tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post4347265706639413850..comments2024-03-29T02:29:03.388-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Scruton on “neuroenvy”Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger33125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-581846399691140332012-03-30T11:31:51.302-07:002012-03-30T11:31:51.302-07:00Zach seems to be one of those desperate defenders ...Zach seems to be one of those desperate defenders of neurononsense, who doesn't even understand the essence of the post and thus resorts to knee-jerk reactions, which is in fact ironic. Someone needs to explain it to him, if he is to contribute anything at all other than the usual tiresome and pedantic neurorhetoric.<br /><br />Regardless, neuroscience (when done correctly) is helpful but very limited. We should presue investigations in the field but always be extremely careful of how we interpret the findings along with how we construct the theories/paradigms. The notion that neuroscience will illuminate our understanding of Mankind in some radical way is a mere illusion that has no place either in science or philosophy. <br /><br />What is dying here, is the public's blind faith in neurogarbage and that is a step in the right direction.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54819485470084520282012-03-29T23:42:10.308-07:002012-03-29T23:42:10.308-07:00"neuroscience will be irrelevant"
Who s...<i>"neuroscience will be irrelevant"</i><br /><br />Who said that? Are you talking about Scruton, Ed, or some group of people?machinephilosophyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07715878687266064548noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69410173078571346122012-03-29T20:15:38.105-07:002012-03-29T20:15:38.105-07:00What strikes me as much more alarming is neurophob...What strikes me as much more alarming is neurophobia, the knee-jerk reaction that neuroscience will be irrelevant because some armchair hack insists on it. The new fad of inventing derisive terms like 'neurobabble' or whatever. Neuroluddites are dying, their paroxisms simply transparent attempts to save the Titanic. Good riddance.<br /><br /><i>This is pseudoscience of the first order, and owes what scant plausibility it possesses to the fact that it simply repeats the matter that it fails to explain. </i><br /><br />It isn't science at all that he cites, but a philosopher Patricia Churchland. As a summary of the research on the neuronal processes that have some explanatory bearing on social relations in mammals, I'm not sure why he is getting so up in arms. What she said, which is a quick summary of more details she gives about the actual research, is fine when considered in context.<br /><br />She would never say she is offering a full or final explanation, but following the evidence where it leads, and it suggests that there are certain chemicals that are very important in certain social interactions in mammals. <br /><br />It is noncontroversial, and she would admit, early in the research. <br /><br />That book 'Conceptual Foundations of Neuroscience' has had zero effect in neuroscience, because it is horrible. For reasons adumbrated various places. <br /><br />The authors are analytical behaviorists. How someone who acts like an authority on these matters could recommend such a piece of trash that is obviously inconsistent with his actual position is something I leave as an exercise for the readers to explain.<br /><br />Stick to metaphysics.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77678593654497828932012-03-29T09:27:36.832-07:002012-03-29T09:27:36.832-07:00Ed,
A great list of books. I've never even he...Ed,<br /><br />A great list of books. I've never even heard of the authors, much less the tomes themselves, although I've seen P.M.S. Hacker's name before, who is the co-author of Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience as well as the Human Nature book. I'm already previewing that one. Heavy metal.<br /><br />Perhaps you could at some point compose a bibliography of books relating to all the issues you deal with.machinephilosophyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07715878687266064548noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-50202057221279614532012-03-29T08:55:32.179-07:002012-03-29T08:55:32.179-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.machinephilosophyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07715878687266064548noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71961993692445056832012-03-28T21:02:59.795-07:002012-03-28T21:02:59.795-07:00jhall,
Thanks for the book recommendation. The Ta...jhall,<br /><br />Thanks for the book recommendation. The Table of Contents itself is amazing. I'm also interested in checking out his Starting Science From God: Rational Scientific Theories from Theism, which came out a year later (2011).machinephilosophyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07715878687266064548noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-56787875618804420872012-03-27T22:29:18.382-07:002012-03-27T22:29:18.382-07:00@Jhall
I looked up the book you recommended about...@Jhall<br /><br />I looked up the book you recommended about essentialism and quantum physics. I found a free . PDF of the book on the web so I skimmed through it. The topic that grabbed my attention was the candidates for pure actuality. I read it more thoroughly but I'm not sure if I necessarily agree. He seems to claim that pure actuality is finite although his argument does not seem convincing. It seemed to me that his pure actuality is a finite event. What is your understanding of that and how do you reconcile that with Thomism and Classicsl Theism? Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29952787940494259312012-03-27T02:53:49.308-07:002012-03-27T02:53:49.308-07:00Aquinas3000 --
Yes, that's why I said that &...Aquinas3000 --<br /><br />Yes, that's why I said that "accident" is the generic term.<br /><br />As to the meaning of "property", it seems to me that in the sciences it has retained the Aristotelian meaning of an accident which flows from a substantial essence and is necessarily found in all things of that substance. It is because properties are necessarily found in all of a kind that they can be used in constructing a "definition" of that kind of thing, e.g., water freezes at 32 degrees Farenheit. (Strictly speaking a combination of properties is not a definition, but serves just as well to identify a substance.)Ann O.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86160074474586027442012-03-27T02:21:46.763-07:002012-03-27T02:21:46.763-07:00Ann O, the trouble with that is that what most peo...Ann O, the trouble with that is that what most people mean by a "property" is what a Thomist would call a "proper accident" that is to say, an accident which flows out of the nature or sort of thing that it is (for example that man is risible which flows out of having an intellectual nature capable of seeing the absurd). But that a man be black or white or 180cm tall is not a property of man but perhaps of this man. So accident is a broader term.Aquinas3000https://www.blogger.com/profile/10548841985385293614noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39389651170962393022012-03-26T21:55:26.963-07:002012-03-26T21:55:26.963-07:00I think the article I cite below would provide som...I think the article I cite below would provide some concrete grist for the theoretical mill of this thread. The researchers pull no punches on the metaphysical import of their research, so I think an equally self-aware metaphysical parsing would be fruitful. <br />http://www.laboratoryequipment.com/news-Memories-are-Held-in-Specific-Brain-Cells-032612.aspx?xmlmenuid=51Codgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54516091742858246682012-03-26T13:06:58.192-07:002012-03-26T13:06:58.192-07:00Presumably you would not hold a student responsibl...<i>Presumably you would not hold a student responsible for falling asleep in your class if he had been given a large enough dose of sedative, but why not?</i><br /><br />Not sure how this causes any particular problem in terms of free will. Either the sedative, with full knowledge of its sedative effects, was taken freely with predictable consequences, or it was administered surreptitiously by another, again, with predictable consequences.<br /><br />In the first instance if the student was stupid enough to take a sedative before a lecture, the he would be culpable for falling asleep. The clue was in the word 'sedative'. If he was administered the drug by another, then he would hardly be culpable (unless he were so imprudent that he allowed another to administer GHB or ativan or whatever without asking what he was being given)<br /><br />Likewise if he was narcoleptic and he fell asleep - he's not culpable for that. <br /><br />This was a spectacularly bad example of neuroscience somehow mitigating falling asleep or explaining away any other behaviour in the face of the idea of free will.<br /><br />Do you want to try again?Paulinushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07764882488839589040noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55640233587644207822012-03-25T22:51:37.034-07:002012-03-25T22:51:37.034-07:00Syphax --
Abouut a new set of words for Aristotle...Syphax --<br /><br />Abouut a new set of words for Aristotle's technical terms. "Efficient causality" is a most misleading expression. I suggest that you use the term that has become common in virtue ethics, "agency". It would serve nicely in the physical sciences and psych as well.<br /><br />The other extremely misleading term in the current Aristotelian lexicon is the generic term "accident". The everyday meaning of the term has nothing whatsoever to do with the philosophical meaning. "Property" in the physical sciences stil retains the Aristotelian meaning, but the generic term "accident" really has got to go.<br /><br />Good luck.Ann O.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-84966090233704299812012-03-25T19:05:27.998-07:002012-03-25T19:05:27.998-07:00"reductionist materialist"
just to butt..."reductionist materialist"<br /><br />just to butt in here, Conrad did say he believes in God and the irreducibility of the mind to matter, so this charge is untrue.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61698157997278461232012-03-25T18:59:19.538-07:002012-03-25T18:59:19.538-07:00Conrad,
n this way, if our immaterial minds do no...Conrad,<br /><br /><i>n this way, if our immaterial minds do not in any way affect changes in the body, it appears impossible to deny that our lives are akin to a certain subsection of falling dominoes, a subsection which is situated within a much larger array of falling dominoes.</i><br /><br />This seems flatly untrue, and again, it seems to rely on assuming the truth of a reductionist materialist account of the world. At least this is the way it's coming across to me.<br /><br />Put the issue of determinism aside for a moment (and let's skip over the potential quantum physics talk too). When you give the sort of account you are, it really seems like you're suggesting - maybe without realizing it - that describing how macromolecules will function in hypothetical situations is to give a complete description of what's going on. But that's, again, what the aristotilean/thomist is going to be denying - they'll say that the description is woefully incomplete, and that the teleological description is complete. And the teleological description is going to speak in terms of intentionality, etc, in addition to everything else (rock-bottom intentionality, no less). You may object that even the teleological description still is going to be fixed in a way - "Could I have done otherwise?" - but that's actually a secondary concern. The teleological description gives an account of the mind that is at odds with the mechanistic one.<br /><br />I suppose another way to say it is that the mind and the dominoes differ, because under the A-T understanding the mind really is thinking, really has intentionality, really is... real. Dominoes lack minds, this kind of intentionality, etc. All that's arguably similar is their determination, which is an important subject (and thats where we get into determinism, quantum physics, etc), but not the only relevant one.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46417602788587236182012-03-25T18:17:04.049-07:002012-03-25T18:17:04.049-07:00Here's my problem: Regardless of whether we...<em>Here's my problem: Regardless of whether we're working within a "mechanistic" framework or a "teleological" one, putting Na+ and Cl- together will necessitate the production of NaCl, glutamate binding to a synaptic cleft will necessitate certain neurological signals, and so on.</em><br /><br />This is true, but it is also an observable fact that this necessity can be used instrumentally by an intention, nature, luck or chance. I can mix the chemicals myself, and then we'd observe them being made intentionally; the chemicals could be mixed in the body of some organism, and then we'd observe them being made naturally or by nature; they could collide randomly in space and then we'd observe them being made by chance, etc. In other words, the necessity you speak about is used by intention and nature all the time. To observe necessity as a fact does not answer the question whether it is fundamental or instrumental. Plato gives an interesting argument in Book X of the Laws that the necessity you speak of is essentially the instrument of soul (as it is when I make my own salt), and this is concomitant with all of St. Thomas's five ways. Nature, both in its necessity and contingency, is still a moved mover, and so is an instrument of another.James Chastekhttp://thomism.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-1372748474923084042012-03-25T16:41:17.781-07:002012-03-25T16:41:17.781-07:00Anon,
I understand that Aristotelians believe tha...Anon,<br /><br />I understand that Aristotelians believe that matter and nature more generally are imbued with teleology. And like I said, I am certainly some variety of Aristotelian/Thomist, because I do think that A-T thought successfully shows that God - conceived as Pure Actuality - exists. What I don't see at all, however, is how this teleology - this "final causality" - does <i>any</i> conceptual work of ridding us of the issue of physical necessitation and hence of the issue of the apparent lack of responsibility. <br /><br />Here's my problem: <i>Regardless</i> of whether we're working within a "mechanistic" framework or a "teleological" one, putting Na+ and Cl- together will <i>necessitate</i> the production of NaCl, glutamate binding to a synaptic cleft will <i>necessitate</i> certain neurological signals, and so on. These are just observable truths. And now I see a bundle of macromolecules called a "sperm cell" fuse with a similar macromolecular system known as an "egg cell," and I think to myself, "The macromolecules of this unconscious bundle interacting internally with each other and externally with the environment in strict adherence to physical law are going to keep on interacting with each other and the environment in strict adherence to physical law, and eventually a particular sort of molecular bundle - a self-aware human adult - will emerge, and unless the immaterial mind that will then come into existence exerts some sort of influence over the physical laws that govern the macromolecules, or over the macromolecules themselves, the system will continue to unfold according to the laws of physics. And if the immaterial mind doesn't directly affect the physical world, I will be forced to conclude that the state of affairs A1, the macrophysical state of the self-aware person at any point during its life, was necessitated by A0, the macrophysical state of affairs before the sperm and egg fused.<br /><br />In this way, if our immaterial minds do not in any way affect changes in the body, it appears impossible to deny that our lives are akin to a certain subsection of falling dominoes, a subsection which is situated within a much larger array of falling dominoes.<br /><br />And whatever "I" am, I am not responsible for things that precede my existence, nor for anything they necessitate.Conradnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72146521716419917882012-03-25T16:16:09.497-07:002012-03-25T16:16:09.497-07:00Hi Ed,
I wrote a piece a while ago on the interac...Hi Ed,<br /><br />I wrote a piece a while ago on the interaction problem, which I think is a real one for Thomists too:<br />http://www.uncommondescent.com/<br />intelligent-design/<br />why-i-think-the-interaction-problem-is-real/<br /><br />See also:<br />http://www.uncommondescent.com/<br />intelligent-design/<br />how-is-libertarian-free-will-possible/<br /><br />Of possible interest:<br />http://www.uncommondescent.com/<br />philosophy/<br />battle-of-the-two-elizabeths-are-free-will-and-physical-determinism-compatible/vjtorleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02770628822850515063noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71424445338740166502012-03-25T15:16:27.910-07:002012-03-25T15:16:27.910-07:00If we have control over some of our actions, then ...<i>If we have control over some of our actions, then some of our actions cannot originate from brain chemistry/physics, since we have no control whatsoever over brain chemistry/physics.</i><br /><br />This depends largely on how "we" and "brain chemistry" are being defined, and is possibly guilty of begging the question against the Aristotilean/thomist out of the gates. It's not just that the thomist and the materialist disagree about the existence of some "soul", but that they also disagree about the nature of matter itself. You're describing what seems to be a thoroughly reductionist understanding of matter, and pointing out the problem of making sense of the Aristotilean view given it. But that understanding is precisely what Aristotileans and Thomists question to begin with.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71905057165452118522012-03-25T11:46:20.805-07:002012-03-25T11:46:20.805-07:00Of course we human beings do not have control over...Of course we human beings do not have control over *all* of our actions. (c.f. Patellar reflex test.)<br /><br />But for responsibility, and hence if a coherent form of Christianity is true, we must have control over *some* of our actions.<br /><br />If we have control over some of our actions, then some of our actions cannot <i>originate</i> from brain chemistry/physics, since we have no control whatsoever over brain chemistry/physics.<br /><br />But every single one of our actions in the physical world is brought about during its terminal phase by brain chemistry/physics, so if we have control over some of our actions, then something other than the brain (mind, soul, whatever) must <i>in some way</i> affect brain chemistry/physics primordially if moral responsibility is to make sense.<br /><br /><br />Otherwise, it seems we just have chains and chains of unbroken physical necessitation stretching back from brain chemistry/physics to some other type of chemistry/physics that was up and running <i>well before we were even born</i>, and we are obviously not responsible for things that preceded us. But if we aren't responsible for those chains, then we aren't responsible for these current chains and their effects either, since they're all the inevitable products of the chains that preceded us.<br /><br /><br />[Personally, I'm still a theist for Aristotelian reasons and will likely always be one, and will continue to believe that the mind is irreducible to brain. But I can't commit to any moral system because I can't find a way around this pesky problem of physical necessitation, and for the life of me I cannot grasp how the Aristotelian doctrine of "final causality" does the conceptual work of addressing the idea that every action is necessitated by a particular neurological substrate, which was in turn necessitated by pre-neurological physical events both inside and outside the body, the chain of physical necessitation stretching back all the way throughout history to at least the onset of macromolecular systems.]Conradnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-37243930495159670512012-03-25T08:09:40.693-07:002012-03-25T08:09:40.693-07:00Reductionism is a philosophical position, held, if...Reductionism is a philosophical position, held, if Dr Feser is right, by materialists and cartesians.<br /><br />Some times people will use Scienctific knowledge to argue for premises in philosophy.<br /><br />Hunt you are equating Materialism or Cartesianism to Science. You see the post is not a cirtique of Scientific knowledge ITSELF.<br /><br />___________________________________<br /><br /><br />Frank ... The post is not about, human beings have control over all their actions... Actually no such thing was argued.Eduardonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-65377345742960179392012-03-25T07:01:01.318-07:002012-03-25T07:01:01.318-07:00Prof. Feser
Presumably you would not hold a ...Prof. Feser<br /><br /> Presumably you would not hold a student responsible for falling asleep in your class if he had been given a large enough dose of sedative, but why not? Is there any discovery of internal medicine or psychology that could lead you to conclude that a given action was not as free and responsible as you had previously thought?<br /> <br /> An unrelated question, and one perhaps too vague to admit of a useful answer: to what extent do the books by Hacker and by Baker and Bennett depend upon Wittgensteinian arguments about category mistakes, abuse of language and "what one would say"?Franknoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-59641898093394859122012-03-25T03:36:55.534-07:002012-03-25T03:36:55.534-07:00"And brain chemistry is only a part, and a re..."And brain chemistry is only a part, and a relatively small one, of understanding human nature."<br /><br />This isn't good evidence against psychological reductionism. Most researchers don't describe things using such absolute words as "cause" and "prove." Most will say that neurochemistry will predispose a person to be prone to addiction. Those with certain genetics will have a greater tendency to have an addiction during their life. Other circumstances will also play an important role. However, the causal nature of neurochemistry will affect the average number of addicts in a certain population. That is the kind of thing science will predict. You have to argue against the real methods of science if you don't want to be pointlessly fighting straw men.Huntnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-36287892877030507582012-03-25T01:22:30.724-07:002012-03-25T01:22:30.724-07:00The other thing to keep in mind with memory is the...The other thing to keep in mind with memory is there is intellectual memory and sense memory.Aquinas3000https://www.blogger.com/profile/10548841985385293614noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-70969790968341034382012-03-24T20:59:19.646-07:002012-03-24T20:59:19.646-07:00...where the intellectual element and the neural e...<i>...where the intellectual element and the neural element are not two things (as they are for the Cartesian dualist) but rather two irreducible aspects of one thing (just as a sentence is one thing with two aspects, material and semantic). </i><br /><br />This viewpoint does not seem different at all from that of reductive cognitivism. To a cognitivist, a chunk of neurons, or a chunk of logic from an AI, is exactly that -- a material thing that also has a semantic component.<br /><br />Yet somehow you think you are in radical opposition to cognitivism. I don't get it. The only difference is that you are explicitly Aristotelian while they are (usually) implicitly Aristotelian.goddinpottynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-62262011606909456812012-03-24T17:56:54.877-07:002012-03-24T17:56:54.877-07:00Hi James,
Check out the book "Philosophy of ...Hi James,<br /><br />Check out the book "Philosophy of Nature and Quantum Reality" by nuclear physicist Ian J. Thompson. It focuses heavily on the interpretation of modern/quantum physics from a new essentialist perspective. In fact, he argues that understanding modern physics in terms of dispositions (read final cause) provides more insight than does the mechanistic model which currently dominates the sciences. This is one of the few guys that seems to be competent in both philosophy and physics.<br /><br />I'd be curious to know if others have read this, and if so, what they think of the work.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com