tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post1461778744180104602..comments2024-03-28T03:20:15.940-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Aristotle and contemporary scienceEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger111125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44227208440786134442017-12-13T22:49:39.667-08:002017-12-13T22:49:39.667-08:00I don't sock puppet, and I'm mostly in agr...I don't sock puppet, and I'm mostly in agreement with Ed on these things. Why on Earth would you take me for this man?iwpoehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17751879308012191778noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40647875950254614042017-11-20T22:13:14.498-08:002017-11-20T22:13:14.498-08:00The water in the coffee is a substance that persis...<i>The water in the coffee is a substance that persists in being over time. It has the accidental form of being hot at one moment in time but it is said that it lacks the capacity to possess the accidental form of being cool (i.e. it lacks the potency for coolness). But, at a later moment in time the same water in the coffee is in fact declared to be cool. This last sentence would be the incoherent part. </i><br /><br />That isn't incoherent because hotness or coolness are possessed at different times , the hot <i>part</i> for example isn't <i>itself</i> later declared to become cool instead it is said that coffee possesses a hot part earlier and a cool part later. think of a piece of metal for example it can be hot at one end and cold at the other. <br /><br /><i>Also, the water in the coffee being hot and the water in the coffee being cold are both actual in the Aristotelian account; both are examples of being-in-act. However, the kind of being-in-act involved is not identical.</i><br /><br />of course something being hot or cold are example of being actually something but the issue here is about whether there is something potential. Redhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05569340378356607760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51661913890401173802017-11-20T22:13:06.374-08:002017-11-20T22:13:06.374-08:00I don’t know if it is unnecessarily complicated bu...<i>I don’t know if it is unnecessarily complicated but if we are discussing act/potency in A-T terms we will need to use A-T terminology. </i><br /><br />I don't think I was straying away from how A-Tists would like to formulate the terms its only that I think my formulation is much more helpful , like in Feser's books act/potency is introduced and explained before any into to form/matter etc. <br /><br /><i>Earlier you presented a definition of what being-in-potency means: <br /><br />Here first consider what being-in-potency means for some object , It means having the ability to bring about some non-actual state of affairs ... but given B-theory no non-actual state of affairs are ever brought about. <br /><br />I replied with what I took to be an Aristotelian definition of what being-in-potency is. Clarifying, something like this:<br /><br />That which gives some persisting matter the capacity to take on some particular range of forms. (Or, if it is compatible with B theory maybe '...to be taking on...')<br /><br />And to clarify, an Aristotelian definition of what being-in-act is:<br />When some matter that has the capacity to take on a particular form possesses this form.</i><br /><br />I don't know if you'll agree but it seems putting things like this gets them wrong way.To know what form the matter of rubber ball has possessed or <i>can</i> posses we need to know how it actually is or potentially is in the first place. That is why I am suggesting that its better we stick to other examples. Form/Matter is dependent here on act/potency not the other way around, unless form is brought to do some other work, which won't be related to this. <br /><br /><i>In the light of the Aristotelian ideas of what act and potency are the idea of a non-actual state of affairs is impossible because it would just be nothing or non-being and therefore not a state of affairs. Any state of affairs would have to be either pure actuality or involve substances that are form and matter composites and therefore types of being-in-act. </i><br /><br />Well its not said, non-<i>existent</i> state of affairs. so that won't mean non-being or nothing. <br /><br /><i>I don’t think being-in-potency can be considered as having any kind of ability to do things or bring things about either, it’s more a capacity to receive or possess things. </i><br /><br />But that isn't really in <i>tension</i> with or reveals something important about the other formulation. <i>possession</i> of something is itself a state which if potential would be brought about. <br /><br /><i>It doesn’t seem that clear to me how closely the A-T kind of definitions of act and potency which I gave above coincide with the meaning of the terms actual and actuality in the concise description of A and B theory you give.</i><br /><br />Perhaps thats because of the confusions created by putting form/matter before act/potency , other wise it doesn't seem that problematic . <br /><br /><i> Maybe on A-theory presentism only the being-in-act of the present moment can be said to exist? But I’m not sure how that would affect the being-in-potency or the capacity of matter to possess certain forms. </i><br /><br />Because on Presentism only presently existing things can be said to be actual, we can easily talk about whats actually the case and whats potentially the case, but nothing of the sort can be done on B-theory/Eternalism because <i>actuality</i> ranges over all the history. <br /><br />Redhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05569340378356607760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57521512650448849722017-11-20T03:27:04.981-08:002017-11-20T03:27:04.981-08:00anon , I would respond to you later.anon , I would respond to you later.Redhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05569340378356607760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-22041165421453795552017-11-20T03:25:31.844-08:002017-11-20T03:25:31.844-08:00Most temporal parts theorists follow Lewis and rej...<i>Most temporal parts theorists follow Lewis and reject metaphysical parts because they endorse temporal parts. Armstrong regards himself as something of an Aristotelian in this respect and is not indicative of the standard approach. So if you are going to say that you can believe in immanent universals on four-dimensionalism, then you will have to show how you can take an Aristotelian basis for immanent universals and use it without any reference to real change plus act/potency on four-dimensionalism.</i><br /><br />Why would it even require reference to real change plus act/potency on four-dimensionalism.? And again nothing of that sort shows any relevance to issue once again.<br /><br /><i>And my account is relevant because it shows how real change occurs intrinsically by forms gaining and losing properties over time.</i><br /><br />Shown what and where? And you've been already explained that talk of gaining or losing properties it meaningless on B-theory. <br /><br /><i>Just because something is actual at one time doesn’t mean that has no potentialities that will actualized at a subsequent time. The coffee is actually cold, but it is still the case that at that second it has a potential to be hot in the next second. Similarly, when the coffee is hot at one second it is also the case that it has the potential to be cold in the next second.</i><br /><br />But its not just actual at just one time , its actual at both , the coffee's coldness and hotness are both actual. how then is there room for its being potentialy something?<br /><br /><i>And why is it cold and then hot? None of your proposed explanations will work. Universalism boils down to simply observing that something that we just happen to call cold coffee and something that we call hot coffee are different. Brute facts are a non-explanation. There are no substances on temporal parts theories so you can’t have forms. You have given no account of causal relations and the way that you phrase your answer denies them. If there is nothing that connects the cold coffee and the hot coffee, you can’t even say that they are the same thing and that something has even changed.</i><br /><br />This passage is a complete red-herring , we're not even talking about four-dimensionalism here , we're just discussing B-theory , Neither are your assertions here any better You've been already explained about mind-dependence or brute facts or your claim about no-substances, its not like you engaged with any of them other then stomping your foot claiming same things again. most of this is utterly irrelevant to the passage you quote above. and indeed its a great indication that you can't have A-T stuff on B-theory. Its not like once you accept endurantism the cold coffee can be said to <i>turn into</i> anything. <br /><br />This is the main thing you're failing to grasp every time , consider the following claims,<br /><br />1.A-T change is incompatible with B-theory.<br />2.Feser's argument against B-theory is unsatisfactory.<br />3.Temporal Part theories are incoherent( there is no change, nothing persists etc) <br />4. A-T change is only incompatible with 4D ( it is compatible with 3D/B-theory) <br /><br />Among these the 2nd one is mine, which I neither intended to defend before reading the paper nor any user here discussed with me. the 4th one is yours and it is independent of others and requires defense independently. From this it should become clear why your tu quoque strategy that you're not convinced by 4D isn't interesting. I already told you if you think it requires a lot of time then that is fine , you can defend it some other time. <br /><br />Next time plz consider dealing with passages which deals with 3D change. as writing a lot in response is difficult and there are other users to respond too. <br />Redhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05569340378356607760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74567069161286997992017-11-20T03:25:05.374-08:002017-11-20T03:25:05.374-08:00Look, either you have read Earman or you haven’t. ...<i>Look, either you have read Earman or you haven’t. If you have, you know what temporal passage means in this debate. If you haven’t, then why did you bother to quote him? I’ve already told you what time on B-theory consists of- an objective succession of events that acts as a mind independent measure of change. Most B-theorists don’t believe that time is a mind-independent measure of anything. And time doesn’t get you the act/potency distinction, it lets you measure change, which in turn is what gets you the act/potency distinction.</i><br /><br />Thats the problem , simply a succession isn't capable of vindicating act/potency because no event in that succession is ever brought into actuality, they are all always actual on B-theory. <br /><br /><i>I don’t claim it, it’s exactly how Feser’s argument is laid out. And he explicitly says that he believes B-theory denies temporal passage, so it’s not a legitimate option for him.</i><br /><br />by <i>your claim</i> I mean both aspects of above passage you quote. the second aspect of above passage is your claim not part of his thesis.<br /><br /><i>I didn’t even do that. I made specific arguments against four-dimensionalism and why it can’t account for change. And if you didn’t come here to defend a claim against that Feser and four-dimensionalism, then why did you make the claim to begin with and especially when you hadn’t even read the chapter?</i><br /><br />You did when I answered your claims against four-dimensionalism , it was you remember who discontinued the discussion of persistence . <br /><br /><i>You think that there are at most two Thomists in the world that are B-theorists? Even if you limit this to professionals, this is flat out-false.</i><br /><br />Perhaps you can point some out? which not merely hold some view but have actually solved current problems? <br /><br /><i>So because I make so called bigger claims I have to defend five different subjects at once, but because you make a smaller claim you don’t even have to defend one subject? Again, this isn’t fair at all.</i><br /><br />No, I didn't make any claims about 4D at all, I only remarked about Feser's criticism of change on B-theory which would apply whether 4D or 3D is true.. so yea you made much bigger claim requiring much healthier level of defense. <br />Redhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05569340378356607760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-85897546256614748212017-11-19T16:03:32.031-08:002017-11-19T16:03:32.031-08:00Hi Red,
That just needlessly complicates the iss...Hi Red,<br /><br /><i> That just needlessly complicates the issue , taking on certain itself is a state of affairs , every thing said above still applies, so its better to stick with simpler instances of change. </i><br /><br />I don’t know if it is unnecessarily complicated but if we are discussing act/potency in A-T terms we will need to use A-T terminology. Earlier you presented a definition of what being-in-potency means: <br /><br /><i> Here first consider what being-in-potency means for some object , It means having the ability to bring about some non-actual state of affairs ... but given B-theory no non-actual state of affairs are ever brought about. </i><br /><br />I replied with what I took to be an Aristotelian definition of what being-in-potency is. Clarifying, something like this:<br /><br />That which gives some persisting matter the capacity to take on some particular range of forms. (Or, if it is compatible with B theory maybe '...to be taking on...')<br /><br />And to clarify, an Aristotelian definition of what being-in-act is:<br />When some matter that has the capacity to take on a particular form possesses this form.<br /><br />In the light of the Aristotelian ideas of what act and potency are the idea of a non-actual state of affairs is impossible because it would just be nothing or non-being and therefore not a state of affairs. Any state of affairs would have to be either pure actuality or involve substances that are form and matter composites and therefore types of being-in-act. <br /><br />I don’t think being-in-potency can be considered as having any kind of ability to do things or bring things about either, it’s more a capacity to receive or possess things. <br /><br />These were the kind of considerations which led me to write that I found it hard to ‘translate’ what you meant into the context of A-T ideas about act and potency. <br /><br /><i> From the above perhaps it will become easier to see which theory permits act/potency which which one doesn't . </i><br /><br />It doesn’t seem that clear to me how closely the A-T kind of definitions of act and potency which I gave above coincide with the meaning of the terms actual and actuality in the concise description of A and B theory you give. Maybe on A-theory presentism only the being-in-act of the present moment can be said to exist? But I’m not sure how that would affect the being-in-potency or the capacity of matter to possess certain forms. <br /><br /><i> The Hot cup can't be said to have potency to become cooler because the time at which it becomes cooler is as actual on B-theory as the present. </i><br /><br />The water in the coffee is a substance that persists in being over time. It has the accidental form of being hot at one moment in time but it is said that it lacks the capacity to possess the accidental form of being cool (i.e. it lacks the potency for coolness). But, at a later moment in time the same water in the coffee is in fact declared to be cool. This last sentence would be the incoherent part. <br /><br />Also, the water in the coffee being hot and the water in the coffee being cold are both actual in the Aristotelian account; both are examples of being-in-act. However, the kind of being-in-act involved is not identical. <br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69065449289000933742017-11-19T14:38:06.444-08:002017-11-19T14:38:06.444-08:00But this neither seems relevant to issue of change...<i> But this neither seems relevant to issue of change at hand or entirely correct. Suppose a temporal part theorists believe in Immanent Universals then you've got metaphysical parts on 4D. and again it isn't clear how this leads to act/potency distinction, it also depends on what work the notion of from is doing here, if that is supposed to follow upon act/potency then again that is needed to be defended with b-theory first , which you haven't.?</i><br /><br />Most temporal parts theorists follow Lewis and reject metaphysical parts because they endorse temporal parts. Armstrong regards himself as something of an Aristotelian in this respect and is not indicative of the standard approach. So if you are going to say that you can believe in immanent universals on four-dimensionalism, then you will have to show how you can take an Aristotelian basis for immanent universals and use it without any reference to real change plus act/potency on four-dimensionalism. And my account is relevant because it shows how real change occurs intrinsically by forms gaining and losing properties over time.<br /><br /><i>But if both are occurring at different times , and both of them are actual , what sense does it make to call one of them actually occurring and the other potentially occurring ? There is simply no room for such a distinction here</i><br /><br />Just because something is actual at one time doesn’t mean that has no potentialities that will actualized at a subsequent time. The coffee is actually cold, but it is still the case that at that second it has a potential to be hot in the next second. Similarly, when the coffee is hot at one second it is also the case that it has the potential to be cold in the next second.<br /><br /><i>This doesn't even make sense , the cold coffee doesn't turn into anything , its like its cold here and hot there. similarly if by move you simply meant that one state is actual and the other is potential then that doesn't happen.</i><br /><br />And why is it cold and then hot? None of your proposed explanations will work. Universalism boils down to simply observing that something that we just happen to call cold coffee and something that we call hot coffee are different. Brute facts are a non-explanation. There are no substances on temporal parts theories so you can’t have forms. You have given no account of causal relations and the way that you phrase your answer denies them. If there is nothing that connects the cold coffee and the hot coffee, you can’t even say that they are the same thing and that something has even changed.<br />Freakazoidnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83891390426216093692017-11-19T14:33:53.030-08:002017-11-19T14:33:53.030-08:00Passage means time passes? buts that doesn't e...<i>Passage means time passes? buts that doesn't explain what it is at all , what does it mean for time to pass ? how does that leads to what A-T wants , the act/potency distinction ?</i><br /><br />Look, either you have read Earman or you haven’t. If you have, you know what temporal passage means in this debate. If you haven’t, then why did you bother to quote him? I’ve already told you what time on B-theory consists of- an objective succession of events that acts as a mind independent measure of change. Most B-theorists don’t believe that time is a mind-independent measure of anything. And time doesn’t get you the act/potency distinction, it lets you measure change, which in turn is what gets you the act/potency distinction.<br /><br /><i>You claim that even if B-theory rules out passage it doesn't rule out change outright. its only the matter of accepting Endurantism</i><br /><br />I don’t claim it, it’s exactly how Feser’s argument is laid out. And he explicitly says that he believes B-theory denies temporal passage, so it’s not a legitimate option for him.<br /><br /><i>Because thats the minimum that can be done in face of your assertions or the fact that you just don't think something works.</i><br /><br />I didn’t even do that. I made specific arguments against four-dimensionalism and why it can’t account for change. And if you didn’t come here to defend a claim against that Feser and four-dimensionalism, then why did you make the claim to begin with and especially when you hadn’t even read the chapter?<br /><br /><i>Well what I did show you is that whether one holds 4D or 3D both are equally static , no properties themselves are changed on either view.</i><br /><br />Well, you only cited a couple of common criticisms of B-theory and endurantism. Then you linked to a post from Alexander Pruss that shows how change is not reductive or static on B-theory since change is having an interval of time such that the object is one way at the beginning and another way at the other end. It gives us dynamism with the universe even if the entire timeline as a whole doesn’t change.<br /><br /><i>Irrelevant ,there aren't more than one or two. Unless such philosophers have defended proofs like first way , or the kind of change that it requires.You can point to that et</i><br /><br />You think that there are at most two Thomists in the world that are B-theorists? Even if you limit this to professionals, this is flat out-false.<br /><br /><i>First again I already demonstrated the disparity between your claims and mine and secondly its not like you have even pointed towards any explanation</i><br /><br />So because I make so called bigger claims I have to defend five different subjects at once, but because you make a smaller claim you don’t even have to defend one subject? Again, this isn’t fair at all.<br /><br /><i>And if your claim had any plausibility He would at least consider such an easy option.</i><br /><br />Look, you can’t have it both ways. Feser can’t both neglect to mention B-theory and temporal passage because it’s not even an option and fail to make an easy argument from temporary intrinsics that would tremendously help his case. I can point to specific parts of his chapter to support what I’m saying and why he doesn’t consider my option. You can’t do the same.<br />Freakazoidnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39935058627557034862017-11-19T00:04:30.345-08:002017-11-19T00:04:30.345-08:00Sure it can. Both these times are actual, but ther...<i>Sure it can. Both these times are actual, but there are different things occurring at these times. There has to be something to the coffee while it is cold that will let it be hot or vice versa, and that it what is potential to it. It doesn’t just move from one state to another with[out?] some sort of explanation.</i><br /><br />But if both are occurring at different times , and both of them are actual , what sense does it make to call one of them actually occurring and the other potentially occurring ? There is simply no room for such a distinction here. <br /><br /><i>There has to be something to the coffee while it is cold that will let it be hot or vice versa, and that it what is potential to it. It doesn’t just move from one state to another with[out?] some sort of explanation</i><br /><br />This doesn't even make sense , the cold coffee doesn't <i>turn into</i> anything , its like its cold <i>here</i> and hot <i>there</i>. similarly if by <i>move</i> you simply meant that one state is actual and the other is potential then that doesn't happen. <br /><br />The Bottom line is this, Your overall claim is that B-theory + Endurantism is compatible with A-T kind of change, there is no parallel claim made by me even if one grants you that I've failed to defend 4D that still won't lead any plausibility to your claim and it would remain as unsubstantiated as it is. IF all you wanted to do was inform everyone about your position then your job is done , but nothing much interesting has come out of it.. if you think such a view is worth defending but you don't have time right now maybe you can elaborate such a view some other time or elsewhere. Redhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05569340378356607760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69784243879095761762017-11-19T00:01:49.366-08:002017-11-19T00:01:49.366-08:00You pointed towards explanations, but you certainl...<i>You pointed towards explanations, but you certainly didn’t give me in depth defenses like the ones you want from me</i><br /><br />First again I already demonstrated the disparity between your claims and mine and secondly its not like you have even pointed towards any explanation , you've simply insisted so far that you are right . <br /><br /><i>If you want to show how four-dimensionalism is equivalent to endurantism for Thomists, then you ought to be able to show that it can account for change in any non-illusory way. </i><br /><br />No, I can show that what thomists call change isn't even available on endurantism to prove that point , I did that. <br /><br /><i>The only responses you gave to my more important questions were that you didn’t understand them, appealed to brute facts, and brought in God to save your account of universalism.</i><br /><br />This is a pretty good indication that you are hell-bent on straw manning me. I have already explained that at least three times in this thread. its not like you offered any rebuttal and it was you who didn't want to continue the discussion on persistence. <br /><br /><i>And the fact of the matter is if Feser agreed with you, he would have said so by saying that B-theory rules out change outright, not via temporal passage. If this wasn’t the case, he could base his whole argument on temporary intrinsic and leave it at that but he doesn’t.</i><br /><br />And if your claim had any plausibility He would at least consider such an easy option. <br /><br /><i>This isn’t true. For example, I’ve named people who do think that real temporal passage is available on B-theory. </i><br /><br />But you've left entirely unsubstantiated how such a different conception of passage vindicates A-T change. <br /><br /><i>And let me get this straight- I have to defend my account of temporal passage, change, substances, temporary intrinsics, and act/potency all in one combox? This is a ridiculously high standard for argumentation.</i><br /><br />No, but you have to at least coherently define those terms and show how they fit with A-T conception of change and how they lead to act/potency. like I observed , its not like you have even given a superficial explanation, you've simply insisted so far. <br /><br /><i>But anyways, Thomists think that given object is composed of some sort metaphysical parts via form and matter. Temporal parts theorists deny that objects have metaphysical. Persisting objects count as substances but are related to larger wholes of substances plus properties. These accidental unities exist at specific times but the intrinsic properties they possess are held by the form as a whole. </i><br /><br />But this neither seems relevant to issue of change at hand or entirely correct. Suppose a temporal part theorists believe in Immanent Universals then you've got metaphysical parts on 4D. and again it isn't clear how this leads to act/potency distinction, it also depends on what work the notion of from is doing here, if that is supposed to follow upon act/potency then again that is needed to be defended with b-theory first , which you haven't.Redhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05569340378356607760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19617907691305026482017-11-18T23:27:22.107-08:002017-11-18T23:27:22.107-08:00That’s exactly what we’re doing. Temporal passage ...<i>That’s exactly what we’re doing. Temporal passage follows change. B follows A. B-theory rules out change. B-theory rules out B. By ruling out temporal passage, we then rule out change. B-theory rules out B, so it then rules out A. You are confusing the fact of change being prior to temporal passage with how we go about ruling out change via temporal passage.</i><br /><br />Ok , but what alternate understanding do you propose that simply gets around all those problems and preserve what you want on B-theory? <br /><br /><i>Just because something is available doesn’t mean he thinks it works. Most B-theorists don’t think my account works. </i><br /><br />Yes, and that is exactly why you need to be more specific and substantive in your claims , simply throwing our vague references won't work. You at <i>minimum</i> need to define coherently what you mean. <br /><br /><i>Temporal passage on B-theory simply means that time passes from one moment to the next. There is an ongoing process of change within the universe. I don’t see what is so hard to understand about this.</i><br /><br />???? Passage means time passes? buts that doesn't explain what it is at all , what does it mean for time to <i>pass</i> ? how does that leads to what A-T wants , the act/potency distinction ? <br />Explaining this would probably take you to write two lines. <br /><br /><i>You said that you’ve read Earman and the like, so you must have some sense of what they are talking about. It is a fact that most B-theorists explicitly deny that time passes in any sense whatsoever and say that change is static instead of ongoing, no matter their views on objective succession. In other words, most people don’t think such an account is readily available.</i><br /><br />This whole passage doesn't make sense, I am not talking about them I am talking about you, You claim that even if B-theory rules out passage it doesn't rule out change outright. its only the matter of accepting Endurantism. its about that I am asking you , if it was so simple why is this option completely ignored ? I am not talking about what B-theorists <i>believe</i> or don't its about your claims. <br /><br />And secondly here again its not about what B-theorists are talking about when they speak of passage , how does that help A-T? <br /><br /><i>This is a pretty low standard. Almost every single philosophical thesis isn’t obviously true or false. And you initially claimed that Feser had no idea what he was talking about in regards to change and four-dimensionalism, so don’t act like you weren’t making any strong claims to begin with.</i><br /><br />Because thats the minimum that can be done in face of your assertions or the fact that you just don't <i>think</i> something works. And I certainly didn't come to defend such claim, that can only take place once I have read the paper.<br /><br /><i>Well, this isn’t obviously true either. You are going to have to show me that properties need to be held in both senses of simpliciter according to Thomism.</i><br /><br />Well what I <i>did</i> show you is that whether one holds 4D or 3D both are equally static , no properties themselves are changed on either view. Nothing like act/potency makes sense. <br /><br /><i> The fact that there are Thomists who are B-theorists and endurantists speaks against your claim,</i><br /><br />Irrelevant ,there aren't more than one or two. Unless such philosophers have defended proofs like first way , or the kind of change that it requires.You can point to that etc.<br /><br /><i>as well as the fact that Feser never argues that B-theory as such rules out real change outright. The structure of his argument is at odds with what you are saying.</i><br /><br />But this would only support you if you described some alternate understanding of change , which you don't . <br />Redhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05569340378356607760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-47074988403852424742017-11-18T18:47:39.197-08:002017-11-18T18:47:39.197-08:00You on the other hand make utterly unsubstantiated...<i> You on the other hand make utterly unsubstantiated claims about what is available or what is not on B-theory. Your thesis here is the one requiring defense You need to explain how if the relevant change is not available on 4D is it available on 3D , what you think temporal passage ,change etc are . how this vindicates act/potency.</i><br /><br />This isn’t true. For example, I’ve named people who do think that real temporal passage is available on B-theory. And let me get this straight- I have to defend my account of temporal passage, change, substances, temporary intrinsics, and act/potency all in one combox? This is a ridiculously high standard for argumentation. People write entire books on these subjects. Despite your claims to the contrary, it is far from clear whether or not indexicalism, adverbialism, or other options is incompatible with a Thomistic account of change. There are Thomists who endorse versions of these accounts.<br /><br /><i>gain I am not asking for you to copy and paste entire literature but you simply do not point to how there is any significance in such an account</i><br /><br />Honestly, it’s because I’m not hopeful on how productive this would be. It’s hard enough to point out some basic errors in your understanding of Feser’s article which you haven’t entirely read. How much more difficult is it going to be with something much more in depth? You’re demanding that I defend at least five different subject in depth. Not only is this difficult to do in a combox, but it is extremely inconsiderate towards my personal time. But anyways, Thomists think that given object is composed of some sort metaphysical parts via form and matter. Temporal parts theorists deny that objects have metaphysical. Persisting objects count as substances but are related to larger wholes of substances plus properties. These accidental unities exist at specific times but the intrinsic properties they possess are held by the form as a whole. <br /><br /><i>I haven't said that coffee is hot and cold at the same moment , only that since both these times are actual the coldness of the coffee can't ever be said to be potential.</i><br /><br />Sure it can. Both these times are actual, but there are different things occurring at these times. There has to be something to the coffee while it is cold that will let it be hot or vice versa, and that it what is potential to it. It doesn’t just move from one state to another with some sort of explanation.<br />Freakazoidnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72091165436742384372017-11-18T18:39:40.431-08:002017-11-18T18:39:40.431-08:00But we're not ruling out A by first ruling out...<i>But we're not ruling out A by first ruling out B</i><br /><br />That’s exactly what we’re doing. Temporal passage follows change. B follows A. B-theory rules out change. B-theory rules out B. By ruling out temporal passage, we then rule out change. B-theory rules out B, so it then rules out A. You are confusing the fact of change being prior to temporal passage with how we go about ruling out change via temporal passage.<br /><br /><i>But what do you even mean by temporal Passage like I said you simply insist on that point. Why do you think if such an account of temporal passage is readily available to B-theorists and can be made sense of per your insistence does he completely ignores it?</i><br /><br />Just because something is available doesn’t mean he thinks it works. Most B-theorists don’t think my account works. Temporal passage on B-theory simply means that time passes from one moment to the next. There is an ongoing process of change within the universe. I don’t see what is so hard to understand about this. You said that you’ve read Earman and the like, so you must have some sense of what they are talking about. It is a fact that most B-theorists explicitly deny that time passes in any sense whatsoever and say that change is static instead of ongoing, no matter their views on objective succession. In other words, most people don’t think such an account is readily available.<br /><br /><i>But there is a disparity here , I didn't come here to defend 4D , All my comments on 4D are in reply to your insistence that You think nothing persists or nothing changes. on 4D . I clearly explained that there is no way that is obviously true</i><br /><br />This is a pretty low standard. Almost every single philosophical thesis isn’t obviously true or false. And you initially claimed that Feser had no idea what he was talking about in regards to change and four-dimensionalism, so don’t act like you weren’t making any strong claims to begin with.<br /><br /><i>and neither does 3D goes through the criteria you've so far mentioned , its pretty much as static for A-T intents and purposes as 4D.</i><br /><br />Well, this isn’t obviously true either. You are going to have to show me that properties need to be held in both senses of simpliciter according to Thomism. The fact that there are Thomists who are B-theorists and endurantists speaks against your claim, as well as the fact that Feser never argues that B-theory as such rules out real change outright. The structure of his argument is at odds with what you are saying.<br /><br /><i>In reply again you simply insist But they are wrong, and you have given me no good reason to think otherwise. it is after that I've complained about having to explain myself.</i><br /><br />You pointed towards explanations, but you certainly didn’t give me in depth defenses like the ones you want from me. If you want to show how four-dimensionalism is equivalent to endurantism for Thomists, then you ought to be able to show that it can account for change in any non-illusory way. The only responses you gave to my more important questions were that you didn’t understand them, appealed to brute facts, and brought in God to save your account of universalism. And the fact of the matter is if Feser agreed with you, he would have said so by saying that B-theory rules out change outright, not via temporal passage. If this wasn’t the case, he could base his whole argument on temporary intrinsic and leave it at that but he doesn’t.<br /><br />Freakazoidnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86084261104851995222017-11-17T22:13:51.159-08:002017-11-17T22:13:51.159-08:00All this means is that something needs to be non-a...<i>All this means is that something needs to be non-actual at the time of said change. The coffee is cold at one moment and it is hot at the next. Both these statements are eternally true. This doesn’t mean that the coffee is hot at the same moment it is cold. You are mistaking a lack of change of the entire universe with a lack of change and thus act/potency within the universe</i><br /><br />I haven't said that coffee is hot and cold at the same moment , only that since both these times are actual the coldness of the coffee can't ever be said to be <i>potential</i>. Redhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05569340378356607760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-34607364645107217332017-11-17T22:13:44.469-08:002017-11-17T22:13:44.469-08:00You did not understand what I said and are just re...<i>You did not understand what I said and are just repeating yourself. By ruling out A by first ruling out B, you cannot be ruling out A prior to ruling out B. If this wasn’t the case, you would rule out A and then rule out B or rule them out at the same time. Feser says that the B-theory rules out change via temporal passage, not that it rules them both out at the same time.</i><br /><br />But we're not ruling out A by first ruling out B, instead what Feser says is that B <i>follows upon</i> A so If A obtains only then can B obtains, this way when B is ruled out then so is A prior to that. <br /><br /><i>That’s not what I said. I said that accepting endurantism with a form of B-theory that affirms temporal passage is necessary to make things consistent. Feser explicitly disagrees that B-theory can provide an account of temporal passage.</i><br /><br />But what do you even mean by <i>temporal Passage</i> like I said you simply insist on that point. Why do you think if such an account of temporal passage is readily available to B-theorists and can be made sense of per your insistence does he completely ignores it? That is what I am pointing out seems implausible to me. <br /><br /><i>Uh, you can’t complain about having to explain four-dimensionalism and then expect me to defend my account of change in detail, especially when you gave me such non-committal answers about how four dimensionalism was supposed to work. This isn’t fair at all.</i><br /><br /><i>Uh, you can’t complain about having to explain four-dimensionalism and then expect me to defend my account of change in detail, especially when you gave me such non-committal answers about how four dimensionalism was supposed to work. This isn’t fair at all.</i><br /><br />But there is a disparity here , I didn't come here to defend 4D , All my comments on 4D are in reply to your insistence that You <i>think</i> nothing persists or nothing changes. on 4D . I clearly explained that there is no way that is obviously true , and neither does 3D goes through the criteria you've so far mentioned , its pretty much as static for A-T intents and purposes as 4D. <br /><br /> In reply again you simply insist <i> But they are wrong, and you have given me no good reason to think otherwise.</i> it is after that I've complained about having to explain myself. <br />You on the other hand make utterly <i>unsubstantiated</i> claims about what is available or what is not on B-theory , Your thesis here is the one requiring defense You need to explain how if the relevant change is not available on 4D is it available on 3D , what you think temporal passage ,change etc are . how this vindicates act/potency. if all you came here to do is inform everyone about what you <i>think</i> then very well your job is done. but that is as uninteresting as it get. <br /><br />So you shoulder a much bigger burden here than me. <br /><br /><i>I’m a constituent endurantist. A lot of modern Thomists who are B-theorists endorse something like this position. It doesn’t suffer from the same difficulties as relationalism or adverbialism. And by Feser’s definition having these different properties is real change.</i><br /><br />Here your use of <i>a lot</i> is certainly a big exaggeration I don't think there are many defenders of such a view , maybe one or two . and again you simply insist upon there being such a solution, again I am not asking for you to copy and paste entire literature but you simply do not point to how there is any significance in such an account. <br /><br />Your statement that <i>And by Feser’s definition having these different properties is real change.</i> is weird, what properties are you talking about? <br />Redhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05569340378356607760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-60417766446847831602017-11-17T18:07:22.627-08:002017-11-17T18:07:22.627-08:00t means having the ability to bring about some non...<i>t means having the ability to bring about some non-actual state of affairs ... but given B-theory no non-actual state of affairs are ever brought about</i><br /><br />That’s reading too much into it in your response to the other poster. All this means is that something needs to be non-actual at the time of said change. The coffee is cold at one moment and it is hot at the next. Both these statements are eternally true. This doesn’t mean that the coffee is hot at the same moment it is cold. You are mistaking a lack of change of the entire universe with a lack of change and thus act/potency within the universe<br />Freakazoidnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55681094453281430652017-11-17T16:23:14.460-08:002017-11-17T16:23:14.460-08:00a) The user "Freakazoid" says he has rea...<i><br />a) The user "Freakazoid" says he has read the paper and he says he disagrees with Feser when he argues that A-T kind of change is consistent with B-theory. <br /><br />b) In the preview of paper itself this can be read .</i><br /><br />Feser says that the B-theory is still workable with Thomism, but he thinks that has to be done in a different way than the A-Theory. I disagree with him insofar as I think it can be done in the same way.<br /><br /><i>But thats weird. If passage is nothing really extra then it seems obvious that if passage is ruled out then change is already ruled out.</i><br /><br />You did not understand what I said and are just repeating yourself. By ruling out A by first ruling out B, you cannot be ruling out A prior to ruling out B. If this wasn’t the case, you would rule out A and then rule out B or rule them out at the same time. Feser says that the B-theory rules out change via temporal passage, not that it rules them both out at the same time.<br /><br /><i>But it seems implausible to think that if all it takes by your account is accepting Endurantism to make B-theory consistent with A-T</i><br /><br />That’s not what I said. I said that accepting endurantism with a form of B-theory that affirms temporal passage is necessary to make things consistent. Feser explicitly disagrees that B-theory can provide an account of temporal passage.<br /><br /><i>That remains to be shown by you.</i><br /><br />Uh, you can’t complain about having to explain four-dimensionalism and then expect me to defend my account of change in detail, especially when you gave me such non-committal answers about how four dimensionalism was supposed to work. This isn’t fair at all.<br /><br /><i>Like I observed above some either relativise property to times or Property possession to times so You would need to defend a particular version of Endurantism that allows that and even if we were to find a plausible B-Endurantism that was capable of doing that, again it isn't clear how simply having intrinsic temporary properties is sufficient for A-T change.</i><br /><br />I’m a constituent endurantist. A lot of modern Thomists who are B-theorists endorse something like this position. It doesn’t suffer from the same difficulties as relationalism or adverbialism. And by Feser’s definition having these different properties is real change.<br />Freakazoidnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54717213896600903932017-11-17T08:06:07.263-08:002017-11-17T08:06:07.263-08:00RedNovember 17, 2017 at 6:12 AM
"The Hot cup...RedNovember 17, 2017 at 6:12 AM<br /><br />"The Hot cup can't be said to have potency to become cooler because the time at which it becomes cooler ..."<br />--On contemporary science temperature is an indication of average molecular motion and its related average molecular kinetic energy. Here is a quick introduction to how contemporary science analyzes the subject:<br />https://www.physics.utoronto.ca/~jharlow/teaching/everyday06/reading10.pdf<br /><br />Note that the Aristotelian naked eye concepts are not employed. Aristotelian descriptions of heat were obsoleted centuries ago.<br /><br />If you want to understand how things get hotter or colder forget Aristotle, he has nothing useful to say on the subject. Open a physics book instead.StardustyPsychehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12493629973262220492noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-662666272382009982017-11-17T06:12:12.363-08:002017-11-17T06:12:12.363-08:00(I don't know if there are some terminology/de...<i>(I don't know if there are some terminology/definition issues here...)</i><br /><br />Yes , that is a an issue. <br /><br /><i>Being-in-potency includes the forms a substance can take on and its capacity to manifest these forms.</i><br /><br />That just needlessly complicates the issue , <i>taking</i> on certain itself is a state of affairs , every thing said above still applies, so its better to stick with simpler instances of change. <br /><br /><i>It seems hard to translate 'no non-actual state of affairs can ever be brought about' into the A-T view......</i><br /><br />I don't know what such "translation" would amount to , but perhaps I can clarify some other way. <br />Try this , Think of what you take 'actuality' to be( I won't provide any reductive analysis of what actuality is here, but You can grasp what it is) , Now Given A-theory ( lets just take the most popular version of it, Presentism) Only one time can be said to be actual ,the present time so only what what exist <i>presently</i> can be said to exist <i>actually</i>, This "presentness" constantly changes and with it changes "actuality" , What <i>was</i> once <i>non-actual</i> can be said to be <i>presently</i> actual It can be said that what is <i>presently</i> <i>non-actual</i> <i>will be</i> actual. But given B-theory this "actuality" ranges over all the history, Past, Present , Future all are actual. <i>was</i> or <i>will be</i> are usually translated here into <i>is-earlier than</i> , <i>is-later than</i>.<br />From the above perhaps it will become easier to see which theory permits act/potency which which one doesn't .<br /><br /><i>Again, at least in A-T terms the idea of a hot cup of coffee which is cooling down over time yet while hot has no potency to become cooler seems incoherent. If the water (in this coffee case) had no being-in-potency for changing temperature it could never change temperature throughout its existence. If the coffee is equally actual in respect of temperature at one moment as at another later moment, this is saying that it remains the same temperature in both of those moments. </i><br /><br />The Hot cup can't be said to have <i>potency</i> to become cooler because the time at which it becomes cooler is as actual on B-theory as the present. Things would only seem incoherent if one deny that future is actual then suggest that cup has <i>no potency</i>. but given B-theory all that happens is that the objects posses these temporary properties , which can be accounted for in ones preferred theory of persistence .<br /><br /><i>I think it's important to look at how Aristotle arrived at the Act/Potency distinction, what it is intended to be/do and so on. If it is impossible for something to be in potency in relation to its being in act change, persistence, the existence of multiplicity as opposed to unity (one single object) seem ruled out as well because these things are the origin/basis for the distinction; it is very closely tied in with the hylemorphic analysis of substances. </i><br /><br />You're right but one also have to look at how One would account for all of those features of the natural world if one doesn't allow there to be potency in it. As you can see from the above discussion , those features are analysed in variety of different ways by different metaphysicans and many different resources are available . Redhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05569340378356607760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35304966324086352142017-11-17T02:42:59.909-08:002017-11-17T02:42:59.909-08:00(I don't know if there are some terminology/de...(I don't know if there are some terminology/definition issues here...)<br /><br /><i> Here first consider what being-in-potency means for some object , It means having the ability to bring about some non-actual state of affairs ... but given B-theory no non-actual state of affairs are ever brought about. </i><br /><br />Being-in-potency includes the forms a substance can take on and its capacity to manifest these forms. It seems hard to translate 'no non-actual state of affairs can ever be brought about' into the A-T view because any state of affairs that exists outside of being an imagined concept in a mind has to be a being-in-potency and being-in-act composite; if it isn't and it is only actual this would mean that it is pure actuality i.e. that it is God. <br /><br /><i> All of the world's history is always there as the past, present and future are equally real. </i><br /><br />As far as I understand it, from the A-T perspective being-in-potency and being-in-act are both considered to be real and to exist, but in different ways. In these terms if all the world's history is equally real i.e. exists in an identical way, it would be saying that past, present and future are indistinguishable from one another. <br /><br /><i> For example consider there is presently a hot cup of coffee which is cooling down. Can we say that the Cup is potentially cold? No, it seems . because the time at which coffee is cold is as much actual as the present moment. </i><br /><br />Again, at least in A-T terms the idea of a hot cup of coffee which is cooling down over time yet while hot has no potency to become cooler seems incoherent. If the water (in this coffee case) had no being-in-potency for changing temperature it could never change temperature throughout its existence. If the coffee is equally actual in respect of temperature at one moment as at another later moment, this is saying that it remains the same temperature in both of those moments. <br /><br /><i> so we need to establish that its possible for something to be in Potency before we can talk about there being a substance which can have a particular combination of being-in-act and being-in-potency at different times. </i><br /><br />I think it's important to look at how Aristotle arrived at the Act/Potency distinction, what it is intended to be/do and so on. If it is impossible for something to be in potency in relation to its being in act change, persistence, the existence of multiplicity as opposed to unity (one single object) seem ruled out as well because these things are the origin/basis for the distinction; it is very closely tied in with the hylemorphic analysis of substances. <br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-79923506200341662422017-11-16T07:17:06.270-08:002017-11-16T07:17:06.270-08:00Check out this latest Post From Dr.Pruss
http://...Check out this latest Post From Dr.Pruss <br /><br />http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2017/11/a-non-reductive-eternalist-theory-of.html<br /><br />Maybe this can make act/potency consistent with B-theory but I don't understand much in that post. So I don't know if this will work or not.Redhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05569340378356607760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-78761907562113082522017-11-16T06:55:19.969-08:002017-11-16T06:55:19.969-08:00I can't see the text of Feser's essay in t...<i>I can't see the text of Feser's essay in the Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives... </i><br /><br />Check the Routledge link in the post. <br /><br /><i>"Feser argues that the Aristotelian account of change is consistent with both the B Theory of time and with a wide variety of versions of the A Theory, in which case, the conflict between relativity and Aristotelian metaphysics would be only apparent."<br /></i><br /><br />This seems to be a mistake on Editor's part because <br /><br />a) The user "Freakazoid" says he has read the paper and he says he disagrees with Feser when he argues that A-T kind of change is consistent with B-theory. <br /><br />b) In the preview of paper itself this can be read .<br /><br /><i>"Naturally, since temporal passage and thus (the Aristotelian argues) real change would be absent from the world as described by B-theory, the theory cannot to that extent be reconciled with Aristotelianism"</i> <br /><br />What he then says is that although change is absent from B-theory , act/potency itself need not be. <br /><br /><i>Supposing there are substances that are composites of being-in-act and being-in-potency as per the act/potency idea and we have a substance that is present at a number of locations t , then, if the substance can change and persist it seems like it can have a certain combination of being-in-act and being-in-potency at t1 and a different combination of being-in-act and being-in-potency at t2, t4 and so on. <br /><br />That a substance can have a particular combination of being-in-act and being-in-potency at one t location and that some of this being-in-potency is being-in-act at a later t location is the actualisation of a potency.</i><br /><br />Here first consider what being-in-potency means for some object , It means having the ability to <i>bring about</i> some non-actual state of affairs ... but given B-theory no non-actual state of affairs are ever brought about. All of the world's history is always there as the past, present and future are equally real. <br /><br />For example consider there is presently a hot cup of coffee which is cooling down. Can we say that the Cup is <i>potentially</i> cold? No, it seems . because the time at which coffee is cold is as much actual as the present moment. <br /><br />so we need to establish that its possible for something to be in Potency before we can talk about there being a substance which can have a particular combination of being-in-act and being-in-potency at different times.Redhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05569340378356607760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-24609471463982224782017-11-16T03:34:38.343-08:002017-11-16T03:34:38.343-08:00No sense can still be made of an actualization of ...<i> No sense can still be made of an actualization of Potentiality.</i><br /><br />This is the part of your criticism I don't grasp. <br /><br />Supposing there are substances that are composites of being-in-act and being-in-potency as per the act/potency idea and we have a substance that is present at a number of locations <i> t </i>, then, if the substance can change and persist it seems like it can have a certain combination of being-in-act and being-in-potency at t1 and a different combination of being-in-act and being-in-potency at t2, t4 and so on. <br /><br />That a substance can have a particular combination of being-in-act and being-in-potency at one t location and that some of this being-in-potency is being-in-act at a later t location is the actualisation of a potency. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6943764230186722822017-11-16T03:14:22.078-08:002017-11-16T03:14:22.078-08:00Plus you're not really proposing an alternate ...<i> Plus you're not really proposing an alternate understanding of Change and Passage that is consistent with A-T, You more or less simply insist that there is relevant kind of change available on B-theory. </i><br /><br />I can't see the text of Feser's essay in the Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives... collection but the summary in the introductory section contains the following: <br /><br />"Feser argues that the Aristotelian account of change is consistent with both the B Theory of time and with a wide variety of versions of the A Theory, in which case, the conflict between relativity and Aristotelian metaphysics would be only apparent."<br /><br />It then makes it seem like the core of the essay is demonstrating this:<br /><br /><i> Even on the supposition that the Aristotelian account entailed the most extreme version of the A Theory, namely, Presentism, Feser contends that Aristotelianism would be consistent with the scientific core of special relativity. </i><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com