tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post4843898795653107296..comments2024-03-19T02:00:34.750-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Reading Rosenberg, Part VEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger65125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58215069588662623472012-01-07T16:01:54.157-08:002012-01-07T16:01:54.157-08:00Greg Ransom's mentions, of Kuhn and the beginn...Greg Ransom's mentions, of Kuhn and the beginning of an explicatory process coinciding with teleological insights, reminds me of an apparent outcome of Thomas Kuhn's "revolutionary" model of scientific progress: If science is wholly empirical, as the "rational" element is merely a slave to finding the correct observation at the correct time, then the theoretical virtues are a post hoc (maybe cum hoc?) answer to their apparent appearance and their apparent recurrence throughout the history of science. In other words - theoretical virtues would not exist. By the same lights, any attempt to claim the theoretical virtues would seem to necessarily be a form of "ludic" fallacy - trying to state that a random event actually has a statistical regularity. I understand that Kuhn strenuously objected to the accusation made that he removed rationality from science, but unfortunately died in the middle of a correspondence on that matter.<br /><br />At least up to the present, the theoretical virtues actually appear to be consistent with best practices for finding truth, in much the same way that geometry is able to find necessary truths.<br /><br />I wonder if it is not a useful fiction. Yet, even if this little is the least that must be supposed, it seems premature for any atheist to deny teleology outright.<br /><br />More reasonably, I will state that although I don't care for DNW's screed against internet trolls (I thought the conversation was essentially civil, at least on the side of "goddinpotty," username aside), I agree that the naturalistic fallacy is a severe problem especially for many atheists and nihilists, who seem to violate the argument of nihilism with each breath - even admitting that machines may operate without any "purpose" does not give one a satisfactory answer about what sort of teleology one should invent. Yet people are naturally drawn to try to find out what rules to follow, including atheists. Every breath taken is in alignment with this purpose, even if one argues that there is a split between a "mechanistic" and a spiritual sort of purpose.<br /><br />I now take my leave from abusing the formal names of fallacies. :)Edwin Herdmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05040978095707760636noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54373669942944741542012-01-06T10:25:37.182-08:002012-01-06T10:25:37.182-08:00Gene Callahan - "the MIT media lab has actual...Gene Callahan - <i>"the MIT media lab has actually used an ordinary glass of water as a computer."</i><br /><br />Where can I read more? The closest thing I could find was this:<br /><br />http://www.blikstein.com/paulo/projects/project_water.html<br /><br />...and, well... I think I'd have to contest the idea that's "an ordinary glass of water".Ray Ingleshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16290483120987779339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74411451685938672432012-01-06T06:51:47.761-08:002012-01-06T06:51:47.761-08:00"Why couldn't it be the case that same-se..."Why couldn't it be the case that same-sex attractions and subsequent same-sex intimacy is programmed into certain individuals by nature in order to keep the human population at a manageable level, as modern science tells us?"<br /><br />Uh. Modern science doesn't tell us this. It also doesn't tell us that diluting medicine in water makes it more effective, that water is alive and capable of feeling emotions, or that the WTC was an inside job, or that blacks are a separate and inferior species.<br /><br />Crackpots tell us this. Sometimes these crackpots argue from bad studies or poor interpretations of studies, good and bad. And sometimes these crackpots are scientists. But it doesn't make their garbage the declaration of science.<br /><br />But if we're going to play that game: the very existence of abstinence, and (if you want to be non-Catholic about it) birth control, means that "nature's use" for homosexuality is either outmoded, or was never its use to begin with. Oops. I guess its time to make homosexuality go the way of the dodo. <br /><br />Or at least the penguin, since the gay penguin couple <a href="http://www.calgaryherald.com/technology/penguins+more+Buddy+Pedro+find+female+partners/5847983/story.html" rel="nofollow">enjoys the company of females</a>. I guess this means that homosexual behavior occurs in nature, and can be cured!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-34271112592489160492012-01-06T06:06:20.734-08:002012-01-06T06:06:20.734-08:00Anon - "Why couldn't it be the case that ...Anon - <i>"Why couldn't it be the case that same-sex attractions and subsequent same-sex intimacy is programmed into certain individuals by nature in order to keep the human population at a manageable level, as modern science tells us?"</i><br /><br />Um... I actually think there may well be evolutionary reasons for homosexuality's persistence. But I'm far less convinced that "modern science tells us" what those reasons are. So far as I know, at this point we just have suggestive hypotheses.Ray Ingleshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16290483120987779339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-38922030722441299102012-01-05T20:28:53.013-08:002012-01-05T20:28:53.013-08:00"I am also not especially convinced that &quo..."I am also not especially convinced that "there is a possible interpretation of the microstructure of the wall in [Searle's] room on which it is running Wordstar". I would like to see that claim defended."<br /><br />Try to keep up with the literature, man! This fact is well known in computer science now. In fact, the MIT media lab has actually used an ordinary glass of water as a computer.gcallahhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10065877215969589482noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-21292520645492408592012-01-05T17:05:05.217-08:002012-01-05T17:05:05.217-08:00@Anon, Martin
You guys might want to voice your c...@Anon, Martin<br /><br />You guys might want to voice your concerns over at Dr. Feser's latest post on lying, since there are a couple of nice sized paragraphs in there in which he discuses the natural law approach to ethics that underwrites his position on lying.Wotannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91219619968514763172012-01-05T15:56:36.882-08:002012-01-05T15:56:36.882-08:00Anonymous on 1/5/12 3:05 (can't you people pic...Anonymous on 1/5/12 3:05 (can't you people pick a name?),<br /><br />I too would like to know the answer to this. Let's say that homosexuality turns out to be some cog in the larger machine of societal cohesion. Then wouldn't it be a necessary part of the final causality of society as a whole? <br /><br />I can understand basing morality off final causality, and in fact morality seems to ENTAIL final causality in some ways, but it seems to me that it might not always be possible to know what the final cause is in all cases. Homosexuality might serve a certain end within that machine, and thus NOT be immoral after all.Martinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06038086497147379685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54221162978647142842012-01-05T15:05:41.343-08:002012-01-05T15:05:41.343-08:00"Does anything in the real world 'point t..."Does anything in the real world 'point to' only one 'final cause'? I haven't thought of an example yet."<br /><br /><br />No, and that's exactly why "Natural Law" moral theory stands on straws, especially if you find opposite final causes of A (like freezing and insulating).<br /><br />Ex. Sodomy. Why couldn't it be the case that same-sex attractions and subsequent same-sex intimacy is programmed into certain individuals by nature in order to keep the human population at a manageable level, as modern science tells us? In this way, sodomy is a completely natural buffer. Not a "metaphysical absurdity," as Feser insists.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14734095827322026692012-01-03T15:13:58.375-08:002012-01-03T15:13:58.375-08:00Why does he use the word "the" there, in...<i>Why does he use the word "the" there, instead of what seems to me to be a far more natural and obvious "a"?</i><br /><br />Yeah, I noticed that too. I can't speak for Feser, but I don't think he meant that making water cold was literally <b>the one and only</b> final cause of ice. At least I didn't interpret it that way.<br /><br />But then again, I can't speak for him.some kanthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12312599784024098652noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-50228091342869747192012-01-03T12:02:44.808-08:002012-01-03T12:02:44.808-08:00Ray Ingles,
But isn't there an obvious differ...Ray Ingles,<br /><br /><i>But isn't there an obvious difference between 'pointing toward' (which A putatively does) and 'drawing toward' (which B would have to do to be a 'cause')?</i><br /><br />This is something I wish Dr Feser would expand upon as well, if he sees this comment. If the material and formal causes are in place (let's say hylemorphism is true), then wouldn't they "push" towards a specific final cause, rather than the final cause "pulling" the material and formal causes into place? <br /><br />I'm sure the answer is somewhere along the lines that if material and formal causes are the only ones that exist, then they only "push" towards any particular end effect by chance, and thus would not entail any particular end effect.<br /><br />But still, if you're reading this Dr Feser, can you do a blog post explaining this in more detail? Or refer us to more in depth sources on the whole "pulling" vs "pushing" thing?Martinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06038086497147379685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53646559049484133062012-01-03T11:29:29.737-08:002012-01-03T11:29:29.737-08:00man with a computer - Interesting references to Fe...man with a computer - Interesting references to Feser's previous posts. But I have difficulty following this statement (from <a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/09/teleology-revisited.html" rel="nofollow">here</a>): <i>"For a cause to be efficacious – including a final cause – it has actually to exist in some way."</i><br /><br />But the term 'final cause' seems to presuppose the notion that B <i>is</i> a 'cause', rather than a result.<br /><br /><i>"for B to be the final cause of A, B must also exist, in some sense, otherwise, being nonexistent, it could not be efficacious."</i><br /><br />But isn't there an obvious difference between 'pointing toward' (which A putatively does) and 'drawing toward' (which B would have to do to be a 'cause')?<br /><br />I also have a visceral reaction to the idea that - as Feser states - <i>"generating coldness is <b>the</b> final cause of ice"</i>[emphasis added] . Why does he use the word "the" there, instead of what seems to me to be a far more natural and obvious "a"?<br /><br />To take a simple example, what of the ice on top of a pond or lake in the winter, which actually <i>insulates</i> the water underneath, keeping it from freezing? Is <i>the</i> final cause of ice actually "retaining warmth"? (Or is <a href="http://discovermagazine.com/2008/feb/did-life-evolve-in-ice/article_view?b_start:int=1&-C=" rel="nofollow">eutectic freezing</a> <i>the</i> 'final cause' of ice?)<br /><br />Does <i>anything</i> in the real world 'point to' only <i>one</i> 'final cause'? I haven't thought of an example yet.Ray Ingleshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16290483120987779339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-70325624405393267872012-01-01T08:24:22.249-08:002012-01-01T08:24:22.249-08:00Monk68: ISTM that the unicity of "upper level...Monk68: <i>ISTM that the unicity of "upper level" or "mid level", empirically observed, repetitious, configurations needs an explanation that reductionism does not readily afford. […] In fact, we only seem to "observe" certain kinds of phenomena *when* lower level entities are brought together in some specific (dare I say) "formal" configuration. </i> <br /><br />Yes, and I definitely consider formal (and final) causes to be necessary to do science at all, regardless of whether moderns acknowledge it or not. The only question is whether Zs have extrinsic forms or whether they have a substantial form. That distinction is presumably invisible to the scientific method.<br /><br /> <i>Like I said, I am open to the possibility that a more elastic notion of matter or "the real" may entail that lower level existents (maybe even the "quantum flux" itself) virtually or latently contains hidden potencies which are only activated upon specific interactions/configurations. But that would mean that fundamental nature is so rich with formal/final potentiality that a Thomist would be a naturalist.</i> <br /><br />The point has been raised here before that it's hard to come up with any definition of "naturalism" that departs from a Scholastic view and still works. I do think that if organisms turned out to have behaviours unexplained by the sum of their parts, then materialists would simply call them new laws of "physics" that only turn up when certain configurations were obtained. And from an empirical perspective, maybe that works: after all, God could have created a universe with any laws He wanted — one where things that appeared to be organisms from the outside were really just "mechanical", or in which fundamental particles have final causes that apply only for certain configurations. But that's why I think we have to rely on common-sense arguments about whether a given Z is an organism or not, rather than strict metaphysical demonstrations.Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-87601506439981870442011-12-31T03:20:50.720-08:002011-12-31T03:20:50.720-08:00Ed
Have you seen E. Steinhardt's "Person...Ed<br /><br />Have you seen E. Steinhardt's "Person's Versus Brains: Biological Intelligence in Human Organisms"? In that paper he basically argues that the human cognitive system permeates the WHOLE body. Which means that the various bodily systems, such as the Immune System, play an integral role within the cognitive system as a whole with various feedback loops etc. Which is why he argues it would be impossible to do a brain transplant because each brain is calibrated to each's respective body.<br /><br />This seems amazing confirmation of Aristotle's theory of the soul as the form of the body and not just some isolated Cartesian soul as Steinhardt argues.Damien Shttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06155771324306587504noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61836284433522032382011-12-31T00:48:18.283-08:002011-12-31T00:48:18.283-08:00The philosopher's ancient demand for justifica...The philosopher's ancient demand for justification clearly lies behind Rosenberg's metaphysics, as condensed here:<br /><br />"Rosenberg’s argument, then, is essentially this:<br /><br />1. The predictive power and technological applications of physics are unparalleled by those of any other purported source of knowledge.<br /><br />2. Therefore what physics reveals to us is all that is real."<br /><br />Recall that the ancient demand for justification derives from the Euclidean paradigm of demonstrative knowledge exemplified by the proof procedure in Euclidean geometry.<br /><br />This picture also drives a conception of human language as consisting of a mapping of "given" entities structured by formal relations (given like an entity or a hat in a box to a single mind).<br /><br />Rather that embedded in imitated human practices and embodied within human motor patterns and ways of going on together, language and all that can be said and known can be imagined as a construct knowable to one mind, from a bird's eye view, the way an economist can "know" every "given" element structured within an equilibrium math construct laid on the pages in from of him.<br /><br />Put the justification demands together with the constructivist picture of language/concepts/math and you get a metaphysics which says that conceptual/math constructs best justified by "the scientific method" are all there is.<br /><br />It's ass backwards, and it gets language and math and science and explanation wrong -- but if you want to take this extreme version of "scientism" down, you need to take down its underlying picture of epistemology, explanation, language, and the relation of all of these to science.<br /><br />My suggestion has been that the non-justificational and social & embodied picture of language and knowledge and science found in Kuhn, Wittgenstein & Hayek (and to some degree in Popper & Bartley & Wright) is the alternative which reveals the underlying pathologies of Rosenberg's heroic attempted rescue of the Mill/Carnap/Barthwaite/Hempel tradition in "scientific philosophy".<br /><br />Rosenberg's argument may be a "gem" of a bad argument, but the key is to show how the motivation for that argument is grounded in false understandings of how knowledge grows, how explanation works, etc. -- as well asin a false picture of what language isand what science is, etc.Greg Ransomnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-90252639919611163102011-12-30T11:24:20.834-08:002011-12-30T11:24:20.834-08:00Not sure how I can be any clearer.
The point is t...Not sure how I can be any clearer.<br /><br />The point is that the ability of one thing to represent another can be a function of a mechanical interpreter -- a ribosome, a CPU, a brain. In the first two cases, we understand pretty well how it works -- it's a magic trick where we can look behind the curtain and see exactly what is going on. We can think about such systems in intentional terms -- DNA *codes for* proteins, the computer *executes the instruction*, or we can understand them in strictly mechanical terms (the attraction and repulsion of molecular forces, a pattern of electrical signals).<br /><br />It may be that there is no objective quality of intentionality, but instead it is nor more or less than a useful way to describe certain systems.goddinpottynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-56861236483545617162011-12-30T11:04:21.447-08:002011-12-30T11:04:21.447-08:00goddinpotty,
but that is just wrong, it is very e...goddinpotty,<br /><br /><i>but that is just wrong, it is very easy to make mechanistic devices that <b>exhibit</b> purpose, which is what I mean by local teleology.</i><br /><br />Can you explain exactly what you mean by "local teleology"? Keep in mind that no one here is advocating some sort of "cosmic" teleology (in fact, we reject ID stuff here). I just want to make sure we are on the same page.<br /><br /><i>that, for me, is a meaningless distinction.</i><br /><br />But why? It's the crux of the discussion, and the whole point of the fully mechanistic/modern-naturalistic accounts of substances: that there is no such thing as an intrinsic <i>telos</i>, and what constitutes a thing is nothing but its material components obeying to a bunch of regular patterns of efficient causation ('laws'), the <i>telos</i> being dependent on the observer. A mousetrap is for catching mice, but there is nothing in its arrangement of material components that implies that it is for catching mice. The fully mechanistic view generalizes this idea to everything else in nature. That this has been somewhat problematic for biologists is the reason why Mayr wrote that paper, because the use of teleological language lent itself to the interpretation that they were making metaphysical commitments about potentially immaterial causes.<br /><br />BTW, I re-read the entire discussion, and I think we have to get on the same page regarding what we mean by "telos", "teleology", "mechanism", "mechanistic", etc. If you have the time, I recommend you give a cursory reading to these other posts:<br /><br /><a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/04/nothing-but.html" rel="nofollow">"Nothing but…"</a><br /><a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/09/teleology-revisited.html" rel="nofollow">Teleology revisited</a>.<br /><br />Cheers.some kanthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12312599784024098652noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-66906993202296011842011-12-30T10:54:04.317-08:002011-12-30T10:54:04.317-08:00Godinpotty at December 30, 9:37 AM.
“I'm not ...Godinpotty at December 30, 9:37 AM.<br /><br />“I'm not interested in "trying to get rid of mind" and I'm not sure why you think I am. I am interested in explaining mind.”<br /><br />You have said things like these:<br /><br />“How does this mysterious meaning or intentionality happen? Turns out there is a physical interpreter machine (the ribosome) that makes use of a dictionary (the complement of tRNA molecules). This machinery interprets the DNA by means of perfectly normal molecular machinery, no magic required. (December 28, 9:57 PM)”<br /><br />“That nature is full of purposive machines? That is more a useful point of view than an assertion. Nature is full of microorganisms, which display many mechanical properties and many purposive properties, and the really the only way to understand them is to combine those points of view rather than separating them.” (December 29, 2:09 PM)<br /><br />“On the contrary, it is you who are "smuggling in" an entirely artificial distinction between the mechanical and the purposive."” (December 29, 1:20 PM)<br /><br />I take you to be arguing for the position that things of the mind (the purposive, meaning, intentionality) do not differ from the mechanical. After all, you refer to “an entirely artificial distinction” between “the mechanical and the purposive.” This position gets rid of “mind,” as I understand the term. I suppose you would say I should re-evaluate how I understand that term. Maybe, but I don’t see why consideration of the details of some molecular biological processes should cause such a re-evaluation. I don’t think there is anything wrong with your description of those processes. I just don’t see how knowing how those processes occur should affect my understanding of the term “mind.” David T’s comment about this at December 30, 10:34 AM seems on point to me.acucucuucnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-8764292869249101342011-12-30T10:34:13.632-08:002011-12-30T10:34:13.632-08:00Actually I am a software engineer myself, and I ha...Actually I am a software engineer myself, and I have no problem understanding computers and don't think they are magical. But I still don't understand what you are saying, because you are just substituting synonyms without explication.<br /><br />You wrote that intentionality "arises" in machines, and I asked just what it is that "arises." You answered with respect to the ability of one machine to "represent" another. Well "represent" is just another way of saying "intentionality", so we haven't gotten anywhere. What is this thing that "arises" in a machine that makes it about something when it otherwise would not be about anything?David Thttp://www.lifesprivatebook.blogspot.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53387804283600374272011-12-30T10:12:42.163-08:002011-12-30T10:12:42.163-08:00I'm a computer scientist with an interest in b...I'm a computer scientist with an interest in biology.<br /><br /><i>I'm asking what you mean by intentionality (or aboutness)</i> -- I mean the ability of one thing to represent another. If you can't or won't understand complex machinery (such as computers or ribosomes), this appears to be a magical, irreducible quality. On the other hand, if you do, then you can replace the magic with causal explanations. <br /><br />Note that this doesn't necessarily apply to all the magic of minds. Consciousness remains a mystery, for instance. But representation, intentionality, and goal-directedness are easy to reproduce in artificial, understandable systems.goddinpottynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55958043979095634982011-12-30T09:55:03.549-08:002011-12-30T09:55:03.549-08:00"Neither. The point is that intentionality (a..."Neither. The point is that intentionality (aboutness) can arise from relatively simple, unconscious machinery."<br /><br />I'm asking what you mean by intentionality (or aboutness). What exactly is it that "arises"? Is it something over and above the unconscious machinery itself?David Thttp://www.lifesprivatebook.blogspot.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-60536992881670988542011-12-30T09:46:06.677-08:002011-12-30T09:46:06.677-08:00goddinputty: Are you a biologist?goddinputty: Are you a biologist?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3692538502483329212011-12-30T09:37:58.392-08:002011-12-30T09:37:58.392-08:00David T -- Neither. The point is that intentionali...David T -- Neither. The point is that intentionality (aboutness) can arise from relatively simple, unconscious machinery.<br /><br />acuccuuuc -- <i>"Triplets of nucleotides" is a concept</i> -- everything we talk about is a concept, so this is a vacuous assertion.<br /><br /><i>But how does that help you get rid of mind? </i> -- I'm not interested in "trying to get rid of mind" and I'm not sure why you think I am. I am interested in explaining mind.<br /><br />man with computer -- <i>My point is that modern naturalism is inherently mechanistic, and as such is doesn't have any space for teleology, neither cosmic nor "local"</i> -- but that is just wrong, it is very easy to make mechanistic devices that exhibit purpose, which is what I mean by local teleology. <br /><br /><i>'purpose' is, for Mayr, apparent and not inherent</i> -- that, for me, is a meaningless distinction. You can pull out other quotes from Mayr, eg <i>There is now complete consensus among biologists that the teleological phrasing of such a statement does not imply any conflict with physicochemical causality.</i> or<br /><br /><i>What finally produced a breakthrough in our thinking about teleology was the introduction of new concepts from the fields of cybernetics and new terminologies from the language of information theory. </i> or<br /><br /><i>The use of so-called teleological language by biologists is legitimate; it neither implies a rejection of physicochemical explanation nor does it imply noncausal explanation.</i><br /><br />In other words, "I happen to have Ernst Mayr here, and he says "<a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0075686/quotes?qt=qt0373304" rel="nofollow">you know nothing of my work</a>"goddinpottynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-8243517169308227442011-12-30T07:23:52.960-08:002011-12-30T07:23:52.960-08:00man with a computer -- sorry, I have no idea what ...<i>man with a computer -- sorry, I have no idea what point you are trying to make.</i><br /><br />My point is that modern naturalism is inherently mechanistic, and as such is doesn't have any space for teleology, neither cosmic nor "local" -- the distinction you made was unhelpful. In fact, the view of teleology as some kind of cosmic thing is quite modern; the traditional understanding was relatively lax and wide-ranging.<br /><br />I brought Ernst Mayr's example because it was a big problem for 20th century biologists who subscribed to naturalism –and in turn to the mechanistic philosophy– but wanted to make sense of the teleological language they were using. Ernst Mayr's idea of "teleonomy" (from <a href="http://faculty.washington.edu/lynnhank/Mayr3.pdf" rel="nofollow">here</a>) is one of the proposed solutions:<br /><br /><i>Teleonomic processes in living nature. <b>Seemingly</b> goal-directed behavior in organisms is of <br />an entirely different nature from teleomatic processes. Goal-directed behavior (<b>in the widest <br />sense of this word</b>) is extremely widespread in the organic world; for instance, most activity <br />connected with migration, food-getting, courtship, ontogeny, and all phases of reproduction is <br />characterized by such goal orientation. [...]</i><br /><br />(The emphasis is mine -- the word "seemingly" is key, because 'purpose' is, for Mayr, apparent and not inherent)<br /><br /><i>Let us take, for instance the sentence: "The Wood Thrush migrates in the fall into warmer countries <b>in order to</b> escape the inclemency of the weather <br />and the food shortages of the northern climates." If we replace the words "in order to" by "and thereby," we leave the important question unanswered as to <b>why</b> the Wood Thrush migrates. </i><br /><br />Just like in the example of the turtle laying its eggs ashore, using words like "in order to" implies some sort of deliberation, which is incompatible with a mechanistic account, because all of these behaviors must be causally determined by the material and formal; in this case, the "program." Mayr is clear: "<i>(9) Teleonomic explanations are strictly causal and mechanistic…</i>"some kanthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12312599784024098652noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-62333747118903396482011-12-30T05:35:52.235-08:002011-12-30T05:35:52.235-08:00"Triplets of nucleotides" is a concept, ..."Triplets of nucleotides" is a concept, i.e. a mental construct. That concept refers to a part of reality, but only insofar as a mind is invovled in the process of referral. Without a mind, there is nothing to carve up the DNA or mRNA into groups of three nucleotides. If you say that it is other parts of the gene expression process that do the carving, say the fact that tRNA binds to mRNA in groups of three nucleotides, you have just pushed the problem away from the nucleic acid and onto the tRNA. What accounts for picking out those parts of reality that we refer to as "tRNA" from everything else, if not a mind saying "Aha, this collection of atoms is a tRNA molecule"? The word generally used to refer to the binding of tRNA to its cognate nucleotide triplet is "recognizes." You can say that words like that are not to be taken literally, they are perhaps analogies. But how does that help you get rid of mind? Can you have an analogy without the involvement of a mind?acucucuucnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-8404907191407338152011-12-30T05:20:47.747-08:002011-12-30T05:20:47.747-08:00goddinpotty wrote:
"How does this mysterious...goddinpotty wrote:<br /><br />"How does this mysterious meaning or intentionality happen? Turns out there is a physical interpreter machine (the ribosome) that makes use of a dictionary (the complement of tRNA molecules). This machinery interprets the DNA by means of perfectly normal molecular machinery, no magic required."<br /><br />I'm not following what you are writing here. Are you saying that the ribosome is a conscious agent that reads DNA the way we read DNA? Or are you writing metaphorically?David Thttp://www.lifesprivatebook.blogspot.comnoreply@blogger.com