tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post2484634132319283885..comments2024-03-28T21:43:44.433-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: McDowell’s Aristotelian near missEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger67125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-36754113866354577012022-03-02T01:39:30.532-08:002022-03-02T01:39:30.532-08:00One that concludes by logical inference that we ar...One that concludes by logical inference that we are only material bodies/cells/brains, while at the same time affirms that <a href="https://aquinasonline.com/soul-kinds-nature-and-powers/" rel="nofollow">"there's something more"</a> to it, resulting in a contradiction. <br /><br />You want Aristotelianism without <a href="https://evolutionnews.org/2015/01/aristotle_on_th/" rel="nofollow"> <br />the soul</a> and materialism with a "something more" that has the properties of the immaterial while at the same time you deny the reality of immaterial substances.UncommonDescenthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01889661912118191190noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72811067316007972242022-03-02T01:25:42.943-08:002022-03-02T01:25:42.943-08:00@Hal:
You have been caught in a contradiction. ...@Hal: <br /><br />You have been caught in a contradiction. You say you are a monist that does not believe in immaterial substances. That logically implies that you believe that reality is comprised solely of one substance (therefore <i>monism</i>) which is characterized as matter (therefore <i>materialism).</i> Therefore <b>monistic materialism.</b> <br /><br />And yet you keep insisting that: <br /><i>* Human beings are animals with a distinctive range of abilities. Though they have a mind, they are not identical with the mind they have. Though they have a body, they are not identical with the body they have. </i> <br /><br />Those "distinctive" abilities, for a monistic materialist that denies immaterial substances, can only be carried out by a physical <i>substratum </i>(our bodies made of cells). Therefore for a monistic materialist we *are* our bodies. And since it's only when the brain is damaged that "we" disappear, we "are" our brains/the result of its workings. <br /><br />So, per your monistic materialism, "you" have now been reduced to the brain. Therefore "you" are enclosed in a skull, falling prey of the same <a href="https://strangenotions.com/materialisms-failures-hylemorphisms-vindication/" rel="nofollow">representationalist theather</a> you want to avoid, no matter how much you affirm the contrary. That's why we keep going in circles, because there is no way out for you. <br /><br />Your position is wholly incoherent. You want to "have" <a href="https://aquinasonline.com/soul-kinds-nature-and-powers/" rel="nofollow">the powers of the soul </a> without allowing an immaterial entity. It can not be done.<br /><br />Thank you for this interesting exchange and also take care.UncommonDescenthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01889661912118191190noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-90419830139050740042022-02-28T23:36:15.464-08:002022-02-28T23:36:15.464-08:00@Hal:
I perceive the red geranium.
1. The one...@Hal:<br /><br /><i> I perceive the red geranium. </i> <br /><br />1. The one that is in the external world?<br />2. Or the image presented by your neurons?UncommonDescenthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01889661912118191190noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69296774162343706662022-02-28T23:02:41.492-08:002022-02-28T23:02:41.492-08:00@Hal;
I am not a materialist. So please quite tr...@Hal;<br /><br /><i> I am not a materialist. So please quite trying to equate my position with materialism. </i> <br /><br />You said you are a monist and that you do not believe in immaterial substances. Therefore, you think what exists is only material. Therefore, a materialist.<br /><br />Is there any other option?UncommonDescenthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01889661912118191190noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5279337124176830032022-02-28T10:59:48.338-08:002022-02-28T10:59:48.338-08:00@Hal:
I am an A-Thomist, therefore and under no ...@Hal: <br /><br />I am an A-Thomist, therefore and under no cirumstance am I a materialist (a philosophy that I despise). I am using the conclusions that materialists have to reach due to their defective worldview. I don't believe the occipital lobe "sees" anything. <br /><br /><i> Rather, the explanans is the whole chain of microphysical events, which is materially constitutive of A’ s perceiving G. </i> <br /><br />And "who" "sees" this chain? Does the chain perceive itself?<br />UncommonDescenthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01889661912118191190noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15650382185698383552022-02-28T07:57:11.792-08:002022-02-28T07:57:11.792-08:00@Talmid:
I understand that Hal's position is ...@Talmid:<br /><br />I understand that Hal's position is very close to ours, but the problem is that there is a fatal flaw with his approach, because his conception of the "self" coupled with a monism (materialism?) IS incongruent. That's why I am not letting him off the hook easily :)<br /><br />I am also enjoying a lot our exchange.UncommonDescenthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01889661912118191190noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40209182919604042782022-02-27T21:48:03.438-08:002022-02-27T21:48:03.438-08:00as you and @Talmid were saying, reductive material...as you and @Talmid were saying, reductive materialists are closed inside their head akin to subjective idealists,solipsists and so on. Talk of "receiving the world" through representation, signification, information, interpretation and other "physicalized" notions of mentality inside the brain completely encloses them in their heads. Was lurking around researchgate and saw this badly written paper made by some dubious lone wolf defending some form of eliminativism that sounds close to what hear from young internet "debaters" https://www.researchgate.net/publication/345461511_From_Consciousness_to_Brain-Sign_a_Neurobiological_Reconstruction<br />note that in the "missing link" part where this dude states his "theory", he indorses some very muddled form representationalism mixed with the "signification and interpretation" the brain supposedly makes to account the mind as epiphenomenal (after that he says "mind"is unscientific without giving any argument for his claims, attacks real scientists for believing in the mental and finishes with the claim that there's no knowledge). Its cringeworthy but kinda funnyBugshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02941249467733326809noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-65880532031807632002022-02-27T19:30:32.154-08:002022-02-27T19:30:32.154-08:00I remember reading before that Wittgenstein did ad...I remember reading before that Wittgenstein did admit never reading Aristotle, so seeing how close his view is to our own suprised me. Great minds think alike, i guess!<br /><br />That was quite a interesting exchange we three had and i'am happy that i could correctly summarize your view. Along with Uncommon cool finding against representationism, the information about Witt view were awesome. Gotta study the guy. Talmidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04267925670235640337noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-2462997908507749362022-02-26T05:54:53.758-08:002022-02-26T05:54:53.758-08:00@Hal:
My apologies.
Do you agree that we all n...@Hal: <br /><br />My apologies. <br /><br /><i>Do you agree that we all need a normally functioning brain, eyes and optical nerves in order to have the power of vision? </i> <br /><br />Yes. I do agree with it. We need all of the above to have the power of vision. But that's a <i>necessary</i> condition, not a <i> sufficient</i> one. There is more to the story.<br /><br />When I asked you "what" is that "you" and where does it reside, I meant the following: <br /><br />After the visual signal procedent from an exterior object has reached the occipital lobe... <i>Where</i> is the <b>knower</b> that is the final destinatary of that information? In said occipital lobe? (you say no, because that would amount to the homunculus error). <br /><br />So, where is the "you" (the self that perceives the object and that now <b>knows</b> that he is perceiving it?) <br /><br />If it's separated from the occipital lobe: how does the visual information, that has stopped there, reach "him" ("you")?UncommonDescenthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01889661912118191190noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-48260600918772121922022-02-25T19:41:08.533-08:002022-02-25T19:41:08.533-08:00@UncommonDescent
It seems that my instinct about ...@UncommonDescent<br /><br />It seems that my instinct about Hal view is correct: dude view is very close to our own. Contra the cartesianist idea of the individual being his ego, his thinking, Hal correctly sees, if he allows me to use aristotelian language, that our thinking, feelings, sense of self etc are not what we are but are atributes we have, we are the substance that unites this. Hal, if i'am wrong you can correct me, bro. <br /><br />Of course, i do think that there are good arguments to the conclusion that some of our atributes, namely the ones of the intellect and of the will, transcend the capacity of material bodies and so are not bodily, being them immaterial and eternal, but that is off-topic. From the standpoint of the representationism debate, Hal seems orthodox to me and that seems what he seems to say when he negates that his view is like the pos-cartesian materialist we criticized before.<br /><br />Again, Hal can correct me, but it seems that you guys do agree about the subject of Ed post.Talmidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04267925670235640337noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55502619070905322892022-02-25T10:44:07.382-08:002022-02-25T10:44:07.382-08:00@Hal:
I see the objects in the world that I am l...@Hal:<br /><br /><i> I see the objects in the world that I am looking at. </i> <br /><br />'What' is that 'you' and where does it reside if it's not in the brain?UncommonDescenthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01889661912118191190noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25204033530732748612022-02-24T19:55:35.935-08:002022-02-24T19:55:35.935-08:00@Hal;
I have read all your posts, Talmid's re...@Hal;<br /><br />I have read all your posts, Talmid's remarks and the review of HNTCFramework.<br /><br />Do you accept the chain of vision described by science that starts in objects in the external world, where light is reflected, enters our eyes, impresses the retina, is modified, travels via the optical nerve and ends in the occipital lobe?<br /><br />If you do: after reaching the occipital lobe, what happens?<br /><br />Because this is the crucial point to disentangle our misunderstanding.UncommonDescenthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01889661912118191190noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-13098678104397240962022-02-24T19:37:59.140-08:002022-02-24T19:37:59.140-08:00It would be interesting to see how Bernardo would ...It would be interesting to see how Bernardo would react to a hylemorphist. What i saw from him gave me the impression that he is mostly unaware of classical ways of understanding matter. Seeing Ed comment more on idealism would also be cool.<br /><br />Talmidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04267925670235640337noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-76656845246164200462022-02-24T11:11:55.412-08:002022-02-24T11:11:55.412-08:00Me too. Although I am not an idealist, I really ad...Me too. Although I am not an idealist, I really admire Bernardo Kastrup and his battle against (stupid) materialism. <br /><br />And you gotta love how he refers to J. Coyne as the <a href="https://www.bernardokastrup.com/2020/02/dim-witted-biologist-consciousness-is.html?m=1" rel="nofollow"> "dim-witted biologist".</a> :)UncommonDescenthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01889661912118191190noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53389553858532448902022-02-24T11:04:48.375-08:002022-02-24T11:04:48.375-08:00@Hal:
Why are you asking about the soul? I'...@Hal: <br /><br /><i> Why are you asking about the soul? I've already stated that I don't think human beings have souls. </i> <br /><br />Well, if you say you are an Aristotelian, Aristotle developed an hylemorphist metaphysics that included <b>the soul.</b> He even wrote this book titled <a href="https://evolutionnews.org/2015/01/aristotle_on_th/" rel="nofollow"> <i> De Anima</i> </a> and advanced that some of its operations were fully immaterial. <br /><br />If you are saying that humans have not souls, then you are a materialist and you have to enclose the human ("brain") inside a skull. <br /><br />Saying that the mind is "neither material, nor immaterial" explains nothing and does not make sense. <br /><br />Are you sure you understand your own position?UncommonDescenthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01889661912118191190noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-78108342660790352712022-02-24T00:33:04.258-08:002022-02-24T00:33:04.258-08:00I would like to see an interaction between Prof Fe...I would like to see an interaction between Prof Feser and Bernado Kastrup on the subject of IdealismMichael CPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04687534245499713242noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-48395440170968145502022-02-23T06:49:21.409-08:002022-02-23T06:49:21.409-08:00@Hal:
(Part II)
Also, I am not interested in ...@Hal: <br /><br />(Part II) <br /><br /><i> Also, I am not interested in trying to persuade you that your belief in God is wrong or that you should embrace atheism or naturalism. </i> <br /><br />I am interested in knowig the truth about this reality into which we did not ask to be brought, to understand what its nature is and our role as human beings in it. Worldviews that suffer from incoherencies must be discarded in my opinion, since incoherency is a mark of falsity. And especially when there are options available that do not fall prey of said problems. <br /><br /><i>As I mentioned earlier, I don't believe thoughts are representations. Do you share that belief? </i> <br /><br />I do share it. As Profesor Feser says, <a href="https://ebrary.net/117796/economics/return_form" rel="nofollow"> a thought and the thing thought about are <b>formally identical. </b> </a> It's an isomorphic, intimate connection. There are no "representations" of any kind going on here. No "theatres" and no non-sense.UncommonDescenthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01889661912118191190noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75974769399149169702022-02-23T06:43:42.446-08:002022-02-23T06:43:42.446-08:00@Hal:
(Part I)
I was surprised to see him rely...@Hal: <br /><br />(Part I) <br /><br /><i>I was surprised to see him relying on the Homunculus argument to attack naturalism.<br />I'm sure there are naturalists who accept that informal fallacy, but I don't. </i> <br /><br />Well, hylemorphism is not mainstream, and I think we can agree that the vast majority of "naturalists" are materialists. The other routes for the naturalist are, as I have mentioned in a previous post: idealism and dualism. For the dualist, he has to explain how two different substances can interact and, either way, he falls prey of the "representationalist" trap, which severs contact with reality and makes science/knowledge about the external world impossible. <br /><br />The idealist has to explain why do we have the "idea of a brain" and what is the relation of said brain with our perception (something incoherent, since it's not the brain who creates or informs the individual, but it's the "self" the one that perceives it "has a brain" and therefore "makes it real" so to speak). <br /><br />A very tiny amount of naturalists like you, who hold an hylemorphist conception of the mind, are not affected by the argument. But the naturalist who holds an hylemorphist view of reality has some important questions to answer: where did the soul come from? Via evolutionary processes? There is no explanation? And how can something that is <a href="https://aquinasonline.com/body-and-soul/" rel="nofollow"> not dependent on matter for some of its operations</a> "die"? Being not dependent on matter it's therefore not subject to "corruption". UncommonDescenthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01889661912118191190noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28066785200213442552022-02-21T00:48:41.594-08:002022-02-21T00:48:41.594-08:00@Hal:
Let's no quibble about the term hylemor...@Hal:<br /><br />Let's no quibble about the term <a href="https://moviecultists.com/was-aquinas-a-dualist" rel="nofollow">hylemorphic "dualism".</a><br /><br />Are you an <a href="https://strangenotions.com/materialisms-failures-hylemorphisms-vindication/" rel="nofollow"> hylemorphist?</a>. Since you have mentioned an Aristotelian conception of the human person, the conclusion follows. <br /><br />Am I right? Do you feel more comfortable with that label?UncommonDescenthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01889661912118191190noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44601287115357581582022-02-19T07:04:46.240-08:002022-02-19T07:04:46.240-08:00@Hal:
You did not mention that you are an hylemor...@Hal:<br /><br />You did not mention that you are an <a href="https://strangenotions.com/materialisms-failures-hylemorphisms-vindication/" rel="nofollow"><b>hylemorphic dualist</b></a> (and so I am. I believe it's the correct approach to understand nature). The argument only covers those positions that need to put forward the "representationalist" non-sense to (try to) salvage their metaphysics. (Especially the massive failure that is mainstream materialism).<br /><br />Same happens with my comments about "thinking about the Eiffel Tower". To coherently say you are thinking about a REAL entity in the external world, you have to first offer a coherent account of how you apprehended said entity (or you would be talking about something existing only in your mind). Since the <a rel="nofollow">aristotelian position</a> covers this, I have no issues with it.<br /><br />My "beef" with "naturalism" is that I have always thought it is an ill-defined position. For example, since you believe in the existence of souls, how did they come about? Do you believe in some sort of "God"/ creative entity? Did they come about via (darwinian) evolutionary processes? <br />UncommonDescenthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01889661912118191190noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75023675437343289432022-02-18T03:55:52.281-08:002022-02-18T03:55:52.281-08:00*Silice = silicon.*Silice = <i>silicon.</i>UncommonDescenthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01889661912118191190noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75268960135350159762022-02-18T00:40:38.187-08:002022-02-18T00:40:38.187-08:00Materialists have not renounced to the concept of ...Materialists have not renounced to the concept of <b>soul.</b> But, instead of "soul", they have renamed it as "complexity".<br /><br />"Complexity" does this or that to matter, when matter reaches certain level of "complexity", it can acquire new properties like "life", and "intelligence" and get to know itself and become self-aware.<br /><br />But in a strange move, when intelligence is involved, "complexity" only affects and gives new/higher capacities to the neurons/brain, while the rest of the body remains unaffected. That's why they believe they will someday be capable of replicating the human brain in silice, as if by "complexifying" silice enough, it will acquire the capacities of the human brain/intellect. <br /><br />What "complexity" does remains a mystery though, since "complexity" is (according to the materialist tale) a result of selective processes, and has no causal powers per se. As with the "laws of nature", it just constitutes a mere description, a placeholder for an attempt of an explanation as to why the world is like it is.<br /><br />And that is how they butcher the marvelous <a href="https://strangenotions.com/materialisms-failures-hylemorphisms-vindication/" rel="nofollow"> concept of soul put forward by Aristotle and refined/perfected by St. Thomas Aquinas. </a><br /><br />And it's no surprise, since their metaphysical system is an abomination.UncommonDescenthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01889661912118191190noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-65949532956167445862022-02-16T15:42:50.110-08:002022-02-16T15:42:50.110-08:00@Hal:
Re-reading your posts, I find this part a b...@Hal:<br /><br />Re-reading your posts, I find this part a bit confusing: <br /><br /><i>Also, though I agree there is much to fault with materialism, I do not believe there are such things as immaterial or mental substances. Of course that does not imply that the only things that exist are material things. </i><br /><br />According to your worldview, the mind is: <br />a) material?<br />b) immaterial? <br />UncommonDescenthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01889661912118191190noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77137464412536474602022-02-16T15:28:38.407-08:002022-02-16T15:28:38.407-08:00Objects in the world have a causal power to effect...<i>Objects in the world have a causal power to effect/affect symbolic representations in the subject.</i> <br /><br />These "symbols" that are "evoked" have to, somehow or other, be <i>different</i> from the "thing itself", (i.e. to be in my senses or in my mind but not "in" there simply by having a dog sitting in my brain), and yet be <i>the SAME</i> as the thing <b>in some sense</b>, in order for the symbolic referential operation to be about the thing itself. It does no good to merely declare that the object in the world has some kind of property as a causal power to evoke a symbolic representation in the subject, without cashing that out in some meaningful way. WHAT power? By what pathway, mechanism, means, or model? Otherwise it hasn't any better position against Hume and the other empiricists' complaint against forms. <br /><br /><i>As a result, all actual objects in the world must also in some sense be subjects, sensitive in some way to their environment (i.e. impressionable). What we call 'representations' in the human mind are a simply a higher level organisation of a property an intrinsic to all matter. </i> <br /><br />Well, according to Newton all objects have the property of being able to affect other objects by efficient causality, by striking them, and imparting a motion in that way. If that's all Whitehead is saying, then he hasn't accounted for sensation and knowledge <b>at all</b>, and is merely engaging in obfuscation to gussy it up as "symbolic representation". So, again, without <i>explaining</i> the "higher level organization" as relevant to the reality of sensation and thinking in a way DISTINCT from ordinary material efficient causality as understood by the materialists, his account isn't actually doing any work. Tonyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07159134209092031897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49282302614998851162022-02-15T19:17:55.428-08:002022-02-15T19:17:55.428-08:00@UncommonDescent
As a reader of Wittgeinstein i s...@UncommonDescent<br /><br />As a reader of Wittgeinstein i suppose that Hal view is very diferent than something like property dualism, a view that still preserves the primary/secundary qualities distinction. So i assumed that his view could end up closer to our own or have a third view of the self. <br /><br /> Who knows, i admit that i need to know Witt better.Talmidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04267925670235640337noreply@blogger.com