tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post4352512465264336695..comments2024-03-28T21:43:44.433-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Meta-comedyEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger186125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51783591388180795522017-10-09T10:28:57.701-07:002017-10-09T10:28:57.701-07:00“Martin's theory is all wrong. His empirical r...“Martin's theory is all wrong. His empirical results happen for a different reason. Suppressed tension exhausts the nervous system, if it is not released. It increases the level of cortisol in the blood, which can lead to anxiety and depression.”<br /><br />I know practically nothing about this, but is it possible that you are here focusing on the material and efficient causes, while Martin is talking about the formal and final?Matjaž Horvathttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01299644309277886201noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25786246291563775042014-10-16T07:39:58.257-07:002014-10-16T07:39:58.257-07:00@Mr. Green:
"[S]ure, everyone could count, b...@Mr. Green:<br /><br />"[S]ure, everyone <i>could</i> count, but it’s never possible to know whether everyone else is counting with you."<br /><br />Exactly, and therefore no one will ever actually start counting, because the count is logically useless unless everyone is doing it at the same time (and known to be doing so, etc.). But you're right, I think, that there's a fairly clear sense in which it's <i>possible</i> to start the count; it's like a supersaturated solution waiting for a grain of salt to be dropped in so that it can instantly crystallize. The Guru's statement provides it.<br /><br />I like the scenic route, especially for this puzzle. Every time I have a chance to discuss it with someone, I end up understanding at least a little more about it.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29750464370870601822014-10-15T22:17:14.800-07:002014-10-15T22:17:14.800-07:00Scott: Sure they do. Every islander sees at least ...Scott: <i>Sure they do. Every islander sees at least two blue-eyed islanders and knows that they can see each other…</i><br /><br />Sorry, there was supposed to be another “…knows that…” in that claim. Anyway, for 5 and up, it’s possible for everyone to know that everyone knows that everyone sees two (or more) blue eyes, so it’s “possible” for everyone to count in a way that isn’t possible for 4 or under. So what’s wrong with the induction I offered last time? Well, I can argue that now it’s “legitimate” for everyone to start counting (yeah, you know where this is going…), but the problem is that nobody knows whether he’s in the <i>n</i> case or the <i>n</i>+1 case. And obviously, that applies no matter how large an <i>n</i> we want to pick; so sure, everyone <i>could</i> count, but it’s never possible to know whether everyone else is counting with you. Which just is my previous induction — and, really, is more or less equivalent to the recursive argument you gave since the start, just looking through the other end of the telescope. (Hey, at least I got some exercise taking the scenic(?!) route to get here!)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-84636101436902157902014-10-14T11:43:18.924-07:002014-10-14T11:43:18.924-07:00@Daniel:
No worries. Your posting it here is meta...@Daniel:<br /><br />No worries. Your posting it here is meta-funny.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77526307516593365522014-10-14T11:25:52.454-07:002014-10-14T11:25:52.454-07:00Oh dear, wrong blog entry. My apologies.Oh dear, wrong blog entry. My apologies.Danielnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-76679367897235756852014-10-14T11:18:20.114-07:002014-10-14T11:18:20.114-07:00Hmm this touches on something which came to mind w...Hmm this touches on something which came to mind when I first discovered the Argument from Queerness. Is the Principle of Economy normative? If so it's hard to see how Mackie's argument can fail to undercut itself (likewise it would seem impossible to state the principle without reference to mathematical objects).<br /><br />All this talk of Wittgenstein is amusing since it neglects to mention his later views towards the inadequacy of scientific as opposed to Ordinary Language. Not that even that matters particularly since Plain Language Philosophy is about as dead as Logical Positivism. If anything Analytical Thomists are <i>too</i> keen on Wittgenstein.Danielnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53595721707364085082014-10-14T09:45:20.707-07:002014-10-14T09:45:20.707-07:00@Tony:
I'll try to be brief here so as not to...@Tony:<br /><br />I'll try to be brief here so as not to repeat myself, but I'm afraid a little repetition is inevitable.<br /><br />"The Guru doesn't tell A or F anything they didn't know.…When N>2, the GS doesn't provide new information and does nothing for any timing."<br /><br />You're right that GS in and of itself doesn't tell anyone anything he doesn't already know. If the Guru had made GS to any of the BEPs (or for that matter any islander) privately, he would have thought, "Yeah, I already know that. So what?"<br /><br />But the Guru's making the statement <i>publicly</i> does give them new information about the state of everyone else's knowledge (namely that everyone on the island has sufficient information to start the countdown, because <i>Everybody heard GS</i> is recursively common knowledge), and I've been at some pains to explain why (including why the islanders <i>didn't</i> have that information before the Guru spoke).<br /><br />For example, for <i>n</i>=6, with the BEPs arbitrarily designated as A, B, C, D, E, and F, I've shown that A <i>does</i> know the proposition <i>C knows D knows E knows F sees a blue-eyed islander</i>, but <i>doesn't</i> know that B knows it too. I take it it's obvious that A does know this after hearing GS publicly. Is it your claim that this isn't new information? Or are you acknowledging that it's new but saying it isn't relevant to the start of the countdown?<br /><br />"Any passage of N days must definitively establish that there are more than N-1 BEPs."<br /><br />In other words, the countdown should have started to run on the day the conditions of the puzzle began to obtain. I know you and Mr. Green think this, but I still haven't seen a successful argument for it.<br /><br />"For N=3, every BEP already knew that every other BEP knew there was at least 1 BEP."<br /><br />Of course. But I've already shown in detail why this knowledge isn't sufficient to start a countdown.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80046930598174917522014-10-13T20:33:10.963-07:002014-10-13T20:33:10.963-07:00In any situation where N > 2, GS is not about N...In any situation where N > 2, GS is not about N or N-1 blue-eyed persons. And so for these cases, GS DOES NOT increase anyone's information about anything: even before he says anything, everyone knows THAT everyone can see a blue-eyed person. The reason the induction result cannot be achieved for the 100th night without the guru is that the induction process REGARDS two cases where the guru's statement is needed to provide information that cannot be achieved without it, N=1 and N=2, not because the guru's statement provides new information to anyone when N=100, for it doesn't. <br /><br />When N>2, the logicians choosing to "start" when the guru makes his statement is completely arbitrary, they could just as well have said "this tells me (and everyone else) nothing new so I cannot not act on it." For N=3, every BEP already knew that every other BEP knew there was at least 1 BEP. Any passage of 3 days would tell all 3 BEPs that N=3 (since they each can see 2 BEPs and they all know that possible -for anyone to believe the minimum for N - is 1), they each know that the MAXIMUM number anyone can think N is, is 3: for A regarding C's knowledge, he can be unsure of C's knowledge of A and of C, so the largest gap between "least possible" and "greatest possible" is always 2 - and everyone knows that. So when N>2 the GS is insignificant for their knowledge. Any passage of N-1 days tells them what N is. The GS is only needed for N=1 and 2, but it is needed for them, and the induction proof needs N=1 and N=2.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39343288055261604272014-10-13T20:32:49.029-07:002014-10-13T20:32:49.029-07:00Note well that A is not entertaining the propositi...<i>Note well that A is not entertaining the proposition F doesn't see any blue-eyed islanders; he knows better than that. </i> <br /><br />The Guru doesn't tell A or F anything they didn't know. <br /><br />In the case of N=1, the guru's statement (can we shorten this to GS?) tells A the blue-eyed person (shorten this to BEP?) something he didn't know. Thus the first step of the inductive proof <i>relies on</i> the fact that GS (right on the surface) provides something that A the BEP didn't know, neither by direct observation nor by deduction from observable facts. <br /><br />In the case of N=2, A and B, A saw a BEP and B saw one, but A did not know if B saw one or not. Because A did not know if B saw a BEP, A didn't know if B knew that N>0. GS added to A's knowledge of B's knowledge: PRECISELY BECAUSE the highest possible number of BEPs was (so far as A or B could tell directly) 2 but the lowest number possible was 1, <b>it was possible for each to think that the other might not see a BEP (or otherwise know there was one)</b>, i.e. each could see a possibility of the other unable to be sure there is at least one BEP. In that way GS added to both A and B's knowledge of each other's information: each now knew that the other knew there was a BEP. Or, to put it another way, through GS, each BEP knew that everyone knew there was a BEP. <br /><br />However, in these 2 cases GS was about N or N-1 blue-eyed persons. And, so for case N=1 and for N=2, GS supplies for information regarding either N or N-1 that CANNOT be achieved by direct observation or simple (single-step) deduction, with a statement REFERRING TO either N or N-1. It is <i>precisely this</i> facet that makes GS new information. <br /><br />In both cases a BEP sees N-1 BEPs. As a result he knows that the number of BEPs is at most N, one more than he sees. When he can establish by logic that the minimum has changed to N, he knows he is a BEP and that gets him off the island. For N=1, the GS itself changes his knowledge that the number of BEPs is one (up from a possible 0). For N=2, it changes every BEPs knowledge from <i>the 1 BEP I see might not know there is a BEP (might think N=0</i>, to a new datum: <i>nobody else can still think that N=0</i>. <br /><br />Knowledge of _when_ to get off the island relates to knowing beforehand that there is at a minimum N-1 BEPs (which he can see) and using logic and passage of time to establish a new datum, that there are N, which N must include you because you were the one you didn't know about when you knew that there were at least N-1 but you were unsure if there were N. <br /><br />Any passage of N days must definitively establish that there are more than N-1 BEPs. But any BEP can see N-1 of them. Therefore any passage of N days tells them there are exactly N BEPs and that he is a BEP. <br /><br />The guru always speaks of 1 BEP but it is knowledge that there is at least N-1 that is critical. So the cases of N=1 and N=2 are special cases where GS provides new information, the number he speaks of falls in N or N-1. And the newness of the information creates a timing point but the timing point is not critical, the knowledge is. <br /><br />When N>2, the GS doesn't provide new information and does nothing for any timing.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-32549390567133745692014-10-13T12:42:47.124-07:002014-10-13T12:42:47.124-07:00(Oops, I wrote "For n=5" and then consid...(Oops, I wrote "For <i>n</i>=5" and then considered the case of six blue-eyed islanders! Ah, well; hindsight is always better than threesight.)Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-21865592366436562632014-10-13T12:18:58.028-07:002014-10-13T12:18:58.028-07:00And just to recap and tie a couple of things toget...And just to recap and tie a couple of things together for the sake of clarity:<br /><br />For <i>n</i>=3, everybody knows everybody sees at least one blue-eyed islander. In particular, if A, B, and C are the blue-eyed islanders (in arbitrary order), then A knows B sees at least one blue-eyed islander (C). What A <i>doesn't</i> know is whether B has enough information to start the countdown, because A doesn't know whether B knows that <i>C</i> sees a blue-eyed islander. (A doesn't know his own eye color, so he has to assume it's possible that B and C are the only two blue-eyed islanders.) So A doesn't start the countdown because he can't be sure B will do so: from A's point of view, B may not have enough information to be sure C will start it.<br /><br />This argument can be extended to any positive integer <i>n</i> (and in particular nothing significant changes for <i>n</i>=5); we just have to keep adding <i>knows</i>-es. For <i>n</i>=5, for example, A can't be sure B will start the countdown because he can't tell whether B knows C knows D knows E knows F will start it.<br /><br />Note well that A is <i>not</i> entertaining the proposition <i>F doesn't see any blue-eyed islanders</i>; he knows better than that. Nor is he entertaining the proposition <i>E doesn't know F sees any blue-eyed islanders</i>; he knows better than that too. For that matter—and this is the really important bit, so pay close attention—he knows that C knows D knows E knows F sees a blue-eyed islander. <i>But he doesn't know whether B has that same knowledge</i>, because for all A knows, B may see one fewer blue-eyed islander than A does. And that's why A can't be sure B will start the countdown: because A can't be sure that B knows <i>F</i> will start it.<br /><br />There's no short-circuiting this part. It's perfectly obvious (I hope) that no one will start counting down without knowing that everyone else is doing so at the same time, without knowing everyone else <i>knows</i> everyone else is doing so, and so forth. If so, it should also be obvious that no one will start counting down unless the same thing is true of <i>There's at least one blue-eyed islander</i>, because that proposition's being recursively common knowledge (RCK) is logically equivalent to its being RCK that <i>Some islander is (equivalently, all islanders are) starting the countdown</i>.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71428241657142762422014-10-13T10:28:49.583-07:002014-10-13T10:28:49.583-07:00@Mr. Green:
"[O]nce we know nobody can be fo...@Mr. Green:<br /><br />"[O]nce we know nobody can be fooled into not counting by not seeing anyone else who is blue, then it’s possible for everyone to start counting, with the inevitable result.…Though [the Guru's statement] is clearly necessary [for small <i>n</i>], and clearly sufficient to kick off the countdown in all other cases, that does not show it’s necessary in all cases. That requires its own argument[.]"<br /><br />As far as I can see, your inductive argument is valid, and <i>n</i>=1 obviously works as a base case. What do you think is wrong with it?*<br /><br />I've given a different argument: A necessary and sufficient condition for the starting of the countdown (for any eye color and any corresponding value of <i>n</i>) is that it be recursively common knowledge (henceforth RCK) that some islander is starting it—again, because islander A won't start without knowing that B will start, and knows B won't start unless B knows C will start, and knows B knows C won't start unless C knows D will start, etc., and it's completely arbitrary which islanders we call A, B, C, and so forth. (That's easily shown to be equivalent to its being recursively common knowledge that <i>all</i> the islanders are starting. If it's RCK that all of them are starting, then of course it's RCK that at least one is doing so; and of course if it's RCK that any one islander is starting, it's RCK that he believes all the others are doing so and that, being a perfect logician, he's correct in this belief.) This is why the very heart of the puzzle is figuring out what everybody thinks everybody else thinks everybody else thinks everybody else thinks…<br /><br />It should be pretty clear that for any value of <i>n</i>, some other condition must be met in order to generate this RCK; in order for these perfect logicians to start popping out of the recursion stack, they need a limit on the depth of the recursion. It should also be pretty clear (though I haven't actually given an argument for this lemma) that this condition must involve new information, and that this information must <i>itself</i> be RCK. And I've given a very detailed argument showing that <i>Everyone knows everyone knows there's at least one blue-eyed islander</i> doesn't qualify.<br /><br />----<br /><br />* Or do you think it's correct but still consistent with your claim that the countdown <i>can</i> get started for sufficiently large <i>n</i>?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77139958435638620082014-10-13T08:57:20.767-07:002014-10-13T08:57:20.767-07:00@Mr. Green:
"For example, the guru might say...@Mr. Green:<br /><br />"For example, the guru might say, 'Free paper hats for everyone who figures out his eye-colour', and that would be enough."<br /><br />But it's already recursively common knowledge among the islanders that <i>Everyone who figures out his eye color leaves the island</i>. If that's not sufficient to start a countdown, why is <i>Everyone who figures out his eye color leaves the island and gets a free paper hat</i>?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52061143814790935982014-10-13T08:50:34.338-07:002014-10-13T08:50:34.338-07:00@Mr. Green:
"At n=3, everyone can see someon...@Mr. Green:<br /><br />"At <i>n</i>=3, everyone can see someone with blue eyes, but doesn’t know that everyone can see blue."<br /><br />Sure they do. Every islander sees at least two blue-eyed islanders and knows that they can see each other…<br /><br />"At <i>n</i>=5+, everyone knows that everyone can see at least 2, so that’s a difference."<br /><br />…and for <i>n</i>≥5, everyone knows that everyone can see at least three (in general, at least <i>n</i>-2). So I still don't see what's supposed to happen for <i>n</i>=5 that doesn't happen for <i>n</i>=3.<br /><br />(Your earlier remarks seemed to imply that two additional blue-eyed islanders are needed so that they can be the two islanders that everybody knows will start the countdown. But I don't see (a) why these two alleged countdown-starters can't be two of the three blue-eyed islanders, nor (b) why they have to be blue-eyed at all.)<br /><br />"So how can we square that with my (and Tony’s) claim…that for large enough <i>n</i>, it is possible to count down?"<br /><br />I don't think we can.<br /><br />"[Y]ou <i>can</i> figure it out for 5 and up, but that assumes that the islanders have some motivation to start counting whenever it becomes possible."<br /><br />But it doesn't. They're perfect logicians; whenever the countdown becomes possible, they'll all know it (and grasp all of the logical implications) no matter what their motivations are.<br /><br />For that matter, the puzzle doesn't even assume anyone <i>wants</i> to leave the island; maybe they'd all rather stay. In that case why would they <i>ever</i> have "motivation" to start counting?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40428710175987453492014-10-13T07:26:41.961-07:002014-10-13T07:26:41.961-07:00Dear Step2,
You wrote:
"I must thank you fo...Dear Step2,<br /><br />You wrote:<br /><br />"I must thank you for your reply that finally solves the ancient mystery, why did the chicken cross the road? To find a statistical corridor that will take a century to map out. I had always imagined it was because the road egged him on but realize now how scrambled up that was, possibly even cheesy."<br /><br />Thank, you, thank, you. One has to look far and wide for such carefully prepared sarcasm.<br /><br />"I don't understand what its meta-character is supposed to subtract from its violation status. It seems to me like your process (joke diagrams, lattice models, Bayesian functions) is preventing you from treating humor holistically as a dynamic and integrated behavior. This type of analysis incurs the cost of ignoring invention and learning which can quickly change the distribution function, even within the joke itself as part of the setup."<br /><br />I don't think you understand. The Bayesian approach allows, specifically, for the real-time modification of the a priori distribution as the joke progresses. Also, the neural linkages I mentioned, above, is the integrated behavior.<br /><br />"I wonder why people feel angry when they were involuntarily experimented on. After the initial shock and relief wears off it probably would make for an amusing story in retrospect."<br /><br />Maybe, maybe not. The anger comes from a defensive position about the original spider.<br /><br />As for benign violation, compare that to Kant's classic definition of humor and laughter, from the Critique of Judgment (if memory serves), to see the parallel:<br /><br />"Laughter is an action arising from a strained expectation (violation) suddenly being reduced to a nothing (benign)."<br /><br />As I have said, nothing new.<br /><br />The ChickenThe Masked Chickennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-60517159705817755592014-10-12T23:57:41.653-07:002014-10-12T23:57:41.653-07:00Scott,
Q: When is it time to go to the dentist?
...Scott,<br /><br /><i>Q: When is it time to go to the dentist?<br /><br />A: When it's </i>n<i>th-hurty for </i>n<i>=2.</i><br /><br />Histories of appointments past<br />Removal that wasn't fast<br />Rummaging in a canal<br />Eruption of a howl<br /><br />Son ov a n! That hurty-gurty, man!<br /><br /><br />Mr. Green,<br /><br /><i>Glenn: 33th?…<br /><br />Hey! What’th wrong with thaying “33th”?!?</i><br /><br />Now that you mention it, nording. Nording at all.<br /><br /><br />Yours truly (not to mention inaccurately),<br /><br /><i>I had thought of that parable when The Masked Chicken wrote,...</i><br /><br />As much as it pains me to do so, I must acknowledge that I am not psychic. 'twas when I read what The Masked Chicken wrote that the thought had occurred to me.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-78073895952657862662014-10-12T22:12:59.791-07:002014-10-12T22:12:59.791-07:00Maolsheachlann: The problem with all meta-humour a...Maolsheachlann: <i>The problem with all meta-humour and anti-humour is that it's ONE joke, repeated ad nauseum, whereas supposedly more formulaic and traditional humour is infinitely varied.</i><br /><br />I suppose it depends upon the details. A twist on a joke is <i>per se</i> no worse than twist on anything else, as far as whether it is humorous (or not). The sort of absurdist or non-sequitur “joke” where the audience is set up to get something (funny) and gets nothing instead cannot really be repeated much and still work, though. I do think that humour requires some substance — well, at least a form — the more cleverness or wit it involves, the better it will be (again suggesting the connection between comedy and puzzles). Even things like “nonsense verse” are not (when done well) truly nonsensical. <br /><br />Anonymist: <i>There's probably an analogy with how "difficult" or avant-garde music has been a popular hit when presented to audiences as soundtrack</i><br /><br />And I think this is a related point: a piece of music may be good as a soundtrack, but bad as a stand-alone composition because it does not have enough substance to stand on its own. As one part of a film, it needs only to support, and be supported by, all the other components; like any disembodied part, it just won’t work in isolation.<br /><br /><br />Glenn: <i>33th?…</i><br /><br />Hey! What’th wrong with thaying “33th”?!?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-30473371458723174412014-10-12T22:07:39.693-07:002014-10-12T22:07:39.693-07:00Tony: You either have to intentionally structure t...Tony: <i>You either have to intentionally structure the scenario to have always existed in the past (with all the problems that has, re St. Thomas' First Way)</i><br /><br />Since Thomas thought it impossible to prove the world had a beginning, I’m not sure why that’s necessarily a problem. Humans “instantly” seeing all logical conclusions is surely more problematic; except of course the idea is to describe an abstract mathematical structure, so it doesn’t matter so much whether the additional details make sense, as they’re there only to aid our imaginations (or perhaps to confuse them by tempting us to apply common sense to a logical abstraction that could never be instantiated that way…).<br /><br /><br />Glenn: <i>But why would it be illogical to count as the first day the day on which they had all arrived?</i><br /><br />I concur with Scott; all that matters is that we have discrete periods so that it’s possible to identify unambiguously whether someone has left or not. And speaking of misdirections, the puzzle is slightly misleading when it says there is no communication between the islanders: leaving — or in this case, the curious incident of the logician in the nighttime — is a form of communication. Connoting that it isn’t perhaps is a way to draw people’s attention away from considering its possible role in the solution. It would work just as well, if more obviously, to have anyone who figures out his eye-colour smack his forehead and exclaim, "Of course, my eyes are blue!"<br /><br /><br />Scott: <i>What I should have said is that it doesn't differ in principle from the case n=3, the first case in which every islander does know that.</i><br /><br />At <i>n</i>=3, everyone can see someone with blue eyes, but doesn’t know that everyone can see blue. At <i>n</i>=5+, everyone knows that everyone can see at least 2, so that’s a difference. The question is whether this difference is relevant. It certainly seems to be, because once we know nobody can be fooled into not counting by not seeing anyone else who is blue, then it’s possible for everyone to start counting, with the inevitable result. For small <i>n</i>, we know that to rule out someone’s being fooled in this way, we need the guru’s statement. Though it is clearly necessary in these cases, and clearly sufficient to kick off the countdown in all other cases, that does not show it’s necessary in all cases. That requires its own argument, such as another induction: if <i>n</i> people <i>can’t</i> start the countdown, then <i>n</i>+1 cannot; because person <i>n</i>+1 sees only <i>n</i> other blues, and thus has to consider that we have the <i>n</i> situation, which by assumption does not work. Ergo, etc. <br /><br />So how can we square that with my (and Tony’s) claim I just finished making, that for large enough <i>n</i>, it is possible to count down? I think what it comes down to is that actually the scenario is subtly different: you <i>can</i> figure it out for 5 and up, but that assumes that the islanders have some motivation to start counting whenever it becomes possible. And the original puzzle is supposed to follow from immediate logical possibilities, not from anyone’s <i>trying</i> to figure it out. That is, it is not that the islanders were all trying to figure out their eye colours in any way possible, but simply couldn’t until the guru came along; rather, with that information, the logical state of affairs changes to a different one (because of the recursively common knowledge), such that it is impossible to consistently refrain from counting down. Simply having five our more people does nothing to change the logical configuration, so something else has to happen that is sufficient to motivate the islanders to actually begin figuring it out. For example, the guru might say, “Free paper hats for everyone who figures out his eye-colour”, and that would be enough. At least, I think that is the correct distinction… emphasising again that we are talking not about real people but about an abstract pattern.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35228217449559567002014-10-12T21:30:11.893-07:002014-10-12T21:30:11.893-07:00Jeremy Taylor: Christianity seems to completely sk...Jeremy Taylor: <i>Christianity seems to completely skirt over humour and laughter</i><br /><br />It’s “over”, but not so much skirting as transcending: there is humour in the Bible and lives of the saints, but of course the focus is on joy. “Humour” is only joy writ small, so I would not especially expect it to figure prominently in dogmatic pronouncements. Since Christianity lets the world be what it is — good (though with evil in it) — vinegar to be sour, wine to be sweet — humour occupies its natural place, and is appropriately studied on a natural level.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28982868232651591422014-10-12T10:33:54.286-07:002014-10-12T10:33:54.286-07:00Q: When is it time to go to the dentist?
A: When ...Q: When is it time to go to the dentist?<br /><br />A: When it's <i>n</i>th-hurty for <i>n</i>=2.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-87506136482570499062014-10-12T10:07:54.601-07:002014-10-12T10:07:54.601-07:00Step2,
My earlier comment wasn't to say that ...Step2,<br /><br />My earlier comment wasn't to say that there isn't a sense in which your point is valid.<br /><br />However, <a href="http://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/216477/jewish/The-Murky-Truth-About-Truth.htm" rel="nofollow">Tzvi Freeman</a> asks a good question, and, in responding to the question, asks another good question--to which he adds the following parenthetical comment: "I'm thinking of the parable of the blind men and the elephant, all with a complete and true understanding of their part of the elephant".<br /><br />I had thought of that parable when The Masked Chicken wrote, "My idea is that it is one single thing that triggers all of these responses[.]"<br /><br />As there are several theories of "elephant" (Pillar Theory, Rope Theory, Thick Branch Theory, Hand Fan Theory, etc.), so there are several theories of "humor" (Superiority Theory, Incongruity Theory, Arousal Theory, Discharge Theory, Pleasure Theory, etc.)<br /><br />After seeing where the 'jesters' link led to, I thought, "Hmm, I wonder if there's any mention of the blind men and the elephant..." A brief search on the site returned favorable results.<br /><br />Although it isn't required that anyone be interested in what the "elephant" might be <i>really</i> like, some people are. I myself am, and applaud the work of similarly interested others who, unlike me, have what it takes to make strides in finding out.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18384016021798698342014-10-12T09:40:46.134-07:002014-10-12T09:40:46.134-07:00You're a face-saver; thank you.
(I was going ...You're a face-saver; thank you.<br /><br />(I <i>was</i> going to use <i>n</i>, but <i>n</i>rd didn't look right.)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72072253255201087872014-10-12T09:22:13.862-07:002014-10-12T09:22:13.862-07:00Well, it's nth for n=33…Well, it's <i>n</i>th for <i>n</i>=33…Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15787220853087246472014-10-12T09:15:17.667-07:002014-10-12T09:15:17.667-07:0033th?...33th?...Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33371878912378976742014-10-12T09:11:59.136-07:002014-10-12T09:11:59.136-07:00Step2,
It seems to me like your process (joke dia...Step2,<br /><br /><i>It seems to me like your process (joke diagrams, lattice models, Bayesian functions) is preventing you from treating humor holistically as a dynamic and integrated behavior.</i><br /><br /><b>a)</b> WIP.<br /><br />Work-in-progress.<br /><br /><b>b)</b> "Before there's an integrated whole, individual things need to isolated and worked on (mapped out, developed, shaped up, refined, etc.). Then they all get bundled into a neat package.<br /><br />"I want the bigger picture. I have been trying to tie everything together - the neural processing, the logic, the physiological responses. Due to recent work in a number of fields it is now possible, more or less to develop a truly comprehensive theory of humor, at least insofar as the material aspects are concerned, so the ten or so papers on the different topics that I have been working on and presenting, hopefully, will get published, soon...<br /><br />"It's not like one can just make up a theory and call it science. The science is incredibly complex and I have had to solve a lot of technical problems along the way...<br /><br />"Beyond the nuts-and-bolts, there is also the metaphysics and even moral implications of humor to be done..."<br /><br /><b>c)</b> WIP.<br /><br />Work-in-progress.<br /><br />- - - - -<br /><br />Or would you propose that a mandatory 7-year prison term be imposed on any adult not yet 40 by the time he reaches his 33th birthday? <br /><br />I hope not.<br /><br />;)Glennnoreply@blogger.com