tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post3240315871442605576..comments2024-03-28T21:43:44.433-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: He refutes you thusEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger889125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-65294395880839814932013-07-25T12:45:08.354-07:002013-07-25T12:45:08.354-07:00Ed:
Could you please delete the last post I sent?...Ed:<br /><br />Could you please delete the last post I sent? I'll just let Ben have the last word here, and spare you the misery of having to moderate the thread.<br /><br />Thanks. dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4361682759391915202013-07-25T10:37:35.390-07:002013-07-25T10:37:35.390-07:00>I’ll tell you what, Ben. If your next response...>I’ll tell you what, Ben. If your next response to me is civil and substantive, then I’d be happy to continue this conversation with you, perhaps on an unmoderated thread.<br /><br />The problem dguller is <b>I don't believe you are civil</b> nor do I find anything you have to say substansive. What? Didn't you notice the way you treated DavidM was wrong?<br /><br />Ignoring his points? Majoring in the minors? Repeating yourself instead of arguing his points? Acting like an arrogant know-it- all? Others commented negatively about your style as well.<br /><br />It is possible to be "uncivil" without uttering a single curse word. David was trying to be polite to you & you acted like a jerk.<br /><br />Aquinas says explicitly there is number in the Trinity but not in the Divine Essence in ON THE POWER OF GOD QUESTION 9 PART V. He also says elsewhere in part VII there is no number in God. So obviously he is using the term "number" in two different senses. I suspect the later has something to do with his realist view of mathematics that real numbers correspond to real objects in some fashion. God is not an object.<br /><br />>>"Totally identical" is a term of equivocation on your part.<br /><br />>It isn’t. X is totally identical to Y iff X is the same as Y in every way iff X is not different from Y in any way. There never was any equivocation.<br /><br />Yet G-L says rather explicitly in his commentary on Q32 in the SUMMA that the Father is God and the Trinity is God but the Father is NOT the Trinity.<br /><br />So obviously the term "fully God" we traditionally use isn't equivalent to your made up term "totally identical". So you are arguing a Straw man & you won't find a single Catholic here familiar with the Trinity who thinks you are doing otherwise & you have been told as much by others (David, Bill Jack etc).<br /><br />There is no advantage to anyone here having a conversation on any of these issues with you IMHO.<br /><br /><b>You condescending offer to continue this "conversation" is neither required or desired.</b> <br /><br />Bye!Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-38723409899552189302013-07-25T05:08:09.531-07:002013-07-25T05:08:09.531-07:00Scott:
dguller: That doesn't explain anything...Scott:<br /><br /><i>dguller: That doesn't explain anything. There appears to be a contradiction, and I'm not convinced that Aquinas or anyone else has explained satisfactorily why it isn't really one. Here's why: [argument that doesn't quite engage the claim of mystery].</i><br /><br />I have addressed Ben’s claims of mystery before. They probably just got lost in the shuffle. <br /><br />My argument against the claim of mystery is the following. Say that a person belonged to a faith that endorsed the following propositions:<br /><br />(1) God is material<br />(2) God is pure act<br />(3) It is impossible for there to be a logical contradiction in God<br />(4) If there seems to be a logical contradiction, then the matter must be subsumed under the category of <i>mystery</i><br /><br />Clearly, on the basis of (1) and (2), we get the following:<br /><br />(5) God has potentiality (by (1))<br />(6) God has no potentiality (by (2))<br />(7) (5) contradicts (6)<br /><br />Since (7) appears to be a logical contradiction, we must apply (3) and (4) to conclude:<br /><br />(8) It is a mystery how (1) and (2) do not logically contradict one another<br /><br />Only someone in the religion in question would endorse (8). Most people would conclude on the basis of (7) that either (1), (2), or (3) is false, by virtue of reductio ad absurdum, but with mystery, this move is completely blocked. In fact, one can theoretically <i>never</i> be permitted to apply a reductio ad absurdum, because one can <i>always</i> cry, “mystery!” For me, the fact that this attitude allows the endorsement of propositions as grossly contradictory as (1) and (2) shows this attitude to be a false one. After all, it makes clear logical contradictions permissible, which destroys the truth-preserving capacity of any rational system. dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14638096307741015192013-07-25T04:50:51.781-07:002013-07-25T04:50:51.781-07:00In the absolute sense yes but Aquinas said " ...<i> In the absolute sense yes but Aquinas said " Again Athanasius says in the Creed: “All the three Persons are co-eternal and co-equal with one another.” Therefore in God there is a number of persons. I answer that the plurality of persons in God is an article of faith, and natural reason is unable to discuss and adequately understand it."POWER OF GOD Ibin.</i><br /><br />Let’s assume that it is possible to count numbers outside of the categories. That would mean that countable numbers are transcendental, because they would be applicable beyond the categories. And that would mean that everything in creation is countable, including the degree of human flourishing. <br /><br />It would also mean that countable numbers must be interconvertible with the other transcendentals. In other words, the number three would be identical in reality to being, to goodness, to truth, to beauty, and so on. To me, that makes absolutely no sense at all. The reason why is that if the number three is identical all the other transcendentals, then the number four must also be identical to all the other transcendentals, and since they are all interchangeable, then the number three must be identical to the number four, which is a logical contradiction. <br /><br /><i> Only in the absolute sense.</i><br /><br />So, there is a relative sense in which God and creation <i>do</i> exist under a common genus? Can you elaborate, because this would violate everything I’ve ever read on the subject.<br /><br />I’ll tell you what, Ben. If your next response to me is civil and substantive, then I’d be happy to continue this conversation with you, perhaps on an unmoderated thread. But if you don’t actually address my points, and hurl abuse upon me, then I’ll let that be your last word. Or, you could just not respond to me, take this as an opportunity to learn to control your passions and feelings. You could be like the great Aquinas, and leave this work unfinished. :)<br /><br />Take care.<br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-21990988707997932742013-07-25T04:50:25.730-07:002013-07-25T04:50:25.730-07:00As Aquinas says at QDP 9.7 at the response to the ...As Aquinas says at QDP 9.7 at the response to the seventh objection:<br /><br />“According to the Philosopher (Metaph. x) we speak of a number of things in two senses: first absolutely, and then number is the opposite of one: secondly comparatively, as denoting excess in relation to a smaller number, and then number is opposed to a few. In like manner magnitude may be taken in two ways: first absolutely, in the sense of a continuous quantity which is called a magnitude: secondly comparatively, as denoting excess in relation to a smaller quantity. In the first sense magnitude is not predicated of God but in the second, and denotes his eminence over all creatures.”<br /><br />Note that when Aquinas says “number” here, he actually means “multitude”, i.e. a plurality of number, like when you say, “there was a number of people”. He says that multitude can be taken in two senses: absolutely and comparatively. When it is taken absolutely, a multitude is simply “the opposite of one”, and when it is taken comparatively, it denotes “excess in relation to a smaller number”, or X > Y (e.g. 3 > 2, 5 > 2, etc.). He says that the absolute sense cannot be predicated of God, probably because that would mean that countable numbers are predicated of God, which he has already said is impossible when he denied that the “principle of number” can be applicable to God. But the comparative sense <i>can</i> be predicated of God, particularly in a metaphor in which “X > Y” can be transferred from multitude to God in order to denote God’s transcendence, greatness and eminence above creation.<br /><br />Otherwise, what does Aquinas mean when he says that numerical terms that are applied to God are <i>not</i> actually numbers, but are <i>metaphors</i> that only <i>seem</i> to be numbers? I’ve provided my explanation, which I think is consistent with Aquinas’ writings. What is yours?<br /><br /><i> How is counting virtual properties counting numbers in the sense of the genus of quantity? God is not really divided in his essence or quantified in his essence because of simplicity or increased in his essence when we say 3 persons or 2 attributes or more so they aren't examples of counting numbers in the genus of quantity in God.</i><br /><br />Because you are using <i>numbers</i>, and numbers are a species of quantity, which means that they are under the genus of quantity, which means that they are <i>accidents</i>. And as you point out, numbers can only apply to what is <i>divisible</i>. If God is indivisible, then numbers cannot apply to God. <br /><br /><i> Which is talking about two things in some sense.</i><br /><br />It isn’t. If there is no common genus between X and Y, then you cannot count X and Y. <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40942484172826444782013-07-25T04:50:04.203-07:002013-07-25T04:50:04.203-07:00Ben:
So that is what it is now? So what was with...Ben:<br /><br /><i> So that is what it is now? So what was with all that mishigoss about not being able to figure out how the sense of three persons and the sense of one essence can't both be the same referent?</i><br /><br />We solved that problem by bringing in the virtual composition of God. The sense of “divine person” is different from the sense of “divine essence”, and the former refers to one virtual component of God, and the latter refers to a different component of God, but they both refer to God as the whole that <i>has</i> the different virtual parts. <br /><br /><i> "Totally identical" is a term of equivocation on your part.</i><br /><br />It isn’t. <i>X is totally identical to Y iff X is the same as Y in every way iff X is not different from Y in any way</i>. There never was any equivocation.<br /><br /><i> Like saying God created everything from nothing therefore God must have created himself from nothing since God must be part of everything.</i><br /><br />I would never say such a thing.<br /><br /><i> I'm sure you will make something up in harmony with your made up view of transendental multiplicity.</i><br /><br />My interpretation on transcendental multiplicity is supported by Emery and Aquinas, and I’ve provided quotations to that effect.<br /><br /><i> How is it you made all these weird claims about Transendental multiplicity meaning I can't say "Divine Goodness and Justice are two attributes of God" without you first looking up the meanings of "species of quantity" or "genus of quantity" and how Aristotle understood those terms to mean & how Aquinas understood them?</i><br /><br />That’s not an answer to my questions about ratio.<br /><br /><i> The real question is how is saying divine goodness & divine justice are twoattributes of God equal some sort of measurement in God & thus making the use of the term "two"is a species of quantity? IT doesn't so it's not wrong to say ds & dj are two divine attributes.</i><br /><br />If all numbers are a species of the genus of quantity, then applying numbers to X means predicating an accident of X. Since God can have no accidents, it follows that God can have no numbers predicated of him. If that wasn’t the case, then Aquinas wouldn’t have said that the “principle of number” is inapplicable to God, but only transcendental unity/multiplicity are. <br /><br /><i> So obviously some type of discrete counting here is permitted provided you know your counting is not dividing, measuring or increasing God who cannot by nature be so counted by number. It's not an absolute counting which is what it seems both realists like Aristotle or Aquinas think "number" to be.</i><br /><br />What is this “some type of discrete counting”? It involves numbers, and thus must be a species of the genus of quantity. But that cannot be possible for God, for the reasons that we talked about. That is why Aquinas said that it only <i>seems</i> like you are using numbers, but in reality, you aren’t. What he said was that whenever you use numerical terms of God, you are not actually applying numbers, but rather are speaking <i>metaphorically</i>. You are transferring a property of the number to God via the metaphor. When you say that God is one, you are not saying that God is numerically one, but rather that God is indivisible. When you say that God is three, you are not saying that God is numerically three, but rather that God is transcendent above creation. <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-70324766125279991122013-07-24T21:05:32.693-07:002013-07-24T21:05:32.693-07:00>I never said that you are not measuring God. Y...>I never said that you are not measuring God. You are counting virtual parts of God, which is not permissible with respect to God, because counting necessarily involves counting numbers, and thus remaining under the genus of quantity. <br /><br />How is counting virtual properties counting numbers in the sense of the genus of quantity? God is not really divided in his essence or quantified in his essence because of simplicity or increased in his essence when we say 3 persons or 2 attributes or more so they aren't examples of counting numbers in the genus of quantity in God.<br /><br />>First, of course you can talk about God and the universe.<br /><br />Which is talking about two things in some sense.<br /><br />> I never said that you couldn’t. You just cannot meaningfully say that there are two things when you are talking about God and the universe, <br /><br />In the absolute sense yes but Aquinas said "<br />Again Athanasius says in the Creed: “All the three Persons are co-eternal and co-equal with one another.” Therefore in God there is a number of persons. I answer that the plurality of persons in God is an article of faith, <b>and natural reason is unable to discuss and adequately understand it.</b>"POWER OF GOD Ibin.<br /><br />So why are you complaining about something neither Aquinas nor I am trying to do? Maybe because you are not listening? <br /><br />>because God and the universe cannot exist under a common genus, which is necessary for counting. .<br /><br />Only in the absolute sense.<br /><br />I am not disputing the brute fact God is a Mystery and cannot be fully comprehended. But we can say things about God that are true as far as they go. So we are talking meaningfully about God as far as we can go on with our limited intellect talking true things about God.<br /><br />>Second, you can seem to be making sense, but actually be talking nonsense. I can write an entire treatise about how square triangles are impossible, and throughout the treatise use the term “square triangles”. <br /><br />Or I could be a two diminutional being talking to another about a tetrahedron(4 flat sides, 3 sided triangles) and you just think I am talking about a square circle and you refuse to even entertain the idea I am not talking about a Square triangle.<br /><br />>And that is because it is an incoherent pairing of words that mutually annihilate any combined meaning. <br /><br />Or maybe you just kept inventing your own meanings for terms instead of those of the tradition you are investigating?<br /><br />>Anyway, I think that we're done. Perhaps this subject can be revisited in the future.<br /><br />We can only hope we are done. Let it end.Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-70571529287023149742013-07-24T21:05:08.112-07:002013-07-24T21:05:08.112-07:00>Right. You have the genus of quantity, and num...>Right. You have the genus of quantity, and number is a species of quantity, which is the “basic notion of measure”. How does this help your case at all?<br /><br />The real question is how is saying divine goodness & divine justice are <b>two</b>attributes of God equal some sort of measurement in God & thus making the use of the term "two"is a species of quantity? IT doesn't so it's not wrong to say ds & dj are <b>two</b> divine attributes.<br /><br />So obviously some type of discrete counting here is permitted provided you know your counting is not dividing, measuring or increasing God who cannot by nature be so counted by number. It's not an absolute counting which is what it seems both realists like Aristotle or Aquinas think "number" to be.<br /><br />Obviously predicating God with a species of quantity isn't done when we say Three persons either.<br /><br />Obj. Boethius says (De Trin.): That is truly one in which there is no number. But God is most truly one. Therefore number is not in him.<br /><br />Reply to the, First Objection. By these words Boethius means to exclude number from the divine essence: for this is the point of his discussion. -ON THE POWER OF GOD Q9 PART V.<br /><br />In your first reply to me you talked about the "category of quantity" not "species of quantity" or "genus of quantity".<br /><br />Nice bait & switch.<br /><br />> It just shows that I have been correct in saying that number is a species under the genus of quantity, and thus remains an accident, which means that it cannot predicable of God who lacks any accidents whatsoever.<br /><br />Rather you never bothered to find out what Aquinas or Aristotle meant by "number" or "species of quantity" or "genus of quantity" or saying there are <b>three</b> persons. You just made up your own stuff by proof texting.<br /><br />Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11207473673828086242013-07-24T20:57:01.486-07:002013-07-24T20:57:01.486-07:00@Scott
There are 2000 posts between dguller &...@Scott<br /><br />There are 2000 posts between dguller & I where I do address him directly point by point & cite the experts on these matters. He pretty much ignores my points & restates his argument. Over and over and over again. He did that to DavidM too. After all that I told him to go fuck himself & I don't take it back. DavidM got pissed at him too but he didn't use foul language..<br /><br />>You two are going nowhere. Give it up and save Ed the time of moderating this counterproductive BS.<br /><br />I guess dguller will have to be the better man.Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-24098842492360247152013-07-24T17:30:17.219-07:002013-07-24T17:30:17.219-07:00>First, thanks for looking that information up....>First, thanks for looking that information up. It was interesting.<br /><br />>Second, I do not understand..............<br /><br />The only statement you have made lately that I agree with.<br /><br />How is it you made all these weird claims about Transendental multiplicity meaning I can't say "Divine Goodness and Justice are <b>two</b> attributes of God" without you first looking up the meanings of "species of quantity" or "genus of quantity" and how Aristotle understood those terms to mean & how Aquinas understood them?<br /><br />QUOTE"Like substance, quantity seems like a reasonable candidate for a highest kind — quantities exist; quantities are not substances; substances are not quantities; and it is not clear what kind would stand above quantity. So, Aristotle's decision to make quantity a highest kind appears well motivated. Aristotle's treatment of quantity, however, does raise some difficult questions.<br /><br />Perhaps the most interesting question concerns the fact that some of the species in quantity appear to be quantified things rather than quantities themselves. Consider, for instance, body. In its most natural sense, ‘body’ signifies bodies, which are not quantities but rather things with quantities. The same is true of line, surface, place and arguably speech. Of course, there are quantities naturally associated with some of these species. For instance, length, breadth and depth are associated with line, body and surface. But Aristotle does not list these as the species under quantity. <b>So, in the first instance, we can ask: does Aristotle intend his division of Quantity to be a division of quantities or quantified things?"</b>END-Aristotle's Categories Standford Encl of Phil onlineSon of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54917818616425780812013-07-24T17:27:00.266-07:002013-07-24T17:27:00.266-07:00Our Conversation So Far
dguller: The doctrine of ...<b>Our Conversation So Far</b><br /><br />dguller: The doctrine of divine simplicity appears to contradict the doctrine of the Trinity.<br /><br />BenYachov: That's not what Catholicism teaches. It's a <i>mystery</i>!<br /><br />dguller: That doesn't explain anything. There appears to be a contradiction, and I'm not convinced that Aquinas or anyone else has explained satisfactorily why it isn't really one. Here's why: [argument that doesn't quite engage the claim of mystery].<br /><br />BenYachov: Straw man! Troll! Fuck you! Everybody is sick of you! Rrrrrr! I'm so <i>angry</i> I could <i>plotz</i>! This is my last reply to this idiot!<br /><br />dguller: That still doesn't address my argument.<br /><br />BenYachov: Okay, <i>this</i> is my last reply!<br /><br />You two are going nowhere. Give it up and save Ed the time of moderating this counterproductive BS.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-30444878965404517732013-07-24T15:55:40.333-07:002013-07-24T15:55:40.333-07:00>Second, I do not understand what it means to s...>Second, I do not understand what it means to say that a ratio leaves the genus of quantity and enters the genus of number. <br /><br />I'm sure you will make something up in harmony with your made up view of transendental multiplicity.Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-48586091463522292882013-07-24T15:53:56.090-07:002013-07-24T15:53:56.090-07:00>My argument was that if the divine persons wer...<br />>My argument was that if the divine persons were totally identical in every way in reality to the divine essence, then the divine persons could not be different from the divine essence in any way.<br /><br />So that is what it is now? So what was with all that mishigoss <br />about not being able to figure out how the sense of three persons and the sense of one essence can't both be the same referent?<br /><br />Three persons/essences in one essence/person and all that? You agreed with that formula?<br /><br />"Totally identical" is a term of equivocation on your part.<br /><br />Like saying God created everything from nothing therefore God must have created himself from nothing since God must be part of everything.<br /><br />Which is why you argument is sophistry not a logical contradiction.<br /><br />It's also jello trying to be nailed to a wall. <br /><br />Let's face it dguller this new argument you made up the day I first quoted G-L on Q30 will be different in a few weeks but you will still say it's the same argument & believe it too.Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9387914687651074562013-07-24T15:53:48.289-07:002013-07-24T15:53:48.289-07:00Ben:
"Certain relations are founded upon qu...Ben:<br /><br /><i> "Certain relations are founded upon quantity, especially upon that species of quantity which is number, to which the basic notion of measure pertains, as is evident in "double and half", "multiple and submultiple [fractions]" etc. Similarly "same", "like" and "equal" are founded upon unity, which is the principle of number.</i><br /><br />Right. You have the genus of quantity, and number is a species of quantity, which is the “basic notion of measure”. How does this help your case at all? It just shows that I have been correct in saying that number is a species under the genus of quantity, and thus remains an accident, which means that it cannot predicable of God who lacks any accidents whatsoever.<br /><br /><i> So how am I measuring God by saying "divine goodness & divine justice are two of God's attributes"?</i><br /><br />I never said that you are not measuring God. You are <i>counting</i> virtual parts of God, which is not permissible with respect to God, because counting necessarily involves counting <i>numbers</i>, and thus remaining under the genus of quantity. <br /><br /><i> Yet both of us just did what you said cannot be done? <br /><br />Yet we just now talked about two things at once God and the universe?</i><br /><br />First, of course you can talk about God and the universe. I never said that you couldn’t. You just cannot meaningfully say that there are <i>two</i> things when you are talking about God and the universe, because God and the universe cannot exist under a common genus, which is necessary for counting. After all, counting involves counting things of the same kind, and if there is no common kind between things, then there can be no counting between them.<br /><br />Second, you can seem to be making sense, but actually be talking nonsense. I can write an entire treatise about how square triangles are impossible, and throughout the treatise use the term “square triangles”. However, just because I keep using that term does not mean that I’m actually saying anything meaningful when I say “square triangles”, even though I keep talking about square triangles. And that is because it is an incoherent pairing of words that mutually annihilate any combined meaning. <br /><br />Anyway, I think that we're done. Perhaps this subject can be revisited in the future.<br /><br />Take care.dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-66276003212448594752013-07-24T15:30:31.175-07:002013-07-24T15:30:31.175-07:00dguller writes,
Ben and I are wrapping it up soon...dguller writes,<br /><br /><i>Ben and I are wrapping it up soon, I think.</i><br /><br />Where have we heard that before?Billnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27317073513567515492013-07-24T14:45:51.963-07:002013-07-24T14:45:51.963-07:00>>>Geez we can't absolutely say God p...>>>Geez we can't absolutely say God plus the universe is really two things given the complete otherness of God.<br /><br />>>But obviously we can say we can talk about two things at once both being God and the universe.<br /><br />>The former is correct. The latter is incorrect. To say that there are two things implies a common scale between God and the universe, which you just said is impossible, given “the complete otherness of God”.<br /><br /><br />Yet both of us just did what you said cannot be done?<br /><br />Yet we just now talked about two things at once God and the universe?<br /><br />dguller you are quite mad & not in the angry sense I often am.<br /><br />I have to stop before I go mad in both senses.Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-68280011623057002972013-07-24T13:42:50.989-07:002013-07-24T13:42:50.989-07:00Ben:
Of course if this latest misrepresentation &...Ben:<br /><br /><i>Of course if this latest misrepresentation & misinterpretation of Aquinas is somehow true then dguller's original MISINTERPRETATION of the Trinity being a "logical contradiction" can't then be true either since there is no way for him to claim the Trinity is somehow in some way teaching 3=1.</i><br /><br />You are correct that if my argument against the Trinity presupposed the number three contradicting the number one, then it would not work if those numbers could not be predicated of God at all. However, that was never my argument. <br /><br />My argument was that if the divine persons were totally identical in every way in reality to the divine essence, then the divine persons could not be different from the divine essence in any way. However, since the divine persons <i>are</i> different from the divine essence in <i>some</i> ways, i.e. the divine persons are really distinct in some way and the divine essence is not really distinct in any way, then they cannot be totally identical to the divine essence in reality. This is perfectly consistent with the idea that God is a virtually composite entity with virtual components, i.e. the divine essence, the divine persons, the divine attributes, none of which is totally identical to the other, because they differ in important ways. That is why you cannot simply substitute one for the other in a logical argument, which is why it is not a logical contradiction to say that three divine persons necessarily means three divine essences. They are not the same virtual component in God, and thus have different essential predicates that define them.<br /><br />But what follows from this is that the divine essence is a different virtual component than the divine attributes and the divine persons. They are all the same in that they are virtual components <i>of God</i>, but they are different virtual components in that they have different essential predicates. For example, the Father generates, the Son is generated, the divine essence is not really distinct in any way, the divine justice punishes, the divine mercy forgives, and so on. The problem with this is that if the divine essence is identical to Being itself, then any virtual component that is not the divine essence is not Being itself, and anything that is not Being itself is a creature. It therefore follows that the divine attributes and the divine persons are all creatures, which is a logical contradiction, because they are supposed to be divine, and what is divine cannot be created.<br /><br /><i>That</i> is the contradiction.<br /><br /><i>When we say Divine Goodness and Divine Justice are two attributes of God are we making a ratio comparison between them? Are we dividing God's absolute essence when we compare them?<br /><br />So maybe simple comparitive counting "two divine attributes" isn't the same producing a genus of of quantity?<br /><br />Maybe?</i><br /><br />First, thanks for looking that information up. It was interesting.<br /><br />Second, I do not understand what it means to say that a ratio leaves the genus of quantity and enters the genus of number. Does that mean that the ratio leaves the genus of quantity for a higher genus (of number) or for a lower genus (of number)? In other words, is the genus of number a transcendental, or is it a species of the genus of quantity? I am more inclined to say the latter than the former, but I’m open to arguments for the former.<br /><br />Third, I do not understand how saying that God has two attributes can be a “ratio comparison between them”. You are <i>counting</i> divine attributes using discrete numbers. Divine goodness, one attribute. Divine goodness and divine justice, two attributes. There is no ratio involved, and so I’m not too sure that this solves the problem.<br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86280418968957205002013-07-24T13:20:43.095-07:002013-07-24T13:20:43.095-07:00Anyway I know dguller is not really interested in ...Anyway I know dguller is not really interested in a conversation with me anymore than I am with him.<br /><br />I will pray to make myself some.<br /><br />You can't argue with a troll.Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54720256407845893862013-07-24T13:19:09.090-07:002013-07-24T13:19:09.090-07:00Then there is "species of quantity" as d...Then there is "species of quantity" as defined by Aquinas?<br /><br /><br />"Certain relations are founded upon quantity, especially upon that species of quantity which is number, <b>to which the basic notion of measure pertains, as is evident in "double and half", "multiple and submultiple [fractions]" etc. Similarly "same", "like" and "equal" are founded upon unity, which is the principle of number.</b><br /><br />Joseph Kennedy OP Philosophy of nature Ch5.<br /><br />So how am I measuring God by saying "divine goodness & divine justice are <b>two</b> of God's attributes"?<br /><br />Nuff said.<br /><br />dguller doesn't know what he is talking about.<br /><br />He is just pulling shit out of his arse.Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35284528415332656992013-07-24T12:42:05.349-07:002013-07-24T12:42:05.349-07:00BTW nobody has bothered to define "genus of q...BTW nobody has bothered to define "genus of quantity".<br /><br /><br />from the wiki on quantity.<br /><br />"In Mathematics the concept of quantity is an ancient one extending back to the time of Aristotle and earlier. Aristotle regarded quantity as a fundamental ontological and scientific category. In Aristotle's ontology, quantity or quantum was classified into two different types, which he characterized as follows:<br /><br /> 'Quantum' means that which is divisible into two or more constituent parts, of which each is by nature a 'one' and a 'this'. A quantum is a plurality if it is numerable, a magnitude if it is measurable. 'Plurality' means that which is divisible potentially into non-continuous parts, magnitude that which is divisible into continuous parts; of magnitude, that which is continuous in one dimension is length; in two breadth, in three depth. Of these, limited plurality is number, limited length is a line, breadth a surface, depth a solid. (Aristotle, book v, chapters 11-14, Metaphysics).<br /><br />In his Elements, Euclid developed the theory of ratios of magnitudes without studying the nature of magnitudes, as Archimedes, but giving the following significant definitions:<br /><br /> A magnitude is a part of a magnitude, the less of the greater, when it measures the greater; A ratio is a sort of relation in respect of size between two magnitudes of the same kind.<br /><br />For Aristotle and Euclid, relations were conceived as whole numbers (Michell, 1993). John Wallis later conceived of ratios of magnitudes as real numbers as reflected in the following:<br /><br /> <b>When a comparison in terms of ratio is made, the resultant ratio often [namely with the exception of the 'numerical genus' itself] leaves the <i>genus of quantities</i> compared, and passes into the numerical genus, whatever the genus of quantities compared may have been. (John Wallis, Mathesis Universalis)</b>END<br /><br />When we say Divine Goodness and Divine Justice are <b>two</b> attributes of God are we making a ratio comparison between them? Are we dividing God's absolute essence when we compare them?<br /><br />So maybe simple comparitive counting "two divine attributes" isn't the same producing a genus of of quantity?<br /><br />Maybe?Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14864168786614005012013-07-24T12:41:33.696-07:002013-07-24T12:41:33.696-07:00It's that simple. The "two" here is ...<i> It's that simple. The "two" here is a seemingly numeral term which is predicated of God as Aquinas says.</i><br /><br />Once again, you are ignoring the fact that Aquinas says that it is “<b>seemingly</b>” a numeral. When someone says that X is seemingly Y, they are <i>not</i> saying that X <i>is</i> Y, but rather that X only appears to be Y, but is actually <i>not</i> Y. For example, the stick seems to be bent in the water does not mean that the stick <i>is</i> bent in the water, but rather that the stick only appears to be bent, but is actually still straight. So, Aquinas is not saying that one can apply numbers to God, but rather is saying that one can use numerical <i>terms</i> about God as long as one recognizes that they do not represent <i>actual</i> numbers, but rather are <i>metaphors</i> for either God’s indivisibility or God’s transcendence.<br /><br /><i> Geez we can't absolutely say God plus the universe is really two things given the complete otherness of God.<br /><br />But obviously we can say we can talk about two things at once both being God and the universe.</i><br /><br />The former is correct. The latter is incorrect. To say that there are two things implies a common scale between God and the universe, which you just said is impossible, given “the complete otherness of God”. <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15743612314731522312013-07-24T12:40:12.676-07:002013-07-24T12:40:12.676-07:00Ben:
Except genus of quantity as Aquinas underst...Ben:<br /><br /><i> Except genus of quantity as Aquinas understood it, given his realism, refers to real numbers that signify real physical things.</i><br /><br />First, that is true. Aquinas says that “quantity properly speaking is a disposition of matter: so that all the species of quantity are mathematical entities which cannot exist apart from sensible matter”. That is yet another reason why numbers cannot be predicated of God, because numbers are necessarily quantities, and quantities can only exist in material beings as accidents. He also says: “It is evident then that no species of quantity can be attributed to spiritual things otherwise than metaphorically”. Since number is a “species of quantity” (QDP 9.7), it follows that no number can be predicated of immaterial beings, other than “metaphorically”. <br /><br />Second, that is irrelevant. We are talking about <i>numbers</i>. Not something that <i>seems</i> like it is a number, but is actually <i>not</i> a number, but actual numbers. “Three” is not seemingly a number, but <i>is</i> a number. Since numbers cannot be predicated of God, it follows that the number three cannot be predicated of God, either. When Aquinas says that God is three, he is not speaking numerically, but rather metaphorically to denote God’s transcendence.<br /><br /><i> It doesn't exclude me from being able to say "divine goodness" and "divine justice" are two of God's attributes. Even thought neither is a genus of quantity and are only logically different from one another and not different in essence.</i><br /><br />That seems like an easy thing to do, but it is fraught with problems.<br /><br />First, to say that the divine goodness and the divine justice are two of God’s attributes presupposes that both are <i>kinds</i> of divine attributes, which would mean that there is a genus of <i>divine attribute</i> with divine goodness and divine justice as species of that genus, such that there is some differentiating factor that divides the two kinds of divine attributes. But God is beyond all genera, and thus this analysis cannot be applicable to God at all. And yet without this analytical structure, I don’t see how it is possible to count the divine attributes at all, because counting presupposes commonality of genus.<br /><br />Second, it presupposes the coherence of countable numbers that are not quantities. I think this idea makes as much sense as saying that there is matter that is not material. Aquinas says that “number” is a “species of quantity” (QDP 9.7), and thus is necessarily under the genus of quantity. When he talks about “number” being outside the genus of quantity, he says that it is “seemingly” a number, but not actually a number. Furthermore, he says that “number” when used outside the genus of quantity is actually a <i>metaphor</i>. So, when he says that God is one, he is not using the number one, but the transcendental one, which is a metaphor for God’s indivisibility. And when he says that God is three, he is using the number three as a metaphor for God’s transcendence and eminence with respect to creation. In other words, just as three is greater than one, God is greater than creation. It simply isn’t possible, under his system, to say that God is <i>numerically</i> three.<br /><br />Third, divine goodness and divine justice must have different essential predicates, which is the reason why they cannot be substituted for one another in a logical argument. For example, divine justice punishes, but divine goodness does not punish, and thus we cannot conclude that because divine justice punishes, therefore divine goodness punishes. That was the entire basis of your argument for why three divine persons does not necessarily imply three divine essences, i.e. a divine person is <i>not</i> a divine essence. Now, these are not <i>accidental</i> predicates such that they could be absent, and the divine attributes remain the same, but rather they are <i>essential</i> predicates. If X and Y have different essential predicates, then they must have different essences, and thus the divine attributes must have different essences. <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9140615998187262392013-07-24T11:57:12.011-07:002013-07-24T11:57:12.011-07:00>And if the number three cannot be literally pr...>And if the number three cannot be literally predicated of God, then the doctrine of the Trinity cannot possibly be true of God, because it presupposes the validity of predicating the number three of God, which is impossible to do.<br /><br />Of course if this latest misrepresentation & misinterpretation of Aquinas is somehow true then dguller's original MISINTERPRETATION of the Trinity being a "logical contradiction" can't then be true either since there is no way for him to claim the Trinity is somehow in some way teaching 3=1.<br /><br />In other words there is no way for him to somehow reformulate three persons in one essence to somehow mean 3=1.<br /><br />But then again nobody here believes he knows what he is talking about in the first place.<br /><br /><b>WITH THIS I CLAIM THE LAST WORD</b>BenYachovnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-90656270159864711262013-07-24T11:23:38.607-07:002013-07-24T11:23:38.607-07:00Geez we can't absolutely say God plus the univ...Geez we can't absolutely say God plus the universe is <b>really two things</b> given the complete otherness of God.<br /><br />But obviously we can say we can talk about two things at once both being God and the universe.<br /><br />Why is this hard?Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35009717090561379922013-07-24T11:16:11.824-07:002013-07-24T11:16:11.824-07:00>And nowhere in that section does he explain ho...>And nowhere in that section does he explain how one goes from the transcendental one and many to numbers without smuggling in the genus of quantity. <br /><br />Except genus of quantity as Aquinas understood it, given his realism, refers to real numbers that signify real physical things.<br /><br />It doesn't exclude me from being able to say "divine goodness" and "divine justice" are <b>two</b> of God's attributes. Even thought neither is a genus of quantity and are only logically different from one another and not different in essence.<br /><br />It's that simple. The "two" here is a seemingly numeral term <b>which is predicated of God</b> as Aquinas says.<br /><br />That's just common sense.<br /><br />If you told Aquinas you are somehow forbidden to say DG & DJ are <b>two</b> divine attributes because there is no quantitative plurality in God he would have laughed in your face.<br /><br />You have no common sense dguller & you make mountains out of mole hills.<br /><br />Maybe now you can tell us how Ali wasn't the better fighter than Fazier in their second bout unless we can measure the actualize force of their punches?<br /><br />Because you know nobody can't tell how bear can be a better fight than a gator unless we do something similar.Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.com