tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post3318356912051946825..comments2024-03-28T13:39:03.094-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Five Proofs previewEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger259125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55088109281930577862017-09-19T09:50:44.753-07:002017-09-19T09:50:44.753-07:003) In order for there to be a first mover, there m...3) In order for there to be a first mover, there must be an object for motion. This could be the mover itself, moving itself (i.e. to create things). If it is not, the dumb slug perceives a causation problem. If the first mover moves an object it did not create then we are left to ponder what created it? If it is as Aristotle presumed always there, then the being itself is an uncaused being. If an uncaused being has potency would we not have a problem of movement again? Perhaps the first mover can apply potency to infinitely extant things thereby establishing contigency in uncaused beings (those that were always there). The slug wonders if the application of first mover does not mandate that it would be the only infinitely extant being and that it must be a creator of all lesser known things?<br />4) Finally, there is no pantheism in natural philosophy (yes it is a stupid, in the sense of obvious, statement - see above about being a slug). As a slug, quantum mechanics would be like asking me to sprout wings and fly, but basic physics I can handle (I stick to walls). In order for there to be movement there must be space for it to move and time for there to be a process. It seems to me that the first mover must either be subject to space and time or must create space and time. If it is the former the first mover would be contingent on space and time in order for it to operate. Again the issue of the moment of instantiation (potency) of the first mover would be limited by its ability to interact with space and time, can the first mover push something to the edge? Beyond it? If it is the latter, which seems more reasonable, the dumb slug perceives another conundrum. That is the question of space (by that I mean the absence of being or nothing). We come back to my stupid pantheism statement. If we have many beings, there must be a point where one being stops and another begins. That line, however small, must be defined by space. A purple circle of paint in a field of yellow paint is the example, one could say that the purple stops somewhere and the yellow begins. Others will say it is all paint and there is no space between the purple and yellow. However, there is still purple here and yellow there. I guess it doesn't matter except to say that we either have to say that space between beings exists or doesn't exist. All is fine and dandy until we come back to the first mover, if it creates spaces and time and creates other beings (always less pure) where does it do so? Must this space and time be created within itself? Or do lesser beings overflow off the edges like warts on the skin? Long preamble to another stupid question, Is the first mover a form of Panentheism? Creating space and time but at the same time being a natural being. For if we call the first mover "Super-natural" it must be "super-reasonable" (by that I mean "Above" reason and not obtainable by philosophy alone)? <br /><br />I was honest in identifying that I make no pretense of genius. I am just a curious person who would like to object, from my lowly state, to the more brilliant creatures of the universe.<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19190718691570523852017-09-19T09:50:21.943-07:002017-09-19T09:50:21.943-07:00I am late to the party here but I have a few quest...I am late to the party here but I have a few questions. Aquinas was called "Dumb Ox" you can call me the "Dumb Slug." I have been accused of ignorance (like a child playing with big words) before so please just respond in an educative manner rather than a pejorative manner (I'm just a slug after all).<br /><br />1) The idea of a first mover (unmoved mover) is one that identifies, within reason, a being that has the power to move in itself. This is a power denied to all other things "set in motion," by this same unmoved mover. Can the unmoved mover move itself? I'd assume so, understanding that no other entity can move it and understanding that to set something else in motion is a motion in itself by the actor. There must be a moment of instigation, and the instigation must have been a potency embedded in the unmoved mover to allow for the first move. If the power exists in one being (the unmoved mover) why is it irrational to believe it exists in others?<br />2) I prematurely brought up potency in the first question so I'll follow up here. The idea of a "First Mover" means that everything must have been at one point still. This would raise the question as to whether the first mover could be Actus Purus (Pure act) if it has potency? I am a dumb slug but I am guessing that if the answer is something like infinite or eternal movement that it would simply be a return to infinite regress? If actus purus can be infinitely or eternally in motion, why can't everything else be?<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49274503459704414102017-07-03T04:37:45.808-07:002017-07-03T04:37:45.808-07:00Good news indeedGood news indeedAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57935677072335853562017-05-19T20:20:41.084-07:002017-05-19T20:20:41.084-07:00AnonymousMay 15, 2017 at 8:23 PM
"Also, talk...AnonymousMay 15, 2017 at 8:23 PM<br /><br />"Also, talk of accepting postulates would presuppose that our rational functions work too. "<br />--I usually add the redundant qualifier "provisional" to "postulate" just for clarity, but sometimes I don't bother for the reason that the qualifier "provisional" is inherent to what a postulate is.<br /><br />"After all, we don't accept just any postulate or pick them at random. We pick ones that are self-defeating to deny, ones that seem to match with nature,"<br />--You used the tern "seem to" very naturally in your sentence, even though you question my use of "seems to". So, I think you likely have an intuitive sense of "seems to" but have not yet incorporated that intuition into a more carefully considered conscious set of positions.<br /><br />"useful ones, etc. If our decision-making apparatus can't be trusted, then how can we trust our selection of postulates?"<br />--We don't, or at least I don't "trust" in the sense of "absolutely accept". We act based on confidence levels absent absolute trust, else we are paralyzed.StardustyPsychehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12493629973262220492noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-48003704996436337062017-05-19T20:04:39.561-07:002017-05-19T20:04:39.561-07:00SP "I say "provisionally postulate"...SP "I say "provisionally postulate"."<br /><br />Anonymous: Then why do you need to make the "seems to work" assertion if you are already postulating that it works anyway? "<br />--Because the postulate is inherently provisional. Science does not do proof.<br /><br /><br />Anonymous: After all, if our rationality has some flaw, then we can't discount the possibility that our way of evaluating whether or not it seems to work is flawed too.<br />--Indeed, which is a reason I say "seems to work"<br /><br /><br />SP "But if that computer controls an engine the engine likely will not run."<br /><br />Anonymous: Why not?<br />--Because a working engine requires a concordance with reality. If the spark plug fires at the wrong time the engine will not run. If the fuel mixture is either too rich or too lean it will not ignite and the engine will not run. In a very real sense the engine "fine tuned to run". A demonstrable intelligence has fine tuned a host of dynamic parameters so the engine will run. If the tuning parameters do not comport with reality the engine will not run in reality.<br /><br /><br />SP "When large numbers of systems seem to function very well on the same set of fundamental postulates...our confidence in those postulates is justifiably high."<br /><br />Anonymous: Why does this follow?<br />--What is the probability that 100 fair coin flips will come up heads in a row? We could account for a single flip turning up heads by mere chance. Two in a row is still not so very difficult to attribute to chance. But if we observe 100 pennies all in on the ground all turned up heads our confidence level is very high that some process is at work, not mere chance.<br /><br />So, the fact that millions of people around the world verify the functionality of Newtonian mechanics at our ordinary functional level is very strong evidence Newtonian mechanics is a valid model under those circumstances.<br /><br />Anonymous: At this point I'll leave you to make the last reply if you wish. I still don't see why the "seems to work" argument wrt rationality is needed if you choose to postulate that it does anyway. <br />--To recap, because postulates are provisional, not proved.<br /><br />Anonymous: And if you do make it, how it isn't circular. After all, mathematical axioms and trivial transformations are postulates, but you can still make a circular argument, where the believability of a premise depends critically on the believeability of the conclusion. So, merely the fact that things are declared to be provisional postulates doesn't make circularity impossible.<br />--That depends on the form of the argument and what the specific claims are. It is the lack of claim of absolute certainty that breaks circularity.<br /><br />StardustyPsychehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12493629973262220492noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80483784128293055912017-05-18T15:43:54.790-07:002017-05-18T15:43:54.790-07:00"I say "provisionally postulate".&q..."I say "provisionally postulate"."<br /><br />Then why do you need to make the "seems to work" assertion if you are already postulating that it works anyway? After all, if our rationality has some flaw, then we can't discount the possibility that our way of evaluating whether or not it seems to work is flawed too.<br /><br />"But if that computer controls an engine the engine likely will not run."<br /><br />Why not?<br /><br />"When large numbers of systems seem to function very well on the same set of fundamental postulates..."<br /><br />"our confidence in those postulates is justifiably high."<br /><br />Why does this follow?<br /><br />At this point I'll leave you to make the last reply if you wish. I still don't see why the "seems to work" argument wrt rationality is needed if you choose to postulate that it does anyway. And if you do make it, how it isn't circular. After all, mathematical axioms and trivial transformations are postulates, but you can still make a circular argument, where the believability of a premise depends critically on the believeability of the conclusion. So, merely the fact that things are declared to be provisional postulates doesn't make circularity impossible.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-90565224109814171672017-05-18T07:18:20.081-07:002017-05-18T07:18:20.081-07:00Dude I am so looking forward to this.Dude I am so looking forward to this.J.Storeyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17397598526134827584noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-43307748450943848582017-05-15T21:28:19.575-07:002017-05-15T21:28:19.575-07:00AnonymousMay 15, 2017 at 7:47 PM
If I did not mak...AnonymousMay 15, 2017 at 7:47 PM<br /><br />If I did not make this point clear allow me to state I am primarily arguing for a naturalistic/materialistic existence. <br /><br />SP "Because it all *seems to* work and seems to produce highly consistent results."<br /><br />"But we undergo a rational process when we deem something as "seeming to work." We don't declare things as just seeming to work arbitrarily. It is a conclusion that we arrive at, using logic/reason/evidence. That's my point. The problem is, if we don't first assume "<br />--What is your definition of "assume"?<br /><br />I say "provisionally postulate".<br /><br />If by "assume" you mean "accept as an absolute fact" then I disagree that is necessary.<br /><br />If by "assume" you mean "tacitly presume", indicating a sort of unawareness, I also deny that definition on naturalism.<br /><br />" how can we put any stock in the results of the process?"<br />--You can put as much stock (make a personal probability estimate or confidence level judgement) as you put in the postulates upon which the conclusion are founded, the basic reliability of the human senses, and the principles of logic.<br /><br />"We can't have an infinite regress of "seems to work." "<br />--Right, neither an infinite regress or circularity are needed.<br /><br />If I am 99# confident all my postulates are the case then I am 99# confident my conclusions are correct. If the 1# turns out to be the case for my postulates then the 1# turns out to be the case for the conclusions.<br />(percentages for illustration only, not intended to be a rigorous probability calculation)<br /><br />" Like I mentioned before, a computer program with an incorrect formula (like a + where there ought to be a *) will still produce consistent results."<br />--But if that computer controls an engine the engine likely will not run. We have a matrix of interconnected evidences. When large numbers of systems seem to function very well on the same set of fundamental postulates our confidence in those postulates is justifiably high.StardustyPsychehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12493629973262220492noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-10653335068840826122017-05-15T21:20:25.181-07:002017-05-15T21:20:25.181-07:00AnonymousMay 15, 2017 at 7:47 PM
If I did not mak...AnonymousMay 15, 2017 at 7:47 PM<br /><br />If I did not make this point clear allow me to state I am primarily arguing for a naturalistic/materialistic existence. <br /><br />SP "Because it all *seems to* work and seems to produce highly consistent results."<br /><br />"But we undergo a rational process when we deem something as "seeming to work." We don't declare things as just seeming to work arbitrarily. It is a conclusion that we arrive at, using logic/reason/evidence. That's my point. The problem is, if we don't first assume "<br />--What is your definition of "assume"?<br /><br />I say "provisionally postulate".<br /><br />If by "assume" you mean "accept as an absolute fact" then I disagree that is necessary.<br /><br />If by "assume" you mean "tacitly presume", indicating a sort of unawareness, I also deny that definition on naturalism.<br /><br />" how can we put any stock in the results of the process?"<br />--You can put as much stock (make a personal probability estimate or confidence level judgement) as you put in the postulates upon which the conclusion are founded, the basic reliability of the human senses, and the principles of logic.<br /><br />"We can't have an infinite regress of "seems to work." "<br />--Right, neither an infinite regress or circularity are needed.<br /><br />If I am 99# confident all my postulates are the case then I am 99# confident my conclusions are correct. If the 1# turns out to be the case for my postulates then the 1# turns out to be the case for the conclusions.<br />(percentages for illustration only, not intended to be a rigorous probability calculation)<br /><br />" Like I mentioned before, a computer program with an incorrect formula (like a + where there ought to be a *) will still produce consistent results."<br />--But if that computer controls an engine the engine likely will not run. We have a matrix of interconnected evidences. When large numbers of systems seem to function very well on the same set of fundamental postulates our confidence in those postulates is justifiably high.StardustyPsychehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12493629973262220492noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4328421128580943752017-05-15T20:33:37.805-07:002017-05-15T20:33:37.805-07:00Sincerely with your last reply, you murdered his p...Sincerely with your last reply, you murdered his position.<br /><br />His position is basically that rationality is black box, and it seems to work... have no idea how anyone knows how the box properly works, but he concluded by using the same black box that it works.<br /><br />It is a logical pretzel if anything.Eduardonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-65946300092618554612017-05-15T20:23:35.854-07:002017-05-15T20:23:35.854-07:00Also, talk of accepting postulates would presuppos...Also, talk of accepting postulates would presuppose that our rational functions work too. After all, we don't accept just any postulate or pick them at random. We pick ones that are self-defeating to deny, ones that seem to match with nature, useful ones, etc. If our decision-making apparatus can't be trusted, then how can we trust our selection of postulates?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-21348284350069136962017-05-15T20:07:39.741-07:002017-05-15T20:07:39.741-07:00The criteria for something that seems to work didn...The criteria for something that seems to work didn't appear out of nowhere. It was a product of human rationality.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-68828875007302069652017-05-15T19:47:37.266-07:002017-05-15T19:47:37.266-07:00"Because it all *seems to* work and seems to ..."Because it all *seems to* work and seems to produce highly consistent results."<br /><br />But we undergo a rational process when we deem something as "seeming to work." We don't declare things as just seeming to work arbitrarily. It is a conclusion that we arrive at, using logic/reason/evidence. That's my point. The problem is, if we don't first assume that human rationality works (which I do, for the record), how can we put any stock in the results of the process? We can't have an infinite regress of "seems to work." And consistency is necessary but not sufficient for something that seems to work. Like I mentioned before, a computer program with an incorrect formula (like a + where there ought to be a *) will still produce consistent results.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86024972342622524802017-05-15T18:58:32.468-07:002017-05-15T18:58:32.468-07:00AnonymousMay 15, 2017 at 4:57 PM
" Why shoul...AnonymousMay 15, 2017 at 4:57 PM<br /><br />" Why should I accept an argument that human rationality seems to be good, "<br />--"Should" would be a strong claim if it were asserted in an absolute sense of what you "ought" to do.<br /><br />The key is "seems to be". My senses seem to be basically reliable. The postulates of logic seem to be valid. Science seems to work to produce a great many results that seem to be very real and beneficial.<br /><br /><br />"when the process used to measure/determine its goodness also depends on human rationality being good?"<br />--Because it all *seems to* work and seems to produce highly consistent results.<br /><br />You are free to consider your experiences to be nothing more than a grand illusion, but I do not recommend it, as Feynman said "the philosopher who contemplated the reality of his food died of hunger"StardustyPsychehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12493629973262220492noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39228825994906467672017-05-15T18:48:54.453-07:002017-05-15T18:48:54.453-07:00AnonymousMay 15, 2017 at 4:50 PM
SP "Not on ...AnonymousMay 15, 2017 at 4:50 PM<br /><br />SP "Not on a human functional level. You are referring to logical/mathematical formalizations."<br /><br />"How is it not involved with the human functional level? (Also define what you mean by human functional level)." <br />--By human functional level I mean the level of functionality each of us employs to function as human beings in our lives.<br /><br />"P-values are used in clinical trials, for example, which help us make decisions about the effectiveness of competing medicines. Isn't that affecting human beliefs and behaviors?"<br />--In such studies great effort is put into controlling for human biases and non-formalized probability estimates. Scientists study formalized methods of calculating probabilities and construct their studies to be mathematically sound.<br /><br />People don't generally function that way. We estimate probability internally as a complex brain process, much of which we are not consciously aware of. We experience these probability estimates as personal emotions, a feeling, a hunch, personal doubt, uneasiness, confidence, or being personally convinced.<br /><br />Such internal probability estimates are the result of pattern matching and analysis algorithms in the brain that do not strictly adhere to the principles of probability one studies from a math textbook.<br /><br />That's what knowledge is, functionally, a personal probability estimate. Structurally knowledge is a dynamic brain network structure.<br /><br />On naturalism we can define knowledge in terms of the human processes of "knowing" information.<br /><br />This avoids the circularity that can be demonstrated in attempting to account for "justified true belief" as a definition of knowledge. <br />StardustyPsychehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12493629973262220492noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67348407993513737392017-05-15T16:57:40.420-07:002017-05-15T16:57:40.420-07:00And again, I'm talking about your argument wrt...And again, I'm talking about your argument wrt rationality. I'm not addressing naturalism as a whole. Why should I accept an argument that human rationality seems to be good, when the process used to measure/determine its goodness also depends on human rationality being good?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-36061155078972516522017-05-15T16:50:03.294-07:002017-05-15T16:50:03.294-07:00"That depends on the form of the argument. Yo..."That depends on the form of the argument. You showed a rather trivial mathematical transformation that arrived back at the starting point on the symmetric property of equality."<br /><br />Yes it was a trivial mathematical transformation. As a proof of the derivative of sin(x), is that trivial transformation convincing?<br /><br />But if you want a better example of a circular math argument, check the first argument here:<br /><br />https://www.quora.com/What-is-a-circular-proof-in-mathematics<br /><br />"Not on a human functional level. You are referring to logical/mathematical formalizations."<br /><br />How is it not involved with the human functional level? (Also define what you mean by human functional level). P-values are used in clinical trials, for example, which help us make decisions about the effectiveness of competing medicines. Isn't that affecting human beliefs and behaviors?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42103371729509082582017-05-15T16:30:14.425-07:002017-05-15T16:30:14.425-07:00He showed a circular thinking process you StarImbe...He showed a circular thinking process you StarImbecile. <br /><br />The Mathematical formulation is obviously meant to represent how we perceive things...<br /><br />But if they are so different, dear troll, show us how they are different, don't just keep saying shit, show us!Eduardonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-84138675538785440722017-05-15T16:02:44.978-07:002017-05-15T16:02:44.978-07:00AnonymousMay 15, 2017 at 3:02 PM
"Do you den...AnonymousMay 15, 2017 at 3:02 PM<br /><br />"Do you deny that it is possible to beg the question even with premises/axioms that aren't taken as absolutely true?"<br />--That depends on the form of the argument. You showed a rather trivial mathematical transformation that arrived back at the starting point on the symmetric property of equality.<br /><br />You seem to think the subject of the presuppositional interrogation algorithm is in some sense irrelevant. I'm not sure how familiar you are with it but it attempts to show the circularity of naturalism using a series of questions and logical assertions.<br /><br />By properly presenting concepts like truth, knowledge, possibility, certainty on naturalism it can be shown that naturalism is not inherently circular.<br /><br /><br />"Also with regard to confidence levels and probability estimates, those are based on probability theory which is based on deductive/mathematical logic."<br />--Not on a human functional level. You are referring to logical/mathematical formalizations.StardustyPsychehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12493629973262220492noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-47984246516102577872017-05-15T15:16:24.748-07:002017-05-15T15:16:24.748-07:00Anon, just read this part:
Circularity is a probl...Anon, just read this part:<br /><br /><i>Circularity is a problem when one claims absolute truth but in fact is using a system founded on unproved postulates.</i><br /><br />This is his position. He doesn't believe in contractions when he perceives the premises in the argument as being provisional.<br /><br />It is as others have said, when it suits him, it works, when it doesn't suits him it is nothing more but provisional/working theories and no conclusion that he doesn't likes can come from that.<br /><br />I applaud you Anon, but nothing is coming from him, he is more likely to give an interesting indication for the wrong reasons then knowing what the heck he is talking about...Eduardonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16273382325260666422017-05-15T15:02:19.168-07:002017-05-15T15:02:19.168-07:00"You brought up circularity."
It wasn&#..."You brought up circularity."<br /><br />It wasn't about the circularity of naturalism per se, but one of the points you brought up about rationality. And go back to my sin(x) example. Do you deny that it is possible to beg the question even with premises/axioms that aren't taken as absolutely true?<br /><br />"A careful analysis of the precise claims I am making shows this is not the case."<br /><br />And why do you need to bring up presuppositionalism in order to make this careful analysis? You could say:<br /><br />"This doesn't beg the question because XYZ."<br /><br />But you seem to have said:<br /><br />"This doesn't beg the question because XYZ. Presuppositionalists bring this up too."<br /><br />In which case it really is just a fun fact. Also with regard to confidence levels and probability estimates, those are based on probability theory which is based on deductive/mathematical logic. AKA, components of human rationality.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-76323063312532081312017-05-15T14:58:28.310-07:002017-05-15T14:58:28.310-07:00Keep Digging StarBraindead maybe you will reach Ch...Keep Digging StarBraindead maybe you will reach China if you keep going XD.Eduardonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-63648866985862439632017-05-15T14:53:12.600-07:002017-05-15T14:53:12.600-07:00Red Herring
Annnnd no argument whatsoever...
&q...Red Herring<br /><br />Annnnd no argument whatsoever... <br /><br />"If only you do THIS, that I could have done from the very start but am unwilling or incapable of, you will see that I am right!"<br /><br />Genius, just genius...Eduardonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-76800991645475524922017-05-15T14:41:10.170-07:002017-05-15T14:41:10.170-07:00AnonymousMay 15, 2017 at 12:29 PM
SP "True, ...AnonymousMay 15, 2017 at 12:29 PM<br /><br />SP "True, are you suggesting I said that? I don't recall saying any such thing."<br /><br />"Maybe not, but then I again wonder why you brought up presuppositionalism. Unless you meant it as a sort of fun fact that was only marginally related to the discussion?"<br /><br />You can call it a fun fact if you want. You brought up circularity. Presuppositionalism is perhaps the most obvious example of theistic circularity in an attempt to prove god's existence, and asserted proofs of god's existence is the subject of the OP.<br /><br />The presuppositionalist will accuse the naturalist of circularity as well. Because the presup follows an interrogation algorithm it can be illustrative to show how there is no circularity on naturalism when naturalism is correctly expressed.<br /><br />There are instances recently above where I have been accused of begging the question. A careful analysis of the precise claims I am making shows this is not the case. <br /><br />The nullification of the presup interrogator algorithm is just one technique for showing that naturalism is not begging the question when properly expressed.<br />StardustyPsychehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12493629973262220492noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-41437979382404961452017-05-15T12:29:23.635-07:002017-05-15T12:29:23.635-07:00"True, are you suggesting I said that? I don&..."True, are you suggesting I said that? I don't recall saying any such thing."<br /><br />Maybe not, but then I again wonder why you brought up presuppositionalism. Unless you meant it as a sort of fun fact that was only marginally related to the discussion?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com