tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post1113535665772144328..comments2024-03-29T05:55:32.588-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Geach on HellEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger102125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-73649102336708738212022-01-12T11:36:53.416-08:002022-01-12T11:36:53.416-08:00How smart thou art ...How smart thou art ...Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-34002277158147358302022-01-11T06:22:39.357-08:002022-01-11T06:22:39.357-08:00You seem to forget D B Hart is as every bit a rust...<i>You seem to forget D B Hart is as every bit a rusted-on Jesus-loving Christian [with a capital 'C'] as one could get. By any objective observation of his cause for and call to Christianity there is not one who could fault his path through the Pearly Gates past a smiling, welcoming Peter to sit at the right hand of God.</i> <br /><br />Good gravy, what blathering nonsense. <br /><br />Unless you are claiming that he is a verifiable saint in his behavior and thinking, this is nothing but bilge-water. And I assure you that even among those who like his various theological flavors of opinions, there are many who DO NOT think his behavior is that of a saint. <br /><br />And the whole comment shows us why it would be silly to accept the opinion of a committed anti-christian what it is to be a good Christian ("with a capital C"). Tonyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07159134209092031897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-159342580165856612022-01-09T18:25:36.273-08:002022-01-09T18:25:36.273-08:00@ Alexander Gieg,
I will give a one sentence repl...@ Alexander Gieg,<br /><br />I will give a one sentence reply to each of your points and say no more about it on this Geach thread:<br /><br />a) You cannot meaningfully categorize things symbolically, even if including as symbols words or groups of words, without first having something non-symbolic to categorize.<br /><br />b) A ring has two binary operations for each of which any two elements of the ring must be able to combine to give an element of the ring [van der Waerden, "Algebra", 7th edition, page 32], so the restricted study is not a ring, but even if it were, it would not address my point, which is that the artifice of restricting a study to just a portion of the whole can cause false conclusions to be drawn about the properties of the whole - but this exercise is a just an illustrative metaphor anyway for what can go wrong when you insist on breaking a whole into parts.<br /><br />c) But the "examination committees" of the scholastics would be conducted in the metaphysics as developed by Aristotle and his contemporaries, which is not the "new" metaphysics you claim to use, which is a total break - and your particular application of this new metaphysics seems to violate the law of parsimony (William of Ockham) - it complicates a sufficient simpler explanation.<br /><br />d) I will send you an email to which you can reply establishing an email connection. You get the last word on this site.<br /><br />It seems that we agree on nothing - an excellent beginning!<br /><br />Tom CohoeAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18897828939773459342022-01-09T07:09:58.658-08:002022-01-09T07:09:58.658-08:00@Tom:
a) "I believe that knowledge is one an...@Tom:<br /><br />a) "I believe that knowledge is one and divisions into categories is artificial."<br /><br />Well, I go in the opposite direction, and see careful categorization as the way to build valid knowledge.<br /><br />For instance, I see two basic categories at play here: on the one hand, Aquinas thought; on the other hand, your thought. Yours may be interesting and even true, but at the moment I'm more interested in Aquinas's.<br /><br />b) "I wish to study the properties of the numbers from 100 to 200, and I wish to assert that these numbers cannot be added. Any time you go outside the boundaries above and below, I get to say you've gone off on a tangent strawman."<br /><br />I'll exemplify what I mean.<br /><br />As I see it, were I to follow the same procedure I perceive you as taking, I'd pick this one sentence of yours, then began talking about:<br /><br />* How that forms a ring, which is a valid mathematical construct;<br /><br />* Mention how rings are used in CPUs for arithmetic;<br /><br />* Vaguely generalize from that towards neural networks and AI;<br /><br />* Then generalize even more vaguely towards how AI may show how the human mind truly works.<br /><br />And on, and on, and on... all of which might be interesting to talk about, but has no relation whatsoever with the question on whether the concept of souls as purely immaterial is primarily grounded on first or second theology as these categories are defined by Aquinas.<br /><br />That's the reason I haven't commented on most of what you wrote: because those points aren't related to Aquinas's philosophy. That's also the reason I'm not adding my *own* perceptions etc. to the conversation, as I'm not interested, at the moment, in my own ideas either.<br /><br />c) "OTOH your idea of formal dispute (where you set the terms of reference) sounds like H*ll on wheels."<br /><br />It isn't my idea, it's the method used for writing Summas, which in turn is a more general take on Platonic dialogues. It was also the way medieval philosophers argued publicly to make sure both were being fully honest about the other's ideas.<br /><br />d) "So if you want to talk by email, I'm open to it. We could have a lot of fun and even find ourselves _not_ talking past each other from time to time."<br /><br />Sure, that's fine for me. My e-mail is alexgieg@gmail.com.<br />Alexander Gieghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12282340926229637743noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-20647290133958840292022-01-07T17:51:40.959-08:002022-01-07T17:51:40.959-08:00@ Alexander Gieg,
PS - I forgot to say that you h...@ Alexander Gieg,<br /><br />PS - I forgot to say that you have also ignored a lot of things I have said but we needn't come to blows over it. Do you think this kind of talk is simple? It should be, but it isn't.<br /><br />Tom CohoeAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88735690296716422692022-01-07T17:48:17.913-08:002022-01-07T17:48:17.913-08:00@Alexander Gieg,
"multiple divergent tangent...@Alexander Gieg,<br /><br />"multiple divergent tangents"<br /><br />Have you never heard of a tangent space? I thought you knew all about general relativity. A tangent, or a tangent space, which multiple diverse tangents would create is a good way to investigate a single point in the general manifold, or to investigate a region in the manifold whose smallest single dimension is less than the largest delta_x smaller than what can be measured or assumed. While very poorly stated, I am talking about boundaries of a region that is treated as linear and small enough that real non linearity can be ignored.<br /><br />You were interested in boundaries you said? Ha-ha-ha? More strawmen?<br /><br />As I said, we are talking past each other.<br /><br />My answer to your question actually _is_ in the things I've said to you. I believe that knowledge is one and divisions into categories is artificial. My "strawman" was a concrete (easy to understand) example of how creating categories allows dispute that is a waste of time but which provides an occupation and it keeps people busy.<br /><br />Here is another example for you to call a strawman. I wish to study the properties of the numbers from 100 to 200, and I wish to assert that these numbers cannot be added. Any time you go outside the boundaries above and below, I get to say you've gone off on a tangent strawman.<br /><br />Ha-ha-ha? Therefore I'm not a philosopher, a metaphysician, a theologian, an Aquinist (an Aristotelian)?<br /><br />In the end, your diagnosis is unimportant.<br /><br />Don't get me wrong. I have enjoyed talking to you. OTOH your idea of formal dispute (where you set the terms of reference) sounds like H*ll on wheels. It would amplify disagreement and misunderstanding. This kind of thing needs a panel of judges, not something I want (who would pick the panel). On what forum would this take place. For me, when the number of comments on this site reaches several hundred it becomes painfully difficult to use. As well, Ed probably does not want / would not allow a forever dispute on his blog.<br /><br />On the other other hand, an _informal_ dialogue by private email is ideal for two people talking past each other endlessly.<br /><br />No, this is actually funny. There is a story about two relatively famous physicists who argued privately about something _for decades_. Then, by some accident of conversation, they discovered that they were using different definitions for an important term and had been talking past each other for all those years. This story appeared on Peter Woit's blog (Not Even Wrong) but I have looked for it several times and have not been able to find it again. I think he deleted a lot of stuff after he went (too) politically correct.<br /><br />So if you want to talk by email, I'm open to it. We could have a lot of fun and even find ourselves _not_ talking past each other from time to time.<br /><br />Tom CohoeAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-34846032900740950952022-01-07T16:17:33.745-08:002022-01-07T16:17:33.745-08:00When you get four out of five sentences right, you...When you get four out of five sentences right, you'd think you'd come closer to a valid argument. But a sound argument requires ALL of its propositions to be true.Craig Paynehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12704935403289384848noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51426188100194473102022-01-07T14:24:49.977-08:002022-01-07T14:24:49.977-08:00@Tom:
I refer to what I perceive as strawmen such...@Tom:<br /><br />I refer to what I perceive as strawmen such as, for one example, these sentences:<br /><br />"(...) it is possible to chop plain things into artificial categories and proceed with 'further arguments' at great length. (...) This 'chopping up' is artificial and provides a method for argument that really makes no more plain sense than drawing out argument about grapefruit for breakfast."<br /><br />If I ask a specific question about a philosophical system, from within its own categories, and explore corollaries, and the other person answer by going out on multiple divergent tangents, and keeps doing that despite my trying to bring them back on-topic, my most charitable interpretation is either that the person doesn't actually want to think systematically about that topic in particular or, a little less charitably, that they refuse the very process of systematic philosophical analysis.<br /><br />If you think this is an inaccurate characterization, I'd suggest we move into a proper disputatio, that is:<br /><br />a) Disputant A states a position X;<br /><br />b) Disputant B, before stating their own position, opinion, or criticism about what A said, first explains X in their own words, asking A that's what they truly meant;<br /><br />c) Disputant A then either agrees that disputant B understood X correctly or, if not, explains X in a better way;<br /><br />d) The process goes back and forth until A is sufficiently satisfied that B understood A's position X well enough;<br /><br />e) Once B hears they understood X correctly, then they provide their own assessment of the subject-matter, stating their own position Y, which must include an analysis/assessment of the stronger, core points made by A in their position X;<br /><br />f) Roles then reverse, with A's turn to explain in their own words B's position Y, the same back and forth procedure being followed until B becomes sufficiently satisfied that A understood B's position Y well enough;<br /><br />g) Once A hears they understood B's position Y correctly, it's A turn again to provide their own assessment of the subject-matter complete with an analysis/assessment of B's position Y, then ether accepting Y, or providing a revised version of position X that takes into position Y's stronger, core points, or even a new position Z that encompasses and surpasses both X and Y's stronger, core points;<br /><br />h) This process proceeds in this way until both A and B reach a final agreement, or are both in full agreement about the irreducible points of divergence in their mutual though, both now knowing in depth what the other thinks and why.<br /><br />This procedure works extremely well as long as both disputants take it seriously and don't mind the time investment required.Alexander Gieghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12282340926229637743noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71206779334507821422022-01-07T12:44:26.129-08:002022-01-07T12:44:26.129-08:00@ Alexander Gieg,
Sensitive dependance on initial...@ Alexander Gieg,<br /><br />Sensitive dependance on initial conditions. That's what I meant by "amplification", but I couldn't recall the phrase at the time.<br /><br />This is anti-intellectual?<br /><br />Ok. If you say so.<br /><br />Tom CohoeAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18888666777751976502022-01-07T10:08:31.850-08:002022-01-07T10:08:31.850-08:00@Tom:
"We seem to be talking past each other...@Tom:<br /><br />"We seem to be talking past each other."<br /><br />Well, from my perspective you're defending a kind of anti-intellectualism, which seems odd given you're also supportive of Scholasticism.<br />Alexander Gieghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12282340926229637743noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-38511783387941117532022-01-07T08:17:59.195-08:002022-01-07T08:17:59.195-08:00@Alexander Gieg,
"My other comments circle a...@Alexander Gieg,<br /><br />"My other comments circle around possible further arguments [...]"<br /><br />I think I answered already, but it is possible to chop plain things into artificial categories and proceed with 'further arguments' at great length.<br /><br />Suppose, for example, you tell me you had a grapefruit at breakfast. That is plain and simple, but I want to argue so I say, "Isn't it possible that you gave your little brother a segment of the grapefruit so that you really had only part of a grapefruit?" You say, "I don't have a little brother." I say, "The term 'little brother' also includes your neighbor's child, whom you could think of as your 'little brother' so it would still be possible you gave your little brother, in this sense, a piece of the grapefruit, so it is possible you only had part of a grapefruit." You say, "I don't think of my neighbor's child as my little brother." I say, "Isn't it possible that you perceive your neighbor's child as you would perceive a little brother, but you have not consciously recognized this simple perception as a thing like thinking of your neighbor's child as ... only had part of a grapefruit?"<br /><br />Etc.<br /><br />God reveals _everything_ to us, whether it is scripture, metaphysical first principals, the sensory awarenesses that are the first principals of science, that guided by metaphysical principals become intellectualized as general principals of a particular science.<br /><br />This "chopping up" is artificial and provides a method for argument that really makes no more plain sense than drawing out argument about grapefruit for breakfast.<br /><br />You can always doubt and nothing anyone else says can cause you to not doubt. It is always your choice.<br /><br />In the same sense that doubt about theological explanations can go on for a long time, doubt can always be raised about the general body of science that we entertain today. One could argue on and on that there are no general bodies of science beyond speculation. You can't logically derive a general conclusion from a bunch of supporting particular examples. You cannot prove that scientific prediction that has worked heretofore will work tomorrow. You cannot prove that everything that has gone into the formation of a general conclusion was not decreed by God to make it look like the general conclusion is true. How does the conservation of momentum continue to be something we hold to be true, when instead of saying, "this is a counterexample, COM is false", every time it appears to be violated, we look instead for something (a new, otherwise indetectable, particle kicked off where the sensible tracks sum up to an apparent non conservation of momentum).<br /><br />Finally, science itself, through the principle that the components of classical states cannot exist simultaneously, without inherent uncertainty, coupled with amplification, supports that the randomness ( unpredictability via any finite algorithm) that visibly exists in our sensible world means that _something_ invisible operates in our sensible world that guides itIt makes a difference in our livesA tornado can hit or miss a vulnetable town. <br /><br />Our senses show us this visible randomness in the waving of wheat stalks in the wind.<br /><br />I am not really able to make sense of what you are asking except as a kind of avoidance freely willed by you. I cannot make you accept that infinity is a positive thing in the intellect. I cannot prove anything to you. You cannot prove anything to me. I cannot make you accept that anti-theism is not what Aquinas and Aristotle, for good reason, called "speculative science".<br /><br />We seem to be talking past each other. <br /><br />Sorry.<br /><br />Tom CohoeAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29365344897819072132022-01-06T08:33:12.645-08:002022-01-06T08:33:12.645-08:00@Anonymous: "One might (...) regard the scrip...@Anonymous: "One might (...) regard the scriptural and magisterial references to it as purely admonitory rather than predictive in their intent by the Holy Spirit"<br /><br />I like the way some Orthodox authors I read work this with the concept of the "divine light". I'm not sure this is what the Orthodox Church as such teaches, but I've found it referred more than once, so it well might be.<br /><br />According that idea, departed souls are basically nude before God's pure energies, without the dampening matter provides, and as such experience them directly.<br /><br />Those who aligned themselves with His will in life then get to experience this Light as loving warmth, embraced by it.<br /><br />Those, in contrast, who have aligned themselves opposite His will get, thus in rejection of Him, get to experience it as a burning fire, for no matter how much they want to shield away from that Light, they cannot, since there's nowhere to hide from it as it pervades all of reality.<br /><br />From this perspective, Heaven and Hell aren't different places, although they can be thought of as such, but more distinct ways to find oneself positioned before the God's same Light.<br /><br />Now, evidently the Orthodox authors I read say that once you're before that Divine Light your choice of embracing it and thus experiencing as warm love, or rejecting it and thus experiencing it as burning fire, is definite and unchangeable.<br /><br />But, at first glance at least, it seems this take is more prone to the possibility of some (and eventually all) of those experiencing it as burning fire to eventually also choosing to experience it as loving warmth. At which point, to run things through a Buddhist metaphor, they'd notice they always did, they were just too stubborn to recognize it as such.<br />Alexander Gieghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12282340926229637743noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27088777689625972962022-01-06T08:12:15.565-08:002022-01-06T08:12:15.565-08:00@Tom:
a) "There is no circularity in that.&q...@Tom:<br /><br />a) "There is no circularity in that."<br /><br />I know there is no circularity, but that wasn't my point.<br /><br />To recap: for Aquinas, as I understand his argument in his commentary to Boethius, there are fundamentally two metaphysics/theologies:<br /><br />* A first theology, known to God alone, which proceeds from premises only God can know about Himself, and reach a list of conclusions. A small handful of these conclusions God provides us via revelations.<br /><br />* A second theology (second from God's perspective), which for us doubles as the prime metaphysics (prime for us). This second theology/first metaphysics reaches conclusions using as its own premises a combination of our own natural knowledge plus divine revelations, that is, plus the conclusions of God's own exclusive first theology that He provided us.<br /><br />It's a little bit more complicated than that, as one may split the second one in a few subitems (natural theology, revealed theology, natural ontology etc.), but the general idea remains.<br /><br />That's the basis for my question. So, given that basis, this is my question:<br /><br />Given the above distinction between first and second theology in Aquinas's philosophy, the concept that the souls of the departed in general, and of the condemned in particular, are completely devoid of matter:<br /><br />i) Is it a conclusion from first theology, that is, it's a revealed truth from God Himself, which thus *must* be adopted as an unquestionable premise in any and all metaphysical reasonings from the second theology/prime metaphysics onwards?<br /><br />ii) Or is it a tentative premise adopted by second theology/prime metaphysics from another source, such as, e.g., from natural theology, thus keeping open the possibility that departed souls may retain some materiality?<br /><br />I'm not asking anything more or less than this. My other comments circle around possible further arguments arising from alternative "ii" being the case.<br /><br />b) "I would be happy to show you this."<br /><br />Thanks, but there's no need to. I actually already have those experiences aplenty myself.<br />Alexander Gieghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12282340926229637743noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-31293973861598116512022-01-05T15:10:53.158-08:002022-01-05T15:10:53.158-08:00"And if the Gospel account is even approximat..."And if the Gospel account is even approximately correct, then it is perfectly clear that according to that teaching many men are irretrievably lost."<br /><br />If it were perfectly clear, then one wonders how there came to be universalists in the first place.. It's not as though they don't also have their biblical prooftexts, so Geach here is making an unwarranted assumption. If it were as simple as quoting a few isolated Bible verses - a rather crude, fundamentalist, and un-Catholic method of settling theological disputes - then it is mystifying as to how some of the most learned biblical exegetes and Christian theologians across the centuries, sensitive to both tradition and the dictates of orthodoxy (or who are its pillars and formulators, as in the case of Gregory Nyssen), have held to or sympathized with universalism in some form.<br /><br />I say "Geach's" and not the "Catholic Church's," because it isn't the Catholic Church's dogmatic position that "many men are irretrievably lost." That's Geach's personal gloss. In light of the fact that the Church has not declared that a single soul is in hell, then to assert that all may or, indeed, will be saved is as licit a theologoumenon as assertions that many or most may or will be forever lost. Nothing has been formally defined here, but there is a clear magisterial trajectory toward universalism. The hope that all men be saved is asserted in the Catechism, invoked in several important prayers, and found in numerous saints, theologians, poets, mystics, and popes (not as numerous, it is true, as those who espouse the opposite view; but then, this was the case with beliefs like the Immaculate Conception at times before it became a dogma, at least among Dominicans and Thomists), all of which amounts to a de jure if not a de facto universalism.<br /><br />I must also comment on the prima facie absurdity of St. Leonard's claim (yes, saints are not immune from making absurd claims), cited by someone above, that a mere five people out of 33,000 who died on a given day went to heaven. With those odds, to turn a familiar critique of universalism on its head, why bother to evangelize? Why procreate? Why get out of bed in the morning? When you do the math (as though such a thing were appropriate to do in this case!), it comes out to a 0.015% chance of being saved and, hence, over a 99% chance of being eternally damned. The whole notion of the Gospel being "good news" then becomes a farce, a sick joke, and a desiccated husk of neurotic scrupulosity. On such a view, as Schopenhauer says, "it looks as if the Blessed Lord had created the world for the benefit of the Devil!" I don't doubt Leonard's personal sanctity, nor that of other saints who affirm similar things, but I am not obliged to go along with his demographic speculations on the afterlife.<br /><br />At best they are pedagogical, suitable to a time and place and audience long since passed. As Chesterton says, "To hope for all souls is imperative; and it is quite tenable that their salvation is inevitable. It is tenable, but it is not specially favourable to activity or progress." More universalists might be known to us were it not for the alleged pastoral and other dangers of being too loose-lipped about it. Better to catechize the peasant with a hammer. I would assume that it is partly for this reason that Schuon places the traditional doctrine of hell within the exoteric sphere. One might then regard it as a form of Plato's Noble Lie, but it needn't be, for universalists can accept the real possibility of an eternal hell and yet regard it as infinitely improbable, to use Edith Stein's phrase, that anyone should go there, or else regard the scriptural and magisterial references to it as purely admonitory rather than predictive in their intent by the Holy Spirit, which is a possible and plausible reading. <br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33565376807266149992022-01-05T09:06:48.307-08:002022-01-05T09:06:48.307-08:00@ Alexander Gieg,
Ok, here is a quotation from th...@ Alexander Gieg,<br /><br />Ok, here is a quotation from the paper:<br /><br />"It is [...] confirmed that – due to the rank of metaphysics’ subject matter – it deserves the position of the first philosophy, prevailing over other sciences (altior omnibus scientiis), despite the fact that in the order of knowledge assimilation it follows after all other sciences (posteriatur post omnes scientias), inter alia due to the fact that grasping the causes of existence must be preceded by knowledge of existence itself."<br /><br />(The ellipsis just removes the word 'also' so that the sentence stands by itself).<br /><br />This is a statement of Avicenna's defense of the primacy of metaphysics. It is also pretty much the same idea I expressed when I cited Romans 1:20 as a metaphysical argument in the Bible - "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead".<br /><br />Everything we know or believe we know comes first through our sensory input. Our sensory input comes before cursive thought. Even a scientist looking at numbers on a dial senses that there is something there before he thinks about it. Particle physicists search for a "resonance" and suspect one before they think about it. This is the prior "knowledge of existence [of something] itself". It is awareness through the senses. But that there can even be a science of this awareness is metaphysical primacy. Animals can be aware - no thought involved - of the same things we experience, but they cannot make a science of it, because they lack the metaphysics of ontology that is possible in human minds. In this way, metaphysics is prior.<br /><br />There is no circularity in that.<br /><br />The interesting thing about experiencing as in Romans 1:20, and as in going out and experiencing, as I suggested, is that if you are willing to be awed by plain experience, then that the awesome effects you experience are of _something_ that science cannot explain is supported by science itself.<br /><br />I would be happy to show you this.<br /><br />Tom CohoeAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-10791772435639871772022-01-04T14:08:34.424-08:002022-01-04T14:08:34.424-08:00@Tom:
The paper is in English, maybe your browser...@Tom:<br /><br />The paper is in English, maybe your browser is misconfigured. Try the PDF instead:<br /><br />https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11406-013-9484-8.pdf<br />Alexander Gieghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12282340926229637743noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-76826300402570647302022-01-04T11:25:10.707-08:002022-01-04T11:25:10.707-08:00Nobody deserves heaven.
Nobody deserves hell.
God ...Nobody deserves heaven.<br />Nobody deserves hell.<br />God is allmighty.<br />God is love.<br />God wills that everybody shall be saved.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-73556112679938477732022-01-03T18:29:34.252-08:002022-01-03T18:29:34.252-08:00@ Alexander Gieg,
You cannot rigorously axiomatiz...@ Alexander Gieg,<br /><br />You cannot rigorously axiomatize thinking and thereby escape well formed questions that cannot be decided from within the axiomatized system, with a finite defined set of rules of inference and a finite set of premises, even if it contains a set of propositions denoted as true, at least if you have axiomatized arithmetic as part of the system ( Goedel - not sure if I expressed that correctly or completely, but I have studied it, and "oe" is correct in his name if you don't use the non-English umlaut). It would not be very difficult to conclude that we can come to truth by other means than with cursive verbal thought or symbol manipulation. I hold that not only can we, we must. <br /><br />I cannot see the use of psychology type proofs that our senses can be fooled. First, only a fool would think that they cannot, and second, I have little use for the pretense of psychology to be a wise discipline. If I cannot learn truth through my senses, much less could I learn it through sensing the words of others. I think it's kind of funny that someone might take a position that "you can't trust your senses except when they sense me telling you what to believe", which reminds me to say that all of mathematics, science, and logic uses symbols ultimately defined in simple words, or else they are arm waving affairs dependent upon a "leap" of extremely non-rigorous ,"understanding", long the territory of flim flam artists and others of similar ilk.<br /><br />It is all rather funny don't you think?<br /><br />I can't read Polish so I didn't get much out of that Polish priest trying to prove that Aquinas is circular (I could get at least that that's what he is really trying to do).<br /><br />Again, funny stuff.<br /><br />Really, go outside and watch the behavior of the natural world. If you can see how it is awesome (way beyond fascinating here), I can give you some reasoning about how axiomatic systems cannot explain it, beyond the simplest phenomena, and even there, just as how you say our senses are fooled, so is our science. This awesomeness is everywhere all the time, but is far more noticeable where human imposition of order is minimal and where the effects approach causing fear or terror than if it is calm (if they kill you, OTOH, you will not be able to report back). You have to use your senses directly, not through reading.<br /><br />Tom Cohoe<br /><br />PS - I haven't checked this very well for errors or good expression because it is time for me to say the Rosary with my wife. - TCAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71090390777252146822022-01-03T14:57:46.433-08:002022-01-03T14:57:46.433-08:00@Tom:
a) "I really do not understand what yo...@Tom:<br /><br />a) "I really do not understand what you mean by that."<br /><br />This paper may help clarify what I'm referring to:<br /><br />* Kielbasa, J. "What is First? Metaphysics as Prima Philosophia and Ultima Scientia in the Works of Thomas Aquinas." Philosophia 41, 635–648 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9484-8<br /><br />b) "(...) your arguments seem (...) contrived to oppose Thomistic reasoning (...) there is not a contradiction in Thomistic theology."<br /><br />I don't think there's a contradiction in either Thomistic theology or philosophy.<br /><br />c) "Thomistic theology (...) teaches, in a very organized way what has been Christian tradition from the beginning."<br /><br />Yes, evidently, but I'm not Christian, so the alignment between Christian tradition and Thomistic philosophy doesn't play a particularly strong role in how I approach it. I look at Thomistic philosophy as a philosophical system, to be considered by itself on its own merits as a philosophy.<br /><br />That doesn't mean the point itself isn't relevant. If, at some point, I convert into Christianity, this alignment would indeed come to the forefront and become *very* relevant. For now, though, that still isn't the case for me.<br /><br />d) "(...) and nothing, in fact has been shown to be false about what my senses reveal to my mind."<br /><br />This is somewhat off-topic, but scientific research shows a broad range of sensorial perceptions that are factually wrong, and thus require extensive rational work to be either corrected or, when its correction isn't possible, conformed with.<br /><br />The paradigmatic example of such an error is about what's moving, the Earth or the skies. Our senses falsely tell us it's the skies that move and that the Earth, excluding the occasional earthquake, is pretty much fixed in place. This false sensorial perception cannot be corrected, so we're left conforming ourselves to the fact we cannot stop perceiving this falsely, and must compensate this defective perception by means of our rational faculties.<br /><br />That's why understanding the precise source of the premises axiomatically adopted by philosophical systems is important, as at least on some occasions what seems evident, or even self-evident, actually isn't.<br />Alexander Gieghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12282340926229637743noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29815208731121438592022-01-03T12:07:41.810-08:002022-01-03T12:07:41.810-08:00@Alexander Gieg,
"the boundary between first...@Alexander Gieg,<br /><br />"the boundary between first and second theologies"<br /><br />I really do not understand what you mean by that. To me, insisting that axioms come before absolute truth is just a denial that there is such a thing as absolute truth, the existence of which we can know with what our senses reveal to our minds before we try to cursively express anything about it at all.<br /><br />You may not see this, but your arguments seem vague to me. They lack precise definitions and have a sense of being contrived to oppose Thomistic reasoning to me. This may not be fair, but I don't see any of it as causing me to say, "Oh, there's a contradiction in Thomistic theology", rather than thinking that it is just trying to avoid seeing that there is not a contradiction in Thomistic theology.<br /><br />Not that Thomistic theology is perfect, but, in fact, it teaches, in a very organized way what has been Christian tradition from the beginning.<br /><br />Look out and watch the wind blowing through a field of wheat. Saying that nothing of absolute truth can be perceived in it is like saying, "but the wind blowing through the wheat has a contradiction in it because ... epsilontics, field extensions, the point at infinity, Cristoffel symbols, etc ... and nothing, in fact has been shown to be false about what my senses reveal to my mind.<br /><br />I do not know whether or not you would recognize it, but that last argument is metaphysics right out of the Bible (around Romans 1:20).<br /><br />Watching the wind waving through a field of wheat is so transcendently beautiful that it reveals transcendent truth to any mind willing to receive it.<br /><br />Tom Cohoe<br /><br />PS - There are descriptions of nature in the Old Testament (eg, in Job) in which the words themselves are transcendently beautiful (we may call this, perhaps, poetry - the cursive revelation of beauty).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16477056600130972522022-01-03T11:31:11.717-08:002022-01-03T11:31:11.717-08:00The damned souls, I think, are much like the Ringw...The damned souls, I think, are much like the Ringwraiths, the Nine servants of Sauron and the ring, so utterly corrupted that their humanity has been disfigured, irreversibly disfigured. Human nature is not destroyed, but in a way they are no longer humans, but ghosts, shadows and wraiths. <br /><br />Spiritual treatises often portray the damned as souls in agony, crying for help, lamenting the loss of heaven, and their sinful, unrepentant lives. It is awful to think that this soul will remain in hell unto the ages of ages. But, of course, this is only a literary device. If a man in hell could for a fleeting moment lament his loss and remember with affection his life on earth, his parents and his home, he would not be beyond help, beyond redemption. We have a tendency to think about a damned soul as an homo viator phisically present in Hell, and we can not bear to think he will be there forever. But that is indeed a lack of imagination. There is nothing left in the hearts of the damned, but bitterness, fear and a despair full of hate. Luiz Felipehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12632328789890118692noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-87703052191223900902022-01-03T05:31:43.855-08:002022-01-03T05:31:43.855-08:00Thank you, and, wow, I think I needed that. I thin...Thank you, and, wow, I think I needed that. I think your post you linked has changed my mind. Obviously I was not paying enough attention, and along the way maybe read some poor exposition on the subject. I have held this belief for a while now, this is quite a jolt. A.https://www.blogger.com/profile/03584985012740841368noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26182609096015577512022-01-02T11:57:00.597-08:002022-01-02T11:57:00.597-08:00@grodrigues: True, but if we refuse infinitesimals...@grodrigues: True, but if we refuse infinitesimals as positively descriptive, we must similarly refuse infinities as positively descriptive, which leaves us with an apophatic definition: "different from that which has boundaries."Alexander Gieghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12282340926229637743noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14098802265218902302022-01-02T09:18:12.754-08:002022-01-02T09:18:12.754-08:00@Alexander Gieg:
"The default is for a tiny ...@Alexander Gieg:<br /><br />"The default is for a tiny bit of materiality to be retained by the departed, not out of necessity, but because God is merciful enough. That amount might be arbitrarily close to zero, that is, "epsilon", in the mathematical sense of the absolutely smallest amount greater than zero that isn't exactly zero, equivalent to "0.00000...infinitely-many-zeroes...00001" (the "dx" and "dy" of calculus)."<br /><br />Quibbling, because that is my middle name, there is no such thing as "absolutely smallest amount greater than zero that isn't exactly zero". There isn't and there can't be (subject to some fairly minimal hypothesis).<br /><br />For starters, the real line has the Archimedean property so any positive number smaller than all 1/n, for n natural is necessarily 0.<br /><br />The next observation is to note that it is possible to construct *extensions* of the real line that violate the Archimedean property and have positive, non-zero elements smaller than all 1/n for all natural n, called "infinitesimals" for more or less obvious reasons. These still are *not* "absolutely smallest amount greater than zero that isn't exactly zero". There is a famous undergraduate book doing Calculus this way (whose name I already forgot) that sidesteps most of the logical machinery (ultraproducts, reflection principles, etc.) needed to actually construct such things and just presents an axiomatics. And non-Archimedean analysis is a field of its own.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-13049212858248134642022-01-02T07:44:09.705-08:002022-01-02T07:44:09.705-08:00@Tom:
a) "Metaphysicians acknowledge that th...@Tom:<br /><br />a) "Metaphysicians acknowledge that they can't do this"<br /><br />That depends on the philosophical school such a Metaphysician follows, as the axioms assumed by different schools vary. Scholastic Metaphysicians do as you say, while others don't.<br /><br />I myself tend more towards Meontology than Ontology, so I don't think in terms of infinite minds except in an apophatic manner. But I appreciate learning the different ways Ontologically-oriented Metaphysicians do that, including, evidently, Neoscholastic ones.<br /><br />b) "Do you actually know what these set views [on the afterlife] are?"<br /><br />I believe I do, as I've read about several of them, both from within and without Christian thought, some more in depth, some less. Although, evidently, I don't know all of them.<br /><br />c) "Do you know what sacred tradition is?"<br /><br />Yes, but as a gentile I evaluate arguments provided by a tradition's authority chain as assumptions, and their conclusions more as logically valid or invalid "assuming that..." than as true or false.<br /><br />d) "Have you heard of divine revelation?"<br /><br />Yes. I know Aquina's argument, on his commentary to Boethius, on how Metaphysics, although first on the order of philosophical knowledge, comes second to revealed theology, as revealed theology provides the conclusions of fully developed reasonings we don't and cannot have access to, and these conclusions, in turn, provides the axiomatic premises for Metaphysical reasoning as second theology.<br /><br />This is an extremely clever way to connect the different modes of knowledge, and it's certainly valid (in the sense I provided in "c", above).<br /><br />e) You may consider my question, thus, as concerning the boundary between first and second theologies.<br /><br />Am I to understand, then, that the point I questioned about pertains to first theology, that is, that Neoscholastic thought doesn't have access to the underlying proof, and thus it assumes that unknown proof's conclusion in an axiomatic manner, proceeding from there?Alexander Gieghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12282340926229637743noreply@blogger.com