tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post1916444588442366913..comments2024-03-28T21:43:44.433-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Other minds and modern philosophyEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger62125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-22443228717373482342020-08-07T17:19:28.697-07:002020-08-07T17:19:28.697-07:00I think, try as one might, one must conceive of Ca...I think, try as one might, one must conceive of Cartesian doubt as a good tool for epistemic processes. Perhaps not a truth tracking one, but a good one nonethelessBill Solomonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17463551320539811359noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33246456295012350782020-07-31T20:29:15.601-07:002020-07-31T20:29:15.601-07:00exactly
† ††
Matthew 21 [19] And when he saw a...exactly<br /><br /><br />† <b>†</b>†<br /><br /><a href="http://matthewrevelation.blogspot.com" rel="nofollow"><br />Matthew 21 [19] And when he saw a fig tree in the way, he came to it, and found nothing thereon, but leaves only, and said unto it, Let no fruit grow on thee henceforward for ever. And presently the fig tree withered away.<br /><br />Revelation 22 [2] In the midst of the street of it, and on either side of the river, was there the tree of life, which bare twelve manner of fruits, and yielded her fruit every month: and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations.<br /></a><br /> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><br /><a href="http://matthew-revelation.blogspot.com" rel="nofollow"> <b> http://matthewrevelation.blogspot.com !</b></a><br /><<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<br /><br /> !<br />Unknown Soldierhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00796210982427639682noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75686470130554831822020-07-13T13:39:50.030-07:002020-07-13T13:39:50.030-07:00"How do I know that any minds at all exist ot..."How do I know that any minds at all exist other than my own?"<br /><br />From the weight of their ... gaze.Isaurianhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06217865703484090366noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3330519462332025952020-07-13T13:14:40.091-07:002020-07-13T13:14:40.091-07:00Yeah, the brain in the vat is a good example: if I...Yeah, the brain in the vat is a good example: if I believe I am not a BIV, and I have absolutely no grounds or evidence to conclude otherwise, then I am, in fact, not a BIV.<br /><br />If an opponent says "wait, but it could be otherwise", we've already stipulated there is no evidence for that conclusion.T Nhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06287822708519943071noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-24979083787623639592020-07-13T11:45:40.950-07:002020-07-13T11:45:40.950-07:00To be clear, I do think that rejection of PSR can ...To be clear, I do think that rejection of PSR can lead to skepticism, even with the standard phenomenal conservative justification. Maybe this is what Dominik was getting at. I just wanted to make it clear that we shouldn't get the order reversed; we don't believe in PSR to then have phenomenal conservatism; phenomenal conservatism is what grounds all our standard beliefs, some of which (upon closer inspection) will end up requiring PSR in order to avoid inconsistency.<br /><br />We have the argument for PSR from skepticism precisely because, through PConservatism, we realize that "skepticism is false". Then we can be forced to adopt PSR in order to avoid an inconsistency. Because ~PSR can indeed be a defeater. It'd be like "everything seems to be to be working in accordance with appropriate causes and effects... but I also don't think it's improbable for things to pop into being uncaused (because of not accepting PSR)". That would be a problem; that would indeed give us a defeater, so we have an argument for PSR. But, to be clear, phenomenal conservatism is what comes first.<br /><br />If you have actual, positive reason for thinking your appearances/intellectual seemings are unreliable, then of course you have a defeater. So the argument from PSR is about establishing that, without PSR, we would have such positive reasons.<br /><br />But the traditional skeptic (a la Descartes) isn't giving us positive reasons for questioning the reliability of the senses. He is asking us WHY we can even in principle trust any appearances; he is defensive, so to speak. "You COULD be dreaming. You COULD be deceived by a demon", etc. Correct, but the "could" doesn't mean it's a scenario that is not-improbable. Skeptics presume the following principle:<br /><br />"One cannot know that P by means of method M if, if P were false, method M would still say that it was true".<br /><br />If one accepts this principle, then skepticism is inescapable. "If you were a brain in a vat, your delusions would still be telling you you're not a BIV, so you cannot trust them!". This is the trick principle behind skepticism. And it is this that Phenomenal Conservatives reject. I could indeed be a deceived brain in a vat, but it is still the case that it really seems like I'm not a BIV, and this can justify my belief that I'm not a BIV. Because it is not as if S is "inferring" that he's not a BIV based on the particular phenomenon of "S is having a seeming that he is not a BIV". It is not an inference like that; S doesn't care that he is having a seeming, so to speak. Rather, reality just is such that it really appears to S to be a certain way. And because P appears to be true to S, S has justification for believing that P.<br /><br />This is the most complicated (and most crucial) thing about phenomenal conservatism. Once you understand it, you get it. It's hard to put into words. The thing is that it's self-evident that, if P really appears to be the case, then we have justification for believing that P. And it has nothing to do with any inference of P from an appearance. It just is P being presented to us as probable or true.Atnohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13138424784532839636noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46879552051517891322020-07-13T03:44:14.176-07:002020-07-13T03:44:14.176-07:00Yeah, Atno is right. What I said above isn't ...Yeah, Atno is right. What I said above isn't relevant. Dominik and I are both trying to ground knowledge in a way that is not necessary according to PC. I'll have to look into it more. Thanks for the help.T Nhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06287822708519943071noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-60343428854977684672020-07-12T15:08:07.778-07:002020-07-12T15:08:07.778-07:00Dominik,
If the skeptical scenario seems to me to...Dominik,<br /><br />If the skeptical scenario seems to me to be crazy, it is not really a defeater. This might have to lead me to conclude PSR is true as well, if it is true ~PSR would give us defeaters. But first and foremost we recognize that this would be a problem ("skepticism bad") because we have intellectual presentations of the falsity of skepticism. <br /><br />Phenomenal conservatism gets around any possible skeptical scenario, because it immediately justifies whatever seemings we have. If X is what really seems to be the case for you, you are justified in believing that X. <br /><br />It is important to note that the phenomenal conservative rejects the idea that we are only justified in believing that P by method M iff our appearance of P wouldn't also be present if M were unreliable. We don't need to first know the reliability of M. This is because Phenomenal Conservatism is NOT a principle of inferential justification, which is crucial. <br />It is not as if we are justified in believing that P because P would somehow be likely given our seeming-that-P. It is not an inference. We are justified in believing that P because it really seems that P, that's all.Atnohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13138424784532839636noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-22080938868452902202020-07-12T14:16:15.947-07:002020-07-12T14:16:15.947-07:00Nonetheless, this is still stuck on an analytic le...Nonetheless, this is still stuck on an analytic level, I know. As I wrote below: The end isn’t math [i.e. analytic explanations]; the end is contemplation.T Nhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06287822708519943071noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75668742492061913882020-07-12T14:09:55.449-07:002020-07-12T14:09:55.449-07:00Yes, I think I'm on the same page. When I men...Yes, I think I'm on the same page. When I mentioned "fundamental presumptions"(perhaps not the best expression), I believe that is a way of speaking of it as a generalized principle when applied accross individuals: I know it's true for me because I experience it, but I'm in the position of necessarily presuming that this senario holds for other minds as well, even though such a presumption begs the question if it isn't just a necessary, fundamental assumption. You seem to touch on the same sentiment when you say "This is how common beliefs really are justified." Because once you speak of "common beliefs", you are assuming the existence of other minds and that they have the same experiences. <br /><br />I like the second paragraph about the "defeater", but I think even there we have no choice but to make a "fundamental presumption" that we would know a "defeater" when we saw it, and that we really have an even more foundational knowledge of objective reality (a "view from nowhere", as Nagel says). <br /><br />The skeptic can't get around any of this because he must make the same assumptions in order for his objection to even get off the ground. T Nhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06287822708519943071noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9657524010463980292020-07-12T13:33:38.282-07:002020-07-12T13:33:38.282-07:00Atno,
It falls prey to the empirical problem Koon...Atno,<br /><br />It falls prey to the empirical problem Koons and Pruss alluded to in their recent paper, as well as Koons in his engagements with Oppy. If you don't have PSR there is by itself no real justification is given for your conviction that what seems to be really is that way. In that sense the phenomenal conservatism is applied without it being grounded. Take Oppys formulation of the PSR for example: Every non-first state needs a cause.<br /><br />This doesn't defeat the skeptical problem that maybe your state of perception could be the first cause and thus phenomenological conservatism would have a defeater it wouldn't have if it were supplemented with a full blown PSR. I also of course agree that the skeptical scenario is ridiculous, but I'd argue that the ridicolousness is due to the fact that we implicitly presuppose PSR.<br /><br />Now what if we apply PC to an event to which we assume that its defeats PSR? Then, given the falsehood of PSR, we have an undercutting defeater to the reasonableness of PC and we'd fall into scenarios like aboveDominik Kowalskihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14634739012344612398noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-17425765159180061712020-07-12T11:03:33.359-07:002020-07-12T11:03:33.359-07:00@Anonymous
Yikes! Didn't mean that to leave th...@Anonymous<br />Yikes! Didn't mean that to leave this sitting for three days! Sorry about the delay in response. I would say that there is a possibility that you wouldn't <i>know</i> the difference between a philosophical zombie and a person when encountering them... except that philosophical zombies aren't metaphysically possible.<br /><br />As for telling the difference, I would say that when me make such judgements, there's always a small added caveat stating something such as which amounts to, if what I think is true about the composition of this being is true, then it must be of the type that I am insinuating. People can be fooled into thinking something has intelligence when it really doesn't, but we can have at least enough faith in our senses to determine that based on what they tell us we can make some pretty good inferences. Again, if its set up like me, it is like me would be the general formula, even if the actual argumentation is more complex.Casual Thomistnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16182251791256988932020-07-12T09:51:40.922-07:002020-07-12T09:51:40.922-07:00It is more like an experience than just a presumpt...It is more like an experience than just a presumption. Of course we are correct in presuming that the external world is real, as well as other facts of common sense. But why, exactly? If I introspect really strongly on the reasons why I believe (for instance) that my memory of yesterday is true, and that other people have minds, etc., I'll find it that it's because *it seems to me that these things are true*. This "seeming" is a kind of sui generis phenomenal event/state. Some authors, such as Bengson, call it a "presentation": the fact is presented to me. It is hard to describe it with more precision than that (perhaps that is a task for phenomenologists), but it does happen. It simply appears to me that other people have minds; I could be completely wrong, what seems to be true isn't necessarily true, perhaps my intellectual presentations/appearances are mistaken here. Perhaps I really am deceived and it just seems as if other people have minds and I am not dreaming. Perhaps. But it *really* doesn't *seem* to be the case. It really does seem to me that such and such is true. And if it really strongly seems to someone that such and such is true, what more can we ask for, for justifying responsible and reasonable belief? <br /><br />Someone might be in the desert and have a mirage. Right, but in this situation most adults know about mirages, so they'd have a defeater for their seeming. There will be intellectual tension. But when there's no such a defeater, and it *really* seems to us that something is the case, then of course we are justified in believing it. Because it really, seriously appears to be true!<br /><br />This principle is self-evident to me, and it gets rid of all skeptical scenarios. In addition, I am convinced that it captures the way common human knowledge actually works. THIS is why people believe they aren't being deceived by a Cartesian demon or dream, even when they entertain such scenarios. Because, no matter how ingenious these skeptical scenarios are, it still *seems* to us that they are false. We have a specific experience/perception of the world in such cases. It is close to our Cartesian, perfect intuition of first principles of logic, but weaker. It is as if reality presents itself to us as really, truly being in a certain way. We might be mistaken. But it doesn't seem like we are. It seems the skeptic is crazy; it seems we are not having a vivid dream. This is how common beliefs really are justified.Atnohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13138424784532839636noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29872848396368938812020-07-12T06:45:38.772-07:002020-07-12T06:45:38.772-07:00Ok, thanks for the reply. After Talmid’s post I r...Ok, thanks for the reply. After Talmid’s post I read a little on Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology (which I initially, wrongly assumed to be some sort of defense of Calvinism. Zing!) and I believe I get the gist of it. You say, “It is not as if we reason ‘this thing is probably true BECAUSE it appears to me to be true’”—which would be a type of crude relativism—the argument is more subtle and is appealing to fundamental presumptions. Any argument against fundamental presumptions would be less compelling than the fundamental presumptions themselves.<br /><br />While the details may be interesting to egghead philosophy types, to most people you run into every day the issue can be painted broadly as mere common sense without doing any harm. It took 500 years to get people this screwed up. It will take a long time to get them back. <br />T Nhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06287822708519943071noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-70356274666044511492020-07-12T06:20:14.287-07:002020-07-12T06:20:14.287-07:00Veritatis Splendor is just a masterpiece, but it&#... Veritatis Splendor is just a masterpiece, but it's more "traditional" and less Phenomenological than JPII’s other works. “Love and Responsibility” (1960) is the gold standard for JPII’s personalism IMO, but it is a difficult read. I’ve read it twice and I still don’t get it. Honestly, I find it very difficult to read Phenomenologists. They say everything six ways from Sunday. It reminds me of a friend who tells his wife she should tell her stories backward so she can get right to the point. Ha! Phenomenology is like contemplative philosophy, and I don’t think I’ve been given the grace. <br /><br />Edith Stein is an amazing figure. The force of her character alone wins her credibility, and that touches on something integral for Phenomenology right there. The dry arguments for other minds are one thing, the experience is another. The difference is as stark as the description of the world by math equations vs. the experience of qualia, and the Phenomenologist has taken on the difficulty of engaging the latter. The physicists tell us they’re going to capture everything in an equation, but that’s completely wrongheaded. The end isn’t math; the end is contemplation.<br />T Nhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06287822708519943071noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-66856505614153747612020-07-11T18:47:48.460-07:002020-07-11T18:47:48.460-07:00I read some stuff by Saint Edith Stein a few years...I read some stuff by Saint Edith Stein a few years ago and it was all very, very good. She is very underrated as a philosopher. I need to familiarize myself more but I could see a gold mine there. Same with SJPII's philosophical work, influenced by similar lines - you'd think the English translation to the saintly pope's main philosophical book would be easy to find, but it isn't. <br /><br />Atnohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13138424784532839636noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80105573850383193412020-07-11T18:18:34.243-07:002020-07-11T18:18:34.243-07:00Oh, and TN, by "practical certainty" I m...Oh, and TN, by "practical certainty" I mean something quite specific, at least it's an idea of mine.<br /><br />There is such a thing as Cartesian or mathematical certainty, we might say. This is the certainty we can say is TRUE 100% certainty. We can know a few things with Cartesian certainty: that something exists; that I exist and think (the cogito); the law of non-contradiction; 2+2=4 and the most basic mathematical and geometrical facts; the principle of phenomenal conservatism (so I argue). That's the stuff we can have 100%, mathematical certainty about.<br /><br />"Practical certainty" refers to propositions which we do not really know with mathematical certainty, but which are still painfully obvious, and which we cannot seriously doubt. If I'm being honest, I could be in the Matrix; I could be deceived by a Cartesian demon right now into thinking I am having this conversation with you. But this seems ridiculously crazy to me. I KNOW I am talking to you. I KNOW my most recent memories are correct. I KNOW other minds are real. These constitute a practical certainty even though I could possibly """"doubt"""" these propositions. Atnohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13138424784532839636noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-64509214238062545102020-07-11T18:13:29.767-07:002020-07-11T18:13:29.767-07:00Also, one important note for understanding PC: it ...Also, one important note for understanding PC: it is *not* a principle of inferential justification. By this I mean that we do not *infer* things on the basis of a particular occurrence of a seeming. It is not as if we reason "this thing is probably true BECAUSE it appears to me to be true" which would obviously be problematic. Rather, the subject simply has justification for believing in whatever appears to be true, because (of course) it is rational and justifiable to believe that which really, really appears to be true to you.<br /><br />This is a conceptual point that is very hard to put into words without making it confusing. Once you "see" it, you see it, and understand the difference. <br /><br />For those interested, I recommend Michael Huemer's book "Skepticism and the Veil of Perception". <br /><br />Dominik,<br /><br />How is that a problem? If it really seems to someone that PSR is false, that person will have justification to believe that it is false. Of course, they will be wrong, because PSR is true. But if it somehow appears false to them, they'll have some justification for believing in their intellectual presentation/appearance. I reckon most adults would find it that PSR actually seems to be true to them, when they reflect on it. Or even that they'd have some defeaters, if PSR were to appear false to them. By simply thinking about PSR and reflecting on it, most people will come to see that it is true, or at least that it is plausible and probable to a good degree. For instance, just thinking that something cannot magically come into being from absolutely nothing, without any cause.<br /><br />Atnohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13138424784532839636noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27563788124387227612020-07-11T18:05:27.639-07:002020-07-11T18:05:27.639-07:00TN,
I believe we've had progress in that we ...TN,<br /><br />I believe we've had progress in that we can now cogently explain how we can be justified in believing in common sense propositions and many other things. No one (well, almost no one) ever truly doubted the existence of other minds, for instance, but there was still the problem of how exactly to justify such a belief. The ancients didn't seem to have an answer either, they just seemed to accept it - Aristotle appeared to be a particularist, "okay, whatever is the case here, we KNOW we can generally trust our senses, so let's move on to actually interesting metaphysical issues". <br /><br />We had significant progress when Moore came along with his "proof of the external world", which was the technical observation that, whatever philosophical story we have, we are more certain that we have two hands than that any argument for skepticism could be plausible (even if we don't know exactly where the argument goes wrong). This logically justifies us in making a "Moorean shift" - if skepticism were false, we wouldn't know that we have two hands, but we are much surer that we have two hands than we can be of the skeptical argument, so we can be sure this skepticism is somehow false. <br /><br />We made even more progress when we got to Plantinga's reformed epistemology, etc., and finally Phenomenal Conservatism. Phenomenal Conservatism (henceforth PC) is really what is at play in justifying our beliefs, including our very sure belief that (e.g.) we have two hands. <br /><br />PC is the following: "if it seems to S that P, then S has some justification for believing that P". So if it seems to S that he has two hands, he will have justification for believing this in the absence of defeaters. The justification conferred is proportional to how strong the "seeming" is, with the consideration of potential defeaters. <br /><br />We believe other people have minds because it really does seem to us that other people have minds. There is nothing else to it, generally. In general don't really "infer" or have to infer that other people are conscious as a best explanation to their behavior - it just seems to us, obviously, clearly, that other people have minds, no matter what skeptical argument might be proposed. <br /><br />To me, PC is strongly self-evident in the way the principle of non-contradiction is self-evident. I know with 100% Cartesian certainty that contradictions are impossible; when I understand the terms, I understand the principle is true. Likewise, when I understand the terms of PC, I understand that it is true. If something really appears to be true, a subject has some justification for believing it to be true. This is self-evident to me.<br /><br />Being self-evident, we can then identify PC as the foundational rock upon which all common sense metaphysical, ethical and natural propositions can be grounded and justified. <br /><br />So I do think that we've made lots of progress in epistemology. We now have a much better and more consistent, worked out, and complete grasp of it than the ancients and medievals did.Atnohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13138424784532839636noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25932290037252425792020-07-11T15:40:12.616-07:002020-07-11T15:40:12.616-07:00Dominick,
Ya can't deny PSR without using PSR...Dominick,<br /><br />Ya can't deny PSR without using PSR. People are just insane. What occupies most of my time is not these typical metaphysical issues, it's the mysterium iniquitatis.T Nhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06287822708519943071noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-64871108180577165132020-07-11T12:13:41.242-07:002020-07-11T12:13:41.242-07:00Children ask good questions. It's a shame when...Children ask good questions. It's a shame when they're given stupid answers. It's a greater shame when they hang on to those stupid answers for the rest of their lives.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33049798811928206732020-07-11T12:11:15.197-07:002020-07-11T12:11:15.197-07:00Chesterton certainly wasn't immune to bloviati...Chesterton certainly wasn't immune to bloviation. And his claim about sceptical philosophers certainly is blovious. And of course black pots often don't fear to point out the bloviation of black kettles, although perhaps they should.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-87228092086900670842020-07-11T11:59:20.022-07:002020-07-11T11:59:20.022-07:00I'd pin it on Ockham and the Nominalists, but ...I'd pin it on Ockham and the Nominalists, but that's just me.Davehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06297660669717051302noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-89638585099636185242020-07-11T11:55:46.132-07:002020-07-11T11:55:46.132-07:00My only problem with phenomenal conservatism is no...My only problem with phenomenal conservatism is not the principle itself, but the fact that I have seen it used to justify a rejection of the PSR, which though, in my view, is actually presupposed by itDominik Kowalskihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14634739012344612398noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-62479460929722280402020-07-11T08:14:12.858-07:002020-07-11T08:14:12.858-07:00Uhm, Balanced, you are breakin my heart here! To ...Uhm, Balanced, you are breakin my heart here! To be fair, the word "child" is pretty ambiguous, I only used it unqualified as a response to the Chesterton quote. Maybe when I was five or something, dunno, but dude, all those different Santas in different stores, I mean, hopefully you figured it out before your 18th birthday, I'm pretty sure you did.<br /><br />More to the point of the OP, even kids can be skeptical and wonder if other people are really thinking the same things we are thinking. Plus, even if kids are not typically reading deep philosophical material there were a few good TV shows like Star Trek with alien computers in a battle of wits with Captain Kirk to inspire some skeptical thoughts about what a mind is and if a computer could have a mind and if it did how would we know the computer was really thinking and feeling like us, not just putting out words to mimic our words?StardustyPsychehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12493629973262220492noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-30332218173362390682020-07-11T07:26:31.830-07:002020-07-11T07:26:31.830-07:00OK, Thanks. I was asking Atno to explain a little...OK, Thanks. I was asking Atno to explain a little more: is "practical certainty" the same as, or a little different than phenomenal conservatism? How would one argue successfully that common sense is not "the truth" without immediately running into a problem? And has the progress of epistemology been due to a return to common sense (i.e. phenomenal conservatism) or something else.<br /><br />Thanks!T Nhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06287822708519943071noreply@blogger.com