tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post2156812876693085516..comments2024-03-18T15:57:33.286-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Midwest Studies in PhilosophyEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger109125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-70642504377580169532013-10-09T21:43:15.619-07:002013-10-09T21:43:15.619-07:00Scott: Of course all I'm doing here is just ma...Scott: <i>Of course all I'm doing here is just making explicit something with which I'm sure you already agree: that the First Mover/Cause isn't merely an "endpoint" of the series but the sustaining cause of each element thereof, exercising a form of causality that is "orthogonal" to that in the series itself. </i><br /><br />Indeed. And I guess the First Cause can be orthogonal to a secondary series as well as the endpoint, when we trace a series of secondary causes back to a point of creation. Which prompts me to consider that theories on which the universe "rolls up" (e.g. space and time converging at a single point at the Big Bang with no loose ends) are somewhat similar to an infinite series: while in the order of secondary causes, no cause is left hanging, in need of a "gap-filling" Primary Cause, the Primary Cause must exist nevertheless. <br /><br />This also led me to ponder a history of the world with no beginning — or to simplify the example, a book that is forever copied, or e-mail message that is forever forwarded — as you say, this be created by God <i>ab aeterno</i>: the content of the message and the forwarding are accidental with respect to each other, so there is no contradiction simply in positing no beginning to the sequence of forwarding. However, the message must have content, or there would be no message to forward, and that content has no <i>per se</i> cause in the chain (or else that cause would be the first (secondary) cause from which the others succeeded). Therefore such a series could exist only with God as the <i>per se</i> cause of the message's content, creating the whole sequence "at once" (from His eternal point of view).Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-30043333448910536032013-10-07T09:35:39.149-07:002013-10-07T09:35:39.149-07:00@Mr. Green:
"GRodrigues is a handy chap to h...@Mr. Green:<br /><br />"GRodrigues is a handy chap to have around: besides knowing a lot about mathematics and physics, he is a careful thinker."<br /><br />Indeed. Knowledgeable, thorough, precise, methodical . . . I'm actually having a hard time thinking of any epistemological virtues he <i>doesn't</i> exemplify. Thanks, GRod.<br /><br />"[T]here cannot be an infinite number of causes between it and the endpoint under consideration."<br /><br />I think this is correct as you've stated it, but I'd like to amplify one point in order to avoid possible misunderstanding.<br /><br />Once it's been shown that a <i>per se</i> series has a First Cause/Mover (<i>i.e.</i>, God), we then know that God is the primary cause that keeps all the secondary causes in being and concurs in their operation. In that case it could perhaps turn out that there's an infinite series of <i>secondary</i> causes (for example, there's no obvious reason why God couldn't have created such a series <i>ab aeterno</i>)—it's just that none of the secondary causes could account for the initial causal power that is "communicated" along the chain.<br /><br />Of course all I'm doing here is just making explicit something with which I'm sure you already agree: that the First Mover/Cause isn't merely an "endpoint" of the series but the sustaining cause of each element thereof, exercising a form of causality that is "orthogonal" to that in the series itself. What Aquinas shows ultimately is that there can't <i>just</i> be an infinite chain of secondary causes, not that such a chain can't be infinite at all even if it has a primary cause.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67933483433390962013-10-06T22:31:56.854-07:002013-10-06T22:31:56.854-07:00[...cont'd]
Timotheos: Like in the example be...[...cont'd]<br /><br />Timotheos: <i>Like in the example before, he only says that each man generates because he has the power to generate, which is accidental to being generated (God could generate each man directly, and of course he’s not generated). He doesn't ever say that a chain of generated men does not involve instrumental causation. Now it may be the case that he would</i><br /><br />I think we can be sure that Aquinas would say a chain of begetting doesn't have to be essential, because otherwise that would provide an argument for the beginning of the world in time, which he thought could be proved only through revelation. Perhaps part of the difficulty comes from our everyday thinking of begetting as causing someone to come into existence; of course, it is God who creates/conserves each person in existence, not his parents. Even the pre-existing matter that forms a person must be conserved at each moment by God. <br /><br />Now before I said that if we consider the effect "being a grandson of Abraham", then in that respect, Abraham's begetting of Isaac is necessary; so couldn't we carry on in this way and turn the infinite series of past events into an infinite <i>per se </i> chain? Well, the only way to do that would be to make a list of all the necessary begettings (say, from "Adam begot..." up to "... who begat Abraham who begat Isaac") — but that's an infinitely long list. (And you thought those ones in Genesis went on!) And of course, saying the series is infinite just means we cannot enumerate it (whether using numbers or using names). <br /><br />In fact, I'd say the reason we cannot go to infinity in any of these proofs comes down the problem of traversing an infinity: in essential causes, we can identify the first cause: it's the one that provides momentum to one of the dominos or boxcars, or existence to one of the beings in the chain; and we can identify the last member of the chain (it's whatever one we started counting back from); but if we've identified two endpoints, then what's in between must be finite. So it's not that a chain of <i>per se</i> causes cannot be infinite, and thus there must be a first one; but rather that there must be a first one, and thus the chain cannot be infinite. Or rather (lest saying there must be a first one seems to beg the question), for a cause to be <i>per se</i> means there must be somewhere a cause we can point to and say, this is the source of the motion (and not merely a transmitter), and whatever number that is, first or otherwise, there cannot be an infinite number of causes between it and the endpoint under consideration. <br /><br />(I hope this all makes sense. It does in my head, though it didn't come out as elegantly as I wanted!)Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-36945148144281706812013-10-06T22:29:34.731-07:002013-10-06T22:29:34.731-07:00Scott: I'm glad to hear the discussion has cha...Scott: <i>I'm glad to hear the discussion has changed your mind; your opinion carries enough weight with me that I was worried!</i><br /><br />GRodrigues is a handy chap to have around: besides knowing a lot about mathematics and physics, he is a careful thinker.<br /><br />Grodrigues: <i>So maybe what Mr. Green wants to say is that the power is only potential and must be actualized, say by some other domino. [...] domino n being toppled (the effect) is the direct cause of the toppling of domino n + 1 so that we do indeed have transitivity in the sequence of topplers qua topplers. But we do not have such in the Abraham-Isaac-Jacob-etc. series of begetters, for Abraham begetting Issac is not directly related to Isaac begetting Jacob. True, for Isaac to beget Jacob, Abraham must beget Isaac in the first place, but qua begetters, Abraham's causal power is neither here nor there.</i><br /><br />Yes; I should have said that a domino has the power to transmit momentum once it has it [from something else]. Isaac does not get his power to beget from anything Abraham or anyone else does, but simply from being a man. And since each domino in the series requires an essential cause to impart motion to it (since the premise is that all dominos begin in stationary upright positions), then the series as a whole is <i>per se</i>. (If any one cause in the series were accidental, then it could not be a cause of the motion in the affected domino, and thus the toppling would not continue past that point.)<br /><br /><i>Also, while simultaneity may be entailed by per se causation, and thus by essentially ordered or per se *series*, is not of its essence. What is of its essence is the ontological dependence of each member on all the previous members, and ultimately, on the source of motion</i><br /><br />I agree with that too. Of course, a <i>per se</i> cause must be simultaneous with its effect in the way that any cause is; if it weren't, then something else would be the cause (or a contributing cause). But this <i>can't</i> mean instantaneous, because if all causes and effects were strictly simultaneous, then the whole life of the universe would occur in a single instant. But nor need an essential series be simultaneous, even in this sesnse, from first cause to last. (It might be, at least in theory, but each cause in the chain will be simultaneous with its own effect; over the whole chain, the time taken by each individual cause will add up.)<br /><br />[continued…]Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-50849837876207596322013-10-05T07:44:11.134-07:002013-10-05T07:44:11.134-07:00@grodrigues:
"Thoughts?"
I think your ...@grodrigues:<br /><br />"Thoughts?"<br /><br />I think your post, especially the last full paragraph, is a very good restatement and amplification of what I was trying to get at earlier and not quite getting clear: that Abraham's power of begetting isn't still acting on/through Isaac when Isaac does some begetting of his own.<br /><br />I'm glad to hear the discussion has changed your mind; your opinion carries enough weight with me that I was worried!Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23732113378289260262013-10-05T06:24:10.251-07:002013-10-05T06:24:10.251-07:00@all:
I have come around to accept that a Domino ...@all:<br /><br />I have come around to accept that a Domino series is an essentially ordered series, for essentially the same reasons Scott gives. Nevertheless, let me first address a couple of points:<br /><br />Mr. Green said:<br /><br />"Yes, I think this is right, and so the toppling dominos makes an essential series — in that respect. Once a man exists, he has the power to beget by virtue of his nature; a domino does not have the power to topple itself."<br /><br />So the distinction is to be made in terms of having the power of itself. But what does it mean to say that the domino does not have of itself the power to topple other dominoes? If a domino topples other dominoes, then it seems correct to say that it is in the power of the domino to topple other dominoes -- it is not like the toppling of dominoes was achieved by a super-natural feat. So maybe what Mr. Green wants to say is that the power is only potential and must be actualized, say by some other domino. But for the power of Isaac to beget a son to be actual, Abraham himself must beget him, so what is doing the work in the distinction? Is it the fact that they are self-movers insofar as they are living creatures? But that fact is surely extraneous to whether a series is accidental or not, right?<br /><br />As far as I can see, the disagreement is (1) over whether certain specific causal *series* are essentially or accidentally ordered and concomitantly (2) whether our understanding of what distinguishes such series is accurate. I stress the word *series*, because I have no problem with for example, Aquinas' remark quoted by Timotheos: "And the mover and the thing moved must be together at the commencement of but not throughout the whole movement, as is evident in the case of projectiles". Aquinas is here talking about per se *causation*.<br /><br />Also, while simultaneity may be entailed by per se causation, and thus by essentially ordered or per se *series*, is not of its essence. What is of its essence is the ontological dependence of each member on all the previous members, and ultimately, on the source of motion But how best to formulate it? G. Klima, in the paper linked by Timotheos, provides a clue: <br /><br />"The fourth conclusion is the non-circularity and linear hierarchy of a series of per se, actual causes. The non-circularity of a series of per se causes is a direct consequence of the irreflexivity and transitivity of per se causation: suppose A is the per se cause of B, and in turn, B is the per se cause of A, constituting circularity. But then, by transitivity (which is generally assumed in any form of causation), A would have to be the per se cause of A, which contradicts the irreflexivity of per se causation just proved." (pdf pg. 28). <br /><br />So besides irreflexivity (one is the mover and the other the moved, and the distinction is real), we have transitivity: I want say that boxcar n pulls boxcar n + k, for all k >= 1, and ultimately that the locomotive pulls every boxcar and moves the whole series. But since I have already conceded that domino n is the per se cause of the toppling of domino n + 1, by transitivity I have to say that domino n topples domino n + k, for all k >= 1.<br /><br />The response is that one cannot apply transitivity willy-nilly, since the effect at some point in the chain (e.g. boxcar n peing pulled) must be in some suitable sense (being deliberately vague) the direct cause in the next link in the chain (boxcar n pulling boxcar n + 1). But this is also what happens in the domino series: domino n being toppled (the effect) is the direct cause of the toppling of domino n + 1 so that we do indeed have transitivity in the sequence of topplers qua topplers. But we do not have such in the Abraham-Isaac-Jacob-etc. series of begetters, for Abraham begetting Issac is not directly related to Isaac begetting Jacob. True, for Isaac to beget Jacob, Abraham must beget Isaac in the first place, but qua begetters, Abraham's causal power is neither here nor there.<br /><br />Thoughts?grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80199216561336883832013-10-04T09:34:46.918-07:002013-10-04T09:34:46.918-07:00@Mr. Green:
Nice summary. Thanks.
Quite a lot of...@Mr. Green:<br /><br />Nice summary. Thanks.<br /><br />Quite a lot of that takes us back to Klima's piano-playing doctor, so I think Timotheos brought in a pretty apt example.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54576183323445912042013-10-03T22:40:53.774-07:002013-10-03T22:40:53.774-07:00Scott: [...] the causal power of the First Toppler...Scott: <i>[...] the causal power of the First Toppler is imparted ("communicated") to each of the dominoes in turn. [...] I agree that the domino series has it, but the domino series also seems to have a kind of instrumentality that the begetting series lacks. That lack is what currently strikes me as the distinctive feature of accidentally ordered series—though, again, I may be mistaken. </i><br /><br />Yes, I think this is right, and so the toppling dominos makes an essential series — in that respect. Once a man exists, he has the power to beget by virtue of his nature; a domino does not have the power to topple itself. (Actually, a man has the power to beget with a mate... a mate is essential, having a father is not.) Once a domino is in motion, it can, by its nature, continue in motion, but it cannot accelerate in the first place unless something else accelerates it — such as another domino, which in turn must have got its momentum from somewhere. <br /><br />Of course, it depends on exactly what effects we are concerned with. Having red hair is not essential to being human, but it is to being a redhead. Abraham is not essential to Isaac's begetting a son, but he is to Isaac's begetting a <i>grandson</i>. A domino is not self-existent; it can't even have "existential inertia" imparted by something else, so its <i>existence</i> requires a cause here and now. So as you say, the more details we fill out in a real-life example, the more different sets of causes there will be, some essential, some accidental.<br /><br />I was going to say that instrumentality need not be simultaneous — a player piano is clearly an instrument, even though it can continue playing after you're long gone — but actually I think GRodrigues is right in that the <i>imparting</i> must be simultaneous (in some sense). The player-piano cannot make music by itself (of its own essence), but it can <i>continue</i> playing of its own essence — it has the power of "musical inertia", in that once programmed, it can "play itself" without further outside causes. And while we normally think of a flute as being "noninertial", if we are pedantic, it does take a tiny amount of time for the air to travel from one end to the other, so the flautist could be annihilated in the nanosecond before the air emerges without stopping the sound. But the flautist, the piano-programmer, the First Toppler, the locomotive engine are all necessary causes for the subsequent effects to take place.<br /><br />(All which might perhaps be shortened to "I agree with Timotheos".)Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77276905311747814572013-10-03T16:29:23.392-07:002013-10-03T16:29:23.392-07:00To sum up my viewpoint, I don’t think it’s the non...To sum up my viewpoint, I don’t think it’s the non-simultaneous-ness of per accidens causation that distinguishes it from per se causation.<br /><br />Rather, I think it’s the fact that a per accidens cause can only actualize in the sense that it’s accidentally united to whatever is the true per se actualizer. (As I have said earlier within this thread)Timotheoshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09848027239405239382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-60563348299796571582013-10-03T15:15:09.866-07:002013-10-03T15:15:09.866-07:00P.S.
Klima's piece, Whatever Happened to Eff...P.S.<br /><br />Klima's piece, <a href="http://faculty.fordham.edu/klima/SMLM/PSMLM10/PSMLM10.pdf" rel="nofollow"> Whatever Happened to Efficient Causes? </a> which has a great disscusion of per accidens causation, is also relevant here.Timotheoshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09848027239405239382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11922771558646969822013-10-03T15:07:54.295-07:002013-10-03T15:07:54.295-07:00@ grodrigues
I think the example that Aquinas giv...@ grodrigues<br /><br />I think the example that Aquinas gives in the Summa may be confusing your understanding of per accidens causation. Like when he seemed to say that anything that heats must already be hot, his examples are meant to be reminders of the idea for people who are already familiar with the concepts, not be taken as complete explanations, full stop.<br /><br />To take a different illustration, I’m going to quote a different part of the Summa, specifically Part 1 Q46 A2 Ad7<br /><br />"In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity per se—such as if the causes which are per se required for some effect were to be multiplied into infinity; as if the stone should be moved by a stick, and the stick by the hand, and thus into infinity. But to proceed per accidens into infinity in agent causes is not thought impossible; as, for example, if all the causes which are multiplied into infinity should hold the order of only one cause, and their multiplication were per accidens; just as a builder acts by many hammers per accidens, because one after another is broken. And so it happens to this hammer that it acts after the action of another hammer."<br /><br />Notice how he does *not* illustrate per accidens causation by saying that each hammer has power independent casual power from its blacksmith, but he illustrates it by saying that the previous hammer that the carpenter happened to use doesn't contribute to the current hammer’s nailing.<br /><br />"And likewise it happens to this man,<i> inasmuch as he generates </i>, that he was generated by another: for he generates as a man, and not inasmuch as he is the son of another man; for all men generating hold the same rank in efficient causes, namely the rank of a particular generator. Whence it is not impossible that man should be generated by man to infinity. But it would be impossible if the generation of this man were to depend on this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity."<br /><br />Like in the example before, he only says that each man generates because he has the power to generate, which is accidental to being generated (God could generate each man directly, and of course he’s not generated). He doesn't ever say that a chain of generated men does not involve instrumental causation.<br /><br />Now it may be the case that he would, that’s what we’re debating, but as far as I can tell, that’s not entailed in the text in which he gives these illustrations. All that he seems to be trying to illustrate is an example of a per accidens cause, in the same way in which I defined per accidens causation earlier in this thread.Timotheoshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09848027239405239382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46064596109184540642013-10-03T13:45:56.554-07:002013-10-03T13:45:56.554-07:00I should perhaps have said, "The point of a p...I should perhaps have said, "The point of a <i>per se</i> series is that each member has its relevant causal power <b>imparted to it by</b> its predecessor and imparts it to its successor."Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77081834906836957512013-10-03T13:44:15.390-07:002013-10-03T13:44:15.390-07:00"This seems to me to collapse the distinction..."This seems to me to collapse the distinction between accidentally ordered and per se series; so allow me to answer with a question. How is the domino series *not* different from the Abraham begets Isaac begets Jacob, etc. series?"<br /><br />By Aquinas's logic, Abraham's semen is an instrument <i>of Abraham</i>, whereas Isaac's is an instrument <i>of Isaac</i>. ("[T]he semen also is understood to be moved by the soul <b>of the begetter</b>, as long as it retains the force communicated by that soul" [emphasis mine].) The point of a <i>per se</i> series is that each member has its relevant causal power from its predecessor and imparts it to its successor. Granting that Isaac owes his existence (in part) to Abraham's semen, I don't think Aquinas would say that Abraham's causal power is still acting through Isaac when the latter begets Jacob—whereas it's at least arguable, I think, that the causal power of the First Toppler <i>is</i> imparted ("communicated") to each of the dominoes in turn. Aquinas, at least, would surely not regard each domino as having a "soul," and perhaps not even as having a substantial form of any kind.<br /><br />"Once Abraham has transmitted the power to Isaac (in this case, begetting him), his job as far as the begetting of children, is done and finished and Isaac is, for the strict narrow purposes of begetting children, independent of Abraham. This is what strikes me as being the distinctive feature of accidentally ordered series, a feature that the domino series seems to me to have."<br /><br />I agree that the domino series has it, but the domino series also seems to have a kind of instrumentality that the begetting series lacks. That lack is what currently strikes <i>me</i> as the distinctive feature of accidentally ordered series—though, again, I may be mistaken. (Mr. Green, are you reading this? Do you have anything to add?)<br /><br />"I do not think pushing or pulling makes a difference; if the locomotive moved the boxcars by pushing them, the situation would be the same."<br /><br />Not if the locomotive detached itself from the boxcars when it stopped, or vanished; then the boxcars would continue moving without it until friction stopped them. (Which would also happen in either case if the locomotive just stopped pulling but didn't brake.) In other words, it's being mechanically attached to the locomotive that makes them stop when the locomotive stops. So maybe it's not pushing vs. pulling that makes the difference, but it smells a bit arbitrary somehow. (I suppose another part of the problem here is deciding what to do with inertia and friction.)<br /><br />"Conversely, one could alter the domino scenario to make it a truly essentially ordered series, but I will leave that as an exercise."<br /><br />Well, I think I addressed that already, but it's not hard to multiply examples. Lay the dominoes end to end and push on the first one. Stack the dominoes one on top of another and lift the bottom one.<br /><br />"The difficulty in articulating the difference, is that the physical details get in the way and obfuscate things; but from a metaphysical point of view, the difference seems to me to be clear."<br /><br />I think you're right that the physical details get in the way, and I also think you're right that the difference between <i>per se</i> and <i>per accidens</i> causal series is clear. I'm just suspecting that there's good reason for the physical details to get in the way if we take the physical examples to be more than illustrations.<br /><br />Perhaps the lesson here is that they <i>are</i> just illustrations: each series involves a large number of causal factors that aren't taken into account in the initial statement of the scenario, and once these <i>are</i> taken into account, we may arrive at a different conclusion as to the nature of the series.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15455590543866770862013-10-03T09:05:28.179-07:002013-10-03T09:05:28.179-07:00@Scott:
"That's true, but the previous d...@Scott:<br /><br />"That's true, but the previous domino has to be toppling in order to impart that motion to the next domino. And the "toppling" seems to be communicated from the first domino in pretty much the same way that the arrow is fired by the archer (using the bow as an instrument). So why would the dominoes not count as instruments? (Or do they?)"<br /><br />This seems to me to collapse the distinction between accidentally ordered and per se series; so allow me to answer with a question. How is the domino series *not* different from the Abraham begets Isaac begets Jacob, etc. series? If Abraham is to beget a grandchild, he must do so by begetting a child, so in that sense Isaac his is instrument to beget a grandchild. But it is also clear that for Isaac to beget Jacob, Isaac does not need the concurring causal power of Abraham, even if the begetting was all instantaneous, and thus all were simultaneous. Once Abraham has transmitted the power to Isaac (in this case, begetting him), his job as far as the begetting of children, is done and finished and Isaac is, for the strict narrow purposes of begetting children, independent of Abraham. This is what strikes me as being the distinctive feature of accidentally ordered series, a feature that the domino series seems to me to have.<br /><br />The actual biological details of begetting in the actual world imply that for Abraham to beget a grandchild, he must do so via Isaac. But this "must do so", does not entail the kind of ontological dependence that is at the heart of Aquinas' arguments.<br /><br />"I assume you mean "locomotive" rather than "caboose" here."<br /><br />Yes, locomotive. Should reread comments before submitting them.<br /><br />"Moreover, the reason for the lack of simultaneity in the domino example as opposed to the boxcar example is ultimately that the former involves pushing and the latter involves pulling. Make the locomotive push the boxcars into one another so that each one bumps into the next, and you have a series that looks an awful lot like the dominoes. Why should the direction of the applied force make such a fundamental difference? (Or is that not what does it?)"<br /><br />I do not think pushing or pulling makes a difference; if the locomotive moved the boxcars by pushing them, the situation would be the same.<br /><br />Suppose on the other hand, that the locomotive pushed the whole train by "bumps", that is, the locomotive bumps the first boxcar imparting motion on it, then the first car imparts motion on the second by bumping into it, etc. Then the scenario is exactly like the domino one and I would claim that it is an example (or an illustration) of an accidentally ordered series. Conversely, one could alter the domino scenario to make it a truly essentially ordered series, but I will leave that as an exercise.<br /><br />The difficulty in articulating the difference, is that the physical details get in the way and obfuscate things; but from a metaphysical point of view, the difference seems to me to be clear.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72553665910596627762013-10-02T16:49:01.250-07:002013-10-02T16:49:01.250-07:00@grodrigues:
"Here is my stab at it: while i...@grodrigues:<br /><br />"Here is my stab at it: while if domino n + 1 is to be toppled, domino n is necessary to exert its causal power and impart motion, and in this sense we have a one-link per se series (not a particularly interesting one, due to the way the scenario is set up), no other dominoes are necessary to keep the causal series going."<br /><br />That's true, but the previous domino has to be <i>toppling</i> in order to impart that motion to the next domino. And the "toppling" seems to be communicated from the first domino in pretty much the same way that the arrow is fired by the archer (using the bow as an instrument). So why would the dominoes not count as instruments? (Or do they?)<br /><br />"Each boxcar, to be moved, depends on all the boxcars that precede it to 'communicate' motion, and ultimately on the caboose to impart it."<br /><br />(I assume you mean "locomotive" rather than "caboose" here.) But the toppling domino also depends on all the previous dominoes to "communicate" motion; they just don't all have to be "communicating" it at once (unless, as I proposed in reply to Timotheos, they're set up together like books on a shelf). The very question at issue is why they <i>do</i> have to be "communicating" it all at once in order to count.<br /><br />Moreover, the reason for the lack of simultaneity in the domino example as opposed to the boxcar example is ultimately that the former involves pushing and the latter involves pulling. Make the locomotive <i>push</i> the boxcars into one another so that each one bumps into the next, and you have a series that looks an awful lot like the dominoes. Why should the direction of the applied force make such a fundamental difference? (Or is that not what does it?)Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19059244614861502022013-10-02T15:05:10.509-07:002013-10-02T15:05:10.509-07:00@ Scott
"Same here. "Instants" are...@ Scott<br /><br />"Same here. "Instants" are just mathematical abstractions that let us do calculus."<br /><br />This is why it bothers me the most when Physicists mess this up. Even though they're not Mathematicians, Calculus was partially developed just to solve Physics problems, and its almost impossible to do modern Physics without it, so they should know better.<br />Timotheoshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09848027239405239382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-60619848732846838202013-10-02T14:58:04.726-07:002013-10-02T14:58:04.726-07:00Or, to take an example that doesn't involve in...Or, to take an example that doesn't involve inertia (if you don’t treat inertia as ‘real’ change), consider the question Aquinas was addressing, which was whether or not the semen is an instrument of a man. <br /><br />The objection was that this couldn't be the case, since every mover must be conjoined with the moved. Aquinas then expressly denied this, saying that “the semen also is understood to be moved by the soul of the begetter, as long as it retains the force communicated by that soul, although it is in body separated from it. And the mover and the thing moved must be together at the commencement of but not throughout the whole movement, as is evident in the case of projectiles.”Timotheoshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09848027239405239382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26987763226135542922013-10-02T14:48:46.001-07:002013-10-02T14:48:46.001-07:00@timotheos:
"In this sense, a intermediate m...@timotheos:<br /><br />"In this sense, a intermediate member of a per se chain of causality would be ontologically dependent on its mover, since it wouldn't be moving now if it weren't moved in the past.<br /><br />Now I may be wrong about this, and I can't speak for Scott, but to me that is all that entailed in the notion of per se instrumentality."<br /><br />That seems to work if we follow your point from Klima and regard the moving object <i>as</i> a "moving object." In the archer/bow/arrow example, the arrow itself isn't ontologically dependent on the bow, but the arrow <i>as flying</i> is ontologically dependent on the bow as that which set it to flying in the first place.<br /><br />If that's grodrigues's answer as well, then we're all in agreement about that much. But in that case the question remains as to why the domino series is different.<br /><br />"No problem, simultaneous is usually used in the sense of instantaneous.<br /><br />Collapsing the distinction is one of my pet peeves though[.]"<br /><br />Same here. "Instants" are just mathematical abstractions that let us do calculus.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-17196041825467913332013-10-02T14:38:11.780-07:002013-10-02T14:38:11.780-07:00(By the way, I don't offhand see any special d...(By the way, I don't offhand see any special difficulty in restricting either the First or the Second Way to cases in which ontological dependence <i>is</i> at issue, so I'm not sure much is actually riding on this.)Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-43551254766048179242013-10-02T14:35:35.574-07:002013-10-02T14:35:35.574-07:00@grodrigues:
"That is my understanding, inst...@grodrigues:<br /><br />"That is my understanding, instrumentality must be understood in terms of ontological dependence, where the sort of dependence depends (heh) on the specific argument being considered (in terms of motion, of existence, whatever)."<br /><br />Let's take Aquinas's own example of instrumentality, the archer and the arrow, cited earlier by Timotheos. Let's also note that the archer uses a bow to shoot the arrow. Thus the arrow has a power communicated to it by the archer using the instrumentality of the bow.<br /><br />Would you say in this case that the arrow (or its motion, or perhaps the arrow <i>qua</i> flying thing) is ontologically dependent on the bow? Or would you say that Aquinas is mistaken in regarding this case as one of instrumentality?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28632799057324021502013-10-02T13:57:31.715-07:002013-10-02T13:57:31.715-07:00@ grodrigues
“Ack, you are correct Timotheos, I w...@ grodrigues<br /><br />“Ack, you are correct Timotheos, I was sloppy in my wording”<br /><br />No problem, simultaneous is usually used in the sense of instantaneous.<br /><br />Collapsing the distinction is one of my pet peeves though, since it is usually brought in by physicists intent on bringing in a “new” objection to the first way. What really annoys me though is that physicists are supposed to know Calculus to be able to do their jobs, but anyone who knows even the least bit about Calculus should be able to spot the difference, since that’s the whole foundation of Calculus.<br /><br />I mean, how would a physicist respond if you told them that nothing has velocity, since at every instant something is moving, it has no velocity, since it’s not moving during an instant?<br />(Actually, don’t ask them that, since that was a question Zeno asked, and since it is philosophical, understanding the question wouldn't be important to physics, since only Science! provides any true insights)Timotheoshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09848027239405239382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81415252484408295412013-10-02T13:40:32.849-07:002013-10-02T13:40:32.849-07:00To get back on topic, I’m not taking instrumentali...To get back on topic, I’m not taking instrumentality to be ontologically dependent on its mover, at least not in the exact same sense as you are grodrigus. <br /><br />While my understanding of instrumentality allows that a moved mover may not be ontologically dependent for its motion at this time (in the sense that it is changing something and it not currently changing), it must have changed at some point, otherwise it would be an eternally unmoved mover (which is ontologically a being of pure act, obviously God). In this sense, a intermediate member of a per se chain of causality would be ontologically dependent on its mover, since it wouldn't be moving now if it weren't moved in the past.<br /><br />Now I may be wrong about this, and I can’t speak for Scott, but to me that is all that entailed in the notion of per se instrumentality.<br /><br />Another point though is that I’m not even confirming that it this is a real metaphysical possibility for something besides God to not be changing in at least some fashion. It may be the case that being a substance with a mixture of act and potency necessitates changing in at least some way at every moment of existence. (For instance, we call solidity a ‘state’ but we know a posteriori that for a material substance to stay solid actually entails much molecular change, and by the Principle of Causality, this motion requires a cause)<br /><br />And I think that an a priori argument for such a conclusion is probably possible, but I don’t think it is absolutely necessary for the purposes of the first way. For even if not every changer is changing at this instant, if it’s not a being of pure act, it must have been actualized at some point, and then that would regress to a being of pure act.<br /><br />Again, I can’t speak for Scott, but that’s my take on it.Timotheoshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09848027239405239382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-70652352921866453642013-10-02T13:36:24.455-07:002013-10-02T13:36:24.455-07:00Ack, you are correct Timotheos, I was sloppy in my...Ack, you are correct Timotheos, I was sloppy in my wording: when I wrote "simultaneous" I meant "instantaneous" as for Aquinas, the cause is simultaneous with the effect, or the knocking down is simultaneous with being knocked down. Prof. Feser makes this point explicitly in the TLS (maybe in Aquinas as well, cannot remember atm). Sorry about the mix up.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27379421747434066572013-10-02T13:24:47.338-07:002013-10-02T13:24:47.338-07:00Oops change "I meant" to "is meant&...Oops change "I meant" to "is meant"Timotheoshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09848027239405239382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9485532403522444232013-10-02T12:59:00.989-07:002013-10-02T12:59:00.989-07:00I personally have never understood why everyone ma...I personally have never understood why everyone makes a big fuss about the domino being knocked down at a slightly different time than it was knocked.<br /><br />If a domino is being knocked down, something is knocking it down at the same time. Conversely, if the mover of the domino is knocking it down, it is doing do so at the same time as the domino being knocked. If the knocker of the domino is knocking the domino, the domino is being knocked. So I don't see the metaphysical room for the knocking to be at a different time than the knock.<br /><br />Now you might say that the domino dosen't move at the instant it is moved, but that is collapsing the distinction between simultaneous and instantaneous, the former being a broader notion than the latter.<br /><br />All that I meant by simultaneous is at the same time, not at the same instant of time. And of coarse nothing changes during an instant, but instants don't make up intervals, they are limits to an infinite division of intervals, and as such, don't technically exist.<br /><br />What do you guys think of this slightly off-topic semi-rant?Timotheoshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09848027239405239382noreply@blogger.com