tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post3989130610391652640..comments2024-03-19T00:20:18.049-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Feynman’s painter and eliminative materialismEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger295125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33981732146309397442015-01-31T20:16:37.260-08:002015-01-31T20:16:37.260-08:00In History the story is different.
The Human scie...<br />In History the story is different.<br /><br />The Human science of history is NOT the same as "writing history".<br /><br />Those who write history are not doing science, and ofen enough they are not historians, they are recording facts as they see them, sometimes their opinions and sometimes even distorting the facts to make them more agreeable to their opinion.<br /><br />For example in 1000 years much of our history might be observed through newspaper articles, blogs, youtube videos, etc... and we all know how different one fact is presented by different people...<br /><br />That is why history is much more difficult than physics on the "interpretational level".<br /><br />You cannot do experiments to test a thesis... you can only work with the documents and archeological data you find... and you must try to think as the people who wrote the documents thought (not an easy feat at all) since the way we used to think, speak and write has certainly changed with culture.<br /><br />Of course this leave ofte much more room for the historian's personal views to trickle down into what he discovers or thinks he discovers, which is quite problematic, of course.<br /><br />In spite of this there is still some objectivity in history as well, although not as easily achieved as in physics or chemistry.Ismaelnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77391611856478412792015-01-31T20:16:19.395-08:002015-01-31T20:16:19.395-08:00""Ever since Einstein’s theory of relati...<i>""Ever since Einstein’s theory of relativity, we have had the concept of the observer who - it was stated - must be taken into account. Whenever I discussed this with people, I observed they were not capable of appreciating the height of that concept. They seemed to think of the observer as, essentially, an algebraic unit. Who he was didn’t matter. <br /><br />In such sciences as chemistry and physics, so precise were the methods that, apparently, it did not matter who the observer was. Japanese, Germans, Russians, Catholics, Protestants, Hindus and Englishmen all arrived at the same impeccable conclusions, apparently bypassing their personal, racial and religious prejudices. However, everyone I talked to was aware that, as soon as members of these various nationalities or religious groups wrote history - ah, now, we had a different story (and of course a different history) from each individual."""</i><br /><br />That's quite a strange assertion by Van Vogt...<br /><br />I would say, first hand, that he doea NOT know or understand what the theory of relativity is... and perhaps history... (but I suppose I cannot judge him from only a single quote.)<br /><br />In Einstein's relativity it still does NOT matter WHO the observer is (not his philosophical or religious or racial backgrpound).<br /><br />Rather what DOES matter is the FRAME OF REFERENCE the observer is in.<br /><br />Now this is a bit true in Galilean relatiity as well:<br />If you are on a train everything in the train is still to your point of view, while trees outside are moving. <br /><br />Another person, sitting outside will see you and everything on the train move, and for him the trees will be still.<br /><br />Einstein (special) relativity extends this concept showing that (unlike in Galilean Relativity) time is NOT absolute, but also the perception of time and the observation of events in time also depends on the frame of reference.<br /><br />For example someone sitting in a planet might see events occur as A-> B -> C in time while travelling very fast (relative to the planet) in a ship might see a different temporal ordering of such events.<br /><br />General relativity then extends the whole theory including gravity, which is a distorsion of spacetime caused by Energy-Mass (they are equivalent in relativity).<br /><br />In all this HOWEVER there is still OBJECTIVE OBSERVATION taking place (maybe using cloks and other instruments to make measurements or record when an event is percieved for example.<br /><br />Funnily enough Relativity rests on an absolute statement: all laws of physics are the same in ALL (inertial) frames of reference (hence why the s[eed of light is the same in all of them).<br /><br />What is "relative" is the observation, which changes from one frame of reference to another... but it is not something purely subjective since we can calculate and predict what an observer would measure in another frame of reference.<br /><br />(continued)Ismaelnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-34866236682897701212015-01-27T19:50:10.780-08:002015-01-27T19:50:10.780-08:00oh geez, yea, "grok" is from Stranger.oh geez, <a href="http://youtu.be/W79N7ph5r9A" rel="nofollow">yea, "grok" is from Stranger.</a>Matt Sheeanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06588390859627450858noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-10012396542039002172015-01-27T19:20:31.314-08:002015-01-27T19:20:31.314-08:00@Matt Sheean:
"I remember that book (Number ...@Matt Sheean:<br /><br />"I remember that book (Number of the Beast, right?) being kinda zany, right?"<br /><br /><i>Stranger in a Strange Land</i>. But yep, zany.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42147561042965498642015-01-27T19:14:02.037-08:002015-01-27T19:14:02.037-08:00I remember that book (Number of the Beast, right?)...I remember that book (Number of the Beast, right?) being kinda zany, right? I've only read that one (and not well) and Starship Troopers (back in high school - which still isn't that long ago) and a couple shorts of his. That might be just as good an explanation for why I wasn't too aware of his association with GS (aside from the mention in the wiki article).<br /><br />I would like to add as well, or really to take back the pejorative tone of my comment about creatives being into weird ideas. While I do think it is unhealthy for the intellect, part of the fun of SF is entering into a fully realized, utterly strange world, and it seems that often the more idiosyncratic the writer's views, the more incredible (in a good way) the worlds are. Not all the time, of course, but sometimes the weirdness plays nicely into the product.Matt Sheeanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06588390859627450858noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-45369615507517353082015-01-27T10:13:49.870-08:002015-01-27T10:13:49.870-08:00@Matt Sheean:
"Yea, Heinlein's work does...@Matt Sheean:<br /><br />"Yea, Heinlein's work doesn't seem to me like the work of someone who'd grok GS. At least it's not obvious"<br /><br />It's all over his stuff if you know where to look for it, but you're right, it's not obvious. For example, you may remember (from the very novel that gave us the word "grok") the character of Anne, one of the women who worked for Jubal Harshaw. She was a Fair Witness—a professional trained to distinguish carefully between fact and inference and report only what she saw, to the point that, when asked what color a house was, she replied, "It's white on this side" (and wouldn't even assume that <i>this</i> side had remained white after she'd stopped looking at it).Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15551430832915300562015-01-26T21:36:01.314-08:002015-01-26T21:36:01.314-08:00Scott,
Yea, Heinlein's work doesn't seem ...Scott,<br /><br />Yea, Heinlein's work doesn't seem to me like the work of someone who'd grok GS. At least it's not obvious<br /><br />Weird sciency and out there philosophical stuff seems to appeal to a certain kind of creative person. EM has a surrealist quality to it (though philosophically maybe dada is the right term?).Matt Sheeanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06588390859627450858noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-38565536572676650782015-01-26T18:33:55.971-08:002015-01-26T18:33:55.971-08:00@Matt Sheean:
Robert Heinlein was pretty enamored...@Matt Sheean:<br /><br />Robert Heinlein was pretty enamored of Korzybski as well. Never saw the attraction myself, though I've always enjoyed much of Heinlein's SF.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7603187792220685552015-01-26T18:09:21.136-08:002015-01-26T18:09:21.136-08:00This comment thread is old news, but...
Here is ...This comment thread is old news, but... <br /><br />Here is a quote from A E Van Vogt’s introduction to the Berkeley edition of his World of Null-A (the motive being to show what is hopefully an amusing example of another author of SF who was enamored with a quasi-scientific novelty and was flabbergasted by the inability of others to appreciate his genius. The novel idea in this case was <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_semantics" rel="nofollow">“General Semantics”</a>).<br /><br />“Now, if I were a writer who merely presented another man’s ideas, then I doubt if I’d have had problems with my readers. I think I presented the facts of General Semantics so well, and so skillfully, in <i>World of Null-A</i> and its sequel that the readers thought that that was all I should be doing. But the truth is that I, the author, saw a deeper paradox.<br /><br />Ever since Einstein’s theory of relativity, we have had the concept of the observer who - it was stated - must be taken into account. Whenever I discussed this with people, I observed they were not capable of appreciating the height of that concept. They seemed to think of the observer as, essentially, an algebraic unit. Who he was didn’t matter. <br /><br />In such sciences as chemistry and physics, so precise were the methods that, apparently, <i>it did not matter who the observer was</i>. Japanese, Germans, Russians, Catholics, Protestants, Hindus and Englishmen all arrived at the same impeccable conclusions, apparently bypassing their personal, racial and religious prejudices. However, everyone I talked to was aware that, as soon as members of these various nationalities or religious groups wrote history - ah, now, we had a different story (and of course a different history) from each individual."Matt Sheeanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06588390859627450858noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-8027461938999826902015-01-25T19:30:12.565-08:002015-01-25T19:30:12.565-08:00@Greg:
"Social practices can be truthy even ...@Greg:<br /><br />"Social practices can be truthy even if truth can't be."<br /><br />Well, sure they can! Because social practices can be abouty even if there's no aboutiness.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-43310312443593110512015-01-25T17:55:39.197-08:002015-01-25T17:55:39.197-08:00@ Scott
I know you joke, but our friend Benjamin ...@ Scott<br /><br />I know you joke, but our friend Benjamin above told me that, though eliminative materialism undermines the findings of science, the fact that they (and their intentionality-undermining consequences) are scrawled in journals, classrooms, etc. is nevertheless an 'indication' of the death of cherished humanity's self-conception.<br /><br />Social practices can be truthy even if truth can't be.Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-70851514979320110802015-01-25T15:59:43.405-08:002015-01-25T15:59:43.405-08:00@Timocrates:
"Now this I got to see!"
...@Timocrates:<br /><br />"Now this I got to see!"<br /><br />We may already have seen it. Churchland's account of a "theory" as a "body of social practices" seems to be right on the money in at least one familiar instance: eliminative materialism itself seems to consist entirely of eliminative materialists' "social practice" of waving their hands in unison.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-50951206923090382602015-01-25T09:28:44.618-08:002015-01-25T09:28:44.618-08:00Greg wrote,
"Churchland characterizes theori...Greg wrote,<br /><br /><i>"Churchland characterizes theories in a couple ways: as a body of social practices a la Kuhn, or as the differing learned or conditioned levels of receptivity among our perceptual faculties. He denies that theories are merely collections of propositions. So he needs an account of social practices to characterize folk psychology as a theory. "</i><br /><br />Now this I got to see! I am very interested in reading this theory that I will learn without need of propositions or a basis in certain propositions. I think perhaps they will have their best chance of success once they can immediately communicate a complete idea without use of language in any form. That would make it more difficult for most to miss that it required propositions and premises in order to arrive at its conclusions.<br /><br />:)Timocrateshttp://americamagazine.org/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77465437053198779072015-01-22T14:50:16.898-08:002015-01-22T14:50:16.898-08:00sorry... seems strange to say that in defense of E...sorry... seems strange to say that in defense of EMMatt Sheeanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06588390859627450858noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77760476879857189812015-01-22T14:49:54.859-08:002015-01-22T14:49:54.859-08:00"I think this way of stating it is much clear..."I think this way of stating it is much clearer than anything I have seen from Bakker."<br /><br />Still, it seems strange to say this at all, since if we say something like, "Bakker could say this thing that Churchland said" What we would mean is that Bakker could say that and it would make sense, or more sense than he has been making.<br /><br />Matt Sheeanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06588390859627450858noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-2772901446994555832015-01-22T13:38:25.853-08:002015-01-22T13:38:25.853-08:00The argument would clearly have to be repeated mor...<i>The argument would clearly have to be repeated more specifically for the components of folk psychology, or else not-Q would be consistent with the truth of even the vast majority of folk psychology. To say not-Q is not equivalent to saying that our understanding of ourselves is systematically false.</i><br /><br />I add that I don't claim Churchland would deny this; his characterization there is obviously intended to be brief.<br /><br />Most of Churchland's articles focusing on folk psychology and eliminative materialism at a high level don't say much about intentionality or truth. Though it could also be questioned: to what extent are some of the finer grained distinctions made by philosophers about intentionality or qualia part of <i>folk psychology</i>?<br /><br />There's an odd tension in the writings of eliminative materialists. On the one hand they claim that there are tons of theories of intentionality and qualia. On the other, they characterize folk psychology as an ailing theory that we've been hanging onto for 4000 years.<br /><br />Most people don't talk about intentionality itself. Nor would people for most have history characterized "the mark of the mental" as "what it is like" to be a human.Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57679664362356880452015-01-22T13:33:22.294-08:002015-01-22T13:33:22.294-08:00@ DNW
There is plenty in folk psychology no doubt...@ DNW<br /><br /><i>There is plenty in folk psychology no doubt, that could be better reformulated, and you might even be able to reduce "belief" to very little more than some complex of behavioral tendencies based on memories of past experiences or innate "wiring".</i><br /><br />Right. This is another point I was thinking about. Q is all of folk psychology. So not-Q just means that folk psychology is not true. The argument would clearly have to be repeated more specifically for the components of folk psychology, or else not-Q would be consistent with the truth of even the vast majority of folk psychology. To say not-Q is not equivalent to saying that our understanding of ourselves is systematically false.<br /><br />There is another aspect of Churchland that is interesting. Many people aim to deny that folk psychology is really a theory (or related objections, i.e. folk psychology does not aspire to precision). Churchland characterizes theories in a couple ways: as a body of social practices a la Kuhn, or as the differing learned or conditioned levels of receptivity among our perceptual faculties. He denies that theories are merely collections of propositions. So he needs an account of social practices to characterize folk psychology as a theory. (Moreover, along that sort of Kuhnian line where theories are kinds of social practices, it is more evident that scientific theories will presuppose intentionality, as do practicing scientists. The characterization of theories as social practices is a double-edged sword for Churchland; it gives him a response to those who would deny that folk psychology is a theory, but it makes it far harder to make the argument that the intentionalistic presuppositions of all practicing scientists are separable from the scientific results he takes to support his theory.)Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19008736070131633952015-01-22T13:09:11.293-08:002015-01-22T13:09:11.293-08:00I just posted a comment that was not particularly ...<br /><br />I just posted a comment that was not particularly needed or good.<br /><br />Forget the part after the positive mention of Greg's effort.DNWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-32530463324705673032015-01-22T13:07:15.859-08:002015-01-22T13:07:15.859-08:00Greg said...
For the record, here is somethin...Greg said...<br /><br /> For the record, here is something Churchland says about the incoherence objection."<br /><br /><br />Nice commentary.<br /><br />It seems to me that Churchland is buying himself some wriggle room by referring to folk psychology.<br /><br />There is plenty in folk psychology no doubt, that could be better reformulated, and you might even be able to reduce "belief" to very little more than some complex of behavioral tendencies based on memories of past experiences or innate "wiring".<br /><br />But what's so remarkable about that?<br /><br />The remarkable thing is the apparent and eventual aim of eliminating mind - even as a reflexive complex - altogether.<br /><br />How you would, or who and what would, move into that house if it were constructed, seems problematical; even granting most of the assumptions.<br /><br />On the other hand if you go whole Bakker, then (I presume) the reductio itself is construed nothing more than a heuristic at most - a kind of way of systematically bumping up against "we" know not what.<br /><br />Looks like the basic problem recurs no matter how they frame it.<br /><br />Those who have studied the early Marx will recall a parallel theme pervading his mode of analysis; which was strictly "historical" as he defined it. <br /><br />We've seen historicism discussed here at great length in fact.<br /><br />Thus, Man, is embedded as a conscious phenomenon in evolving circumstances; arising as the consciousness of the inorganic body: a determination which he cannot in principle transcend. His perspective is radically limited by the circumstances in which the species was produced and produced itself, and his proper fate is to live out this way of being critically and scientifically, and not to try and transcend it radically by understanding what could not be stood-under, or over.<br /><br />Of course it turns out that his anti-metaphysical posturing was a metaphysical claim itself, but it seemed for a time to many people like a solution "forward".<br /><br />I guess just because that way of thinking killed millions, doesn't mean it is a bad or unhelpful thing. Since bad and helpful are just illusions anyway ...DNWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27116336318876129102015-01-22T10:42:53.361-08:002015-01-22T10:42:53.361-08:00... Ed's argument, which challenges EM by requ...<i>... Ed's argument, which challenges EM by requiring that it state itself coherently.</i><br /><br />Since eliminativists might object to the requirement that EM be stated coherently, I ask: If EM can't be stated coherently but is nevertheless a 'good' theory demanded by the relevant science, then what is EM? This question can only be answered by a statement of the theory that is EM. If it can't be answered, as the imagined eliminativists are now complaining, then we can't identify what EM is, and the idea that the data somehow compels <i>EM</i> is an illusion founded upon claims that are, taken in themselves, perhaps plausible or understandable, but which cannot constitute a coherent theory.Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54268415836765587852015-01-22T10:27:03.996-08:002015-01-22T10:27:03.996-08:00Sorry, the above Churchland article is "Evalu...Sorry, the above Churchland article is "Evaluating Our Self-Conception," <i>Mind and Language</i> 8, no. 2 (1993), 211-222, collected also in the Churchlands' <i>On the Contrary</i>.Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83943499626813676902015-01-22T10:25:08.850-08:002015-01-22T10:25:08.850-08:00For the record, here is something Churchland says ...For the record, here is something Churchland says about the incoherence objection.<br /><br /><i>A purely a priori objection, it dismisses EM as incoherent on grounds that, in arguing, stating, or embracing its case, it must presuppose the integrity of the very conceptual framework it proposes to eliminate. Consider, for example, the evident conflict between the eliminativist's apparent</i> belief <i> that FP [folk psychology] is false, and his concurrent claim that there </i>are not<i> beliefs.<br /><br />These and many other "pragmatic paradoxes" do indeed attend the eliminativist's current position. But they signal only the depth and far reaching character of the conceptual revolution that EM would have to contemplate, not some flaw within EM itself. Logically, the situation is entirely foursquare. Assume Q (the framework of FP assumptions); argue legitimately from Q and other empirical premises to the conclusion that not-Q; and then conclude not-Q by the principle of reductio ad absurdum.<br /><br />If the self-defeating objection were correct in this instance, it would signal a blanket refutation of all formal reductios, because they all "presuppose what they are trying to deny." Such a demonstration would be a major contribution to logic, and not just to the philosophy of mind. A more balanced opinion, I suggest, is that this venerable principle of argument is threatened neither in general, nor in the case at issue.<br /><br />Let us concede then, or even insist, that current FP permits no coherent or tension-free denial of itself within its own theoretical vocabulary. As we have just seen, this buys it no proof against empirical criticism. Moreover, a </i>new<i> psychological framework - appropriately grounded in computational neuroscience, perhaps - need have no such limitation where the coherent denial of FP is concerned. We need only construct it, and move in. We can express criticisms of FP that are entirely free of internal conflicts. This was the aim of EM in the first place.</i><br /><br />I think this way of stating it is much clearer than anything I have seen from Bakker. It would, in fact, be a valid way of rebutting the incoherence charge as Churchland has construed it, but a lot rides on "arguing legitimately from Q and other empirical premises to the conclusion that not-Q." For the claim is not that not-Q is deduced from Q, but that science, because it generally eliminates things, will go on to do so. So there are underdetermination problems that are more than merely theoretical. Why reject Q other than some of the empirical premises? The empirical premises have to be given as true in order for the reductio ad absurdum of Q to be legitimate, but if one does not have a non-intentional account of science, then that won't work. (This is, of course, assuming that Q conjoined with some empirical premises does imply not-Q, which also does not seem to be true for any empirical premises of which I'm aware. What is reduced to absurdity might instead be the induction on the supposed elimination by science of fairies, leperchauns, and other things that eliminativists like to talk about.)<br /><br />More seriously, this defense doesn't touch something like Ed's argument, which challenges EM by requiring that it state itself coherently. If it cannot give non-intentional accounts of things like 'truth', then it lacks content or contradicts itself. The complaint is not that EM presupposes FP. In a sense it doesn't, for its proponents passionately disavow FP. The complaint is that EM can't show what it is to do instead. (The account might seem a bit more plausible if one understands the objection in terms of the statement "I believe I have no beliefs", as Churchland does.)Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-36602687137222523892015-01-22T09:38:18.742-08:002015-01-22T09:38:18.742-08:00Monk68 writes: But if Bakker's "independe...Monk68 writes: <i>But if Bakker's "independent basis" (say neuroscience or some such)turns out to be *itself* dependent upon intentionality for the discovery and communication of its own findings, then all that an appeal to such an "independent basis" will have achieved is to kick the can further down the road.</i><br /><br />I would just like to add to Monk68's point, that there are other philosophies of mind (reductionism, functionalism, etc.) equally consistent with neuroscience. It's not like Bakker can correctly say, "Look, neuroscience <i>demands</i> eliminativism. No other philosophy makes sense of it." These other philosophies also admit the intentionality so basic to human experience.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58177584441852708542015-01-22T09:20:36.909-08:002015-01-22T09:20:36.909-08:00With Ed Feser's permission, [he can remove thi...With Ed Feser's permission, [he can remove this without my objection] I'd like to leave a couple of links to news items which just showed up in my mail box and relate to certain concepts of intentionality, in a variety of ways.<br /><br />Although not directly addressing the notion of intentionality, they express on various levels notions of what is taken to be intentionality; through their very existence. Both as the object and the purported explanation. Layers of intentionality are in place.<br /><br />(By the way, and for those who've kept up their studies: weren't "explicans" and "explicandum" the terms of art at some time in the past? The alternative, "explanans" for example, seems very awkward to me. Almost ludicrous. Bananarama.)<br /><br /><br />Many here who have strong backgrounds in historical studies, like Crude perhaps, and who have kept up on the literature, will know all about this. But it may only be on the fringes of others' awareness.<br /><br />At any rate, relating to intentionality, interpretation, reinterpretaion, new light on a "dark age", religion and mind, and even the crushing of recent<br />academic dogmas or intellectual conceits by new scientific analysis.<br /><br />Class it along with the Nuraghes of Sardinia, the Vinca culture, among others, as paradigm shifting areas of research.<br /><br /><br />https://www.academia.edu/4386577/Establishing_a_Radiocarbon_Sequence_for_G%C3%B6bekli_Tepe._State_of_Research_and_New_Data<br /><br /><br /><br />https://www.academia.edu/1877122/The_role_of_cult_and_feasting_in_the_emergence_of_Neolithic_communities._New_evidence_from_G%C3%B6bekli_Tepe_south-eastern_Turkey<br /><br />And for those who don't recall the "first the city then the temple" dogma,<br /><br />https://www.academia.edu/6198728/G%C3%B6bekli_Tepe_Newsletter_2014<br /><br /><br /><br />https://www.academia.edu/1606875/G%C3%B6bekli_Tepe_A_Stone_Age_ritual_center_in_southeastern_TurkeyDNWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-47828281266282613692015-01-22T09:04:29.178-08:002015-01-22T09:04:29.178-08:00Oops, I see I was writing as Brandon was already m...Oops, I see I was writing as Brandon was already making the same point.monk68https://www.blogger.com/profile/02718257273640738688noreply@blogger.com