tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post492550378886375159..comments2024-03-28T13:39:03.094-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: An exchange with Keith Parsons, Part IIEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger120125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39518023287537126312014-03-18T11:39:00.529-07:002014-03-18T11:39:00.529-07:00I could add (though I trust it is obvious): And ne...I could add (though I trust it is obvious): And neither do we have entirely sharp, <i>'subformal'</i> demarcations by which to understand material processes.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-21711805870642785922014-03-18T11:34:59.380-07:002014-03-18T11:34:59.380-07:00"It accounts for the fact that by and large w..."It accounts for the fact that by and large we don't have entirely sharp, formal demarcations by which to understand material processes."<br /><br />Or rather: It <i>expresses</i> this fact.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49242816905046121432014-03-18T11:31:57.441-07:002014-03-18T11:31:57.441-07:00@SR:
"How does Thomism mark the point at whi...@SR:<br /><br />"How does Thomism mark the point at which the grass ceases to be grass and become part of the rabbit? I imagine it will talk of a grass cell matter/form composite decomposing and the grass cell's matter becoming part of the rabbit's cells."<br /><br />Not a grass <i>cell</i>, so much, but just the <i>grass</i>, as soon as it is uprooted or cut and incapable of continuing to perform its proper operations (nutrition, growth, reproduction), ceases to be <i>grass</i> (except in an equivocal sense - it is a grass-'corpse,' you could say). Part of the deceased grass (or portion thereof) - the grass material - becomes part of the rabbit, or serves as fuel for the rabbits proper operations, when it is metabolically transformed by the rabbit, so as to serve as matter for its formal operations, while part of it is expelled as waste in the form of droppings, which can't really be said to have any (substantial) form. (What exactly are droppings, by your account? Are they actualized 'subforms'? Do they have proper operations? At what point do they count as having been 'generated' qua <i>this subform</i>? Are there actually any discrete 'subforms' (of poop), identifiable as such, to speak of here?)<br /><br />"I would explain it as the grass cell ceasing to be actualized, leaving the cell's actualized subforms as an aggregate, which the rabbit incorporates into its cells."<br /><br />So you want to say that the grass cell loses its 'form'; its 'subforms' then become (subsistent) 'forms'; and then (if) they are incorporated into the cells of the rabbit they becomes 'subforms' again? But it seems that there are no sharp points of demarcation here to determine whether or not a cell or a molecule (or what have you) instantiates a particular 'form' or a 'subform.' That's why it's nice to conceive of <i>matter as such</i> (an intrinsic principle of potency or becoming) as belonging to the <i>intrinsic constitution</i> of a 'material' thing (a thing which is the subject of natural processes of generation and destruction, coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be). It accounts for the fact that by and large we don't have entirely sharp, formal demarcations by which to understand material processes.<br /><br />"In other words, no difference as far as explanatory power. Differences arise when one talks about angels and humans."<br /><br />If there is no difference, then there is no improvement, no? <br /><br />When we talk about matter-form composites, we have an explanation for the (formal) unity of the rabbit, as well as of the intrinsically vague status of the 'subforms' (i.e., matter) of the substrates for the rabbits proper operations, which involve both constant 'becoming' - continuous flux of transeunt, metabolic (material) processes - as well as the (formal) continuity of the immanent causal processes (nutrition, etc.) that constitute its <i>living</i> existence.<br /><br />Anyway, I'm sorry if that's not as clear as it could be, but the question remains: Why do you think your 'form-subform' ontology is an improvement on the old 'form-matter' ontology?David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57561770821274865392014-03-14T17:07:41.659-07:002014-03-14T17:07:41.659-07:00@SR:
"How do physicists distinguish between ...@SR:<br /><br />"How do physicists distinguish between two electrons? Not because one has one form and another another, but because they are in different locations, or exist at different times, or are in a different relation to other things (like free or bound to a nucleus)."<br /><br />Which provides no <i>meta</i>physical basis for distinguishing the state of affairs "two electrons" from the state of affairs "one electron in two places" (or, <i>mutatis mutandis</i>, provide a ground of distinction in the other cases). After all, why <i>can't</i> one electron be in two places? Universals (if they're real) can, and you've just walked straight into the famous "problem" thereof.<br /><br />Now, if you <i>want</i> an ontology that doesn't include any principle of individuation, that's fine; at one time I thought (though I don't now think) that something like a "bundle theory" of particulars would suffice and the only true "individual" was the overarching system of reality itself. (You'll find a good exposition of this view in <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Reason-Analysis-Paul-Carus-Lectures/dp/0875481124" rel="nofollow">Brand Blanshard's <i>Reason and Analysis</i></a>, which is a great book all around and I highly recommend it.) But the fact remains that your "acts of existing" don't serve as such a principle.<br /><br />But as I said, I'm bowing out.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-43872982410563322212014-03-14T15:46:30.257-07:002014-03-14T15:46:30.257-07:00@David M said...
My apologies, I though you were...@David M said...<br /><br /><br />My apologies, I though you were asking why I thought prime matter and acts of existence were interchangeable. As to whether I think actualizing power and acts of existence are interchangeable, well, one uses one phrase in one context and another in another, like using 'thinking' sometimes, and 'thoughts' at other times.<br /><br /><i>Yes, that that is your purpose is evident. But it seems that you haven't first understood the more complex ontology that you're trying to simplify, so that might be the place to start.</i><br /><br />I raised the issue here (rather than, say, writing an essay on it) <i>because</i> I don't have a thorough understanding of A-T. I asked if there was some reason it wouldn't work, got some objections, responded to the objections, and in the process learned some more about A-T. But so far I haven't come across a show-stopping objection.<br /><br /><i>Do you think that a rabbit's organs, and the grass that a rabbit eats, and its poop, are all univocally 'subforms' of the form of a rabbit?</i><br /><br />No.<br /><br /><i>Please explain how you make such determinations (without invoking a conceptual distinction like that of 'matter/form').</i><br /><br />How does Thomism mark the point at which the grass ceases to be grass and become part of the rabbit? I imagine it will talk of a grass cell matter/form composite decomposing and the grass cell's matter becoming part of the rabbit's cells. I would explain it as the grass cell ceasing to be actualized, leaving the cell's actualized subforms as an aggregate, which the rabbit incorporates into its cells.<br /><br />In other words, no difference as far as explanatory power. Differences arise when one talks about angels and humans.<br /><br />@Scott<br /><i>If you're not getting rid of the concepts of act and potency (as you're obviously not if you're keeping Pure Act), then you're not getting rid of "pure potency" any more than you're getting rid of Pure Act. You might just as well say you want to rewrite the "ontology" of the grayscale spectrum by keeping the distinction between black and white, but rejecting "pure black" and retaining only Pure White.</i><br /><br />The difference is that in my ontology, "potential" consists of forms. I don't see that it makes sense to speak of "pure form". It does make sense to speak of "Pure Act", to distinguish it from the acts of existence that are composed with forms. It is not like black/white, it is like One/many.<br /><br /><i>If you're saying that an actualized form can actualize other forms, then you seem to have misspoken when you said forms don't actualize anything. If you're not, then it's not at all clear what you think your actualized forms can be "efficient cause[s]" of.</i><br /><br />I thought it would be clear that what I meant was that the ability of an actualized form to actualize something comes from the actualizing power in the actualized form, not the form.<br /><br /><i>The problem, basically, is that you've left no way to tell the actualizations apart. What distinguishes Pure Act's actualization of the "form of a dog" in one instance from Pure Act's actualization of the "form of a dog" in another instance? You say the two dogs have different actualized subforms. But now I can ask what distinguishes the two actualized subforms, which are just forms in their own right. The only answer available to you is that they in turn have different actualized subforms. But since you think the hierarchy of forms "bottoms out" in the elementary particles, you can only keep giving that answer for so long; eventually you reach a level where you can't tell, say, two electrons apart.</i><br /><br />I addressed this a while back. How do physicists distinguish between two electrons? Not because one has one form and another another, but because they are in different locations, or exist at different times, or are in a different relation to other things (like free or bound to a nucleus).Scott Robertshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06903018448299432876noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6615729528780556902014-03-14T10:07:43.334-07:002014-03-14T10:07:43.334-07:00@SR:
One final reply and I'll bow out of this...@SR:<br /><br />One final reply and I'll bow out of this discussion.<br /><br />"I would say that an actualized form (a thing) can be an efficient cause because it is channeling the actualizing power."<br /><br />If you're saying that an actualized form can actualize other forms, then you seem to have misspoken when you said forms don't actualize anything. If you're not, then it's not at all clear what you think your actualized forms can be "efficient cause[s]" <i>of</i>.<br /><br />"They would have different actualized subforms. Each actualization of a form (or subform) is a separate individual."<br /><br />That doesn't address the question. The subform itself is the same subform in each instance, so you must be (and are) saying that the instances are differentiated by having been brought about by different "actualizations." But subforms are just lower-level forms, so you've just pushed the problem down one level.<br /><br />The problem, basically, is that you've left no way to tell the <i>actualizations</i> apart. What distinguishes Pure Act's actualization of the "form of a dog" in one instance from Pure Act's actualization of the "form of a dog" in another instance? You say the two dogs have different actualized subforms. But now I can ask what distinguishes the two actualized subforms, which are just forms in their own right. The only answer available to you is that they in turn have different actualized subforms. But since you think the hierarchy of forms "bottoms out" in the elementary particles, you can only keep giving that answer for so long; eventually you reach a level where you can't tell, say, two electrons apart.<br /><br />This individuation is precisely the function that "matter" fulfills in A-T. You have nothing in your own ontology to take over that job—and if you did, it would turn out to be "matter" under another name. (For example, "pure potency," which it is quite inconsistent of you to reject while keeping the concepts of act and potency. If you were consistent on this point, "pure potency" would just <i>be</i> the "prime matter" of your own system.)<br /><br />You want to say that "acts of existing" can do the job, but they can't. As I've previously mentioned, A-T <i>already includes</i> an account, much like yours, specifically of <a href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/aq-meta/#H2" rel="nofollow">immaterial substances like angels</a>—and unfortunately for you, it also holds that there can be only one immaterial being of each form, so it still doesn't give you any way to make two dogs. You're not only reinventing the wheel but making it square.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-65602043452878291512014-03-14T09:04:00.477-07:002014-03-14T09:04:00.477-07:00@SR:
"I don't just want to avoid the ter...@SR:<br /><br />"I don't just want to avoid the term 'matter'. I want a simpler ontology, in which there is no material/immaterial distinction."<br /><br />So much, as David M says, is evident. What is not evident to either of us is <i>why</i>.<br /><br />"In this ontology, there is no 'pure potency'. There is just Pure Act and forms."<br /><br />This doesn't address my question and it just introduces new problems.<br /><br />If you're not getting rid of the concepts of act and potency (as you're obviously not if you're keeping Pure Act), then you're not getting rid of "pure potency" any more than you're getting rid of Pure Act. You might just as well say you want to rewrite the "ontology" of the grayscale spectrum by keeping the distinction between black and white, but rejecting "pure black" and retaining only Pure White.<br /><br />I have to echo David M in suggesting you become more familiar with the ontology you're trying to simplify before you try to simplify it.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52938877124011108322014-03-14T08:50:34.967-07:002014-03-14T08:50:34.967-07:00@SR:
"'There is a cat in the room. There...@SR:<br /><br />"'There is a cat in the room. There is also a ghost in the room.' I don't take that to mean the cat and the ghost are interchangeable."<br /><br />What you actually wrote was more like <i>There is something called a "cat." There is also something called a "ghost" (or "vampire").</i><br /><br />I believe David M is asking you why you think ghosts and vampires are interchangeable, not why you think cats and ghosts are.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57575399564846428362014-03-14T07:55:59.248-07:002014-03-14T07:55:59.248-07:00""There is a cat in the room. There is a...""There is a cat in the room. There is also a ghost in the room." I don't take that to mean the cat and the ghost are interchangeable."<br /><br />Er, right; neither do I. Relevant? I think not.<br /><br />"My purpose is work out a simpler ontology, in which there is no material/immaterial distinction."<br /><br />Yes, that that is your purpose is evident. But it seems that you haven't first understood the more complex ontology that you're trying to simplify, so that might be the place to start.<br /><br />"the improvement -- if it works out -- is that there are only essence/existence composites (one no longer speaks of form/matter composites)."<br /><br />But why think this is an improvement (other than an irrational antipathy towards speaking of form/matter composites)? Do you think that a rabbit's organs, and the grass that a rabbit eats, and its poop, are all univocally 'subforms' of the form of a rabbit? Please explain how you make such determinations (without invoking a conceptual distinction like that of 'matter/form').David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14343052436139397472014-03-13T16:58:59.598-07:002014-03-13T16:58:59.598-07:00@DavidM,
"There is a cat in the room. There ...@DavidM,<br /><br />"There is a cat in the room. There is also a ghost in the room." I don't take that to mean the cat and the ghost are interchangeable.<br /><br /><i>So you want to preserve Thomas' twofold composition of act and potency in material substances, but you just don't want to use the word 'matter' or 'material'? (If so, what is the point of doing so?)</i><br /><br />My purpose is work out a simpler ontology, in which there is no material/immaterial distinction.<br /><br />@Scott,<br /><br /><i>But that does imply that we can do without the act/potency account of physical things. If physical things consist entirely of forms (and subforms), and "there is no actualization of anything by forms," then nothing physical ever actualizes anything.</i><br /><br />No, physical things are actualized forms, form/actualizing-power composites, which can actualize other things.<br /><br /><i>Can you get around this issue by making "acts of existence" physical as well? In Thomism it's God Who joins essences to acts of existence. Are you proposing to change that too?</i><br /><br />No. The actualizing power is Pure Act, i.e., God.<br /><br /><i>If not, then you also seem to be at least skirting the edges of a version of occasionalism. If the created world consists only of forms (including "subforms"), forms don't actualize anything, and "acts of existence" come directly from God, then where has secondary causation gone?</i><br /><br />I would say that an actualized form (a thing) can be an efficient cause because it is channeling the actualizing power. <br /><br /><i>Another question: You've already implied that what individuates one substance from another is just the possession of different "subforms." But I don't see any reason in principle why (say) two dogs couldn't have all the same subforms. Supposing they did, what would individuate them?</i><br /><br />They would have different actualized subforms. Each actualization of a form (or subform) is a separate individual.<br /><br /><i>And I gather from one or two of your previous posts that you expect things to bottom out at the most elementary physical particles, which on your view don't actualize "prime matter" but are instead themselves forms actualized by "acts of existence." (I say "instead" because you're presenting this as an alternative, but in fact the essences of elementary particles, just like those of anything else, are already actualized by "acts of existence" on the Thomist account.)<br /><br /> In what way are you saying this account improves on the one that relies on "prime matter"?</i><br /><br />Unless I am missing something about essences, the improvement -- if it works out -- is that there are only essence/existence composites (one no longer speaks of form/matter composites). There is work to be done in explaining the substance/accident distinction, but I think that can be done in terms of essential and inessential subforms.<br /><br /><i>Another thought: If all you want to do is avoid the terms "matter," "material," and so forth, but you want to keep the concepts of act and potency, then what's wrong with saying "pure potency" instead of "prime matter"?</i><br /><br />I don't just want to avoid the term 'matter'. I want a simpler ontology, in which there is no material/immaterial distinction. One can, of course, distinguish physical and non-physical things, but, ontologically speaking, that is no more fundamental than, say distinguishing between living and non-living things. In this ontology, there is no "pure potency". There is just Pure Act and forms.Scott Robertshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06903018448299432876noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75164103154037582142014-03-13T11:07:54.085-07:002014-03-13T11:07:54.085-07:00@SR:
Another thought: If all you want to do is av...@SR:<br /><br />Another thought: If all you want to do is avoid the terms "matter," "material," and so forth, but you want to keep the concepts of act and potency, then what's wrong with saying "pure potency" instead of "prime matter"?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-68735683545247868692014-03-13T08:43:41.500-07:002014-03-13T08:43:41.500-07:00@SR:
It also seems from your previous posts that ...@SR:<br /><br />It also seems from your previous posts that you're saying (correctly) that, for Thomists, the "matter" out of which (say) a bronze statue is made (bronze, which you don't object to calling "matter" in the everyday sense of the word) has a form of its own, and that this having of "subforms" continues downward.<br /><br />Now, if you're doing away with "prime matter," then I suppose one of two things must happen: either the subforms go on forever, or they "bottom out" somewhere in nothing at all. And I gather from one or two of your previous posts that you expect things to bottom out at the most elementary physical particles, which on your view don't actualize "prime matter" but are instead themselves forms actualized by "acts of existence." (I say "instead" because you're presenting this as an alternative, but in fact the essences of elementary particles, just like those of anything else, are already actualized by "acts of existence" on the Thomist account.)<br /><br />In what way are you saying this account improves on the one that relies on "prime matter"?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39894605186002113282014-03-13T08:26:43.544-07:002014-03-13T08:26:43.544-07:00@SR:
"I've never said we can do without ...@SR:<br /><br />"I've never said we can do without the act/potency account of physical things (I'm trying to avoid the word 'material'.) I am saying that there is no actualization of anything by form. . . . I am saying that there is no need for a concept called 'matter' to account for changing things, that all we need are the concepts 'acts of existence' and 'forms' and 'subforms'."<br /><br />But that does imply that we can do without the act/potency account of physical things. If physical things consist entirely of forms (and subforms), and "there is no actualization of anything by forms," then nothing physical ever actualizes anything.<br /><br />Can you get around this issue by making "acts of existence" physical as well? In Thomism it's God Who joins essences to acts of existence. Are you proposing to change that too?<br /><br />If not, then you also seem to be at least skirting the edges of a version of occasionalism. If the created world consists only of forms (including "subforms"), forms don't actualize anything, and "acts of existence" come directly from God, then where has secondary causation gone?<br /><br />Another question: You've already implied that what individuates one substance from another is just the possession of different "subforms." But I don't see any reason in principle why (say) two dogs <i>couldn't</i> have all the same subforms. Supposing they did, what would individuate them?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-8013224873941767092014-03-13T05:35:42.470-07:002014-03-13T05:35:42.470-07:00"I am saying that there is no actualization o..."I am saying that there is no actualization of anything by form." - sure, so you say, but it's still not clear how that is actually supposed to work.DavidMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42699380920693423482014-03-13T05:31:25.180-07:002014-03-13T05:31:25.180-07:00@SR:
"Where did I say they were interchangea...@SR:<br /><br />"Where did I say they were interchangeable?"<br /><br />In the quote immediately preceding my comment to that effect! (Where else?) To remind you:<br /><br />"There is also something called "God's actualizing power" (or "acts of existence")."<br /><br />So to clarify your proposal, you say "that there is no need for a concept called "matter" to account for changing things, that all we need are the concepts "acts of existence" and "forms" and "subforms"."<br /><br />So you want to preserve Thomas' twofold composition of act and potency in material substances, but you just don't want to use the word 'matter' or 'material'? (If so, what is the point of doing so?)DavidMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75458527091762716922014-03-12T18:44:00.184-07:002014-03-12T18:44:00.184-07:00@DavidM
"there is something called "pri...@DavidM<br /><i><br />"there is something called "prime matter"."<br /><br />Fine.<br /><br />"There is also something called "God's actualizing power" (or "acts of existence")."<br /><br />Where are you getting the idea that these two notions are interchangeable? Thomas distinguishes a thing's act of being from its essence (the latter comprised of form and matter).</i><br /><br />Where did I say they were interchangeable? I said that in Thomism, they are both present in physical things. What I am proposing is that one can drop 'prime matter' from an account of physical things.<br /><br />On the "reversal" issue, see below.<br /><br />@Scott<br />On (1) and (2)<br />Ok. <br /><br /><i>(3) And yet somehow Thomism manages to distinguish between the actualization of matter by form and the actualization of essence by acts of existence. You don't seem to be reversing anything at all—just collapsing a distinction already present in Thomism, without (as far as I can see) giving any reason to regard the two concepts as redundant or (as David M says) explaining why you think we can do without the act/potency account of material substances.</i><br /><br />I've never said we can do without the act/potency account of physical things (I'm trying to avoid the word "material".) I am saying that there is no actualization of anything by form.<br /><br /><i>If you were really reversing the idea that form actualizes matter, you'd be proposing that matter actualizes form. But you're not (are you?).</i><br /><br />I am saying that there is no need for a concept called "matter" to account for changing things, that all we need are the concepts "acts of existence" and "forms" and "subforms".Scott Robertshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06903018448299432876noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-59512472304825120012014-03-12T10:15:48.175-07:002014-03-12T10:15:48.175-07:00@SR:
"I am proposing an alternative, where t...@SR:<br /><br />"I am proposing an alternative, where there is no 'prime matter'. To do this, I also need to reverse the A-T idea that, for physical things, form actualizes, while 'matter' is potential. Instead, I say that acts of existence actualize potential forms."<br /><br />Like David M, I'm having trouble understanding your proposal.<br /><br />(1) In order to drop prime matter from the Thomist[*] account, it's not necessary to "reverse" anything. As David M says, it's not clear that Aristotle believed in "prime matter" himself, and at any rate it's possible to propose alternatives that don't involve any such reversals. (For example, maybe it's "form all the way down" forever and it never bottoms out anywhere.) So it seems incorrect to say that in order to propose an account without prime matter, one needs to reverse the idea that form actualizes matter. (Nor, as we'll see in a moment, does your own proposal appear to require it.)<br /><br />(2) Your proposal that acts of existence actualize forms is already a part of Thomism. Thomism already says that acts of existence actualize essences; I don't see that this differs in any significant way from your proposal, and you've already said yourself that they're the same thing as far as you're concerned.<br /><br />(3) And yet somehow Thomism manages to <i>distinguish</i> between the actualization of matter by form and the actualization of essence by acts of existence. You don't seem to be <i>reversing</i> anything at all—just collapsing a distinction already present in Thomism, without (as far as I can see) giving any reason to regard the two concepts as redundant or (as David M says) explaining why you think we can do without the act/potency account of material substances.<br /><br />If you were really reversing the idea that form actualizes matter, you'd be proposing that matter actualizes form. But you're not (are you?).<br /><br />----<br /><br />[*] I'm gathering from your previous remarks that when you say "A-T" you really mean "Thomism."Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-595479832246992082014-03-12T05:05:39.935-07:002014-03-12T05:05:39.935-07:00@SR:
Once? Every time you use the expression '...@SR:<br /><br />Once? Every time you use the expression 'A-T' you are referring to Aristotle. Every time. <br /><br />Now, re. the coherence of your proposal (which seems to keep changing):<br /><br />"there is something called "prime matter"."<br /><br />Fine.<br /><br />"There is also something called "God's actualizing power" (or "acts of existence")."<br /><br />Where are you getting the idea that these two notions are interchangeable? Thomas distinguishes a thing's <i>act of being</i> from its <i>essence</i> (the latter comprised of form and matter).<br /><br />"Both, in A-T, pervade all physical [or material] beings, while only the latter pervades all non-physical things."<br /><br />Sure: All things have an act of being, only material beings have matter.<br /><br />"I am proposing an alternative, where there is no "prime matter"."<br /><br />So you think.<br /><br />"To do this, I also need to reverse the A-T idea that, for physical things, form actualizes, while "matter" is potential. Instead, I say that acts of existence actualize potential forms."<br /><br />This is incoherent. You go from <i>form actualizes matter</i> to <i>acts of existence actualize forms</i>. How on earth is that supposed to be a reversal? In Thomas' view (again, drop the 'A-T') there is a twofold composition of act and potency in material substances. I don't see any coherent proposal here for any kind of 'reversal' of this position.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-21608416883306957512014-03-11T16:41:18.586-07:002014-03-11T16:41:18.586-07:00@DavidM,
It would appear, then, that I picked it ...@DavidM,<br /><br />It would appear, then, that I picked it up from the 'T' in A-T, rather than the 'A'. Which I acknowledged at March 6, 2014 at 12:55 PM. I note that since that point I did refer once to Aristotle, when I, perhaps, shouldn't have. But what does this have to do with the coherency of what I am proposing?Scott Robertshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06903018448299432876noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-56239638265053016612014-03-11T05:33:48.323-07:002014-03-11T05:33:48.323-07:00@SR:
"And one thing I have picked up is that ...@SR:<br />"And one thing I have picked up is that A-T postulates that there is something called "prime matter"."<br /><br />Okay, but unless you can show me where Aristotle (the 'A' of 'A-T') postulates prime matter, then for starters I'm asking you to un-pick-up this claim. From the SEP article, "Aristotle's Metaphysics":<br /><br /><i>Matter, form, and the compound of matter and form may all be considered subjects, Aristotle tells us, (1029a2–4), but which of them is substance? The subject criterion by itself leads to the answer that the substance of x is an entirely indeterminate matter of which x is composed (1029a10). For form is predicated of matter as subject, and one can always analyze a hylomorphic compound into its predicates and the subject of which they are predicated. And when all predicates have been removed (in thought), the subject that remains is nothing at all in its own right—an entity all of whose properties are accidental to it (1029a12–27). The resulting subject is matter from which all form has been expunged. <b>(Traditional scholarship calls this “prime matter,” but Aristotle does not here indicate whether he thinks there actually is such a thing.)</b></i><br /><br />Okay?DavidMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52794147821461655482014-03-10T15:05:50.082-07:002014-03-10T15:05:50.082-07:00@DavidM,
Yes, I am no expert on Aristotle, nor ha...@DavidM,<br /><br />Yes, I am no expert on Aristotle, nor have I claimed to be. I am basing all this on what I have learned of A-T from <i>Aquinas</i> and whatever else I have picked up from this blog.<br /><br />And one thing I have picked up is that A-T postulates that there is something called "prime matter". There is also something called "God's actualizing power" (or "acts of existence"). Both, in A-T, pervade all physical beings, while only the latter pervades all non-physical things. I am proposing an alternative, where there is no "prime matter". To do this, I also need to reverse the A-T idea that, for physical things, form actualizes, while "matter" is potential. Instead, I say that acts of existence actualize potential forms.<br /><br />What is incoherent about this? One still has individualization and the ability to undergo alterational change, only one describes it as a matter of having replaceable subforms, rather than as having replaceable matter.Scott Robertshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06903018448299432876noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-63817995187386536402014-03-10T13:49:32.123-07:002014-03-10T13:49:32.123-07:00@SR: I think you're clearly not listening (or ...@SR: I think you're clearly not listening (or understanding). There is no 'A-T view' of the matter. I am saying that Aristotle and Thomas do not have the same position here. There is nothing un-Aristotelian or naïve about calling bronze 'matter.' I think this is a matter of you not grasping the terminology (understandably, never having actually read Aristotle before setting out to refute him - correct?).<br /><br />"I don't see any difference here. If a rabbit undergoes a heart transplant, or has an artificial heart installed, it is still the same rabbit. If there is some aspect of a form that cannot be substituted, then I wouldn't call that aspect a subform."<br /><br />So do ya figure you can substitute the <i>form of the rabbit</i>? Surely you can see that having an organ transplant is not the same as eating grass and taking a poop. The two are not conceptually related in the same way to the form of the rabbit (its life, its rabbity little soul).<br /><br />"You don't seem to be grasping that in the exact statement of my view, the word 'matter' does not show up at all."<br /><br />Words are irrelevant if <i>conceptually</i> what you refer to is no different from what Aristotle refers to (as 'matter').<br /><br />"I have referred to the A-T phrase "proximate matter" just to note that in my alternative, this is expressed as "subforms". So when you say I am "in fact referring to what Aristotle would call a "composite thing" (i.e., a material substance, a composite of matter and form)", you are basically trying to reinsert the A-T idea of matter into my alternative."<br /><br />Again, what 'A-T idea of matter' are you referring to? It seems like you maybe don't really know what you're talking about.<br /><br />"Hardly. As I said in my first comment (February 27, 2014 at 10:34 PM) my alternative view reverses the Aristotelian assignment of actual to form and potential to matter. In so doing it eliminates "matter" as an ontological category, though it is still useful as a naive term to refer to forms with molecular subforms."<br /><br />Could you try that again? I don't think that's what the post you refer to actually says, and in any case it sounds incoherent.DavidMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-20422387865533315292014-03-10T13:07:58.671-07:002014-03-10T13:07:58.671-07:00From an Aristotelian perspective, you seem to be c...<i>From an Aristotelian perspective, you seem to be conflating two very different kinds of 'subform.' A part like an organ is an integral part of the organism as such. It is itself a hylemorphic compound without being a complete substance. Molecules, on the other hand, do not have any kind of formal specificity in relation to the organism. The individual molecules making up the organism are in constant flux, and this is essential to the proper operation (life) of the organism. That said, the molecules do instantiate 'subforms,' but that does not imply that they are not the 'matter' of the organism.</i><br /><br />I don't see any difference here. If a rabbit undergoes a heart transplant, or has an artificial heart installed, it is still the same rabbit. If there is some aspect of a form that cannot be substituted, then I wouldn't call that aspect a subform.<br /><br /><i> Not all matter is prime matter, so it seems you are in fact referring to what Aristotle would call a "composite thing" (i.e., a material substance, a composite of matter and form).</i><br /><br />You don't seem to be grasping that in the exact statement of my view, the word 'matter' does not show up at all. I have referred to the A-T phrase "proximate matter" just to note that in my alternative, this is expressed as "subforms". So when you say I am "in fact referring to what Aristotle would call a "composite thing" (i.e., a material substance, a composite of matter and form)", you are basically trying to reinsert the A-T idea of matter into my alternative. <br /><br /><br /><i>Hmmm... Well I don't think there is a common A-T account of the matter. But for Aristotle (i.e., 'A') a form is an act of existence, so your thesis amounts to the claim that an actual elemental form is a composite of its act of existence and an act of existence. Is that what you want to say?</i><br /><br />Hardly. As I said in my first comment (February 27, 2014 at 10:34 PM) my alternative view reverses the Aristotelian assignment of actual to form and potential to matter. In so doing it eliminates "matter" as an ontological category, though it is still useful as a naive term to refer to forms with molecular subforms.Scott Robertshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06903018448299432876noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81011854270764332322014-03-10T06:23:09.209-07:002014-03-10T06:23:09.209-07:00SR wrote: By "complex" I mean a form tha...SR wrote: <i>By "complex" I mean a form that contains subforms. Like a rabbit contains organs, which contain cells, which contain molecules, etc. See above on my (incorrect) use of "accidental change".</i><br /><br />From an Aristotelian perspective, you seem to be conflating two very different kinds of 'subform.' A part like an organ is an integral part of the organism as such. It is itself a hylemorphic compound without being a complete substance. Molecules, on the other hand, do not have any kind of formal specificity in relation to the organism. The individual molecules making up the organism are in constant flux, and this is essential to the proper operation (life) of the organism. That said, the molecules do instantiate 'subforms,' but that does not imply that they are not the 'matter' of the organism. Not all matter is prime matter, so it seems you are in fact referring to what Aristotle would call a "composite thing" (i.e., a material substance, a composite of matter and form). <br /><br />SR's thesis appears to be this:<br /><br />DavidM wrote: <i>If there is some most elemental form (or forms) of actual matter, the formal actuality of which is present in (i.e., within the formal actuality of) all other material substances, then since this most basic element of material reality never changes (never loses its intrinsic elementary form of actuality), it can be regarded as immaterial. - How does that sound?</i><br /><br />SR wrote: <i>Well, not quite. First, see above about my (mis)use of "accidental change".</i> [So elemental things only undergo 'relational change.'] <i>Anyway, my thesis is that an actual elemental form is a composite of its form and an act of existence, rather than, as in A-T, form and prime matter.</i><br /><br />Hmmm... Well I don't think there is a common A-T account of the matter. But for Aristotle (i.e., 'A') a form is an act of existence, so your thesis amounts to the claim that an actual elemental form is a composite of its act of existence and an act of existence. Is that what you want to say?DavidMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46115929360468796222014-03-09T18:20:07.596-07:002014-03-09T18:20:07.596-07:00According to Aquinas, since angels are immaterial ...<i>According to Aquinas, since angels are immaterial and are therefore not differentiated/individuated by matter, there's just one of each species (form). According to your view, could there be more than one angel with the same form?</i><br /><br />If one considers two instances of an overall form, but with differing subforms (like different dog breeds, or, indeed, different dogs), then, yes. In sum, my view has subforms doing all the differentiating and individuating that "proximate matter" does in A-T.Scott Robertshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06903018448299432876noreply@blogger.com