tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post2907252339008697941..comments2024-03-18T20:56:27.126-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Judging a book by what it doesn’t coverEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger192125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15386513642157798912014-06-15T18:34:58.122-07:002014-06-15T18:34:58.122-07:00dguller,
if everyone is not granted “external gua...dguller,<br /><br /><i>if everyone is not granted “external guardianship” (SCG 3.162.8), then that is unfair</i><br /><br />The role meant to be played by the parenthetical reference in this seems unclear.<br /><br />It is true that SCG 3.162.8 does mention "external guardianship", but it is also true that SCG 3,162.8 says nothing which may be taken as an indication that not everyone is granted "external guardianship".<br /><br />SCG 3,162.8 does mention that the help of that "external guardianship" might be taken away for some under certain circumstances, true.<br /><br />However, that cannot be taken away which one does not have. <br /><br />And to take away the help of "external guardianship" is not to take away the "external guardianship" itself.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-78511675485107119832014-06-15T17:49:38.450-07:002014-06-15T17:49:38.450-07:00dguller,
if
(a) there is nothing about person A...dguller,<br /><br /><i>if <br /><br />(a) there is nothing about person A that justifies A’s receiving grace and/or guardianship <br />(b) there is nothing about person B that justifies B’s receiving grace and/or guardianship<br />(c) A receives grace and/or guardianship<br />(d) B does not receive grace and/or guardianship<br /><br />then (a) to (d) is manifestly unfair.</i><br /><br />This is to say, "If (a), (b), (c) and (d), then (a) to (d) is manifestly unfair."<br /><br />However, this doesn't seem to make much sense as it stands, and it might be better to recast it as follows:<br /><br />1. If (a), (b), (c) and (d), then (a) to (d) is manifestly unfair.<br />2. (a), (b), (c) and (d).<br />3. Therefore, (a) to (d) is manifestly unfair.<br /><br />But {(a), (b), (c) and (d)} is a substition instance for X in the following argument:<br /><br />1. If X, then X is manifestly unfair.<br />2. X.<br />3. Therefore, X is manifestly unfair.<br /><br />And {(a), (b), (c) and (d)} isn't necessarily the only possible substitution instance for X in that argument. <br /><br />For example, another substitution instance for X in that argument might be "dguller exists". <br /><br />In this case, the argument would read as follows:<br /><br />1. If dguller exists, then dguller is manifestly unfair.<br />2. dguller exists.<br />3. Therefore, dguller is manifestly unfair.<br /><br />See how that works?Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49606119875799277802014-06-13T16:49:26.064-07:002014-06-13T16:49:26.064-07:00dguller,
>> But if everyone is granted grac...dguller,<br /><br />>> But if everyone is granted grace, then that is "coercion" (because everyone's space of possible choices is curtailed by virtue of no one being able to choose to not be granted grace).<br /><br />> No, I acknowledged that grace actually opens up a possibility that was previously closed, and thus is not actually coercion.<br /><br /><br />>> If not everyone is granted grace, then that is "unfair".<br /><br />> Yes, and even if everyone is granted grace, then if everyone is not granted “external guardianship” (SCG 3.162.8), then that is unfair,<br /><br /><br />By hook or by crook...Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72376906069994342212014-06-13T10:57:11.386-07:002014-06-13T10:57:11.386-07:00Glenn:
If not everyone is granted grace, then th...Glenn:<br /><br /><i> If not everyone is granted grace, then that is "unfair".</i><br /><br />Yes, and even if everyone <i>is</i> granted grace, then if everyone is not granted “external guardianship” (SCG 3.162.8), then <i>that</i> is unfair, especially if the divine decision regarding who receives grace and/or guardianship is not justified by anything that the potential or actual recipients have warranted. In other words, if <br /><br />(a) there is nothing about person A that justifies A’s receiving grace and/or guardianship <br />(b) there is nothing about person B that justifies B’s receiving grace and/or guardianship<br />(c) A receives grace and/or guardianship<br />(d) B does not receive grace and/or guardianship<br /><br />then (a) to (d) is manifestly unfair.<br /><br /><i>But if everyone is granted grace, then that is "coercion" (because everyone's space of possible choices is curtailed by virtue of no one being able to choose to not be granted grace).</i><br /><br />No, I acknowledged that grace actually <i>opens</i> up a possibility that was previously closed, and thus is not actually coercion.<br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-13493034272966251202014-06-13T10:23:06.230-07:002014-06-13T10:23:06.230-07:00dguller,
It would have been far more fair to gran...dguller,<br /><br /><i>It would have been far more fair to grant everyone grace, and then leave it to them to do with grace what they will.</i><br /><br />On your account:<br /><br />If not everyone is granted grace, then that is "unfair".<br /><br />But if everyone is granted grace, then that is "coercion" (because everyone's space of possible choices is curtailed by virtue of no one being able to choose to not be granted grace).<br /><br />Why dost thou torture thyself?Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7613455995345109972014-06-13T09:56:03.457-07:002014-06-13T09:56:03.457-07:00Another question.
When Aquinas writes that “there...Another question.<br /><br />When Aquinas writes that “there is no reason to ask why He converts the former and not the latter” (SCG 3.161.2), then is that because (a) there is no reason, or (b) there is a reason, but it is beyond our ability to know it. It seems that (b) must be true, because he writes that the determination regarding which people are granted grace and support, and which are not, “this depends on His will alone” (SCG 3.161.2). And since his will <i>is</i> his intellect, there must be a reason underlying his determination, even if it is fundamentally inscrutable from our finite and limited understanding. But this divine reason itself has <i>nothing</i> to do with the human beings involved, because their actions are <i>irrelevant</i> to God’s determination, and thus the matter lies <i>exclusively</i> with God himself. So, from eternity, he pre-determined which people would receive his blessing and support, and which people would be denied it, even though the former would receive a substantial advantage over the latter in terms of obedience to his will, and that advantage was <i>completely</i> unearned by them. Once again, the entire affair seems arbitrary and cruel, especially given the stakes involved. It would have been far more fair to grant everyone grace, and then leave it to them to do with grace what they will. That would level the playing field, and make it significantly more fair. To arbitrarily aid one group and not another is not just by any means.<br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81688063383011520102014-06-13T09:48:21.576-07:002014-06-13T09:48:21.576-07:00Anonymous:
God offers grace to all people, but w...Anonymous:<br /><br /><i> God offers grace to all people, but we can and do sometimes choose to refuse the gift.</i><br /><br />But to “refuse the gift”, one would have to first <i>recognize</i> the gift. If one unknowingly turned away from a gift, because one never knew that it was a gift to begin with, then how can they be blamed, especially if there were a number of factors and elements that distorted one’s ability to recognize the gift at all, even if it was staring one in the face?<br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-78812746942581094982014-06-13T09:45:38.496-07:002014-06-13T09:45:38.496-07:00dguller --
God offers grace to all people, but we...dguller --<br /><br />God offers grace to all people, but we can and do sometimes choose to refuse the gift.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-36383877333201556332014-06-13T08:32:32.027-07:002014-06-13T08:32:32.027-07:00With regards to (a), it would seem that after rece...With regards to (a), it would seem that after receiving grace, someone acted in a sufficiently sinful fashion to warrant the removal of grace. But God could have intervened via “external guardianship, whereby the occasions of sinning are taken away from man by divine providence and whereby provocations to sin are suppressed” (SCG 3.162.8), which may have prevented the sinful behavior itself, thus precluding the need to remove grace. And certainly, God <i>has</i> intervened in such a way in the past to support certain pre-selected individuals, but that seems to give those pre-selected individuals an unfair advantage over others, and then the non-pre-selected individuals subsequently pay an eternal penalty that is partly due to the absence of divine support. It would be like comparing material success between the offspring of a wealthy family and the offspring of a family in poverty, and then punishing the latter for not achieving what the former achieved. Ultimately, it seems that God arbitrarily provides supernatural support, over and above grace, to some <i>irrespective of their merit</i>, and denies it to others <i>solely based upon their merit</i>, and then judges the two groups on the same standard. Even Aquinas writes that “there is no reason to ask why He converts the former and not the latter” (SCG 3.161.2).<br /><br />With regards to (b), prior to the reception of grace, a person lives in a state of sinful disobedience, and this state certainly does not preclude the reception of grace. Furthermore, in that state of sinful disobedience, one must have <i>acted</i> in a sinful fashion, and thus neither the state nor the actions is relevant to the infusion of grace, which means that entire affair is left to the choice of God, completely independently of human worth. Once again, the matter seems to be completely arbitrary, which would be fine, except that those who are arbitrarily given advantages end up receiving further rewards and blessings, whereas those who are denied said advantages end up being severely punished. And worse of all, “the aforementioned differentiation of men must be ordered by God from eternity” (SCG 3.163.1).dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-141563114565118582014-06-13T08:32:20.160-07:002014-06-13T08:32:20.160-07:00Glenn:
Just to make sure I understand, I’ll summa...Glenn:<br /><br />Just to make sure I understand, I’ll summarize what I think that you and Scott are saying.<br /><br />Aquinas writes that “man's soul is moved by God to know or will or do something” (ST 1a.110.2). Since all movement is such that a potency is actualized, the question is what potency is actualized with the infusion of grace. Seemingly, the potency would be <i>the power to freely choose to know and love God</i>, which remains in potency while human nature is tainted by sin, and cannot be actualized by any finite created being, thus requiring that “some supernatural form and perfection must be superadded to man whereby he may be ordered suitably to the aforesaid end” (SCG 3.150.5). However, with grace, this power <i>in potency</i> becomes a power <i>in act</i>, and thus becomes available for the person to use. So, with grace, a person can actually freely choose to know and love God, and without grace, this power remains dormant and obstructed by sin. Under this account, I don’t see any coercion, because it seems that grace does <i>not</i> eliminate any possible choice(s), but rather through the actualization of a power, in fact, ends up <i>increasing</i> the range of possible choices to include the choice to know and love God.<br /><br />In addition, Aquinas makes it pretty clear that even with grace, a person may not attain their ultimate end. He writes that there are “many impediments” to man’s ability to achieve his ultimate end, including “the weakness of his reason”, “the passions of his sensory nature”, “by the feelings whereby he is attracted to sensible and lower things”, and so on (SCG 3.147.7). Since all of these “impediments” remain, even in the presence of grace, a person may still freely choose to reject God altogether, which means that the presence of grace is not <i>sufficient</i> to achieve man’s ultimate end, even though it is <i>necessary</i> to do so.<br /><br />One concern that I have with this account is it seems that not everyone is infused with grace, but rather some people receive it from God, and others do not. After all, Aquinas writes that “although one may neither merit in advance nor call forth divine grace by a movement of his free choice, he is able to prevent himself from receiving this grace” and that “those alone are deprived of grace who offer an obstacle within themselves to grace” (SCG 3.159.2). This implies that some people have grace and other people lack grace. Now, this leads to an interesting problem, because it means that one can (a) receive grace, and then be deprived of it, and (b) obstruct the reception of grace altogether. <br /><br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14891277567196219482014-06-13T01:51:06.243-07:002014-06-13T01:51:06.243-07:00And a summary of the summary, i.e., that which Sco...And a summary of the summary, i.e., that which Scott already has said and under which the above may be subsumed:<br /><br />"...divine grace makes it <i>possible</i> for us <i>to</i> choose salvation, not <i>im</i>possible for us <i>not</i> to."Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72135901432463136262014-06-13T01:49:28.089-07:002014-06-13T01:49:28.089-07:00A summary of some things:
1. It is not a secret t...A summary of some things:<br /><br /><b>1.</b> <a href="http://dhspriory.org/thomas/english/ContraGentiles3b.htm#148" rel="nofollow">It is not a secret that</a> it might seem to someone that by divine help some external compulsion to good action is exercised on man. Indeed, to be drawn, to be led, and to be pressed seem to imply coaction. But that this is not true is clearly shown:<br /><br />o Divine providence provides for all things according to their measure. But it is proper to man to act voluntarily and to control his own acts. But coercion is contrary to this. Therefore, God by His help does not force men to right action.<br /><br />o Man reaches his ultimate end by acts of the virtues. Now, forced acts are not acts of the virtues, since the main thing in virtue is choice, which cannot be present without voluntariness. Therefore, man is not divinely compelled to act rightly.<br /><br />o The ultimate end which is felicity is appropriate only to voluntary agents, who are masters of their acts. Therefore, the help that is divinely given men to attain felicity is not coercive.<br /><br />(The link at the head of this point ought to be consulted for a proper, non-wordsmithed version.)<br /><br /><br /><b>2.</b> Likewise, <a href="http://dhspriory.org/thomas/english/ContraGentiles4.htm#70" rel="nofollow">it is not a secret that</a> men are able to sin after receiving sacramental grace:<br /><br />o Although grace is bestowed upon men by the sacraments previously mentioned, men are not thereby rendered incapable of sin.<br /><br />o Gratuitous gifts are received in the soul as habitual dispositions. But it is not always the case that a man acts according to those gifts, for nothing stops him who has a habit from acting in accord with the habit or against it. To wit, a grammarian can in accord with grammar speak rightly, or even against grammar speak awkwardly. It is also like this with the habits of the moral virtues, for one who has the habit of justice can also act against justice. Why? Because the use of habits in us depends on the will, and the will is related to each of two opposites. It is clear, then, that he who receives gratuitous gifts can sin by acting against grace.<br /><br />o So long as a man can be altered in the soul’s passions, he can also be altered in vice and virtue. But alteration in the soul’s passions is not taken away by the grace conferred in the sacraments, for such alteration persists in a man as long as the soul is united to the body, which is capable of passion. It is clear, then, that the sacramental grace does not render a man impeccable.<br /><br />(Again, the link at the head of this point ought to be consulted for a proper, non-wordsmithed version.)<br /><br /><br /><b>3.</b> An objection, and a reply.<br /><br />Objection: But 2. has to do with <i>sacramental</i> grace. What about <i>non</i>-sacramental grace? <br /><br />Reply: See 1. above.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5333557806371178152014-06-12T19:42:22.111-07:002014-06-12T19:42:22.111-07:00"Grace is (a) always operative within the wil..."Grace is (a) always operative within the will, (b) simultaneous with the choice of the will, and (c) a cause of the movement of the will."<br /><br />dguller --<br /><br />Does Aquinas say that grace is initially presented to us "within" the will? As I understand it, grace is offered to the person -- made present in consciousness -- without the grace initially acting upon the will. The will must choose to accept the grace and be energized (so to speak) by it.<br /><br />That certainly matches my experience -- at times I'm aware of the presence within myself of an added power to do a much needed good, and I'm also conscious of choosing *not* tp accept the grace, often with the excuse, "Thanks, Lord, but not yet, maybe next time"). Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81117574669464689312014-06-12T15:36:50.381-07:002014-06-12T15:36:50.381-07:00@dguller:
"[I]f you want to say that God int...@dguller:<br /><br />"[I]f you want to say that God interferes with our freedom by the act of grace for our own best interests, then I have no problem with that, but if you want to say that he has not interfered with our freedom at all in such a scenario, then I have to disagree with you."<br /><br />I think the more or less official reply on this point is that divine grace makes it <i>possible</i> for us <i>to</i> choose salvation, not <i>im</i>possible for us <i>not</i> to.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9384412017967682772014-06-12T13:45:40.117-07:002014-06-12T13:45:40.117-07:00Okay, I see what you're saying. I think. Your ...Okay, I see what you're saying. I think. Your 'complaining', if we may loosely call it that, would be about having the power or ability to do something, but that something is not available, or, more egregiously, has been either taken away or otherwise rendered unavailable to you.<br /><br />This reminds me of the time not long ago when Hostess Inc. closed down due to bankruptcy, and I could no longer purchase Twinkies. I had the power to purchase them, but could not act on or from that power because Twinkies no longer were available. It was a most difficult time in my life, I'll admit. And I suppose I'd even be willing to admit, to some extent anyway, that my will had been "coerced", at least in the sense that it had become impossible for me to exercise my power to purchase Twinkies by actually going out and purchasing those Napoleon wannabes.<br /><br />I'm making light of the matter, to be sure, but I'll stop doing that right now.<br /><br />Recidivism, e.g., is possible even after grace has been bestowed/received. And that wouldn't be possible if the power to return to making the kind of choices one used to make had been taken away. So, even if certain <i>choices</i> are, in a sense, "taken away", the power itself to make them most definitely is not.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-87427229765928402732014-06-12T13:21:06.503-07:002014-06-12T13:21:06.503-07:00Glenn:
Why would you want to complain about not ...Glenn:<br /><br /><i> Why would you want to complain about not being able to choose to do what is impossible for you to do? More interestingly, why would you want to complain that you can't choose to not do what is impossible for you to do?</i><br /><br />The point is that the free choice to do X or not to do X presupposes the possibility of <i>doing X</i>. If doing X is impossible, then the will is not free to choose do X or not to do X. So, if God’s grace removes doing X from the power of the will to do, then the will is not free to choose to do X or not to do X. And since coercion is the delimiting of the power of the will to choose an action, then God’s grace should be considered a form of coercion, because <i>doing X</i> is not actually something that the will chose to avoid, but rather by having that possibility removed from the power of the will, the will was coerced by something <i>other than the will</i> towards <i>not doing X</i>. Again, it may be in a person’s best interests for this to occur, but this should not be misconstrued as a free choice.<br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27766590225731164302014-06-12T13:16:08.966-07:002014-06-12T13:16:08.966-07:00Why would you want to complain about not being abl...Why would you want to complain about not being able to choose to do what is impossible for you to do? More interestingly, why would you want to complain that you can't choose to <i>not</i> do what is impossible for you to do? <br /><br />Surely there are better ways to entertain oneself. (Or maybe not; I wouldn't know -- I don't live in Canada! ;))Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-63503296405843852282014-06-12T12:54:27.750-07:002014-06-12T12:54:27.750-07:00Glenn:
If my understand of Aquinas is correct, t...Glenn:<br /><br /><i> If my understand of Aquinas is correct, then, in the context of a fully functioning free-will, the space of possible choices always consists of exactly two choices -- to accede or not to accede.</i><br /><br />My only addition to that fine account is that to accede to X or not to accede to X presupposes that X is a real and genuine possibility for the will to choose. If X is blocked or eliminated from the realm of possibility, then one can neither accede to X nor not accede to X. For example, it is impossible for me to grow wings and fly, and thus it makes no sense to say (a) that I can accede to growing wings and flying, <i>and</i> (b) that I can <i>not</i> accede to growing wings and flying. Growing wings and flying must be <i>within my power</i>, i.e. an action that I can possibly choose to do. Similarly, if God has restricted an action from my power by his grace, then that action is no longer a real possibility for my will, and thus I can choose neither to accept nor reject that action, because it is outside the power of my will altogether, which makes it a form of coercion.<br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-8879727847534118542014-06-12T12:40:32.841-07:002014-06-12T12:40:32.841-07:00(This is a tab bit more lucid: "...let me say...(This is a tab bit more lucid: "...let me say, proposed to it by the reason.")Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-82754112371508997762014-06-12T12:28:54.011-07:002014-06-12T12:28:54.011-07:00dguller,
Thanks for the responses.
According to ...dguller,<br /><br />Thanks for the responses.<br /><br />According to my understanding of Aquinas (which understanding may be inaccurate (or, worse, completely wrong)), free-will has less to do with whether the space of possible choices is constrained or not (or to what extent, if it is), and more to do with the will obeying or disobeying what is, let me say, proposed by the reason for it, the will, to do. <br /><br />If my understand of Aquinas is correct, then, in the context of a fully functioning free-will, the space of possible choices always consists of exactly two choices -- to accede or not to accede.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14629714043109683502014-06-12T11:07:12.249-07:002014-06-12T11:07:12.249-07:00Glenn:
Here’s another way of putting my point. I ...Glenn:<br /><br />Here’s another way of putting my point. I endorse the following principles:<br /><br />(P1) A will W is free to choose to do X iff X is a real possibility for W to choose<br /><br />(P2) A will W is free <i>not</i> to choose X iff X is a real possibility for W to choose<br /><br />It follows from (P1) and (P2) that if X is <i>not</i> a real possibility for W to choose, then W is neither free to choose X nor free not to choose X. For example, if a parent prevents a child from driving a car by withholding the car keys, then the child’s will is not free to choose to drive the car <i>or</i> to choose not to drive the car. The choice has been made by the child’s parent and not by the child themselves. <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3929799259281371012014-06-12T06:48:52.003-07:002014-06-12T06:48:52.003-07:00Glenn:
1. Does the following statement from your...Glenn:<br /><br /><i> 1. Does the following statement from your last lengthy reply to me accurately reflect what you meant to say: "Efficient causes are clearly coercive"?</i><br /><br />Yes.<br /><br /><i>2. Am I correct in understanding your position to be: if there is something coercive involved in the will's choice of an act, or in the will being caused to choose an act, that the will's freedom is thereby compromised, inhibited or otherwise interfered with, and so the will only appears to be free, but really isn't free?</i><br /><br />Yes. To be truly free would mean that those other possible choices were available to the will. If they are blocked by another agent, then the will’s space of possible choices has been restricted, and thus its freedom has been constrained, which is coercion. <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7815615626111589132014-06-11T23:18:38.895-07:002014-06-11T23:18:38.895-07:00dguller,
Now that that seems to be cleared up, I ...dguller,<br /><br />Now that that seems to be cleared up, I think I understand how your earlier statement re the will being caused to choose its natural inclination is relevant to the conversation: you had actually meant to speak of the will being caused to choose <i>an act in keeping with</i> its natural inclination.<br /><br />Okay, fine.<br /><br />Two questions:<br /><br />1. Does the following statement from your last lengthy reply to me accurately reflect what you meant to say: "Efficient causes are clearly coercive"?<br /><br />2. Am I correct in understanding your position to be: if there is something coercive involved in the will's choice of an act, or in the will being caused to choose an act, that the will's freedom is thereby compromised, inhibited or otherwise interfered with, and so the will only <i>appears</i> to be free, but really <i>isn't</i> free?Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-13106379884077922882014-06-11T22:42:37.177-07:002014-06-11T22:42:37.177-07:00Scott,
Thanks for your input.Scott,<br /><br />Thanks for your input.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18428058671100195632014-06-11T16:49:36.837-07:002014-06-11T16:49:36.837-07:00Glenn:
Are you now saying that you had meant to ...Glenn:<br /><br /><i> Are you now saying that you had meant to say, "That the children's freedom has been inhibited by their parents is not an illusion"?</i><br /><br />Yes.<br /><br /><i> Perhaps we have gotten to a point where we're starting to talk past one another. If so, it may be a good idea for us to take a break. (Blisters are starting to form on my finger-tips, so I for one will benefit from a break.)</i><br /><br />I don’t think that we are talking past each other. I actually think that we are narrowing in on the fundamental differences between us. However, in deference to the well-being of your fingertips, we can continue to discussion at a later date. :)<br /><br />Scott:<br /><br />That's exactly what I was trying to say, however ineffectually.dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.com