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Monday, July 13, 2026
Anscombe on human dignity
My essay “Misunderstanding
“Human Dignity,’” which discusses some illuminating things Elizabeth
Anscombe had to say about the subject, appears today at Postliberal Order.
What is different about humans that makes you so shocked that some people see no difference between murdering humans and being non-vegetarian? You've spoken of vegetarianism as one of the most shocking, absurd things in all of human history, right up there alongside infanticide.
I can't speak for Ed, but one of the basic issues to my mind is this: Let's grant for the sake of argument that humans are not meaningfully different from other animals (at least not different enough so as to make a moral difference here). Then either animals are "elevated" to the level of humans, at which point we can hold them responsible, morally speaking, for killing and/or eating other animals. Or, we humans "collapse" down to the level of other brutes, at which point we are simply animals doing what it is that animals sometimes do, namely eating and killing other animals.
The former position is highly counter-intuitive and even more impractical to effectively enforce well. The latter position largely hollows out the substance of the vegetarian's moral objection to eating meat.
So in short, either humans are unique, or, if they are not, then by that very fact the issue ceases to matter.
I'd be interested in what Dr. Feser has to say too, but he is of course busy. I am interested in this topic and have heard many arguments related to it, so here's one. The answer animal rights activists and the like tend to give to the dilemma ccmnxc presented is that there is a difference between moral patients and moral agents - moral agents can have moral responsibilities even to those incapable of morality who cannot be held responsible for their own actions. Note that this is widely accepted for humans. For instance, a young child or someone with a severe mental illness may be incapable of understanding morality and may cause harm to others, yet moral human adults aren't allowed to do things such as eat them. (There may be cases, such as self-defense, in which harming someone could be moral, but this generally doesn't include eating them.)
Now, natural law theorists do have a response to this: humans have a rational essence and other animals don't, and it's this essence that leads to the possession of rights, even if circumstances such as age, sickness, or the like inhabit the actual exercise of those capacities. This is why it's a defect if a human cannot reason but not a defect if other animals cannot, just like it's a defect if a sparrow has no wings but not a defect if a human has no wings. Feser has discussed this argument in some previous articles. But even if there are such essences... I think it could be argued that rights do depend on actual capacities instead of essence. Note that moral responsibility seems to depend on capacity - even if, say, young children have a moral essence, they will not be held morally responsible if they cannot actually act morally. Moral responsibility is not exactly a right, but humans who have serious limitations in actual reasoning are often restricted in their privacy and freedom to move, and generally have no right to vote, for instance.
Am I saying that it's fine to kill humans who cannot reason? Absolutely not! The point here is that perhaps rights such as the right to life may depend on a capacity other than rationality or moral agency. The discussion so far has taken certain ideas for granted: there are essences, nonhuman animals cannot reason or act morally, and rights-talk is the best (or a good) way of spelling out our moral obligations. Each of these assumptions can and has been questioned, but I worry that if I go too deep into them, we may go too far afield. With that said, I do think considering why death is a harm (if it is a harm) is important when considering a right to life. Is it really only rational beings who can be harmed by death? But things get particularly messy when considering religion and the possibility of an afterlife.
Here's a further thing to note: nowadays, we generally think that causing suffering to animals for fun is bad, even if those animals cannot act morally and suffering is common in nature. From what I've heard, thinkers such as Kant and Aquinas argued that this is purely because someone who acts cruelly towards animals corrupts their own character and is more likely to be cruel to humans. But we only have obligations to rational beings, so we may still use nonrational beings for our benefit. Whether we only have obligations to rational beings is also controversial, but even if we accept it, I'm not actually sure if it can justify eating animals and so on by itself. After all, killing animals can also corrupt people's character and make them more likely to kill humans. I don't think this is true in all cases - certainly, some people can kill many nonhuman animals and never harm another human. But it is also possible for some people to torture many nonhuman animals and never harm another human. This might justify killing animals (and causing animal suffering) when necessary to save human lives, but I'm not sure for any reason less important than that.
I seems to recall a article from the Professor were he does touch on the origin of rights. I think it is someting like "Natural Law, Natural Rights and Taxation". There, he does defend than rights are connected to moral duty, so i suppose that he would argue than beings that can't by nature have duties do not have rights.
(Of course, the Imago Dei also would influence Dr. Feser, but that is probably not the place to discuss christianity)
Sure, one can do like Intentionality Anon and cast doubt on the view that we have essences*, but them natural law is not even a thing, so it should be taken for granted when we discuss the status of non-human animals in it.
*the argument about humans with no use of reason was made quite well in a debate between a vegan and a hoppean libertarian one time, i recall, there i can't really find a way out for the non-vegan
I would personally question the existence of essences (and even the existence of rights - though specifically in the sense that I think we do have moral obligations, but there may be better ways of describing them than in terms of rights). However, the main point I was making earlier was actually that even natural law theorists seem to at least implicitly accept that some things seem to depend on actually being able to reason and be moral - not merely having a rational or moral essence, even if such essences do exist. Why does moral accountability depend on actualized moral capacity, not essence (we don't hold infants morally accountable even though they naturally develop into moral beings)? Why do humans who cannot reason tend to be restricted in rights such as privacy, freedom of movement, and voting, but not the right to life? What, in general, determines whether something depends on essence or actual capacity? (It would be obviously absurd to give someone the privileges and responsibilities of a job before they actually have that job, even though they still possess the potential for that job).
Anonymous, I think if rights correspond to duties then the reason the right to life begins at conception is because the duty to steward your life begins at conception (a duty that an embryo can unconsciously exercise) whereas the duty to vote begins later and thus the right to vote begins later, because the nature of voting implies not just having a rational essence but, unlike merely being alive, a conscious use of reason.
I mean, if you do not believe in essences them it is harder to argue for rights. You probably need something like divine command theory. Non-theist alternatives than try to get at moral realism seems unconvincing to me and, like i mentioned before, i guess they probably all fall to the vegan argument from these than do not have use of reason but do have value
. About natural law, i guess that the principle of "ought implies can" does play a role in moral accountability. A toddler is by nature ordered to act well, but he does not have the moral knowledge nor the brain development necessary to choose to act well, so there is not really how to say than he is choosing to act wrong when he throws a tantrum*. In fact, he has the right to be helped to develop these capacities in order to fullfil his duty.
About why people who can't reason can be restricted in freedom, remember than freedom is aways directed to the person good and also the common good. Since someone who cannot reason tend to act against these, they be free to do so would be against this freedom very existence,so these restrictions are natural but we do not tend to restrict their freedom if there is no risk. A toddler is, for instance, not free to beat up his little baby brother or put a fork in a wall outlet, but he is free to play with his toys or to eat alone if he already can do it.
These are not formalized distinctions like what your questions asks for, but i guess they do tend to help the discussion advance. On classical natural law all rights are in the end a consequence of we being ordered naturally to act well, so when looking at what depends on the essence or the actual capacity we need to look at a case by case basis
*just a example, i admit that toddlers capacity to responsability is not my expertise XD
I suspect that Intentionality Anon is bumping up against the nature of moral obligation, itself. I don't know if I can help him, but this occurs to me: as the perennial philosophy would have it, the act that is properly called "the human act", acts that are understood to be quintessentially human and not merely like in kind to what other animals do (like eating), have that character precisely in virtue of being made by a being capable of reason, and made using reason in certain ways. In particular, the human act involves 3 fonts or sources that address the act as folding forth from the rational faculties, and these are accounted as the object of the act as known to the agent, the motive or goal or purpose, and the circumstances he considers (or that he omits to consider). These three are acts of the faculty of reason (and ending in an act of will, which is the intellectual appetite).
And it is these that make an act moral or immoral. Without them, an act BY a human isn't a "human act", it isn't a moral or immoral act, it is non-moral, e.g. a reflex like sneezing, or bleeding when cut. So, noticing that we don't hold babies morally responsible for their acts is just the recognition that they don't yet have control of the faculties of reason and thus their acts fall short of the fonts that make an act characterized by reason operating.
One doesn't need to cotton to "essences" as such, in the A-T sense, to allow that the use of reason characterizes acts that are held to bear moral responsibility.
But clearly IF there are things that are natural KINDS, those that have reason will bear possibilities that those whose natural kinds do not have reason, and this implies at least room for different treatment. Whether to call them "rights" is a further question, sure.
First anonymous who mentioned conception: Interesting! Given that we're talking about unconscious and nonrational processes here, I'm not sure whether a human embryo could be said to have a "duty" in a sense that animals (or indeed any living organisms including plants, bacteria, etc.) do not. Though when I think about it as "humans should be rational," I think I have at least some grasp on why impeding the possibility of a human becoming rational would be considered bad. I've discussed abortion before on this site, and I mentioned that I personally don't think that anything intrinsically bad happens if an organism that has never been conscious dies (if there is something bad, it would be due to the circumstances, such as if someone wanted a child). I'll also note that if the potential for future development specifically matters, that might cover embryos, fetuses, infants, and so on - but by itself, it doesn't cover humans with disorders that prevent them from ever developing rationality.
It also doesn't seem intrinsically bad to me if fertilization fails to happen and a sperm cell or egg cell dies - even though presumably, fertilization is the purpose of sperm and eggs. Now, while contraception is immoral from the Catholic point of view, I don't think even Catholics support maximizing the number of sperm cells and egg cells that fulfill their purpose - celibacy is allowed, for example. I think some would say that it's because a fertilized egg is a complete new organism, while sperm and eggs separately are not. Though there's also the known issue that even people who believe that life should be protected from conception onwards tend to pay much less attention to natural embryo loss than diseases affecting born people (note that while induced abortion involves an intentional act that might be considered worse, both natural embryo loss and disease don't involve such an intentional act).
Second anonymous who mentioned feeling (I'm not sure if you are the same as the first anonymous or not): Yeah, I think something like that might be the best shot at a nontheistic and nonessentialist moral realism, whether it ultimately uses "rights" language or not. So I would disagree with Talmid on whether nontheistic moral realism can be convincing, though that's probably to be expected. And if it does turn out that nontheistic morality entails veganism, alright! Vegans, especially of the nontheistic sort, will be happy. (I'm actually a vegetarian, not a vegan, though I've considered veganism.) As for what he says about moral accountability and freedom, I think that's actually roughly correct as far as it goes. The question is whose well-being we have a reason to promote. And I think that reflecting on the nature of pleasure and suffering shows that they just have a fundamental goodness and badness, respectively. (There may, of course, be forms of pleasure and suffering that depend on rationality, and one might even argue that rationality makes pleasure and suffering more intense - though this is controversial, and may even go the opposite direction. But their basic forms don't seem to require rationality - in fact, intense feelings tend to suppress reasoning, yet they can still be extremely positive or negative.)
Now, even the people who have this view generally admit that it's hard to give any deeper reasons for why it's feelings that matter morally - they might have to appeal to it just being a fundamental truth. This is an issue, as it's easy to just deny, but well, arguably every view bottoms out in some fundamental assumptions eventually. And even if there is a human nature, I don't think our knowledge of it is more secure than our knowledge of the natures of pleasure and suffering. I think the idea that consciousness is what matters at least neatly explains not only why humans who can't reason have moral value, but also why it's wrong to, say, torture animals for fun even if the person doing it is the sort of person who would never harm a human. (It might be unlikely that someone would be like this, but I would think that killing animals when not necessary for human survival is also likely to corrupt one's character, so again, it raises the question of why killing animals isn't wrong even on this account. In fact, contrary to certain stereotypes, many animal rights activists who care about animals for their own sake also strongly emphasize the negative effects human treatment of animals has on humans).
There are some issues, but every view of morality, including natural law theory, also has issues. Here's a quick one that I mentioned before in an abortion discussion, but I'll mention again because it keeps getting brought up - how does the view that consciousness matters deal with people who are asleep or in a temporary coma? I think the best answer is probably that conscious states before and after temporary unconsciousness are connected. And yes, this is a form of potential (and teleology, or at least directedness), but as has been pointed out before, it seems incoherent to deny that these things exist within the mind at least. And even if they exist outside the mind, that doesn't necessarily mean they matter morally when not related to the mind.
As a final note, I think there is a view that might be at least in an Aristotelean spirit - we simply have special obligations to all members of our own species. The interesting thing here is that this wouldn't even require humans to be objectively superior in some cosmic sense (it is species-relative), or have rationality ground moral status. It might allow for eating animals, as that is natural for humans, but not torturing them for fun, as that isn't natural for humans and is likely to corrupt human character. I'm certainly not saying I would agree with it, but it might be more defensible than some would expect. A common objection is that this is similar to a bias towards the group of humans you belong to, which is now generally regarded as immoral. However, as noted in a recent post, Feser and many people in general believe a degree of partiality towards your own nation is a good thing - so at the very least, it is a self-consistent viewpoint in that regard.
I do believe moral obligation exists. I just don't see how God is needed for it.
Interestingly, I think that Aristotle believed that the universe is eternal and the First Mover isn't its source, (so is not God in the sense Christians use the term), but held that we have obligations. So, I guess he would notionally agree.
I think that Christians and some atheists would tend toward the view that without a personal God who creates and ordains the universe and its creatures with purpose, any "obligation" that would otherwise be said to apply to humans would be a kind of conditional obligation. For example, you have an obligation to help your neighbor, IF society is going to be successful in serving your needs and everyone else's. The rub being that if you simply decide to turn your back on such a social goal and reject it, there doesn't appear to be an objective basis for calling that "failing your obligations" rather than rejection of others' goals.
Social animals have instincts (apparently molded by evolution) which guide them toward socially beneficial behaviors, but since humans can observe the nature of such instinctual constraints and look beyond them, they can choose to disregard them. If random chance in evolution created such constraints, there doesn't seem to be an objective basis that grounds such behaviors for human obligation that are "oughts" which humans are morally obliged to observe: what is the nature of "obligation" if its source is random chance?
@Tony: for Aristotle, the first unmoved mover does not bring the universe into being. Aristotle's First Unmoved Mover is the first princple, ἀρχή, of all motion and change within an eternal universe. Maybe we should say, Aristotle's First Unmoved Mover is not the SOURCE of the world/universe but is the ground of it and of its changes. ???
A response to the argument about obligations could be that if we can determine morality by reasoning, we might very well have nonconditional obligations whether or not there is any God. For instance, take the view being discussed that pleasure and suffering have intrinsic moral components. You can rationally figure out it is likely that others have similar feelings to you, so your reason to promote the well-being of others is an extension of your reason to promote your own well-being. People such as Thomas Nagel and several utilitarians (Nagel specifically rejects utilitarianism in his The Possibility of Altruism, though) have made roughly this argument. There are all kinds of issues that might be brought up, of course, but it's just an example. Perhaps we could discuss the Categorical Imperative or, indeed, our intrinsic natures, for instance.
The important idea is that maybe there is something in the universe apart from God (whether God exists or not) that can lead to us having objective obligations, something more than mere nonrational instinct - and we might be able to rationally come to accept this. I would say what matters for morality is not how exactly, say, rationality, pleasure, suffering, or nature came about (to insist otherwise may involve a genetic fallacy), but simply that they exist and are what they are. There are other arguments - for instance, can our reasoning really be trusted if it came about purely through random chance? But if you're trying to seriously argue for any claim (including the claim that objective morality doesn't exist), that seems to require the presupposition that no matter how flawed, your capacity to reason is at least minimally reliable.
It should be noted that Thomas Nagel, whom I mentioned above, has argued that cosmic teleology, instead of pure random chance, may be necessary to account for the development of features such as consciousness and rationality, but he also argues that this does not require God. Feser disagrees and argues that teleology ultimately requires God, but does note that this position requires argument and cannot merely be assumed. I have my doubts on whether those arguments work, but I worry that getting too deep into that issue may lead off-topic yet again. Also, I have argued there are plausible accounts of morality that don't require teleology, or at least only involve the teleology that exists within non-divine minds.
The Bible teaches that, originally, people were vegetarian. It was Noah that gained the exception of eating meat.
"From the beginning of creation to the flood, we were satisfied with the produce of the earth... But after the flood, together with the shedding of blood and the hard-heartedness of the human race... the eating of meat was introduced." Saint Jerome
I would like to see what the rest of the Fathers say about this, whether they all concur, or whether Jerome is a bit of an outlier.
There are several reasons to doubt that animals were considered protected and not eaten. First, God made clothes for Adam and Eve (after the fall) from skins. Of animals. I think we can presume they followed in his footsteps and made skins also. If you are going to kill an animal and use its hide, are you going to let its meat and bones go to waste? Improbable.
The very first sacrifices mentioned were those by Cain and Abel. Abel's sacrifice is described as:
Abel also offered of the firstlings of his flock, and of their fat
The "and of their fat" makes us pause and ask what's going on. You can kill the animal whole and burn it entire as a sacrifice to the lord, that's a holocaust. But in this case, you burn the whole thing, so, fat, flesh, bones, etc. Later Jewish practice explicitly prescribed 2 sacrifices, one as the holocaust burned entire, another as the peace offering, in which the fat and internal organs were burnt for God and they - the priest and those offering sacrifice - would partake of other things in order to signify fellowship and communion, which Christ later perfects in offering Himself to us, for our communion. Since Abel and his lamb is a type of Christ, it is at least plausible that the "and of their fat" refers to a practice like this.
When Noah was directed what kinds of animals to put on the Ark, he was told a pair of every kind of unclean animals, but 7 pairs of "clean" animals. After the flood comes and then recedes, he offers sacrifice of clean animals. The very concept of "clean" animals has to do with the distinction of ones fit for eating, it doesn't even carry any significance separated from that.
Finally, in Genesis 9 when it describes God telling Noah he can eat animals "as meat for you", it is part of a passage in which God is also merely confirming gifts and blessing he had already given in Adam: "And God blessed Noe and his sons. And he said to them: Increase and multiply, and fill the earth." Indeed, it seems possible to read in both the passage in Genesis 1 ("have dominion over all the earth"), and Genesis 9, ("And God blessed Noe and his sons. And he said to them: Increase and multiply, and fill the earth. And let the fear and dread of you be upon all the beasts of the earth, and upon all the fowls of the air, and all that move upon the earth: all the fishes of the sea are delivered into your hand"), i.e. God manifesting what is the natural law in respect of man and his worldly environment. A progressive manifestation of man's nature is quite common in God's biblical method. (E.G. Adultery didn't become immoral because God made a commandment about it to Moses after the Exodus).
St. Jerome offers an explanation:
But after the flood, together with the shedding of blood and the hard-heartedness of the human race... the eating of meat was introduced.
This strikes me as rather implausible: God had just finished WIPING OUT all the humans who were wickedly engaged in all those evils like bloodshed, saving only Noah and his family, and was prescribing with a clean slate. He had no need - yet - to accommodate bloodthirsty men by making a new rule, a new concession, that Noah and his family didn't have any need of and (presumably) would have found repulsive. If God found men eating animals horrible, he could have readily pointed out to Noah that this was one of the things He destroyed mankind for, and put it off limits, or at least let the existing standard rest as a continued reproach.
We don't see animals being given as food prior to the fall, and this is part of why in the early monastic movements you did have people also perpetually abstaining from meats as a sort of eschatological sign (kinda like celibacy also was). But the reasons for this ancient kind of vegetarianism were quite different from the modern, more affectively based ones. I'm not surprised that Jerome takes this interpretation.
There is a certain regulation of violence taking place rather than a complete elimination of it after the flood (as the authorization of the potential use of the death penalty shows in Gen 9:6). But this is true also of the eating of animals.
The command that God gives in the garden of Eden involves the provisions of the plants, but not to eat of the tree of knowledge. We know that the giving of the garments was also a post-fall event as well, along with the animal sacrifices.
The command after the flood parallels the command in the garden in that there is provision being made for all the animals being available to eat (likely also including the unclean ones (see vs 2-3) but there is some foreshadowing of the clean/unclean distinction in the sacrificial component to the "clean" animals of which you needed 7 pairs rather than two... ). However the provision comes with the restriction against the drinking of blood, since life is in the blood. The reasons against eating blood have likely to do with idolatry of some kind, but general violence against animals was discouraged also in various parts of Torah, and it's interesting to me that in vs 5 God is holding man accountable for any life he takes (justified or not), not just that of man. This prohibition of eating blood flows right into the prohibition of murder.
One, the creation of religious rules and sects based on niche and novel interpretations of the Bible, which I find fascinating.
Two, the use of "Church Fathers" as a kind of pseudo-canon. Normally, if the Church Fathers agreed on something, you'd likely cite it as if it were from the Mouth of God, but when you have something contrary to what your group has historically believed, suddenly the Fathers lose their exalted status and become simply Men again, whom it is perfectly acceptable to disagree with. I know this may come across as polemical, but genuinely, how do you square this circle? How many Church Fathers need to write on something before it becomes Certain Doctrine? How much disagreement is allowed? Is it at least permissible if at least one Father believed in it? Who even counts as a Church Father to begin with? Is it possible to disagree with the Fathers' consensus, say, when they are very obviously incorrect about some matter? And who decides on the rules governing all this? It all just seems like a chaotic, unruly mess. I don't know how I'd be able to handle believing in something like that. Not to mention the fact that the mere fact that someone came to be termed a Church Father is largely an accident of history. Who knows how many wise thinkers were forgotten to the ravages of time, or even condemned as heretics, whether their condemnation was noted down or no? The closest thing I ever got to an answer back when I was a Catholic amounted to "well, their views became dominant, therefore they must have been right/what God wanted", which seems pretty obviously fallacious, or at least totally reliant on a faith-claim rather than evidence.
It seems to me that we have been looking at the question from 2 distinct angles. Mine has been more from the aspect of what actions are in line with human nature itself, whereas yours has been more in line with what actions did God positively express approval, or disapproval for.
These angles need not provide exactly the same results: it is entirely feasible that the what God gave express approval for is a smaller set than what actions are suited to man's nature, e.g. a subset of actions that are consistent with human nature. And similarly, it is possible that God gave express disapproval for some actions that are in line with human nature (i.e. not UNnatural in themselves). Since Genesis only records express approval for using fruit and seeds for food, and no express disapproval is stated (except for the tree of the knowledge of good and evil), we may draw an implication that nothing not expressly approved was held to be DISapproved, but that's only an inference, and not a rock solid demonstration from the text itself.
Another way to look at it, which (kind of?) might tend to marry the two angles, is to note that Eden appears to have constituted a special condition of protection / beneficial order for Adam and Eve, e.g. protection from natural harm, and grant of easy and bountiful food and other goods, beyond what nature operating according to natural laws alone would provide. (I believe this is an aspect of the preternatural gifts.) We can suppose not only plentiful food, but also unusually enriched food that provides better sustenance than ordinary to nature. In this condition, (perhaps) neither they nor the other carnivores needed to eat meat, and in Eden God thus provided something of an extra-natural pathway of sustenance for all of them. (We have to consider the situation of lions and wolves and such as well as man.) When they were kicked out of Eden after sin, instead of assuming an immediate cessation of all of the preternatural gifts, what if God withdrew some of those gifts and protections gradually over time, so that man had time to adapt? This might be hinted at when God eventually indicated that man's life span would be limited to 120 years (Gen. 6:3), while some men in the catalog clearly exceeded that span (Noah). Possibly, then, the withdrawal of above-nature benefits was intended to be matched to natural, ordinary modes of sustenance applied both the man and other animals?
We don't see animals being given as food prior to the fall, and this is part of why in the early monastic movements you did have people also perpetually abstaining from meats as a sort of eschatological sign (kinda like celibacy also was).
Interesting parallel: Celibacy is a sign of the eschatological order, wherein there is no marriage and no sexual relations, but on this earth not only is conjugal activity permitted, it is a positive good (when done for the right reasons, conditions, etc), both according to man's nature and pleasing to God. My discussion is pointed toward the idea that humans eating meat is, also, according to man's nature, and if it (EVER) was disapproved by God, we may believe it was disapproved not as an evil act (which was later only tolerated), but because God was providing something better than nature in its place, just as in heaven we have something better than natural relations.
and it's interesting to me that in vs 5 God is holding man accountable for any life he takes (justified or not), not just that of man.
I think you might have that not entirely correct: in the first half of v5, he seems to hold ANIMALS accountable for killing a human (which fits in later in the Torah when he prescribes death for an ox that kills a man) and in the second half he holds man accountable for taking human life.
"This strikes me as rather implausible: God had just finished WIPING OUT all the humans who were wickedly engaged in all those evils like bloodshed, saving only Noah and his family, and was prescribing with a clean slate."
Yet the narrative of Genesis makes it perfectly clear that this effort failed utterly. Even within the narrative, the Flood did not wipe out wickedness whatsoever. Mankind continues just as it did beforehand, since there are plenty of evils mentioned after this point. Even with Noah himself, we still have the story about him getting blind drunk, having Ham expose his nakedness, and then the whole Curse of Ham thing. Of course, this story is pretty obviously a later insertion to justify the enslavement of Canaanites (notice that Noah, for some reason, does not curse the son who actually dishonored him, but only his youngest son for some reason?). But if you take it seriously, you have to admit that evil was right back up to its old tricks in no time at all.
Also, for posterity's sake, I'd like to ask - Tony, how do you view the Bible? Do you believe that there was an actual, literal, globe-spanning flood? If so, how long ago do you think it took place?
Various popes, including Pius XII and John Paul II, make it clear that Genesis 1 - 11 entails a great deal of metaphor as well as theological imagery rather than using a scientific or historical mode of description. The details are to be worked out by development of analysis and exegesis - and input from the sciences and history. I don't have a settled opinion of what exactly are the historical facts upon which the Flood account is based, and I can live with various options.
Nevertheless, whatever the real, historical facts are, we are allowed to presume that the account is meant to hold together internally, and to carry its meaning(s) coherently.
Yet the narrative of Genesis makes it perfectly clear that this effort failed utterly.
The Old Testament makes clear that God is transcendent in both his power and his knowledge of all truth: he doesn't ACTUALLY change his mind, nor do his plans fail. The passages that seem to have this are understood as figurative or metaphorical. He knew Noah wasn't perfect, as are all fallen men with original sin. He also knew that later men would have original sin as well, and would be sinners: part of the Old Testament is to provide (to the Jews as much as anything) proof of our need for a different KIND of aid in overcoming evil, i.e. a Messiah who came to save us from our sins by working internal to our souls, not a warrior or king.
Though I don't expect to convince you of this, I am treating your question as if it were were meant in good faith. But when you say things like
Of course, this story is pretty obviously a later insertion to justify the enslavement of Canaanites
I discount the "obviously" as rather a lot less, more like a guess that is gussied up to pretend to be a hypothesis, but remains rather distant from a theory and nothing like "obvious". It's notionally possible. It's not remotely proven.
My two cents, cuz I'm helpful that way, giving out two-cent pieces: I think it's best to leave discussion of biblical texts out of philosophy of religion discussions, or other philosophical discussions -- except maybe as such texts can be used as examples when discussing philosophy of literature vel sim. "Modernists" can come up with all sorts of takes on a biblical passage, and Catholic controversialists can always fall back on denying the interlocutor the right to employ private judgment re doctrinal conclusions.
From the purely materialistic perspective, human life is astonishing. The Pareto principle shift from 20/80 to 1/99. 99% of our most extraordinary capabilities arise from 1% of our DNA. That 1% of the biological software is amazing. It is a pity that we do not understand how it works. But that 1% allows us to tell jokes, cook, read, write, think about human rights and duties,… things that not other animal can do.
I knew one of Anscombe's and Peter Geach's many children, and I met Ms. Anscombe a few times. She did not countenance being addressed as "Mrs. Geach." Funny stories. And a great mind. She once grilled me on Plato. I never did finish reading Intention, aargh.
Oh, come on, didn't ANYBODY notice I was being tongue in cheek? Surely nobody thought "inimical" (or the intended "inimitable") is sufficiently close to "eliminable" to accidentally replace one for the other? I was poking fun at not only the original Anon's "inimical", but another common mistake, i.e. the "intensive purposes".
Given that the article is paywalled, I can't truly comment on whatever argument it's trying to make. But from a cursory search over Anscombe's work, it seems as if her definition of human nature and dignity leans heavily on the mystical, or at least on the notion that humans are spiritual creatures with souls, or that our knowledge of these facts is "connatural", by which she seems to mean intuitive. Personally, I don't think any theory based on intuition can ever be very sound - it would seem to require the assumption that our intuition is divinely designed and good at finding truths, the first of which is very likely wrong, and the second of which is demonstrably wrong. Intuition is *frequently* incorrect - do you have any idea how many cognitive biases the human brain has? Indeed, why expect otherwise? Why would you expect an organ randomly evolved to be just good enough at understanding the world to survive to be good at finding the truth? We can train it to do better, we can develop tools like critical thinking that supplement its failings, but those are technologies, not innate to us, and some of us never learn them.
I admit this may be a hash of her position, but if so, I'd appreciate actually being informed of where and why I'm mistaken, rather than simply snarled or laughed at.
From https://kirkcenter.org/reviews/c-s-lewis-and-gender-ideology/ :
We don’t need no stinking metaphysical ideals here, for what could be higher, deeper and so on than the ordering of human bodies toward the begetting of new persons? This is illustrated by an anecdote about Elizabeth Anscombe. As retold by Rachel Lu,
Anscombe was an Oxford professor, a high-profile analytic philosopher, and also a mother of seven. People sometimes had opinions about that, and the story goes that she came into her classroom one day (pregnant with her seventh) to find that some mean-spirited troll had written the words “ANSCOMBE BREEDS” on her chalkboard. Calmly, without apparent embarrassment, she picked up the chalk and added two words. “ANSCOMBE BREEDS IMMORTAL BEINGS.”
Anscombe was brilliant! When I taught philosophy at the university, I required my students to become well acquainted with one of the philosophers of the 20th century. The female students often chose Anscombe. Even male students who chose Wittgenstein were forced to consider her.
Paywall :(
ReplyDeleteWhat is different about humans that makes you so shocked that some people see no difference between murdering humans and being non-vegetarian? You've spoken of vegetarianism as one of the most shocking, absurd things in all of human history, right up there alongside infanticide.
ReplyDeleteI can't speak for Ed, but one of the basic issues to my mind is this: Let's grant for the sake of argument that humans are not meaningfully different from other animals (at least not different enough so as to make a moral difference here). Then either animals are "elevated" to the level of humans, at which point we can hold them responsible, morally speaking, for killing and/or eating other animals. Or, we humans "collapse" down to the level of other brutes, at which point we are simply animals doing what it is that animals sometimes do, namely eating and killing other animals.
DeleteThe former position is highly counter-intuitive and even more impractical to effectively enforce well. The latter position largely hollows out the substance of the vegetarian's moral objection to eating meat.
So in short, either humans are unique, or, if they are not, then by that very fact the issue ceases to matter.
I Really want Edward to answer for himself.
DeleteI'd be interested in what Dr. Feser has to say too, but he is of course busy. I am interested in this topic and have heard many arguments related to it, so here's one. The answer animal rights activists and the like tend to give to the dilemma ccmnxc presented is that there is a difference between moral patients and moral agents - moral agents can have moral responsibilities even to those incapable of morality who cannot be held responsible for their own actions. Note that this is widely accepted for humans. For instance, a young child or someone with a severe mental illness may be incapable of understanding morality and may cause harm to others, yet moral human adults aren't allowed to do things such as eat them. (There may be cases, such as self-defense, in which harming someone could be moral, but this generally doesn't include eating them.)
DeleteNow, natural law theorists do have a response to this: humans have a rational essence and other animals don't, and it's this essence that leads to the possession of rights, even if circumstances such as age, sickness, or the like inhabit the actual exercise of those capacities. This is why it's a defect if a human cannot reason but not a defect if other animals cannot, just like it's a defect if a sparrow has no wings but not a defect if a human has no wings. Feser has discussed this argument in some previous articles. But even if there are such essences... I think it could be argued that rights do depend on actual capacities instead of essence. Note that moral responsibility seems to depend on capacity - even if, say, young children have a moral essence, they will not be held morally responsible if they cannot actually act morally. Moral responsibility is not exactly a right, but humans who have serious limitations in actual reasoning are often restricted in their privacy and freedom to move, and generally have no right to vote, for instance.
Am I saying that it's fine to kill humans who cannot reason? Absolutely not! The point here is that perhaps rights such as the right to life may depend on a capacity other than rationality or moral agency. The discussion so far has taken certain ideas for granted: there are essences, nonhuman animals cannot reason or act morally, and rights-talk is the best (or a good) way of spelling out our moral obligations. Each of these assumptions can and has been questioned, but I worry that if I go too deep into them, we may go too far afield. With that said, I do think considering why death is a harm (if it is a harm) is important when considering a right to life. Is it really only rational beings who can be harmed by death? But things get particularly messy when considering religion and the possibility of an afterlife.
Here's a further thing to note: nowadays, we generally think that causing suffering to animals for fun is bad, even if those animals cannot act morally and suffering is common in nature. From what I've heard, thinkers such as Kant and Aquinas argued that this is purely because someone who acts cruelly towards animals corrupts their own character and is more likely to be cruel to humans. But we only have obligations to rational beings, so we may still use nonrational beings for our benefit. Whether we only have obligations to rational beings is also controversial, but even if we accept it, I'm not actually sure if it can justify eating animals and so on by itself. After all, killing animals can also corrupt people's character and make them more likely to kill humans. I don't think this is true in all cases - certainly, some people can kill many nonhuman animals and never harm another human. But it is also possible for some people to torture many nonhuman animals and never harm another human. This might justify killing animals (and causing animal suffering) when necessary to save human lives, but I'm not sure for any reason less important than that.
I seems to recall a article from the Professor were he does touch on the origin of rights. I think it is someting like "Natural Law, Natural Rights and Taxation". There, he does defend than rights are connected to moral duty, so i suppose that he would argue than beings that can't by nature have duties do not have rights.
Delete(Of course, the Imago Dei also would influence Dr. Feser, but that is probably not the place to discuss christianity)
Sure, one can do like Intentionality Anon and cast doubt on the view that we have essences*, but them natural law is not even a thing, so it should be taken for granted when we discuss the status of non-human animals in it.
*the argument about humans with no use of reason was made quite well in a debate between a vegan and a hoppean libertarian one time, i recall, there i can't really find a way out for the non-vegan
I would personally question the existence of essences (and even the existence of rights - though specifically in the sense that I think we do have moral obligations, but there may be better ways of describing them than in terms of rights). However, the main point I was making earlier was actually that even natural law theorists seem to at least implicitly accept that some things seem to depend on actually being able to reason and be moral - not merely having a rational or moral essence, even if such essences do exist. Why does moral accountability depend on actualized moral capacity, not essence (we don't hold infants morally accountable even though they naturally develop into moral beings)? Why do humans who cannot reason tend to be restricted in rights such as privacy, freedom of movement, and voting, but not the right to life? What, in general, determines whether something depends on essence or actual capacity? (It would be obviously absurd to give someone the privileges and responsibilities of a job before they actually have that job, even though they still possess the potential for that job).
DeleteAnonymous, I think if rights correspond to duties then the reason the right to life begins at conception is because the duty to steward your life begins at conception (a duty that an embryo can unconsciously exercise) whereas the duty to vote begins later and thus the right to vote begins later, because the nature of voting implies not just having a rational essence but, unlike merely being alive, a conscious use of reason.
Delete@Intentionality Anon
DeleteI mean, if you do not believe in essences them it is harder to argue for rights. You probably need something like divine command theory. Non-theist alternatives than try to get at moral realism seems unconvincing to me and, like i mentioned before, i guess they probably all fall to the vegan argument from these than do not have use of reason but do have value
. About natural law, i guess that the principle of "ought implies can" does play a role in moral accountability. A toddler is by nature ordered to act well, but he does not have the moral knowledge nor the brain development necessary to choose to act well, so there is not really how to say than he is choosing to act wrong when he throws a tantrum*. In fact, he has the right to be helped to develop these capacities in order to fullfil his duty.
About why people who can't reason can be restricted in freedom, remember than freedom is aways directed to the person good and also the common good. Since someone who cannot reason tend to act against these, they be free to do so would be against this freedom very existence,so these restrictions are natural but we do not tend to restrict their freedom if there is no risk. A toddler is, for instance, not free to beat up his little baby brother or put a fork in a wall outlet, but he is free to play with his toys or to eat alone if he already can do it.
These are not formalized distinctions like what your questions asks for, but i guess they do tend to help the discussion advance. On classical natural law all rights are in the end a consequence of we being ordered naturally to act well, so when looking at what depends on the essence or the actual capacity we need to look at a case by case basis
*just a example, i admit that toddlers capacity to responsability is not my expertise XD
Wha about people who say that simply having feelingsentails rights naturally?
DeleteI suspect that Intentionality Anon is bumping up against the nature of moral obligation, itself. I don't know if I can help him, but this occurs to me: as the perennial philosophy would have it, the act that is properly called "the human act", acts that are understood to be quintessentially human and not merely like in kind to what other animals do (like eating), have that character precisely in virtue of being made by a being capable of reason, and made using reason in certain ways. In particular, the human act involves 3 fonts or sources that address the act as folding forth from the rational faculties, and these are accounted as the object of the act as known to the agent, the motive or goal or purpose, and the circumstances he considers (or that he omits to consider). These three are acts of the faculty of reason (and ending in an act of will, which is the intellectual appetite).
DeleteAnd it is these that make an act moral or immoral. Without them, an act BY a human isn't a "human act", it isn't a moral or immoral act, it is non-moral, e.g. a reflex like sneezing, or bleeding when cut. So, noticing that we don't hold babies morally responsible for their acts is just the recognition that they don't yet have control of the faculties of reason and thus their acts fall short of the fonts that make an act characterized by reason operating.
One doesn't need to cotton to "essences" as such, in the A-T sense, to allow that the use of reason characterizes acts that are held to bear moral responsibility.
But clearly IF there are things that are natural KINDS, those that have reason will bear possibilities that those whose natural kinds do not have reason, and this implies at least room for different treatment. Whether to call them "rights" is a further question, sure.
(Part 1)
DeleteFirst anonymous who mentioned conception: Interesting! Given that we're talking about unconscious and nonrational processes here, I'm not sure whether a human embryo could be said to have a "duty" in a sense that animals (or indeed any living organisms including plants, bacteria, etc.) do not. Though when I think about it as "humans should be rational," I think I have at least some grasp on why impeding the possibility of a human becoming rational would be considered bad. I've discussed abortion before on this site, and I mentioned that I personally don't think that anything intrinsically bad happens if an organism that has never been conscious dies (if there is something bad, it would be due to the circumstances, such as if someone wanted a child). I'll also note that if the potential for future development specifically matters, that might cover embryos, fetuses, infants, and so on - but by itself, it doesn't cover humans with disorders that prevent them from ever developing rationality.
It also doesn't seem intrinsically bad to me if fertilization fails to happen and a sperm cell or egg cell dies - even though presumably, fertilization is the purpose of sperm and eggs. Now, while contraception is immoral from the Catholic point of view, I don't think even Catholics support maximizing the number of sperm cells and egg cells that fulfill their purpose - celibacy is allowed, for example. I think some would say that it's because a fertilized egg is a complete new organism, while sperm and eggs separately are not. Though there's also the known issue that even people who believe that life should be protected from conception onwards tend to pay much less attention to natural embryo loss than diseases affecting born people (note that while induced abortion involves an intentional act that might be considered worse, both natural embryo loss and disease don't involve such an intentional act).
Second anonymous who mentioned feeling (I'm not sure if you are the same as the first anonymous or not): Yeah, I think something like that might be the best shot at a nontheistic and nonessentialist moral realism, whether it ultimately uses "rights" language or not. So I would disagree with Talmid on whether nontheistic moral realism can be convincing, though that's probably to be expected. And if it does turn out that nontheistic morality entails veganism, alright! Vegans, especially of the nontheistic sort, will be happy. (I'm actually a vegetarian, not a vegan, though I've considered veganism.) As for what he says about moral accountability and freedom, I think that's actually roughly correct as far as it goes. The question is whose well-being we have a reason to promote. And I think that reflecting on the nature of pleasure and suffering shows that they just have a fundamental goodness and badness, respectively. (There may, of course, be forms of pleasure and suffering that depend on rationality, and one might even argue that rationality makes pleasure and suffering more intense - though this is controversial, and may even go the opposite direction. But their basic forms don't seem to require rationality - in fact, intense feelings tend to suppress reasoning, yet they can still be extremely positive or negative.)
(Part 2)
DeleteNow, even the people who have this view generally admit that it's hard to give any deeper reasons for why it's feelings that matter morally - they might have to appeal to it just being a fundamental truth. This is an issue, as it's easy to just deny, but well, arguably every view bottoms out in some fundamental assumptions eventually. And even if there is a human nature, I don't think our knowledge of it is more secure than our knowledge of the natures of pleasure and suffering. I think the idea that consciousness is what matters at least neatly explains not only why humans who can't reason have moral value, but also why it's wrong to, say, torture animals for fun even if the person doing it is the sort of person who would never harm a human. (It might be unlikely that someone would be like this, but I would think that killing animals when not necessary for human survival is also likely to corrupt one's character, so again, it raises the question of why killing animals isn't wrong even on this account. In fact, contrary to certain stereotypes, many animal rights activists who care about animals for their own sake also strongly emphasize the negative effects human treatment of animals has on humans).
There are some issues, but every view of morality, including natural law theory, also has issues. Here's a quick one that I mentioned before in an abortion discussion, but I'll mention again because it keeps getting brought up - how does the view that consciousness matters deal with people who are asleep or in a temporary coma? I think the best answer is probably that conscious states before and after temporary unconsciousness are connected. And yes, this is a form of potential (and teleology, or at least directedness), but as has been pointed out before, it seems incoherent to deny that these things exist within the mind at least. And even if they exist outside the mind, that doesn't necessarily mean they matter morally when not related to the mind.
As a final note, I think there is a view that might be at least in an Aristotelean spirit - we simply have special obligations to all members of our own species. The interesting thing here is that this wouldn't even require humans to be objectively superior in some cosmic sense (it is species-relative), or have rationality ground moral status. It might allow for eating animals, as that is natural for humans, but not torturing them for fun, as that isn't natural for humans and is likely to corrupt human character. I'm certainly not saying I would agree with it, but it might be more defensible than some would expect. A common objection is that this is similar to a bias towards the group of humans you belong to, which is now generally regarded as immoral. However, as noted in a recent post, Feser and many people in general believe a degree of partiality towards your own nation is a good thing - so at the very least, it is a self-consistent viewpoint in that regard.
I do believe moral obligation exists. I just don't see how God is needed for it.
DeleteI do believe moral obligation exists. I just don't see how God is needed for it.
DeleteInterestingly, I think that Aristotle believed that the universe is eternal and the First Mover isn't its source, (so is not God in the sense Christians use the term), but held that we have obligations. So, I guess he would notionally agree.
I think that Christians and some atheists would tend toward the view that without a personal God who creates and ordains the universe and its creatures with purpose, any "obligation" that would otherwise be said to apply to humans would be a kind of conditional obligation. For example, you have an obligation to help your neighbor, IF society is going to be successful in serving your needs and everyone else's. The rub being that if you simply decide to turn your back on such a social goal and reject it, there doesn't appear to be an objective basis for calling that "failing your obligations" rather than rejection of others' goals.
Social animals have instincts (apparently molded by evolution) which guide them toward socially beneficial behaviors, but since humans can observe the nature of such instinctual constraints and look beyond them, they can choose to disregard them. If random chance in evolution created such constraints, there doesn't seem to be an objective basis that grounds such behaviors for human obligation that are "oughts" which humans are morally obliged to observe: what is the nature of "obligation" if its source is random chance?
@Tony: for Aristotle, the first unmoved mover does not bring the universe into being. Aristotle's First Unmoved Mover is the first princple, ἀρχή, of all motion and change within an eternal universe. Maybe we should say, Aristotle's First Unmoved Mover is not the SOURCE of the world/universe but is the ground of it and of its changes. ???
DeleteA response to the argument about obligations could be that if we can determine morality by reasoning, we might very well have nonconditional obligations whether or not there is any God. For instance, take the view being discussed that pleasure and suffering have intrinsic moral components. You can rationally figure out it is likely that others have similar feelings to you, so your reason to promote the well-being of others is an extension of your reason to promote your own well-being. People such as Thomas Nagel and several utilitarians (Nagel specifically rejects utilitarianism in his The Possibility of Altruism, though) have made roughly this argument. There are all kinds of issues that might be brought up, of course, but it's just an example. Perhaps we could discuss the Categorical Imperative or, indeed, our intrinsic natures, for instance.
DeleteThe important idea is that maybe there is something in the universe apart from God (whether God exists or not) that can lead to us having objective obligations, something more than mere nonrational instinct - and we might be able to rationally come to accept this. I would say what matters for morality is not how exactly, say, rationality, pleasure, suffering, or nature came about (to insist otherwise may involve a genetic fallacy), but simply that they exist and are what they are. There are other arguments - for instance, can our reasoning really be trusted if it came about purely through random chance? But if you're trying to seriously argue for any claim (including the claim that objective morality doesn't exist), that seems to require the presupposition that no matter how flawed, your capacity to reason is at least minimally reliable.
It should be noted that Thomas Nagel, whom I mentioned above, has argued that cosmic teleology, instead of pure random chance, may be necessary to account for the development of features such as consciousness and rationality, but he also argues that this does not require God. Feser disagrees and argues that teleology ultimately requires God, but does note that this position requires argument and cannot merely be assumed. I have my doubts on whether those arguments work, but I worry that getting too deep into that issue may lead off-topic yet again. Also, I have argued there are plausible accounts of morality that don't require teleology, or at least only involve the teleology that exists within non-divine minds.
The Bible teaches that, originally, people were vegetarian. It was Noah that gained the exception of eating meat.
ReplyDelete"From the beginning of creation to the flood, we were satisfied with the produce of the earth... But after the flood, together with the shedding of blood and the hard-heartedness of the human race... the eating of meat was introduced." Saint Jerome
I would like to see what the rest of the Fathers say about this, whether they all concur, or whether Jerome is a bit of an outlier.
DeleteThere are several reasons to doubt that animals were considered protected and not eaten. First, God made clothes for Adam and Eve (after the fall) from skins. Of animals. I think we can presume they followed in his footsteps and made skins also. If you are going to kill an animal and use its hide, are you going to let its meat and bones go to waste? Improbable.
The very first sacrifices mentioned were those by Cain and Abel. Abel's sacrifice is described as:
Abel also offered of the firstlings of his flock, and of their fat
The "and of their fat" makes us pause and ask what's going on. You can kill the animal whole and burn it entire as a sacrifice to the lord, that's a holocaust. But in this case, you burn the whole thing, so, fat, flesh, bones, etc. Later Jewish practice explicitly prescribed 2 sacrifices, one as the holocaust burned entire, another as the peace offering, in which the fat and internal organs were burnt for God and they - the priest and those offering sacrifice - would partake of other things in order to signify fellowship and communion, which Christ later perfects in offering Himself to us, for our communion. Since Abel and his lamb is a type of Christ, it is at least plausible that the "and of their fat" refers to a practice like this.
When Noah was directed what kinds of animals to put on the Ark, he was told a pair of every kind of unclean animals, but 7 pairs of "clean" animals. After the flood comes and then recedes, he offers sacrifice of clean animals. The very concept of "clean" animals has to do with the distinction of ones fit for eating, it doesn't even carry any significance separated from that.
Finally, in Genesis 9 when it describes God telling Noah he can eat animals "as meat for you", it is part of a passage in which God is also merely confirming gifts and blessing he had already given in Adam: "And God blessed Noe and his sons. And he said to them: Increase and multiply, and fill the earth." Indeed, it seems possible to read in both the passage in Genesis 1 ("have dominion over all the earth"), and Genesis 9, ("And God blessed Noe and his sons. And he said to them: Increase and multiply, and fill the earth. And let the fear and dread of you be upon all the beasts of the earth, and upon all the fowls of the air, and all that move upon the earth: all the fishes of the sea are delivered into your hand"), i.e. God manifesting what is the natural law in respect of man and his worldly environment. A progressive manifestation of man's nature is quite common in God's biblical method. (E.G. Adultery didn't become immoral because God made a commandment about it to Moses after the Exodus).
St. Jerome offers an explanation:
But after the flood, together with the shedding of blood and the hard-heartedness of the human race... the eating of meat was introduced.
This strikes me as rather implausible: God had just finished WIPING OUT all the humans who were wickedly engaged in all those evils like bloodshed, saving only Noah and his family, and was prescribing with a clean slate. He had no need - yet - to accommodate bloodthirsty men by making a new rule, a new concession, that Noah and his family didn't have any need of and (presumably) would have found repulsive. If God found men eating animals horrible, he could have readily pointed out to Noah that this was one of the things He destroyed mankind for, and put it off limits, or at least let the existing standard rest as a continued reproach.
We don't see animals being given as food prior to the fall, and this is part of why in the early monastic movements you did have people also perpetually abstaining from meats as a sort of eschatological sign (kinda like celibacy also was). But the reasons for this ancient kind of vegetarianism were quite different from the modern, more affectively based ones. I'm not surprised that Jerome takes this interpretation.
DeleteThere is a certain regulation of violence taking place rather than a complete elimination of it after the flood (as the authorization of the potential use of the death penalty shows in Gen 9:6). But this is true also of the eating of animals.
The command that God gives in the garden of Eden involves the provisions of the plants, but not to eat of the tree of knowledge. We know that the giving of the garments was also a post-fall event as well, along with the animal sacrifices.
The command after the flood parallels the command in the garden in that there is provision being made for all the animals being available to eat (likely also including the unclean ones (see vs 2-3) but there is some foreshadowing of the clean/unclean distinction in the sacrificial component to the "clean" animals of which you needed 7 pairs rather than two... ). However the provision comes with the restriction against the drinking of blood, since life is in the blood. The reasons against eating blood have likely to do with idolatry of some kind, but general violence against animals was discouraged also in various parts of Torah, and it's interesting to me that in vs 5 God is holding man accountable for any life he takes (justified or not), not just that of man. This prohibition of eating blood flows right into the prohibition of murder.
I will note two interesting phenomena here:
DeleteOne, the creation of religious rules and sects based on niche and novel interpretations of the Bible, which I find fascinating.
Two, the use of "Church Fathers" as a kind of pseudo-canon. Normally, if the Church Fathers agreed on something, you'd likely cite it as if it were from the Mouth of God, but when you have something contrary to what your group has historically believed, suddenly the Fathers lose their exalted status and become simply Men again, whom it is perfectly acceptable to disagree with. I know this may come across as polemical, but genuinely, how do you square this circle? How many Church Fathers need to write on something before it becomes Certain Doctrine? How much disagreement is allowed? Is it at least permissible if at least one Father believed in it? Who even counts as a Church Father to begin with? Is it possible to disagree with the Fathers' consensus, say, when they are very obviously incorrect about some matter? And who decides on the rules governing all this? It all just seems like a chaotic, unruly mess. I don't know how I'd be able to handle believing in something like that. Not to mention the fact that the mere fact that someone came to be termed a Church Father is largely an accident of history. Who knows how many wise thinkers were forgotten to the ravages of time, or even condemned as heretics, whether their condemnation was noted down or no? The closest thing I ever got to an answer back when I was a Catholic amounted to "well, their views became dominant, therefore they must have been right/what God wanted", which seems pretty obviously fallacious, or at least totally reliant on a faith-claim rather than evidence.
Thank you, your ideas are helpful.
DeleteIt seems to me that we have been looking at the question from 2 distinct angles. Mine has been more from the aspect of what actions are in line with human nature itself, whereas yours has been more in line with what actions did God positively express approval, or disapproval for.
These angles need not provide exactly the same results: it is entirely feasible that the what God gave express approval for is a smaller set than what actions are suited to man's nature, e.g. a subset of actions that are consistent with human nature. And similarly, it is possible that God gave express disapproval for some actions that are in line with human nature (i.e. not UNnatural in themselves). Since Genesis only records express approval for using fruit and seeds for food, and no express disapproval is stated (except for the tree of the knowledge of good and evil), we may draw an implication that nothing not expressly approved was held to be DISapproved, but that's only an inference, and not a rock solid demonstration from the text itself.
Another way to look at it, which (kind of?) might tend to marry the two angles, is to note that Eden appears to have constituted a special condition of protection / beneficial order for Adam and Eve, e.g. protection from natural harm, and grant of easy and bountiful food and other goods, beyond what nature operating according to natural laws alone would provide. (I believe this is an aspect of the preternatural gifts.) We can suppose not only plentiful food, but also unusually enriched food that provides better sustenance than ordinary to nature. In this condition, (perhaps) neither they nor the other carnivores needed to eat meat, and in Eden God thus provided something of an extra-natural pathway of sustenance for all of them. (We have to consider the situation of lions and wolves and such as well as man.) When they were kicked out of Eden after sin, instead of assuming an immediate cessation of all of the preternatural gifts, what if God withdrew some of those gifts and protections gradually over time, so that man had time to adapt? This might be hinted at when God eventually indicated that man's life span would be limited to 120 years (Gen. 6:3), while some men in the catalog clearly exceeded that span (Noah). Possibly, then, the withdrawal of above-nature benefits was intended to be matched to natural, ordinary modes of sustenance applied both the man and other animals?
We don't see animals being given as food prior to the fall, and this is part of why in the early monastic movements you did have people also perpetually abstaining from meats as a sort of eschatological sign (kinda like celibacy also was).
Interesting parallel: Celibacy is a sign of the eschatological order, wherein there is no marriage and no sexual relations, but on this earth not only is conjugal activity permitted, it is a positive good (when done for the right reasons, conditions, etc), both according to man's nature and pleasing to God. My discussion is pointed toward the idea that humans eating meat is, also, according to man's nature, and if it (EVER) was disapproved by God, we may believe it was disapproved not as an evil act (which was later only tolerated), but because God was providing something better than nature in its place, just as in heaven we have something better than natural relations.
and it's interesting to me that in vs 5 God is holding man accountable for any life he takes (justified or not), not just that of man.
DeleteI think you might have that not entirely correct: in the first half of v5, he seems to hold ANIMALS accountable for killing a human (which fits in later in the Torah when he prescribes death for an ox that kills a man) and in the second half he holds man accountable for taking human life.
Also, Tony, as regards this point you make:
Delete"This strikes me as rather implausible: God had just finished WIPING OUT all the humans who were wickedly engaged in all those evils like bloodshed, saving only Noah and his family, and was prescribing with a clean slate."
Yet the narrative of Genesis makes it perfectly clear that this effort failed utterly. Even within the narrative, the Flood did not wipe out wickedness whatsoever. Mankind continues just as it did beforehand, since there are plenty of evils mentioned after this point. Even with Noah himself, we still have the story about him getting blind drunk, having Ham expose his nakedness, and then the whole Curse of Ham thing. Of course, this story is pretty obviously a later insertion to justify the enslavement of Canaanites (notice that Noah, for some reason, does not curse the son who actually dishonored him, but only his youngest son for some reason?). But if you take it seriously, you have to admit that evil was right back up to its old tricks in no time at all.
Also, for posterity's sake, I'd like to ask - Tony, how do you view the Bible? Do you believe that there was an actual, literal, globe-spanning flood? If so, how long ago do you think it took place?
Various popes, including Pius XII and John Paul II, make it clear that Genesis 1 - 11 entails a great deal of metaphor as well as theological imagery rather than using a scientific or historical mode of description. The details are to be worked out by development of analysis and exegesis - and input from the sciences and history. I don't have a settled opinion of what exactly are the historical facts upon which the Flood account is based, and I can live with various options.
DeleteNevertheless, whatever the real, historical facts are, we are allowed to presume that the account is meant to hold together internally, and to carry its meaning(s) coherently.
Yet the narrative of Genesis makes it perfectly clear that this effort failed utterly.
The Old Testament makes clear that God is transcendent in both his power and his knowledge of all truth: he doesn't ACTUALLY change his mind, nor do his plans fail. The passages that seem to have this are understood as figurative or metaphorical. He knew Noah wasn't perfect, as are all fallen men with original sin. He also knew that later men would have original sin as well, and would be sinners: part of the Old Testament is to provide (to the Jews as much as anything) proof of our need for a different KIND of aid in overcoming evil, i.e. a Messiah who came to save us from our sins by working internal to our souls, not a warrior or king.
Though I don't expect to convince you of this, I am treating your question as if it were were meant in good faith. But when you say things like
Of course, this story is pretty obviously a later insertion to justify the enslavement of Canaanites
I discount the "obviously" as rather a lot less, more like a guess that is gussied up to pretend to be a hypothesis, but remains rather distant from a theory and nothing like "obvious". It's notionally possible. It's not remotely proven.
My two cents, cuz I'm helpful that way, giving out two-cent pieces: I think it's best to leave discussion of biblical texts out of philosophy of religion discussions, or other philosophical discussions -- except maybe as such texts can be used as examples when discussing philosophy of literature vel sim. "Modernists" can come up with all sorts of takes on a biblical passage, and Catholic controversialists can always fall back on denying the interlocutor the right to employ private judgment re doctrinal conclusions.
DeleteFrom the purely materialistic perspective, human life is astonishing. The Pareto principle shift from 20/80 to 1/99. 99% of our most extraordinary capabilities arise from 1% of our DNA. That 1% of the biological software is amazing. It is a pity that we do not understand how it works. But that 1% allows us to tell jokes, cook, read, write, think about human rights and duties,… things that not other animal can do.
ReplyDeleteI knew one of Anscombe's and Peter Geach's many children, and I met Ms. Anscombe a few times. She did not countenance being addressed as "Mrs. Geach." Funny stories. And a great mind. She once grilled me on Plato. I never did finish reading Intention, aargh.
ReplyDeleteYou can read more about the inimical Ms. Anscombe here.
Deletehttps://crisismagazine.com/vault/cloud-of-witnesses-g-e-m-anscombe
"inimical"?
DeleteFor all intensive purposes, I'm sure he meant "eliminable".
Delete;-)
Did you mean “inimitable”?
DeleteProbably “inimitable”
DeleteI'm guessing "inimitable" was on the mind.
DeletePerhaps meant to say inimitable?
Delete'inimitable"?
DeleteWhatever Anon meant, you, Tony, meant to say INTENTS AND purposes, not "intensive purposes".
DeleteOh, come on, didn't ANYBODY notice I was being tongue in cheek? Surely nobody thought "inimical" (or the intended "inimitable") is sufficiently close to "eliminable" to accidentally replace one for the other? I was poking fun at not only the original Anon's "inimical", but another common mistake, i.e. the "intensive purposes".
DeleteI got it. But didn't you mean "tongue and cheek"? ;-)
DeleteTony, I could tell you pacifically made that mistake as a joke.
DeleteThis is funny
DeleteDid you mean “inimitable”? Yes. I don't type well on my cellphone.
ReplyDeleteI found a thief!
ReplyDeletehttps://liamoflakewood.blogspot.com/2026/07/the-aquinas-meat-grinder.html
Given that the article is paywalled, I can't truly comment on whatever argument it's trying to make. But from a cursory search over Anscombe's work, it seems as if her definition of human nature and dignity leans heavily on the mystical, or at least on the notion that humans are spiritual creatures with souls, or that our knowledge of these facts is "connatural", by which she seems to mean intuitive. Personally, I don't think any theory based on intuition can ever be very sound - it would seem to require the assumption that our intuition is divinely designed and good at finding truths, the first of which is very likely wrong, and the second of which is demonstrably wrong. Intuition is *frequently* incorrect - do you have any idea how many cognitive biases the human brain has? Indeed, why expect otherwise? Why would you expect an organ randomly evolved to be just good enough at understanding the world to survive to be good at finding the truth? We can train it to do better, we can develop tools like critical thinking that supplement its failings, but those are technologies, not innate to us, and some of us never learn them.
ReplyDeleteI admit this may be a hash of her position, but if so, I'd appreciate actually being informed of where and why I'm mistaken, rather than simply snarled or laughed at.
From https://kirkcenter.org/reviews/c-s-lewis-and-gender-ideology/ :
ReplyDeleteWe don’t need no stinking metaphysical ideals here, for what could be higher, deeper and so on than the ordering of human bodies toward the begetting of new persons? This is illustrated by an anecdote about Elizabeth Anscombe. As retold by Rachel Lu,
Anscombe was an Oxford professor, a high-profile analytic philosopher, and also a mother of seven. People sometimes had opinions about that, and the story goes that she came into her classroom one day (pregnant with her seventh) to find that some mean-spirited troll had written the words “ANSCOMBE BREEDS” on her chalkboard. Calmly, without apparent embarrassment, she picked up the chalk and added two words. “ANSCOMBE BREEDS IMMORTAL BEINGS.”
Charles, She always had the perfect riposte.
DeleteAnscombe was brilliant! When I taught philosophy at the university, I required my students to become well acquainted with one of the philosophers of the 20th century. The female students often chose Anscombe. Even male students who chose Wittgenstein were forced to consider her.
ReplyDeleteWittgenstein chose Anscombe to translate his writings.
ReplyDelete