tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post2143386151488070364..comments2024-03-28T21:43:44.433-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Fodor’s trinityEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger34125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49256384601153988382010-08-10T06:33:05.783-07:002010-08-10T06:33:05.783-07:00Why would you say Locke embraced dualism? That is...Why would you say Locke embraced dualism? That is no obvious fact.Just Thinkingnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-73520984286059624872010-08-07T09:03:39.387-07:002010-08-07T09:03:39.387-07:00Ed & Ilion, thanks for the answers.
Ed,
&quo...Ed & Ilion, thanks for the answers.<br /><br />Ed,<br /><br /><i>"It is those which have it -- for example, a thought like "That is an apple" -- that can be true or false, and those indeed cannot be material. But those without a conceptual structure -- for example, a horse's desire for the apple he sees -- can be material (at least if we allow, as an Aristotelian would, that final causality is immanent to the material world) while they cannot be true or false."</i><br /><br />This is OK. It is just that I thought that modern philosophers, when they talk about intentionality, mean only what you call the intentional states with conceptual structure (so horse'e desire for an apple wouldn't even count as an intentional state on this view). Perharps I was wrong.<br /><br /><i>"Re: the argument from abstract thought (...) The point, again, has instead to do with conceptual structure. In particular, no purely material entity or process, even on an Aristotelian understanding of matter, can in principle have the universality and determinacy thought has."</i><br /><br />OK. Please note that I am not a naturalist. On the contrary, I want to fight naturalism. That's why I am in constant search for airtight arguments against naturalism. But in order to ensure that the argument is really "airtight", I try to anticipate possible naturalist's replies or objections to it. So I was wandering, what if our naturalist takes refuge in some form or another of representationalist theory of knowledge (as he probably will) and from this point of view denies our premise, replying effectively: "Well, other symbols, like words, images and computer variables, being material, also lack this universality and determinacy, yet this doesn't prevent them to refer to universal and determinate things and thus be universal and determinate <i>in another sense</i>" (perharps because of having some universal and determinare relation - causal or whatewer - to those universal and determinate things.<br />Can we still salvage the argument from abstract thought, <i>without</i> resorting to the argument from intentionality to show that he is wrong? I suppose we could reply that such representationalist theories lead to the problem of universal scepticism, and I concede this is a powerfull argument against representationalist theories of knowledge, but I am not sure if this is a strict refutation.tnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-10809630716217768332010-08-06T23:30:35.119-07:002010-08-06T23:30:35.119-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.Codgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-89860596732338326552010-08-06T23:29:55.197-07:002010-08-06T23:29:55.197-07:00George R.:
Well, it's nice to know I haven&#...George R.: <br /><br />Well, it's nice to know I haven't driven you AWAY from hylemorphism! ;p I used the word "suspect" in reference to the existence of what physicists like to call "fundamental particles," and I think given the methodological limits of exact physical science, there is no more fitting word than "suspect" (or conjecture, etc.), since science inherently lacks a way to PROVE its discoveries are ultimate (i.e. not falsifiable) and actual (i.e. not merely operational). If my suspicion about fundamental particles appears to be a lack of confidence in hylemorphism, that's just a foible I'll have to live with. ;p The reason I think hylemorphism is intellectually superior to any putative or prospective scientific claim, and therefore immune to crude 'falsification' by some new 'discovery', is twofold. First, supposing there comes a day when (in more or less Peircean terms) there is, in principle, no farther scientists can dig into nature––for example, because the apparatus required to explore some -nth level of physical order is so large and complicated that it would exhaust all conceivable human resources (thus leaving no observers for the post-experiment world), or the size of which would be mathematically corrupted by spacetime dilation and/or cataclysm––if at that point, scientists just agree they've found THE fundamental particles in nature (since going 'deeper' wouldn't leave behind anything coherently 'natural'), then it would still be subject to hylemorphic analysis. It reminds me of Walker Percy's idea of the indefatigable Delta Factor (viz. Peirce's triadicity): despite all efforts to 'reduce' language to energy exchanges or pure abstract necessity, the articulation and reception of that reduction would itself be subject the irreducibly human and semiotic constraints of the Delta Factor. So, again, if science hasn't 'debunked' hylemorphism by now, I see no principled reason why it could ever do so. This may not count as 'proof' for hylemorphism, but a worldview without a significant defeater is by definition significantly undefeated. Undefeasibility is probably too strong a requirement for ANY rational claim. <br /><br />The second reason hylemorphism is superior to what I call perinoetic reductionism (i.e. theoretic empiricism), is that hylemorphism already gets to the heart of reality and orders epistemology in turn, whereas the former (Kantian-Carnapian) metaphysics orders reality based on our epistemological functions. Hylemorphism, in other words, is already saying what we need to make sense of reality––albeit with a number of outstanding internecine theoretical dispute on fine points––while model-based empiricism is constantly second-guessing itself about what––or whether!––reality is. Interestingly, the presence of ongoing dispute in the hylemorphic "big tent" displays its vitality, contrary to much popular bias, as an active "research program." I think the last real metaphysical opponent to hylemorphism was Hegel, since he challenged the fundamental subject-accident schema in his own way, but by now I think it's obvious his system is… well… I don't see Zizek mounting a serious defeat of hylemorphism anytime soon. <br /><br />Best,Codgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39338525140007452822010-08-06T11:31:58.146-07:002010-08-06T11:31:58.146-07:00Codgitator,
Thanks. I like your answer.
I was...Codgitator,<br /><br />Thanks. I like your answer. <br /><br />I was just playing devil’s advocate, by the way. I myself am a committed hylemorphist. Your defense of hylemorphism is very good. The question is this, however: Can hylemorphism be demonstrated with certitude? I say it can be. Your argument does go a ways toward proving it, but when you say things like “I suspect. . .” I wonder if you yourself are entirely convinced. Furthermore, do you think that there is an argument that would be able to persuade the resistant, or those like David who are trying to understand the concept? It seems to me that most scientists and philosophers today, even those few that are sympathetic to classical philosophy, are unable to grasp the concept of natural substance being ontologically prior to all quantity. Therefore, they invariably identify substance <i>per se</i> with secondary matter, which is a quantity <i>per se</i>. So what is needed, IMO, is a convincing demonstration that proves that substance is prior to quantity. <br /><br />But like I said, I don’t think you’re too far of from proving it already.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81730521988691316732010-08-06T09:50:38.435-07:002010-08-06T09:50:38.435-07:00[continued]
Now, in this program, some of the but...[continued]<br /><br />Now, in this program, some of the buttons perform one action when you click them and perform a different (though perhaps related) action when you hold down the shift-key and then click them.<br /><br />Are these "shift-click" buttons instances of a second custom written button, or are they instances of the button I'd mentioned previously? From your perspective, they're a totally different type of button. But, are they really? And, how can you decide?<br /><br />And, keep in mind, the descriptions I've been giving really have little, to no, relationship to what really goes on when the program is executed ... including something so basic as speaking of "clicking the button." <br /><br /><br />Scientific explanations of the world are analogous to the explanations of a program by its users. They may be descriptive, and they may be useful (one certainly hopes so), and some may be more useful than others. But, absent an ability to "get under the hood," so to speak, there is no way to know that they're the truth of the matter.<br /><br /><br /><b>David:</b> "<i>This example doesn't work for a house which takes human forethought and effort to construct. Would you make a distinction between "natural" systems and "human" systems?</i>"<br /><br />It <i>appears</i> to us that natural systems or reactions (say, the formation of table salt, or the formation of ice crystals) "must happen" (or "just happen," as some materialists assert these days) given certain conditions. But, we can't know that to be the actual case; what we know is that we haven't observed otherwise and that it has been <i>useful</i> to us to assume it to be the case.<br /><br />But, even if the reactions <i>must happen</i> ... why must they? Ultimately, is it really that the "rule" by which the reactions happen is itself something that <i>just happened</i>; or, ulimatly, is it that the "rule" really is a rule, that the rule was intended and was designed into the fabric of physical reality? That is, ultimately, are there only <i>causes</i> (as in cause-and-effect), or are there <i>reasons</i> (as in ground-and-consequent) for what happens?Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67695031327850682162010-08-06T09:50:09.286-07:002010-08-06T09:50:09.286-07:00David: "But, when I think of "parts"...<b>David:</b> "<i>But, when I think of "parts" I also think of the properties they have. I put Sodium metal and Chlorine gas together in a flask and they order themselves as NaCl (table salt) because of the ionic properties of the atoms.</i>"<br /><br />That's one explanation for the observed phenomenon; whether it's the truth of the matter ... well, God knows. We don't, and can't. Mind you, I'm not saying that it's not the truth of the matter, but only that we can't really know that it is the truth of the matter. <br /><br />That's a weakness of scientific explanations; we rarely, if ever, know that a scientific explanation <i>really is</i> an explanation. And, we can't use science to separate the potentially true ones from the false ones.<br /><br /><br />Allow me an illustration --<br /><br />I'm a computer programmer. I currently write PC programs using object-oriented languages; originally, I wrote mainframe programs using assembler. But, even then, there were multiple layers of abstraction between the work I did in writing programs (and in my understanding of what I was doing) and what *really* went on when one of my programs executed.<br /><br />But, it's 2010 and I've moved on from those days. So, let us say that I have written some program you wish to use. I've given you a copy of it and I'm explaining to you how to use it.<br /><br />So, I'll say something like, "<i>When you click on this button, 'thus-and-such' will happen.</i>"<br /><br />But, the truth of the matter is that that explanation has no relationship to what really happens, and it has little relationship or similarity to my own "internal" explanation of what happens. I, being the author of the program, and you, being the user of it, care about quite different abstractions or models of the program and what *really* goes on when it executes.<br /><br />Suppose the buttons used in the program are instances of a button I custom wrote. There are a different ways I might have gone about doing this ... and you likely don't care. You likely don't care that I wrote the code for the button, and you're even less likely to care about the various ways I might have gone about doing so. But, suppose that you do care. How, merely by using the buttons, are you ever going to decide whether I created the button in this manner or that? The answer is, you can't differentiate unless you can swing some deeper level of analysis (say, getting a copy of the source code for the button).<br /><br />Now, I didn't make a point of mentioning this to you ('cause I didn't deem it important to your use of the program), but you later notice that when you hover the mouse cursor over a button, its appearance changes; and, when you click a button, its appearance changes yet again.<br /><br />Is this change of appearance of the buttons just "eye candy," or is it functional (and there are at least two modes in which this might be functional)? That is, is the change of appearance somehow necessary for the button to do what it does? Or, is it intended as a visual cue to the user, but strictly speaking is unnecessary to the program's functionality? Certainly, you might explain the behavior in any of these three ways, but which explanation is correct? And, how can you decide between them without, again, managing a deeper analysis than that available to you as a user of the program.<br /><br />[continued]Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-68655412528841465092010-08-06T00:39:52.680-07:002010-08-06T00:39:52.680-07:00George R.
Two things that come to mind about ato...George R. <br /><br />Two things that come to mind about atoms. <br /><br />1. Parts partake of wholes and therefore saying a cat's atoms are most fundamental in the cat's being is to presuppose there is a formally integrated, formally intelligible "cat" in the first place. If atoms are the basis of all reality, there can't be formally discrete entities to which they belong since 'being a cat-complex' is not a property of atoms. Being an atomic complex is, however, a formal property of cats. <br /><br />2. Atoms are what they are and not something else because they themselves existentiate concrete forms. I suspect there's no such thing as "fundamental particles" because even the most empirically austere particles are, on hylemorphism, but concrete acts of depotentiated matter. As such, atoms' atomicity itself already evinces hylemorphic constraints. <br /><br />Best,Codgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-48345237831413757842010-08-05T21:18:52.416-07:002010-08-05T21:18:52.416-07:00Thanks Ilion,
I think I understand your ideas. B...Thanks Ilion,<br /><br />I think I understand your ideas. But, when I think of "parts" I also think of the properties they have. I put Sodium metal and Chlorine gas together in a flask and they order themselves as NaCl (table salt) because of the ionic properties of the atoms. So, the design principle was inherent in the properties that make the "parts."<br /><br />This example doesn't work for a house which takes human forethought and effort to construct. Would you make a distinction between "natural" systems and "human" systems?<br /><br />If I'm not using all the right terminology, just bear with me. I'm genuinely trying to understand.Gimli 4 the Westhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09077653879666675956noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83095795901757128562010-08-05T11:32:44.270-07:002010-08-05T11:32:44.270-07:00From a hylemorphic point of view, my having a ment...<i>From a hylemorphic point of view, my having a mental image, like my having a stomach and eyeballs, is no less ontologically fundamental than my being made up of atoms. Hence however we characterize "matter," it has to be consistent with that fact.</i><br /><br />Yes, but why must the hylemorphic point of view be accepted as true? What is it about atoms that doesn’t allow them to ontologically most fundamental?George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86487066280130445092010-08-04T21:59:02.891-07:002010-08-04T21:59:02.891-07:00"... (given name or fan of Homer?) ..."
..."<i>... (given name or fan of Homer?) ...</i>"<br /><br />It's my name. <br /><br /><b>David:</b> "<i>I must admit I have a hard time seeing the world as not the sum of its parts. ...</i>"<br /><br />One of the parts of a thing -- and which nearly everyone seems to go out of his way to overlook -- is the design or plan or "organizing principle" of the thing. In more A-T terms, this would be its 'form.'<br /><br />Relatedly, another ignored or overlooked part of a thing is the <i>process</i> (or 'work') by which the various component parts of the thing came to be organized in the particular relationships which hold between them. In more A-T terms, this would probably be its 'efficient cause.'<br /><br />I think that that silly aphorism, "<i>the whole is greater than the sum of the parts</i>" is both a reflection of and a cause of or contributor to this habit of (and sometimes insistence upon) not seeing the immaterial parts of a physical thing.<br /><br />For example, one may have all the material parts which might comprise a house or a car (or a single brick of that hypothetical house) and still not have a whole house or car (or brick). Or, one may have all the chemicals (down to the level of the exact individual atoms and molecules) which might (or formerly did) comprise an organism and still not have an organism, but rather herely a goo of chemicals (or a corpse).<br /><br />One seemingly has all the parts comprising the thing -- to be precise, one has all the parts that are visible to a materialistic reductionist mindset -- and yet one does not have a whole house or car or brick or organism.Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-73000930613221677292010-08-04T20:24:54.894-07:002010-08-04T20:24:54.894-07:00Thanks Prof. Feser for taking the time to answer m...Thanks Prof. Feser for taking the time to answer my question. Thanks also to Ilion (given name or fan of Homer?) for the dry humor and honest response.<br /><br />I must admit I have a hard time seeing the world as not the sum of its parts. I worked my way through a BS in Chemistry at the CSUF (an average student) because I thought that was a good way to understand the world and a promising way to make a living. When I fix my car or repair my leaking plumbing I think in terms of parts. I think also about this in terms of my theology--God as a Trinity and having certain characteristics.<br /><br />Can you give me some examples of systems that can't be understood best as the sum of its parts or are best understood without thinking about the parts that make them up?<br /><br />Forgive me if I sound simple.Gimli 4 the Westhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09077653879666675956noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52379657759566837952010-08-04T12:20:22.089-07:002010-08-04T12:20:22.089-07:00Is it possible for anyone who is unable to cause m...Is it possible for anyone who is unable to cause matter to exist to truly claim to really understand matter?Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74619605784375904712010-08-04T11:44:21.815-07:002010-08-04T11:44:21.815-07:00Crap, what an awful lot of typos in those last two...Crap, what an awful lot of typos in those last two comments. Oh well.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74512929346630550482010-08-04T11:38:37.630-07:002010-08-04T11:38:37.630-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-21669861562397963702010-08-04T11:38:30.527-07:002010-08-04T11:38:30.527-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-38873894044379459102010-08-04T11:38:27.190-07:002010-08-04T11:38:27.190-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4913562808630884302010-08-04T11:38:13.757-07:002010-08-04T11:38:13.757-07:00Hello David,
What exactly the image is is a big t...Hello David,<br /><br />What exactly the image <i>is</i> is a big topic. My only point was that while it seems obviously immaterial on a modern, mechanistic conception of matter -- it doesn't seem like a complex arrangement of colorless, odorless, tasteless particles; we don't observe anything like that when we look in a guy's brain; etc. -- when we reject that conception of matter and think in hylemorphic terms the issue just isn't so clear.<br /><br />Part of the problem here is that we moderns have a natural tendency to think of a material substance as a collection of basic parts and to think of everything true of it as somehow a truth about the arrangement of those parts. Hence we think: "I don't see how the atoms, or molecules, or neurons, or whatever all add up to a mental image." But that's just the wrong way to think about the issue from the get go. Part of the point of hylemorphism is that we need to break free of this "how does the whole arise out of the parts?" way of thinking. <br /><br />Related to this, I suspect that many people symathetically encountering A-T for the first time unreflectively tend to maintain an essentially atomist understanding of matter and then think of a "substantial form" as something that gets added to the atoms or whatever. The atoms (or whatever we think of the smallest elements as being) are somehow the most fundamental thing about a material substance ontologically speaking, and anything else ahs to be either constrcuted out of them or added on from outside. But that too completely misses the point. From a hylmorphic point of view, my having a mental image, like my having a stomach and eyeballs, is no less ontologically fundamental than my being made up of atoms. Hence however we characterize "matter," it has to be consistent with that fact.<br /><br />The bottom line is: Materialists are not only wrong to say that amtter is all that exists. They also don't even understand what matter itself is in the first place. Unfortunately, most moderns work with an essentially materialist cocneption of matter, which means most modern dualists don't understand what matter is either. If we don't see that hylemorphism is a <i>radical</i> challenge to what moderns tend to take for granted, we haven't understood it.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-63442711182956181332010-08-04T11:22:22.539-07:002010-08-04T11:22:22.539-07:00Hello t,
As I indicated in the post, we need to d...Hello t,<br /><br />As I indicated in the post, we need to distinguish between intentional states having a conceptual structure and those which do not. It is those which have it -- for example, a thought like "That is an apple" -- that can be true or false, and those indeed cannot be material. But those without a conceptual structure -- for example, a horse's desire for the apple he sees -- can be material (at least if we allow, as an Aristotelian would, that final causality is immanent to the material world) while they cannot be true or false. A horse might be frustrated when he bites the "apple" and (because it is a fake) tastes wax. But he doesn't have a false thought in that case, because he doesn't have a thought at all. He just has an internal state which moves him toward (what we conceptualize as) apples.<br /><br />Re: the argument from abstract thought, the point isn't that a purported brain symbol lacks anything like intentionality; at least on an Aristotelian metaphysic it might have some kind of "goal-directedness" and thus something like intentionality. (True, even the most rudimentary forms of intentionality are a problem for materialism, because it assumes a mechanistic conception of matter. But if we avoid that error, basic instances of "directedness" like the horse's desire for the apple do not establish that there is anything immaterial involved.)<br /><br />The point, again, has instead to do with conceptual structure. In particular, no purely material entity or process, even on an Aristotelian understanding of matter, can in principle have the universality and determinacy thought has. For example, any purported brain symbol is going to have individualizing features that are incompatible with the universality of the concept it is purportedly to be identified with; it is going to be ambiguos in a way the concept is not; and so forth.<br /><br />Re: qualia, that's a much bigger topic. Suffice it to say that there is disagreement between Aristotleian-Scholastic philosophers about the extent to which "secondary qualities" reflect objective features of things, though all are agreed in rejecting the non-hylemorphic approach to conceptualizing matter that goes hand in hand with the way the moderns deal with this issue.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-62241286978406175472010-08-04T08:30:00.933-07:002010-08-04T08:30:00.933-07:00[continued]
T: "... and in demonstrating it ...[continued]<br /><br /><b>T:</b> "<i>... and in demonstrating it you must have reference to intentionality.</i>"<br /><br />It's just about impossible to discuss the concept/abstraction (which I perforce must here represent by the glyphs) '<i>apple</i>' without using either the word "apple" or the glyphs "a-p-p-l-e."<br /><br />How then can I say to that fellow over there, "<i>No, no, no; you're misapplying or misattributing the concept 'intentionality'</i>" if I do not in some way refer to the concept?<br /><br /><br /><i>We</i> are minds/subjects -- intentionality is "what we do" (and it seems almost to be our default mental setting to see or attribute intentionality even where/when there seems to be none). But, <i>mere objects</i> do not "do" intentionality. And, it is false to treat of ourselves <i>as though</i> we were mere objects; it is false to treat of mere objects <i>as though</i> they were subjects. <br /><br /><br /><b>T:</b> "<i>But isn't it than the case that the argument from abstract thought somehow relies on the argument from intentionality as a more basic, more fundamental argument?</i>"<br /><br />Almost every argument relies upon some more fundamental argument(s) ... until one gets down to rock-bottom axioms.<br /><br />An "argument from abstract thought" is generally intended as a falsifier or defeater for certain naturalistic or materialistic objections to other anti-materialistic arguments. Or, in my case, it might well be intended as a step in showing God-denial to be demonstrably false.Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58844813036763803812010-08-04T08:29:23.606-07:002010-08-04T08:29:23.606-07:00T: "But the point is, you are compelled to ta...<b>T:</b> "<i>But the point is, you are compelled to talk about meaning and intentionality to reply to this (superficial, I completely agree) objection.</i>"<br /><br />Only in so far as the objection is improperly or incorrectly phrased in terms of meaning and intentionality. <br /><br />The objection, being a statement of '<i>naturalism</i>,' publicly repudiates suh concepts as <i>telos</i> and intentionality being fundamental to reality ... and then attempts to smuggle intentionality into its premises, unaknowledged -- visualize someone trying to sneak her (*) friends into the bar through the bathroom window, so as to avoid the cover charge.<br /><br />(*) GASP! Is one allowed to use "inclusive language" in such a non-laudatory manner? GASP<br /><br /><br /><b>T:</b> "<i>It is not in itself obvious that a particular thing cannot refer to many objects (and so to an abstract concept); this has to be demonstrated ...</i>"<br /><br />Of course it is obvious, for it's definitional: '<i>to reference</i>' (that is, "to pointing to") definitionally implies '<i>intention</i>;' it is only by reason of the intention of (one or more) intenders that a thing can be said to -- <i>can be imputed to</i> -- reference, or point to, another thing. This referencing, or pointing to, is imputed or attributed to the thing by the intender(s), but it is not inherent to the thing; the one thing doesn't *really* reference, or point to, the other thing.<br /><br />Certainly, a thing may <i>symbolize</i> any number of other things; but symbolization is the extrinsic <i>imputation</i> of meaning to a thing.<br /><br /><br />For example, if I were to throw a quiver of arrows into the air and allow them to fall as they may to the ground, and if I were then to observe the alignment of the arrows and were to say of one arrow "<i>It's pointing at the house</i>," and of another "<i>It's pointing at you</i>," my statements are, strictly speaking, false. As no one <i>intended</i> any of the arrows to be in the particular alignments into which they fell, it logically cannot be the case that any of them are "pointing to" anything. <br /><br />However, in normal discourse, it's far easer to talk about the alignment of the arrows by using the imprecise (and logically false) language than by using accurate language. <br /><br />Likewise with speaking about more typical symbols; it is generally far easier to speak as though the meaning <i>imputed</i> to some symbol were intrinsic. But, the price of using imprecise (and false!) language is that our thinking tends to become imprecise (and thus false to a greater or lesser degree).<br /><br />[continued]Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9986369274078804942010-08-04T03:43:16.097-07:002010-08-04T03:43:16.097-07:00Ilion,
yes, I understand everything you say and I...Ilion,<br /><br />yes, I understand everything you say and I completely agree. But the point is, you are compelled to talk about meaning and intentionality to reply to this (superficial, I completely agree) objection. It is not in itself obvious that a particular thing cannot refer to many objects (and so to an abstract concept); this has to be demonstrated and in demonstrating it you must have reference to intentionality. But isn't it than the case that the argument from abstract thought somehow relies on the argument from intentionality as a more basic, more fundamental argument?tnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25566074916890686722010-08-04T02:44:08.916-07:002010-08-04T02:44:08.916-07:00T: "On the other hand, I don't fully unde...<b>T:</b> "<i>On the other hand, I don't fully understand the argument from abstract thought. This argument says that the thought cannot possibly be material because we are capable of thinking of abstract objects while material objects and/or processes are always particular and never universal. But someone could reply in the following way: I can write the word "apple". The letters themselves are, of course, particular, but they nevertheless refer to any or all apples in the world.</i>"<br /><br />But see, the glyphs "a-p-p-l-e" do not actually "<i>refer to any or all apples in the world</i>; " the glyphs "a-p-p-l-e" do not actually refer even to the <i>sound</i> of the word "apple." Moreover, the <i>sound</i> of the word "apple" doesn't actually refer to any particular apple nor to the concept/abstraction (I perforce must here represent by the glyphs) '<i>apple</i>.'<br /><br />These physical entities (squiggles of ink on paper or light on a screen, sounds in a certain pattern) do not possess of themselves any meaning whatsoever, they do not of themselves refer to anything whatsoever. Rather, they are <i>symbols</i>; that is, while they are utterly meaningless of themselves, we have agreed amongst ourselves:<br />1) to use these certain glyphs to stand for these certain sounds;<br />2) to use this certain pattern of individual sounds to stand for this "word:"<br />3a) to use this word to stand for any particular object of a certain sort;<br />3b) to use this word to stand for the abstraction or universalizaton of any or all objects of that certain sort.<br />It is because these physical entities are inherently meaningless that we (being minds) are able to use them as symbols; it is because they are actually meaningless that we are able to attribute or ascribe or impute meanings to them.<br /><br /><br /><b>T:</b> "<i>In the same way, some pattern or process in brain, although by itself particular, could nevertheless refer to any number of objects and so be abstract. You could respond that this is derived intentionality as oposed to original or intrinsic intentionality of human thought, and you would be perfectly right. But it seems to me that by taking this step, the argument from abstract thought falls back to the argument from intentinality.</i>"<br /><br />But, just as with "letters" and "words," the electro-chemical states (and state changes) within brains are utterly meaningless of themselves; there is no meaning or intentionality or referentiality <i>in</i> the brain states.Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25816469153482867392010-08-04T00:59:12.001-07:002010-08-04T00:59:12.001-07:00"... Hope you [Feser] take questions from ave..."<i>... Hope you [Feser] take questions from average guys. If not Ilion (“Troy?” Or “ I the Lion?”) seems like a smart guy.</i>"<br /><br />Troy (and thanks for the compliment). Also, it always oddly pleases me when others recognize, or suspect, that ‘Ilíon’ isn’t about lions, but is about the city we English-speakers call ‘Troy.’<br /><br />And, while he [Ilíon] is slightly smarter than average, he's also so utterly average by just about any measure one might bring to bear that it’s just sad to contemplate. And, even where he may be "above average" (say, in stubbornness), he has other “average” or “below average” characteristics (say, in perseverance) which frequently work against him meeting his potential.Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-251920209336115312010-08-04T00:52:45.352-07:002010-08-04T00:52:45.352-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.com