tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post1646091596585197994..comments2024-03-29T07:52:59.883-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Theology and the analytic a posterioriEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger212125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81017208366799236942020-06-28T23:48:19.155-07:002020-06-28T23:48:19.155-07:00https://edwardfesermarchfromthomism.blogspot.com/
...https://edwardfesermarchfromthomism.blogspot.com/<br /><br />Very topicalAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52554335744953519002020-06-25T10:32:44.072-07:002020-06-25T10:32:44.072-07:00@David McPike writes:
"So the one generated ...@David McPike writes:<br /><br /><i>"So the one generated isn't the being/essence; he merely shares it, correct?"<br /><br />No! Not correct. Obviously not correct!</i><br /><br />But you <a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2020/06/theology-and-analytic-posteriori.html?showComment=1592418084084#c5664462372104000903" rel="nofollow">said</a>:<br /><br /><i>...except that that generated essence is the divine essence, which is identical to the divine being, so that the one generated fully <b>shares</b> the being/essence of the one generating and is only differentiated relationally, through the truly, divinely eternal act of generation intrinsic to the divine life.</i><br /><br />But perhaps you meant "share" in a "different sense," but that different sense in a simple being can only have the exact referent, so that God "shares" with Himself.<br /><br />Moreover, they cannot be "differentiated" because the relation is <i>no different</i> than the essence itself. Thus, the "differentiation" is nominal as to the actual essence and "real" only in the sense that God is real and having a relation with Himself.Billhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08001130202947985336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6327314426822030362020-06-25T10:06:39.102-07:002020-06-25T10:06:39.102-07:00But you're still saying that God is having rel...But you're still saying that God is having relations with Himself. The "cause" is God and the "receiver" is God. The "relation" is God, and God is simple, undivided essence.<br /><br />When you say that the "relation" is real, it can only be real because God is real, for the relation is wholly and completely God. Ergo, God relates to Himself.<br /><br />It is only when trinitarians insist that there is a real difference in the essence that contradictions occur. As I've stated repeatedly, you are either arguing something indistinct from modalism or you are contradicting yourself.Billhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08001130202947985336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-56513565437626960612020-06-25T09:06:59.951-07:002020-06-25T09:06:59.951-07:00@Bill:
Perhaps it will help if you reflect on the...@Bill: <br />Perhaps it will help if you reflect on the principle that "whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver." So the Son of God does not receive according to the mode of a creature, but according to his own divine mode, according to the full measure of the divine essence which he fully-eternally-necessarily possesses.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-89326058359147651672020-06-25T08:52:34.885-07:002020-06-25T08:52:34.885-07:00@Bill (in response to your June 17, 2020 at 12:21 ...@Bill (in response to your June 17, 2020 at 12:21 PM):<br /><br />"So the one generated isn't the being/essence; he merely shares it, correct?"<br /><br />No! Not correct. Obviously not correct!<br /><br />"But the Son receives it [the divine essence] through a process of eternal generation. It's not as if he was generated and He now exists a se. His being is continually being generated, thus His existence is dependent on this eternal begetting else He would not exist."<br /><br />Right; and yet he too is <i>a se</i> because his eternal generation follows from the intrinsic nature of the divine aseity. Tricky, right? Hard to wrap you head around, right? But not a logical contradiction.<br /><br />But wait, you still want to say:<br />"This 'intrinsic causality' is not the Son's precisely because He is eternally receiving it from the Father."<br /><br />But you're wrong! This intrinsic causality IS the Son's, precisely because He IS eternally receiving it from the Father!David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-41046965743831522020-06-25T08:43:50.773-07:002020-06-25T08:43:50.773-07:00@Bill:
"So the one generated isn't the b...@Bill:<br /><br />"So the one generated isn't the being/essence; he merely shares it, correct?"<br /><br />No! Not correct. Obviously not correct!<br /><br />"But the Son receives it [the divine essence] through a process of eternal generation. It's not as if he was generated and He now exists a se. His being is continually being generated, thus His existence is dependent on this eternal begetting else He would not exist."<br /><br />Right; and yet he too is a se because his eternal generation follows from the intrinsic nature of the divine aseity. Tricky, right? Hard to wrap you head around, right? But not a logical contradiction.<br /><br />But wait, you still want to say:<br />"This 'intrinsic causality' is not the Son's precisely because He is eternally receiving it from the Father."<br /><br />But you're wrong! This intrinsic causality IS the Son's, precisely because He is eternally receiving it from the Father!David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46336982488039814052020-06-24T20:36:17.498-07:002020-06-24T20:36:17.498-07:00@Bill
Don't worry, my problem is more with Aq...@Bill<br /><br />Don't worry, my problem is more with Aquinas absolue DS, i believe it can be saved on a weaker version. I agree that a complete denial of it is failure to understand that God is not the most powerful and smart creature, but way, WAY more.Talmidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04267925670235640337noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-41165483350539897422020-06-23T21:48:12.111-07:002020-06-23T21:48:12.111-07:00Thanks, Talmid. A couple of posters claim that I h...Thanks, Talmid. A couple of posters claim that I have been answered, but I honestly don't see how their replies avoid the contradictions I've highlighted. The logical extension of their terminology either amounts to nothing other than God relating to Himself, or it asserts direct contradictions.<br /><br />Anyway, I encourage you not to give up on divine simplicity. Anything less than that renders us bereft of a metaphysical ultimate. I wholeheartedly agree with Feser that a denial of simplicity is atheism.Billnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-47047560724208138602020-06-23T19:26:17.477-07:002020-06-23T19:26:17.477-07:00@Bill
(Can't post on the same place, i dunno w...@Bill<br />(Can't post on the same place, i dunno why)<br /><br />Thanks for a more elaborate defense of your problem with Trinitarianism, i don't think i know a good way to answer it, don't remember if someone here did it. The appeal to mystery maybe can be used, but i agree that it can't work with a literal contradiction, so someone would need to disarm your argument first.<br /><br />As i said, i'am not that much bothered because i have some issues with Aquinas view of Divine Simplicity, so i need to look up if it is the better view or not, but your point seems pretty clear to me. <br /><br />If someone thinks there is a problem with Bill argument, he is all yours.Talmidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04267925670235640337noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19235146218944263312020-06-22T20:06:29.292-07:002020-06-22T20:06:29.292-07:00It should also be again stressed that the differen...It should also be again stressed that the different "sense" the DT defenders refer to is not a logical one. God is mercy in one sense and wrath in another sense, but there is no real distinction in God; it is only from our perspective. For trinitarians, the relations are real, and that sets them apart from God's attributes. But this explanation doesn't appear to work for a simple being in which there can only be a single referent, no matter how many terms and senses our minds can come up with. We can say that Venus (V) = the Morning Star (MS), and that V = the Evening Star (ES). Both MS & ES have the same referent, thus MS = ES. We can, however, come up with a real difference of relation in that MS refers to one spatiotemporal part of Venus whereas ES refers to another spatiotemporal part due to her different orbits (meaning that Ms ≠ ES). Thus, the multiplicity of real senses is defensible because Venus is a composite entity. However, God is absolutely simple, so a similar sense distinction for the relations does not work.<br /><br />When Aquinas tells us that the relations are wholly identical with, do not differ from, and are one and the same with the divine essence, such that any distinction between them and the essence exists only in our minds, the "really" different sense defense appears to collapse. Considering the simple essence of God, it is impossible that PC = PD.<br /><br />The divine essence is one and indivisible. A relation is wholly identical with the divine essence (thus, R = E). The Father is a relation (F = R), the Son is a relation (S = R), and the Holy Spirit is a relation (HS = R). Thus F = E, S = E and HS = E (and transitive identity then tells us that F = S = HS). Aquinas states, "as the three persons agree in the unity of essence, we must seek to know the principle of distinction whereby they are several.” In other words, the F, S & HS are not different as to their essence. They each are the whole, undivided essence. We might informally say that “the Father shares the divine essence with the Son,” but once we’re into being precise we have to remember that the Father is the divine essence and the Son is the divine essence as regards substance; they don’t “share” anything, they “are” each the divine substance as substance. E is what every R has in common and R = E. Since E is simple and indivisible, there is no real distinction in E (else E is composite). If E is common to F, S & HS, then E ≠ PD. And if E ≠ PD, then R ≠ E. But if R = E, then PC = PD which is a straight contradiction.<br /><br />Since there is no contradiction in God, there can be no real distinction in His essence. Since R = E and God (G) = E, the statement that the F, S & HS are having real relations with each other is logically indistinct from saying that the Essence relates to Essence (G relates to E). And since God is simply having relations with Himself, nothing unique to the DT is added.Billhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08001130202947985336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-66377021565860422652020-06-22T20:03:40.786-07:002020-06-22T20:03:40.786-07:00@Talmid, you write:
My worry is that our concepts...@Talmid, you write:<br /><br /><i>My worry is that our concepts of unity, relations, composition etc are taken from the material world, who can't even dream of holding a candle to God, so our language when we talk about The Lord turns into a bunch of analogies that are actually easier to follow apophaticism, so our language of analogy can trick us if we get distracted.</i><br /><br />We're not groping in the dark, however. As Romans 1:20 tells us, we can clearly see the essence of God by the things that are made. As you note, though, we cannot allow ourselves to get distracted. As Gilles Emery writes:<br /><br /><i>St. Thomas is looking at the fact of distinction by means of relation alone, making it play a role analogous to that of a ‘principle of individuation’. In physical beings, the principle of individuation is the material which renders an individual, in relation to the species whose nature the individual has. All of them have, of course, the nature appropriate to the human species, but this humanity is, as it were, ‘multiplied’ in each one of them. It works out differently in the Triune God. The divine essence is numerically one: the essence is absolutely one and the same identical reality in the three divine persons. What makes the persons of the Trinity plural is not the common essence but relation as a personal property, a ‘quasi principle of individuation'.</i><br /><br />Clearly, then, as others have argued here, this "principle of individuation" is the relation, and Emery makes it equally clear that the plurality is not the essence which of course corresponds with PC ≠ PD. And if the plurality is not the common essence (E), and if the plurality is the relation, then it follows that the relation cannot be the common essence. This is all very straightforward. However, since Aquinas and others here have made it clear that the relations (R) are indeed the divine essence (no different, wholly identical, one and the same, etc.) we have a direct logical contradiction: R = ~R. The DT defenders here acknowledge the "apparent" contradiction, but they argue that the PC = PD in one sense and not in another. It is thus the different senses of the essence that enables one to defend the DT without contradiction.<br /><br />continued...Billhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08001130202947985336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91917231155980393412020-06-19T19:44:50.576-07:002020-06-19T19:44:50.576-07:00@Bill
I say thanks to you because you read, a wri...@Bill<br /><br />I say thanks to you because you read, a writed a lot, hehe.<br /><br />I think i get your point about trinitarism requiring a real distinction on the essence, i just think that we don't know enough to say that God can't have any kind of distinction at all, neither we do know exactly what trinitarism means. <br /><br />Even with this epistemological problem, your objection to thomistic trinitarism is very interesting, i had heard it before but never thought about it much. I'am not THAT bothered by it because the Modal Collapse Objection to absolute Divine Simplicity is making me look up the possibility of a weaker DS, but it is a pretty good objection.<br /><br />Also, how do you see the Incarnation? That one i just can't see a way to work that is not either nonsense or heretical, similar to the relation between the divine persons to me, but who knows.Talmidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04267925670235640337noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23981329721579304312020-06-19T06:57:53.877-07:002020-06-19T06:57:53.877-07:00Guys, please don't feed the StardustyPsyche tr...Guys, please don't feed the StardustyPsyche troll.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83503583472385111692020-06-19T04:52:56.566-07:002020-06-19T04:52:56.566-07:00Talmid,
"...God(as thomism understand) is imp...Talmid,<br />"...God(as thomism understand) is impossible because the idea of a omnipotent mind(or even any mind) that is absolutely simple is a incoherent idea. As a thomistic theist, you agree with me that this is not true and only works if you read "mind" or "simplicity" as what these worlds means when they describe things on this material world."<br /><br />Yet the OP states<br />" But we know this only because we’ve reasoned from the existence of the things of our experience to an ultimate cause having this essence."<br /><br />So which is it? God cannot be reasoned from sense experience or god can be reasoned from sense experience?<br /><br />Thomism only concludes that by reasoning from sense experience there must be a real existence of some sort that is impossible for us to understand. Thus, Thomism solves nothing.<br /><br />We start out realizing that the nobody understands the ultimate explanation for all that exists in our sense experience, then we apply Thomism, only to arrive at the conclusion that nobody understands the ultimate explanation for all that exists.<br /><br />Why do Thomists seem to think they have solved a problem when all they have done is stated that the "solution" to the unknown is unknowable?<br />StardustyPsychehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12493629973262220492noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-2070631041022098362020-06-18T22:58:14.223-07:002020-06-18T22:58:14.223-07:00@Talmid
Thanks for your post. You raise interesti...@Talmid<br /><br />Thanks for your post. You raise interesting points, and I agree that God's existence is such that finite terms can never adequately describe.<br /><br />That said, I believe I mentioned previously that whatever terms we use cannot be contradictory if for no other reason that we'd be uttering gibberish if we do.<br /><br />The crux of the matter for me is the implication that there is a real difference in God's essence. Metaphysical or physical, a real difference in the essence is composition which is the very thing that Thomist trinitarians adamantly deny. Well, deny it or not, that's what it is.<br /><br />They cleverly argue that the persons' identity as God is one and the same; it is the relation that's different. But Aquinas clearly states that the relation IS the essence, so how does that help matters? As I've stated multiple times now, either God is relating to Himself or there is a zone unique to each person. If the former, you have modalism or Arianism; if the latter, you have a straight contradiction.<br /><br />For me, modalism is clearly superior because it affirms strict monotheism and the full deity of Jesus without any contradiction. It at least has the luxury of being free from the logical impossibilities of three really different persons who are not really different.Billhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08001130202947985336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-79177950994743215182020-06-18T20:21:58.420-07:002020-06-18T20:21:58.420-07:00@Bill
So, what do you believe is the diference be...@Bill<br /><br />So, what do you believe is the diference between this view and the trinitarian one Aquinas used? When you say that God is one what you actually says is "God is non-composite", and Aquinas agree on that. <br /><br />My worry is that our concepts of unity, relations, composition etc are taken from the material world, who can't even dream of holding a candle to God, so our language when we talk about The Lord turns into a bunch of analogies that are actually easier to follow apophaticism, so our language of analogy can trick us if we get distracted.<br /><br />To give you a example, a poster here tried to argue several times that God(as thomism understand) is impossible because the idea of a omnipotent mind(or even any mind) that is absolutely simple is a incoherent idea. As a thomistic theist, you agree with me that this is not true and only works if you read "mind" or "simplicity" as what these worlds means when they describe things on this material world. But can't we do the same mistake when talking about the Trinity? Maybe it looks like there is a contradiction because our language is not apophatic enough and we think we do know how God is.<br /><br />This looks like a excuse, i know, but i think the problem is that both sabelianists and trinitarians don't know what the idea of the Trinity actually means, so this debate won't get anywhere. This is diferent that, say, when a vedantist say both that:<br /> <br />1. Everything is Brahman <br /><br />and<br /><br />2. Brahman has no atributes<br /><br />These entail<br /><br />3. Nothing has atributes<br /><br />This conclusion do talks about what we actually know(creation), so we don't have the same dificult and can just point out that this don't make any sense.<br /><br />In the end, i believe we should just believe in what is revealed to us, even if we can't actually understand what is revealed, and never try to "prove" the Trinity by arguments. I mean, do you actually understand what the Incarnation means? I don't, but i believe that Jesus is divine because He said that and proved He had the authority.Talmidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04267925670235640337noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-63549189523642704042020-06-18T05:49:15.812-07:002020-06-18T05:49:15.812-07:00David McPike,
It's not unusual around around ...David McPike,<br /><br />It's not unusual around around here for some to offer a thought like "I think not", and then repeat about 80% of what I said.<br /><br />That said, it's also my experience that "obvious" is usually the end of reason in a discussion, to thank you for the interchange.One Browhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11938816242512563561noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7628147035921979352020-06-18T04:09:31.753-07:002020-06-18T04:09:31.753-07:00Folks, please don't feed the StardustyPsyche t...Folks, please don't feed the StardustyPsyche troll.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07522871857374444517noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-20638800889462482352020-06-17T21:43:21.463-07:002020-06-17T21:43:21.463-07:00@Feser: A synthetic proposition is true by virtue ...@Feser: <i>A synthetic proposition is true by virtue of something beyond the relations between its constituent concepts.</i><br /><br />This is not quite right. It would be better to say that a synthetic proposition is true by virtue of something <i>other than a relation <b>of containment</b> between its constituent concepts.</i><br /><br />The point is that, for Kant, a synthetic proposition <i>does</i> assert a relation between constituent concepts. It's just that that relation isn't the relation <i>of containment</i>. Instead, the relation is a different one. Explaining this relation is what Kant considers to be <i>the</i> general problem of transcendental philosophy.<br /><br />For example, as you point out, Kant considers 2 + 2 = 4 to be synthetic. But Kant wouldn't deny that this is a relation between the concepts of "2+2" and "4". In particular, if you read "2+2" as a sequence of operations to execute in intuition (such as by visualizing two dots placed adjacent to two other dots), then the result will necessarily fall under the concept "4" (there will be 4 dots). In this way, the concept of "2+2" is connected inseparably to the concept "4". So there <i>is</i> a relation between the concepts.<br /><br />What there <i>isn't</i> is a relation of <i>containment</i>. The concept "4" appears nowhere in the concept "2+2". The detour through intuition is necessary to see the relationship between "2+2" and "4". You have to visualize the dots or otherwise invoke the faculty of intuition, perhaps by counting on fingers or by manipulating formal symbols according to certain rules.<br /><br />Nonetheless, "2 + 2 = 4" is true just in virtue of the meanings of these concepts, as descriptions of possible experience.Tyrrell McAllisterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03742116091097551615noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-70591428530436367532020-06-17T21:13:34.131-07:002020-06-17T21:13:34.131-07:00@Talmid
Hello again! I explained a bit of how a m...@Talmid<br /><br />Hello again! I explained a bit of how a modalist views relation elsewhere in this thread. Here's a snippet:<br /><br /><i>I’ve not argued that logical or notional distinctions are unreal. God’s mercy, judgment, love, etc., are REAL. From one perspective, God is love, from another, He is judgment, but all of His attributes are one in Him. He is not one part love, one part mercy, one part judgment, etc.; He just simply IS. So God’s judgment demanded the destruction of Sodom and its inhabitants, but His mercy also acted to save Lot and his family. God’s judgment and mercy “worked together” to save Lot, but there is not one person of judgment and another person of mercy.</i><br /><br />So, in the example I provided, judgment and mercy had what we would say is analogous to a relationship. The wrathful aspect of God "determined" to destroy Sodom, but God's mercy "stepped in" and said, "Let me save Lot." Since God is simple, this scenario didn't play out like I described. It is simply how it "works" from our perspective.<br /><br />Aquinas makes it clear that a relation IS the divine essence, and since the essence is not and cannot be divided, the distinction is only in "our mode of intelligibility" or as it is sensible to man. It is all one in God.Billhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08001130202947985336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5201407332994370282020-06-17T19:51:46.646-07:002020-06-17T19:51:46.646-07:00Hi (blank), thanks for stopping by.
Can you expla...Hi (blank), thanks for stopping by.<br /><br />Can you explain how the term "pure form" is in any sense coherent?<br /><br />Or at least, can you employ a logical, rational argument to refute my argument on the merits?<br /><br />I mean, it should be pretty simple, after all, I provided a very specific argument as to why "pure form" is incoherent.<br /><br />It should be pretty simple for you to point out specifically on the logical rational merits where exactly my argument is mistaken, shouldn't it?StardustyPsychehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12493629973262220492noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14206415845748012212020-06-17T19:28:54.551-07:002020-06-17T19:28:54.551-07:00If we have a relation, don't we them have a so...<br /><br />If we have a relation, don't we them have a sort of oposition on the essence? Don't this means we do have some diference between "parts"(not metaphysical parts, of course) that could them be Father, Son and Holy Spirit? I do not mean that this shows there are three Gods, of course.<br /><br />The trinitarian is not saying that there are three totally diferent selfs or a Cerberus on the Godhead like, say, William Lane Craig believes, he is saying that there is some sort of relation on God(not that they are diferent) that separates the three persons in a way that is not a numerical one(because them we would have three Gods) neither a mere logical one(because the opositions actually are the essence). What does this means? Dunno, but the modalist also believes that he can't actually explain God nature, so...<br /><br />I mean, what do we mean by "God is relating to Himself" and how exactly this is diferent from the trinitarian belief? If we can't define the two beliefs in a way that shows exactly how they contradict each other, this discussion won't end.<br /><br /><br />Talmidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04267925670235640337noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-82246606104689201902020-06-17T18:55:32.856-07:002020-06-17T18:55:32.856-07:00Guys, please don't feed the StardustyPsyche tr...Guys, please don't feed the StardustyPsyche troll.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3588227199209757482020-06-17T18:36:32.899-07:002020-06-17T18:36:32.899-07:00David McPike,
"Pure Form"
...is an incoh...David McPike,<br />"Pure Form"<br />...is an incoherent term.<br /><br />What is the form in "pure form of? Absolutely nothing at all? Then in that case "pure form" is incoherent because nothing cannot be coherently said to have any form at all.<br /><br />If the form in "pure form" is of something, then "pure form" is incoherent because then the form is not pure, rather, of that something.StardustyPsychehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12493629973262220492noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-59225432676908660582020-06-17T12:21:50.645-07:002020-06-17T12:21:50.645-07:00@David McPike
Right: "same thing" in on...@David McPike<br /><br /><i>Right: "same thing" in one respect; "something else" in another respect.</i><br /><br />And this "same thing" and "something else" is the simple, undivided essence of God.<br /><br /><i>God the Father has a relationship with Himself; he knows and loves himself as God and as principle of generation within the Godhead.</i><br /><br />But since "God the Father" is the simple, undivided essence of God, the "principle of generation" applies to the entire Godhead.<br /><br /><i>This entails that He likewise has a relationship with the Son, as God like unto himself and as His only begotten Son.</i><br /><br />But since "God the Son" is the simple, undivided essence of God, and since, per Aquinas, the relation is the simple, undivided essence of God, then God is still having the relationship with Himself.<br /><br /><i>Why is Sabellius clapping?</i><br /><br />Because modalists and Arians won't object to the fact that the undivided essence of God knows Himself and loves Himself and relates to Himself. All your verbiage serves to accomplish is not that there is a real difference in the essence of God; it merely shows on Aquinas's terms the single personhood of God.<br /><br /><i>If you like [God generating another God]; except that that generated essence is the divine essence, which is identical to the divine being, so that the one generated fully shares the being/essence of the one generating and is only differentiated relationally, through the truly, divinely eternal act of generation intrinsic to the divine life.</i><br /><br />So the one generated isn't the being/essence; he merely shares it, correct? And since this sharing is occurring as an "intrinsic" act, then there is an aspect of the essence unique to the person, for the person is either the whole undivided essence or He is a part. If the former, then again the essence is relating to itself. If the latter, you have composition. You appear to reject both in favor of intrinsic Xeroxing, that within God there can be the generation of another God, but this "another" cannot <i>really</i> be another else there is clear composition in the Godhead. So, as Aquinas notes, the difference is only in their mode of intelligibility because they are all one in the simple, undivided essence of God. Pass the popcorn.<br /><br /><i>The Son receives and has sufficient causality to explain both what he is and that he is, because he receives the fullness of the very being/essence of the Father. He thus exists necessarily, like the Father, and not in dependence on the free will of the Father (which he naturally fully shares with the Father).</i><br /><br />But the Son receives it through a process of eternal generation. It's not as if he was generated and He now exists <i>a se</i>. His being is continually being generated, thus His existence is dependent on this eternal begetting else He would not exist.<br /><br /><i>But the Son has that intrinsic causality because he has it from another; and remember that he (necessarily! - but by a necessity known to us a posteriori, on the basis of revelation) has it necessarily, not contingently as in the case of creatures.</i><br /><br />This "intrinsic causality" is not the Son's precisely because He is eternally receiving it from the Father. If he had that causality, He would not need the Father's begetting. The Father doesn't need begetting nor does He receive His personhood from another. That can only mean that there is something in the essence of the Father that is not in the essence of the Son, which equivocates on what it is to be God or it affirms composition.<br /><br /><i>(Is Sabellius still clapping? What's he listening to?)</i><br /><br />Yep. He's listening to you. Standing-O.Billhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08001130202947985336noreply@blogger.com