tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post4804449061693746959..comments2024-03-29T02:29:03.388-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Review of JaworskiEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger40125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-68661539881246222522014-10-01T07:20:31.675-07:002014-10-01T07:20:31.675-07:00A though on the question of Hylemorphism in the OP...A though on the question of Hylemorphism in the OP and in Brainë: I think it’s important that we do not lose sight of the fact that though the soul is the form of the body it is not just the form of the body; it, or at least the immortal part of it as Aristotle remarks, is also Nous, the imago dei. This would be incomprehensible if one were to understand by the term 'form' merely physical structure. Thomists should not lose sight of the Neo-platonic elements in their psychology (I say ‘Neo-platonic’ but of course these elements where present in the thought of Aristotle himself too).<br /><br />Since it’s probably the only philosophical stance vis-à-vis Soul/Body relationship on which the notion of the Resurrection of the Body sounds remotely plausible it’s understandable why Christians should stress the ‘unity of man’; however I think it’s ultimately dangerous to portray the disembodied soul as living an ‘impoverished existence’ or ‘limping along’. The soul may not be the ‘person’ in the strict sense but it is the core of the person hence why it is often referred to by that term albeit in a lose manner. <br /> Danielnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-20493536372783217582014-09-28T11:55:29.952-07:002014-09-28T11:55:29.952-07:00@Mr. Green:
"Surely it has to be cashed out ...@Mr. Green:<br /><br />"Surely it has to be cashed out in terms like that — if you weren’t falling short of some goal, then what’s erroneous about the outcome?"<br /><br />I think this is right, but your point here is subtly different from Bobcat's: falling short of a[n existent] goal isn't quite the same thing as aiming at a non-existent one. Thus…<br /><br />@Bobcat:<br /><br />"Is the thought supposed to be that, if someone aims at a non-existent goal, then this can be only because they have a representation of that non-existent goal, and representations are intentional notions?"<br /><br />I think I have to say no this suggestion as it stands. As Mr. Green says, in the present context it's the <i>being directed at a goal</i> that qualifies as "intentionality," not the <i>having of a representation</i>.<br /><br />Representations may well be intentional, but (a) I don't think that's the important point here and (b) I have grave objections to characterizing knowledge and other mental/intellectual phenomena as "representational" if that means what e.g. Locke meant by it.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9297392464921891902014-09-26T13:07:36.547-07:002014-09-26T13:07:36.547-07:00Bobcat: While I see how illusion is an intentional...Bobcat: <i>While I see how illusion is an intentional notion, I'm not sure why error is. […] error could be cashed out in terms of aiming a non-existent goal.</i><br /><br />Surely it has to be cashed out in terms like that — if you weren’t falling short of some goal, then what’s erroneous about the outcome? It’s just whatever you got. And being directed at some goal is intentionality (whether extrinsic or intrinsic).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-56912069490903250712014-09-26T03:25:42.407-07:002014-09-26T03:25:42.407-07:00'But how do we find out these things about par...<br />'But how do we find out these things about particles and objects? It can't be a matter of origin, surely, because a pile of rocks at the bottom of a hill is an artifact even though it is completely natural.'<br /><br />A pile of rocks is not an artifact but an aggregate (this is not to say some aggregates might not also be artifacts). <br /><br />An artifact is de facto a substance or aggregate of substances with an Accidental Form imposed upon them by the artificer with the purpose of achieving some goal (say organizing more substances thus ways) <br /><br />I will leave the question of scientific praxis to one more up on that than I. A basic answer would likely be that we attempt to study these molecules as far as we possibly can in isolation and by employing a fair amount of theoretical abstraction. <br /><br />'From what I understand, intentionality is in the function of an object, and stuff like cloning or breeding animals still results in substantial forms because the results are very similar to the natural thing.'<br /><br />They do but it is at least highly debatable as to whether they produce anything more than a modification of the Accidents which flow from the being's Substantial Form. The exact way in which shifts in substantial specific form occur on a large scale in nature is still up for question<br /><br />Danielnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19790418117004402292014-09-25T11:10:51.396-07:002014-09-25T11:10:51.396-07:00@Daniel
But how do we find out these things about...@Daniel<br /><br />But how do we find out these things about particles and objects? It can't be a matter of origin, surely, because a pile of rocks at the bottom of a hill is an artifact even though it is completely natural.<br /><br />From what I understand, intentionality is in the function of an object, and stuff like cloning or breeding animals still results in substantial forms because the results are very similar to the natural thing.MookVanguardnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-21795754630562797792014-09-25T06:12:14.224-07:002014-09-25T06:12:14.224-07:00Searle asserts that neuroscience can at least in p...<i>Searle asserts that neuroscience can at least in part (say, in conjunction with his theory of ‘biological dualism’) explain the origin of intentionality from brain processes whilst Rosenberg claims it can’t and thus in the interests of preserving Naturalism, or at least his preferred understanding of it, we should reject the notion that our cognitive activity does display such intentionality.</i><br /><br />That's perfectly correct with regard to their conclusions, but I'm interested in where their assumptions differ in order to generate those conclusions. <br /><br />Here's the big premise they share: that if there were any original intentionality <i>in rerum natura</i> at all, it could only lie in the cognitive activities of individual brains. Searle affirms this, and Rosenberg denies this, but they are affirming and denying the same proposition. <br /><br />Whereas my view is that the identification of original intentionality <i>in rerum natura</i> with the activity of the individual brain is deeply problematic, because it basically just leaves intact the Cartesian model of intentionality and simply identifies the <i>res cogitans</i> with the brain. All the conceptual flaws of Cartesianism are dressed up in neuroscientific drag. <br /><br />Once we see this, however, and we see that the interpretation of neuroscience results can be disentangled from the Cartesian hang-over, then we will see that eliminativism about intentionality simply does not follow. Kantian Naturalistnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-618444951652667912014-09-25T03:04:41.213-07:002014-09-25T03:04:41.213-07:00@MookVanguard,
No worries - it’s an interesting q...@MookVanguard,<br /><br />No worries - it’s an interesting question to ask. Apologies in advance though if I rehash stuff you have already heard though. <br /><br />What you ask about the cell touches on Mereology, the question of the nature of Wholes and their relation to Parts. On the A-T approach the component parts which make up a substance, be it a living body or, say, Water, do not have the same degree of ontological priority as the substance itself. Thus the water manifesting its properties - freezing and boiling at X temperatures - is present in a sense the hydrogen atoms, and descending degrees of sub-atomic particles which make it up are not. Ed touches up this in a recent post (see the Oderberg quote):<br /><br />http://edwardfeser.blogspot.co.uk/2014/09/symington-on-scholastic-metaphysics.html<br /><br />For A-T metaphysics a body -in the biological sense - is always a living body (the Germanophone distinction between Leib and Körper might be a good way of expressing this) - when a living entity dies it loses its substantial form at which its body ceases to be that body at all and becomes merely an aggregate of component molecules. The first two posts in Ed’s long going controversy with the Intelligent Design movement help illustrate this:<br /><br />http://edwardfeser.blogspot.co.uk/2011/04/nature-versus-art.html<br /><br />http://edwardfeser.blogspot.co.uk/2011/05/reply-to-torley-and-cudworth.html<br />Danielnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40803745266651085542014-09-25T02:41:55.677-07:002014-09-25T02:41:55.677-07:00@Kantian Naturalist,
After posting that I realise...@Kantian Naturalist,<br /><br />After posting that I realised the comparison with Searle might not have been the most felicitous since presumably he does not admit Dispositional Properties and thus Physical Intentionality (what Aristotelianism understands as Teleology), one of the consequences being that a lot of what he would class as As-If-Intentionality would in fact stand as examples of real intentionality qua Physical Intentionality. Of course if one is endorses such a view of dispositions and intentionality it becomes, at least on the surface, a lot easier to account for the intentionality of the mental as developing out of non-mental but still intentional physical processes. Presumably a number of the New Essentialist Naturalists do just this.<br /><br />(I have to confess though I am not familiar with Searle’s specific view soon metaphysical issues or even if he has any so I may be doing him an injustice here).<br /><br />'As a bit of a lark, I'm trying to figure out the exact point of contention between Searle and Rosenberg, since they agree on so much -- and yet Rosenberg denies that there's any original intentionality and Searle insists on it.' <br /><br />I’d hazard a guess that the difference is something like this: Searle asserts that neuroscience <i>can</i> at least in part (say, in conjunction with his theory of ‘biological dualism’) explain the origin of intentionality from brain processes whilst Rosenberg claims it can’t and thus in the interests of preserving Naturalism, or at least his preferred understanding of it, we should reject the notion that our cognitive activity does display such intentionality. Rosenberg's 'Disenchanted Naturalism' thus commits him to a far stricter framework of what is acceptable than Searle's.Danielnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71671355086043271002014-09-25T00:05:15.390-07:002014-09-25T00:05:15.390-07:00Thanks for answering.
But the machine does perfor...Thanks for answering.<br /><br />But the machine does perform actions which lead to more machines being built. I'm not sure if the parts themselves need to be oriented toward the whole, as lipids do not intrinsically tend toward forming cells either. The form is imposed on them by the cell which first either forms the lipids from raw materials, then integrates them into its own substantial form.<br /><br />(I'm not hostile to A-T thought, I'm just legitimately curious. If I'm being annoying, just say so.)MookVanguardnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-34651259295824779732014-09-24T23:18:30.272-07:002014-09-24T23:18:30.272-07:00I think that the important difference, that has be...I think that the important difference, that has been mentioned already, is that the machine parts don't have the tendency to get themselves arranged Von Neumann-wise. There is nothing about any of the parts of the Von-Neumann machine that are that way except that an agent has given it to them to be that way.<br />Matt Sheeanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06588390859627450858noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-90527452839922547942014-09-24T20:09:12.431-07:002014-09-24T20:09:12.431-07:00*By parts in the first sentence I meant 'metal...*By parts in the first sentence I meant 'metal' parts, or whatever a Von Neumann replicator would be made from. Some carbon-based molecule, perhaps.MookVanguardnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15118253541352564182014-09-24T20:08:23.947-07:002014-09-24T20:08:23.947-07:00How does it matter whether or not a self-replicati...How does it matter whether or not a self-replicating organism is made of parts or not? The water molecules in a cell aren't intrinsically pointed toward the good of an animal.<br /><br />I don't know, I just don't see how building a machine is different from artificially creating a cell, and I don't see how artificially creating a cell is different from giving birth to one if the final function is the same.MookVanguardnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88538470956873729142014-09-24T16:50:48.963-07:002014-09-24T16:50:48.963-07:00I'd say only in a quasi-sense in that the '...<i>I'd say only in a quasi-sense in that the 'physical intentionality' in question is 'as-if-intentionality' to use a term of John Searle's. The parts have no intrinsic orientation to function for the whole so it still doesn't fulfill that sense of immanent teleology.</i><br /><br />That seems right to me. Though notice that Searle does think that the brain does have original intentionality, and that it's up to neuroscience to explain how the original intentionality of the mind arises from the causal powers of the brain. <br /><br />As a bit of a lark, I'm trying to figure out the exact point of contention between Searle and Rosenberg, since they agree on so much -- and yet Rosenberg denies that there's any original intentionality and Searle insists on it. <br /><br /><br />Kantian Naturalistnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86397235219438332722014-09-24T15:06:09.293-07:002014-09-24T15:06:09.293-07:00I'd say only in a quasi-sense in that the '...I'd say only in a quasi-sense in that the 'physical intentionality' in question is 'as-if-intentionality' to use a term of John Searle's. The parts have no intrinsic orientation to function for the whole so it still doesn't fulfill that sense of immanent teleology.Danielnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14630414650364672162014-09-24T14:57:49.182-07:002014-09-24T14:57:49.182-07:00Just a thought, is a Von Neumann replicator (a mac...Just a thought, is a Von Neumann replicator (a machine that builds more versions of itself, ad infinitum) an example of immanent teleology?<br /><br />I would think so, although that might not be conventional thought.MookVanguardnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-37124564700936415782014-09-24T10:30:20.812-07:002014-09-24T10:30:20.812-07:00@ Daniel and Scott
Thank you both very much for t...@ Daniel and Scott<br /><br />Thank you both very much for the links. The books look very interesting and I cannot wait to jump in! I appreciate the help!Christiannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-32356628114536606302014-09-24T09:48:30.725-07:002014-09-24T09:48:30.725-07:00@Christian:
Both of Daniel's suggestions are ...@Christian:<br /><br />Both of Daniel's suggestions are excellent, and I particularly second his recommendation of Loux.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5092610610301276812014-09-24T02:28:20.560-07:002014-09-24T02:28:20.560-07:00@Christian,
If you are looking for an introductor...@Christian,<br /><br />If you are looking for an introductory overview of Analytical metaphysics, and thus assumable are familiar with classic metaphysical issues like the debate over Universals and the nature of Causation, I would recommend E.J. Lowe's A Survey of Metaphysics:<br /><br />http://www.amazon.com/Survey-Metaphysics-E-J-Lowe/dp/0198752539/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1411550842&sr=1-1&keywords=A+Survey+of+Metaphysics<br /><br />If you find you get on well with this Michael Loux's Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction make a nice, more advanced follow-up:<br /><br />http://www.amazon.com/Metaphysics-Contemporary-Introduction-Introductions-Philosophy/dp/0415401348/ref=pd_ybh_3<br />Danielnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19945062888848354122014-09-23T20:52:38.575-07:002014-09-23T20:52:38.575-07:00@ Scott
I appreciate the link, and the clarificat...@ Scott<br /><br />I appreciate the link, and the clarification. Thanks!Christiannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-43192079495928520072014-09-23T18:25:49.601-07:002014-09-23T18:25:49.601-07:00@Christian:
"I was wondering if either you o...@Christian:<br /><br />"I was wondering if either you or your readers could point me in the direction of a introductory level book on analytic metaphysics?"<br /><br />"Analytic metaphysics" is a broad term (and at one time would have been almost an oxymoron), but I'd recommend <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Sketch-Systematic-Metaphysics-D-Armstrong/dp/019965591X" rel="nofollow">this</a>. (I wouldn't call it strictly "introductory," but it's "introductory-<i>level</i>.")Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46624532935598280962014-09-23T18:08:07.409-07:002014-09-23T18:08:07.409-07:00Hey Dr. Feser,
I was wondering if either you or y...Hey Dr. Feser,<br /><br />I was wondering if either you or your readers could point me in the direction of a introductory level book on analytic metaphysics?<br /><br />Thanks!!Christiannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28836601258222730812014-09-23T14:05:00.628-07:002014-09-23T14:05:00.628-07:00Here is that Freeman article.<a href="http://www.mindmatter.de/resources/pdf/freemanwww.pdf" rel="nofollow">Here</a> is that Freeman article.Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-17789651179839482542014-09-23T14:02:50.472-07:002014-09-23T14:02:50.472-07:00Thanks, I will take a look--but the link appears t...Thanks, I will take a look--but the link appears to be broken.<br /><br />I skimmed David Braine's book. What he likes about Ryle is what he regards as a not-quite-behaviorism where we can apply mental concepts to others based on their external behavior, not because mental concepts are behavior or are simply external, but because they are characteristically manifested in behavior.<br /><br />Hylemorphists, because the soul/mind of man is just man's form, likewise believe that mental concepts are "visible" in behavior, even if they aren't reducible to behavior. Braine also appreciate Ryle's presumption in favor of normal situations.Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57224241597605162132014-09-23T13:50:51.753-07:002014-09-23T13:50:51.753-07:00I hadn't heard of that Kerr article, but it se...I hadn't heard of that Kerr article, but it seems interesting -- thank you. <br /><br />I might have mentioned this before, but some of you might be interested in "<a href="sulcus.berkeley.edu/wjf/CR%20FreemanAquinas.pdf" rel="nofollow">Nonlinear brain dynamics and intention according to Aquinas</a>" (PDF) by Walter Freeman (in <i>Mind and Matter</i> 6 (2):207-234 (2008).) <br /><br />Freeman is an experimental neuroscientist who uses Aquinas's conceptual framework to explain what he sees going on in the large-scale brain activation patterns he studies. I've seen his name come up in a lot of the stuff in "enactivist" philosophy of mind (Evan Thompson, Alva Noe, Teed Rockwell, and Anthony Chemero).Kantian Naturalistnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-66071010990449643902014-09-23T13:43:19.018-07:002014-09-23T13:43:19.018-07:00@KN
It seems quite odd to hear Wittgenstein and R...@KN<br /><br /><i>It seems quite odd to hear Wittgenstein and Ryle described as even "suggesting" a hylemorphic view. Hylemorphism, as I understand it, is a metaphysical view about what it is for something to be an object.</i><br /><br />Well, I am not skilled enough to defend the position. But interpretations of Wittgenstein are vast, and folks like Anscombe (in her Intention) and Geach (in his Mental Acts) certainly found implicit in Wittgenstein theories of intention and concept acquisition that were consonant with Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophical anthropology. To be sure, such philosophers would not refrain from metaphysics to the extent that Wittgenstein did, but then, who does?<br /><br />Fergus Kerr has done some work on the subject more recently. His article "Aquinas After Wittgenstein" is a fairly broad approach to the topic. Then there is John Cahalan's "Wittgenstein as a Gateway to Analytical Thomism". There are others who have blended the Aristotelian-Thomistic approach with Wittgenstein's insights (Anthony Kenny, Roger Pouivet).<br /><br />Though perhaps I'm interpreting the question a bit more broadly than it was intended, since Kenny was fairly anti-metaphysical himself. But I think it is adequate to say that one doesn't have to stretch too far to find Wittgensteinian insights congenial to hylemorphism, at least as a philosophy of mind, granting that there could not be too much metaphysical affinity.Gregnoreply@blogger.com