tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post432576193754808866..comments2024-03-28T10:44:57.324-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Reply to KozinskiEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger350125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-84597842520478092572013-12-19T19:41:39.267-08:002013-12-19T19:41:39.267-08:00Not that I should need to do this, but because of ...Not that I should need to do this, but because of certain slanderous attacks on my person on this website combox, I would like to make a public statement. <br /><br />I, of course, and again, this should go without saying based upon my life, family, writings, and good reputation with those who know me, my life, and my work, reject all forms of antisemitism as a grave sin, especially the willful and malicious denial of the evident historical record of premeditated, systematic violence against Jews on account of their race. It is only because of a certain person's slanderous and unprovoked attack on me that I have to state the obvious.<br /><br />Let me also say that I wholeheartedly reject "conspiracy theories," if this means those theories that are the result of imposing one's psychological problems and delusions and unexamined prejudices onto reality and calling what such a superimposition looks like to you and other likeminded nuts, the truth. These are the real "holocaust deniers," and I repudiate this as a betrayal of Truth and as the gravest of intellectual sins. I have spent my whole professional career as a philosopher attacking such theories.<br /><br />I do not, however, reject any honest inquiry into the details and overall truth of any official, publicly authorized narrative, no mater how "sacred" to governments, mainstream media, and the "beast" (Plato's term) of uninformed public opinion, and the sheepleish "academic community"--inquiries that are good-willed, use well vetted evidence and logic, and are motivated by the desire for truth, love of the good and of neighbor, and the exposing of propaganda. <br /><br />Those who reject such inquiry and slander those who defend or participate in it are themselves betrayers of Truth and offensive to God.<br /><br />This should also go without saying, but defending manifestly immoral behaviors and justifications of those behaviors, such as NAMBLA and neo-Nazi groups, is disgusting and not worthy of rational debate. Censorship, condemnation, ridicule, and perhaps prison are alone worthy of such subverters of the common good and enemies of truth.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54825164554092453832013-05-02T09:38:34.971-07:002013-05-02T09:38:34.971-07:00Let me give you a hint, guller. Here's your su...Let me give you a hint, guller. Here's your supposedly analogous argument:<br />1. Square circles don’t exist<br />2. I know that square circles don’t exist<br />3. I have no positive conception of square circles<br />4. If I had a thought about square circles, then 1, 2 and 3 would be false<br />5. My affirmation of 1, 2 and 3 imply that I am thinking of square circles<br />6. Therefore, 1, 2 and 3 are false<br /><br />First of all, 3 does not follow from 1, as in the original argument. Secondly, 4 is obviously false, unlike in the original argument.DavidMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39197913296402363082013-05-01T11:55:35.544-07:002013-05-01T11:55:35.544-07:00guller wrote: "Your point is that any denial ...guller wrote: "Your point is that any denial of X necessarily implies knowledge of X, and thus my denial of knowledge of God necessarily implies first having knowledge of God in order to subsequently deny that knowledge. Clearly, it is not always the case that denying the validity of X necessarily means that X is a meaningful proposition to begin with. It could be incoherent, which is why it must be denied in the first place." <br /><br />No, that's not it at all. Try again. <br /><br />(I hope you'll forgive my curtness - I'm not so fond of long question-begging rambles, full of rank sophistry and whatnot.)DavidMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33880996752037709592013-04-23T16:01:48.706-07:002013-04-23T16:01:48.706-07:00Sancrucensis,
I don't know what the exchange ...Sancrucensis,<br /><br />I don't know what the exchange you linked to was all about, but I know for a fact that the Thaddeus Kozinski who posted here (and who has now removed almost all of his comments) was the real guy.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-59024028973502007692013-04-23T12:49:52.469-07:002013-04-23T12:49:52.469-07:00Apparently there are two Thaddeus Kozinskis. See t...Apparently there are two Thaddeus Kozinskis. See the comment thread here: http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2011/12/toward-a-sensible-discussion-of-empire/peter-j-leithartPater Edmundhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02227184831077044432noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40356745917590154292013-04-20T09:43:19.441-07:002013-04-20T09:43:19.441-07:00After reading Kozinski's article, I cannot avo...After reading Kozinski's article, I cannot avoid feeling that he is complaining about NL theorist's accounts because they are so incomplete - but fails to recognize the reason they are incomplete is that their interlocutors <i>never let them finish a sentence</i>, much less an argument. It's like listening to the Supreme Court arguments: the Chief Justice invites the attorney to start his argument, but all of the justices have already read the arguments in detail, and they have all formed specific questions on specific points. So, after the attorney gets about 2 sentences into his 200-page dissertation, Kennedy or Kagan interrupts to ask about something on page 5. Half an hour later, after jumping around from page 5 to 90, back to 36, and on 4 wild goose tangents cooked up by the justices, the attorney "wraps up" in a very unsatisfactory way. If an observer were to be unaware that this oral argument was not the ONLY basis for the attorney's position, he would rightly walk away thinking the attorney never even came close to proving his thesis, never even came close to presenting a real case for it. <br /><br />In NL discussions, especially involving Gnu Atheists, (for example, though not limited to them), the objectors spend so much time interfering with the presentation of a complete argument that they never, ever, allow the NL theorist to get to the later 50 pages of the presentation, the parts where they bring the argument around to including tradition, historical practice, practical reason, etc. Kozinski, likewise, is arguing a straw man. <br /><br />Either that, or his premise is completely wrong. He uses "theology" interchangeably with "theology based on direct revelation by God." But NL theory has always included within its domain the impact of <i>natural theology</i>, the body of truth of what we can know of God through nature herself, without considering Revelation. If you re-read his arguments allowing his use of the word "theology" to encompass both revealed theology and natural theology, I think you conclude that it just doesn't wash, not at all - the points end up either being untrue, or being not in the least opposed to NL properly speaking. <br />Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4809303966389165512013-04-18T14:24:42.250-07:002013-04-18T14:24:42.250-07:00I don’t understand. X and Y are independently exis...<i>I don’t understand. X and Y are independently existing substances. How can a relation between X and Y only really exist within Y? The relation would have to exist between X and Y in order to be a relation at all. It would be like saying that X is taller than Y, but that tallness only really exists within Y.</i><br /><br />I find relations very difficult to understand, too. Aquinas based some of his more complicated formulations of relation on the work of the Muslim Aristotelians, whose work I have yet to read--so I don't have an answer for you on this point. I just know that relation cannot begin to exist within a cause without the vicious regress problem rearing its head again.<br /><br /><i>First, the problem is that superiority and inferiority only make sense within an ordered hierarchy relative to a common standard.</i><br /><br />God is the standard of all standards, and so we're always already in a kind of hierarchy with him, even though he can't be said to be in a hierarchy with us.<br /><br /><i>Second, to say that Y is really inferior to X must mean that X is really superior to Y. Why? Because superiority and inferiority must be relative to a common standard.</i><br /><br />This simply begs the question. If X is in every way more complete than Y, then Y is inferior to X. And things are more complete when they fall into less binary oppositions--i.e. form/matter, being/non-being, essence/existence. Hence, if X falls into less binary oppositions than Y, then Y is inferior to X. Angels are superior to humans because they have no matter, and because their knowledge is not discursive (i.e. reliant on the parsing of binary oppositions). This is not a matter of a common standard, because the idea of a common standard is a metaphysical one that relies on binary oppositions.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9349141180322326512013-04-18T12:17:40.763-07:002013-04-18T12:17:40.763-07:00Rank:
The relation between Y and X is a real rel...Rank:<br /><br /><i> The relation between Y and X is a real relation that exists within Y.</i><br /><br />I don’t understand. X and Y are independently existing substances. How can a relation between X and Y only <i>really</i> exist within Y? The relation would have to exist <i>between</i> X and Y in order to be a <i>relation</i> at all. It would be like saying that X is taller than Y, but that tallness only really exists within Y. <br /><br /><i> Also, the terms "superior" and "inferior" get their meaning from a real inferiority in Y and an analogical superiority in X. If Y relies on X, then language of inferiority and superiority is automatically entailed.</i><br /><br />First, the problem is that superiority and inferiority only make sense within an ordered hierarchy relative to a common standard. For example, John is superior to Jack in terms of his athletic ability. In that situation, the common standard is “athletic ability”, and because John is a better athlete, he is superior to Jack in that particular respect. So, to say that <i>Y is inferior</i> necessarily implies that <i>Y is inferior to X according to a common standard</i>. Otherwise, it makes absolutely no sense. It would be like saying that John is taller while denying that John is taller than anything else relative to their respective heights. <br /><br />Second, to say that Y is really inferior to X must mean that X is really superior to Y. Why? Because superiority and inferiority must be relative to a common standard. If X is inferior according to a standard of <i>reality</i> and Y is superior according to a standard of <i>analogy</i>, then you are not really comparing the two at all, and they do not exist in a relationship. In order for there to be a relationship, there must be a commonality between them that they share or participate in according to different degrees. <br /><br />Third, if dependence necessarily entails an ordered hierarchy, then dependence does not save your position from my objection, because if dependence is an ordered hierarchy, then God must transcend it, and thus creation cannot be dependent upon God, because that would put God into an ordered hierarchy of dependence in which God is superior to creation and creation is inferior to God, which is impossible.dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25804017780144656902013-04-18T11:48:56.291-07:002013-04-18T11:48:56.291-07:00dguller,
That's fine. Take all the time you n...dguller,<br /><br />That's fine. Take all the time you need.<br /><br />The relation between Y and X is a real relation that exists within Y. Also, the terms "superior" and "inferior" get their meaning from a real inferiority in Y and an analogical superiority in X. If Y relies on X, then language of inferiority and superiority is automatically entailed.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-32463212781843266812013-04-18T04:04:12.855-07:002013-04-18T04:04:12.855-07:00Rank:
I'll try to reply in more detail to you...Rank:<br /><br />I'll try to reply in more detail to your last series of points. I'm backed up with my reading, and family obligations being what they are, that may take some time, especially given the little I've read of the Lonergan paper, which is <i>very</i> interesting, and requires deep thought on my part.<br /><br />However, I just wanted to make the point that I’m not too sure what any of this has to do with my argument. Even if you want to reframe matters from causality to dependence, to say that Y is dependent upon X puts X and Y in an ordered hierarchy in which Y is inferior to X, and thus X is superior to Y, because “inferior” only acquires meaning from within an ordered hierarchy by virtue of being a relational term. <br /><br />The question is whether this relationship in which Y depends upon X is real or a projection of our minds. You seem to imply that it is just a projection of our minds, and not actually occurring in reality. I don't see how that doesn't completely undermine using this principle to justify God's <i>real</i> existence, and not just as a projection of our minds that we impose upon reality to put it in some kind of explanatory framework.dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-45502176017992652012013-04-15T13:44:43.451-07:002013-04-15T13:44:43.451-07:00But on your account, act is not superior to potenc...<i>But on your account, act is not superior to potency, because the transition from potency to act can occur without anything really actual facilitating the transition at all.</i><br /><br />This is blatantly false. How could something in potency change to act without the presence of a second entity in act to pull it forward? You're talking about spontaneous change, here. <br /><br /><i>So, the efficient cause is just a model for the effect to imitate? It does not actually give anything to the effect? Or, perhaps what it gives is just something for the effect to aspire towards?</i><br /><br />It doesn't give anything in the sense of taking part of itself and placing it in another. But it does communicate itself in that the relation of dependence allows the being in potency to imitate a form contained by the being in act. So, for example, hotness in the sun is imitated by the iceberg, which causes the iceberg to melt.<br /><br /><i>But again, that would collapse the efficient cause into a final cause. After all, Y has a final cause, and X does not give another final cause, but rather helps Y actualize its final cause by causing the transition from a potential final cause to an actual final cause.</i><br /><br />Every Y has a final cause toward an almost limitless number of possibilities. X actualizes one of these by being present as a model for Y. Obviously, X itself has final causes that determine which final causes it may actualize. Let's say X is the sun and Y is the iceberg.<br /><br />Material cause: the iceberg, which may be drawn into the act of melting.<br />Efficient cause: the sun, whose presence does the drawing.<br />Formal cause: the accidental form of hotness which is actual in the sun and potential in the iceberg.<br />Final cause: the melting of the iceberg. <br /><br />Of course, we have to remember that both efficient and material causes have final causes. Both are ultimately substances, which means that they are in act to some degree. The sun couldn't draw the iceberg into melting if it didn't have a final cause in that direction, and the iceberg couldn't melt if it didn't have a final cause in that direction. rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16644416654531767382013-04-15T13:42:40.849-07:002013-04-15T13:42:40.849-07:00Second, if there is a single event, i.e. the trans...<i>Second, if there is a single event, i.e. the transition from potency to act in ens Y, then by metaphysical principles, there must be an ens X in act that caused that transition from potency to act in ens Y.</i><br /><br />Change is prior to cause and effect. Cause and effect are posited to explain change--not the other way around. You, once again, are smuggling in modern terminology. Aquinas and Aristotle are explaining change in a way that does not involve mechanistic cause and effect, even though their solution does contain what might be called causes and effects.<br /><br /><i>Third, I think that you are confusing the fact that we deduce the presence of X from the transition from potency to act in Y with the necessity that X must therefore be a being of reason. That’s just wrong. After all, we deduce the existence of God, but do not thereby conclude that God is a being of reason.</i><br /><br />I'm not confusing anything. This is the position that Aquinas and Aristotle held. Here--just read it: http://www.ts.mu.edu/readers/content/pdf/3/3.3/3.3.3.pdf.<br /><br /><i>The bottom line is whether you want to call it a “relation of dependence”, a “causal relationship”, or “giving”, there is something in X that is received by Y that results in the transition from potency to act in Y, and without that “something” that is given by X and received by Y, there would be no transition from potency to act in Y, and that is why Y is dependent upon X. In other words, the causal relationship is the relation of dependence, which is the giving and receiving of something from X to Y that results in the transition from potency to act in Y.</i><br /><br />Once again you're smuggling in mechanism. What does "giving" mean? What does "receiving" mean? Does it mean that the potency is drawn into actuality by being related to another being in act? (Aristotle's and Aquinas's position.) Or does it mean that the being in act rams into the being in potency and gives it part of itself?<br /><br /><i>The “relation is dependence” is causality, because the effect (i.e. the transition from potency to act in Y) depends upon the presence of X to occur. And X is not just some innocent bystander that does not contribute anything real to Y to facilitate that transition, which is what you seem to imply when saying that Y imitates X without X actually doing anything at all, kind of like X being the final cause of Y and pulling Y in the direction of actualizing its potencies.</i><br /><br />That's what is happening, so I'm not sure what your objection is.<br /><br /><i>In that case, you are collapsing the efficient cause into the final cause, which is invalid, because the final cause is just the end that cannot be actualized without the efficient cause to cause that very actualization to occur. Otherwise, you don’t actually need the efficient cause at all. The final cause should be sufficient.</i><br /><br />There are no efficient causes as you're using that term, which is to say mechanistically. There are only final causes that bring out other final causes. This is what we call efficient causality. One being's efficient cause is just another being's final cause.<br /><br />Change is when something in potency is drawn into actuality by a being in act, just as the Unmoved Mover draws all things toward itself. The presence of the being in act draws potential being into actual being--that's it. <br /><br />And it's obvious that one being's final cause cannot be sufficient of itself to bring about change. First, a being's final cause must begin to exist, which means that generation is prior to a being's final cause. (Of course, generation is the act of a prior final cause, and so on.) Second, final causes are almost always impeded in some way. And this means that a final cause relies on another final cause (now called an efficient cause) to remove its impediments. See the example of the sun, the iceberg and the Greek god that I gave Sobieski. It's final causes all the way down.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-56790596974581693142013-04-15T06:44:49.869-07:002013-04-15T06:44:49.869-07:00All causality is a relation of dependence from a c...<i> All causality is a relation of dependence from a contingent being (i.e. a being that might not have existed) to some higher entity; and the contingent being changes by imitating via this relation of dependence the higher entity to which it is related. We call these the moved and the mover, for short.</i><br /><br />Exactly. The “relation is dependence” <i>is</i> causality, because the effect (i.e. the transition from potency to act in Y) depends upon the presence of X to occur. And X is not just some innocent bystander that does not contribute anything real to Y to facilitate that transition, which is what you seem to imply when saying that Y <i>imitates</i> X without X <i>actually</i> doing anything at all, kind of like X being the final cause of Y and pulling Y in the direction of actualizing its potencies. In that case, you are collapsing the efficient cause into the final cause, which is invalid, because the final cause is just the <i>end</i> that cannot be actualized without the efficient cause to cause that very actualization to occur. Otherwise, you don’t actually need the efficient cause at all. The final cause should be sufficient.<br /><br /><i> The cause must be superior because it must possess whatever the effect does not possess. </i><br /><br />But on your account, act is <i>not</i> superior to potency, because the transition from potency to act can occur without anything <i>really</i> actual facilitating the transition at all.<br /><br /><i> A relation of dependence is no good unless the effect has something actual to imitate.</i><br /><br />So, the efficient cause is just a <i>model</i> for the effect to imitate? It does not actually <i>give</i> anything <i>to</i> the effect? Or, perhaps what it gives is just something for the effect to aspire towards? But again, that would collapse the efficient cause into a final cause. After all, Y has a final cause, and X does not give another final cause, but rather helps Y actualize its final cause by causing the transition from a potential final cause to an actual final cause. Your account would make this process impossible to understand, because the efficient cause literally does nothing in reality, but only in our minds.<br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-78822064905528198182013-04-15T06:44:35.010-07:002013-04-15T06:44:35.010-07:00Rank:
But C9 is a being of reason. You're ju...Rank:<br /><br /><i> But C9 is a being of reason. You're just handwaving. We deduce cause and effect from the existence of change, which occurs solely in that which changes. The name "effect" is given to those things which change. Causes are named from the effects that occur when a being in potency is related to a being in act. You can talk about "bidirectional" relationships all you want, but it's irrelevant to the argument. You're smuggling in malformed modern conceptions of causality to argue against Aristotle and Aquinas.</i><br /><br />I am not “handwaving” or “smuggling” anything. <br /><br />First, to say that the cause is a “being of reason”, i.e. an ens rationis, means that it is distinct from a real being, i.e. an ens reale. So, you are saying that the cause is not a real being at all, but just a byproduct of the human mind projecting upon reality a particular conceptual framework. <br /><br />Second, if there is a single event, i.e. the transition from potency to act in ens Y, then by metaphysical principles, there <i>must</i> be an ens X in act that <i>caused</i> that transition from potency to act in ens Y. X is not an ens rationis, but an ens reale. X must really and actually exist in order to be a cause, and cannot be an ens rationis, or else it would only be in the human mind and not in reality. <br /><br />Third, I think that you are confusing the fact that we deduce the presence of X from the transition from potency to act in Y with the necessity that X must therefore be a being of reason. That’s just wrong. After all, we deduce the existence of God, but do not thereby conclude that God is a being of reason. In other words, just because we just rational deduction to conclude the existence of X does not necessarily mean that X is a being of reason.<br /><br /><i> Causes produce nothing in the sense you're using that word. Even creation from nothing, as Aquinas says, is merely a "beginning of existence". We say that God creates because of a posteriori phenomena that must by necessity be related to him.</i><br /><br />I’m focusing upon one kind of change, i.e. from potency to act, because it is easier to understand due to its familiarity. Creation ex nihilo is too conceptually difficult, and so let’s first see how your account works for easy cases before moving on to harder ones.<br /><br /><i> Giving is a matter of a phenomenon in X recurring in Y via Y's relation of dependence on X. You keep focusing on C9 and C10 when the real meat of the debate is in the relation.</i><br /><br />This is all just semantics, no? The bottom line is whether you want to call it a “relation of dependence”, a “causal relationship”, or “giving”, there is something in X that is received by Y that results in the transition from potency to act in Y, and without that “something” that is given by X and received by Y, there would be no transition from potency to act in Y, and <i>that</i> is why Y is dependent upon X. In other words, the causal relationship <i>is</i> the relation of dependence, which <i>is</i> the giving and receiving of something from X to Y that results in the transition from potency to act in Y.dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11608315507029551472013-04-12T14:23:37.057-07:002013-04-12T14:23:37.057-07:00Rank:
I have to do a bit of reading, and my famil...Rank:<br /><br />I have to do a bit of reading, and my family has a busy weekend. I'll hopefully post a reply to your intriguing ideas soon. Just be patient. I'm on it!dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28525899222323351122013-04-12T14:23:01.318-07:002013-04-12T14:23:01.318-07:00Jack:
So I take it your response to DavidM (“I’m...<br />Jack:<br /><br /><i> So I take it your response to DavidM (“I’m thinking of a square circle”) wasn’t trying to say anything about affirmations, or positive conceptions, about things that don’t exist?</i><br /><br />My point was that saying that not-p does not mean that p necessarily has a meaningful positive content. If p is incoherent nonsense, then p cannot have meaningful positive content, even though the negation of p is true, but only because for p to be true, p would have to first be meaningful, and if p is not meaningful, then p cannot be true at all.<br /><br /><i> No, we don’t start with the metaphysical truth that evil doesn’t exist. We do not start with imperfection either. We start with finite being and that is not imperfection; rather it is, as we distinguish from the start, perfection and limit.</i><br /><br />I see your point. Aquinas writes that “a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection” (ST 1.4.1). If actuality is associated with perfection, then the absence of actuality would have to be associated with imperfection. And the absence in question would have to be due to the limitation placed upon the perfection of actuality.<br /><br /><i> Like nothingness, darkness, and evil, imperfection is a figment of the intellect. And our actual thoughts about finite being consist of perfection and limit. It bears repeating until you concede this.</i><br /><br />But then how does this not contradict Aquinas’ numerous sayings that we can only know what God is not, because we are incapable of knowing his essence? To know God in a positive way would require that God be received by our intellect, which is metaphysically impossible. So, if God cannot be received by our intellect, then we cannot know God at all, and that would support Aquinas’ endorsement of a negative theology.<br /><br />And even if we start with perfection and limitation, how does this lead to the conclusion that we have positive knowledge of God? Whatever positive content we have in our minds is necessarily infinitely inadequate to encompass God, and thus must be negated to preserve his transcendence. That is what even Aquinas says that we must negate our very mode of signification when talking about God, because “no name can be applied to God according to its mode of signification” (ST 1.13.12), because all names have “a mode of signification which belongs to creatures” (ST 1.13.6). <br /><br />As far as I can tell, to negate a mode of signification can only result in one of three possible scenarios:<br /><br />(1) Another creaturely mode of signification<br />(2) A divine mode of signification<br />(3) No mode of signification at all<br /><br />(1) would preserve the same problems, and thus is no solution. (2) is metaphysically impossible. (3) makes thought and language impossible, meaning that it would compromise any thought and language about anything, including God. <br /><br />Any thoughts?<br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40542078142942318222013-04-12T07:55:33.288-07:002013-04-12T07:55:33.288-07:00dguller:
We are talking about our knowledge here,...dguller:<br /><br /><i>We are talking about our knowledge here, not ontology. We do not </i>start<i> with the knowledge of the metaphysical truth that evil as such does not exist.</i><br /><br />So I take it your response to DavidM (“I’m thinking of a square circle”) wasn’t trying to say anything about affirmations, or positive conceptions, about things that don’t exist? The more you protest, the more you’re at war with yourself. Whatever. <br /><br />No, we don’t start with the metaphysical truth that evil doesn’t exist. We do not start with imperfection either. We start with finite being and that is not imperfection; rather it is, as we distinguish from the start, <i>perfection</i> and <i>limit</i>. <br /><br />Look, you’re the one who insists he has been conceiving of God in a wholly negative way, so you need finite being to be imperfection. But the relevant part of my statement isn’t the metaphysical truth of, say, darkness’s nonexistence. The relevant part is simply that imperfection is not finite being <i>in the same way</i> that darkness isn’t finite being - they’re both negations of finite being. <br /><br />Like nothingness, darkness, and evil, imperfection is a figment of the intellect. And our actual thoughts about finite being consist of perfection and limit. It bears repeating until you concede this.<br />Jack "Vaughn" Bodiehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08077819454982265896noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69433699696864277172013-04-12T04:25:57.968-07:002013-04-12T04:25:57.968-07:00Jack:
Nothingness does not exist – it is the neg...Jack:<br /><br /><i> Nothingness does not exist – it is the negation of being. Darkness does not exist – it is the absence of light. Evil does not exist – it is the want of some good. Likewise there is no such thing as imperfection. Imperfection just is perfection limited in some way. Literally imperfection is a lack of completeness, something unfinished.</i><br /><br />We are talking about our knowledge here, not ontology. We do not <i>start</i> with the knowledge of the metaphysical truth that evil as such does not exist. That requires philosophical demonstration to demonstrate that metaphysical truth. After the demonstration, you have the knowledge. Perhaps in your social circles, people innately and intuitively know that the entities that they interact with around them are incomplete and limited perfections, but I doubt it. And even after that demonstration, do they really understand perfection? Wouldn’t that require one to understand God himself as perfection itself? <br /><br /><i> For, where you see a partial identity and a partial difference in analogates, the scholastic (I put it to you) understands that logical or virtual distinctions within each – introduced by our thought, or the result of our thought – allow a logical identity between these logical or virtual parts despite the real difference between analogates. This is the basis of similarity in things, and in no way corresponds to univocal or a partial real identity.</i><br /><br />Why does univocity have to be partial real identity? What exactly is the relationship between the two? A partial (logical or virtual or real) identity and a partial (real) difference is <i>still</i> a kind of partial identity and partial difference, and thus well within my account of similarity. <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61109037563084276342013-04-11T20:16:59.776-07:002013-04-11T20:16:59.776-07:00dguller wrote: “You are looking at the conclusion ...dguller wrote: “You are looking at the conclusion at the end and are reading it into the beginning, which, on the one hand, makes perfect sense, because the conclusion was <i>virtually </i>present in the beginning, but on the other hand is inappropriate, because the conclusion was not <i>actually </i>present in the beginning, and we are talking about our actual thoughts and knowledge, not virtual or potential knowledge.” (emphasis his)<br /><br />Yeah, no. Like nothingness, darkness, and evil, imperfection is a figment of the intellect. And our actual thoughts about the non-entity “imperfection” consist of perfection and limit. It bears repeating until you concede this.<br />Jack "Vaughn" Bodiehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08077819454982265896noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-84267060927452228612013-04-11T20:13:54.852-07:002013-04-11T20:13:54.852-07:00dguller reckons: “Our knowledge of things does not...dguller reckons: “Our knowledge of things does not begin with perfection, but rather with imperfection.”<br /><br />dguller also writes: “As you say, “we start with finite things”. Finite things are not perfect, but rather are imperfect, and so if we start with finite things that are imperfect, then we must start with imperfection.”<br /><br />Nothingness does not exist – it is the negation of being. Darkness does not exist – it is the absence of light. Evil does not exist – it is the want of some good. Likewise there is no such thing as imperfection. Imperfection just is perfection limited in some way. Literally imperfection is a lack of completeness, something unfinished. <br /><br />So, yes, we start with finite being. But that gives us, from the start, perfection and limit.<br /><br />This is line 1, page 1 stuff.<br /><br />Once you concede this (as you must to stay true to your claim of taking on the scholastics on their own ground), then you will see that what I say about the negation of a negation follows, and you have not been “conceiving of God in a wholly negative fashion,” and thus have been contradicting yourself by using your knowledge of God’s Infinitude and Simplicity to argue as you have.<br /><br />So where did you go wrong? <br /><br />Once again you have erred by insisting that your formulas for identity, difference, and similarity are the only game in town. I can only suggest you read (or re-read) the general scholastic teaching on the doctrine of distinction, paying careful attention to the great difficulty in discriminating between virtual distinctions – especially perfect virtual distinctions – and real distinctions.<br /><br />For, where you see a partial identity and a partial difference in analogates, the scholastic (I put it to you) understands that logical or virtual distinctions within each – introduced by our thought, or the result of our thought – allow a logical identity between these logical or virtual parts despite the real difference between analogates. This is the basis of similarity in things, and in no way corresponds to univocal or a partial real identity.<br /><br />I accused you of idealism because your formulas confound the real and logical orders. But let’s forget labels – you’ve been shown to be contradicting yourself, and the formulas pumping blood around your argument clearly don't heed the careful, crucial distinctions that the Scholastics made. What’s really left of your attack on Thomas’s doctrine of analogy but dogmatic assertion that your formulas are exclusively right?<br />Jack "Vaughn" Bodiehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08077819454982265896noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28724999058021725012013-04-11T15:35:39.968-07:002013-04-11T15:35:39.968-07:00@dguller
There are various types of grace. One ty...@dguller<br /><br />There are various types of grace. One type is in the order of efficient causality (i.e., movements of soul), and another is in the order of formal causality (i.e., qualities of soul). In the same Summa article you cited, St. Thomas says man is aided by God's gratuitous will in two ways: "first, inasmuch as man's soul is moved by God to know or will or do something, and in this way the gratuitous effect in man is not a quality, but a movement of the soul; for 'motion is the act of the mover in the moved.'" Second, "man is helped by God's gratuitous will, inasmuch as a habitual gift is infused by God into the soul."<br /><br />I agree that formal causes are incoherent without final causes, but it seems to me they are also incoherent without agent causes as well because it is the agent acting for an end that brings the form about (i.e., moves something in potency to a form/end to have that form/end in act). I think this is true in the case of the will. The will must move to determine itself toward some end. While the end is the reason or explanation of the movement, agency is required for the will to actually move from potency to act. St. Thomas says this movement is ultimately derived from God's action:<br /><br />"There must be a cause for the fact that a person understands, deliberates, chooses, and wills, for every new event must have some cause. But, if its cause is another act of deliberation, and another act of will preceding it, then, since one cannot go on to infinity in these acts, one must reach something that is first. Now, a first of this type must be something that is better than reason. But nothing is better than intellect and reason except God. Therefore, God is the first principle of our acts of counsel and of will." (SCG 3.89).<br /><br />Rank holds that God's being the Supreme Good is sufficient to explain said movements of the will in the orders of nature and grace apart from His agency because in general, the end is the "cause of causes," the "pull" or "draw" of which accounts for the change. I think God's agency has to be involved as well, but such agency since it is from the Creator and not the creature is unique in that it doesn't necessitate or destroy freedom of the will:<br /><br />"The only way in which an external agent moves a thing naturally is by causing an intrinsic principle of motion within the movable thing. Thus, a generating agent, which gives the form of weight to a heavy generated body, moves it downward in a natural way. No other extrinsic being can move a natural body without violence, except perhaps accidentally, by removing an impediment, and this uses a natural motion, or action, rather than causes it. So, the only agent that can cause a movement of the will, without violence, is that which causes an intrinsic principle of this movement, and such a principle is the very power of the will. Now, this agent is God, Who alone creates a soul, as we showed in Book Two. Therefore, God alone can move the will in the fashion of an agent, without violence. Hence it is said in Proverbs (21:1): 'The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; wherever He wishes, He turns it.' And again in Philippians (2:13): 'It is God Who works in us, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.'" (SCG 3.88)Sobieskinoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-79890410016170898712013-04-11T13:56:20.883-07:002013-04-11T13:56:20.883-07:00But that is only if “grounded” already extends bey...<i>But that is only if “grounded” already extends beyond contingent into non-contingent, as well, which is precisely what is at issue, and thus the question begging.</i><br /><br />Non-contingent is a negation--it isn't a positive label. I'm just saying that, if all things are contingent, then nothing exists now. Therefore, there is more than the contingent. What does this mean? Something non-contingent, which is to say not anything that we know. This is logically entailed by the existence of contingent (= possibly not existent) beings. There's no begged question here. If there is nothing beyond the contingent on which the contingent relies, then nothing exists now.<br /><br /><i>Thus, to be a cause is to produce an effect, and to be an effect is to be caused by something else. There is a bidirectionality between the two such that the presence of one necessarily implies the presence of the other. After all, C9 and C10 are just different aspects of a single event, i.e. the transition from potency to act of a substance, and thus you have the presence of C9 iff you have the presence of C10.</i><br /><br />But C9 is a being of reason. You're just handwaving. We deduce cause and effect from the existence of change, which occurs solely in that which changes. The name "effect" is given to those things which change. Causes are named from the effects that occur when a being in potency is related to a being in act. You can talk about "bidirectional" relationships all you want, but it's irrelevant to the argument. You're smuggling in malformed modern conceptions of causality to argue against Aristotle and Aquinas.<br /><br /><i>Right, because there would be no transition of potency to act in substance Y at all unless there was substance X in act to produce that transition in the first place.</i><br /><br />Causes produce nothing in the sense you're using that word. Even creation from nothing, as Aquinas says, is merely a "beginning of existence". We say that God creates because of <i>a posteriori</i> phenomena that must by necessity be related to him. <br /><br /><i>X in act must give something to Y in order to produce the transition from potency to act in Y, and this occurs simultaneously such that X’s giving occurs at the same time as Y’s receiving (i.e. transition from potency to act).</i><br /><br />Giving is a matter of a phenomenon in X recurring in Y via Y's relation of dependence on X. You keep focusing on C9 and C10 when the real meat of the debate is in the relation.<br /><br /><i>First, even your own construal of your position negates itself. You write that “all causality is a relation of the moved to the mover” (emphasis mine), which ultimately comes down to a relation of the effect to the cause.</i><br /><br />I was writing in shorthand. If you want the long-form description, then here it is. All causality is a relation of dependence from a contingent being (i.e. a being that might not have existed) to some higher entity; and the contingent being changes by imitating via this relation of dependence the higher entity to which it is related. We call these the moved and the mover, for short.<br /><br /><i>Second, if you are correct, then Aquinas is wrong in that the cause must be superior to the effect.</i><br /><br />The cause must be superior because it must possess whatever the effect does not possess. A relation of dependence is no good unless the effect has something actual to imitate.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-64833622262572496542013-04-11T13:09:41.205-07:002013-04-11T13:09:41.205-07:00And this is no longer a weighty objection if all c...<i> And this is no longer a weighty objection if all causality is a relation of the moved to the mover, coupled with a C10 in the moved and a notional C9 in the mover. This allows God to exist beyond any determining confines, while simultaneously having all things rely on him.</i><br /><br />First, even your own construal of your position negates itself. You write that “all causality is a relation of the moved <b>to the mover</b>” (emphasis mine), which ultimately comes down to a relation of the effect to the cause. Unless you want to say that the cause does not actually cause the effect, then to say that the effect is related to the cause means that the cause is related to the effect, because there would be no effect without the cause, and where there is an effect, there must be a cause of that effect. After all, they are two different aspects of a single event, both of which are essential and necessary. <br /><br />Second, if you are correct, then Aquinas is wrong in that the cause must be superior to the effect. In fact, the effect is real and the cause is imaginary, and the real must be superior to the imaginary. But assuming that Aquinas was right, then cause-and-effect still exist in an ordered hierarchy in which the cause is superior to the effect, and act is superior to potency. And since God cannot be described according to the terms of an ordered hierarchy, then he cannot be described according to the terms of causality at all, and without the Neoplatonic metaphysics of efficient causality as participation, which is hierarchical to its core, there is simply no way to know anything about God from creation, because one would be making a category error.dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18006592454780370132013-04-11T13:09:33.106-07:002013-04-11T13:09:33.106-07:00Rank:
If every cause is understood from its effe...Rank:<br /><br /><i> If every cause is understood from its effects, then it's completely possible for contingent beings to be grounded in the non-contingent.</i><br /><br />But that is only if “grounded” <i>already</i> extends beyond contingent into non-contingent, as well, which is precisely what is at issue, and thus the question begging.<br /><br /><i>But causality occurs through a relation.</i> <br /><br />And the question is whether the causal relationship is bidirectional, meaning that the presence of an effect necessarily implies the simultaneous presence of a cause. You yourself have already stated that any effect must have a ground other than itself, and that ground just is the cause. Thus, to be a cause is to produce an effect, and to be an effect is to be caused by something else. There is a bidirectionality between the two such that the presence of one necessarily implies the presence of the other. After all, C9 and C10 are just different aspects of a single event, i.e. the transition from potency to act of a substance, and thus you have the presence of C9 iff you have the presence of C10.<br /><br /><i>As Lonergan says, "[C]ausation is simply the relation of dependence in the effect with respect to the cause. This is the Aristotelian position presented in the Physics".</i><br /><br />Right, because there would be no transition of potency to act in substance Y at all unless there was substance X in act to produce that transition in the first place. The transition from potency to act in Y cannot occur without X in act, but X in act can occur without the transition from potency to act in Y. Thus, the dependence relationship in which X in act is considered ontologically prior to the transition of potency to act in Y.<br /><br /><i> As a result, we can't say that effects have no cause at all--just that C9 is a notional extension of C10, and that C10 occurs because of a relation. This means that all causality is reducible to a relation of the moved to the mover.</i><br /><br />I don’t see this at all, but I might be missing something. X in act must give something to Y in order to produce the transition from potency to act in Y, and this occurs simultaneously such that X’s giving occurs at the same time as Y’s receiving (i.e. transition from potency to act). Your claim, insofar as I understand it, is that X’s giving is not real at all, but only a projection of the mind from the transition from potency to act in Y, which is the only real occurrence. But then you have real receiving, but only imaginary giving, which makes no sense. How can Y receive something, but X give nothing? And if X isn’t really giving anything to Y to cause the transition from potency to act, then what is the point of the Scholastic principle that a cause cannot give what it does not already have? In reality, the cause gives <i>nothing at all</i>.<br /><br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-70382297126510515232013-04-11T12:45:38.844-07:002013-04-11T12:45:38.844-07:00I really have no idea what Free Will "is"...I really have no idea what Free Will "is" other then my intuitions and experience tell me I have it. <br /><br />That I have the real power to freely choose between a or b regardless of wither or not my intellect moves my will to do so or some sort of volunteerism is something I believe I have.<br /><br />(Mind you I tend to accept the Intellect moves the Will model)<br /><br />I know God causes Our Reality, our natures and our free will to exist and be truly free & I can't for the life of me figure out how that is the case other then I can see no formal contradiction.<br /><br />OTOH under a strict materialism I see logically we can't have free will since all our choices are nothing more then random physics and chemistry & there is no real "me" that does the choosing. <br /><br />Thus I am indifferent as to who wins a molinist vs Banez debate since I tend to think at some point you bow to mystery.<br /><br />Carry on. BenYachovhttp://www.catholic.comnoreply@blogger.com