tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post1055860283184631423..comments2024-03-27T23:49:45.668-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Hitchens, Dawkins, and CraigEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger183125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-43825076931547526702012-02-21T22:05:02.029-08:002012-02-21T22:05:02.029-08:00Well...hmm...
I remember Peter Kreefts words in r...Well...hmm...<br /><br />I remember Peter Kreefts words in refusing to debate a deconstructionalist primarily because they lack integrity (which is a necessary conclusion from such a universal standard of judgment). So in a way, if Dawkins has the equivolent, albeit "apparent" view of William, I suppose his dismissal makes sense. <br /><br />What doesn't make sense, however, is debating with only Bishops/Cardinals/Popes...It seems as if his point here is merely this: Those who are in authority, which of itself is a fallacy. <br /><br />While the clergy are educated in philosophy, their given vocation may not be toward debate or even philosophy itself. Laity should be respected in their field, simply for what they know, rather than what position they hold. <br /><br />As for characterizing William C. as absurd as a deconstructionalist, I'd have to conclude that would not be true or fair. In any case, not entering into a debate does not give us the right to impute motives on Dawkins. Calling him a Coward to me is merely a device that detracts from arguments. While I can empathize with frustration on him not being open to dialogue, I must say we should be careful not to market the same tactics of fallacious reasoning many in the Athiestic Agenda employ. We ought to not only espouse a Christian philosophy, but live it to...FYI - preaching this to myself as well.<br /><br />Deacon ChrisAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-36889854310910167102012-01-09T09:45:53.773-08:002012-01-09T09:45:53.773-08:00Ray Ingles said...
DNW - "No I would not...Ray Ingles said...<br /><br /> DNW - "No I would not accept your argument."<br /><br /> I didn't ask you to accept it. I asked you if you would classify it as an argument at all, whether good or bad. You went on for a while working to classify it as a bad argument, so apparently you do, actually, think it's an argument."<br /><br /><br />Ray, <br /><br />On the restricted matter of whether or not I think or acknowledge that you have made an argument of some kind.<br /><br />Why don't we clarify, for the future, what such a presumably tacit admission such as you suppose, might actually imply or not imply.<br /><br />To do so, let's refer to a what is probably a well-known passage, one with which we were all once immediately familiar.<br /><br /><br />"Although the process of inference is not of interest to logicians, corresponding to every possible inference is an argument, and it is with these arguments that logic is chiefly concerned. An argument, in this sense, is any group of propositions of which one is claimed to follow from the others, which are regarded as providing grounds for the truth of that one." Irving Copi<br /><br />Now, since you seem to believe that some of the propositions you mooted provide grounds for concluding the truth of some other propositions which you either stated or imply, then I think that it is fair to say that I assume that you believe that you have made, or are in the process of making, some kind of argument or another.<br /><br />In order to say so I do not have to conclude that the structure of your assumed argument is coherent or valid or would lead anywhere, nor that some of the premisses would in fact technically follow from others, nor that any of the premisses are themselves sound propositions.<br /><br />I hope this helps to clarify the matter.DNWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83407498484400499892012-01-09T05:59:12.048-08:002012-01-09T05:59:12.048-08:00I remember chatting with Craig after a debate with...I remember chatting with Craig after a debate with an athiest at the University of Maryland. About a dozen people were around Craig asking him questions and he was very charitable. I recall mentioning to him a quote by Peter Kreeft relevant to something that came up in the debate. Craig was very interested in the quote and discussed it with me and asked a few questions on the subject. He was a very nice guy.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83090455827996200872012-01-07T15:11:00.610-08:002012-01-07T15:11:00.610-08:00To caracterize William Lane Craig inner testimony ...To caracterize William Lane Craig inner testimony of the Holy Spirit as voices in my head is a great stretch..<br /><br />one must go to Alvin Plantinga and look for his pressuposionalist defence, reformed epistemology and his doctrine of basic beliefs, like the belief that I really had lived 5 minutes ago and not pop up with this memories now.<br /><br />Would be awesome if crimes were commited in front of judges, but until there, the only guy who knows you didn't commit a murder is you and the murdered, even if the real murder make all evidence look like it was you.<br /><br />And if you don't have any reason to distrust your senses, if they work properly, you can rely on your inner witness, while members of other religions, which think they have this witness (another stretch, a budist have a very different way to feel "God", like a oneness with nature) but in reality, and by evidence, they don't.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29604594201067780502012-01-07T07:23:32.316-08:002012-01-07T07:23:32.316-08:00DNW - "No I would not accept your argument.&q...DNW - <i>"No I would not accept your argument."</i><br /><br />I didn't ask you to accept it. I asked you if you would classify it as an argument at all, whether good or bad. You went on for a while working to classify it as a bad argument, so apparently you do, actually, think it's an argument.<br /><br />Maybe someday we'll come back and address some of your points about it (of course, you attacked the baby-talk version of it, which was deliberately 'strawmanned' to show its (essential?) nature as an argument at all, not meant to actually establish a case). Be well until then.Ray Ingleshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16290483120987779339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9851786773504279532012-01-06T14:16:26.628-08:002012-01-06T14:16:26.628-08:00Ray Ingles writes:
" 'To summarize thing...Ray Ingles writes:<br /><br />" 'To summarize things even further: "Me have inner life. If materialism, then inner life come from brain. Live humans with functional brains all seem to process about same. So, reason to assume inner life for them too.'<br /><br />That's only an outline of an argument, though I've linked to something that fleshes out a few sections of it.<br /><br />Now, before we walk hand-in-hand down such a garden path... does this seem like something you could accept as an argument (whether or not it's a good or bad argument)? "<br /><br /><br />I don't know what it's supposed to be an argument for: The previously mooted categorical proposition that, " ... all men have a qualitatively identical inner life ..." ?<br /><br />Because that is not what you are even trying to argue in what you now present.<br /><br />Perhaps what you are now trying to argue is not about "all men" as a class of beings, but about the existence of Some Men that, as near as you can tell, have brains which Probably present them with Qualitatively Similar experiences to that of Some Other Men: *assuming* that these subjects have brains that are shown to work the same way, and that the brains that are shown to work the same way are undamaged or unwarped, and that we would on materialist premisses somehow still be justified in saying the following: That of the number of those potentially similar brains which do not in fact work in the same way because of "defect", it would nonetheless be correct on some grounds or other to continue to impute to them membership in the class of Similarly Working Brains. Which is technically speaking, a class to which they do not on strict empirical grounds really belong. But imputed nonetheless, despite the fact that as good little materialists we don't believe in concepts like teleology, or in the way things "properly should be because of some essential nature they possess"<br /><br /><br /><br />By the way, your "Me have inner life" bit is irrelevant to making your case that an inner life (of some unspecified kind or quality) exists in any human having a brain, and that therefore if possessing a functioning brain, then experiencing an inner life. <br /><br />It's simply not needed if you wish to stipulate that a functioning brain necessarily means an inner life ... of some kind or another<br /><br />The developed, "Me have inner life", "You like-same me", "You got same inner life too", is in fact a nice example of a rather famous fallacy used to illustrate logic texts. See, C. West Churchman, "Elements of logic and formal science" 1940, for an example.<br /><br />So,<br /><br />No I would not accept your argument. And I certainly would not, to answer your question, accept it "whether or not it's a good or bad argument"<br /><br /><br />And now I think I'll bow out of this conversation since it's obvious that we are merely chewing up Feser's bandwidth to no good end.<br /><br />You of course, are free to do as you wish. And I am sure that some are still waiting patiently for you to develop your argument. Whatever that argument might be.DNWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-70735159701535703812012-01-06T13:25:25.985-08:002012-01-06T13:25:25.985-08:00The Deuce,
My reason for saying that proof only e...The Deuce,<br /><br />My reason for saying that proof only exists in mathematics is, as Anonymous @7:50 says, is that all the terms used in a mathematical proof are self-contained. Mathematics does not refer to anything outside of itself. This is not the case in metaphysics, or in science.<br /><br />Now I do not say that metaphysics has no rational arguments, but how logical they are depends on agreeing with certain assumptions and on the univocal definition of the terms used. If one disagrees with the conclusions, it is seldom difficult to find an assumption that was used that one can disagree with. So how does one adjudicate between assuming X versus assuming Y?<br /><br />The best answer I can give to that question is to use abduction, that is, what overall view of everything does one get assuming X versus assuming Y, and then just choosing one or the other as "most plausible". But then what does that mean? Well, one can make some stabs at it, like coherency, and agreement with experience, but there isn't (in metaphysics) any <i>objective</i> way to be certain one has made the right choice. So I think at bottom it is just an intuitive choice.<br /><br />Which should make sense, since metaphysics is about more than the objective, and to assume that only the objective is real is, of course, a metaphysical choice, one that I strongly disagree with.<br /><br />You said:<br /><br /><i>If you mean *objectively* more plausible, as in closer to the truth, or "would be more likely to be believed true by a perfectly reasonable person given the same information", then you are affirming the status of reason as a guide to truth, and so aren't a post-modernist (at least in the sense that I meant it, as a deconstructionist/relativist about truth and logic).</i><br /><br />I agree and disagree with this. One could say that I used the word 'objective' in a somewhat different sense than you do here, but I think this difference is relevant. One thing I agree with in postmodernist thinking (at least as Rorty put it) is that there are different kinds of truth, that different intellectual activities have differing methods of arriving at their kind of truth. They all use reason, but they have different kinds of criteria. For example, science uses experiments on objects, while law courts depend on apparent trustworthiness of witnesses, historians depend on apparent authenticity of documents, and so forth. So what do metaphysicians use?<br /><br />In my opinion, the discipline that metaphysics is closest to is, as it turns out, mathematics, in that there is nothing outside the system against which it can be tested. Except perhaps one, and that is the effect a commitment to the system has on the metaphysician. Now I do think there is an absolutely true "way things are", but since we can't look to see what that is, the only clue we might have is to consider those effects ("by their fruits you will know them"), but then that raises further issues and I've gone on long enough.SRnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80398227457210285512012-01-06T10:17:28.103-08:002012-01-06T10:17:28.103-08:00DNW - "Please refer to my post of yesterday, ...DNW - <i>"Please refer to my post of yesterday, January 5, 2012 1:50 PM"</i><br /><br />I refer you to my post of January 5, 2012 6:01 AM, where I outlined an argument and didn't get a response.<br /><br />To summarize things even further: "Me have inner life. If materialism, then inner life come from brain. Live humans with functional brains all seem to process about same. So, reason to assume inner life for them too."<br /><br />That's only an outline of an argument, though I've linked to something that fleshes out a few sections of it.<br /><br />Now, before we walk hand-in-hand down such a garden path... does this seem like something you could accept as an argument (whether or not it's a good or bad argument)?<br /><br /><i>"And hey, you didn't even thank me for saving you from further embarassment regarding Gould's scientifically fraudulent polemic."</i><br /><br />I referred to it as an illustration of <i>historic</i> 'scientific' racism, but your cautions are welcome. You're quite correct that Gould was demonstrably wrong about Morton; other points, such as "g", are... <a href="http://www.cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/weblog/523.html" rel="nofollow">a little more nuanced</a>, at the very least.Ray Ingleshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16290483120987779339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44646142465268427612012-01-06T09:15:29.469-08:002012-01-06T09:15:29.469-08:00@Anonymous (continued):
"How are you certain...@Anonymous (continued):<br /><br />"How are you certain you have a 'good' definition (one that represents what actually happens) of time and beginning. I submit you don't."<br /><br />For someone who admits that he is a novice at metaphysics you sure have some definite opinions on it. And your comments actually show that the qualifier "ignorant of" is more appropriate.<br /><br />"I go back to quantum mechanics. It wasn't by pure reasoning that one could determine how things worked on a small scale. What gives you the confidence you can accurately do it with 'God'?"<br /><br />I go back to mathematics. What gives you good reason to think the Feit-Thompson theorem is true? Repeat with me: you study the proof. The same with metaphysics; you study the arguments.<br /><br />"But, as Dennett says in the video I posted above. With math you have high confidence in your choosen definitions. When you start cantilevering out with things you really can't confirm in extension of your arguments your confidence plummets."<br /><br />This is hopelessly confused. What does it mean to have high confidence in chosen definitions? And sticking to mathematics, you really cannot confirm anything in mathematics outside the arguments offered, so what exactly are you trying to say?<br /><br />If you wish to maintain that rational arguments are not enough for the *empirical sciences*, whoever disputed that? If you wish to maintain that rational arguments are not enough, full stop, then no rational argument you can provide is enough to substantiate the claim that "rational arguments are not enough" -- in other words it is a self-refuting position.<br /><br />Bottom line: clear your mind of cant (as Dr. Johnson admonished), drop the self-refuting scientism, go read a book.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57860612468801746642012-01-06T09:14:40.809-08:002012-01-06T09:14:40.809-08:00@Anonymous:
"But, math is built on definitio...@Anonymous:<br /><br />"But, math is built on definitions and axioms of your choosing."<br /><br />The choice of axioms is not arbitrary (which it seems is what you think), rather it is motivated and justified by various sorts of considerations, both mathematical and philosophical, that I will not go into.<br /><br />"Is it true or not then that there is any Euclidean representation in the physical world? There is matter and energy so space is curved, non Euclidean. It's simpler to approximate using Euclidean but its not 'true'."<br /><br />Look, a theory modeling some slice of reality, say General Relativity, uses some mathematical tools and does not use others. So according to GR, our spacetime is a 4d Lorentizan manifold and Einstein's equation connects the distribution of matter and energy to the geometry of the manifold codified by the metric. In particular, and assuming that GR is an accurate picture of reality (which a lot of considerations which I will not go into show that it cannot be), it says that spacetime has only 4 dimensions (and not say 3 or 24 or infinite dimensions) and it has certain *specific* structures (it is a smooth manifold, it is orientable, it has a Lorentizan metric, etc.).<br /><br />What conclusion do you want to draw from this? The status of Euclidean geometry as a *mathematical* theory has not changed one iota. Sure, it is not anymore a good model for physical spacetime (although only at the large scale or in "unusual" conditions, as Engineers in most cases continually to operate in blissful ignorance of GR), but so what?<br /><br />"I'm not so convinced (and I'm a novice at metaphysics) how you can be so certain about your definitions of 'categories', 'universals', 'purpose', etc. Especially when applied to the non material world. How are you confident of your guesses about how the material and non material world interact?"<br /><br />This is a very stupid question. The proof of say Feit-Thompson's theorem takes up some 200 pages of difficult mathematics. How are mathematicians sure that there is not an error somewhere in there? Well, they *study* the proof...<br /><br />Besides, what is causation? what is order? what is a physical law? Physics *presupposes* these notions, all of them metaphysical at bottom, so if you follow the rules of your game consistently, your skepticism entails skepticism of the natural sciences themselves.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-48149503622413158402012-01-06T08:02:54.384-08:002012-01-06T08:02:54.384-08:00Ray Ingles says today...
DNW - We already had...Ray Ingles says today...<br /><br /> DNW - We already had a "normative" argument: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2011/10/reading-rosenberg-part-i.html<br /><br /> You apparently want to have another one, but ..." January 6, 2012 7:13 AM<br /><br /><br />Hold on Ray. Please refer to my post of yesterday, January 5, 2012 1:50 PM. It is only the last and latest in a series of invitations to you yesterday, and in this very thread - using Edward Feser's bandwidth - to post whatever the hell argument you want to post.<br /><br />To wit: <br /><br />"If that is what you wish to argue - mere alternate means by which you shall establish that " 'all men have a qualitatively identical inner life' "; without suggesting any additive implications which you have elsewhere implied the notion of a soul has been used to formulate, then please, by all means, go right ahead and do it."<br /><br /><br />Or earlier that same day, at January 5, 2012 12:03 PM<br /><br /><br />"It's your argument - if there is an argument waiting poised somewhere - to make Ray.<br /><br />Set your premisses and draw your inferences any way your wish. You can continue to talk about rainbows and how they make you feel, if you feel compelled to do so and think that it demonstrates some philosophical point."<br /><br /><br />See Ray? You are and have been free to make any argument you want. You have had not only my permission but my repeated and explicit invitations to do so.<br /><br />Hiding behind me now, and implying that I am stopping you from doing so because the day before yesterday I surmised some logical implications which someone taking up your position on class membership and attribute possession would eventually face, is highly unconvincing.<br /><br />You are in fact coming off as a real autistic case.<br /><br />And hey, you didn't even thank me for saving you from further embarassment regarding Gould's scientifically fraudulent polemic. Think of the ongoing embarassement you would suffer if I had, without comment or warning, allowed you to continue to strut around citing that book as if it were some kind of fact filled gospel.<br /><br />Yet, not a word of thanks.<br /><br />That makes you seem ungrateful, as well.<br /><br />So, you go ahead and do or don't as seems safest to you. It's all the same to me either way.DNWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19800132931865338202012-01-06T07:50:22.160-08:002012-01-06T07:50:22.160-08:00The Duece,
"This already puts you ahead of t...The Duece,<br /><br />"This already puts you ahead of the guy grodriges responded to who, if his claims are actually taken at face value, indicated that mathematical findings are subject to empirical confirmation/disconfirmation. And remember, math follows from logic, not the other way around, so it <b>should</b> at least be worth looking into whether proof is possible in other areas."<br /><br />I notice the equivocation. I'm open to being corrected regarding math. But, math is built on definitions and axioms of your choosing. Whether the mathematical model you are using has any relevance to the world can still be in question. How about this? Changing the definitions (constraints, add more or leaving some out) lead to vastly different results. ie. Euclidean and Non Euclidean geometry. Is it true or not then that there is any Euclidean representation in the physical world? There is matter and energy so space is curved, non Euclidean. It's simpler to approximate using Euclidean but its not 'true'.<br /><br />I'm not so convinced (and I'm a novice at metaphysics) how you can be so certain about your definitions of 'categories', 'universals', 'purpose', etc. Especially when applied to the non material world. How are you confident of your guesses about how the material and non material world interact?<br /><br />How are you certain you have a 'good' definition (one that represents what actually happens) of time and beginning. I submit you don't. <br /><br />I go back to quantum mechanics. It wasn't by pure reasoning that one could determine how things worked on a small scale. What gives you the confidence you can accurately do it with 'God'?<br /><br />"If you mean *objectively* more plausible, as in closer to the truth, or "would be more likely to be believed true by a perfectly reasonable person given the same information", then you are affirming the status of reason as a guide to truth, and so aren't a post-modernist."<br /><br />I probably wouldn't argue with that. If you'd like to say math is true, I'll agree. But, as Dennett says in the video I posted above. With math you have high confidence in your choosen definitions. When you start cantilevering out with things you really can't confirm in extension of your arguments your confidence plummets. <br /><br />I'm open to being wrong because I'm not certain. I prefer to think in confidence intervals and relative probability.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42081605967432664812012-01-06T07:13:57.041-08:002012-01-06T07:13:57.041-08:00DNW - We already had a "normative" argum...DNW - We already <i>had</i> a "normative" argument: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2011/10/reading-rosenberg-part-i.html<br /><br />You apparently want to have another one, but that wasn't what I was going for. I was addressing one specific point, and referred to that page for that purpose.<br /><br />If you want to talk about further implications, that's a separate issue.Ray Ingleshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16290483120987779339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42925099191633755992012-01-06T05:53:39.141-08:002012-01-06T05:53:39.141-08:00Hi, SR:
In particular, I regard "proof"...Hi, SR:<br /><br /><i>In particular, I regard "proof" as something that only occurs in mathematics.</i><br /><br />This already puts you ahead of the guy grodriges responded to who, if his claims are actually taken at face value, indicated that mathematical findings are subject to empirical confirmation/disconfirmation. And remember, math follows from logic, not the other way around, so it should at least be worth looking into whether proof is possible in other areas.<br /><br /><br /><i>but it does mean that I consider it unreasonable to think one can arrive at metaphysical certainty.</i><br /><br />The obvious question here is, "How certain are you about that?" because the claim that it's unreasonable to think you can arrive at metaphysical certainty is itself a claim about metaphysics (and specifically our place in it), which you think that reason objectively shows.<br /><br /><br /><i>The best one can hope for is to think that one's metaphysical position is more plausible, taking everything into consideration... than all others one knows about. Reason being the means of judging plausibility.</i><br /><br />Well, of course everyone's own position is most plausible *to them*, which is what makes it their position. If you mean *objectively* more plausible, as in closer to the truth, or "would be more likely to be believed true by a perfectly reasonable person given the same information", then you are affirming the status of reason as a guide to truth, and so aren't a post-modernist (at least in the sense that I meant it, as a deconstructionist/relativist about truth and logic).The Deucehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09664665914768916965noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-64181473526732986842012-01-05T16:23:30.717-08:002012-01-05T16:23:30.717-08:00The Deuce,
"I'm not sure if that is post...The Deuce,<br /><br />"I'm not sure if that is postmodernism, but I would like to hear how you would react to it."<br /><br />Me too.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-62763856022983653822012-01-05T15:44:11.547-08:002012-01-05T15:44:11.547-08:00Ray Ingles writes,
"Examples?"
Try foll...Ray Ingles writes,<br />"Examples?"<br /><br />Try following your link to your own page.<br /><br />Now, you can quit stalling and get busy making whatever argument you earlier implied you were about to make, or not.<br /><br />It's up to you, Ray. And it's all the same to me either way.DNWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6993576622049080222012-01-05T14:10:54.314-08:002012-01-05T14:10:54.314-08:00DNW - "without suggesting any additive implic...DNW - <i>"without suggesting any additive implications which you have elsewhere implied the notion of a soul has been used to formulate"</i><br /><br />Examples?Ray Ingleshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16290483120987779339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40394504407563783852012-01-05T13:50:03.615-08:002012-01-05T13:50:03.615-08:00Ray Ingles says,
" all I'm trying to do ...Ray Ingles says,<br /><br />" all I'm trying to do is demonstrate the possibility of alternate means of reaching the conclusion that "all men have a qualitatively identical inner life"."<br /><br />If that is what you wish to argue - mere alternate means by which you shall establish that " 'all men have a qualitatively identical inner life' "; without suggesting any additive implications which you have elsewhere implied the notion of a soul has been used to formulate, then please, by all means, go right ahead and do it.<br /><br />But once again, and before we go too much further, I'll take the liberty of pointing out that you had previously modified the terms of the issue being mooted from a categorical proposition formulated in universal affirmative terms, to something very much less than that.<br /><br />Now, if you are convinced that saying that "some men" or "most men" have substantially similar qualitative inner lives constitutes a sound major premiss for deducing the conclusion that "all men have a qualitatively identical inner life", then again, for the umpteenth time, go ahead and make your argument.<br /><br />You don't have to stop every few moments, in effect asking, "Am I doing alright? Do you agree so far?" LOLDNWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27788048835297446202012-01-05T12:42:26.691-08:002012-01-05T12:42:26.691-08:00DNW - "the social claims you (apparently) wis...DNW - <i>"the social claims you (apparently) wish to eventually make."</i><br /><br />I'm curious what you think those might be.<br /><br />The way the conversation went, from my perspective: You stated that that 'nominalist materialists' have "no definitional reason to assume that all men have a qualitatively identical inner life".<br /><br />I agreed with the "no <i>definitional</i> reason", but pointed out that they could have other reasons, and outlined an example.<br /><br />You apparently think I'm trying to establish some social policy thereby. However, all I'm trying to do is demonstrate the possibility of alternate means of reaching the conclusion that "all men have a qualitatively identical inner life".Ray Ingleshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16290483120987779339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25022805227082704292012-01-05T12:14:43.464-08:002012-01-05T12:14:43.464-08:00@The Deuce,
I just wonder when [naturalists will]...@The Deuce,<br /><br /><i>I just wonder when [naturalists will] be *fully* consistent in embracing their newfound post-modernism and stop presenting themselves as hard-headed disciples of "evidence", "science", "objectivity", and "reason".</i><br /><br />Though I am not a naturalist, I am also not unsympathetic to some post-modernist moves. In particular, I regard "proof" as something that only occurs in mathematics. This does not mean that I consider reason to be absent in other areas -- in particular in metaphysics -- but it does mean that I consider it unreasonable to think one can arrive at metaphysical certainty. The best one can hope for is to think that one's metaphysical position is more plausible, taking everything into consideration (including a multitude of varying revelations), than all others one knows about. Reason being the means of judging plausibility.<br /><br />I'm not sure if that is postmodernism, but I would like to hear how you would react to it.SRnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69015402945866793262012-01-05T12:03:15.199-08:002012-01-05T12:03:15.199-08:00Ray Ingles writes,
"Live humans with functio...Ray Ingles writes,<br /><br />"Live humans with functional brains' isn't precise enough?<br /><br />January 5, 2012 10:55 AM"<br /><br /><br />It's your argument - if there is an argument waiting poised somewhere - to make Ray.<br /><br />Set your premisses and draw your inferences any way your wish. You can continue to talk about rainbows and how they make you feel, if you feel compelled to do so and think that it demonstrates some philosophical point. <br /><br />You can also talk about Mandelbrot sets, or for that matter anything else that doesn't test the limits of our host's no doubt wearing-thin patience, and adds light rather than mere heat.<br /><br />As I have told you repeatedly, you don't need my permission.<br /><br />Just remember that this isn't a Socratic dialog, and I am not obligated to applaud your gropings toward your goal, whatever that might be; just to judge for myself whether your reasoning is adequate to substantiate the social claims you (apparently) wish to eventually make.DNWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-21711207848983450302012-01-05T11:59:03.804-08:002012-01-05T11:59:03.804-08:00"E.H. Munro - I didn't think it was your ..."E.H. Munro - I didn't think it was your site. Just seemed your style, that's all. :)<br /><br />I mean, it was a higher priority to point out you found her unattractive than to accuse her of hypocrisy. Obviously, though, she would have been right if you'd found her attractive."<br /><br />Hmmmm, could you point out where in the following statement I made any remark to her looks at all?<br /><br />"I could point out to Rebecca Watson that when you openly and publicly sexualize other people on your blog you’re not on very solid ground, by your own retarded standards, complaining about other people sexualizing you. This before getting into the cold hard reality that your “rights” stopped long before they reached that guy’s brain. (Or anyone else’s brain for that matter, aren’t you supposed to be rational? Do I really have to explain the concept of “Keep you hands off my body and my mind” to a bloody feminist?) Oh, and that whole feminist canard about men “taking advantages of power differences”, would that be like you using a public forum in front of dozens of gnus to publicly humiliate a couple of your coreligionists for having the gall to disagree with you? Doubly funny as your victims were fematheists too. Were you channeling your inner Phallocrat? Yeah, you’re a pretty rude person too. Not that there’s anything unusual in that amongst the gnu herd."<br /><br />Because I'm not seeing anything in that statement about her looks at all. Her hypocrisy and manners, on the other hand...<br /><br />As for her "being right if she were good looking" that's a complete non-sequitir (I understand logic isn't really plentiful there in the gnu herd, so you're just going to have to break down and acquire some). And as my humour requires a little thought, it has nothing in common with the sorts of websites you apparently prefer reading.E.H. Munrohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09038816873823422488noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14080441750974837272012-01-05T11:13:48.290-08:002012-01-05T11:13:48.290-08:00the Mandelbrot Set might 'exist' in some s...<i>the Mandelbrot Set might 'exist' in some sense - but it's not at all clear it has any causal power.</i><br /><br />Well, it clearly has causal power, because it has caused you and me to comment on it.<br /><br />Of course if you define causality strictly in terms of physical force, then it doesn't. It isn't a physical thing (and possibly, neither are you and me).goddinpottynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12243340634243821902012-01-05T10:59:22.771-08:002012-01-05T10:59:22.771-08:00DNW - "Has this become the new line of argume...DNW - <i>"Has this become the new line of argument for materialists and atheists who wish to preserve the scent of essences while dumping the concept?"</i><br /><br />I don't recall posting any arguments with regard to anything like that yet. But if the word 'fractal' makes you break out in hives, substitute the value of pi or the abstract concept of the triangle. Again, there intuitively seems a sense that they 'exist' - but on the other hand, there seems no way they could exert any causal power.Ray Ingleshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16290483120987779339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57641880939803443712012-01-05T10:55:27.581-08:002012-01-05T10:55:27.581-08:00DNW - "But once again, if you wish to make ca...DNW - <i>"But once again, if you wish to make categorical claims regarding a certain class of objects while refraining from stipulating precisely how you determine membership in the class, or what it is exactly that constitutes membership in the class, go ahead and make your argument."</i><br /><br />'Live humans with functional brains' isn't precise enough?Ray Ingleshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16290483120987779339noreply@blogger.com