tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post2788158131589988203..comments2024-03-19T02:00:34.750-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Aristotelians ought to be presentistsEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger130125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-8234466726208217392022-11-12T08:02:06.912-08:002022-11-12T08:02:06.912-08:00I was hoping if any could respond to this comment ...I was hoping if any could respond to this comment I found on Pruss's blog<br /><br />“Thus at the time of the causation, there is both potentiality and actualization, and so an Aristotelian presentist who accepts simultaneous causation has to accept that the existence of a potentiality is compatible with the existence of its realization.”<br /><br />" Indeed, and thus A-T plants the seeds or its own demise, logically."<br /><br />Writes another. <br /><br /><br />I was wondering if anyone could shed some light on this. <br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53624589867527513762021-03-17T12:47:05.466-07:002021-03-17T12:47:05.466-07:00Hi Ed and others.
Thanks for this. If you'll ...Hi Ed and others.<br /><br />Thanks for this. If you'll indulge me, I have a question concerning the notion of such an apparently unchanging object, only in a universe where *other* things change, please.<br /><br />I accept the insight that, in a universe without any change at all, it would not be coherent to say that time was passing. And therefore an unchanging banana would not be changing even in the minimal sense of taking on a new temporal location.<br /><br />But let's say that, instead of this 'unchanging' banana existing all on its own, it instead were to exist in our universe. So you'd have an object that otherwise stayed the same, but could be said to have a 'before' and 'after' in virtue of other events in the same universe.<br /><br />This means that the otherwise unchanging banana (or rock or anything you like) would at least be passing through time.<br /><br />This is my question: in that specific situation, would be true to say that the banana is in undergoing some kind of intrinsic change - namely change in temporal location? (just as movement through space entails a change in location) Time is one of the 9 Aristotelian accidents, just as much as location, after all.<br /><br />Or alternatively, would this be a mere 'Cambridge change' in the banana?<br /><br />Thank you!David Snoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12574476260364731542019-08-14T08:38:52.714-07:002019-08-14T08:38:52.714-07:00One difficulty I have with presentism is specifica...One difficulty I have with presentism is specifically theological. I'm not sure how presentism can be squared with the fact that all moments of time are present to God. In a universe with only changeable things, or in an Aristotelian universe where the timeless God has no interaction with the world, this problem doesn't arise. But if we believe that God is both timeless and aware of/engaged in the contingent world, how can the past and future be unreal? How can they be timelessly present to God if they don't really exist?<br /><br />As an aside, I've never actually seen this objection addressed, but it seems very intuitive to me. It's possible that the reason is that there's a really simple answer, but if so, I've got a blind spot here.Ryan Whttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17622973367285644324noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44590812308169585772019-06-02T14:54:00.524-07:002019-06-02T14:54:00.524-07:00It's controversial (and a minority position am...It's controversial (and a minority position amongst philosophers) because it is prima facie incompatible with Einstein's relativity - one of the most rigorously verified theories in physics.chasekanipehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08566246112406016177noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81139904860795786122019-05-20T02:55:03.381-07:002019-05-20T02:55:03.381-07:00Fair enough.Fair enough.Miguel Cervanteshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01891484277032885884noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44987222215282298732019-05-16T07:18:31.324-07:002019-05-16T07:18:31.324-07:00There seems to me quite a few...conceptions that a...There seems to me quite a few...conceptions that are deformed here as to what's being argued. Perhaps see the other blogs by OP on the specific arguments/A/T thought if not buying the books. Thanks. Anonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11122746359465351676noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35268194454941260422019-05-16T07:10:11.676-07:002019-05-16T07:10:11.676-07:00Julius Caesar does exist. He's either in purga...Julius Caesar does exist. He's either in purgatory, heaven, or hell. <br /><br />That there is change in reality does not imply a change in God. He is pure act and hence has no potentialities. If God is pure act and therefore unchanging, and if time just is change, then God obviously is timeless. <br />Actualizing potential (which is just what change is) in some being would not imply a change in God who sustains the universe at an utterly foundational level. <br />The human body has the potential to shut down for good (ie, to die). This doesn't mean reality is no longer being sustained by God. <br />This is just an analogy, but if you think about God as an author, then it should be clear. If I write a story about Jim and Bob, and then write that Bob dies, it is not the case that I need to enter into the book. <br />Keep in mind, presentism is the thesis that in the temporal realm, only present objects exist; one can also believe in eternal or aeviternal realities. Anonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11122746359465351676noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54742590226266549852019-05-16T06:47:22.525-07:002019-05-16T06:47:22.525-07:00Though I may be also a noob, it would appear you a...Though I may be also a noob, it would appear you are also making the issue of making abstractions concrete. Our measure of time vs what time actually is. A clock that counts seconds is actually following the mechanism within the clock. <br />So, the fact the banana is the only thing in this world means there is no measure of seconds or minutes or years. Anonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11122746359465351676noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42646192783142130632019-05-16T06:37:16.814-07:002019-05-16T06:37:16.814-07:00Please see "aeviternal". They are not et...Please see "aeviternal". They are not eternal. Anonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11122746359465351676noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-85808011237552249962019-05-02T04:52:30.538-07:002019-05-02T04:52:30.538-07:00@Yakov,
If divine simplicity is true, God's n...@Yakov,<br /><br />If divine simplicity is true, God's nature is not prior to his self love because in reality they are identical. To say otherwise implies composition in God. <br /><br />I think we are pretty much on the same page when it comes to God's necessary, yet free, love of himself. I just want to emphasize that anything we say that implies a distinction within God is not literally true. Logical distinctions are simply distinctions in our mind, they are the product of the fact that we use multiple diverse concepts to capture a single reality. So they can be useful to an extent when reasoning about God, however we also have to be careful that we do not slip into thinking that the distinctions exist in God or we will run into trouble. <br /><br />All that said, God's freedom pertaining to himself isn't really the crux of the issue, what I say in #3-8 above and what you say rests on "nonstarters" regards God and his relationship to creation. If you are interested in continuing that discussion, I would be happy to.<br /><br />In any case, I hope you are feeling better soon!Tomhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07838482665489703825noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-45728946335931958292019-05-01T13:42:28.017-07:002019-05-01T13:42:28.017-07:00@Tom
I have been as sick a dog and I am still rec...@Tom<br /><br />I have been as sick a dog and I am still recovering.<br /><br />>If divine simplicity is true, God's nature is not prior to his self love.<br /><br />I don't see how? How can Love Itself not Love Itself? That makes no sense.<br /><br />>From our perspective we can make a notional distinction between God's act of self love and his nature and say that the latter explains the former. However, we cannot make a real distinction like this. <br /><br />I tentatively agree.<br /><br />>God does possess the nature of being love itself but this nature is not something which forces God to love himself. Rather it is identical with his self love. <br /><br />Logically it "forces" him but nothing external forces him no internal etc passive potency made actual etc....<br /><br />>I think the volunteerist/intellectualist debate is difficult and at times misguided since in reality God's will and intellect are identical on classical theism.<br /><br />But they are logically distinct otherwise God would forgive with His Wraith and condemn with His Mercy. <br /><br />>Be that as it may, my exposition of divine freedom is not volunteerist because I denied that God could have done otherwise with respect to his self love. <br /><br />I do too but I conclude it is logically absurd for Love Itself not to love itself. <br /><br />>When you say his freedom with respect to creation is different, are you endorsing what I call the "Thomistic" understanding? And I am interested in why you think my arguments are nonstarters or rely on univocal comparisons between God and his creatures.<br /><br />I will get back to you on that. I have very sick and I am only now getting my strength back.Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-34140666865666903512019-04-29T17:01:17.706-07:002019-04-29T17:01:17.706-07:00We only need enough to suppose that the prior bein...<i>We only need enough to suppose that the prior being of the rock and the successor not-being of the rock are not said of the same present moment. What is the least amount of time needed?</i><br /><br />If I'm not misunderstanding you, you are assuming that any time is needed; but whether time or something else is the correct category for the difference is precisely the point at issue.<br /><br /><i>And precisely what respect carries the burden of distinction?</i><br /><br />The relation between an effect and the cause as source of its existence is distinct from the relation between an effect and its cause as the reason why it has an end. It's very much the same point Scotus makes with regard to the Immaculate Conception: there is a logical distinction here that requires a logical ordering, so the <i>logical instants</i> are distinguishable, even though we are not talking about a difference in time.<br /><br /><i>I maintain that the state of "all reality" (including both God and everything else) is different after the rock ceases to exist as compared to the state before it existed</i><br /><br />I don't know what the 'state of all reality' is, and I lack the omniscience required to say anything more than very indirectly and abstractly about it, so I can only be tentative here. But there are a few possibilities, depending on the exact scenario. If the rock is the only thing that exists, how is there an 'after the rock ceases to exist' and a 'before the rock ceases to exist'? It sounds very much like a figure of speech for talking about a limit. Nobody denies that there is a difference between being and non-being; but difference is not itself something that requires either change or temporality -- there are lots of kinds of differences that are nontemporal. Again, the difference would be analogous to difference in location, which is a nontemporal difference, but it's hard to say how similar or in what ways it would be different without knowing what, exactly the difference is. <br /><br />(2) On the other hand, if there are other things that preexist and postexist the rock, so that what changes is their relation to the rock, then we are really not talking about time for the rock but time for the other things. It's exactly equivalent to what you said about freezing time: for the rock time is frozen, for other things not, and any talk about time is entirely in terms of the relation of those other things to the rock, and not derived simply from the rock itself.<br /><br />It's perhaps best not to talk about the rock at all, if scenario (1) is in play. It becomes just a matter of the universe: God creates a universe (let's assume we aren't talking about a counterfactual version of this universe but just a different universe from ours), it has no changes, He annihilates it. Since there are no changes, there is no way to differentiate large intervals or short intervals, which we do by clocks, which by definition are changes; so on the assumption that it's temporal, we have no way of determining while it goes on whether it lasts a long time, or a short time, or an infinitesimal time, or an infinite-but-bounded time, and we're not before or after or eckwise to it according to any common measure, so, since we don't normally use our language to talk about things of that sort, none of our tenses are strictly accurate on the assumption, because they all assume some common measure that allows coordination. I suppose you could use literary present, as we usually do in English, or literary past, as the French do. But since we have no common measure, we aren't actually talking about what's true 'before' God created it, or what's true 'after'; we have no way to measure such befores and afters, even assuming that they exist, and therefore no way to talk about them accurately. In our universe none of the claims you are making are literally true; you have to ampliate, as the old terminology would say, to all universes God creates, and then you're not using a normal tense, by definition.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74924731657602460512019-04-29T11:48:22.057-07:002019-04-29T11:48:22.057-07:00Dear Ed:
You say that past things *were* real.
W...Dear Ed:<br /><br />You say that past things *were* real.<br /><br />Why isn't that an exact parallel to the fact that golden mountains *are-possibly* real or that Sherlock Holmes is-according-to-a=story real?<br /><br />Is it just that things that were real or will be real *have* a grounding role, but things that are possibly real don't have a grounding role?Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44489588123786986372019-04-29T06:59:13.903-07:002019-04-29T06:59:13.903-07:00In English, in fantasy and science fiction stories...<i>In English, in fantasy and science fiction stories and the like, we sometimes use the phrase 'freezing time', which always describes a cessation of change.</i> <br /><br />True, we do have that expression. But what it invariably means is that God (or some magical being) "freezes" <b>most</b> things to preempt change in them, but does not freeze <i>everything</i>, so that something or other in the story can <i>happen</i> while "everything else" remains unchanged. It is completely uninteresting and irrelevant to story-making if change stopped for EVERYTHING "for a time" and then re-started: doing so would have no bearing on the story whatsoever. <br /><br /><i>If God creates the rock, at that moment freezes time, and annihilates the rock, how much time are we talking?</i> <br /><br />We only need enough to suppose that the prior being of the rock and the successor not-being of the rock are not said of the same present moment. What is the least amount of time needed? <br /><br /><i>Perhaps I am just misunderstanding the argument, but is this really an issue? Because the rock would not be existing and ceasing in the same respect </i> <br /><br />And precisely what <i>respect</i> carries the burden of distinction? We supposed, here, that there is no change occurring. Nothing is ever different ABOUT the rock, other than its existing and then (there we go again) not existing. <br /><br />I maintain that the state of "all reality" (including both God and everything else) is <i>different</i> after the rock ceases to exist as compared to the state before it existed: on one perspective, it would be true that "God will create a rock" and (in that perspective) not true that "God did create the rock", and on the other that under a different perspective "God did create a rock" and not true that "God will create the rock". In order to say (under the latter perspective) that the statement "God did create the rock" is "not true" one has to say that God did not create - and then <i>what is the meaning of our supposition to begin with?</i> But if the statement "God did create the rock" is true after the rock ceased to be, (in whatever sense that past tense can possibly be valid) then that sense allows us to assert such a temporal framework to the rock even in the absence of change. <br /><br />Speaking of this thought-experiment not in sheer physical terms but moral and spiritual, one might easily argue that the notion of God creating a non-spiritual being (a rock) that is by nature capable of change, and supernaturally hold it in stasis in a universe consisting of only the rock and nothing else, and then let it lapse into non-existence, is a morally repulsive hypothesis: that God could have no possible reason to create so, and this perhaps underlies why we are unable to fashion a rational way of speaking about it. That is, maybe there <i>really is</i> something metaphysically nonsensical about the hypothesis, which we are ignoring ex hypothesis. Tonyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07159134209092031897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-56084282859650772282019-04-28T20:08:24.586-07:002019-04-28T20:08:24.586-07:00Hi Prof. Feser (or anyone else),
What does it mea...Hi Prof. Feser (or anyone else),<br /><br />What does it mean to <i>exist</i> or to be <i>real</i>? And are these two terms synonyms?<br /><br />Would an Aristotelian-Thomist consider numbers to be real, for example?Iannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-65979757522421794192019-04-28T13:27:07.706-07:002019-04-28T13:27:07.706-07:00Feser proposes a universe consisting of a single g...Feser proposes a universe consisting of a single green banana that is not changing, so there is no passage of time in this imagined universe. However, if the banana ripens from green to yellow and rots from yellow to brown, then we have the passage of time because this universe is changing.<br />Feser is wrong because there can be no ‘passage of time’ in a universe of a single motion or mutation. By proclaiming the ‘passage of time’ in a single-motion universe, Feser is himself Platonizing time. For change to take time or for time to pass, there must be a second independent motion to which to compare the change, as well as a human mind to make the comparison.<br />There are two disparate meanings of the word, time. One is qualitative, namely the condition of mutability or mutation itself. With this meaning we say that something exists in time. i.e. it is subject to change. The other is quantitative, namely the human mental act of comparing one motion with a second motion. This is measurement. With this meaning we speak of passing time or of taking time when all we experience is the non-quantifiable, ever present, now.<br />Bob Druryhttp://theyhavenowine.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12211885613377297272019-04-28T10:48:59.147-07:002019-04-28T10:48:59.147-07:00@Yakov,
(1) Whether or not we agree on this point...@Yakov,<br /><br />(1) Whether or not we agree on this point I do not think is especially important since I merely put it here as a backdrop to discuss divine freedom pertaining to creation in #2. <br /><br />But I would disagree with this: "nothing outside God forces him to love himself and no passive potency that become act in God moves Him to love Himself but His nature moves Him to love himself." If divine simplicity is true, God's nature is not prior to his self love. From our perspective we can make a notional distinction between God's act of self love and his nature and say that the latter explains the former. However, we cannot make a real distinction like this. <br /><br />Moreover, you say "if you mean God doesn't possess the nature of being Love Itself and loves Himself based on some ill defined implicit volunteerist act."<br /><br /> God does possess the nature of being love itself but this nature is not something which forces God to love himself. Rather it is identical with his self love. <br /><br />I think the volunteerist/intellectualist debate is difficult and at times misguided since in reality God's will and intellect are identical on classical theism. This is not my personal interpretation of classical theism. This is standard. Be that as it may, my exposition of divine freedom is not volunteerist because I denied that God could have done otherwise with respect to his self love. <br /><br />(2) When you say his freedom with respect to creation is different, are you endorsing what I call the "Thomistic" understanding? And I am interested in why you think my arguments are nonstarters or rely on univocal comparisons between God and his creatures. Tomhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07838482665489703825noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-63460142211826645022019-04-27T18:03:09.712-07:002019-04-27T18:03:09.712-07:00Aristotle Jedi. I would say I tend these days to ...Aristotle Jedi. I would say I tend these days to error to the right of Lagrange. <br /><br />@Tom . We might not agree here. Let me explore it.<br /><br />(1)Well God is Love Itself so how can Love Itself not Love Himself? That is like saying God who is Unconditional Existence Itself could choose not to exist. How can Existence coherently not exist? There is no real distinction between the Essence and Being of God so God is his one attributes. Sure nothing outside God forces him to love himself and no passive potency that become act in God moves Him to love Himself but His nature moves Him to love himself. So I disagree with your statement "Nothing within God forces him to love himself since there is nothing in God that is prior to his act of self-love." if you mean God doesn't possess the nature of being Love Itself and loves Himself based on some ill defined implicit volunteerist act.<br /><br />(2) God’s freedom pertaining to creation is different but I think many of your arguments if not most are non-starters because you are making unequivocal comparisons between God and his creatures. Not an analogous one. So it is possible responses 3 to 8 suffer from this oversight. <br /><br />Anyway I will respond more later as I am tired. Cheers.Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-13236875165858888692019-04-27T12:41:43.794-07:002019-04-27T12:41:43.794-07:00I don't know what a better way of saying it wo...I don't know what a better way of saying it would be, but if you want to avoid the conclusion that presentism is incompatible with classical theism, you should drop the 'no longer' part. <br />But I don't think that can be done.Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40900038251973015782019-04-27T11:11:14.978-07:002019-04-27T11:11:14.978-07:00Clumsy wording on my part, for sure. Perhaps a be...Clumsy wording on my part, for sure. Perhaps a better way of saying it is that Julius Caesar is no longer being sustained. <br /><br />I appreciate the back and forth. As a rookie, it is always helpful!Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13952459303163638951noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-45102578141340732802019-04-27T10:30:14.272-07:002019-04-27T10:30:14.272-07:00Tony said,
In which case, the rock's _existi...Tony said,<br /><br /><i> In which case, the rock's _existing_ and its _cessation_ would not be separated in time. In effect, you seem to be saying that the rock would both exist and not-exist, and we would not have the option of using "not at the same time" to distinguish, and thus -maintain the principle of non-contradiction. </i><br /><br />Perhaps I am just misunderstanding the argument, but is this really an issue? Because the rock would not be existing and ceasing in the same <i>respect</i> (and if the rock is not measurable in terms of time, then the 'at the same time' part would simply not be applicable); the latter would just be the statement that there is some kind of limit to the rock's existence. Even on the sharpest distinction between place and time, it would not be fundamentally different from a point's existing here and only here.<br /><br />In English, in fantasy and science fiction stories and the like, we sometimes use the phrase 'freezing time', which always describes a cessation of change. If God creates the rock, at that moment freezes time, and annihilates the rock, how much time are we talking? Well, if we take time as genuinely being frozen, then no time passed, just ex hypothesi. And if we hold that time's being frozen is just a figure of speech nothing other than that change stopped, stasis, then what could conceivably ground an answer to the question of how much time has passed?<br />Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-59138737859714549882019-04-27T08:34:11.148-07:002019-04-27T08:34:11.148-07:00@Cogniblog,
All angels belong to the same genus,...@Cogniblog,<br /><br /><br />All angels belong to the same genus, namely that of "intellectual / personal being". But they all differ from each other in species.<br /><br />All humans are of the same species because they have matter. Just as all cats are of the same species "cat" because of their matter. But angles don't have matter, so the difference between each angel is not the difference between one and another human or one and another cat, but like the difference between camels and lions, for example.JoeDnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9767159061595389742019-04-27T08:30:29.835-07:002019-04-27T08:30:29.835-07:00@Cogniblog,
Because "equilateral triangle&...@Cogniblog,<br /><br /><br />Because "equilateral triangle" is an abstract concept, and as such is immaterial. The intellect grasps and possesses these concepts and as such it is immaterial. Your eyes can see <b>an</b> equilateral triangle, but they can't see <b>equilateral triangularity</b> <i>as such.</i><br /><br />Feeling sorrow, on the other hand, clearly involves no conceptual thinking and is something that happens to the body and is thus essentially sensed by the senses, not abstracted.JoeDnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-22888985568879429582019-04-27T08:02:01.023-07:002019-04-27T08:02:01.023-07:00@Tony,
Yes, that is my main argument that I want...@Tony,<br /><br /><br />Yes, that is my main argument that I wanted to make in my OP.<br /><br />It's intuitively easy to understand that if an unchanging incorruptible rock were to exist, it can also stop to exist. But that would require that the rock's existence has duration.<br /><br />And that duration may be shorter or longer. In other words, time (considered as duration or endurance) still applies even to unchanging incorruptible things with regards to their continued existence.JoeDnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-59250821074543336272019-04-27T07:59:07.164-07:002019-04-27T07:59:07.164-07:00As I said, that God is in time while sustaining th...As I said, that God is in time while sustaining the universe from moment to moment is the conclusion that follows from <i>your</i> claim that "God is <i>no longer</i> sustaining Julius Caesar as a living human being".<br />So, there is no question-begging anywhere.<br />Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.com