tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post4794093401411248168..comments2024-03-28T21:43:44.433-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Blackfriars Aquinas SeminarEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger453125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55640862941509236352013-02-05T11:23:58.433-08:002013-02-05T11:23:58.433-08:00The bottom line is that inferiority only makes sen...The bottom line is that inferiority only makes sense relative to that which is superior. That is why we say that X is inferior <i>to Y</i>. It makes no sense to say that X is inferior, period, without any relative comparison to a superior Y. And that means that if you want to say that X is inferior, then it must point towards what is superior, and that must mean towards another composite ens within an ordered hierarchy within metaphysics. In other words, <b>an inferior X within metaphysics cannot point to a superior Y beyond metaphysics, but can only point towards a superior Y within metaphysics</b>. And thus, there is no way to reach God via the inferiority of creation, because God cannot be superior due to his existence beyond the metaphysical framework of ordered hierarchies, and thus nothing can be inferior to him, including creation. Again, this is a direct consequence of the demand for utter transcendence. It ends up undermining any analogy that can be made between creation and God, even on its own terms. And thus, we are left in the darkness of the hole, unable to know if we are blinded by too much light or no light at all. <br /><br />One last thing. I think that you are right that Aquinas’ thought is a development from earlier Christian thought and mysticism, and so I am reading several books on the subject to better familiarize myself with his background. I’m reading Robert Louis Wilken’s <i>The Spirit of Early Christian Thought</i> now, and will then read Andrew Louth’s <i>The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition</i>. I’ve also got Eric Perl’s <i>Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite</i>, William Riordan’s <i>Divine Light: The Theology of Denys the Areopagite</i>, and Andrew Louth’s <i>Deny the Areopagite</i> to better understand Pseudo-Denys’ thought, which as you mentioned was key for Aquinas’ thought. I’ve also ordered a book on Gregory of Nyssa, and a few books on Eckhart to better understand the mystical tradition to understand your position better, especially before I venture to read Hart. I have a few books on continental philosophy of religion to read first, as well, before Hart. After all, you seem to highly value his books, and so I want to have a good background in place before I tackle his thought. <br /><br />That being said, I think that the argument that I have made above is compelling, and undermines all attempts to adhere to utter divine transcendence and any form of knowledge of the divine rooted in the similarity/dependence/contingency of creation. You cannot have both together, and one must give way. <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53668035450820609962013-02-05T11:23:43.135-08:002013-02-05T11:23:43.135-08:00Not in the slightest. The First Way shows that no ...<i> Not in the slightest. The First Way shows that no secondary change can exist unless it is grounded in something that is beyond secondary change. This is a logical and ontological fact. Whether or not we can actually comprehend the being to which this logic leads us is irrelevant to the logic itself.</i><br /><br />And yet this “logical and ontological fact” turns out to be impossible, for the reasons that I’ve outlined above. <br /><br /><i> Considering that all we use the principle of causality for is discussing creation and effects, I don't see how this is a problem. The principle of causality is how we find the holes in every totalistic metaphysical scheme, and it is how we then realize that these holes point to something that we can only understand through analogy.</i><br /><br />It is a problem, because even if you find holes in metaphysics using the principle of causality, you cannot use it to reach any conclusions about the holes themselves, because they are beyond the reach of the principle of causality. You cannot even make any analogies between the hole and creation, because analogy presupposes similarity, which presupposes the metaphysics of participation and efficient causality, which cannot be applied to the hole. So, you are <i>lost</i>.<br /><br />And just to formalize my argument, here it is:<br /><br />(1) X is higher than Y iff Y is lower than X iff X and Y are part of an ordered hierarchy relative to a particular standard<br />(2) X involves an ordered hierarchy iff X is within metaphysics <br />(3) The principle of causality involves ordered hierarchies (such as act > potency, perfection > imperfection, cause > effect) <br />(4) Thus, the principle of causality is within metaphysics (by (2), (3))<br />(5) X is beyond metaphysics iff X cannot be understand by that which is within metaphysics<br />(6) God is beyond metaphysics<br />(7) Thus, God cannot be understand by that which is within metaphysics (by (5), (6))<br />(8) Thus, God cannot be understood by the principle of causality (by (4), (7))<br />(9) The principle of causality necessarily presupposes the truth of the metaphysics of participation and efficient causality<br />(10) Thus, God cannot be understood by the metaphysics of participation and efficient causality (by (8), (9))<br />(11) X is similar to Y iff X is an effect of Y iff X is dependent upon Y iff X and Y can be understood according to the metaphysics of participation and efficient causality<br />(12) Let X = creation and Y = God in (11)<br />(13) Creation is similar to God iff creation and God can be understood according to the metaphysics of participation and efficient causality (by (11), (12))<br />(14) It is not the case that creation and God can be understood according to the metaphysics of participation and efficient causality (by (10))<br />(15) Thus, creation cannot be dependent upon God, creation cannot be an effect of God, and creation cannot be similar to God (by (11), (14))<br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91697183445692515482013-02-05T11:23:27.016-08:002013-02-05T11:23:27.016-08:00It is not presupposed that metaphysics have a caus...<i> It is not presupposed that metaphysics have a cause: it is just demonstrated that there is a giant hole in the center of any metaphysical system. What we must then decide is whether we're going to worship the hole (as Derrida did), accepting the irrationalism and skepticism that follow, or to acknowledge something similar to what Aquinas and the Church Fathers did. This second position is that the hole simply shows that metaphysics are not self-supporting--the hole is not the original stuff from which metaphysics were built--, which means that all things that we know are contingent. This in turn leads us to say that creation is an effect, even though it has no cause in the absolute, metaphysical sense.</i><br /> <br />I accept that there is a giant hole in metaphysics, but since this hole is beyond metaphysics, and our thought is saturated by metaphysics, it means that we literally have no idea what is going on in that hole. And that leaves us in a fundamental state of undecidability. We do not know if the darkness in the hole is due to something in excess of being (i.e. God) that blinds us with too much light, or due to something less than being (i.e. differance) that has too little light to show anything at all. There is no resolution to this undecidability, because the only tools that we have available cannot apply to the dark hole at all. So, we are lost, adrift, unsure in our footing, and walking cautiously over an abyss. <br /><br />Neither Derrida’s nor Aquinas’ solutions are adequate to the task. Both lead to irrationalism and inconsistencies that are irresoluble. And that is because both rely upon necessary impossibilities. That is why there are so many parallels between deconstruction and apophatic theology, and much literature has been written about their relationship. <br /><br />The traditional Christian solution assumes what turns out to be impossible, and tries to make sense of things in a way that ends up being senseless. To say that creation is an effect carries with it a series of implications, all of which are completely falsified, which compromises the initial position in which creation is an effect at all. It makes no sense to think of creation as an effect without also thinking of creation as an effect <i>of a cause</i>. That is what the principle of causality is all about. However, causality is only applicable to a reality that is ordered hierarchically, because cause > effect, act > potency, perfection > imperfection, and so on, and so none of these concepts can be utilized to understand that which transcends all ordered hierarchies, and that must include God. You embrace this conclusion, as you should. So, God cannot be considered the cause of creation, and if God cannot cause creation, then <i>nothing can</i>, and if creation has no cause, then creation is not an effect. And if creation is not an effect, then there is no sense to asking what its cause could be, because only effects require causes, which completely undermines the Five Ways, and all natural theology, because all natural theology tries to reason from the composite entia of creation to its ground, which turns out to be impossible, under its own rules. <br /><br />What the approaches of apophatic theology and deconstruction tell us in their different, but related, approaches to the necessary impossiblities of their systems is But they tell us more about ourselves than about reality. They tell us about our desire, the desire of language itself, the desire of reason itself, to transcend itself, even when it leaves all meaning and sense and logic behind it. <br /><br /><i> That is absolutely false. The principle of causality is an ontological reality for every metaphysical entity. We merely discover it.</i><br /><br />That is absolutely false. It does not apply to God. If it did, then he would not be transcendent.<br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40146971287994445242013-02-05T11:23:05.164-08:002013-02-05T11:23:05.164-08:00Again, you start with the meaning of higher-lower ...Again, you <i>start</i> with the meaning of higher-lower within metaphysics as being in an ordered hierarchy relative to a standard in which each is defined in opposition to the other. And here we are, within metaphysics, and you claim that we are lower (or inferior). Well, within metaphysics, all instances of lower within metaphysics imply a higher also within metaphysics. And thus my inferiority within metaphysics is defined relative to a superiority also within metaphysics. My inferiority makes no reference to what is outside metaphysics. So, if my inferiority has nothing to do with what is outside metaphysics, then my inferiority cannot be used as a justification for the need for a ground outside metaphysics, because my inferiority can only refer to a superiority within metaphysics, and not to a superiority beyond metaphysics. And since the cause-effect relation is necessarily one of superiority-inferiority, then the ground of creation cannot be found outside of creation. A ground can only be within creation, because all grounds are superior to what they ground, and this relation is impossible beyond metaphysics. <br /><br />So, creation requires a ground outside of creation, because of the validity of the Five Ways, but there cannot be a ground outside of creation, because “ground” only makes sense as part of an ordered hierarchy, and ordered hierarchies only apply within creation. <br /><br /><i> I provided it several weeks ago with my talk of the Trinitarian trace. Our likeness to God cannot be broken down or analyzed: it is factical, the condition of creation--something presupposed in every metaphysical endeavor. The likeness just is present. Like esse, it is a simple truth.</i><br /><br />It is justified on the basis of a metaphysical system that is fundamentally unstable. And our likeness to God <i>can</i> be analyzed, certainly with imperfect understanding, but it is not so fundamentally inexplicable that the words themselves are incoherent. Or is it?<br /><br /><i> Created res is the reference. We understand created res just as we understand created modes of being: by witnessing, internalizing and signifying.</i><br /><br />But you missed the point. <br /><br />words <--> thoughts <--> composite entia --> simple God. <br /><br />Our words refer to reality by virtue of the mediation of our thoughts. It is only because reality can affect our minds that our minds can associate words with reality at all. So, there is no problem with the <i> words <--> thoughts <--> composite entia</i> part of the above schematic.<br /><br />My question is how words --> simple God. In order for divine names to refer to God, they would have to be mediated by semantic and cognitive content within our minds, and yet this is impossible, because any semantic and cognitive content that could exist within our minds can only be about composite entia, as per your schema. If the simple God is hidden behind composite entia, fundamentally un-representable to our minds, then God is invisible to our minds, and thus to our language. Thus, we cannot talk about him at all, including to say that he exists within the above schema. <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51078670200598351452013-02-05T11:22:46.704-08:002013-02-05T11:22:46.704-08:00So, to avoid one contradiction, i.e. between the a...So, to avoid one contradiction, i.e. between the above account and divine impassibility and immutability, you embrace another contradiction, i.e. inferiority independent of superiority. For whatever reason, you have less cognitive dissonance with the latter than the former, but I can assure you that they are <i>both</i> incoherent. You may as well embrace square circles for the sake of God. Heck, you could even repeat “square circle” often enough that you numb your mind and blur your intellectual vision to the contradiction at its heart, but that does not change the fact that it is contradictory to its core. <br /><br />Your task is simple to refute me. Explain “inferiority” without any mention of an ordered hierarchy relative to a standard. So, go for it.<br /><br /><i> For something to be superior to something else, it has to fall under metaphysics.</i><br /><br />Furthermore, under metaphysics, X is superior to Y relative to standard S iff Y is inferior to X relative to standard S. Superiority and inferiority are co-relational terms that make reference to S in an ordered hierarchy. That is what these terms <i>mean</i>, “under metaphysics”. I hope you’ll agree with this.<br /><br /><i> God doesn't.</i><br /><br />Yes, God does not “fall under metaphysics”. He transcends metaphysics, as well as all ordered hierarchies, and thus transcends any metaphysics that is rooted in ordered hierarchies, which must include the Thomist metaphysics of act-potency, cause-effect, perfection-imperfection. None of this can be applicable to God at all. <br /><br /><i> However, because we do fall under metaphysics, it is possible for us to be inferior.</i><br /><br />But inferiority does not exist in itself. It is inferior <i>to something else</i>, according to a standard by which superiority and inferiority are measured in an ordered hierarchy. To say that we are inferior necessarily implies that we are inferior <i>to something else</i>, and the meaning of inferiority is such that if X is inferior to Y, then Y is superior to X. If God transcends metaphysics, then God transcends all ordered hierarchies, and thus cannot be superior to anything, including us. And if God cannot be superior to us, then we cannot be inferior to God, because that is what “superior” and “inferior” mean. So, we cannot possibly be inferior to that which transcends metaphysics.<br /><br /><i> Hence, we are inferior but God is not superior.</i><br /><br />Nope.<br /><br /><i> These types of dialectical terms do not have the Hegelian universal applicability that you seem to think they do: they are connected to distinctions like act/potency and the ten categories. Anything that falls under those distinctions will also fall under distinctions like higher/lower. Anything that does not fall under those distinctions will not fall under distinctions like higher/lower. Hence the strange and unintuitive break between our inferiority and God's lack of absolute superiority.</i><br /><br />First, why do we always have to make higher affirmations after negations if “higher” has nothing to do with God? You want to say that he is higher, and yet claim that he cannot be higher. Even saying that he is higher than higher is still saying that he is <i>higher</i>.<br /><br />Second, I’m not talking about Hegel. Or his bagels. (Simpsons reference.)<br /><br />Third, if higher-lower only applies within metaphysics, then we can only be lower than something else within metaphysics. After all, being lower means being lower <i>than something else</i>, and if this “something else” transcends metaphysics, then it cannot be higher than us, because higher-lower only applies within metaphysics. And if it cannot be higher than us, then we cannot be lower than it. <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55253884806368404982013-02-05T11:22:21.984-08:002013-02-05T11:22:21.984-08:001. Everything that is not self-sufficient relies o...<i> 1. Everything that is not self-sufficient relies on something that is not itself (trivial truth). </i><br /><br />True.<br /><br /><i>2. If something relies on something that is not itself, then it is inferior to it.</i><br /><br />Only according to the standard of independence, which necessarily involves an ordered hierarchy relative to that standard.<br /><br /><i>3. If something is inferior to something that is not itself, then there is said to be a likeness of one to the other.</i><br /><br />But why is there “said to be a likeness”? <i>X is dependent upon Y iff X is like Y</i> is certainly not a logical truth. It requires some justification. The only justification that I have come across is the metaphysics of participation and efficient causality. And thus anything that operates within that metaphysics can be said to be similar to its cause, but anything that operates outside of that metaphysics cannot have any justified similarity relationships rooted in dependency relationships. <br /><br /><i>4. A likeness of the kind mentioned in premise (3) leads to an analogy of proportion. </i><br /><br />If X is part of the metaphysics of participation and efficient causality, then X can participate in an analogy of proportion to X’s causes and X’s effects. But if X is beyond that metaphysics, then X is beyond the only foundation that could justify an analogy of proportion between causes and effects.<br /><br /><i>5. Creation is not self-sufficient.</i><br /><br />True.<br /> <br /><i>6. Therefore, creation relies on and is inferior to and is analogous to *insert analogous name here*.</i><br /><br />But if *insert analogous name here* is beyond the very conditions that ground all inferiority and analogous relationships, then it cannot be a cause or ground or act of creation, and since effects requires causes, then if there are no causes, then there are no effects, which contradicts (5). <br /><br /><i> Even if I had put "a ground" or "something else" in place of *insert analogous name here*, both terms are once again reducible to analogy. And this does not mean that the syllogism is a non sequitur or an equivocation, because all of the premises inexorably lead us to that same conclusion. The thing is that the conclusion is, again, the very end of metaphysics, after which point we have only analogy. But metaphysics does do us one last favor, in that it guarantees the possibility of analogy right before collapsing.</i><br /><br />But the possibility of analogy depends upon the metaphysics, and so if the metaphysics collapses, then so does the very justification of the analogy itself! That’s the whole point. <br /><br /><i> And yet I don't see any argument from you in support of this view: just assertions and begged questions.</i><br /><br />I could say the same thing about you. You agree that between composite entities X and Y, X is superior to Y relative to standard S iff Y is inferior to X relative to standard S. (I hope you’ll agree with this, because if you reject this basic claim, then I really don’t know what else to say.) Even Aquinas endorses this view. <br /><br />Your claim is that because this position cannot possibly be true if God is as classical theism describes him due to divine impassibility and immutability, then this position must be false. <br /><br />But the problem is that you have not given an account of how this position can be false, and yet the terms involved in the position retain their meaning. Inferiority is <i>defined</i> in opposition to superiority relative to a standard, and so denying the validity of superiority necessarily denies the validity of inferiority, because they define each other mutually, much like an effect can only be an effect <i>of a cause</i>, and thus the cause is part of the definition of the effect. That is the whole point of your double-grounding thingy.<br /><br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-56781574839699308802013-02-05T11:21:43.156-08:002013-02-05T11:21:43.156-08:00You have to realize that God is the ground of both...<i> You have to realize that God is the ground of both act and potency (as both Aquinas and Hart assert), being himself neither in absolute terms.</i><br /><br />God is the actuality of all acts, which makes him a kind of act. And that is important, because the principle of causality says that if X is an efficient cause, then X must be in act. <br /><br /><i>To say that God is act is a distant analogy, derived from the fact that our act is similar to that which sustains it. We don't call God "potency" because potency is inferior to act, and so cannot be one of the highest names; but that doesn't mean that he isn't its source.</i><br /><br />But this similarity presupposes ordered hierarchies to justify it, and thus cannot apply to that which transcends all ordered hierarchies, which completely undermines any possibly similarity between creation and God, and that completely undermines anything we can know or say about him. <br /><br /><i> He is our actuality in that he is called actual via analogy. But God transcends every metaphysical scheme, and so obviously cannot be actual in the absolute sense. This does not mean that he is not our ground, though.</i><br /><br />If God “transcends every metaphysical scheme”, then that must include one that involves similarity, participation and efficient causality, which completely undermines your claims about the possibility of an analogy between creation and God. It’s like saying that X is only possible if Y, and then when it is shown that Y cannot occur, then you still carry on claiming X. <br /><br /><i> The principle of causality is based on the world of act and potency--this is true. But the principle of causality reveals its own insufficiency with its inability to explain creation without relying on onto-theology. This does not mean that it ceases to apply to us: merely that it does not apply to our ground in any absolute sense. And this is enough to say that we are inferior, since the principle of causality does indeed guarantee that we are effects (i.e. contingent, imperfect, etc.) even though it cannot, in strict metaphysical terms, explain why or how this result has come about. Not that it's necessary for it to do so, given that the apophatic ground from which we spring is already reachable via analogy thanks to our inferiority to it.</i><br /><br />The principle of causality guarantees that we are effects <i>of causes</i>, and if the standard is independence, then effects are inferior to causes. But this is an ordered hierarchy relative to the standard of independence. If God transcends all ordered hierarchies, then he transcends this standard, and without this ordered hierarchy relative to this standard, the principle of causality no longer applies, and without this principle, there cannot be similarity and without similarity, there cannot be analogy, and so we are left in darkness.<br /><br /><i> Nope. An effect is something contingent, in need of some kind of ground. It is not defined solely by its dialectical relation to a "cause". I know you're looking for a begged question in my account, but it just isn't going to work.</i><br /><br />You just defined it “by its dialectical relation”. You just changed the word “cause” to “ground”, as if that made any difference. I appreciate the appropriation of Heidegger, but why it changes anything is beyond me. So, an “effect” is “in need of some kind of ground”, which means that if X is an effect, then X must be sustained by a cause, which is exactly what I said. You cannot call X an effect without saying that it must be an effect <i>of a cause</i>. You can call this cause a “ground”, or a “moose”, or whatever, but the underlying point remains the same.<br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12281726572085846732013-02-05T11:21:17.609-08:002013-02-05T11:21:17.609-08:00Also, the core issue here is that you seem to thin...<i>Also, the core issue here is that you seem to think there's an underlying problem in something being inferior without something else being superior. I've never seen this objection trotted out--ever. Neither have you, despite your large amount of reading on the subject. And what you don't seem to grasp is that your "solution" to this "problem" dissolves into Hegelianism and onto-theology, and so is not really a solution at all.</i><br /><br />First, I think it’s ridiculous that you are so dismissive of my objection, because you’ve never heard it before. Wow. I’m going to dismiss Plantinga’s EAAN, because it’s original. That’s so much easier than engaging in a detailed refutation. And I never knew that an argument derived its force from the number of its adherents. I thought it derived its force from whether it was <i>sound</i> or <i>unsound</i>, not whether it is <i>popular</i> or <i>unpopular</i>. <br /><br />Second, you have admitted that “If one thing is inferior to something else, then the other must be said to be "better" in some way”. Inferiority is clearly the opposite of superiority, and thus the presence of one necessarily implies the opposite of the other. To deny that X is superior to Y necessarily means that Y is not inferior to X, and so to deny that God is superior to creation means that creation is not inferior to God. I’m sorry if this fact upsets your theology, but you haven’t justified your claim that inferiority is a relative state, and yet cannot be a relative state. To say that X is inferior to Y necessarily involves <i>Y</i> in a dialectical relationship to X by virtue of X’s inferiority <i>to Y</i>. You may as well say that a statue represents a person, but the person is not represented by the statue. It just doesn’t make sense, and your attempt to ground inferiority in dependency fails, because it presupposes an ordered hierarchy according to the standard of independence in which if X is more independent than Y, then X is superior to Y, and if X is less independent than Y, then X is inferior to Y. <br /><br />Third, I do not have a solution to this problem. My position is that <i>there is no solution</i>. All logical possibilities lead to absurdities. We are lost in a middle of a necessary impossibility.<br /><br /><i> God doesn't transcend the act/potency distinction in the sense that applying the term "act" to him is equivocation. God is indeed "act" in the sense that act is a perfection applied via analogy to him. He is "pure act", in fact--the "highest act". But he is none of these things absolutely, since analogy by nature only hints at God.</i><br /><br />But all of this makes him part of an ordered hierarchy, which is impossible. <br /><br /><i> All false. Our arguments for God are based on the impossibility of creation being self-sufficient. If creation is not self-sufficient, then it must be grounded in something else. It is this fact that gives us the issue of inferiority, which in turn provides the analogy of proportion, which in turn allows one to give God names like "pure act", "being itself" and suchlike. There are no begged questions in this chain of reasoning.</i><br /><br />The begged question is that the entire line of reasoning is only possible for that which is part of an ordered hierarchy involving act > potency, perfection > imperfection, cause > effect, independence > dependence, ungrounded > grounded, and so on. Without this fundamental assumption, the entire chain of argumentation fails, and yet this very assumption makes the entire chain of argumentation unable to be about anything that transcends ordered hierarchies, which necessarily involves God. So, if God transcends all ordered hierarchies, then he cannot be part of any analogy, because all analogy presupposes ordered hierarchies involved in participation and efficient causality. <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-22905204243621984672013-02-05T11:20:21.636-08:002013-02-05T11:20:21.636-08:00Second, dependence itself does not explain similar...Second, dependence itself does not explain similarity. Just because X depends upon Y does not mean that X has to be similar to Y. That further claim requires additional justification. Aquinas’ justification is his account of participation and efficient causality as a form of giving something from cause to effect. If God is beyond the reach of such an account, then there is no longer any justification of any similarity relationship between creation and God, even if there is a dependency relationship. <br /><br /><i>To say that God is X-in-C is to speak of God in composite terms. It doesn't work. What Aquinas means there is that every created good is said to be like God, and from this he extrapolates, via analogy, that God is something like the principle of all things. But to call God the principle of all things is to use a divine name, which again is only to engage in analogy from effects. Aquinas has no intention of making an absolute statement about the divine nature.</i><br /><br />But if God cannot be part of a metaphysics of participation in which C has X-in-C and gives X to E to cause the transition from potential X-in-E to actual X-in-E, then you cannot infer that E is like C at all. You have eliminated the sole basis for any similarity relationship between E and C. What else is the similarity relationship based upon? <i>Nothing at all</i>. I mean, the whole system collapses once it is applied to God, because it <i>cannot</i> be applied to God, and yet it <i>must</i> be applied to God, which results in a massive contradiction. It is like cutting off the very branch that you are sitting on, and expecting to float in the air. You will fall, and the system <i>does</i> fall. There is a specific account of how an effect is similar to a cause, and if that account cannot apply to a “cause”, then effects cannot be similar to that “cause” at all, because similarity is only for causes, and not “causes”.<br /><br /><i>X is said to be similar to Y if X is inferior to Y. X is inferior to Y if X relies on Y. Your case about shared traits is a red herring.</i><br /><br />No, it is a key point that you are trying to gloss over. Why does dependence imply similarity, according to you? As I said above, Aquinas has an explanation based upon participation and efficient causality, but you claim that this explanation cannot apply to God, and thus the sole rationale for any similarity between creation and God has been tossed aside, and you are left using the word without any justification and without any coherent meaning, because it makes no sense to say that X is inferior <i>to Y</i>, but Y is not superior to X. The antecedent in the conditional already implies the negation of the consequent, and yet you are pretending to some new meaning that still preserves its sense, even though your new meaning flatly contradicts the core meaning of the original terms.<br /><br /><i>No offense, but you are not Aquinas. Few alive today could match his intellect. Further, Aquinas rarely formulated his own positions: he usually just argued for positions that others had advocated in the past in different words.</i><br /><br />Great. So, he is smarter than anyone alive today, but never had original positions, and only acted as a sophisticated thesaurus for older thinkers. And other than resorting to an ad hominem against my intelligence, you didn’t answer the argument, except in the “weak” form of authority and condescension towards a critic.<br /><br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-70583150937787013632013-02-05T11:19:33.046-08:002013-02-05T11:19:33.046-08:00The language of participation is based on the idea...<i>The language of participation is based on the idea of one thing sustaining another in a certain aspect.</i><br /><br />X participates in Y iff X takes part in Y. X could not be X without its participation in Y, and thus you are correct that Y sustains X “in a certain aspect”. For example, John participates in football iff John takes part in football, and John could not be a football player unless John participated in football. For Aquinas, participation is closely related to efficient causality, and the effect is said to participate in the cause, because the cause gives something to the effect that exists in a higher and more eminent fashion in the cause than in the effect, but exists in both the cause and the effect. That is the basis of the Thomist principle that causation is akin to a gift from cause to effect in which the cause cannot give what it does not have. <br /><br /><i> For example, the hand sustains the stick in motion. However, the hand itself has to be sustained by something that is not sustained--something that does not have any accidental features. And, in the case of this thing, it is impossible to talk about it possessing a certain trait that it shares with creation, because it has no traits. This does not mean that the hand does not participate in the traitless thing, which would be a non sequitur. Rather, the hand participates in God himself, rather than in one of God's traits (which do not exist). What this means is knowable only by analogy from composite, created res to that in which it participates.</i><br /><br />But there is no analogy possible between a simple and a composite entity. Analogy presupposes similarity and likeness, and similarity and likeness presuppose a metaphysics of participation and efficient causality, which itself presupposes ordered hierarchies. If God cannot be part of an ordered hierarchy due to his divine transcendence, then God cannot be part of the metaphysics of participation and efficient causality, and thus God cannot be involved in any similarity or likeness relationship to composite entities, and thus there can be no analogy at all. <br /><br />You still haven’t explained any coherent notion of analogy that does not presuppose some commonality between the analogates. Even if you want to say that it is not partial identity and partial difference, but rather sameness-in-difference, there is still the <i>sameness</i> in the difference that must be present. My contention is that you cannot possibly come up with any coherent account of analogy that does not presuppose some commonality between the analogates, and if this is true and it is impossible for there to be any commonality between God and creation, then there can be no analogy between them.<br /><br /><i>This is not the reason that effects are inferior to causes, but is rather one of the side-effects of that reason. The reason that effects are inferior to causes is that every effect is in some way potential or prone to non-being--contingent. Effects rely on something else, since otherwise they cannot exist. It's a contradiction to say that something relying on something else is not inferior to that thing in some way. Now, since every aspect of creation relies on God, it must be the case that everything is inferior to God. Again, if something is inferior to something else, then there is a likeness and hence an analogy.</i><br /><br />First, inferiority is only measured according to the standard of independence. A child that depends upon their parents for support is not inferior to another child that is independent of their parents, according to the standard of the child adhering to people who benefit them. So, you have to justify the standard that you are using here.<br /><br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-76790230728650794002013-02-05T11:18:47.744-08:002013-02-05T11:18:47.744-08:00On the other hand, God for Aquinas (and Christian ...<i>On the other hand, God for Aquinas (and Christian tradition) grounds both act and potency, being neither. Creation is not a change and it emerges from no dialectical ground (i.e. being combined with non-being), but rather from something that is totally self-sufficient. We call this self-sufficient thing "act" via analogy, since act is better than prime matter or potency or what have you.</i><br /><br />First, you cannot call “this self-sufficient thing” an “act”, because it is “better”, because it must transcend all ordered hierarchies, including that of better and worse, and thus we cannot call it act at all. In fact, we cannot call it <i>anything</i><br /><br />Second, creation <i>is</i> a change, as I explained above. It is a change from potentially existing within the divine intellect to actually existing outside the divine intellect. It is a different kind of change than what occurs within creation, but it is still a change from potency to act.<br /><br /><i>All of those affirmations may be applied via the analogy of proportion, since all things are inferior to him. If one thing is inferior to something else, then the other must be said to be "better" in some way. Now, in the case of God, no affirmation is capable of expressing him completely. Hence, we have to deny our affirmations with further affirmations.</i><br /><br />The problem is that they can’t. God cannot be better in <i>any</i> way, because he transcends all ordered hierarchies, which would have to include superior-inferior, better-worse, and so on, and thus if X cannot be better than Y, then Y cannot be inferior to X. Furthermore, if X is inferior to Y, then Y must be said to be better than X <i>according to the same standard by which X is inferior to Y</i>. <br /><br /><i>This is a discussion of created and composite entities.</i><br /><br />I know, and that is the only aspect of reality in which this framework can possibly make sense, which means that it cannot apply to that which transcends composite entities at all. And that makes sense, because everything within this framework operates according to ordered hierarchies according to some standard, and if X transcends all ordered hierarchies, then X cannot operate according to the principles of ordered hierarchical entities at all. And that would have to include act-potency, perfection-imperfection, cause-effect, higher-lower, superior-inferior, and since these are dialectical relational concepts in which the former implies the latter, and vice versa, then if X cannot be a cause of Y, then Y cannot be an effect of X, for example. <br /><br /><i> There is no such thing as "X-in-C" when we're talking about God, because God does not contain any perfections in this accidental way. Also, his "perfections" are not virtual in the way that we say the divine ideas are virtual, since names like "good" signify the divine being itself rather than some divine idea. His perfections are only virtual in the sense that created res signifies the divine being in a variety of ways, since the divine being can be called by many names (truth, goodness, nobility, beauty, etc.) that are true but not absolutely true.</i><br /><br />The created res does not just signify divine being, but rather manifests divine being in an imperfect and limited fashion, and that is how a created res can participate in divine being, and this participation is ultimately a matter of efficient causality in which the effect is like its cause by sharing something in common with it, but in a different mode. Again, if none of this is applicable to God, then God is beyond all causal analysis, and thus cannot be a cause of creation, which means that creation cannot be an effect of God at all. <br /><br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81165012803471969012013-02-05T11:17:51.779-08:002013-02-05T11:17:51.779-08:00Since God does not refer to creation and God as pa...<i>Since God does not refer to creation and God as partially similar and partially different, this is irrelevant. Creation's similarity to God is its likeness to him that is always already present prior to any analysis--the facticity of existence. You cannot break it down into simpler components. It just is true.</i><br /><br />First, your claim presupposes the applicability of a framework that cannot possibly apply, which is a huge problem.<br /><br />Second, you <i>can</i> break it down into simpler components. I’ve already done it. Even Aquinas uses my definition in the commentary on the Metaphysics, and so there is some support for it. The problem is how to use it between God and creation, and in that situation it is impossible, but since it isn’t replaced by anything else, it becomes utterly empty.<br /><br />Third, how do you differentiate “X is similar to Y” from “X is identical to Y” and “X is different from Y”? Saying that X is similar to Y is neither X is identical to Y nor X is different from Y does not help, because then similarity would involve any relationship that is neither identical nor different. And that would mean that similarity would encompass a huge number of other relationships, and thus lose all specificity. After all “X is yellower than Y” is also neither “X is identical to Y” nor “X is different from Y”. So, “X is similar to Y” becomes too general to be meaningful.<br /><br />Fourth, it must be <i>meaningful</i> before “it just is true”.<br /><br /><i>This move seems tempting at first, but then you realize that it's prone to the onto-theological critique. If the Unmoved Mover is just a giant univocal engine within an ordered hierarchy of best and worst, then it follows that the Unmoved Mover is involved in a double-grounding and so must be grounded in some further thing from which it derives its power and being. This brings us right back to where we started: divine transcendence of dialectics.</i><br /><br />Why would this be the case? The problem of double-grounding is only for effects. Since the Unmoved Mover is not an effect, it is beyond the double-grounding problem altogether. Remember that an effect cannot ground itself. A cause that is not also an effect is beyond the applicability of this rule, and thus it is not a problem.<br /><br /><i>This is only because every cause in the created sense is itself an effect. Admittedly, God is ungrounded rather than self-grounded, but the terms are basically interchangeable when referring to creation. To say that creation is ungrounded just is to say that it's self-grounded.</i><br /><br />They are not interchangeable. “Ungrounded” implies <i>no ground</i> and “self-grounded” implies <i>a ground that grounds itself</i>. The former implies the non-existence of a ground, and the latter implies the existence of a ground that grounds itself. <br /><br /><i>You run off the rails when you start talking about how every effect is a transition from potency to act. This is only the case with change, which is all the Unmoved Mover took care of. Aristotle did not believe in creation: the Unmoved Mover and prime matter were locked in an eternal, unbreakable struggle between pure order and pure chaos, from which only change could result. There was no creation, and the universe had always existed.</i><br /><br />I know. That is why I wrote “transition” in scare quotes when discussing the “transition” from non-being to being. Of course, since God is eternal, and God has ideas about anything that could possibly exist, it follows that things always <i>potentially exist</i>, and thus when he creates them makes the transition from <i>potentially existing by actually existing in the divine intellect</i> to <i>actually existing outside the divine intellect</i>, and <i>that</i> is a transition from potency to act. <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52497301831306064532013-02-05T11:16:07.347-08:002013-02-05T11:16:07.347-08:001. Anything that is inferior to something else is ...<i>1. Anything that is inferior to something else is said to be like that thing, insofar as it is "less than" it. <br />2. Creation is inferior to that which is prior to it. <br />3. Therefore, creation is said to be like that which is prior to it, insofar as it is "less than" it.</i><br /><br />But the only way for (1) to be justified is according to the metaphysics of participation and efficient causality in which the cause has X in a pre-existent and virtual mode (i.e. X-in-C), which it then gives or transfers to the effect to cause the transition from <i>potential X-in-E</i> to <i>actual X-in-E</i>. This justifies the underlying similarity and inferiority relationship between the cause and effect, because they are partially identical (i.e. they both have X) and they are partially different (i.e. X-<i>in-C</i> versus X-<i>in-E</i>). Without this framework, (1) cannot be justified, and thus should be rejected for anything that is beyond this framework. And the problem is that if you want to say that God transcends all ordered hierarchies, then he must also transcend this framework, which means that God cannot stand as cause of creation, and if God cannot be the cause of creation, then creation has no cause, and if creation has no cause, then it cannot be an effect. And if it is not an effect, then it is not inferior to anyting or similar to anything, and the whole thing unravels.<br /><br /><i>This is what it means to say that God is the "maximum". Creation is less than God, and so we must, by an analogy of proportion, apportion to God all of the highest names from creation in an attempt to reach him.</i><br /><br />If God transcends all ordered hierarchies, then he transcends the only framework in which creation could be inferior to or similar to God. The analogy of proportion only makes sense within the metaphysics of participation and efficient causality that I’ve outlined. <br /><br /><i>They make it impossible to talk about God univocally. The metaphysical scheme is wholly divorced from him, and so it stands or falls on its own terms.</i><br /><br />The metaphysical scheme is what justifies his existence, and so if you want to cut off the branch that you are sitting on, then don’t be surprised if you fall. Also, if the metaphysical scheme says that there is only one way to talk about anything, and God transcends this only form of meaningful reference, then the metaphysical scheme implies that we cannot talk about God at all in a meaningful fashion. So, you have two options. You either stop talking about God, but endorse the metaphysical scheme, or you keep talking about God, but falsify the metaphysical scheme. You cannot talk about God <i>and</i> endorse the metaphysical scheme.<br /><br /><i>Ignorance is an epistemological problem. The problem of having no Unmoved Mover is one of logic and ontology, and it leads to a direct contradiction. Act and potency would simply have to be scrapped.</i><br /><br />Nope. Act and potency are facts. How they are possible is a separate issue. If Aristotle never came up with the act-potency distinction, and Parmenides held reign, the world would still go on as it does. If all our possible explanations lead to paradox, then we just don’t understand how reality works at a fundamental level. It does not obliterate reality itself. It just means that we need a better explanation, and if we don’t have any at this time, then we have to admit that we are lost at this time. <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-31411253280914228532013-02-05T11:15:25.251-08:002013-02-05T11:15:25.251-08:00Rank:
Your Rocca quote meshes perfectly with ever...Rank:<br /><br /><i>Your Rocca quote meshes perfectly with everything I just wrote. The human mind witnesses some mode of being (modus essendi), internalizes it (modus intelligendi) and then signifies it in language (modus significandi).</i><br /><br />Right. Modus significandi is the way the modus intelligendi, which is a cognitive and intellectual representation, is presented in a linguistic and semantic mode.<br /><br /><i> As Aquinas writes, although I can't recall in which work, we gather knowledge (modus intelligendi) of simple modes of being and subsisting modes of being (modus essendi), which we may then abstract from their initial appearance and apply to something else (modus significandi). For example, we might discuss "whiteness", which is a white (res) that subsists (modus significandi). There is no such thing as whiteness in the real world, since every appearance of white is one of accidental being: derivative of substantial being. However, it is still wholly possible to discuss the idea in abstract, since res and modus are not inseparable mentally and linguistically and since we do not have to see something exactly in order to talk about it.</i><br /><br />I don’t know what quote you are talking about, and so I can’t evaluate the veracity of your claim, but it seems prima facie to contradict everything that I’ve ever read about the modus intelligendi and modus significandi, as medieval terms for grammar and language. Even Aquinas, when he uses the term “modus significandi”, is referring to the mode by which our names signify their referents, which must be according to our human understanding, and thus limits our ability to understand referents that exist beyond composition (see ST 1.13.3, 6). It also contradicts what Wippel and Rocca have written on the subject. And since you have not cited Aquinas, nor any other scholar, in support of your position, I feel comfortable ignoring it as just your individual understanding of these terms that carries no weight at all.<br /><br /><i>1. Every effect is inferior to that which is prior to it. <br />2. Effects cannot be self-grounding. <br />3. Creation is an effect. <br />4. Therefore, creation is inferior to something prior to itself.</i><br /><br />Again, the tacit assumption in this argument is that creation and creator stand as effect to cause, and thus the principle of causality must be applicable to the causal relationship between creation and creator. However, if you also want to claim that God is beyond all ordered hierarchies due to his divine transcendence, then he must also be beyond the principle of causality, because the principle of causality only applies to what exists in an ordered hierarchy (e.g. act-potency, perfection-imperfection, cause-effect). It must follow that God cannot be the cause and creator of creation. And if God cannot be the cause or creator of creation, then creation <i>has</i> no cause, because only God could be the cause of creation. And if creation has no cause, then creation is not an effect at all, which violates (3) above.<br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67894889634512514852013-02-01T18:07:46.136-08:002013-02-01T18:07:46.136-08:00This means that only what exists within an ordered...<i>This means that only what exists within an ordered hierarchy can be under the purview of the principle of causality, and thus that which exists outside of all ordered hierarchies is also outside the principle of causality, which would have to include God. It follows that one cannot use it to infer anything about what transcends it, including what grounds its existence and truth.</i><br /><br />Considering that all we use the principle of causality for is discussing creation and effects, I don't see how this is a problem. The principle of causality is how we find the holes in every totalistic metaphysical scheme, and it is how we then realize that these holes point to something that we can only understand through analogy.<br /><br /><i>But forms are not simple entities. Forms are composite entia involving essence and existence.</i><br /><br />A form is simple. A <i>substance</i> is a composite of essence and existence; and a form exists inside this substance as one of its core parts. But the form itself is not composed of anything at all. Angels are pure and subsistent forms, it is true, but they are also substances--which is why they are existence-essence hybrids, and why they are capable of being forms at all. <br /><br /><i>After all, a simple entity must have its essence = its esse, and only God meets that criteria, which means that either forms are composite entia or each form is God.</i><br /><br />Not true. Something is simple if it cannot be divided into further parts. Forms fit this description, as does esse. God, on the other hand, is <i>absolutely simple</i>. This means that he not only cannot be divided into further parts, but that he is completely unreliant on any other parts. Esse melds with essence; form requires esse and essence; matter requires form; the average substance requires it all. In this way everything is composite, even when it is simple when considered in itself. God is all that he is--and so he is absolutely simple.<br /><br /><i>And yet absolute simplicity is precisely what we are trying to figure out how we to conceive.</i><br /><br />Absolute simplicity is a completely apophatic term that means essentially nothing. Aquinas erases each distinction in God until he hits essence-esse, which he removes as well. Once that's gone, there's nothing left at all. That is absolute simplicity--it cannot be conceptualized.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9869703347253402522013-02-01T18:06:17.735-08:002013-02-01T18:06:17.735-08:00Second, the presumption that metaphysics is ground...<i>Second, the presumption that metaphysics is grounded upon a relation of similarity is the unfounded part of this system. How does one know that metaphysics is similar to what transcends metaphysics? Well, one sees how efficient causality works within metaphysics, and it certainly involves similarities and likenesses between cause and effect. One then infers that this same system within metaphysics must also be operative in that which transcends metaphysics, and thus if metaphysics is conceived as an effect, then it must have a cause or ground in what transcends metaphysics, and since all cause-effect relationships involve similarity, a similarity relationship must also exist between metaphysics and that which transcends metaphysics.</i><br /><br />The issue of the likeness of creation to God is based the knowledge that anything grounded in another must be inferior to that other. See my syllogism for the detailed argument. See also my comments about the metaphysical/mystical divide, which is what allows something to be inferior without having an absolute superior.<br /><br /><i>But this presupposes that metaphysics is an effect of that which transcends metaphysics, and thus that the principle of causality applies.</i><br /><br />It is not presupposed that metaphysics have a cause: it is just demonstrated that there is a giant hole in the center of any metaphysical system. What we must then decide is whether we're going to worship the hole (as Derrida did), accepting the irrationalism and skepticism that follow, or to acknowledge something similar to what Aquinas and the Church Fathers did. This second position is that the hole simply shows that metaphysics are not self-supporting--the hole is not the original stuff from which metaphysics were built--, which means that all things that we know are contingent. This in turn leads us to say that creation is an effect, even though it has no cause in the absolute, metaphysical sense.<br /><br /><i>Thus, there can be no similarity between metaphysics and that which transcends metaphysics, and thus there can be no cause or ground of metaphysics, because all causation and grounding presupposes similarity.</i><br /><br />Every effect is inferior to something else, simply because it relies on it. This inferiority is the basis of the analogy of proportion.<br /><br /><i>The principle of causality is something that we inductively infer from our experience of how composite entia interact with one another in causal relationships.</i><br /><br />That is absolutely false. The principle of causality is an ontological reality for every metaphysical entity. We merely discover it. <br /><br /><i>Based upon it, we can reason that “no effect can be self-grounding”, which ultimately reduces to “the transition from potency to act involved in every effect must have an efficient cause that is in act and possesses the effect in a formal or virtual mode of being”.</i><br /><br />It does not ultimately reduce to that equation, not least because creation is from non-being and thus involves no potency.<br /><br /><i>Where I disagree is when you then say that this first cause is not a first cause at all, because it transcends anything that we can conceive, including first causes. It is a cognitive idol or mental construct that refers to that which is beyond anything we can conceive. Because then the conclusion of the First Way, for example, is not about God, but about a cognitive construct. It is a conclusion about how we think about reality and not about reality itself.</i><br /><br />Not in the slightest. The First Way shows that no secondary change can exist unless it is grounded in something that is beyond secondary change. This is a logical and ontological fact. Whether or not we can actually comprehend the being to which this logic leads us is irrelevant to the logic itself.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14285474307845025812013-02-01T18:04:32.998-08:002013-02-01T18:04:32.998-08:00Yes, they refer to aspects of creation, period. Cr...<i>Yes, they refer to aspects of creation, period. Creation then refers to God. But our minds would have to be able to represent that further reference, which is precisely the problem. An unrepresentable reference is invisible to the mind, even if the reference itself objectively exists. The fact that you claim to be able to talk about this reference means that it must be representable to the mind. My question is how this is possible at all, given Thomist principles of epistemology and language.</i><br /><br />Created res is the reference. We understand created res just as we understand created modes of being: by witnessing, internalizing and signifying. <br /><br /><i>I have no idea what you are talking about. A dog that is not being thought of by any mind “is mental content”?</i><br /><br />The mode in which a dog essence exists in the world is modus essendi, and we can consider this mode via modus intelligendi. We can then signify this mode via modus significandi. Likewise with the res "dog". We witness the dog in the real world, then abstract its form, which we signify (res significata). A perfection like "goodness" works the same way. We witness it in the real world, then consider it as we do with modus intelligendi, and then signify it (res significata).<br /><br />The word "dogness" signifies both a res and a mode of being. The res is "dog" (a form). The mode is subsistence. Obviously, there is no such thing as dogness in the real world, because no dog form subsists: a dog form must be attached to matter. Dogness is a fiction of language created out of a res and modus taken from other places.<br /><br /><i>Wow. So, you would endorse that X exists as a res iff X exists as a logical being in the mind? And you accused me of Kantianism!</i><br /><br />A res in the mind is based on a res in the real world, just as esse commune is based on real esse.<br /><br /><i>First, are you saying that no-one prior to Duns Scotus ever tried to explain all of reality into a single system of thought? What about the pre-Socrates, such as Parmenides, Heraclitus, Democritus?</i><br /><br />Notice that I was referring to Christian tradition in that line. I wrote:<br /><br />"Thomism, like <b>all traditional Christian thought</b>, is built on a foundation of mysticism. The attempt to totalize everything, including the ground of metaphysics, into one giant metaphysical picture is a decidedly modern, post-Scotist endeavor--one that leads to incoherence and onto-theology."<br /><br />Obviously there were ancient practitioners of totalistic, onto-theological metaphysics. Aristotle was one of them, as I have readily admitted for a long time. Plato was further away from it, in my opinion, but he still never escaped it. The Neo-Platonists came pretty close to getting out, but Hart argues convincingly that they never quite pulled it off.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69489499976793032082013-02-01T18:02:49.366-08:002013-02-01T18:02:49.366-08:00But you have to first explain in what sense an eff...<i>But you have to first explain in what sense an effect is less than its cause that is non-circular.</i><br /><br />My six-point syllogism should take care of that.<br /><br /><i>I doubt that you will reject the truth that if John is inferior to Peter, then Peter is superior to John. That is what “superior” and “inferior” mean. (You do not have “inferior” in itself, but rather “inferior to” or “less than”. They are inherently relational, because they make reference to an opposite that is part of their very meaning.)</i><br /><br />Peter and John both exist in the metaphysical realm of the created. That's where terms like "better" and "worse" have meaning. This is also why Peter can be superior to John and John inferior to Peter without God being superior to both, even though both are inferior to God.<br /><br /><i>Now, with God things get more complicated, because he is impassible and thus unchanging due to his pure actuality. And I think this leads to a contradiction, because once creation has been created, he necessarily becomes a creator as the cause of the created effect. There is a difference between a God that has created and a God that has not created. After all, if God is identical to his intellect, then an intellect that knows an actual creation would have to be different from an intellect that knows a potential creation. Also, a God that has not created is not dependent for his identity upon a creation, because there is no creation to be dependent upon. But a God that has created is dependent for his identity upon a creation, because there is a creation that stands as an effect of his efficient causality.</i><br /><br />Of course, I agree with your concern. This is the very definition of onto-theology: the creator comes to be defined by its creation, resulting in a double-grounding. The thing is that your argument is built on a fundamental misunderstanding of the split between metaphysics and mysticism. <br /><br /><i>Aquinas says that goodness is “in Him in a most excellent way”, because “all desired perfections flow from Him as from the first cause” (ST 1.6.2). Again, this only makes sense in terms of his account of efficient causality as a metaphysics of participation, in which everything that has being and goodness only does so “inasmuch as it participates in [being and goodness itself] by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective” (ST 1.6.4). And if that framework applies, then one can certainly say that God has perfect goodness, because he is goodness itself, and thus is the perfect actualization of goodness from which all other goodnesses “flow from him as from the first cause”.</i><br /><br />This means that, given the analogy of proportion between created goodness and God, it must be said that God is something like the standard of all goodness and hence the highest goodness. <br /><br /><i>I know. The problem is that he gives no other account of similarity, other than similarity between created beings. So, what account is he using then? You still haven’t provided one, but try to use other terms, such as imitation, likeness, and so on, which are all interrelated.</i><br /><br />I provided it several weeks ago with my talk of the Trinitarian trace. Our likeness to God cannot be broken down or analyzed: it is factical, the condition of creation--something presupposed in every metaphysical endeavor. The likeness just is present. Like esse, it is a simple truth.<br /><br /><i>But even if something is shared “in the loosest terms”, it follows that something is shared. If nothing was shared, then there would be no terms, including “loosest terms”, that could be used.</i><br /><br />I meant that one could say that esse divinum was shared with esse commune in that esse commune is similar to esse divinum. But this is only in informal usage--the "loosest terms".rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3948196670703318072013-02-01T18:01:42.037-08:002013-02-01T18:01:42.037-08:00But again, if we know that creation is not self-su...But again, if we know that creation is not self-sufficient, then it follows that creation is inferior to *insert analogous name here*. Let me put it in the form of a syllogism.<br /><br />1. Everything that is not self-sufficient relies on something that is not itself (trivial truth).<br />2. If something relies on something that is not itself, then it is inferior to it.<br />3. If something is inferior to something that is not itself, then there is said to be a likeness of one to the other.<br />4. A likeness of the kind mentioned in premise (3) leads to an analogy of proportion.<br />5. Creation is not self-sufficient.<br />6. Therefore, creation relies on and is inferior to and is analogous to *insert analogous name here*.<br /><br />Even if I had put "a ground" or "something else" in place of *insert analogous name here*, both terms are once again reducible to analogy. And this does not mean that the syllogism is a non sequitur or an equivocation, because all of the premises inexorably lead us to that same conclusion. The thing is that the conclusion is, again, the very end of metaphysics, after which point we have only analogy. But metaphysics does do us one last favor, in that it guarantees the possibility of analogy right before collapsing.<br /><br /><i>The problem is that inferiority only makes sense relative to superiority, i.e. within an ordered hierarchy according to some standard by which things in the ordered hierarchy are measured. You want to keep the sense of inferiority but dislodge it from an ordered hierarchy, which is like wanting to keep the definition of squareness but dislodge it from four-sidedness.</i><br /><br />And yet I don't see any argument from you in support of this view: just assertions and begged questions.<br /><br /><i>Honestly, explain to me how X can be less than Y, but Y not be more than X. Explain how “less than” can have sense without being part of an ordered hierarchy of higher and lower, superior and inferior, more than and less than, and so on.</i><br /><br />For something to be superior to something else, it has to fall under metaphysics. God doesn't. However, because we <i>do</i> fall under metaphysics, it is possible for us to be inferior. Hence, we are inferior but God is not superior. These types of dialectical terms do not have the Hegelian universal applicability that you seem to think they do: they are connected to distinctions like act/potency and the ten categories. Anything that falls under those distinctions will also fall under distinctions like higher/lower. Anything that does not fall under those distinctions will not fall under distinctions like higher/lower. Hence the strange and unintuitive break between our inferiority and God's lack of absolute superiority.<br /><br />Something similar happened with created grace. The Eastern Orthodox were appalled that Aquinas would consider grace created rather than uncreated, when in fact he said nothing of the sort. The confusion arose because Aquinas referred to grace as created from the angle of creation--in that a person begins to be affected by it--, but uncreated from the perspective of God, since grace is God's own being. This is the gap between metaphysics and theology/mysticism to which Aquinas always paid careful attention, but which most of his followers ignored.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12142235573584240722013-02-01T17:59:14.759-08:002013-02-01T17:59:14.759-08:00Again, if God transcends the principle of causalit...<i>Again, if God transcends the principle of causality, then it cannot be used to infer anything about him. And you should be satisfied by this conclusion, because the principle itself is nothing but a part of creation, and thus is necessarily infinitely removed from the transcendence of God.</i><br /><br />The principle of causality is based on the world of act and potency--this is true. But the principle of causality reveals its own insufficiency with its inability to explain creation without relying on onto-theology. This does not mean that it ceases to apply to us: merely that it does not apply to our ground in any absolute sense. And this is enough to say that we are inferior, since the principle of causality does indeed guarantee that we are effects (i.e. contingent, imperfect, etc.) even though it cannot, in strict metaphysical terms, explain <i>why</i> or <i>how</i> this result has come about. Not that it's necessary for it to do so, given that the apophatic ground from which we spring is already reachable via analogy thanks to our inferiority to it.<br /><br /><i>And in order for a cause (or “cause”) to produce effects, those effects must pre-exist formally or virtually within the cause (or “cause”). Otherwise, it is impossible to account for causality at all. And if those effects pre-exist virtually within the cause (or “cause”), then they are more perfect and higher than the effects themselves. As he writes: “To pre-exist virtually in the efficient cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect way” (ST 1.4.2).</i><br /><br />This, again, is just Aquinas's way of saying that everything has to come from our ground. Bit by bit, he shows that nothing in creation is self-grounded (or ungrounded), which throws all of it into the apophatic void from which we emerge. <br /><br /><i>But without this account, there is no sense to saying that creation is an effect of God. You cannot even call it an effect at all, because to be an effect, it must be an effect of a cause, i.e. be grounded in something else in act, and to have a cause (or ground) is to be involved in an ordered hierarchy in which a cause is higher than an effect, act is higher than potency, perfection is higher than imperfection, and so on.</i><br /><br />Nope. An effect is something contingent, in need of some kind of ground. It is not defined solely by its dialectical relation to a "cause". I know you're looking for a begged question in my account, but it just isn't going to work.<br /><br /><i>You keep wanting to have it both ways. You want to say affirmative things about God, and then take them back, leaving nothing behind, but pretending that there is still something there. All that we can conclude is that “there exist effects that cannot be produced by creation”. According to you, it does not follow that we can infer anything about the cause of creation, because it literally makes no sense to say “the cause of creation”, because that would imply a relationship from the cause of creation to creation itself, which is impossible, because only creation can have a relation to its cause, and not vice versa. So, again, I’ll accept your conclusion, but if you want to be consistent, then you cannot say anything about the cause of creation. All you can do is point to the inadequacy of creation as an explanation of itself. You cannot point anywhere else, and so must stop there.</i><br /><br />To say that creation is not self-sufficient and end there is to state a contradiction. Not even a skeptic could accept this result. The thing is that once we admit that creation is not self-sufficient, we've reached the end of metaphysics. That is their limit--they cannot go beyond it. As soon as we begin talking about that which is not creation, we are talking about theology and mysticism rather than metaphysics. Everything that we say after this point is ultimately reducible to analogy. rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-79660944023592562562013-02-01T17:57:38.237-08:002013-02-01T17:57:38.237-08:00A configuration of what?
Act and potency and bein...<i>A configuration of what?</i><br /><br />Act and potency and being and non-being. If everything with being tends toward non-being, then it is not only possible but necessary that there will be a configuration of being and non-being in which nothing exists. In this state not even prime matter or substantial forms could exist, because both are parasitic on the esse/essence composites that tend toward non-being.<br /><br /><i>You completely missed the point, which was that if you want to say that God transcends the act-potency distinction, then it cannot apply to him, and thus all the divine properties that are inferred on the basis of that distinction also cannot apply to him.</i><br /><br />God doesn't transcend the act/potency distinction in the sense that applying the term "act" to him is equivocation. God is indeed "act" in the sense that act is a perfection applied via analogy to him. He is "pure act", in fact--the "highest act". But he is none of these things absolutely, since analogy by nature only hints at God.<br /><br /><i>And even saying that actuality is like God implies the metaphysics of efficient causality and participation, which itself presupposes ordered hierarchies. And if God transcends all ordered hierarchies, then the metaphysics of efficient causality and participation cannot be applicable to him, and thus you cannot even say that creation is like God at all, because the underlying likeness is rooted in what is passed to the effect from the cause, which undermines the entire system.</i><br /><br />All false. Our arguments for God are based on the impossibility of creation being self-sufficient. If creation is not self-sufficient, then it must be grounded in something else. It is this fact that gives us the issue of inferiority, which in turn provides the analogy of proportion, which in turn allows one to give God names like "pure act", "being itself" and suchlike. There are no begged questions in this chain of reasoning.<br /><br /><i>As I explained above, saying that “no potency can be self-grounding” is the logical equivalent of “every potency must be grounded by another". And furthermore, the “another” that grounds the potency must be in act.</i><br /><br />You have to realize that God is the ground of both act and potency (as both Aquinas and Hart assert), being himself neither in absolute terms. The only thing that God does not sustain is non-being, which is a logical construct that does not exist. To say that God is act is a distant analogy, derived from the fact that our act is similar to that which sustains it. We don't call God "potency" because potency is inferior to act, and so cannot be one of the highest names; but that doesn't mean that he isn't its source.<br /><br /><i>And since God is supposed to transcend all ordered hierarchies, and the act-potency dichotomy is an ordered hierarchy, it follows that God transcends act and potency, and thus God cannot be “the actuality of all acts” at all. He cannot be an “actuality” of anything at all!</i><br /><br />He is our actuality in that he is called actual via analogy. But God transcends every metaphysical scheme, and so obviously cannot be actual in the absolute sense. This does not mean that he is not our ground, though.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-17623365117989147002013-02-01T17:55:30.938-08:002013-02-01T17:55:30.938-08:00In other words, because we know X-in-E, we can inf...<i>In other words, because we know X-in-E, we can infer that the X-in-E must have come from C, which must have possessed X as X-in-C. Without this framework, it is impossible to make any inferences from effects to causes. And that is what Aquinas means when he writes that “whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently” (ST 1.13.5).</i><br /><br />To say that God is X-in-C is to speak of God in composite terms. It doesn't work. What Aquinas means there is that every created good is said to be like God, and from this he extrapolates, via analogy, that God is something like the principle of all things. But to call God the principle of all things is to use a divine name, which again is only to engage in analogy from effects. Aquinas has no intention of making an absolute statement about the divine nature.<br /><br /><i>Because creation is the effect of God, and all effects are similar to their causes, because the causes contain the effects either formally or virtually, it follows that creation is similar to God.</i><br /><br />X is said to be similar to Y if X is inferior to Y. X is inferior to Y if X relies on Y. Your case about shared traits is a red herring.<br /><br /><i>But to say that God is the cause of creation even in an analogical sense implies an underlying similarity</i><br /><br />Only from creation to God. Not the other way around.<br /><br /><i>The fact that I never heard you say that Aquinas should not have offered criticisms of Aristotle, given the authority and duration of his positions means that this objection is not a good one at all.</i><br /><br />No offense, but you are not Aquinas. Few alive today could match his intellect. Further, Aquinas rarely formulated his own positions: he usually just argued for positions that others had advocated in the past in different words.<br /><br />Also, the core issue here is that you seem to think there's an underlying problem in something being inferior without something else being superior. I've never seen this objection trotted out--ever. Neither have you, despite your large amount of reading on the subject. And what you don't seem to grasp is that your "solution" to this "problem" dissolves into Hegelianism and onto-theology, and so is not really a solution at all.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15975122521567275532013-02-01T17:52:42.398-08:002013-02-01T17:52:42.398-08:00But since God transcends all ordered hierarchies, ...<i>But since God transcends all ordered hierarchies, it follows that we cannot say that he is “least definite”, “least limited” and “more powerful”. None of this has anything to do with God, and only with what exists as part of an ordered hierarchy.</i><br /><br />All of those affirmations may be applied via the analogy of proportion, since all things are inferior to him. If one thing is inferior to something else, then the other must be said to be "better" in some way. Now, in the case of God, no affirmation is capable of expressing him completely. Hence, we have to deny our affirmations with further affirmations.<br /><br /><i>Say you have a cause C and an effect E. To say that C causes E means that something X is passed from C to E. X exists in a particular mode of being in C (i.e. X-in-C) and X exists in a particular mode of being in E (i.e. X-in-E). If X-in-C is identical to X-in-E, then C is a univocal cause. If X-in-C is similar to X-in-E, then C is an equivocal or analogical cause. Notice that in the similarity relation, there is partial identity (i.e. X) and partial difference (i.e. X-in-C versus X-in-E).</i><br /><br />This is a discussion of created and composite entities. There is no such thing as "X-in-C" when we're talking about God, because God does not contain any perfections in this accidental way. Also, his "perfections" are not virtual in the way that we say the divine ideas are virtual, since names like "good" signify the divine being itself rather than some divine idea. His perfections are only virtual in the sense that created res signifies the divine being in a variety of ways, since the divine being can be called by many names (truth, goodness, nobility, beauty, etc.) that are true but not absolutely true. <br /><br /><i>Participation is involved in this account, because E is said to participate in C by virtue of their mutual possession of X, but X exists primariy and more perfect mode of being as X-in-C, and X exists in a secondary and less perfect mode of being in X-in-E.</i><br /><br />The language of participation is based on the idea of one thing sustaining another in a certain aspect. For example, the hand sustains the stick in motion. However, the hand itself has to be sustained by something that is not sustained--something that does not have any accidental features. And, in the case of this thing, it is impossible to talk about it possessing a certain trait that it shares with creation, because it has no traits. This does not mean that the hand does not participate in the traitless thing, which would be a non sequitur. Rather, the hand participates in God himself, rather than in one of God's traits (which do not exist). What this means is knowable only by analogy from composite, created res to that in which it participates.<br /><br /><i>That is one of the reasons why an effect is inferior to a cause, i.e. the effect is a less perfect instantiation of X than the cause.</i><br /><br />This is not the reason that effects are inferior to causes, but is rather one of the side-effects of that reason. The reason that effects are inferior to causes is that every effect is in some way potential or prone to non-being--contingent. Effects rely on something else, since otherwise they cannot exist. It's a contradiction to say that something relying on something else is not inferior to that thing in some way. Now, since every aspect of creation relies on God, it must be the case that everything is inferior to God. Again, if something is inferior to something else, then there is a likeness and hence an analogy.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55193372807406350302013-02-01T17:49:55.471-08:002013-02-01T17:49:55.471-08:00What is the difference between “partially similar”...<i>What is the difference between “partially similar” and “partially different”?</i><br /><br />Since God does not refer to creation and God as partially similar and partially different, this is irrelevant. Creation's similarity to God is its likeness to him that is always already present prior to any analysis--the facticity of existence. You cannot break it down into simpler components. It just is true.<br /><br /><i>Second, the sticking point that unravels the Five Ways is divine transcendence. If God transcends all kinds of ordered hierarchies, then he must transcend the principle of causality, which is saturated by ordered hierarchies. And if he transcends the principle of causality, then we cannot use it to know anything about him. However, if it applies to him, then we can certainly reason about him. So, if the Unmoved Mover, or Pure Act, were a kind of actuality, and not “actuality”, then everything would be fine, because that Unmoved Mover sits firmly and appropriately within the principle of causality.</i><br /><br />This move seems tempting at first, but then you realize that it's prone to the onto-theological critique. If the Unmoved Mover is just a giant univocal engine within an ordered hierarchy of best and worst, then it follows that the Unmoved Mover is involved in a double-grounding and so must be grounded in some further thing from which it derives its power and being. This brings us right back to where we started: divine transcendence of dialectics.<br /><br /><i>First, Aquinas would say that nothing, i.e. neither causes nor effects, can be self-grounded.</i><br /><br />This is only because every cause in the created sense is itself an effect. Admittedly, God is ungrounded rather than self-grounded, but the terms are basically interchangeable when referring to creation. To say that creation is ungrounded just is to say that it's self-grounded.<br /><br /><i>Second, let’s unpack this a little. If the principle of causality states that no effect can be self-grounding, then that implies that all effects must be other-grounded. I presume that if X grounds Y, then X is a cause of Y, and if Y is grounded by X, then Y is an effect of X. And that means that for any effect, there must be a cause of that effect, and the cause is not identical to the effect. And since every effect is a transition from potency to act (or the “transition” from non-being to act), then every cause must be in act to cause the transition. And that would get us to Pure Act and an Unmoved Mover, for example.</i><br /><br />You run off the rails when you start talking about how every effect is a transition from potency to act. This is only the case with change, which is all the Unmoved Mover took care of. Aristotle did not believe in creation: the Unmoved Mover and prime matter were locked in an eternal, unbreakable struggle between pure order and pure chaos, from which only change could result. There was no creation, and the universe had always existed.<br /><br />On the other hand, God for Aquinas (and Christian tradition) grounds both act and potency, being neither. Creation is not a change and it emerges from no dialectical ground (i.e. being combined with non-being), but rather from something that is totally self-sufficient. We call this self-sufficient thing "act" via analogy, since act is better than prime matter or potency or what have you.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-30712725982271408162013-02-01T17:48:14.253-08:002013-02-01T17:48:14.253-08:00I'm going to be away from my computer for seve...I'm going to be away from my computer for several weeks, so don't expect to see me around for awhile. Plus, this debate is starting to wear me down: the combination of comment moderation and arguing in circles for weeks has burned me out. I'm pretty confident in my position at this point, though, even though I doubt you'll be convinced by the case I present below. Anyway, feel free to respond if you'd like, but I'm going to leave future counter-arguments to any interested parties who may be lurking.<br /><br /><i>You have it wrong, and have confused different modi.</i><br /><br />Not at all. Your Rocca quote meshes perfectly with everything I just wrote. The human mind witnesses some mode of being (modus essendi), internalizes it (modus intelligendi) and then signifies it in language (modus significandi). As Aquinas writes, although I can't recall in which work, we gather knowledge (modus intelligendi) of simple modes of being and subsisting modes of being (modus essendi), which we may then abstract from their initial appearance and apply to something else (modus significandi). For example, we might discuss "whiteness", which is a white (res) that subsists (modus significandi). There is no such thing as whiteness in the real world, since every appearance of white is one of accidental being: derivative of substantial being. However, it is still wholly possible to discuss the idea in abstract, since res and modus are not inseparable mentally and linguistically and since we do not have to see something exactly in order to talk about it.<br /><br /><i>So, inferiority only makes sense according to an ordered hierarchy according to some standard, and whether the inferior X is relative to the standard itself (i.e. “the maximum”) or something else being compared to the standard, there must be a hierarchy involved.</i><br /><br />Aquinas uses the term "maximum" here not univocally, which would result in placing God as the "highest being", but rather analogously. He means exactly what I've been saying all along, which I will lay out again.<br /><br />1. Every effect is inferior to that which is prior to it.<br />2. Effects cannot be self-grounding.<br />3. Creation is an effect.<br />4. Therefore, creation is inferior to something prior to itself. <br /><br />1. Anything that is inferior to something else is said to be like that thing, insofar as it is "less than" it.<br />2. Creation is inferior to that which is prior to it.<br />3. Therefore, creation is said to be like that which is prior to it, insofar as it is "less than" it.<br /><br />This is what it means to say that God is the "maximum". Creation is less than God, and so we must, by an analogy of proportion, apportion to God all of the highest names from creation in an attempt to reach him.<br /><br /><i>The epistemological problems do undermine the system. If you are talking about the system, then it must be possible to talk about the system. If it is impossible to talk about the system, then you cannot be talking about the system.</i><br /><br />They make it impossible to talk about God univocally. The metaphysical scheme is wholly divorced from him, and so it stands or falls on its own terms. <br /><br /><i>First, why would ignorance lead to ontological impossibility?</i><br /><br />Ignorance is an epistemological problem. The problem of having no Unmoved Mover is one of logic and ontology, and it leads to a direct contradiction. Act and potency would simply have to be scrapped.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.com