphysical one is one which has no explanation because there is no explanation at all even in principle. <br /><br />Feser admits there can be brute facts of the former but brute facts of the later render things unintelligible.<br /><br />Also there is the distinction between the Scholastic version of the Principle of Sufficient reason vs the Rationalist One. The former is accepted and defended by Feser the later is not. <br /><br />The Scholastic PSR is formulated thus to quote SCHOLASTIC METAPHYSICS.<br /><br />“everything which is, has a sufficient reason for existing” and “everything is intelligible” (both from Garrigou-Lagrange 1939, p.181). A third is: There is a sufficient reason or adequate necessary objective explanation for the being of whatever is and for all attributes of<br />any being. (Wuellner 1956b, p. 15)." <br /><br />The rationalist PSR would include propositions as among the things that require explanations. But the Scholastic Version would have none of that.<br /><br />Thus the sufficient reason for God's existence is God is Pure Act and is thus the reason for His own existence under the scholastic PSR.<br /><br />The Rationalist PSR would ask the question "Why is there an Act/Potency distinction and why does it terminate in Pure Act. Why is existence not something else?". Because propositions are part of what requires an explanation under the rationalist version. But the scholastic need not believe all propositions require an explanation.<br /> <br /><br />Failure to make these distinctions dooms a discussion to equivocation.<br /><br />"My argument is that, since a brute fact is possible." Yes but what kind and which PSR are you presupposing if any or rejecting?<br /><br />Otherwise this whole conversation is just some equivocating bullshit and I am already bored.<br /><br /><br />Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74496500768984954272021-03-20T11:12:28.887-07:002021-03-20T11:12:28.887-07:00Yer an idiot wee lamb. Paps is no more an expert ...Yer an idiot wee lamb. Paps is no more an expert in Atheist counter classic Theistic philosophy then I am an expert in Quantum Gravity.<br /><br />He is a philosophical illiterate. He always has been and always will be. He couldn't formulate a philosophical defeater argument to save his life.<br /> Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49674103931962635392021-03-20T09:22:46.651-07:002021-03-20T09:22:46.651-07:00Finally, and obviously, Catholics believe in divin...Finally, and obviously, Catholics believe in divine inspiration of Sacred Scripture as an article of faith and are in addition supposed to be classical theists. So Catholic Thomists have additional reasons for being persistent in their attempts at correct synthetic interpretation. We treat the books of Scripture we happen to share with the Jews accordingly, and to the extent they agree in interpretation, no difference in terms of standard seems to arise. I am not aware of Quranic passages containing descriptions beyond “mere anthropomorphism”, so I don't think an arbitrary double standard obtains in this case (but then, I never studied the book in any sufficient depth). What familiarity I have with missionary exegesis attempts, e.g. engagement with Vedic literature, or the Chinese classics, say, suggests no lack of effort in „charitable” classical theist interpretation of the sources, whether warranted or not, at least by some of the missionary orders involved, as in the example of the Jesuits during Chinese Rites Controversy. <br /><br />So I don't think there's sufficient reason to accuse Catholics/Thomists of adhering to an arbitrary double standard when it comes to Helenic or Norse myth. <br />I suppose this can be context-sensitive, that is, depend on the views of a polytheist interlocutor in question. However, generally speaking, as I intended to convey in my original reply, these myths are no longer in the cultural possession of polytheists, nor do I think a sufficiently public argument in favour of particular polytheistic and contemporarily active of schools of thought on the matter (such as henadology) has been made to challenge the prevailing way in which our existining cultures understand the texts. Precisely this, after all, is usually the point of reference by Thomists.<br /><br />I'll attempt to address the remaining points when opportunity presents itself. <br />Family duty calls!<br /><br />Thomas Gavisus <br />Thomas Gavisushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15291566449128189887noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58356130697145484622021-03-20T09:21:50.812-07:002021-03-20T09:21:50.812-07:00Now, to be sure, with some effort as a Thomist (at...Now, to be sure, with some effort as a Thomist (at least in ambition) I can try and salvage some salient meanings here. As my exposure to intentional commentary on myth is limited, this seem naive, but all the better: off the top of my head, one could argue that passion overcoming reason is a hint of the lack of a real distinction between divine reason and appetite; suppose that the tragedy of rape corresponds to the futility and irrationality of resisting divine will, whereas the latter's actual benevolence is revealed in the good of progeny, with the problematic aspects being simply written off on account of limitations characteristic of metaphor. However, I think such cases demand noticeably greater effort, and if you agree with my estimation of their relative frequency, therein lie the non-arbitrary quantitative and qualitative reasons for discrimination between Catholic Holy Scriptures and the texts of myth.<br /><br />This exercise was not especially hard; however, again, I thinks it's obvious that this is not the most immediate reading, and it resulted from me setting my mind specifically on the task of interpreting mythic rape through an Aristotelian-Thomistic lense, which, however, recognises the obvious downsides of such a device, as specified above. Moreover, in applying such a lens to texts that were not written by Aristotelians, let alone Thomists, for all I know, I am engaging in a blatantly anachronistic exercise. Without evidence of Homer's or Hesiod's implicit Aristotelianism (or Platonism or what have you), or an esoteric tradition possessed of sufficient philosophical acumen, I think this conclusion is inescapable. In the case of the Norse, we lack evidence for any comparable philosophical theology, which compounds the anachronism. And this is an additional reason to be dissuaded from such interpretations.Thomas Gavisushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15291566449128189887noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-38257359284716300692021-03-20T09:20:15.375-07:002021-03-20T09:20:15.375-07:00As regards the Fatherhood of God, I must say that,...As regards the Fatherhood of God, I must say that, at least in Catholic understanding, this is not entirely correct: 1) we are called in, Christ, to be God's -non-metaphoric- sons and daughters, but the kinship thus offered is adoptive, not natural, and contingent on its embrace by the creature (whether personally or vicariously through parents); 2) in the case of infant baptism, as regards the internal efficacy of the sacrament, the soul is understood to be by nature disposed towards the goods of human nature, including those offered in baptism, so there is, ontologically, no violence to speak of.<br /><br />If you are referring to the appelation and a certain popular familiarity contained in the Old Testament, this is, I suppose, a partial metaphor (inasmuch as righteousness is not quite explicitly stated to be supernatural, as I understand it), and hence more of a match; however, again, I am compelled to point out that such fatherhood, as it is present in the text, is 1) only applicable if sustained by the mortal (penalties for defection notwithstanding; the punishment of mortal delinquency against divine commands is not peculiar to Catholic Sacred Scripture); 2) is unequivocally benefical for the child; so the parallel breaks down immediately, as far as I can see.<br /><br />[For the purposes of the following exercise, I operated on the assumption of a substantial agreement between the host-cultures, on the one hand, and me on the other, on the recognition of the evil of rape (that it is evil in the case of women in the in-group, at the very least). If you choose to challenge this assumption, please see the discussion below.]<br />Thomas Gavisushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15291566449128189887noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-50007648185350201442021-03-20T09:18:36.368-07:002021-03-20T09:18:36.368-07:00What I meant for us to consider, instead, is a cas...What I meant for us to consider, instead, is a case of anthropomorphism of a different kind, namely, anthropomorphic descriptions imputing moral failure to divine personages: I understand rape as an intrinsically disordered, atrocious act, in addition presupposing the overpowering of the rapist's reason by disordered passions. If anthropomorphism is supposed to facilitate our contemplation of divine perfection that is, in itself, too lofty for a mortal's mind, attributing rape to divinity seems exceedingly counter-productive. Moral failure is a peculiarly human and creaturely reality with no correspondent in divinity; such attributions seem positively impious, whereas “mere anthropomorphism” does not. If it is relative perfection that makes humans suitable iconographic material, and moral perfection is the apex of human perfection, then the resulting icons are disfigured during production, so to speak.<br /><br />Now that I have further clarified my query, it would be great to see your thoughts on inter-Olympian/Æsir rape/attempts at it, specifically, but generally and in regard to predation on humans (or nymphs or jötnar?; my recollection of the case of Rindr is vague), in light of the considerations adduced above, I think rape as a conveyer of necessity is still problematic at least in two important aspects: 1) „delectatio victrix”, overpowering, but eminently reasonable attraction (along the lines of final causality) on the mortal’s part immediately suggests itself as eminently preferable, inasmuch as, apart from the impious implications mentioned above, this would avoid any suggestion of the sadly usual, but nonetheless ludicrious conceptualisation of the world's relation to divinity as something the latter can “interfere with” (as opposed to “invervene in”), whereas rape just is a case of violent, unnatural imposition of necessity (of intercourse); 2) it seems to fundamentally misrepresent our relationship to divinity, of which all creatures are ontological beneficiaries, even if not consenting ones, as is the case with, say, existence: a victim of rape can hardly be considered to have benefitted from the experience personally (nor do the relevant texts, in my recollection, hint at this being the case). <br />Thomas Gavisushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15291566449128189887noreply@blogger.com