tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post1706456167693247105..comments2024-03-18T21:06:42.546-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Smith, Tollefsen, and Pruss on lyingEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger90125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35663231460902173572013-11-30T20:08:07.572-08:002013-11-30T20:08:07.572-08:00I find this idea perverse in the extreme
Then it ...<i>I find this idea perverse in the extreme</i><br /><br />Then it is a good thing we don't worship James.<br /><br />Seriously, please review Dr. Feser's comments about reduced/limited culpability when under duress.Scott W.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-20704347003759327192013-09-14T18:11:55.583-07:002013-09-14T18:11:55.583-07:00Hence it is wrong to lie even to the murderer who ...Hence it is wrong to lie even to the murderer who comes to your door demanding to know where to find his intended victim. It is not wrong to refrain from telling him, or to speak evasively, or to use a broad mental reservation. But if these ploys do not work, it would be wrong to lie to him. Not gravely wrong, but still mildly wrong.<br />--------------<br />I find this idea perverse in the extreme. There is no offence to the God or to the Divine Goodness to seek to protect one's life or the lives of loved one from a murderer by "lying" to him. His intent is evil, and one is trying to thwart evil. The intent behind the "lie" is obviously good. God is neither stupid nor a pedant nor a moralist.Jamesnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11580578482004609982013-05-23T21:41:04.920-07:002013-05-23T21:41:04.920-07:00What I want to say is:
Thank you, thank you, than...What I want to say is:<br /><br />Thank you, thank you, thank you for the civilized and Christian nature of this piece and the whole discussion.<br /><br />Thank you for treating Janet Smith with respect and love even though you are convinced she is seriously wrong.<br /><br />Thank you for a full and honest and fair presentation of the position of the "minority opinion" on this question.<br /><br />Thank you for the full and beautiful exposition of your own understanding of the truth of the matter.<br /><br />Thank you, Ed Feser. And God bless you. I'll say a Hail Mary for you right now.<br />Jeffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05362705229107017257noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14645092256556391552012-01-28T17:40:15.856-08:002012-01-28T17:40:15.856-08:00Misuse of "communicative faculties" seem...Misuse of "communicative faculties" seems far too broad in its application to be a useful criterion for immorality. For example, if I recite a sentence in the company of no other, I am not even communicating, although I'm using my communicative faculties.onelasttimenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25185010399998226702012-01-24T12:39:38.476-08:002012-01-24T12:39:38.476-08:00Tony: That we agree on, the conventions have to in...Tony: <i>That we agree on, the conventions have to incorporate the situation, context, and conditions in order to BE one distinct set of conventions at all. That's why using Freno (which nobody here in the US knows) to answer the murderer is just plain unsuited to every element of the communicative realm. </i><br /><br />Agreed.<br /><br /><i> On the other hand, everyone knows and recognizes in some cases primary versus secondary meanings - within contexts. Half of all word plays and puns would be impossible without there being a priority that is generally recognized. […] And so secondary meanings that rest on other meanings clearly include priority. </i><br /><br />Well, sometimes a pun rests on using the "secondary" or "atypical" meaning for a word where the "primary" meaning would be expected. But a joke can work just as well by setting it up so that the secondary meaning is expected until you hit the punchline and find out it was the "primary" meaning. Which is primary or secondary is just an accident of history, and will differ for different people. I don't see how that can be morally relevant (unless we know or require people to understand the etymology and development of the languages they speak).<br /><br /> <i>Now, there was no general convention, an idiom, in Egyptian or Greek speech that the phrase "He is close to you" actually stands for a different meaning like "he is so darn close you need look no further". There was no idiom like that. So the words did NOT have a language convention that meant something different than their primary meaning taken at face value, literally. </i><br /><br />I argue that the context provides essential additional meaning to the bare words (as it always must), so the "literal" meaning is not relevant enough. If I run up to the bus stop and ask you, "Did I miss the bus?" there is nothing in the "literal" meaning of the words that prevents them referring to the <i>next</i> bus. But common sense knows from the context that I mean the bus that is due at approximately this time. If you say, "No" because I haven't missed the bus that's due in another 55 minutes, I think it's clear you've told a lie (and/or a joke, depending on how you play it, of course).Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-73064650530506894112012-01-22T16:18:43.224-08:002012-01-22T16:18:43.224-08:00Rather than label interpretations as primary, seco...<i>Rather than label interpretations as primary, secondary, etc., I would say that some interpretations are more to be expected than others. I expect physicists to interpret certain sounds and symbols differently from grocers, and I expect Russians to interpret differently from Frenchman, etc., and Russian physicists who are shopping in a French grocery are yet another set of expectations.</i> <br /><br />I agree in part: If I say "nine" here in the US, most people will jump to one meaning, but if I say the same sounds in Germany, they are going to jump to a completely different meaning. That we agree on, the conventions have to incorporate the situation, context, and conditions in order to BE one distinct set of conventions at all. That's why using Freno (which nobody here in the US knows) to answer the murderer is just plain unsuited to every element of the communicative realm. <br /><br />On the other hand, everyone knows and recognizes in some cases primary versus secondary meanings - within contexts. Half of all word plays and puns would be impossible without there being a priority that is generally recognized. For example, the word "evening" cannot take on the broad, indistinct, fuzzy meaning that might be understood to include late afternoon in certain contexts unless it already had a more specific, more determinate meaning to begin with, a meaning that the broad meaning rests on, is "in relation to". And so secondary meanings that <i>rest on</i> other meanings clearly include priority. <br /><br />I would suggest that a statement that is true in a secondary sense but false full stop in the primary sense cannot be accounted in the same status (lie or not a lie) as the reverse, a statement true in the primary and false in one (or more) of the secondary senses. I DON'T think that a statement needs to be true in both the primary and ALL of the secondary senses to avoid a charge of its being a lie, because a statement can be capable of many secondary senses, with varying degrees of likelihood of being considered, and degrees of coherence with my thought. It is too much to expect a person to have to parse through all of the possible senses and all of the potentially accepted meanings to be considered to "tell the truth". <br /><br /><i>I would say that some interpretations are more to be expected than others.</i> <br /><br />True, but insufficient. Take Ed's example in the more recent thread, of St. Athanasius misleading the soldiers. St. A has the rowers say "he is close to you". The soldiers cannot leap to the idea "close but not so close as to just lay hands on him right here" without first knowing full well what "he is close to you" means in its OWN right. The meaning they leap to is a meaning they consider AFTER they get the primary meaning that he is close. Now, there was no general convention, an idiom, in Egyptian or Greek speech that the phrase "He is close to you" actually stands for a different meaning like "he is so darn close you need look no further". There was no idiom like that. So the words did NOT have a language convention that meant something different than their primary meaning taken at face value, literally. <br /><br />What you are saying is that idioms have the same bearing on our usage as withheld potential information has in a context and situation. You are saying that with St. A, the rowers using the phrase "he is close to you" without adding more information could not have legitimately said that unless it was also true that "he is not here", as if the words were as it were an idiom. But it is not clear why they need to volunteer more information than they actually gave to people who have no right to the truth - there is no _convention_ in favor of that. It is not clear why giving part of the truth of necessity involves giving all of the truth, when the hearer isn't entitled to ANY of the truth.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74425489646030217332012-01-21T15:48:35.673-08:002012-01-21T15:48:35.673-08:00[continued]
Tony: [You rely on] on multiple levels...[continued]<br />Tony: <i>[You rely on] on multiple </i>levels<i> of meaning. There is a primary meaning of "he has not come back this evening", and that primary meaning is TRUE FULL STOP. It is not partly true and partly false, for example. </i><br /><br />I think this is what our disagreement boils down to. I don't accept this layering. Yes, there are different interpretations, but I don't think there is this fixed hierarchy of levels. There are only levels that are nearer or closer to the context at hand, and as you said, "Language IS a set of conventions", where anything and everything might (or might not!) figure into the relevant context. There is no magical difference between some squiggles that are printed in a dictionary somewhere or a gesture that you make with your face. Either somebody gets the meaning you wished to convey, or he doesn't. The vast and interwoven complex of formalities and informalities that make up communication in any given case cannot themselves be the determining factor in whether some utterance is a lie. The synonym of a lie cannot be the truth. The only thing that can be relevant is what conventions and inferences you <i>expect</i> your listener to apply, and on those grounds, "broad" reservations seem to drop out of the picture.<br /><br /><br /><i>In some cases, perhaps there is no clear preference for which of the 2 meanings constitutes the primary meaning - conventions can be blurry and indistinct at times, language changes, and during the change there can be disagreement about which meaning comes first. But by and large we communicate successfully, and this means that by and large we know primary meanings pretty well.</i><br /><br />"Pretty well", or "well enough"? In most circumstances, precision is not really necessary, so it's easy to get around everyday life with lots of miscommunication going on and not notice — if we could all project our thoughts on a screen to compare them, we'd probably be surprised at just how much variation there is in the interpretation of "agreed" meanings. Rather than label interpretations as primary, secondary, etc., I would say that some interpretations are more to be expected than others. I expect physicists to interpret certain sounds and symbols differently from grocers, and I expect Russians to interpret differently from Frenchman, etc., and Russian physicists who are shopping in a French grocery are yet another set of expectations. Indeed, "English" is just a vast set of expectations established over time though design and habit.<br /><br />To say there are "secondary" or implicit interpretations is only to say that in different circumstances, someone would interpret the same sounds/squiggles differently. But only the actual circumstances are relevant to the morality of my actual acts, and so only the interpretation that is expected here and now can determine whether I am lying.Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88165632189467997542012-01-21T15:39:45.176-08:002012-01-21T15:39:45.176-08:00Tony: I assure you that generally moralists do not...Tony: <i>I assure you that generally moralists do not similarly equate them, even the ones that think my deception examples are wrong actions. </i><br /><br />Right, but I do not see how the distinction is sufficiently well-grounded; there is a difference of degree, not kind, so my conclusion is that there is a difference of lesser and worse lies, rather than not being lies at all.<br /><br /> <i>you are of course invoking a (fictitious) conventional application that is wholly unsuitable (to the purpose of conveying anything you hold in your mind) given the circumstances, and thus it is wholly unreasonable that you should use this Frenobulexian phrase</i><br /><br />Yes! And it is partially unreasonable to use a phrase that is partially unsuitable given the circumstances. That is, we all know perfectly well that saying, "He hasn't returned this evening" (because technically he returned at 5:59pm) is not what the killer means or is asking about. The only difference from the Frenobulexian case is that there he was completely deceived whereas in this case he was "almost" not deceived. But that cannot stop it from being a lie any more than if the killer's victim almost survives it makes him not guilty of murder.<br /><br /><i>your Freno phrasing conveys no thought of yours and your (simultaneous) English phrasing conveys falsehood. That's a lie. </i><br /><br />This doesn't convince me. The made-up language <i>does</i> express a thought of mine, albeit highly contrived; conversely "he hasn't returned this evening" also expresses a falsehood. It can express a truth as well, obviously: there are two [and more] ways to interpret that sentence. But again we know — or at least, expect — that the killer isn't going to interpret in the true way, which of course is the whole point of phrasing it like that.<br /><br />[cont…]Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88774674660437930292012-01-20T08:59:41.881-08:002012-01-20T08:59:41.881-08:00Mr. Green, you are equating my proposal with stric...Mr. Green, you are equating my proposal with strict mental reservation. I assure you that generally moralists do not similarly equate them, <i>even the ones that think my deception examples are wrong actions.</i> <br /><br />All speech uses convention. Language IS a set of conventions. There are so many conventions in play, and so many fine tunings of convention, that it is difficult to speak precisely about the matter. When you say "<i>Which is Frenobulexian for 'You're a horrible man, go away!' </i>", you are of course invoking a (fictitious) conventional application that is wholly unsuitable (to the purpose of conveying anything you hold in your mind) given the circumstances, and thus it is wholly unreasonable that you should use this Frenobulexian phrase that sounds just like another language that means <i>nothing like</i> what think. <br /><br />It is one thing to say and successfully communicate something true in the language (i.e. in the set of conventions) you share with the hearer) without saying anything about what you don't wish to communicate, and another thing entirely to use a set of conventions you DON'T share with the hearer (and you know you don't share it) to say something, because in that case the inappropriate convention does not allow you to convey anything that you think. When the very same phrase that conveys NOTHING of what you think is also the same set of sounds that have a meaning in a shared language (a shared set of conventions) that is contrary to your thought, what is happening is that your Freno phrasing conveys no thought of yours and your (simultaneous) English phrasing conveys falsehood. That's a lie. <br /><br />When (as in my example) you say something true and hope for the aggressor to deceive himself, you are relying on not merely multiple possible meanings, but actually on multiple <i>levels</i> of meaning. There is a primary meaning of "he has not come back this evening", and that primary meaning is TRUE FULL STOP. It is not partly true and partly false, for example. In addition to the primary meaning, the totality of the expression and the larger context carry a secondary, <i>implicit</i> connotation: that (a) "this evening" is after 3pm, and so when I say "this evening" I am sort of referring to the whole period after 3pm, and/or (b) if I had meant to distinguish this afternoon (after 3pm) from 'this evening' I would have spoken about each period separately. <br /><br />It cannot be denied that with respect to these implicit secondary connotations, my phrasing does not express my mind. The claim, for moral use of this sort of broad mental reservation, is this: you have to stick to the truth in your primary meaning, but you can (for adequate reason) depart from the truth in secondary meanings that are ALSO conveyed in your phrasing. <br /><br />In some cases, perhaps there is no clear preference for which of the 2 meanings constitutes the primary meaning - conventions can be blurry and indistinct at times, language changes, and during the change there can be disagreement about which meaning comes first. But by and large we communicate successfully, and this means that by and large we know primary meanings pretty well.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3899978758019862092012-01-19T19:18:46.055-08:002012-01-19T19:18:46.055-08:00Tony: Words represent ideas, but sometimes a singl...Tony: <i>Words represent ideas, but sometimes a single word (or phrase) represents more than one idea, it is ambiguous.</i><br /><br />Sure, I glossed over a lot of detail there.<br /><br /> <i>You have not successfully communicated X to him, because he had no right to know and you didn't intend for him to get that information. Your letter isn't a LIE to the mailman. </i><br /><br />I don't buy that. If I were unaware of the postman's snooping, then there is no intent and thus no moral responsibility one way or the other. But in your example I do know, and thus I cannot avoid communicating something to him, if I choose to go ahead and communicate at all. (I could decide not to write to my friend, of course, or to write to him in a secret code that the postman can't understand at all; either case is the moral equivalent of keeping silent.) If I expect the postman to interpret my letter as meaning "X" (just as I expect my friend to), then that's fine; I have communicated truthfully. But if I expect the postman to interpret the meaning as "Y", then what I am doing is in fact communicating "Y" to the postman. The fact that my choice of words conveniently can (and expectedly will) be interpreted by my friend as meaning "X" is irrelevant: it may be a neat trick that I have manage to communicate two different messages using the same words, but since I deliberately conveyed to the postman a thought I did not hold true, I have lied. <br /><br /> <i>you say: "he left at 3:00 and hasn't come home this evening." This is true. </i><br /><br />Again, I think we need to distinguish between the utterance (which has a meaning) and the thought (which has truth). Often we can drop the middle term because it's not relevant, but here I think it is. The words as given can be interpreted multiple ways, some of which are true [to reality or to one's mind] and some of which are not. But one of the points I was making above is that this is <b>always</b> the case. Many utterances may have only a single <i>obvious</i> interpretation, given a certain time and place and language, etc., etc., but communication depends on the interpretation that the listener is expected to have. <br />I don't even need to arrange for the victim to step out; I can say simply, "he's not in". After all, he isn't in… the oven. He isn't in… hock. He isn't in… vulnerable. If that were the criterion, then it would be possible to lie only with words that had no interpretation at all that could be true — which leaves a pretty open field.<br /><br /><i>But if he does think that, he doesn't think that because you told him to think that, he does it because of his own error, his assumption that you wanted to give more information than the information ACTUALLY contained in your statement. But you didn't want to give any implied information about the afternoon, you want that information hidden.</i><br /><br />If the killer asks where John Smith is, and I reply, "He's not here and never has been", referring to Humphrey Bogart — well, that's the killer's fault for assuming that I wished to tell him something relevant to his question, right? It's true that Bogart has never been near my house. And if he persists, I can say, "I don't know John Smith, the person you are looking for, and would lead you straight to him if I could." Which is Frenobulexian for "You're a horrible man, go away!" It's the killer's own error if he assumes I was speaking to him in English.Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51961355023736974972012-01-18T19:46:32.676-08:002012-01-18T19:46:32.676-08:00statements represent ideas, and it is the ideas th...<i>statements represent ideas, and it is the ideas that are true [to reality] or not.</i><br /><br />No. Words represent ideas, but sometimes a single word (or phrase) represents more than one idea, it is ambiguous. Take the printed word<br /><br />invalid<br /><br />If you ask a nurse which syllable gets the stress, she will say the first. If you ask a mathematician, he will say the second. But they are the same printed word: each has a different <i>meaning</i> in mind. <br /><br />Suppose you send a letter to a friend, and you know that your postman is likely to read it (illegally and immorally, but there it is), and you insert a phrase that is ambiguous, that you know your friend will interpret as X, and (with high likelihood) the mailman will interpret as Y. Suppose X is true. You are intending to communicate X to your friend, and you succeed: you used a phrase that does mean X, X is the truth in your own mind. You are <i>aware</i> that the mailman, who has no right to know X, will probably walk away thinking Y, but that's his look-out and not yours. You have not successfully communicated X to him, because he had no right to know and you didn't intend for him to get that information. Your letter isn't a LIE to the mailman. <br /><br />Coming closer to the bone of contention: if the unjust aggressor asks for the location of the innocent victim you are protecting, and you artfully tell him something that is true but not germane, and distracts him from the truth he is seeking, you are not lying to him. If you (working artfully) arrange to have the victim step out of the house at 3pm and step back in, and the aggressor comes by at 9pm, you say: "he left at 3:00 and hasn't come home this evening." This is true. You are perfectly fine with the aggressor holding this truth. You (ALSO, in addition to the truth that you want him to hold and that you told him) want him to assume that the truth you told him <i>bears on</i> something that you didn't tell him: that he didn't come home in the afternoon either. But if he does think that, he doesn't think that because you told him to think that, he does it because of his own error, his assumption that you <i>wanted</i> to give more information than the information ACTUALLY contained in your statement. But you didn't want to give any <i>implied</i> information about the afternoon, you want that information hidden. Nothing is immoral about not wanting to give information that he doesn't have a right to, and he is in error for thinking that you should, and do, intend to convey that information. You present him with an opportunity for him to fool himself. Your words truly convey the thought in your mind, and don't convey more than the thought that you intend to convey.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5146545562841388692012-01-17T20:19:03.599-08:002012-01-17T20:19:03.599-08:00Brandon: When we look at the full picture, broad m...Brandon: <i>When we look at the full picture, broad mental reservations start looking very different from this, although some will be closer to lying than others. </i><br /><br />They all look about the same to me, though — anyone have some good examples? Misunderstandings aside (and language is always fuzzy in the sense that one can never guarantee perfect interpretation), either you say something that you believe the hearer will understand in the sense you mean, or not. I don't see how any mental reservation avoids being an attempt to mislead someone; maybe to a greater or lesser degree, but that only makes it a greater or lesser lie. <br /><br /><br />Tony: <i>You can deceive him with the truth artfully presented, so that his evil condition (holding an untruth) is his own doing.</i><br /><br />But technically, there is no such thing as "truth presented" — despite the bizarre modern attempt to view statements as true or false, statements represent ideas, and it is the ideas that are true [to reality] or not. And an idea presented artfully or otherwise is deceptive if you intend the hearer to interpret it as something false. That's why I can't see how reservations, false trails, military strategies, etc., are all not simply forms of lying. All communication communicates some idea or thought (unless it fails as communication altogether), and either the idea so received is deceptive or not. If the deception is intentional, then it's a lie. I don't see room for anything else.Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88866607890371307072012-01-16T09:06:21.061-08:002012-01-16T09:06:21.061-08:00Deacon Jim,
There are plenty of sins of thought,...Deacon Jim, <br /><br />There are plenty of sins of thought, including consenting to malice in your heart, even if you never express that thought in word or deed. <br /><br />In addition, there are plenty of sins of speech where the evil doesn't rest in whether your words conveyed the truth at all, but the fact that you chose to convey it. For example, if you hold a military secret, blurting it out at a conference with a neutral party might be a very wrong act: you had a responsibility to keep it secret. Likewise, a priest's revealing someone's confessed sins is a sin of speech, but not in the least because of a failure of coordination between what he signifies in words and what he holds in his mind. <br /><br />In general, there are times when our moral duty is silence, and to speak then is a sin. There are times when our moral duty is not silence, but silence is probably better for society and thus more prudent, like when the wife asks "does this dress make me look fat?" There are times when a deceptive truth is more prudent, like when you are asked by an unjust aggressor where his innocent victim is, or when an acquaintance asks "do you like me," and you can't stand him. To tell the truth in that case is not an offence against the NATURE of speech, it is an offense against other aspects of the common good than that. If you tell a deceptive truth intending to deceive someone who has an absolute right to the truth from you, your evil is in failing to <i>intend to</i> successfully communicate the truth, not in the failure to speak truly in whatever words you use. There are lots of different _kinds_ of failing in the social duties that surround truth than merely telling a falsehood.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-68768485433659152182012-01-15T10:41:43.372-08:002012-01-15T10:41:43.372-08:00So, if the natural end of speech is the "conv...So, if the natural end of speech is the "conveyance of thought," what can be said about conveying thoughts that are decidedly *not* good--when one speaks, quite truthfully, of his hatred for another person, for example (or forms of what we'd call "verbal abuse")? Is such use of speech within keeping of the "natural end" of speech, assuming it truthfully conveys one's thoughts?<br /><br />I'm curious about these aspects because it seems to me that the question rests more on the fundamental relationship between speech and truth, rather than speech and "thought."Deacon Jim Russellnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11480018932784518212012-01-15T10:01:14.076-08:002012-01-15T10:01:14.076-08:00I would say, rather, that the natural end of speec...I would say, rather, that the natural end of speech is conveying your thought. Words are signs of thoughts. <br /><br />What is the "natural end" of conveying your thought? Dunno off hand. The good in some sense, but it need not be more determinate than that, just "good". All sorts of goods can be the end of conveying your thought, both private goods and common goods, I don't know that it has a fixed, specific "natural end."Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39685556752151632212012-01-15T05:28:29.984-08:002012-01-15T05:28:29.984-08:00Tony--I'd be interested to know your thought r...Tony--I'd be interested to know your thought regarding this question: If the natural end of speech is "truth," is there a comparable natural-law expression regarding what the natural end of "truth" is?Deacon Jim Russellnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29723770467185355752012-01-14T16:28:48.187-08:002012-01-14T16:28:48.187-08:00Huh, I was thinking "plan B" type drugs,...Huh, I was thinking "plan B" type drugs, not spermicides. I have no knowledge of them. For the moment I will take your word for it that they don't present any danger to a conceived embryo. <br /><br />The act that must be moral for you to do is the act that YOU do, not the act that someone else does. If someone else does some act A whose innate purpose is X, but doing that act A was wrong, there is nothing inherently wrong for <i>you</i> to now block X result. You are not doing act A. You presumably would have blocked act A if you could have, and then the offender wouldn't have done that immoral act A. Since you are not the one doing act A, your blocking X result is not violating the innate norms of your own chosen act. <br /><br />That's moral problem of <i>your</i> interference with normative nature of a natural act of your own, an act defeating the natural meaning of your OWN act. It is the internal contradiction that is the problem. Since some other person isn't making your act that has that natural meaning, his attempt to defeat its purpose isn't an internal contradiction in him, it is an external one. <br /><br /><i>Likewise, with the use of speech or actions in the context of communication which is already "disorderd" because the communication involves an unjust aggressor who will use truth for evil,</i> <br /><br />No, your speech to the unjust aggressor is not internally disordered on account of something HE does (or, as you put it, something he WILL do, in the future): his act is external to your act. Your act is your own, and its morality is determined by the usual 3 criteria: the nature of the act itself, your purpose, and the circumstances. All 3 have to be rectified to have a good moral act. Whatever the circumstances are, they cannot make moral an act whose own nature is an internal disruption of the natural meaning of the faculty used. <br /><br />You can speak to the aggressor without disordered speech. You can tell him stories, you can sing him a song, you can convert him to Buddhism (well, assuming you believed Buddhism is true) all without disorder. What he does with your speech after you are done is up to him, it doesn't disorder YOUR act thereby. Nothing in his activity can corrupt your act, unless you formally cooperate with his intention, or unless you mediately materially cooperate without due cause. If you don't tell a lie, your not saying something cannot be cooperation with him at all, so his action does vitiate your (non)action. <br /><br />If, on the other hand, you tell him a lie, your act is vitiated all by itself even apart from his intention. Suppose, just for a moment, that this whole operation is a sting set up by some agency, they never had any intention of actually killing the person you are trying to protect. They don't actually INTEND to harm anyone. You, thinking they do and that you "have to" tell them something, tell a lie. Your act is disordered, and the disorder stands in the contradiction between using speech, a faculty made to convey the thought in your mind, to instead convey the opposite. This disorder exists even though they have no intent to harm anyone.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33458942987632788062012-01-14T12:57:30.838-08:002012-01-14T12:57:30.838-08:00Hi, Tony--you said: "....it is not really act...Hi, Tony--you said: "....it is not really acting to prevent conception, but to prevent the new person from developing. That isn't morally acceptable."<br /><br />It's morally acceptable to use *non-abortifacient* contraceptive measures post-rape--(e.g., spermicides)--during the typical window of time that elapses between coitus and conception. In such cases, it's definitely a contraceptive--not abortifacient--action. So, in this example, we have an unjust aggressor perverting the inherent meaning of sexual relations in such a way that one *can* employ an action--contraception--which is viewed as intrinsically evil when employed in marital relations.<br /><br />Thus there are examples of moral acts which are permissible in situations in which an unjust aggressor turns nature, truth, and the individual and common good "inside out" so to speak. <br /><br />With contraception, it becomes morally laudable to prevent a rapist from conceiving a child with his victim. Because the rapist so twists the meaning of the act as to make its natural end--conception--something that is *not* a good that must be embrace.<br /><br />Likewise, with the use of speech or actions in the context of communication which is already "disorderd" because the communication involves an unjust aggressor who will use truth for evil, it would seem that speaking falsehood, while contrary to the natural "end" of speeech (which is ordered to truth), would be just as morally permissible as is the use of contraception in post-rape situations.<br /><br />Its permissibility would rest in the fact that the communication is already "disordered" by the unjust aggressor who does *not* seek the common or individual good.Deacon Jim Russellnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77375822838445439062012-01-14T07:12:58.433-08:002012-01-14T07:12:58.433-08:00via post-rape contraception
I am not always up o...<i>via post-rape contraception</i> <br /><br />I am not always up on the medical jargon, but my understanding is that "post-rape contraception" so-called, at least in part acts by preventing the implantation of an already fertilized egg, so it is not really acting to prevent conception, but to prevent the new person from developing. That isn't morally acceptable.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33989544568952088412012-01-14T06:18:45.281-08:002012-01-14T06:18:45.281-08:00Tony et al.--
As soon as time permits I'll tr...Tony et al.--<br /><br />As soon as time permits I'll try to reply fully to your last note to me, but in the meantime, can you address this question:<br /><br />Why is it morally permissible to frustrate the primary natural purpose/end of sexual relations--conception--via post-rape contraception, but it's not morally permissible to frustrate the primary natural purpose/end of *speech*--truth-telling--as a defense against an unjust aggressor?Deacon Jim Russellnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-47613941297325621972012-01-13T14:55:30.268-08:002012-01-13T14:55:30.268-08:00What if you have to either tell the truth or lie w...<i>What if you have to either tell the truth or lie without resorting to mental reservation or equivocation? It seems wrong to suggest that we ought to tell the truth to a serial killer/rapist as where his next victim is located at. I concede that lying is a venial sin but if you tell the truth you will allow a far greater crime to take place; murder and rape. </i> <br /><br />D Duran, these are all false choice situations. How can "don't tell him anything" be taken off the table? It can't. <br /><br />But forget that for a minute: why is it that you are some kind of passive information bank here? This guy is serial killer, for crying out loud. GO AFTER HIM, DAMMIT. Kill him, if you must. Rip his arms off, break his kneecap, throw ink in his eyes, stick his hand down the toaster, carve his gizzards with the kitchen knife. I mean, jeepers, people, what kind of humans are you? <br /><br />OK, so he might kill you. And? What't the problem, your fellow innocent human being isn't worth your taking a risk or two? If he won't take silence, and you can't deceive him, and you can't convert him (did you try? How did you know you can't?), then take him on and see if God will give you the strength of lions. He might, you know.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-79447975813593996732012-01-13T14:47:00.051-08:002012-01-13T14:47:00.051-08:00Deacon Jim, you are asking questions from the wron...Deacon Jim, you are asking questions from the wrong end of the telescope. <br /><br /><i>Is it a good thing or a bad thing for an unjust aggressor to erroneously believe that there is actually *no* potential victim hiding in your basement when there really *is* a victim there?</i> <br /><br />It is a bad thing for the unjust agressor to believe as true what is untrue. Error IS a form of evil, it is the evil of being mentally out of step with reality. (When this evil is our own doing, it is also a form of self-imposed insanity, another level of evil.) In addition to being an evil for the aggressor to believe an untruth, it is an ADDITIONAL evil for the aggressor to will to do something immoral. These are 2 real evils. The first one is not a moral evil, the second one is, but they are both evils. <br /><br />If the unjust aggressor is going to use your information for evil, you don't have to give it to him. You can be silent, then you are not giving him information (or disinformation). You can deceive him with the truth artfully presented, so that his evil condition (holding an untruth) is his own doing. You can also convert him from the unjust aggression, and turn him away from evil. You can do this through persuasion, example, sacrifice, and so on. <br /><br />ALL of these are moral actions. The fact that he will do something evil with the truth doesn't mean you can do something evil to prevent that. This is a general moral principle, that applies to LOTS MORE cases than just lying: do not do evil that good may come of it. <br /><br />The malice of the lie isn't located <i>specifically</i> in the intent that the aggressor be deceived. It lies in willfully misusing speech to cause his error, willfully misappropriating the faculty for conveying what you hold in your own mind and using it instead for misrepresenting what you hold in your own mind. <br /><br />What you do or don't want the guy to do with the data is irrelevant to that.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53016535122909841312012-01-13T12:58:58.692-08:002012-01-13T12:58:58.692-08:00What if you have to either tell the truth or lie w...What if you have to either tell the truth or lie without resorting to mental reservation or equivocation? It seems wrong to suggest that we ought to tell the truth to a serial killer/rapist as where his next victim is located at. I concede that lying is a venial sin but if you tell the truth you will allow a far greater crime to take place; murder and rape. <br />It seems false that in this sort of situation you must tell the truth. Thoughts?William of Warehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02535587062481569067noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5451810298884751242012-01-11T01:51:57.173-08:002012-01-11T01:51:57.173-08:00Gyan - of course more than a few right-wing Cathol...Gyan - of course more than a few right-wing Catholics were quite fond of the Nazis<br /><br />www.nobeliefs.com/nazis.htm <br /><br />Plus in occupied France they enthusiastically rounded up the Jews who were thus transported to the death camps.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58844528887558137812012-01-11T00:00:00.707-08:002012-01-11T00:00:00.707-08:00Truth for Christians is not an impersonal thing bu...Truth for Christians is not an impersonal thing but a person, Jesus. <br /><br />So, we are truthful if we are being true to Jesus i.e. acting in love towards God and our neighbor. <br /><br />Our neighbor includes both the victim in the basement and the Nazi at the door. Equally we strive to save the victim's life and prevent the Nazi from becoming an actual murderer (though he already has murder in his heart). The question to which I don't know the answer is does that make a difference, actually committing murder?Gyanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09941686166886986037noreply@blogger.com