tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post274763637832390279..comments2024-03-28T08:34:20.807-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Is it wrong to lie to HAL?Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger69125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-68749700944725707052012-11-01T22:51:05.407-07:002012-11-01T22:51:05.407-07:00Hal doesn't know what truth is because Hal doe...Hal doesn't know what truth is because Hal doesn't have an immaterial intellect.Geremiahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11812810552682098086noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-63327726276575515732012-10-19T20:19:32.765-07:002012-10-19T20:19:32.765-07:00Hmm...what about giving false information on a web...Hmm...what about giving false information on a website? Can you lie to the YouTube server? Or what about creating a digital persona with fictitious information?Aquohnhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02109131929299273989noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18823964049081998752011-09-20T01:48:41.381-07:002011-09-20T01:48:41.381-07:00Mental reservation will not work when a crafty Naz...Mental reservation will not work when a crafty Nazi recognizes the crucifix on the wall, and asks, "Are you hiding any Jews in your house. Any other answer than 'no' will result in us searching every square inch of this house and upon finding anyone who looks remotely non-Aryan, an immediate execution of everyone in the household. NOW SPEAK!"<br /><br />The idea that cunning crafty language is legitimate but an outright answer is not seems to be absurd. Where do you draw the line between legitimate mental reservation and Clinton-ian non-sense which EVERYONE recognizes as a total absurdity, but I'm sure he thought was being very clever at the time. <br /><br />You are doing the same exact thing in both cases, the only difference is that in some humorous way, the one statement MAY have a possible interpretation that actually contains truth, while the other does not.<br /><br />If you are forced to choose between two evils, I would argue that yes, it is always a sin to lie, but it may not be YOUR sin. What I mean is, why cannot we posit that the Nazis bear the sin for forcing innocents to lie to them in order to save more innocent lives?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71502088272374914992010-11-13T10:35:57.122-08:002010-11-13T10:35:57.122-08:00“There are no Jews in my house [since my house is ...“<i>There are no Jews in my house [since my house is now theirs, and won't really be mine again till you leave and they are gone].</i>”<br /><br />A lie is something one says with the purpose to deceive the other person. To suggest Clintonian linguistic tricks like the above is in my judgment shameful, and bespeaks badly of those who defend the Natural Law theory of ethics.Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49467570285267851192010-11-13T07:46:04.063-08:002010-11-13T07:46:04.063-08:00"There are no Jews in my house [since my hous..."There are no Jews in my house [since my house is now theirs, and won't really be mine again till you leave and they are gone]."Codgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-2408127251920639782010-11-11T10:19:06.969-08:002010-11-11T10:19:06.969-08:00Aeon J. Skoble: I see where you're going, but ...Aeon J. Skoble: <i>I see where you're going, but isn't this a double-effect situation? </i><br /><br />If lying were (sometimes) moral, then you could perhaps use Double Effect to justify the possible bad effect (the Nazi coming to believe a falsehood) because of the greater, desired effect of saving innocent lives. But since the claim here is that lying is intrinsically immoral, Double Effect doesn't even get off the ground (you can never commit an evil that good may come of it). <br /><br /><i>Your own explanation earlier seems to allow for lies about how that dress looks - if that sort of deception is permissible, it seems a fortiori that lying to the Nazi is also.</i> <br /><br />I don't think Prof. Feser would allow that as an exception if somebody specifically asked. (People who ask, "Do I look good?" may be superficial and vain enough to get upset if you answer "No", but they nevertheless want an honest answer — because they honestly want it to be the case that they do look good!) I took his example there to be equivalent to the social convention of "How are you?"/"Fine, thanks.", in which nobody is really deceived because everybody interprets "Fine, thanks" to mean "Either I really am fine, or I'm not fine but it's none of your business."<br /><br />Of course, I don't see why we can't argue similarly for the Nazis: "No Jews here" could be interpreted to mean, "There really are no Jews here and I am honestly stating my mind." Or it could mean, "There are Jews here but I am trying to deceive you" (=a lie, which is [allegedly] wrong). But there are other possible meanings! For example, "No decent human being would go around hunting down Jews and if you had an ounce of moral courage in your body you wouldn't be asking" — which of course is true, and therefore entirely permissible to state.<br /><br /><i>why are we understanding the natural function of our communicative abilities solely in terms of "speaking the truth," as opposed to more broadly "serving our ends in social settings"?</i><br /><br />That is more or less how I see it. Whatever terms are used to describe it, everyone accepts joking, acting, etc. as legitimate uses of our communicative abilities, so I don't see why escaping the clutches of a maniac does not qualify too (whether you call it an exception or an alternative end, or whatever.)Davidnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4786579137105609252010-11-10T20:34:32.303-08:002010-11-10T20:34:32.303-08:00I see where you're going, but isn't this a...I see where you're going, but isn't this a double-effect situation? I agree that in most circumstances I should keep silent or misdirect etc., but when they come to the door and ask straight out "Are you hiding Jews in the attic?" I have to say either yes or no. Telling the lie is justified by saving the life. Your own explanation earlier seems to allow for lies about how that dress looks - if that sort of deception is permissible, it seems a fortiori that lying to the Nazi is also.<br />A further, separate, question: why are we understanding the natural function of our communicative abilities solely in terms of "speaking the truth," as opposed to more broadly "serving our ends in social settings"? On the latter read, lying to homicidal maniacs becomes perfectly understandable.Aeon J. Skoblenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3033225391526467822010-11-10T15:43:58.950-08:002010-11-10T15:43:58.950-08:00Hi Aeon,
Of course there is no duty to give them ...Hi Aeon,<br /><br />Of course there is no duty to give them up; in fact, I would say there is a duty not to give them up. Keep in mind that to say "You must not lie" does not entail "You must say what you know." In this case, you shouldn't say what you know, and you shouldn't lie either. So, either you should say nothing at all, or you should distract the Nazi's attention, or you should run, or whatever.<br /><br />Also, the claim isn't that you owe the Nazi the truth. You do not owe him that, so it is not a matter of committing an injustice against him. It is not a matter of injustice at all. It is rather a matter of acting contrary to the good of the communicative faculty, which is bad per se, even when the other person doesn't have a right to the truth.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-45942364797782404242010-11-10T13:45:43.421-08:002010-11-10T13:45:43.421-08:00Ed, I have a different sort of objection. Seems t...Ed, I have a different sort of objection. Seems to me that telling the truth to the Nazi at the door is logically inconsistent: presumably you're hiding the Jews precisely because it's unjust to persecute and kill them. It's not logically possible that justice can require me to both save them from murderers and deliver them unto murderers. This is what has always bugged me about Kant, but I don't see why classical natural law thinking commits us to this illogical result. You invoke the natural function of our communicative faculties, but I'd back it up one step and invoke the natural function of our rational faculties. If we are correct in perceiving a duty to hide the Jews, then we're in error in perceiving a duty to give them up.Aeon J. Skoblenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-32635929745083274182010-11-10T11:19:27.572-08:002010-11-10T11:19:27.572-08:00[Continued... I thought this went through hours ag...[Continued... I thought this went through hours ago, but it seems to have disappeared...]<br /><br />However, I'm more receptive to the importance of whether one's audience has the authority to demand the truth from you. Of course it's not the only factor, but it cannot be irrelevant. That's because I do not consider the "natural" function of speech to be conveying one's actual thoughts. That is <i>one</i> of its natural functions. Joking, acting, and scat singing are others. (If lying to Nazis were wrong, scatting would <b>have</b> to be!) But there's more: communication often serves the purpose of mundane signalling, as a mere un-human mechanism to carry out some action. (Un-human not as in "inhuman" or bad, but as in "if we could get a machine to do this for us, we would".) Reciting a telephone number to an operator is in itself no more (or less) "telling the truth" than the equivalent action of turning a dial. And that brings us nicely back to the original topic of this thread.<br /><br />As pointed out, "talking" to HAL is really just a way of providing input, of "steering" a machine. A very advanced machine may lend a more human appearance to its interactions than pushing buttons on a phone, but it would no more count as lying than would turning the "hot" tap to get cold water if you knew that the taps had been mislabelled. (The defective HAL is simply a very elaborate instance of "mislabelling", so to speak.) In the case of clicking a button on the computer to indicate agreement, the computer is acting as a medium of communication with the providers of the software, so it <i>does</i> count as communicating with a person. (Though it still might not count as lying: for example, you may have certain legal consumer rights that cannot be forfeited, even if you say/click that you do. This is an example where the authority of your audience is clearly relevant.) Note that communicating with HAL could in some sense be considered an extension of communicating with its programmers, so there is some possibility of "lying" to HAL if you take that to mean you are (ultimately) lying to HAL's creators. (But in the case of a malfunctioning HAL, you still are simply manipulating a tool in whatever way is necessary to make it operate how the designers <i>meant</i> it to operate, so this particular example is still not lying.)<br /><br />Anyway, the case of the Nazi is more like "talking" to a machine — or a dog — than a relational, human, interpersonal activity. The soldier is merely carrying out a function, not swapping poetry with you; if he could complete his task without any communication — say, by seeing footprints on the floor — then he would. (And in turn, if Hitler had robots, he could have substituted them for human soldiers.) It's not quite as simple as saying the Nazi doesn't have the authority to demand a truthful answer to his question, but in this case the speech is not about promoting or revealing truth; it is merely functional speech, a means to an end, and in this case natural law surely requires the most just application possible. The natural end of speech in this case is justice, and "lying" to the Nazi is what would promote justice (which means that ultimately it has truth as its end as well). <br /><br />(And yes, "such judgement (Who really deserves to be told the truth?) lies outside our competence" just as everything lies outside our competence... if perfection is required. But as in any other practical situation, we can but do our best. Most of the time it isn't that hard. Also by the way, I think the point of Regulus's story is more about honour and duty than lying. It's certainly a different case from Nazis.)Davidnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-34178653342092889192010-11-10T08:06:45.550-08:002010-11-10T08:06:45.550-08:00A major problem is deciding just what the word &qu...A major problem is deciding just what the word "lie" means (and how it translates into other languages; not only do cultural expectations change across time and space, but so do exact shades of meaning). Quotations like, "Holy Scripture seems to condemn lying as absolutely and unreservedly as it condemns murder" are rather unhelpful in this regard. Do they mean that lying is absolutely wrong, as is murder, because of the very definition of the word? All <i>murder</i> is wrong, though not all <i>killing</i> is. And yet even the people who want to lie to Nazis would, it seems clear, call it "lying". <br /><br />Josh is correct in pointing out that if that really is the law, then that's the law, no matter how uncomfortable or how odd or how "unappealing" it may be. Sometimes truth is stranger than [telling] fictions, and gut instinct is simply not a reliable guide to right and wrong. On the other hand, some people seem far too quick to dismiss the Nazi-liars' instincts; guts are not wholly reliable, but if one has trained oneself, if one has tried to develop virtue, then one's instincts ought to be at least partially reliable (that's what they're there for, after all). Anyway, simply accusing people of having succumbed to modern relativism is not sufficient to answer the charges: an argument that "lying to Nazis just <b>feels</b> right" is no argument, but it is a serious point that it seems to follow that lying is worse than murder, or that actually it's OK to lie as long as you use a really sarcastic tone.<br /><br />In general, killing someone is wrong, by simple application of natural law; but it can be moral to kill someone in self-defence or in a proper state execution. Natural law does not insist that you can safely wound someone in self-defence, but killing your attacker is merely a venial sin, or something like that. The killing can, under the right circumstances, be morally acceptable (though of course if you can merely wound the aggressor, say, that would obviously be better). The parallel case would surely be that lying can, under extreme enough circumstances, be acceptable (though remaining silent, etc. might be better, if possible). If that's not the case, then killing a man must be more "natural" than telling a lie, which is an exceedingly unobvious claim to make.<br /><br />Again, you could argue that according to a strict definition of the English word, uttering truthful words sarcastically is not "lying", but it unarguably is intentional deception and surely wrong. (Unless it's to Nazis, of course!) According to Prof. Feser's definition — "communicating in a way that is unambiguously contrary to what one really thinks" — the "sarcastic pseudo-lie" is, in fact, a real lie. The question, though, isn't how or when you can cheat natural law; the question is whether the natural end of communication really is to "unambiguously convey what one really thinks". In fact, joking or acting were already excused on the grounds that they do not "purport to express our actual thoughts". But what about a joke that depends on being taken seriously (at least at first, until reaching the punchline, perhaps)? Are they immoral? What about planning a surprise party, or buying a surprise gift? Such things involve deliberately deception, so if we really want to be strict, those are all immoral too. (It makes "natural" law seem rather unnatural, but I'm prepared to forsake a fair bit of common sense for a position that's truly consistent.)<br /><br />[cont'd]Davidnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33543690160500825932010-11-10T06:40:31.486-08:002010-11-10T06:40:31.486-08:00In essence Dr. Feser it's like the torture iss...In essence Dr. Feser it's like the torture issue. Torture is intrinsically immoral but then does waterboarding really constitute torture? What's the definition of torture?<br /><br />Lying is intrinsically immoral but is it really a lie to mislead someone who has no right to the truth?BenYachovhttp://www.catholic.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-84912975366536912010-11-10T04:33:48.292-08:002010-11-10T04:33:48.292-08:00This Nazi question is an excellent subject of deba...This Nazi question is an excellent subject of debate. I've been considering it for some time and am a bit conflicted, though not I think in the traditional way.<br /><br />1. I have no problem whatsoever with the idea that one may be required to die rather than sin in some cases; why should lying be an exception?<br /><br />2. I am a "hardcore" Thomist, and have been for years. Naturally, then, I totally agree that there are moral absolutes and that our morality must be guided by reason and not emotion, which is sometimes very flawed.<br /><br />But after considering the issue, I still feel as though something is missing in the consideration. It is difficult to distinguish between the urging of conscience and that of emotion at times, to be sure, but I understand what others are saying here. It seems to me at least initially that lying to a Nazi would not be wrong in those circumstances.<br /><br />Here is an approach that may have not been considered, however:<br /><br />1. Under certain conditions (games, warfare, etc.) deception is a part of the standard rules, and therefore allowable.<br /><br />2. One could very well consider the Nazi state to be illegitimate. Or, even if not, one could certainly agree that the Nazis and the Jews were in a state of war, at least in some sense, and that the Jews were on the right side of the conflict.<br /><br />3. In protecting Jews, one is an ally of them/on their side of the war, and the Nazis, in turn, are operating as agents on the other side of the war. As such, and since deception is allowable in warfare, one could lie to the Nazi as an act deception in warfare.<br /><br />I'm not saying that this is certainly correct, mind you; I'm only presenting it as a possible solution to the conundrum. Deception in games and warfare is generally agreed upon to be allowable. So what do you think, Mr. Feser et al?<br /><br />- d_sentiAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-68850016839652765372010-11-09T23:01:28.052-08:002010-11-09T23:01:28.052-08:00Perhaps the truth lies in a different direction: T...Perhaps the truth lies in a different direction: That the good, being part of the nature of God, is intrinsically free and creative and thus not amenable to nailing down by some absolute formula. For example, I know of no ethical theory, including Natural Law theory, which justifies Mary Magdelene wasting the precious stuff to wash Jesus’ feet. The only formula about ethics which is never wrong would be a tautological formula, such as “the moral deed is one love moves one into choosing”. <br /><br />Perhaps it’s a weakness of faith that we even search for such ethical formulas, for following Christ is not a matter of applying a formula or following a set of beliefs or reading a map, but a matter of experiencing the living and actual presence of the risen God.Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40470266588195286982010-11-09T22:35:35.483-08:002010-11-09T22:35:35.483-08:00Yes, Dr Feser, but everything is different now tha...Yes, Dr Feser, but everything is different now that we've been freed by V2. :pCodgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52599296899434222362010-11-09T20:07:28.082-08:002010-11-09T20:07:28.082-08:00It is worth adding that the CE article on "Me...It is worth adding that the CE article on "Mental reservation" also affirms that:<br /><br /><i>"According to the common Catholic teaching it is never allowable to tell a lie, not even to save human life. A lie is something intrinsically evil, and as evil may not be done that good may come of it, we are never allowed to tell a lie."</i><br /><br />To cite an official teaching document, you also find the teaching that "lies of every sort are prohibited" by the Eight Commandment in the Roman Catechism (i.e. the Catechism of the Council of Trent, issued by Pius V).<br /><br />So, again, it is very misleading just to say flatly that "there is no unanimity of Catholic teaching" on this issue. Like many other issues that later got settled, there was some diversity of opinion on this matter in the early Church. But for many centuries now the position I have been describing has been the standard one.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71974055609150138632010-11-09T19:14:57.578-08:002010-11-09T19:14:57.578-08:00Vincent,
You are quoting rather selectively from ...Vincent,<br /><br />You are quoting rather selectively from the CE and conveying a very misleading impression. The very same article also points out that St. Augustine's no-exceptions view: <br /><br /><i>"has generally been followed in the Western Church, and it has been defended as the common opinion by the Schoolmen and by modern divines."</i><br /><br />It says also that:<br /><br /><i>"In places almost innumerable Holy Scripture seems to condemn lying as absolutely and unreservedly as it condemns murder and fornication. Innocent III gives expression in one of his decretals to this interpretation, when he says that Holy Scripture forbids us to lie even to save a man's life."</i><br /><br />and that the article's description of the view of Aquinas and others about lying:<br /><br /><i>"reproduces the common and universally accepted teaching of the Catholic schools throughout the Middle Ages until recent times" and that "Most of these writers who attack the common opinion show that they have very imperfectly grasped its true meaning. At any rate they have made little or no impression on the common teaching of the Catholic schools."</i><br /><br />In other words, while the view I have been describing and defending is not the <i>infallible</i> teaching of the Church (and I never claimed it was) neither is it merely one position among other equally defensible ones. Whatever might have been true many centuries ago, it is now and has been for many centuries <i>the standard view</i>.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58103421269211113412010-11-09T18:22:20.551-08:002010-11-09T18:22:20.551-08:00Hi everyone,
There is no unanimity of Catholic te...Hi everyone,<br /><br />There is no unanimity of Catholic teaching on the question of whether it is ever right to tell a lie. Please have a look at this article from the Catholic Encyclopedia on lying:<br /><br /><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09469a.htm" rel="nofollow">Lying</a><br /><br />A few excerpts:<br /><br />"There is some difference of opinion among the Fathers of the Christian Church. Origen quotes Plato and approves of his doctrine on this point (Stromata, VI). He says that a man who is under the necessity of lying should diligently consider the matter so as not to exceed. He should gulp the lie as a sick man does his medicine. He should be guided by the example of Judith, Esther, and Jacob. If he exceed, he will be judged the enemy of Him who said, 'I am the Truth.' St. John Chrysostom held that it is lawful to deceive others for their benefit, and Cassian taught that we may sometimes lie as we take medicine, driven to it by sheer necessity."<br /><br />"St. Augustine held that the naked truth must be told whatever the consequences may be. He directs that in difficult cases silence should be observed if possible. If silence would be equivalent to giving a sick man unwelcome news that would kill him, it is better, he says, that the body of the sick man should perish rather than the soul of the liar. Besides this one, he puts another case which became classical in the schools. If a man is hid in your house, and his life is sought by murderers, and they come and ask you whether he is in the house, you may say that you know where he is, but will not tell: you may not deny that he is there. The Scholastics, while accepting the teaching of St. Augustine on the absolute and intrinsic malice of a lie, modified his teaching on the point which we are discussing. It is interesting to read what St. Raymund of Pennafort wrote on the subject in his Summa, published before the middle of the thirteenth century. He says that most doctors agree with St. Augustine, but others say that one should tell a lie in such cases. Then he gives his own opinion, speaking with hesitation and under correction. The owner of the house where the man lies concealed, on being asked whether he is there, should as far as possible say nothing."<br /><br />"From the middle of the eighteenth century onwards a few discordant voices have been heard from time to time. Some of these, as Van der Velden and a few French and Belgian writers, while admitting in general a lie is intrinsically wrong, yet argued that there are exceptions to the rule. As it is lawful to kill another in self-defense, so in self-defense it is lawful to tell a lie. Others wished to change the received definition of a lie."Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28651913830349678952010-11-09T15:54:45.861-08:002010-11-09T15:54:45.861-08:00It was devastating to Kant, I believe, and it woul...<i>It was devastating to Kant, I believe, and it would be devastating as well to Natural Law if indeed that is what it is saying.</i><br /><br />Not in the nineteenth century; Kant's view on the point wasn't generally considered strange at the time. The notion that this is somehow a devastating response -- I find that it's pretty much never made clear why it's supposed to be devastating, since people prefer to be vague and handwaving about it -- is something that has arisen relatively recently. So it is very clearly a socialized response. And as I noted before, Corrie ten Boom, who grew up in a Dutch Calvinist society, and who, unlike pretty much anyone who uses the Nazi-at-the-door scenario today, actually faced this very situation, and so actually knew what she was talking about, always held that it would have been better if she could have avoided lying when she did. (Her sister Betsy, although often in similar circumstances, never lied, and got away with it.)<br /><br />There are problems with Kant's ethics; this is not one of them, or, at least, we should be very suspicious of the fact that belief that it is a problem with it is so very localized historically and geographically. Particularly since the point is never that lying is always and everywhere an utterly heinous sin, but the very weak position that any time you lie, your actions have some real moral defect. Historically speaking, that is far from being the strongest position people have taken on this sort of subject; and that it is so common to reject this very weak principle is perhaps a sign of just how much we lower our standards whenever they start looking difficult.<br /><br />Part of the problem is that you are thinking of "the moral thing to do". It's simply a mistake, especially when we are dealing with abstract cases to do, to think about morality as something found in the one wholly right thing, period. In fact, there is a wide spectrum of things one could do, some of which are fully moral, some of which are moral but defectively so, and some of which are outright immoral. The danger in thinking of 'the moral thing to do' is that one doesn't do justice to the middle group: one either ignores it completely, or pretends that it is completely moral. And this is a serious problem, because it is where most decent people are most of the time. <br /><br />I suspect most people who give the lying solution to the problem would, in practice, turn out to be neither so decent as they think nor so clever as to be able actually to pull it off, but that's true of every area of moral life when we're talking about it abstract terms. Lying to protect lives is exactly the sort of thing lots of decent people would do; the danger lies not in being this sort of decent person (which is moving in the right direction, at least) but in pretending there's nothing in it that falls short, because that's as much as to say that honesty and concern for truth should be sold down the river whenever they get too inconvenient.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39807878885358428272010-11-09T14:55:17.246-08:002010-11-09T14:55:17.246-08:00Brandon: Conversion has nothing to do with it rea...Brandon: Conversion has nothing to do with it really, except as I am mulling over it, I'd like to understand what exactly it says about things like these.<br /><br />I really don't think you can say that this particular scenario is a "socialized" one. It was devastating to Kant, I believe, and it would be devastating as well to Natural Law if indeed that is what it is saying. I can live with the whole idea of it being a venial sin in that case, but man, it just seems so clear that it is the moral thing to do in that situation...Joshuahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03854212736162113327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75312244528796243092010-11-09T10:49:16.798-08:002010-11-09T10:49:16.798-08:00Ed Feser writes: “Therefore, HAL, being (like any ...Ed Feser writes: “<i>Therefore, HAL, being (like any other machine) entirely material, could not be rational; and being an artifact and thus not a true substance, could not possibly be a person.</i>”<br /><br />I fail to understand this logic. Suppose one would take Ed Feser’s body and make an exact copy of it, atom by atom. From all we know from science that copy would behave exactly as the original Ed Feser does. Would one nevertheless be justified in saying that the copy, being a physical artifact, is not a person and is not rational?Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-1111483174528157392010-11-09T07:08:02.002-08:002010-11-09T07:08:02.002-08:00The thing is Tony a mortal sin requires all three ...The thing is Tony a mortal sin requires all three conditions. Clearly condition one tells me it's not a grave matter to lie to a Nazi anymore than stealing a penny from Donald Trump is a grave matter.<br /><br />(Of course I can't think of any reason to steal even a penny from Trump but up against the wall I could lie my arse off to a Nazi).BenYachovhttp://www.catholic.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61881015183565424062010-11-09T07:03:52.644-08:002010-11-09T07:03:52.644-08:00Tony,
Well lying to a Nazi is self-evidently the ...Tony,<br /><br />Well lying to a Nazi is self-evidently the same as stealing a penny from Donald Trump. Both are objectively wrong but not on the level of lying to the Pope or stealing the last penny from a despratly poor person. So my intellect tells me it is a venial sin which is why I owe God a Rosary if I do it. If I wasn't sorry I would not do the Rosary.<br /><br /> But naturally I realize that I am too close to the dark side when I do so & naturally if I can get away with not telling the Nazis what they need to know without directly lying I will do that first.BenYachovhttp://www.catholic.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23383253584447659852010-11-09T06:05:00.086-08:002010-11-09T06:05:00.086-08:00The funny thing is that in the nineteenth century ...The funny thing is that in the nineteenth century you find people regularly appealing to common sense and sentiment as reasons why you should obviously never, ever lie regardless of the circumstances. The reaction some people are having is not as graven into their hearts as they think it is. As Tony notes, this is one of the areas of moral life in which our first gut reactions are very influenced by how we are socialized.<br /><br />I'm not sure what conversion to Catholicism has to do with anything; the argument is essentially that lying to someone is essentially disordered as a matter of reason. It just so happens that Catholics are one group emphasizing the importance of order according to reason in moral life. (And it is notable that virtually every philosophical position that does take order according to reason as important, however much it may diverge from natural law theory, nonetheless takes a very strong stance against lying.)<br /><br />And what is it with all the people who think the only alternative to lying to Nazis and murderers is to tell them everything, or, indeed, anything at all? Does no one see any problem with even appearing to condone their behavior?Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6585386634581245112010-11-08T21:29:46.387-08:002010-11-08T21:29:46.387-08:00So, let's say I'm considering converting t...So, let's say I'm considering converting to Catholicism. I understand part of the greatness of the Church is in its unwavering defense of tradition and moral dogma. But guys...really? This answer seems so against common sense, as well as emotion. I understand the Nazi case is an extreme one, but why would God implant such a strong pang of conscience to "do the right thing" and lie to the Nazis? Surely our passions and instincts would tell us to give the refugees up, save ourselves...is that not also clearly immoral? Didn't Augustine say that "an unjust law is no law"?<br /><br />If a good Catholic must swallow this aspect of Natural Law regarding lying, then so be it, I suppose, but these comments seem to point to an error made along the way. But I ain't no expert.Joshuahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03854212736162113327noreply@blogger.com