tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post3628529344634151689..comments2024-03-18T21:06:42.546-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Coyne on intentionalityEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger69125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4030623768536524932011-06-05T16:43:03.503-07:002011-06-05T16:43:03.503-07:00Shane:
>> What I want to know is how bacter...Shane:<br /><br />>> What I want to know is how bacterial metabolism is (relevantly) different from, say the rusting of iron, which I assume you do not ascribe proto-intentionality to.<br /><br />The rusting of iron involves teleology, but not intentionality. I would say that proto-intentionality is something that occurs in living organisms, and not inanimate objects. In other words, there has to be a sufficient level of organization before proto-intentionality begins to occur.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23269150086824704752011-06-04T10:51:04.369-07:002011-06-04T10:51:04.369-07:00djindra: "I don't know why it should be s...djindra: <i>"I don't know why it should be significant to you or me either."</i><br /><br />It's significant to me because usually, when an atheist says "it evolved", he means that processes with no intentionality behind them produced something with intentionality.<br /><br />The theories of evolution I cited (and others) are all about "intentioned" evolution. So it's important what we mean when we say "it evolved like everything else".Daniel Smithhttp://thefoolishnessofgod.blogspot.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81340583287456505622011-06-03T19:02:34.476-07:002011-06-03T19:02:34.476-07:00"What I want to know is how bacterial metabol..."What I want to know is how bacterial metabolism is (relevantly) different from, say the rusting of iron, which I assume you do not ascribe proto-intentionality to."<br /><br />Metabolism is the dynamic perpetuation of a complex energy vortex. Rust is the static decay of an inanimate object.<br /><br />"Also, what about "proto-intentionality" is a form or component of the property that our conscious mental states exhibit?"<br /><br />Well, it is much more diffuse and probabilistic than proto-intention because it involves many more cells, and the even greater number of connections between those cells, so it becomes entwined in layers of biochemical coding and electrical wave patterns. So it is a more indirect signal than the proto-intention, but it is also capable of much greater variation.Step2noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18435037994898813842011-06-03T18:30:42.361-07:002011-06-03T18:30:42.361-07:00Daniel Smith,
"When you say 'it evolved ...Daniel Smith,<br /><br />"When you say 'it evolved like everything else', could you be a bit more specific?" <br /><br />No. I know nothing about Coyne. And for the purposes of this discussion it doesn't matter which version of evolution he supports. I don't know why it should be significant to you or me either.Don Jindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05550378223563435764noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-62780256953799799872011-06-03T17:30:44.573-07:002011-06-03T17:30:44.573-07:00djindra: "this facility -- no matter what it ...djindra: <i>"this facility -- no matter what it is -- evolved like everything else."</i><br /><br />How was that?<br /><br />Did it evolve like <a href="http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=WzDfOuHgBzMC&oi=fnd&pg=PR15&dq=otto+h+schindewolf&ots=xAIacFaNAT&sig=dECNAbwPFd66ULPv83XeDXpmDTI#v=onepage&q&f=false" rel="nofollow">Otto Schindewolf</a> said it did?<br /><br />Did it evolve like <a href="http://www.machanaim.org/philosof/nauka-rel/universal_genome.htm" rel="nofollow">Michael Sherman</a> said it did?<br /><br />Like <a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1077008/pdf/pnas01788-0029.pdf" rel="nofollow">Richard Goldschmidt</a> said? <a href="http://www.conservapedia.com/Pierre-Paul_Grass%C3%A9" rel="nofollow">Pierre Grasse</a>? <a href="http://www.uncommondescent.com/documentation/Semi-Meiosis.pdf" rel="nofollow">John Davison</a>?<br /><br />When you say "it evolved like everything else", could you be a bit more specific?Daniel Smithhttp://thefoolishnessofgod.blogspot.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9310280858001194702011-06-03T13:17:28.331-07:002011-06-03T13:17:28.331-07:00To build off of what Shane has said, if intentiona...To build off of what Shane has said, if intentionality is reducible to "what always happens to object X under Y condition" doesn't this destroy the distinction between, nonliving, living and living-and-concious matter, thus putting us in performative contradiction territory?Mr. Derpnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-60492379650174700972011-06-03T13:01:56.610-07:002011-06-03T13:01:56.610-07:00dguller,
Perhaps my formulation of 1 was unclear....dguller,<br /><br />Perhaps my formulation of 1 was unclear. It's supposed to express a sense of purpose, as you seem to believe that the bacterium's physical mechanisms have the purpose of getting to the next one, or of contributing to the survival of the bacterium. What I want to know is how bacterial metabolism is (relevantly) different from, say the rusting of iron, which I assume you do not ascribe proto-intentionality to.<br /><br />Also, what about "proto-intentionality" is a form or component of the property that our conscious mental states exhibit?shanenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-70732647517980624952011-06-03T09:03:33.559-07:002011-06-03T09:03:33.559-07:00June 3, 2011 6:42 AM
djindra said...
DNW,
...June 3, 2011 6:42 AM <br />djindra said...<br /><br /> DNW,<br /><br /> "...then maybe we need a different name for what we used to call machines so we will know which is which."<br /><br /> I see. Let's keep the word pure so you can keep begging the question."<br /><br /><br />Come back when you are willing to quote properly. Your troll games don't interest me.DNWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-13682706606434287712011-06-03T08:37:32.889-07:002011-06-03T08:37:32.889-07:00@Step2:
"The less forgivable the crime, the ...@Step2:<br /><br />"The less forgivable the crime, the more they must be forgiven." <br /><br />Not to quibble, but that's a Christian paradox, not really a contradiction.Joshuahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03854212736162113327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-43962792811083174992011-06-03T06:47:14.849-07:002011-06-03T06:47:14.849-07:00DNW,
"...then maybe we need a different name...DNW,<br /><br />"...then maybe we need a different name for what we used to call machines so we will know which is which."<br /><br />I see. Let's keep the word pure so you can keep begging the question.Don Jindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05550378223563435764noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83243694977001915912011-06-03T06:42:00.529-07:002011-06-03T06:42:00.529-07:00"Coyne, a loudmouth who doesn't shut up a..."Coyne, a loudmouth who doesn't shut up about his materialism"<br /><br />Had you and Feser attacked his materialism that would have been appropriate. But instead you put words in his mouth. You've been caught, like Weiner. Now, like Weiner, you're bored with the questioning.Don Jindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05550378223563435764noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55106061483831879052011-06-03T05:43:49.964-07:002011-06-03T05:43:49.964-07:00Side note.
The jokes about Weiner write themselve...Side note.<br /><br />The jokes about Weiner write themselves.BenYachovhttp://www.catholic.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-64186100693210887412011-06-02T20:46:34.880-07:002011-06-02T20:46:34.880-07:00djindra,
What's Coyne's response to this?...djindra,<br /><br /><i>What's Coyne's response to this? Nothing. He doesn't care. He says he'll leave that question to the philosophers. Coyne likely does this because he's not interested in the philosopher's mind/body problem. </i><br /><br />That you have to go for a defense that amounts to 'Coyne, a loudmouth who doesn't shut up about his materialism, probably has no position on the mind-body issue - so we can't take his words in the most obvious sense' is really saying something. I won't pick apart the other inconsistencies in your explanation, because by now it's just plain dull. If I wanted to read this level of spinning, I'd follow more Congressman Weiner news.Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11728300363988918462011-06-02T20:27:47.824-07:002011-06-02T20:27:47.824-07:00Crude,
Let me explain why Feser and you got it wr...Crude,<br /><br />Let me explain why Feser and you got it wrong. <br /><br />You say "Feser points out that Coyne's vague handwaves are not explanations of meaning." I say that Feser is jumping to a conclusion Coyne never intended. Nowhere in his post does Coyne claim to explain meaning. Nowhere does he even attempt such and explanation. His post was a response to Torley. Torley goes off on a wild tangent. Torley wants to prove that mind and brain are not the same. He mentions Feser numerous times in this regard. What's Coyne's response to this? Nothing. He doesn't care. He says he'll leave that question to the philosophers. Coyne likely does this because he's not interested in the philosopher's mind/body problem. He's likely not interested in what "mind" is in the dualist's sense. He offers not a hint of that interest and offers no counter proposal. His interest in "meaning" is only to note that we have it. And if we have it he sees no problem operating under the working assumption that this facility -- no matter what it is -- evolved like everything else. That's what Coyne means when he says, "'meaning' seem[s] to pose no problem, either physically or evolutionarily, to me: our brain-modules have evolved to make sense of what we take in from the environment." Are you and Feser going to claim our brains did not evolve? If that ID tact is extreme, are you instead going to claim our brains evolved to scramble what we take in from the environment? I think Coyne is making a very straightforward and relatively modest proposal that Feser blew completely out of proportion.Don Jindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05550378223563435764noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-68560711031603165522011-06-02T17:02:05.428-07:002011-06-02T17:02:05.428-07:00Anonymous:
>> It's right there in the b...Anonymous:<br /><br />>> It's right there in the book you bought, though.<br /><br />The only definition that I could find is an account of the world that rejects formal and final causes. In that case, yes, I do reject that version of materialism.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11957592735689195282011-06-02T17:00:42.725-07:002011-06-02T17:00:42.725-07:00"Apropos, that's self-contradictory."..."Apropos, that's self-contradictory." <br /><br />Maybe, but I think the human condition is filled with contradictions. One of the more inspirational quotes I've ever heard was from a nun who ministered to death row inmates. She said, "The less forgivable the crime, the more they must be forgiven."Step2noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-21547092071544307232011-06-02T16:19:48.774-07:002011-06-02T16:19:48.774-07:00In the end, we are self-perceiving, self-inventing...<i>In the end, we are self-perceiving, self-inventing, locked-in mirages that are little miracles of self-reference.</i><br /><br />Apropos, that's self-contradictory. ;)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29883566510628531582011-06-02T16:09:30.757-07:002011-06-02T16:09:30.757-07:00"I'd almost think that one's theory o..."I'd almost think that one's theory of meaning is coincident with perception."<br /><br />I would mostly agree with that. There are categories in which you could differentiate the various processes involved in intentional meaning, so long as you remember that there is some overlap and tension between the categories. Communication, which relies in part upon shared perceptions. Integration, which connects memory to current perception. Filtering, which edits perception, frequently in response to desires or fears.<br /><br />“In the end, we are self-perceiving, self-inventing, locked-in mirages that are little miracles of self-reference.”<br />— Douglas HofstadterStep2noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-38490260723417878962011-06-02T14:41:23.236-07:002011-06-02T14:41:23.236-07:00How does he define them? I cannot recall.
It'...<i>How does he define them? I cannot recall.</i><br /><br />It's right there in the book you bought, though.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88760164178199380172011-06-02T13:25:16.760-07:002011-06-02T13:25:16.760-07:00dinjra comments:
" Maybe you ought to questi...dinjra comments:<br /><br />" Maybe you ought to question your unquestioned notion that all machines are designed "intentionally." "<br /><br /><br /><br />Maybe you ought to engage in fewer dishonest categoricals in developing your polemics.<br /><br />I had just gotten through saying that if Coyne and company want to appropriate and redefine the term machine by packing non-designed and unintentionally arising, non-devices, into the concept they are certainly welcome to do so.<br /><br /><br /><br />But of course, in the process they undercut their own goal of disconcerting the rubes with an application of the term "machine", while at the same the explanatory power of the definition fades similarly.<br /><br />You wind up with the silliness of Hobbes and Guattari, and maybe lathes with rights ... if only they were "sentient".<br /><br /><br />If however nondesigned "systems" that serve no end are now to be called by the same name that things made by men to assist in performing work are called, then maybe we need a different name for what we used to call machines so we will know which is which.DNWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80560094960584613352011-06-02T13:22:14.884-07:002011-06-02T13:22:14.884-07:00Anonymous:
>> So you reject naturalism and ...Anonymous:<br /><br />>> So you reject naturalism and materialism as Edward Feser defines them?<br /><br />How does he define them? I cannot recall.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12675209435314719512011-06-02T12:57:14.422-07:002011-06-02T12:57:14.422-07:00Jon, read the past posts or buy Ed's books. Mo...Jon, read the past posts or buy Ed's books. Most of us here have at least purchased and read The Last Superstition, but more detail can be found in the archives.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4002173918645464972011-06-02T12:53:25.551-07:002011-06-02T12:53:25.551-07:00Tim,
I don't know who J is. My name is Don Ji...Tim,<br /><br />I don't know who J is. My name is Don Jindra. I've never in over twenty years of online activity posted under anything but djindra or donjindra.Don Jindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05550378223563435764noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14718097642661415032011-06-02T12:50:02.573-07:002011-06-02T12:50:02.573-07:00Yaargh. I still don't get it.
It seems the ar...Yaargh. I still don't get it.<br /><br />It seems the argument being made here is that nothing "makes sense" unless we already have a larger understanding of "sense."<br /><br />If so, I don't see why this should be the case. Instead I would guess that one would only need to be able to perceive difference between things in order to build an understanding of the world.<br /><br />In other words, I would think that the larger understanding of "sense" that y'all are saying should be presupposed is more likely a product of perceiving difference and gaining experience. Once one is able to recall that one thing is different than another, one could use some things to represent other things: that is, give some things meaning.<br /><br />Meaning, as I understand it, is a relationship between two things. Any two things perceived differently, which is to say registered differently in the mind, will force the perceiver to log some meaning relative to one or the other thing. So I don't understand where presupposition comes into play. I'd almost think that one's theory of meaning is coincident with perception.<br /><br />But I am way out of my depth here and don't mean to sound as if I know what I'm talking about. Are the ideas I articulate above close to any "real" philosophical positions that I could study?Jonnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-78684693577992455242011-06-02T12:43:32.421-07:002011-06-02T12:43:32.421-07:00Are you agreeing that there are formal and final c...<i><b>Are you agreeing that there are formal and final causes in nature?</b><br /><br />Yup.</i><br /><br />&&<br /><br /><i>I would say that as long as there is any kind of regularity, patterns and law-like behavior, then you inherently have teleology, because the behavior of entities is directed towards following those laws.</i><br /><br />So you reject naturalism and materialism as Edward Feser defines them?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com