tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post2173941712487108471..comments2024-03-28T13:39:03.094-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: A further reply to Mullins on divine simplicity (Updated)Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger165125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58608859863731957562024-01-23T05:17:39.120-08:002024-01-23T05:17:39.120-08:00Are "real" and "cambridge" the...Are "real" and "cambridge" the same as "essential" and "accidental" properties?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25360547109621874252023-01-18T22:56:32.591-08:002023-01-18T22:56:32.591-08:00Can I ask what sources you would recommend to get ...Can I ask what sources you would recommend to get started on that best represents Aquinas? I know no one book will achieve such a thing so go ahead and suggest as many books as needed if it's no problem.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9606322322652054432019-08-28T06:37:03.635-07:002019-08-28T06:37:03.635-07:00...the problem is that most commit a category mist......the problem is that most commit a category mistake and treat God and creation as a mechanistic cause effect situation...wherein God is willing something external...yet this is impossible as all creation is ordered to God as a final cause...since as we have already demonstrated we would have to posit an infinite regress of creators...hence creation is merely the divine essence willing intrinsically its own goodness...God could have willed his own goodness without creation as God is ontologically imperfectible...creation adds nothing to Gods infinite goodness as a pure perfection...we cannot add or subtract from an infinite being in itself...john konnorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15745756021498300622noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5210031652064664832019-08-27T13:34:15.015-07:002019-08-27T13:34:15.015-07:00In that case you would presumably mean something l...<i>In that case you would presumably mean something like this: "the occurrence of X is a dependent result of the necessary divine being/power/essence/act BY WHICH and OUT OF WHICH contingent effects are created." Or in short, (T1) the created effect X arises (contingently, through divine freedom) out of the necessary being of God.<br />I'm going to assume that when you affirm that the occurrence of X is a dependent result of God's ordaining of X, you mean (T1).</i><br /><br />I have no idea whatsoever what you mean by "arising out of the necessary being of God", which means that I have no idea what you are talking about in most of the rest of your criticism.<br /><br /><i>"God freely ordains X--but the occurrence of X is NOT a DEPENDENT RESULT of that ordaining" because that's EXACTLY what is implied if you insist that God's ordaining X is transitive</i><br /><br />No, this is not only false, it is literally not logically possible for it to be true; the effects of transitive causal actions are necessarily dependent on the causes to which the transitive acts are attributed. Again, the only way you can mean this is if you are using 'transitive' in a way that not only is nonstandard, and not only is directly inconsistent with what I have explicitly said 'transitive' means, but is actually inconsistent with the particular brief comments you have made about what 'transitive' means (<i>in the precise sense that its completion occurs in something other to God (just as the being-at-work of an agent only occurs in the patient)</i>; <i>occurring "in the patient" (which is how transitive action is understood on the Thomistic account)</i>; etc.), all of which directly require that the object of the transitive action be dependent on that which acts.<br /><br />It is very noticeable that you have yet again failed to explain in any way specific points in your own position that I had noted were problematic, such as your claim that what is ordained is temporally posterior to an ordaining that is eternal. Again, it's utterly absurd to suggest that you are in any way being clear when you prefer to try to make up opinions to attribute to me rather than actually explain yourself.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-50882862027360103612019-08-26T22:45:02.403-07:002019-08-26T22:45:02.403-07:00I think I'm being pretty clear, actually. But ...I think I'm being pretty clear, actually. But anyway, no more animosity. I just want to get clear on what you are saying. I am finding it difficult.<br /><br />I think that might be because you are equivocating between two uses of "ordaining". You say just now that the occurrence of X IS a dependent result of God ordaining X. Okay. In that case you would presumably mean something like this: "the occurrence of X is a dependent result of the necessary divine being/power/essence/act BY WHICH and OUT OF WHICH contingent effects are created." Or in short, (T1) the created effect X arises (contingently, through divine freedom) out of the necessary being of God.<br />I'm going to assume that when you affirm that the occurrence of X is a dependent result of God's ordaining of X, you mean (T1).<br /><br />So let's, for now, go along consistently with THAT understanding of "God's ordaining X." I can't see how "God's ordaining X" in THAT sense could be transitive (in the Aristotelian sense of an action that only occurs qua action in the patient). For the divine being is not a transitive action with reference to any created effect. It is wholly intransitive. So if you are going to defend the view that the occurrence of X is indeed a dependent result of God's ordaining, you cannot, in the same breath, also say that "God's ordaining" is transitive. Not without equivocating.<br /><br />I (tentatively) attributed to yourself the view that "God freely ordains X--but the occurrence of X is NOT a DEPENDENT RESULT of that ordaining" because that's EXACTLY what is implied if you insist that God's ordaining X is transitive--and you did insist on the latter quite explicitly. I may have misunderstood you, but to say that it has "literally nothing to do with anything I have said" is a bit odd. And yes it may be inconsistent what what you have said, but that could be because you are equivocating with respect to God's "ordaining".<br /><br />It seems to me that you want to agree that X is a dependent result of God's ordaining--but only by implying that "God's eternal ordaining" is intransitive.<br /><br />And then you want to say that God's ordaining is transitive--but only by understanding "God's ordaining" in such a way that the effect of God's ordaining is NOT a dependent result of that ordaining.<br />Brendan Triffettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7031755148980712782019-08-26T21:00:45.272-07:002019-08-26T21:00:45.272-07:00The notion that you are in any way explaining your...The notion that you are in any way explaining yourself clearly is absurd; you can't simultaneously use terms in nonstandard senses for the context without adequate explanation and pretend that you are being clear.<br /><br /><i>all free ordinances of God occur IN the creatures which are ordained to exist, and not independently of those creatures (or created effects).</i><br /><br />No, this is equivocal between whether one is talking about God's power to ordain, which is active, or about what is ordained; my point is explicitly that one cannot equivocate between the two. 'God ordains X' is explicitly about God and X both; but it is about God with respect to X, and if X is contingent, temporal etc., it is entirely X's contingency, temporality, etc., that is the ground of this.<br /><br /><i>God freely ordains that X will occur, and as a DEPENDENT RESULT of that ordaining, X occurs. X is an effect that is posterior to the ordinance itself (posterior in nature and in time).</i><br /><br />And, as I previously noted, this is obviously wrong; the effect is posterior by nature, but it is logically impossible to be temporally posterior to eternity.<br /><br /><i>God freely ordains X--but the occurrence of X is NOT a DEPENDENT RESULT of that ordaining. </i><br /><br />No, this is again one of those things that you have invented in your head and attributed to me; the number of them is starting to mount up quite a bit. This claim has literally nothing to do with anything I have said, and is in fact inconsistent with several things I have said.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11021448429305482322019-08-26T20:45:42.397-07:002019-08-26T20:45:42.397-07:00My point doesn't turn on whether we agree to u...My point doesn't turn on whether we agree to use "transitive" in the way that you define it! It's a bit irritating, my friend, when I'm honestly trying to discuss something with you and I explain very clearly and repetitively my use of terms and then you just say no, that's not what the terms means.<br /><br />I am trying (for crying out loud!) to say that God's infallible ordinances are eternal, and that at least some of these infallible ordinances are "free" (I'll use your word, since you don't like "contingent" here) in the libertarian sense--it is absolutely possible that God never ordained S. Ok. So far so good.<br /><br />Now I'm not sure, but it seems that you want to agree to that first proposition -- (1) that there are divine, infallible, eternal, libertarian-free ordinances (acts of ordaining that something will be or occur). [You of course would not say that these "acts" are something plural in God or something superadded in God to the essential act of God. But this proposition doesn't demand that]. Let these be called "free ordinances."<br /><br />And it seems to me you also want to say that <br />(2) Just as the transitive action of an agent occurs IN the patient, and just as the effective production of something only occurs IN that which is produced, and not naturally prior to or independently of the latter [the patient or produced term] (for there is not first the act of production, and then, as a distinct result of that, the produced term)--likewise all free ordinances of God occur IN the creatures which are ordained to exist, and not independently of those creatures (or created effects).<br /><br />Now if (2) is true--if God's free ordinances are transitive in THIS sense--then by definition they only occur IN creatures. What that amounts to is in (4) below :<br /><br />On my view<br />(3) God freely ordains that X will occur, and as a DEPENDENT RESULT of that ordaining, X occurs. X is an effect that is posterior to the ordinance itself (posterior in nature and in time).<br /><br />But as we saw, transitive action/production does not RESULT in some effected/produced term. It is not as if there is transitive efficacy, and then, as a result of that, the effect. The action occurs in the patient; to move another is materially identical to being-moved-by-another, etc etc (I trust you know all this). <br /><br />It seems as if you want to defend the following:<br /><br />4) God freely ordains X--but the occurrence of X is NOT a DEPENDENT RESULT of that ordaining. Just as (for Aristotle) the being-moved of the patient is the same thing as the action/efficacy of the transitive agent, the creature's being-caused is the same thing as God's ordaining the creature to be.<br /><br />I object to (4) because well, it's obviously false. If God ordains X, then the occurrence of X FOLLOWS from God's ordaining X as a DEPENDENT RESULT and EFFECT of God's ordaining X.<br />Brendan Triffettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-47780348505766338352019-08-26T19:34:49.449-07:002019-08-26T19:34:49.449-07:00Necessarily, all of God's acts with regard to ...Necessarily, all of God's acts with regard to anything not Himself are contingent in the sense you give here; the historical term for that is not contingent but free -- God is free with respect to anything other than himself. This is indeed something said of God Himself; God is necessarily free, even if nothing else exists, and He does not stop being free if contingent things do exist because of Him. <br /><br />If S is not God, and we are talking about God's act of ordaining S, then that act is (as I said above) transitive literally by definition.<br /><br /><i>God is not efficaciously causing S to be until S actually exists. Now if God's ordaining the existence of S were "transitive" in THAT sense, that of course would mean that God doesn't ordain the existence of S until S actually exists.</i><br /><br />No, this is a confusion that arises from your switching which modal operators go where. Since God is eternal, God's ordaining something in time is only in time in the exact sense that what he ordains is in time. God doesn't have to wait for His ordinance to go into effect; He's eternal, and thus not measured by time, and it's only the thing He is ordaining that is in time. To say that God has ordained infallibly that (say) something will happen tomorrow just means that it will happen tomorrow because of God, who does not, however, have to wait for it like we do because He is eternal.<br /><br />Your talk about intentionality, again, is a strange introduction; intentionality is part of the causal structure whenever we are talking about any kind of intelligent agent, so in a productive act, the intentional reference is part of the production even for us. Since God is omnipotent, He requires nothing else than willing, so attempting to introduce a distinction in this particular context is obviously wrong. It was not, however, anything remotely like what I was talking about in the previous comment, which was about completion of a causal action in an object; you were the one who introduced the notion.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-21779546969977964022019-08-26T19:09:21.886-07:002019-08-26T19:09:21.886-07:00I deliberately passed over my first question to fo...I deliberately passed over my first question to focus on the second one which is more important.<br /><br />Yes, by "divine ordaining 'qua contingent'" I mean God's act A of ordaining something S where it is absolutely possible that God might not have ordained S. A is contingent, and so is S.<br />I gave you a reason why God's contingent act A of ordaining something S, is totally complete AS AN ACT OF ORDAINING in God himself--that it does NOT come to exist by occurring "in the patient" (which is how transitive action is understood on the Thomistic account). Here's my argument again. The created something S which God ordains comes to exist in time. Therefore, by our understanding of transitive operation/action, the "full actuality" of God's causing-S-to-be begins to occur in time. God is not efficaciously causing S to be until S actually exists. Now if God's ordaining the existence of S were "transitive" in THAT sense, that of course would mean that God doesn't ordain the existence of S until S actually exists. But that is clearly false. God has ordained infallibly that certain things will happen, but they haven't happened yet. It's pretty clear, then, that God's ordaining of created effects is NOT "transitive" in the sense that you use (and which I use too) when speaking about transitive action/operation.<br /><br />However, God's eternal ordaining of things DOES have something on the side of creation as its intended object--it refers to something non-divine. Something non-divine is that which God ordains. God wills (infallibly) from all eternity that something S will be realised in creation, and he knows from all eternity that S will be realised. That's what "intention" means: knowing and/or willing an object (there are other modes of intentionality too but they don't apply here). Intention has a reference to an object. So yes, God's ordaining S has an intentional reference to something non-divine. But from that it does NOT follow that God's ordaining S is "transitive" in the precise sense explained above.<br />You attempted to answer my objection by conflating intentional reference (willing/knowing X) with transitive action. But that's a false assumption. And that's why I said you needed to try again.<br /><br />Brendan Triffettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-30274105519129225182019-08-26T17:35:24.677-07:002019-08-26T17:35:24.677-07:00Again, I have no idea what your question is, so yo...Again, I have no idea what your question is, so you should take the trouble to explain yourself before you expect an answer; this is not a guessing game. 'Being-in-a-patient' is not a standard meaning of 'transitive' at all, so there was no way to guess what you meant from your very cryptic comments. I have no idea what you mean by 'intentional reference'; the standard meaning of 'transitive' is that which is completed in a distinct object. It is the standard Thomistic view that in transeunt or transitive causation the action of the cause qua cause is in the effect; from which it follows that God's ordaining something contingent, insofar as it is a cause of the contingent thing, which God's ordaining always is, is always transitive, and the contingency applies to the contingent thing. God eternally ordains things that are contingent; the ordaining of contingent things is by definition contingent because of the contingent things so ordained.<br /><br />I notice that in your response you fail actually to clarify any of the points which I had explicitly noted were obscure in your original comment. I still don't know what you mean by "divine ordaining 'qua contingent'", since you apparently don't mean God's ordaining of contingent things; I still don't know what your first question was. Try again.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-90179671464380023842019-08-26T16:47:45.439-07:002019-08-26T16:47:45.439-07:00You are conflating two senses of "transitive&...You are conflating two senses of "transitive". The sense that I was interested in has to do with being-in-a-patient, or more generally, being-in-something-other. That is how Aquinas understands the operation of creating/sustaining. The sense of "transitive" you have in mind is just intentional reference. You'd be hard pressed to defend the view that for God, all intentional reference to creatures is divine causal efficacy in respect to creatures. For some things which arise in time are ordained contingently by God from all eternity. God's ordaining them is clearly NOT something which is transitive in the FIRST sense.<br />Try again.Brendan Triffetthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01187177378808663874noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28892968227338417522019-08-26T12:13:04.782-07:002019-08-26T12:13:04.782-07:00@Walter Van den Acker:
"I'll concede tha...@Walter Van den Acker:<br /><br />"I'll concede that for the sake of the argument), but the property "God specifically wills X" cannot possibly be a Cambridge property, because (logically) prior to creation everything is identical to God."<br /><br />This begs the question against St. Thomas spectacularly, not even engaging in what St. Thomas says about how X is in God's mind.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-1053637441453058182019-08-26T11:40:16.010-07:002019-08-26T11:40:16.010-07:00grodrigues
I guess it's time to agree to disa...grodrigues<br /><br />I guess it's time to agree to disagree, because I really don't see how we ccan make any progress here. Just one thing. The property "God is the creator of the world" may be a Cambrigde property (although I fail to see how it can be, but I'll concede that for the sake of the argument), but the property "God specifically wills X" cannot possibly be a Cambridge property, because (logically) prior to creation everything is identical to God.<br /><br />That's it. Thank you for the interesting discussion.Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77477856902902852722019-08-26T11:32:07.820-07:002019-08-26T11:32:07.820-07:00@Brendan Triffett:
"Sorry, but this is not g...@Brendan Triffett:<br /><br />"Sorry, but this is not going to work as a way of solving the problem and I even doubt that Aquinas would allow it."<br /><br />Brandon has already responded and honestly, I don't feel like adding anything.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-2671881093890953392019-08-26T10:14:36.985-07:002019-08-26T10:14:36.985-07:00I don't understand your first question at all,...I don't understand your first question at all, and in the second I'm not really sure what you have in mind when you talk about the divine ordaining 'qua contingent'; ordinarily we would say the contingency is in what is ordained, and what is ordained is in the case you suggest not eternal but temporal. The divine power to ordain is itself eternal and necessary; and among the things that the divine power to ordain can ordain are things that are temporal and contingent.<br /><br />You seem to think there is some problem with transitivity, but if God is willing things other than himself, that is transitive by definition; and transitive causal claims about anything are never about just the cause but also about the caused. For instance, if I say, "John taught Mary to read", that's a transitive act, completed only in Mary in reading; and it is an error to think that John has an intrinsic property just in himself that is the having-taught-Mary-to-read property. The claim does describe John, but only insofar as something is true of Mary, who is a different person. 'God ordains that John will be a prophet' is a true statement about God, but only insofar as something is true of John, who is very much not God; thus one can't conclude from it that this is something 'in' God, because it is quite explicitly a mixed statement about both God and John, who is not God.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-34388006338793574932019-08-26T07:39:27.998-07:002019-08-26T07:39:27.998-07:00But we aren't talking about entities that exis...But we aren't talking about entities that exist prior to creation. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11035470073109272002019-08-26T07:33:57.035-07:002019-08-26T07:33:57.035-07:00It seems dubious to me to claim that God's cre...It seems dubious to me to claim that God's creative action is intrinsic to God. Our own creative actions are not intrinsic to us, after all.<br /><br />Consider my action of making a toy car. A necessary condition for the action of making a toy car to exist is that the toy car exist (otherwise, I didn't make a toy car, but just tried to). This suggests that the action is not entirely in me: it is at least partly in the toy car.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44750421355332171642019-08-26T06:30:13.824-07:002019-08-26T06:30:13.824-07:00That was for GRodrigesThat was for GRodrigesBrendan Triffetthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01187177378808663874noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6320243107751753802019-08-26T06:28:36.814-07:002019-08-26T06:28:36.814-07:00I hope you don't mind me adding something here...I hope you don't mind me adding something here here. Thomists like yourself keep insisting that the contingent act of ordaining/willing creation is transitive, just as the full act of creation is--in that way you can insist it is denominated extrinsically. Sorry, but this is not going to work as a way of solving the problem and I even doubt that Aquinas would allow it. If you care to hear me out, my reasoning behind this is down the bottom of this page. God ordains, and he ordains contingently, from all eternity. It is false to say that all of God's ordaining with respect to creation is denominated extrinsically. The extrinsic denomination / logical relation / Cambridge differences solution doesn't get to the heart of the problem.Brendan Triffetthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01187177378808663874noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11382992795954288402019-08-26T06:14:07.525-07:002019-08-26T06:14:07.525-07:00@Walter Van den Acker:
Let me put things in a sli...@Walter Van den Acker:<br /><br />Let me put things in a slightly different perspective. We have *independent* grounds to hold the following:<br /><br />(1) God is the creator of this world.<br /><br />(2) God is divinely simple.<br /><br />(3) This world is contingent.<br /><br />So whatever contradictions may emerge from (1)-(3) cannot be real but merely apparent. How exactly they are resolved is a matter of internecine dispute between classical theists, but that they can be resolved is more or less agreed (*), even if the moves are ad hoc -- which, while in general is a telltale mark of bad philosophy, is pretty much unavoidable since God is not just unique but uniquely unique so some distinctions will arise precisely because of the perceived tension between commitments and will apply only to Him.<br /><br />(*) I suppose one could go full blown mysterian, but I am a Thomist and such a move while understandable is not in the end very tenable.<br /><br />Now I well understand that someone who is not already sympathetic to (1)-(3) will have different priors and will weigh the arguments differently -- but then this is their problem, since (1)-(3) are obviously true. Poker (or whatever the best hand -- 4 aces? -- in Poker is called).<br /><br />edit: I have just noticed I have been misspelling your name, putting a "der" where a "den" should be. My apologies.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61315726644562212932019-08-26T06:11:14.489-07:002019-08-26T06:11:14.489-07:00@Walter van der Acker:
""...which just ...@Walter van der Acker:<br /><br />""...which just means God (specifically) willed X. Whatever gave you the impression otherwise?"<br /><br />The fact that it is claimed that "God wills X" is merely a Cambridge property of God. Now you seem to disagree with that."<br /><br />This is a recurrent problem: trying to map St. Thomas' metaphysics into modern analytical terms, and when finding that it does not really map that well, concluding that St. Thomas is wrong. As Gyula Klima once put it, in criticizing a similar move by Kenny, it's like playing poker and declaring victory by crying "Check Mate!"<br /><br />Let us list (some of the things) that St. Thomas is committed to:<br /><br />(1) God necessarily wills Himself.<br /><br />(2) In the single, undivided act of willing himself, God can also will things other than Himself, necessarily contingent, which as a useful and accurate shorthand can be translated as "God wills world X", as ordered to Himself.<br /><br />(3) There is no such thing as a best possible world.<br /><br />(4) So whatever reasons one could adduce for God choosing world X are not necessitating or determining, e.g. the willing is free, but with the necessity of supposition. In particular, God is free to not create and world X is contingent.<br /><br />(5) God willed this world into being, which just means He created this world.<br /><br />(6) By divine simplicity, the creation of this world does not entail any change in God, neither God bears any real relation to it. Or for once reverting to modern analytical terminology, the property "God is the creator of this world" is a Cambridge property.<br /><br />Now, you and others claim that there is some contradiction somewhere in this sextad (??), possibly extended with some other commitments I have forgotten to add. I have yet to see a cogent argument. You for example, seem (seem because as the exchange has shown I am not very good at understanding what you are saying) to think that there is some contradiction between God willing X and the fact that the property "the creator of X" is a Cambridge property. I don't see why. The proposition "God is the creator of X" is true by extrinsic denomination (which is more or less equivalent to saying that the property "creator of X" is a Cambridge property), not by something intrinsic in God. In particular, it is illegitimate to move from God's act of will simpliciter, or God willing Himself, which is indeed His act of existence, to conclude that God willing contingent X is also His act of existence.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86951391729640081952019-08-26T01:09:58.610-07:002019-08-26T01:09:58.610-07:00grodrigues
"...which just means God (specifi...grodrigues<br /><br />"...which just means God (specifically) willed X. Whatever gave you the impression otherwise?"<br /><br />The fact that it is claimed that "God wills X" is merely a Cambridge property of God. Now you seem to disagree with that. But if it's not a Cambridge property, it is a real property. But that contradicts Divine Simplicity.Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-32301659335488051572019-08-25T11:32:41.796-07:002019-08-25T11:32:41.796-07:00@Walter van der Acker.
"How does God get X w...@Walter van der Acker.<br /><br />"How does God get X without specifically willing X?"<br /><br />God does specifically will X -- I am not sure the adverb is doing any work. If world X exists (let us speak about worlds, as it sidesteps some potential complications), then it is because God created X which just means God (specifically) willed X. Whatever gave you the impression otherwise?<br /><br />Not to beat a dead horse, but in trying to imagine what a non-Thomist would object to, two immediate questions come to mind: (1) since God necessarily wills himself, and God's willing is a single undivided act, how can God will something other than himself? (2) Since, as Thomists contend, there is no such thing as a best world, whatever reasons He as for willing X are non-necessitating or non-determining (e.g. the choice is free), what is it that explains that God willed X instead of Y? St. Thomas answers (1) directly and I have answered (2) -- Prof. Feser's new post on Scotus take on divine simplicity also gives an answer, albeit one that makes a neophyte Thomist like me a little nervous.<br /><br />"I don't think most Thomists "display a dishonest tactic answering with a quote from the Angelic Doctor""<br /><br />I know, I was just venting.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-84682736014955691012019-08-25T06:21:22.083-07:002019-08-25T06:21:22.083-07:00grodrigues
The question is simple
How does God ge...grodrigues<br />The question is simple<br /><br />How does God get X without specifically willing X?<br />I don't think most Thomists "display a dishonest tactic answering with a quote from the Angelic Doctor", it's simply that I can simply find no answer to my question in the writings of Aquinas, so I hoenstly start to wonder whether there is an answer. if there is one, I am very curious to hear it.<br /><br />Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83017885052310625242019-08-25T06:05:37.580-07:002019-08-25T06:05:37.580-07:00@JesseM:
"But I'm having trouble seeing ...@JesseM:<br /><br />"But I'm having trouble seeing how his answer would address the problem in the way I was thinking of it, in terms of the (modern) notion of a distinction between internal properties and Cambridge properties, and how we can understand numbers as truly distinct if God's idea of each number is not a distinct internal property of God, nor a Cambridge property dealing with God's relation to something external."<br /><br />That is a bizarre way of trying to understand St. Thomas; he must be understood on its own terms, which often do not map that well to a modern analytic understanding.<br /><br />Besides, in #51-52, St. Thomas poses the problem, in #53 he offers his solution (to quote: "Now, the divine intellect understands by no species other than the divine essence, as was shown above. Nevertheless, the divine essence is the likeness of all things. Thereby it follows that the conception of the divine intellect as understanding itself, which is its Word, is the likeness not only of God Himself understood, but also of all those things of which the divine essence is the likeness. In this way, therefore, through one intelligible species, which is the divine essence, and through one understood intention, which is the divine Word, God can understand many things."), and in #54 he deals with how the divine essence can be the "likeness of all things" -- he even quotes Aristotle that specifically mentions numbers.<br /><br />"Do you (or anyone else) know of any commentary on Aquinas' approach to mathematics and divine simplicity that might help with unpacking his assumptions and argument?"<br /><br />Not really. There are not many studies in (specifically) Thomistic philosophy of mathematics that I know of, and the ones that I do know will probably not be of much help. I will add though that B. Mullahy's thesis "Thomism and Mathematical Physics" is probably the best Thomistic treatment. The last chapter, "The Nature of Mathematics", *may* be of some help but I have not read yet with the attention it deserves to know that with certainty. The thesis is available online, just google it (or give me your email and I will send you a copy if you cannot find it).grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.com