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Selected for the First Things list of the 50 Best Blogs of 2010 (November 19, 2010)
Sunday, December 17, 2023
The Aristotelian proof on Within Reason
Some time back,
Alex O’Connor and I recorded a discussion of the Aristotelian argument from
motion for the existence of God, for his Within
Reason podcast. The episode is now available on YouTube.
I'm not shocked. Alex had William L Craig on a while back. He also interviewed Peter Hitchens. He is friendly with Trent Horn. Why would you think Alex wouldn't have Feser on the show?
I might be missing something but I am confused by the first objection that Alex gave against potency being a real feature of things? If temperature really is infinitely divisible in the way he proposed, then how is it a problem if the coffee cup can have an infinite number of potencies with regards to temperature? We can't say that the coffee cup has a real number of infinite properties unless we have already established the existence of a real infinity that exists outside the coffee cup (temperature or infinite space to follow the examples he gave). If this is the case though, then Alex undermines his own argument because he fails to realize that he has basically granted the possibility of a real infinity at the beginning of his argument.
Yes, I also thought it was a rather silly argument. I don't think O'Connor understands the distinction between actuality and potentiality. Both exist, but not in the same way. So the fact that there are an infinite number of temperatures the coffee could be is perfectly compatible with the impossibility that there are an infinite number of temperatures the coffee is. Also, potentiality is limited by the nature of the substance. The coffee can be any temperature, but it cannot potentially get up and walk away or the coffee potentially turn into tea. I don't see why he thinks that argument has any force at all.
Under atomic theory / quantum theory, there are actually a (high but) finite number of temperatures a finite object can be, as there are a finite quanta of energy states possible, there are "smallest" energy state change amounts possible. The possible number of averages of those finite possible states for each particle is also finite.
I think the issue is how to conceive of potentiality. The way I think of it is to say that potency is prefigured in the actual in that the potency of a thing is the possibility of the relevant causal factors to be in any one place or state of change.
Take the coffee example, the coffee is potentially temperature C (T.C.), the realness of the potential of the coffee to be T.C. is prefigured in the relevant causal factors. It may be that world is made of a high number of potencies that are being actualized at a rapid-fire pace, hence a web of potencies being actualized. Going back to the coffee example, it may be the case that we ought to think of potency in terms of the relevant causal factors, that when micro potencies are actualized result in macro potencies being actualized, that then we can deem potencies to be a real feature of the world. It seems strange to me, to say relevant causal factor X having the possibility to be at place C is not a real feature of the world.
Not sure if this adds anything to your question, I am working out all this myself.
"Under atomic theory / quantum theory, there are actually a (high but) finite number of temperatures a finite object can be, as there are a finite quanta of energy states possible, there are "smallest" energy state change amounts possible. The possible number of averages of those finite possible states for each particle is also finite. "
True, but virtually in every realistic case, the state spaces of quantum systems are infinite-dimensional.
Not that I think this poses any sort of problem (and there are other assumptions smuggled in, e.g. in the counting of potentialities), it is just that this type of answer will only get you so far.
The problem is that the whole potential/actual distinction fades away because potentialities really exist, But if potentialities really exist, there is no reason why they can't actulaize themselves. It is not a matter of something coming from nothing because potentialities are not nothing. Alex is not undermining his own argument because he is not a priori treating potentials as real features of things.
An objection that Alex doesn't seem to raise is this: Ed seems to treat creation of things as actualizing a potential, but that entails that God is not the creator of everything, because if God were the creator of the potential of, let's say angels, to exist, He would have to be the creator of the potential of the potential of angels to exist, which would lead to an infinite regress of essentially ordered causes. One of the main problems with Thomism is that it cannot account for the existence of potentials.
Walter, you're conflating the terms. Actuality in created beings is a perfection, whereas a potency is a capacity to a perfection. The capacity to a different state of being is really present in something actual, but since it lacks perfection, it has no efficacy to produce the effect. Only something actual can produce that.
I think Bill answered your first objection well so I will leave it at that.
With regards to your second objection, I don't think saying that God is the creator of the potential for angels to exist is something that most Thomists would accept. The potential for angels to exist is something that pre exists in the Divine Intellect by God's knowledge of himself and the possible ways for being to exists in a limited way.
Finally, I don't think that you have actually responded to what my original problem with Alex's argument is (which could very well be my fault for not being clear enough). My problem is rather that if we want to say that real infinites can't exist, therefore if you hold that potentials are real features of the world then you have to accept the existence of real infinites (coffee cup temperature or infinite space example) we run into a problem. Taking the coffee cup example, we have to first allow for either the existence of infinite divisibility of temperature or the infinite range of temperature to be real features of the world before we can say that the coffee cup has an infinite number of real potentials for temperature. This is a problem though because we can no longer say that the infinite number of real potentials poses any kind of problem for the A/T position as we have already been forced to accept a real infinity to make the objection. Hopefully that might be more clear.
I know that's what Tomists and Aristoteleans claim, but it is, to say the least, controversial that the efficacy to produce an effect requires perfection. I see no reason to believe that. I do believe, however, that ex nihilo nihil fit, but since potentials are not nothing, that doesn't in itself raise any problem.
The potential for angels to exist is something that pre exists in the Divine Intellect by God's knowledge of himself and the possible ways for being to exists in a limited way.
If I resall correctly, Ed says that the potential of angels to exist must be actualized. If what you say is true, God actualizes a potential in Himself to 'create' angels. But God cannot have any potentials. Hence, creation must be something entirely different from actualizing a potential.
As to your second point, there are things that most people agree are potentially infinite. If the universe keeps on expanding, then that is a potential infinity. If we don't treat potentials as really existing (in whatever mode), then that is not a problem. But if potentail are real, the universe really has an infinite number of potentials. So, no, Alex is not forced to accept a real infinity to make the objection, because if potentials are not real features of the world, there is no real infinity.
I know that's what Tomists and Aristoteleans claim, but it is, to say the least, controversial that the efficacy to produce an effect requires perfection.
If it’s controversial, it shouldn’t be. Since a potency isn’t an actuality, it doesn’t have the same degree of being or reality. For example, let’s say you’re in Boston right now (i.e., you are actually in Boston). However, you are in potency to Dallas (or anyplace else in the universe). Walter in Dallas is a real capacity for Walter in Boston, but Walter in Dallas does not exist in actuality (only in potency). So, how can Walter in Dallas be realized? Walter in Dallas cannot actualize itself because Walter isn’t in Dallas at the moment. Walter in Dallas can only be raised to actuality by Walter in Boston. Thus, potency can be reduced to act only by that which is in act.
We see this same pattern in all instances of change. The stick does not move itself to push a stone. The finger does not move itself to press a button. What has the capacity to be actualized or perfected is perfected by something which is itself perfect. This is rather obvious, Walter.
I have no problem with the claim that something must exist in order to moe something else. That's pretty obvious. But I don't believe in perfections. Being in Boston mis not a perfection.
Accidentally pushed the publish button. Just to add. Being in Dallas isn't a perfection, so my being in Boston may be changed to being in Dallas, but it isn't perfected. Boston seems nice to me. Moreover, I do not see why it can't be the case that everything is necessarily both act and potency. The "act" is simply a way of stating what is the case at an instant, the "potency" is what happens/can happen over time. No need for a real disntinction. Existing is moving. Something that doesn't move does jnot exist.
I have no problem with the claim that something must exist in order to moe something else. That's pretty obvious. But I don't believe in perfections.
If you have no problem with that claim, then you have no problem with the claim that potencies cannot be reduced to act except by something in act. That’s saying the same thing. And if you don’t believe in perfections, then you don’t believe in change, because perfection is the completion of change.
Being in Dallas isn't a perfection, so my being in Boston may be changed to being in Dallas, but it isn't perfected.
You’re missing the point, Walter. If you’re in potency to Dallas, by definition you’re not actually in Dallas. Your body has the capacity to move to Dallas, and once you’re there, the capacity or potency to move to a particular spatial coordinate is fully actualized or perfected. Perfection is merely the termination of a causal series or change.
Moreover, I do not see why it can't be the case that everything is necessarily both act and potency.
All created beings are in act and potency. Who told you otherwise? They are simply not in act in the same respect as they are in potency. Your vocal chords actually exist (they are in act), but they can potentially vibrate. These principles of being are features of every creature or thing. You keep repeating criticisms of the argument without comprehending what the argument is.
The "act" is simply a way of stating what is the case at an instant, the "potency" is what happens/can happen over time. No need for a real disntinction.
Then why do you assert a distinction? On your own terms, there is a difference between what is and what can be.
Existing is moving. Something that doesn't move does jnot exist.
Of course, but you’re conflating terms again. Anything that moves is in act with respect to its presently moving, but the thing in question is also in potency to either continued movement or the cessation of movement. Potency accounts for the capacity of a subject to change. So, in one sense, existence in created things is movement because existence is continually being added to essence in order for a subject to continue existing, just like your vocal chords need air in order to keep vibrating. Vibrating vocal chords are clearly in act, but they also clearly have the capacity or potency to stop moving. They are thus in act in one sense and in potency in another sense.
Act and potency are merely ways of describing the limitation of being. Being simpliciter (unqualified being) has no restrictions (obviously, since it is unqualified). “Being” applies to all states of reality, so if there is such a thing as Pure Being, no further actuality could be added to or taken away from it. Since creatures do not have unqualified existence, terminology was developed to describe these limited states of being. We have a qualified existence which is limited by our essences, which is our capacity to acquire or lose states of reality. Act and potency are not like Lego blocks. They are principles of being which describe our creaturely status. We can change only because we have the potency or capacity to change. That’s a real feature of anything that changes, which I consider rather self-evident. It truly is baffling to me why this is even controversial.
Of course we change because we have the capacity to change, but we don't change because we are not perfect and move to perfection. Change is simply the capacity to become something else, not the capacity to become something better. There is no "better" or "worse". No state of being is "limited". I "assert" a distinction between act and potency for the sake of the discussion, but there is no real distinction. The Morning Star is the Evening Star seen in the morning.
I think that you need to keep clear on the distinction between possible and potential. A potential is a readiness for some being, and readiness for implies already a KIND of being as such. "Possible" doesn't imply that. Before God created, it was possible for him to create or not create other beings. But there was no thing to be ready for receiving creation. Nothingness is not readiness for being. And God's mind knowing the kind of thing he may create is not properly a potential of some thing.
Also, a real created being has a possibility of ceasing to exist , i.e. if God stops sustaining it, (which would result in annihilation of it, not merely death or change - even angels can cease if God stops sustaining their being), but this is not a potentiality of the created being. Ceasing to have any actuality at all cannot be described as a potentiality, only a possibility. Potential has to do with taking on some other condition of being, (whether you call it a perfection or not), and ceasing all being isn't going to some other condition of being, it is non-being altogether.
Change is simply the capacity to become something else, not the capacity to become something better. There is no "better" or "worse". No state of being is "limited".
You’ve been told multiple times that a perfection is the actualization of a potency. It is a realized capacity. Causal efficacy may result in good or evil, but that has nothing to do with the definition of the term. A knife is supposed to cut. Thus, when a knife is used to cut something, its capacity to cut is perfected when it cuts, even if it illegitimately cuts someone’s throat. Now, you may have your own definition of perfection, but that bears no relevance to the Thomist version. If you take it upon yourself to criticize A/T metaphysics, you have to use its terminology, not what you prefer as a substitute, else you’re skewering scarecrows.
Walter, it’s quite obvious that you know little of A/T metaphysics, even after all this time commenting on these boards. It seems that you hear or read something, spin it according to your presuppositions, and then condemn it in ignorance.
I "assert" a distinction between act and potency for the sake of the discussion, but there is no real distinction.
No, you didn’t assert the distinction for sake of discussion. You said:
The "act" is simply a way of stating what is the case at an instant, the "potency" is what happens/can happen over time. No need for a real disntinction.
What is really (not conceptually) is distinct from what can be. If what can be is not really distinct from what is, then an acorn is not really distinct from an oak tree. Sitting is not really distinct from standing. Sleeping is not really distinct from being awake.
The Morning Star is the Evening Star seen in the morning.
You’re using Venus to illustrate nominal distinctions, but surely you are aware that that’s not the only kind of distinction. Moreover, there is a real distinction between the Morning Star (MS) and the Evening Star (ES). In the morning, we are viewing one spatiotemporal orbit of Venus, and in the evening, we are viewing another spatiotemporal thereof. We are then viewing different sides of Venus, depending on when we are viewing them. And how is it that we are able to view different sides of Venus? That is explained by the causal powers perfected in rotation. Thus, there is a real distinction between the MS and the ES. This is really pretty basic stuff, Walter.
"It is a realized capacity." I know that's what you think, and what Thomists in general think, but I reject it, because I don't believe that things are "supposed to" do anything. That's our main point of disagreement, I think, and all the rest follows from it. I don't believe in teleology and you obviously do, which is fine, but that doesn't in itself mean that I am wrong. To show me I am wrong, you 'll have to come up with some real arguments. But the problem is that you seem to be stuck in your Thomistic framework so that you cannot even begin to comprehend anything that questions the very basis of that framework. And that's what I am doing. Before you draw the "you don't understand Thomism" card, you should first try to understand what I really say, instead of knocking down strawman. For example, I have never said anything about good or evil, I am saying that things "become" different and that's all.
Your reply about Venus is a good illustration. The Morning Star and the Evening Star are not real distinctions of Venus. Even if Venus was completely changeless, we would still see it as the Evenning Star and the Morning Star, because move. The Earth rotates and that is the main reason why we draw the distinction between the Morning Star and the Evening Star. But it is not because there is a real distinction. Nobody is talking about "Venus at 8 p.m." and "Venus at 8.01 p.m." as distinct planets, although its position has slightly changed. You can find distinctions everywhere if you want, but my question is: do they denote a real feature of the thing described or not. You assert that they do, I say that they don't. For my, "actuality" is simply a different way of looking at something than "potentiality", we see it from a different angle, that's all.
I am not sure your comment was addressed to me, but I do not think that the distinction between possible and potential is really meaningful, unless you are merely talking about logical possibility. I do not believe for a moment that things can come into existence or go out of existence. Ex nihilo nihil fit.
I know that's what you think, and what Thomists in general think, but I reject it [that change is a realized capacity], because I don't believe that things are "supposed to" do anything. That's our main point of disagreement, I think, and all the rest follows from it.
If you know that’s what we think, then why do you write about it the way you do (whether perfections are something “better”)? You couldn’t have written that if you “know what we think.” Moreover, what in the world is “supposed to do” supposed to mean in this context? Do you mean teleology by an intelligent agent? All Thomists say at this point is that there is a real capacity in things to different states of being pursuant to their nature. A heart has the capacity to pump blood, not to make ice cream. A ping-pong ball has the capacity to bounce, not to digest acorns. Water has the capacity to freeze, not to build lawnmowers. And why can’t water build lawnmowers? And why in the world does this need to be explained if you know what we think?? It is not within the range of causal capacities of water to build lawnmowers, skyscrapers or rockets. This kind of dialog gives every impression that you’re not arguing in good faith.
I don't believe in teleology and you obviously do, which is fine, but that doesn't in itself mean that I am wrong. To show me I am wrong, you 'll have to come up with some real arguments. But the problem is that you seem to be stuck in your Thomistic framework so that you cannot even begin to comprehend anything that questions the very basis of that framework. And that's what I am doing.
Oh, you want me to rewrite Aquinas or Scholastic Metaphysics? You’ve been commenting on these boards for some time. I simply assumed that you at the very least did some background research before running your keyboard. If you haven’t read the necessary material, then you have no business popping off about who hasn’t offered “real arguments.” And if you have read the material and didn’t recognize the plethora of “real arguments” therein, then nothing I write will help you further. I full well comprehend legitimate questions to the Thomistic framework. I wasn’t born into classical theism, and I questioned plenty when it was presented to me.
Your comment about not believing in teleology is telling. It appears that you’re so intent on denying teleology that you reflexively deny every aspect of an argument that might lead to it. Actuality is simply what is real here and now. Potentiality is the capacity to become something else. Change is the process by which a potential becomes actual. A perfection is what results from change. And we see examples of change everywhere we look in the universe. This is our common experience and is the basis for the scientific method. You’re just denying the obvious.
Before you draw the "you don't understand Thomism" card, you should first try to understand what I really say, instead of knocking down strawman. For example, I have never said anything about good or evil, I am saying that things "become" different and that's all.
Are you the pot or the kettle? Are you so caught up with the mere words good and evil that you entirely missed the point I was making? Why don’t YOU try to understand your interlocutor’s words as much as you’d like others to understand yours? I was replying to your point that “[c]hange is simply the capacity to become something else, not the capacity to become something better.” My reply referencing good and evil is illustrative only that regardless of any alleged betterment of an actualization, a perfection is merely the termination of change in a particular respect. Your comment betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of what you’re criticizing. You don’t even know what a perfection is. I was pointing out that a perfection is precisely the “something else” that something has the capacity to realize. You cannot consistently say that you disagree with something when that something is exactly what you say you believe.
You can find distinctions everywhere if you want, but my question is: do they denote a real feature of the thing described or not. You assert that they do, I say that they don't.
You said this in reference to my comments about the MS and the ES (Venus). This is just plain silly. One side of Venus is materially different from the other side of Venus. When we view Venus in the morning, we are looking at one side of it. When we view it in the evening, we are looking at another side thereof. There is thus a real difference between the two, even though we’re referencing the same planet. There is a real distinction between your right hand and your left hand, even though we’re referencing the same person (Walter). If you’re speaking of Venus collectively, then, yes, MS & ES is a nominal distinction. But if speaking more precisely, we’re looking a different parts of Venus, depending on when we look at it. You’re conflating collectives and particulars.
If all Thomist's really mean is that things can change because they can change, then I am OK with that. I believe that too, and so does everybody who thinks change is real. But you said that "perfection is the completion of change", and I don't agree with that. IMO, there is no such thing as the completion of change. There is change, and that's it. At some time, X is X and at another time it is Y, but , unless time is discrete, and we can stop the time at the exact moment in which Y is the case, there is no such thing as an actual Y. But there is no "termination".
As to Venus, my point is that not every distinction is a real feature of a thing. Some distinctions are nominal. The Morning Star and the Evening Star are examples of such nominal distinctions. Even if we always saw one side of Venus, we couild still refer to it as The MS or the ES, depending on our view of it. So, we can call a thing 'potential' or 'actual' depending on our view of it, but they, IMO, do not refer to actual features of that thing. That's it. Now you claim I should refer to them as really distinct features, but you have given me no argument as to why I should do so. I haven't found a convincing argument in Aristotle or Aquinas either, but of course, I can be mistaken. In any case, it is not "obvious" in any way.
"But there was no thing to be ready for receiving creation. Nothingness is not readiness for being. And God's mind knowing the kind of thing he may create is not properly a potential of some thing."
That's what I thought was the Thomist way of looking at creation, but, to my surprise, Ed Feser, in his discussion with Alex O'Connor, between 1.15:56 and 1.16:03 says the following, "They (angels) stil have to be created, because they are merely contingent things, and that means they have to go from potentiality to actuality".
"They (angels) stil have to be created, because they are merely contingent things, and that means they have to go from potentiality to actuality".
This is just a way of saying that essence is in potency *with respect* to existence, where essence is now just the archetypes in God's mind for creation (or more precisely, the ways in which finite being can participate in the unlimited, infinite being of God, that God knows through knowing Himself perfectly) not that there are some unrealized potentials absolutely speaking, either in God or in some sort of Platonic heaven. It would be better to speak of possible being to avoid confusion.
If all Thomist's really mean is that things can change because they can change, then I am OK with that. I believe that too, and so does everybody who thinks change is real.
Well, that’s not “all” they believe, and you know it. With respect to change, why does it take post after post to own up to it? Anything that changes has the real capacity to change, but folks somehow want to dig in their heels and argue every single point as if their lives depended on denying the obvious. They’re so obsessed with validating their bias against either Catholicism (I’m not Catholic) or theism, they have to convince themselves and anybody who’ll listen that all of it is false from top to bottom. This is something we should never have argued about.
But you said that "perfection is the completion of change", and I don't agree with that. IMO, there is no such thing as the completion of change. There is change, and that's it. At some time, X is X and at another time it is Y, but , unless time is discrete, and we can stop the time at the exact moment in which Y is the case, there is no such thing as an actual Y. But there is no "termination".
And you’re again using terms differently than we’re using them. Why do you keep doing this? One reason is your fundamental misunderstanding of our arguments. Whether you like it or not, that’s a fact. And why are you posting on these boards unless you want to be taken seriously with your objections? Nobody here will take you seriously when you don’t even know what they believe. If you want to prove we’re wrong, at least get our arguments right.
There is accidental change and substantial change (know what that means?). If you’re sitting, you have the potential to stand. The proximate efficient cause of your standing is your will which actualizes a chain of secondary or derivative causes which terminates in your standing. Once you’re actually standing the causal chain in that regard ends. That does not mean that you lack the potency to sit back down or do myriad other things. Your standing is actual, yet you are in potency as to other things. The same goes with substantial change. An acorn becomes an oak. Once it’s actually an oak, the changing process in that regard terminates. Again, that does not imply that the oak lack potential for other perfections. The proof of causal termination is everywhere you look.
As to Venus, my point is that not every distinction is a real feature of a thing.
Nobody said it is. I already mentioned nominal distinctions, so why are we traipsing around that point again? Want some more repetition? Your left hand isn’t your right hand. That’s not a nominal distinction; it’s a real distinction. One side of Venus isn’t the other side of Venus. They are different portions of matter which compose said planet. Thus, there is a real difference between them. If you’re referring to the planet collectively, then we can agree that MS & ES is a nominal distinction. But when speaking particularly, it’s a real distinction. Why are we going around this again? Is it your position that the left hand is materially the same as the right hand (the same portions of matter?). Please.
I am afraid we'll have to agree to disagree on this. You obviously do not understand what I am arguing for, and that may be because I failed to make it clear to you. Anyway, I don't feel like going into too many details on my view. That would take up more space than this combix allows for. Just one thing. We 'are going around this ( Venus) again' because you claimed that I was asserting a distinction. I wasn't asserting a real distinction, only a nominal one for the sake iof the argument, which is that there is no real distinction between potentiality and actuality. Merry Christmas.
You obviously do not understand what I am arguing for, and that may be because I failed to make it clear to you.
Well, it would help matters if you understood what you’re trying to criticize. You never answered whether you’ve read Aquinas or Scholastic Metaphysics. You never answered whether you think “left hand” and “right hand” is a nominal distinction. And you typically “agree to disagree” and disappear when you can’t answer questions like that.
We 'are going around this ( Venus) again' because you claimed that I was asserting a distinction.
I claimed that you asserted a nominal distinction between MS & ES (which you acknowledge in the very next sentence). A nominal distinction IS a distinction, but it isn’t a real one. I agreed that if speaking collectively, it is a nominal distinction. But on deeper analysis, it is obviously a real distinction. Venus is a composite being, and the matters on one side of Venus is different from the matter on the other side (just like the carbon that’s in you is really distinct from the carbon that is in me).
Walter, I feel like I’m trying to explain these things to a second-grader. These things are so obvious, you have to try really, REALLY hard to miss them. At this point, I have to conclude that you’re just being obstinate.
...there is no real distinction between potentiality and actuality.
Of course there is, and I’ve demonstrated that with multiple examples. If you’re going to make a claim, don’t hide behind the combox’s size to avoid defending it. Define “real” and show why that definition is different from the classical definition of the term. Please explain why standing isn’t really distinct from sitting, why speaking isn’t really distinct from being silent, and why takeoff isn’t really distinct from landing. Unless you’re advocating an unproved B-theory of time, your position is absurd.
I have, from the beginning, said that there is "no need for a real disntinction." That means that I consider the distinction between potential and actual as merely nominal. The MS and the ES are nominal distinctions because they do not refer to any real feature of the planet Venus. That Venus does have real distinct features, like any physical thing, is not relevant, because, as I have explained (and you never reponded), even if Venus did not have real distinct features, we could still speak of the Morning Star and The Evening Star. And FYI, there is a real difference between speaking and being silent, I have never claimed ther wasn't. So, if you truly want to continue this discussion, stop strawmanning and address what I actually wrote.
I have, from the beginning, said that there is "no need for a real disntinction." That means that I consider the distinction between potential and actual as merely nominal.
And I have, from the beginning, supplied you with numerous examples of real distinctions between potency and actuality. And your proofs by assertion are still fallacious.
The MS and the ES are nominal distinctions because they do not refer to any real feature of the planet Venus.
What part of “collective” and “particular” confuses you?
That Venus does have real distinct features, like any physical thing, is not relevant, because, as I have explained (and you never reponded), even if Venus did not have real distinct features, we could still speak of the Morning Star and The Evening Star.
If Venus didn’t have “real distinct features,” then what in the world are we looking at, an illusion? And I’ve told you more than once that MS & ES can certainly be a nominal distinction. But since we know that Venus is a planet, and since we know that we are looking a different sides of the same planet, MS & ES isn’t a nominal distinction when considering Venus’ different spatiotemporal orbits. If I see Walter’s left side in the morning and Walter’s right side in the evening, I can legitimately say that “left side” is really distinct from “right side.” This isn’t rocket science, Walter.
And all of that is irrelevant to the main point that there are real distinctions in substances, whether or not Venus is an illusion.
And FYI, there is a real difference between speaking and being silent, I have never claimed ther wasn't.
If there is a real difference between speaking and being silent, then there is a real difference between act and potency, because that’s what I’ve been saying all along! Speaking is the actualizing of the vocal chords’ potency to vibrate. On your terms, then, there is a real difference between the two. This is true of accidental change and substantial change. You seem to be arguing that the vocal chords remain the same whether or not they’re moving (which amounts to making “vibration” and “at rest” nominal distinctions), but since that a clear straw man of our arguments, and since you’re very sensitive to straw men, you certainly can’t be arguing that.
I haven’t “straw-manned” one thing, Walter. The onus is on you when you come to a classical theist site to criticize arguments you don’t understand. I’ve told you more than once that if you want to be taken seriously, you need to first understand what you’re criticizing and state precisely where you think the argument goes astray. If you’ve got a problem with the act/potency real distinction, then lay out your argument. Don’t take potshots and then accuse your critics of not presenting arguments that merit your approval. I ask you again, did you read Aquinas and/or Scholastic Metaphysics? Did you read The Last Superstition. How about Five Proofs? Did you even watch the linked video?? If not, then what in the world are you doing here?
A real difference can't be merely nominal, speaking and bei!ng silent are really different, but I do not consider one of them potential and the other actual. My view is that existence is motion. So, motion exists, and we can indeed say that someone is speaking at a certain moment and being silent at another, but that is no a matter of any potential being actualized. It's much more complex than that, but in my view 'potentiality' is fundamental while actuality is not a real feature of the world. I don't like to call it 'potentiality', though. I prefer 'capacity to change' or even 'motion'. When I take a highway between two cities, then I really am in all the towns in between, but that is not because my being in, say Cleveland, is actualized, but because my motion happens to bring me in the Cleveland area. The main difference is, as I have tried in vain to explain to Bill, is that there is no a priori teleology towards an actuality, it is merely because of the motion that we can, a posteriori, distinguish between stages.
Now, it is more complex than that, because obviously, there is some kind of teleology in living creatures.
A real difference can't be merely nominal, speaking and bei!ng silent are really different, but I do not consider one of them potential and the other actual.
What you personally consider is irrelevant to Thomism. You have to show why, on Thomist terms, its conclusions do not follow. Merely stating another view is not a rebuttal. Moreover, speaking and silence are different states of actuality. Neither state is a potency as to the state itself. It is the person who is silent, and it is the person who is speaking. Since the person exists, the person is actual (that’s what actual (real) means). If said person is silent, he is in potency to speaking. And if said person is speaking, he is in potency to silence. And said person is in potency to what you’ve called really distinct states because his substance has the potency to realize those states. Potency is thus a real feature of his existence.
My view is that existence is motion. So, motion exists, and we can indeed say that someone is speaking at a certain moment and being silent at another, but that is no a matter of any potential being actualized.
Again, your view is irrelevant unless you show why it’s superior to the Thomist explanation. Existence is actuality with the potency for continued actuality. Every created thing is actual in that it exists (if not, then what is it?) and is simultaneously in potency to continued existence and other states of reality. Existence is actuality, so if you believe that some things exist, then on Thomist terms, some things are actual (not imaginary or illusory).
but in my view 'potentiality' is fundamental while actuality is not a real feature of the world.
Sigh. The word actual, defined, means: existing in act or fact; real; existing now; present; current
So, if actuality is not a real feature of the world, then nothing is real.
I don't like to call it 'potentiality', though. I prefer 'capacity to change' or even 'motion'.
And you’ve been told over and over that’s how we define potentiality as well. The question is WHAT has the capacity to change?
The main difference is, as I have tried in vain to explain to Bill, is that there is no a priori teleology towards an actuality, it is merely because of the motion that we can, a posteriori, distinguish between stages.
But since you don’t believe that actuality is a real feature of the world, then nothing is real. Your view is nonsensical. What are the “stages” that the motion is between? More motion? An acorn’s nature is to become an oak, not a computer or a plastic sandwich bag. While it is really an acorn, it isn’t an oak. In other words, the oak is not actual. It only becomes actual or existing when the potential (“capacity to change”) inherent in the acorn is initiated by other actualities which result in an actually existing oak. You’re again conflating terms and misapplying the sense in which they’re used.
Finally, you still haven’t answered my questions, though you’ve been asked multiple times. Have you read the material I listed or even watched the linked video? If not, then what are you doing here?
I offer an Alternative to Thomism, so I don't have to show why the conclusion doesn't follow. I simply don't agree with all the premises. So.either you show me why my view is wrong or you admit that Thomism is only one of the possibilties alongside others. So far, you have been attacking straw-men and begging the question. And, not that it is any of your business, I have read plenty on Thomism and I have watched the video.
If you "really" are in all the towns on your way to Cleveland then are you "really" in them at once? Or are you "really" there sequentially in time?
I'm tryng to understand if you are advocating a b-theory of time. If not, then I don't get your distinction between potency/act and 'capacity to change'/being located in a actual location at an actual time. Is your argument merely that we can see what is going on only by observation and not via some innate knowledge? I didn't get that Bill was making that assertion. If I remember correctly, Aristotle came to this distinction a posteriori and so Thomists would too, presumably.
Regardless, wouldn't you agree that we recognize that some things change always or for the most part in the same way under certain circumstances? Isn't that called teleology whether we know it a priori or a posteriori?
No, I am not advocating a b-theory. On my way to Cleveland I am in all the other towns sequentially, just like an arrow is at one metre and later at two metres from me. The point is that the arrow doesn't stop there. In fact, it doesn't stop anywhere unless some force acts upon it. Everything is always in motion. That some things change in the same way is not teleology. It has to do with restrictions due to different forces. It is a very complex issue.
I offer an Alternative to Thomism, so I don't have to show why the conclusion doesn't follow. I simply don't agree with all the premises.
Yes, you do. Simply offering an alternative without an argument means nothing. Moreover, since you know that this is a Thomist site, blathering about your not believing the obvious has zero effect. If the conclusions follow, then harping about your having another theory is meaningless.
So.either you show me why my view is wrong or you admit that Thomism is only one of the possibilties alongside others. So far, you have been attacking straw-men and begging the question.
Actually, you’ve got plenty of straw men in your barn, as evidenced by your trotting some of them out in this thread. I don’t know what your overall epistemology is, so I can only go on what you’ve written here. And so far, it’s a jumbled mass of confusion. Part of the problem is that you run or go silent when pinned down. If you’d bother to address my objections, perhaps progress can be made. You won’t do that because you’ve not been arguing in good faith. If you had a viable alternative, you wouldn’t mind addressing my objections.
And, not that it is any of your business, I have read plenty on Thomism and I have watched the video.
It is certainly my business because you’ve chosen to interact with me. You’ve come here asking for full-blown arguments, so my questions are directly relevant to your request. If you’re clueless what classical theist arguments are, then I might be compelled to provide detailed argumentation (although it would make you look foolish to comment on material you haven’t read). However, if you are adequately informed, then your request for arguments makes no sense.
You claim to have “read plenty on Thomism,” but thus far, you’ve exhibited no retention of what you’ve read. You repeatedly make false claims about what we believe, and you repeatedly show that you lack adequate knowledge of the most elementary aspects of classical theism. Let’s do some basic arithmetic:
Actual, defined, is: existing in act or fact; real; existing now; present; current
Potential, defined, is: possible, as opposed to actual; capable of being or becoming
Thus, “our” terms are not some secret club code-speak that few can understand. They are what everybody who can understand English (or whatever other language equivalents exist) grasp when they’re written or spoken. What exists is actual and what can exist is potential. You, on the other hand, turn language on its head and apply potential to what’s actual while denying that anything is actual (that all reality is movement). But since “reality” is the state or quality of being real, then reality is actuality. Yet, you deny actuality, so then nothing is real. And if this is somehow a straw man, then please by all means try to unravel your contradictions.
Just to answer your question. Of course the stages the motion is between is more motion, since motion is all that exists.
And this is an additional helping of confusion. If the stages the motion is between is motion, then “stages” is just another word for motion. There is thus no stage at all; it’s all just motion. But what then is moving? You cannot have movement without something to move. And if there is a concrete something that moves, then something has a degree of actuality, else your argument reduces to nothing moving, which is absurd.
Bill, Definitions are generally a good starting point. Too often arguments depend on equivocation or the parties simply have differing definitions for the terms employed.
"Actual, defined, is: existing in act or fact; real; existing now; present; current" Ok, so actual is real, a beable, a being, a feature of the cosmos with existential realization.
"Potential, defined, is: possible, as opposed to actual; capable of being or becoming" Ok, so existentially possible, a state of affairs that can actually be the case of real beables in the real cosmos.
Important to distinguish between existentially possible as opposed to logically possible.
A logical possibility is any hypothetical state of affairs that does not violate an axiom of logic.
A logical possibility does not necessarily entail an existential possibility.
One can express a logically possible state of affairs that is impossible to realize in the actual cosmos.
However an existential possibility must entail a logical possibility. If a state of affairs in the cosmos is actually the case and really exists then it must necessarily be logically possible.
It is impossible for an actual existence to be logically impossible. If actuality violates an asserted axiom of logic then the asserted axiom of logic is invalid and was never a true axiom of logic.
*all reality is movement* (attribution unknown) I don't know if that statement is rightly attributed to anybody, but I disagree with the plain text of that phrase.
"But since “reality” is the state or quality of being real, then reality is actuality." That seems tautologically true, which is not a pejorative criticism, just sayin...
"If the stages the motion is between is motion, then “stages” is just another word for motion. There is thus no stage at all; it’s all just motion. But what then is moving?" Fair question, assuming the premise is fairly stated.
"You cannot have movement without something to move." Agreed. You also cannot have existence without something to exist.
Does movement move? Does existence exist? No and No.
"...which is absurd." Agreed. Movement itself is absurd. Existence itself is absurd.
"Actual, defined, is: existing in act or fact; real; existing now; present; current
Potential, defined, is: possible, as opposed to actual; capable of being or becoming"
Yes, I know that those are the Thomists definitions of actual and potential. But I reject the distinction between them. There are no actual things tyhat can be defined like this. There are, however, things that can be defined as permanent motion. At some moment this motion is 1 metre from me, and at another moment it is 1.5 metres from me, and then we can describe this as "the arrow is at 1.5 metres now", which is in fact inaccurate because we cannot freeze time at an exact moment. But there is no intrinsic difference between the arrow at 1 metre and the arrow at 1.5 metres. It is simply moving and it will go on moving for infinity. That is what is true about the arrow, and you could describe it as "the arrow is actually moving". That's why the distinction between actual and potential fades away into one system of motion. So, "stages" is indeed just another word for motion. As to "you can't have movement without something to move". If existence is motion then of course you can have movement without something to move. Absurd? at first glance it may looik that way, but then there are people who claim that existence exists, but then, I could reply, "you can't have existence without something to exist". I could, but I don't.
"All reality is movement" can be atributed to me. It can also be atributed to Heraclitus and, in a way, even to Socrates. You disagree with it, but you also think, IIRC, that material is energy. Material is not some very tiny block that gets thrown around by forces, material is those forces. As to your conclusion, I agree that someone who thinks that it is absurd to say that movement does not require something to move should at least understand that some people think it's absurd to say that existence does nor require something to exist. My idea about it is that both statements can be defended.
OK. So if I understand correctly, you can be said to occupy certain locations at certain times on your way to Cleveland. As I mentioned, that seems indistinguishable from what a Thomist would say. Also the fact that something else is required to change the state of somethings motion is seems equally indistinguishable.
Do you think that Thomists assert that everything or at least somethings that we observe never change? I've never heard that. I've heard it said that a motion can be completed. So for instance if you are making a trip to Cleveland, there is a beginning to the trip, a middle part and the end of the trip when you have reached Cleveland. Of course that doesn't mean you turn to stone upon arriving at Cleveland, it just means that particular motion is over.
That some things change in the same way is not teleology.
That is my understanding of teleology. It's not very complex at all. Do deny that some things change always or for the most part in the same way under certain circumstances?
Yes, I know that those are the Thomists definitions of actual and potential. But I reject the distinction between them.
Correction: They are not merely how Thomists define those words, as you’ve been told. They are the standard definitions of said terms, as the links to the dictionary demonstrate. You are defining those words discordant with their definitions. If something exists, then it’s actual. If it doesn’t exist, then it isn’t actual.
There are, however, things that can be defined as permanent motion. At some moment this motion is 1 metre from me, and at another moment it is 1.5 metres from me, and then we can describe this as "the arrow is at 1.5 metres now", which is in fact inaccurate because we cannot freeze time at an exact moment.
Are you defining the word things as permanent motion, or are you saying that there are some things that are permanently in motion? The former is unintelligible because motion is movement (or change), but without something moving, there is no motion. The latter affirms what we say since it acknowledges a distinction between the moved and the movement.
You then supply an example of a thing as an arrow. But if the arrow isn’t actual (real), then it cannot be measured. You must presuppose its existence before you can intelligently analyze its distance from you. And an arrow’s being in local motion is really distinct from its substantial existence as an arrow. Its movement away from you doesn’t exist until it is actualized (moved) by something other than the arrow. The fact that whatever moves the arrow is itself moved as to its substantial existence is irrelevant because its movement isn’t in the same respect as the movement in question. Since what is actual is what is real (by definition), your position again reduces to the affirmation that nothing real is moving.
That is what is true about the arrow, and you could describe it as "the arrow is actually moving". That's why the distinction between actual and potential fades away into one system of motion.
And you again betray a fundamental misunderstanding of what you criticize. I gave you a similar example with moving vocal chords. The potency for vocal chords to vibrate is actualized by the air in your lungs. When they vibrate the vibration is in actuality (the chords are actually vibrating), but they are in potency to continued vibration. There is nothing in the “nature” of vocal chords to vibrate on their own. They are thus always in potency to vibration and continued vibration. It’s the same with an arrow. Its movement away from you is actualized by the propulsion of a bow, and its continued movement is temporarily sustained by kinetic energy and gravity. Thus, its local motion is actual, whereas it remains in potency to continued motion. If there is no actuality, then there is no reality. Thus, you have no arrow at all.
If existence is motion then of course you can have movement without something to move. Absurd? at first glance it may looik that way, but then there are people who claim that existence exists, but then, I could reply, "you can't have existence without something to exist". I could, but I don't.
Yes, it remains absurd. Playing tu quoque (which doesn’t work, but we’ll go with it for now) is a transparent attempt at deflection. Movement is synonymous with action, and action presupposes an actor (as motion presupposes a mover or something moved). Your system is gibberish. What is motion? Well, it’s movement? What is movement? Well, it’s motion. What is moving? Well, movement is moving. What is movement? Well, it’s motion. What is moving? Well, motion is moving. This is what your epistemology reduces to.
As to existence existing, existence is the state of existence (a noun), whereas exist is to have actual being (a verb). They are not synonymous. Your system reduces to an arrow’s being synonymous with its local motion, which, as shown, is incoherent.
"So if I understand correctly, you can be said to occupy certain locations at certain times on your way to Cleveland. As I mentioned, that seems indistinguishable from what a Thomist would say."
The difference is that my being in those locations isn't a completion. It is simply a slice of time in which I happen to be at a certain location. The same goes for Cleveland. "That particular motion is over" is also the case the moment I am in Delaware on my way to Cleveland. The Thomist claims that motion is the actualization of a potency, that means the motion from Montreal to Delaware in my way to Cleveland is also the actualization of a potential, which means that, depending on the way we can divide distances, there are a very high numebr or even infinitely many potencies in me. My alternative is much simpler. I am existing, which is the same as I am moving.
And it is true in the case of me flying an aeroplane or taking a train to go to Cleveland, something else is required to change my motion and for complex systems, you can always point to something else because the things around us influence us. But my view that existence is motion is to be understaood at the very basic level. There are no little "chunks" being thrown around by various forces, the chunks are those forces. And the forces of one "chunk" influence the others.
"Do (you) deny that some things change always or for the most part in the same way under certain circumstances?"
No, I don't deny that. But it is, IMO, not the result of some pre-existing teleology. it has to do with complex systems in which the "parts" influence each other and from certain patterns.
Movement is the state of movement (a noun) whereas to move is to have movement (a verb). They are not synonymous.
I am not playing tu quoque. As I explained to SP, I think "existence exists" can be defended, an so can "movement moves" .
"If something exists, then it’s actual. If it doesn’t exist, then it isn’t actual.
The problem is that, according to you and other Thomists, potentials do exist, which means that , according to your own definition here, they are actual. And that, my friend, has been my point all along. Potentialities do not need to be actualized because they are actual and they are the only actual "things".
So, of course the arrow is actual, because it moves. Suppose it did not move, I challenge you to measure it in that case. You can only measure it because it moves. The local motion of the arrow is simply an analogy to show that, even if there is no real distinction between potentality and actuality, we can still say that the arrow was at 1 metre at one "moment" and at 1.5 metres at another "moment". It is not an example of something moving itself. Macro-objects do not simply move themselves because their motion is complex. Fundamental motion is self-motion, AKA existence. "Unmoving existence" is a contradiction in terminis. There is no such things as "chunks" that do absolutely nothing, because they would be nothing.
And now, unless you really have some argument other than "I find it absurd", I am going to bow out. If you want to call this running out or going silent because I am pinned down, then so be it. If it makes you happy, then that's fine with me. Happy New Year.
Walter, "Material is not some very tiny block that gets thrown around by forces, material is those forces." Is it?
Is energy the force itself? I don't think so.
One definition of energy is the capacity to do work. But a static force does no work.
"Exist" and "move" are verbs, not nouns.
A verb is descriptive of some thing or some process, and a process is always of a thing not of itself.
I suggest you are conflating the description with the thing itself.
"My idea about it is that both statements can be defended." I am not aware of a sound defense that the verb is the noun. Your contention, then, seems to be: Existence exists. Motion moves.
Does running run? Does speech speak?
What would "running itself" even mean? Can there be speech without a speaker?
What would "pure speech" be?
You lost me here, Walter. I don't see how any of that works. Motion itself is incoherent. Existence itself is incoherent.
Ok, consider this, if you will. Absolutely nothing at all, just supposing, no space, no time, no material, nothing at all in any sense, just philosophical absolutely nothing at all.
To nothing add motion. What is moving in that case? Where is this motion moving to and from? Just pure motion? What does that even mean?
Alternatively, instead of pure motion, what happens to nothing when pure existence is added? What is existing in that case? Just existence existing? Just a circle of verbs? Descriptions of descriptions that do not describe anything except descriptions? What is doing all this describing? Nothing? A description without a describer? Again, what does that even mean?
Bill, "The fact that whatever moves the arrow is itself moved as to its substantial existence is irrelevant because its movement isn’t in the same respect as the movement in question." Irrelevant to your immediate point, perhaps, but highly relevant to the subject of the OP, the Aristotelian argument for a first mover.
If the apparent mover of the arrow was not itself moved equally then there would be a one-way causal regress called for. Arrow, moved by hand, which was moved by x which was moved by y which was moved by z and so forth ad infinitum, which is impossible, therefore a first mover.
But supposing A and H move each other. What moved A? H. What moved H? A. The linear one-way causal regress is over before it begins, in that case, and no additional movers are called for at all, much less a regress of movers terminating in a first mover.
Oh, but A and H are not moved in the same respect, you say. At base they are, but that is difficult for a human being to observe.
To simplify that realization consider the primary motive force in this case, the sliding filaments in the muscles. There you find molecular forces at work, equal and opposite forces primarily of electrostatic attraction and repulsion.
There is no call for a first mover because at base all causation is mutual and net lossless.
The appearance that change is in a different respect, that change is somehow one-way or linear, is only superficial and due to the limits of human perception.
My alternative is much simpler. I am existing, which is the same as I am moving.
I'm not following from your example why you think your alternative is simpler unless you mean that you are providing less information by saying that you are simply existing. I suppose that is simpler than saying you have completed a trip to Cleveland, but it doesn't explain your trajectory. It seems to be less an alternative than an under-explanation.
There are no little "chunks" being thrown around by various forces, the chunks are those forces. And the forces of one "chunk" influence the others.
So there there is no matter in your system? Only forces? If so, then what do you mean by forces? In physics, force is defined as the mass of an object multiplied by its acceleration. How is your definition different?
No, I don't deny that. But it is, IMO, not the result of some pre-existing teleology. it has to do with complex systems in which the "parts" influence each other and from certain patterns.
I'm not sure who you think you are disagreeing with. Aristotle contrasted things happening in nature in predictable ways "always or for the most part" with things happening randomly or by chance as do Thomists. So if you recognize patterns in nature, it seems you are recognizing the teleology of Aristotle and the Thomists. What do you think I'm missing?
Movement is the state of movement (a noun) whereas to move is to have movement (a verb). They are not synonymous.
I never said they were. Can’t you keep track of your own argument? Your system reduces to the terms being synonymous. Recall your words:
…the distinction between actual and potential fades away into one system of motion. So, "stages" is indeed just another word for motion. As to "you can't have movement without something to move". If existence is motion then of course you can have movement without something to move.
You acknowledge that this sounds absurd and for good reason—it is absurd. If stage is just another word for motion, and if the motion between stages is motion (of course), then all you have is motion, not the “state of movement” and “movement.” All you have is one continuous motion. And whether or not we have a state of movement or to move, you are forced (if you want to be understood) to tell us what is moving. Indeed, in order to explain yourself, you cited an arrow’s movement. But if “arrow” is synonymous with “motion,” then we still don’t know what is moving. If everything is moving in the same respect, and if that’s reality, and if you further state that it’s essentially synonymous with actuality, then you can equally say that everything is actuality. But regardless the term you use, you are verbally handicapped in properly describing the transition from one state of actuality to another. As you’ve been told, any standard dictionary supplies the terms that anybody can understand. And as you’ve also been told, actualities are in potency to other actualities, but not in the same respect as the actuality in question.
As I explained to SP, I think "existence exists" can be defended, an so can "movement moves" .
Of course they can, but not under your alleged system (you’re still avoiding presenting us an argument, while at the same time demanding that we supply ours). And while I’m at it, your, “I’ve read plenty on Thomism,” doesn’t answer whether you’ve read the books I listed, and at this point I have to assume that you didn’t. So, your “plenty” of reading could just as well be from critics as opposed to true believers. That of course explains why you goof up Thomism almost every time you write about it.
There is a state of existence because something exists, so “existence exists” in the sense that it affirms that something exists. And “movement moves” can be defended if one presupposes something moving. It is incoherent otherwise. Otherwise it’s the state of moving that moves, which tells us nothing.
The problem is that, according to you and other Thomists, potentials do exist, which means that , according to your own definition here, they are actual.
Your ignorance is on display again. Potencies do not have actuality. They are real capacities in actualities for different states of being (again, as you’ve been told repeatedly). An arrow has the real capacity, right now, to be shot from a bow (or thrown). The actuality of shooting does not exist but the capacity does. In order for your criticisms to work, you have to address the arguments your opponents make, not one you wish they made.
So, of course the arrow is actual, because it moves. Suppose it did not move, I challenge you to measure it in that case. You can only measure it because it moves.
I must confess that I have no idea what this is supposed to mean. A stationary arrow is not moving in the sense of its moving away from me. I can therefore walk up to it and stretch out a measuring tape to my heart’s content. In that sense, the arrow isn’t moving at all; I am moving.
even if there is no real distinction between potentality and actuality, we can still say that the arrow was at 1 metre at one "moment" and at 1.5 metres at another "moment".
Well, no. If the arrow didn’t have actuality, then we couldn’t measure it. Actuality is reality (by definition). Hence, if the arrow isn’t real, then there’s nothing to measure. You’re again changing word definitions.
Fundamental motion is self-motion, AKA existence. "Unmoving existence" is a contradiction in terminis. There is no such things as "chunks" that do absolutely nothing, because they would be nothing.
This has been directly addressed. You don’t get to ignore a rebuttal and repeat yourself as if it wasn’t addressed. Of course, “chunks” are in motion, but not in the sense of becoming something else. They are actual in one sense and potential in another sense.
And now, unless you really have some argument other than "I find it absurd", I am going to bow out.
I’ve provided plenty, but you typically ignore them to repeat yourself. You're bowing out due to your bypassing arguments which demonstrate your incoherence. You're bowing out due to your changing the definition of words to fit your philosophy. You are turning language on its head to fit your system. Why one would deny the obvious is anybody's guess.
"Movement is the state of movement (a noun) whereas to move is to have movement (a verb). They are not synonymous." Nouns don't necessarily exist.
We have arrived at another limitation of using the dictionary to do philosophy. The dictionary can be a source to clarify terms, maybe, or the dictionary definition might be in some sense detrimental.
A noun is a person, place, or thing, I was told many years ago. Consider a mathematical point, which seems like a place, but does not exist.
A triangle does not exist, yet it is listed as a noun.
A dictionary lists the part of speech for that reason, that is where people put the word in a typical sentence. Nouns tend to be placed where nouns typically go in typical sentences. That does not mean that all nouns exist. It just means that people commonly speak of non-existent concepts as if they are existent things.
"Movement" and "Existence" are nouns that do not exist.
Terms like these are all incoherent: movement itself pure motion existence itself pure existence pure act
My alternative is simpler because it doesn't call for an unmoved mover. If motion is existence, there is no need for such a vague concept. Something that doesn'tv move can't move anything else.
Matter and forces are the same. What do you think the little chucks of matter are made from? There is, basically no real difference between movement and matter. Something that doesn't move cannot possibly influence anything else. I am not, BTW, using "forces" in the strict physical sense.
The difference between my "teleology" and yours is that mine is not a priori. There is no real distinction between things happening in nature in predictable ways "always or for the most part" with things happening randomly or by chance.
I don't think there are static forces. Forces are always dynamic. As I told bmiller, I am not using forces in the strict physical sense. If there are "chunks that move" then we have to account for both the chunks and the movement of those chunks. "Pure Movement" is dynamic, while "Pure Existence" or "Pure Act" is static.
Walter, Well, I confess I have never encountered quite this set of metaphysical, ontological, physical, or existential claims. A quick search of your assertions turned up references to -Platonic self motion- and a dialectical materialism reference that -Motion is the mode of existence of matter. To be means to be in motion-.
Not that I am asking you to defend what somebody else said, just considering what you are asserting.
I suppose when Einstein asserted matter/energy equivalence and then later gravitation/acceleration equivalence there might have been some skepticism. But, he derived those equivalences mathematically whereas you seem to just be making some general conceptual claims. I have not been able to find any arguments, experiments, or mathematics to support your claims, so I remain skeptical to say the least.
---------- "motion is existence"
"Matter and forces are the same"
"I don't think there are static forces. Forces are always dynamic. I am not using forces in the strict physical sense."
"There is no real distinction between things happening in nature in predictable ways "always or for the most part" with things happening randomly or by chance."
""Pure Movement" is dynamic, while "Pure Existence" or "Pure Act" is static." ----------
It may be that all existent things are moving, it certainly seems that way, I know of no identified exceptions, but that in no way entails that existence=motion, that existence IS motion.
All people consume oxygen. That does not entail that a person IS the consumption of oxygen.
You also say that matter IS forces, that matter and forces are the same. Yet you do not use "forces" in the strict physical sense. Is this some sort of idealism? What is a force if not a physical phenomena?
You say that all forces are dynamic, never static. There is a brick stacked on top a brick. There seem to be equal and opposite static forces between them. Perhaps you are referring to the continual vibrations and disturbances that even the most static seeming objects are in fact undergoing?
There is no distinction between things happening in predictable ways versus randomly or by chance? That seems demonstrably wrong.
No difference between determinism and indeterminism? D=~D ? Things happen in nature by in predictable ways due to deterministic mechanisms. On this site they talk about the PSR, that things happen for sufficient reasons, always. That makes sense to me.
Things happening randomly would be the opposite, just poof any old which way by no cause, for no reason, by no mechanism, just alakazam presto changeo discontinuous jump.
That is why the PSR rules out free will. Free will is impossible on the PSR. The PSR mandates determinism. Determinism mandates the absence of free will.
Yet you say regularity and randomness are the same?
Well, apparent randomness is regularity at base, the PSR is sound, randomness is impossible, determinism is required, therefore free will is impossible.
If motion is existence, there is no need for such a vague concept.
Regardless of whether the Unmoved Mover is a vague concept or not, I'm having a difficult time following your proposal. For instance:
I am not, BTW, using "forces" in the strict physical sense.
OK. Then what sense are you using the term? Can I find it in the dictionary? Or are you proposing something like Luke Skywalker's "The Force"? Does your system contradict science?
The difference between my "teleology" and yours is that mine is not a priori.
Walter, I already mentioned that Thomists do not arrive at teleology "a priori". Where did you get that idea?
There is no real distinction between things happening in nature in predictable ways "always or for the most part" with things happening randomly or by chance.
That is a pretty bold assertion. It seems you are saying that one can both predict how things work and can not predict how things work in the same respect at the same time. If so that is a good example of a a contradiction.
I am using "forces" without specifically referring to physics because my alternative is not scientific, it's philosophical or metaphysical. I don't think it contradicts science in any way, but then I am not a scientist. If it does contradict science, I'll drop it. And it is not like the force of Luke Skywalker, because that force is clearly teleological.
As to teleology, ,it's not a matter of arriving a priori or not, it's a matter of the teleology beion g present a priori or posterior to the existence of complex systems. I don't deny that complex systems may develop what looks like teleology. Evolution would be an example. Most eveolutionists do not believe there is any prior teleology that "guides" evolution. Hence, it is possible to predict how things work at the macro level.
So, I maintain that my alternative is much simpler, not only because it doesn't need an at fits glance contradictory concept like unmoved movers, but because it doesn't require a huge number of potentialities and actualities. Let's look at an analogy agian. Suppose an arrow starts at A and moves to its target F. In doing so, it passes B, C, D and E on its way. Now, we can say that at a certain time, the arrow is at B. If there really are such things as potentialities that must be actualized, once the arrow is at B, its potential to be there is actualized. But it still has a separate potentail to go to C etc. So, that means the arriow has at least five potentials and five actualities. Now, we can add lots of stages in between, each of which requires a different potential to be actualized and all those potentials are the result of the "actualizition" of the arrow by the bow. It gets even worse, because the arrow does not stop until some other force acts upon it. So, it has the "potential" to go on forever. But that means it has an infinite number of potentials, that, somehow, already exist in the action of the bow. On my alternative, there is only one thing, motion. So, it is not just a bit simpler, it is infinitely simpler.
As I told bmiller, I am not proposing a strictly scientific alternative. I leave room for some indeterminism and hence, for some random processes at least at the micro-level. That doesn't mean that at the macro-level, things are not for the most part predictable by followng the rules.
Well since physics is the study of matter and energy and since your scheme claims there is no matter then yes it contradicts the basic assumptions of science. But why would that concern you?
As to teleology, ,it's not a matter of arriving a priori or not, it's a matter of the teleology beion g present a priori or posterior to the existence of complex systems.
I don't understand the way you are using the terms "a priori" and "a posteriori". These were terms used by Aristotle to distinguish ways of knowing things. I can't even guess what you think the terms mean in this statement.
Most eveolutionists do not believe there is any prior teleology that "guides" evolution. Hence, it is possible to predict how things work at the macro level.
How do you think evolutionists can make predictions if evolutionary processes are random. The term random means unpredictable. If some process is predictable it normally means one can look at the intial conditions and narrow down the range of possible outcomes "always or for the most part" which is just how Thomists distinguish between random events and predictable events. If evolutionists think that there is no need for an occasionalist God, then Thomists will happily agree.
There is nothing contradictory about a mover not moving but I'll leave that aside.
Your concern about infinite potentialities is just one of Zeno's paradoxes repackaged but at least Zeno thought arrows existed. One can never walk across a room because he would first have to go half the way, but before he could go half the way he would have to go half of the half, but before that, half the half of the half and so on. Therefore no one can ever go anywhere. No motion at all is infinitely simple than only motion...as long as you aren't concerned about your actual experience of reality. That seems to me to be a major problem with your alternative.
I don't understand the way you are using the terms "a priori" and "a posteriori". These were terms used by Aristotle to distinguish ways of knowing things. I can't even guess what you think the terms mean in this statement.
As Walter’s been told, this is a major part of his problem. He doesn’t know what terms mean, and he applies whatever spin he puts on them arbitrarily. He claims that he doesn’t have to show where Thomism goes astray, but he spends a considerable amount of time here trying to convince us that we’re wrong by “offering an alternative” that he never lays out an argument for (while demanding that we produce a full-blown argument, which of course has been done myriad times). It’s clear that he doesn’t understand Thomism, but he wants to criticize it anyway. Just remarkable.
However, as I said, I don’t view him as a troll on par with some others here. Perhaps he is and I’m just not seeing it. Maybe he can be helped, but when he’s finally cornered, he turns tails and runs. Hope springs eternal.
There is nothing contradictory about a mover not moving but I'll leave that aside.
This too has been explained to him previously, but he just disappeared without a response, only to return and repeat himself. Of course, that’s not how rebuttals work.
Finally, although you probably know this, I am not reading posts from certain individuals because they’re obvious trolls. Ed can put up with them all he wants, but I’m having no part of them.
I don't deny that complex systems may develop what looks like teleology. Evolution would be an example. Most eveolutionists do not believe there is any prior teleology that "guides" evolution. Hence, it is possible to predict how things work at the macro level.
This is just more confusion. Walter thinks that teleology is exclusively intelligence directed, so he’s got to deny that because he wants to deny that God’s existence can be proved by the order we observe in the universe. But at this point, all that’s argued (as he should know if he’s “read plenty” of Thomism) is that things (“chunks”) have natures with a limited range of potencies toward other states of being (states of chunkiness), and this is what enables the kinds of predictions he concedes.
But his theory doesn’t get off the ground because “chunks” is synonymous with “motion,” so adding the word “chunk” does nothing to help us understand what he’s arguing. If I equate the word steel with Jello, then I’ll have to say that the dessert is made of Jello and the hammer head is made of Jello. But even that’s too charitable, because the “dessert” is just motion. I’ll thus have to say that the motion is made of motion, and the motion is made of motion. There is no real hammer head, there is no real dessert, and there is no real Jello. It’s all just motion. Walter has in effect said nothing intelligible. He wants to borrow intelligibility from realism while denying its viability.
It gets even worse, because the arrow does not stop until some other force acts upon it. So, it has the "potential" to go on forever. But that means it has an infinite number of potentials, that, somehow, already exist in the action of the bow.
Walter imagines that his previous scenario of a motion passing motion motions (an arrow (chunk) passing multiple points (chunks)), presents us with a problem when we happily acknowledge that actualities remain in potency to other actualities inherent with their nature. That’s not a problem at all.
The alleged problem he raises here has been addressed both in this thread and in others. He’s either forgotten or he’s typically repeating himself without bothering to address the replies. The oak doesn’t “already exist” in the acorn. The acorn has the capacity to become an oak. Water has the capacity to become liquified. Liquidity is not the current state of ice, so there’s no such thing as its “already” existing in the ice. So long as the acorn remains an acorn, there will be no oak. The oak will only appear when the potencies in the acorn are actualized by other actualities.
As bmiller points out, Walter is intentionally or unintentionally raising a kind of Zeno’s Paradox that substances, as Thomists understand them, are actual infinite states of being at present. This again betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the act/potency distinction. In created beings, their natures possess a limited range of potencies (as Ed notes, a ping-pong ball has the potency to bounce but not to digest food). There are thus no infinite states of being in potency in a created substance.
My 'scheme' does not claim there is no matter. It's just not clear what exactly 'matter' is. There is, at this moment, no scientific consensus on that. I use a prior for 'from the beginning' or 'fundamentally'. There is in my scheme no teleology at the fundamental level. There may be some teleology further down the path but it is not so that from the very beginning, things are moving towards something. They are moving, that's all.
Zeno's paradox van be solved by not treating potentials as real features of reality. And that's what you are doing here, without realizing it.
And yes. no existence at all is infinitely simple than only existence.
I think Walter just wants to defend his atheism and so wants to criticize theism. It looks like he finds Thomism challenging and so an interesting discussion to have.
He is polite and tries to constructively engage with the people he doesn't agree with. He tries to avoid arguing fallaciously. I don't fault him for not being an top expert on Thomism but it seems he has some of the concepts down.
If he has a different system than Thomism then I find that interesting. I think in some cases he is not in disagreement with Thomism but maybe doesn't realize that.
"He claims that he doesn’t have to show where Thomism goes astray, but he spends a considerable amount of time here trying to convince us that we’re wrong by “offering an alternative” that he never lays out an argument for" Lucky for you that I show you exactly where Thomism goes astray. For example, 1.Aquinas uses a false premise that whatever is in motion now must necessarily be put in motion by another now. Inertial motion makes that premise false. 2.Aquinas uses invalid logic, committing the fallacy of false dichotomy, by neglecting the mutual causation case that is fundamentally circular. Scotus recognized that error and made a failed attempt to fix that error of Aquinas. 3.Aquinas uses invalid logic by the fallacy of non sequitur in the final phrase of the First Way. The attribution to god has no logical connection to the rest of the argument, which Koons calls "the gap problem".
" It’s clear that he doesn’t understand Thomism, but he wants to criticize it anyway. Just remarkable." Lucky for you as well that I understand Thomism in great detail such that my criticisms are remarkably sound.
"I am not reading posts from certain individuals because they’re obvious trolls." Ha ha ha. Sounds like a typical snowflake crying "racist" when his nonsense arguments get called out.
The Aristotelian "proof" is unsound. Aquinas uses invalid logic and false premises. Dr. Feser fails to defend NECESSITY, merely retreating to compatibility of an idle speculation.
I have stated specifically why in 1, 2, and 3 above which you have no demonstrated capability to rationally address.
I agree that he's more congenial, but many of the statements he's made about act/potency require no level of expertise to see how awful they are. By my lights, he's almost completely in the dark about it, which has led to his making some truly bizarre comments.
Modern physics assumes they are different and have diffent properties. So whatever matter is, it is not force. Maybe you have the correct answer and physicists are wrong.
Thanks for clearing up your use of the term "a priori". What do you mean "at the fundamental level"? Does that mean at that level it is unpredictable that things are moving or not? Because if you can predict they are going to be moving, then that is indeed predictable always and for the most part.
There may be some teleology further down the path but it is not so that from the very beginning, things are moving towards something. They are moving, that's all.
I don't understand this concept. To my way of thinking if something has moved, it has moved from location A to location B. From A to B. That's how I can tell it moved. Are you saying at the fundamental level things are moving but not from place to place? How does that work?
Zeno's paradox van be solved by not treating potentials as real features of reality. And that's what you are doing here, without realizing it.
I didn't provide a solution to Zeno's paradox so you must be thinking of something else. But I'm interested in your solution. BTW, it occurred to me that one of the paradoxes was the Arrow Paradox. Wouldn't it be more appropriate to use this one rather the runner paradox?
In the arrow paradox, Zeno states that for motion to occur, an object must change the position which it occupies. He gives an example of an arrow in flight. He states that at any one (durationless) instant of time, the arrow is neither moving to where it is, nor to where it is not.[16] It cannot move to where it is not, because no time elapses for it to move there; it cannot move to where it is, because it is already there. In other words, at every instant of time there is no motion occurring. If everything is motionless at every instant, and time is entirely composed of instants, then motion is impossible.
It is true that in some cases I am not in disagreement with Thomism. But I do realize that. I have, e.g.no problem with macrosystems that are predictable. I
I don't think you've claimed that they do exist either, other than to say that motion exists. To exist means to be actual, as opposed to imaginary or potential (having the capacity to exist---look it up in any dictionary). You're just obsessed with avoiding the word actual, even though that’s what that word means.
But it gets worse. Since the “chunk” arrow is simply motion, it's a meaningless term. It's meaningless because every noun (house, tree, dolphin, meteor, etc.) is nothing but “motion.” Instead of, “I'm going to drive the car to the store to buy some groceries,” you're really saying, “motion is motioning the motion to the motion to motion some motions.” It's just senseless drivel. To rescue such absurdity with “chunk” epistemology (that Chunk 1 is “I” and Chunk 2 is a “car,” etc.), one must ask, “What is a chunk?” Of course, the answer is...motion!
So, if Walter is telling the truth that there is real existence to an arrow, and the term “arrow” isn't merely a nominally distinct chunk, then he is affirming the actuality of an arrow—that the label “arrow” represents a material existence really distinct from other material existences. Otherwise, Walter is just playing a shell game with words.
"I didn't provide a solution to Zeno's paradox so you must be thinking of something else. But I'm interested in your solution." There is no paradox, just misunderstandings of infinity, mathematical infinite series, and conflation between a human process and the concept of infinity.
Suppose I go .5m in .5s on the way to my 1m goal in 1s. No problem, I still have .5s to go the next .5m.
Well, suppose I go another .25m in another .25s. No problem, I still have .25s to go .25m.
So, it stands to reason, that at any particular division, I will always have just the right amount of time needed to get to my 1m destination in the allotted 1s, no problem, no paradox.
The confusion is a psychological conflation in that one typically tends to think about how long it takes to stop and consider each division, and if we do that infinitely many times it will take infinitely many such time consuming divisions and therefore infinitely many seconds to get to the 1m goal.
That sort of thinking is just fuzzy headed confusion, and has nothing to do with the concept of an infinite series of fractions.
Infinity is a concept, not a number. All those fractions do not exist. There are no objects in the cosmos with existential realization such that all those fractions must somehow be traversed and accounted for, each consuming some amount of time.
Infinity is just an abstraction that requires zero time.
When one considers an infinite number of divisions there is no physical realization of those divisions.
There is simply the motion through space. Any particular motion takes some amount of time, done, no paradox to be solved.
There is no upper bound on the finite number of divisions one can abstractly consider in our 1s journey to go 1m. For any particular number for n in a series of 1/2^n there is always that last fraction of 1/2^n that takes just the right amount of time to complete the journey in the expected 1s. Again, there simply is no paradox to be solved.
The only problem to be solved is the psychological misconceptions about infinity, division processes, time required for a human being to consider each division, and the rather fuzzy thinking that commonly accompanies such division problems.
Ever heard of virtual particles? You amy not believe they exist but they are taken serious by lots of scientists. now, what matter are those VPs made from? I do not claim to know all the answers but I, together with lots of professional philosophers and scientists (and I am neither), wonder what exatly matter is. It is not some very tiny "rock" or something. What it really is, is a mystery to which I offer my two cents by suggesting it may be some sort of force or motion, or a string. In any case, if there is no motion at all, there is no meaningful way in which something exists.
Xhen i say they are not moving towards something, I mean that, at the very basic level, if something is at A, we cannot at that moment say where it is heading. Sure, if we have no reference frame, we can call any "other" place it will be "B", but it's not that A's motion is in any way completed at B. Now, if only one thing exists, it is indeed impossible to tell it moves from place to place, but if we can tell it exists, it does move or vibrate or whatever.
As to Zeno's paradox, I have stated from the beginning that if time is discrete, there is no motion or change at a particular moment. So maybe there is no such thing as an instant of time and time is simply continuous. I really don't know. But, in any case, my infinite potentialities is not just one of Zeno's paradoxes repackaged. If potentials are somehow real feutures of a thing and we can say that those potentials are "completed", then it follows that, since an arrow once moved stays in motion for eternity if no other force is applied to it, it follows that the arrow is given an infinite number of different potetialities by the bow because it has the potentiality to go to A, B, C ....
Yes I've heard of virtual particles. I haven't heard anyone claim they were a force or energy.
Are you claiming that nothing can exist unless it is in motion? I ask because this seems more encompassing than the claim that motion is existence.
Now, if only one thing exists, it is indeed impossible to tell it moves from place to place, but if we can tell it exists, it does move or vibrate or whatever.
This sounds contradictory to me. If motion is existence and we can't tell if it is moving, then since you've stated we can't tell if it is moving it follows that we can't tell if it exists.
Regarding the arrow. What do you mean by those potentials are "completed"?
Your handling of infinite potentials reminds me of Zenos paradoxes since he seemed to treat the possiblity of dividing a magnitude in half recursively as creating something infinite from something that is really finite. I can divide a 1 inch length into an infinite number of smaller lengths, but it is still really 1 inch, not an infinite number of real lengths. Just like an actual substance can have a infinite number of potentials but still really be a finite actual substance.
According to classical physics, the bow imparts kinetic engergy to the arrow wrt to the bow. The energy does not change unless something else adds or removes that kinetic energy as you say. If 2 arrows were shot from the same bow at the same time with the same kinetic energy and direction, both arrows would perceive (if they could perceive) the other as being motionless. So they would be in motion wrt to the bow but motionless wrt each other. If something must be in motion to exist, would the arrows cease to exist since they are motionless wrt each other or would they exist since they are in motion wrt the bow?
Ever heard of virtual particles? You amy not believe they exist but they are taken serious by lots of scientists. now, what matter are those VPs made from?
Actually, they’re not particles at all. They’re ripples or disturbances in the electromagnetic fields of two electrons as they pass each other. A good read is Virtual Particles: What are they?
I do not claim to know all the answers but I, together with lots of professional philosophers and scientists (and I am neither), wonder what exatly matter is.
David Oderberg, who wrote Real Essentialism, wrote an interesting paper analyzing the theory that classical theism’s prime matter is energy (see Is Prime Matter Energy?).
In any case, if there is no motion at all, there is no meaningful way in which something exists.
For created beings, yes. All created beings are being moved to exist moment-to-moment (as you’ve been told repeatedly). But one must exist (be in actuality) in order to move something else. It is thus the principle of actuality that explains motion (or the effect). If it were not actual, it would at best be in potency and would thus have no causal efficacy. Again, since the oak does not exist, it has no causal efficacy to draw water from the soil, provide shade or produce acorns. It must exist before it can produce effects.
if something is at A, we cannot at that moment say where it is heading. Sure, if we have no reference frame, we can call any "other" place it will be "B", but it's not that A's motion is in any way completed at B.
We can most certainly say where it is going if it our intention to move it there. And you’re again conflating terms. A’s potency to arrive at B is most certainly completed when it arrives at B (e.g., when Walter moves from Boston (A) to Denver (B). Walter’s motion as to other things is not completed because those series or chains are not contemplated or referenced. My potency to walk in the park with my wife is actualized when my wife and I go to the park and walk together, but my “motion” as to looking at the trees or waiving at somebody I know isn’t terminated merely by my walking with my wife. One type of completed motion doesn’t necessarily terminate other types of motion (as you’ve been repeatedly told).
Now, if only one thing exists, it is indeed impossible to tell it moves from place to place, but if we can tell it exists, it does move or vibrate or whatever.
This is again incoherent. What is a “thing”? Well, if you’re consistent, a thing is a chunk, which is motion. It’s only a nominally distinct label for motion. If not, then there is a “thing” that actually exists (has actuality) that is really distinct from the fact that it moves.
Mathematical infinities do not imbue matter with infinite states of existence. The mathematician’s infinity is an abstract construct. If A is 10 feet from B, I can move from A to B in a moment because I’m under no obligation to proceed at an abstract pace (half, then half, then half). This confuses potential infinites with actual infinites (not to be further confused with the metaphysical act/potency construct). And the obvious scientific proof of that is our myriad movements to points of destination. When Walter says that we cannot move from A to B because an actual infinite cannot be crossed and we move from A to B in moments, the hypothesis is disproved.
Turning on the way-back machine: "If something exists, then it’s actual. If it doesn’t exist, then it isn’t actual.
"The problem is that, according to you and other Thomists, potentials do exist, which means that , according to your own definition here, they are actual. And that, my friend, has been my point all along. Potentialities do not need to be actualized because they are actual and they are the only actual "things"."
Yes, the assertion that potentialities exist leads to self contradiction.
"Yes I've heard of virtual particles. I haven't heard anyone claim they were a force or energy."
Well, I don't know what VPs are made from. Some say they are disturbances. But what is a disturbance if not a movement. In any case, they are not lottle "chunks".
Are you claiming that nothing can exist unless it is in motion? I ask because this seems more encompassing than the claim that motion is existence."
Yes, that is also what I am claiming. And indeed, if we can't tell whether something is moving we cannot tell it exists. If the only possible information about the arrow is that it is moving from A to B (or whatever), then we cannot tell it exists. In order for us to tell something exists, it has to "do" something. A "stationary" arrow can be said to exist because it absorbes and reflects photons etc.
Zeno's paradox is about subdividing a finite thing into infinitely many parts. If those parts are somehow real, that is a genuine problem of an infinity of real things. I don't treat potentialities are real features of a thing, so that's not a problem for my scheme. But Thomists do treat those potentials as real features of a thing, and that's why things can have a real infinite number of potentialities if Thomism is true. A potential is completed when it becomes an actuality. So, when the arrow is at 1 metre from me, its potential to move 1 metre is completed or actualized, but it still has a potential to go to 2 metres etc. That cannot be the same potential because that is completed. Now the arrow can go on for infinity, so it has to have an infinite number of different potentialities.
A disturbance is generally considered a disturbance of a thing. If there is no thing the can be no disturbance of it.
If the only possible information about the arrow is that it is moving from A to B (or whatever), then we cannot tell it exists. In order for us to tell something exists, it has to "do" something.
How can there be any information about anything that doesn't exist? Especially its velocity. And isn't moving from A to B "doing" something?
I don't treat potentialities are real features of a thing, so that's not a problem for my scheme. But Thomists do treat those potentials as real features of a thing, and that's why things can have a real infinite number of potentialities if Thomism is true.
Zeno is correct that a continuous thing can potentially be subdivided recursively an infinite number of times. It really can be. But that is not a problem, because although the potentiality of doing that exists, it does not actually exist. The line is actually 1 inch in length. It is the nature of a continuum to be potentially infinitely divisible although it is an actual length with a finite magnitude. Perhaps confounding the term real with only with what is actual is causing the problem. A real possibility doesn't mean the same thing as an actual existing state.
A potential is completed when it becomes an actuality....
Thanks for the explanation. Seems it captures the idea but in different terms.
Walter, "Now the arrow can go on for infinity," Can it?
Supposing the arrow travels at 1m/s, and supposing it never runs out of space to travel in and that it never gets stopped and it never ceases to exist.
The arrow just keeps going and going without end.
Will the arrow ever get to infinity of time or distance?
No. No real process can achieve infinity. Infinity is not a number one can count up to, or something that eventually happens if a process continues without end.
At any particular time the arrow will always have traveled some finite distance and will always have been traveling some finite time.
An actual infinite is incoherent.
Infinity is just concept, an abstraction, that might be crudely described as instantly boundlessly everything.
Infinity requires zero time to achieve.
That's why there were no paradoxes posited by Zeno, only malformed questions based on false concepts of infinity and the relationship between humanly made or considered divisions versus the concept of infinite divisions.
Yes, that is also what I am claiming [that nothing can exist unless it is in motion].
And what is your argument for this? You follow that up with:
And indeed, if we can’t tell whether something is moving we cannot tell it exists.
But the fact that you cannot perceive something does not mean that it doesn’t exist. Yet, your claim is stronger than agnosticism over what you cannot perceive. You state categorically that nothing can exist unless it is in motion. I think you need to defend that statement.
I don't treat potentialities are real features of a thing, so that's not a problem for my scheme.
Then what is the oak to the acorn? If the acorn doesn’t have the potential to become an oak, how does it become an oak?
But Thomists do treat those potentials as real features of a thing…
If the potency to become an oak isn’t a real feature of an acorn, then an acorn could never become an oak. What is the conceptual roadblock in your mind from understanding this, despite being told numerous times? Becoming a watermelon isn’t a real feature of a ping-pong ball. There is nothing in the nature of a ping-pong ball that will allow it to become a watermelon, but it is a real feature of the stationary ping-pong ball to bounce. You continue to treat potency as an actuality when it has no actuality at all. It is the actual thing that has the capacity toward a different state of existence. Capacity is synonymous with potency.
…and that’s why things can have a real infinite number of potentialities if Thomism is true.
You cannot legitimately state that without addressing the objections. If proof by assertion is true, then Thomism is true because it’s been asserted. All created things are limited by their natures as to the states of being they can realize. And even if you can legitimately conflate the abstract with the real, or if division and distance are potentially actual states for substances, there is a difference between a potential infinite and an actual one. The former never achieves the latter by definition, but you are leaping to the latter in describing the former. Thus, you’re conflating terms again.
"If there is no thing there can be no disturbance of it."
That brings us back to square one: what is a thing? The answer is not straight-forward.
"How can there be any information about anything that doesn't exist? Especially its velocity. And isn't moving from A to B "doing" something?"
The point is that thre can't be any information about something that doesn't exist. There cannot be just the information that it goes from A to B. This was just some thought- experiment for something that cannot possibly be the case.
"But that is not a problem, because although the potentiality of doing that exists, it does not actually exist."
But a potential does actually exist. It isn't an actuality but it actually exists. It is, to borrow your definitions, a thing and it follows that there are an infinite number of separate things in the arrow. To use the dictionary definition, which I am told I am abusing, "Actual, defined, is: existing in act or fact; real; existing now; present; current" The potential is real, existing now, present, current. It is not in act because of the very peculiar way Thomists define in act as completed. What you say comes down to potentailities are only potentially present in a thing, but in that case , they are not real features of a thing. You conflate a possibility with a potentiality. Possibilities are abstractions, potententialities as defined by Thomism, are not.
If a potentiality is completed when it's actualized, we have an infinite number of incomplete real properties of a thing. If we treat potentailities and actualities as abstractions, we do not encounter this problem.
Now, maybe you don't think an actual infinity is problematic?
Byb "The arrow can go on for infinity" I do not mean that it will ever reach infinity, but if, potentialities are real, it has a real infinite number of potentialities, which, if infinity is an abstraction, is impossible.
Walter, Is there a generally recognized name for this view, that existence IS motion? Not that a label makes it right or wrong, just wondering if further arguments are out there under some searchable term.
"Yes, that is also what I am claiming [that nothing can exist unless it is in motion]." All existent things DO move, as far as anybody has observed, but that is entirely different than saying existence IS motion.
Or perhaps your are stating that motion is necessary but not sufficient for existence? In that view motion would be a co-joined necessity of existent material.
Do you then rule out a real absolute zero temperature, even in principle? By your view, then, even in principle, one could only asymptotically approach absolute zero temperature from above?
Bill, "Then what is the oak to the acorn?" Nothing. For an acorn there is no oak, there is only the acorn.
"If the acorn doesn’t have the potential to become an oak, how does it become an oak?" Chemical reactions, which are physics interactions in the aggregate.
"If the potency to become an oak isn’t a real feature of an acorn, then an acorn could never become an oak." Sure it can, all it has to do is interact in the present moment with adjacent materials.
It turns out that some interactions do occur and other interactions do no occur.
There is no necessity for aggregate descriptions of whole collections of interactions through time to somehow be stored in the acorn.
The only thing in the acorn is its present structure at the fundamental level. That's all the acorn ever possesses and that is all that is necessary for us to observe its eventual change into animal food or a tree.
"What is the conceptual roadblock in your mind from understanding this," The fact that the assertion of real existent tree potentials in the acorn is false.
I, and apparently Walter, have a mental block against accepting your falsehoods.
"but it is a real feature of the stationary ping-pong ball to bounce." You are just imagining that. A stationary ball just sits there, it is not attempting to bounce in any sense.
It's all in your head. Just your imagination, runnin away with you...
"All created things are limited by their natures as to the states of being they can realize." Which are infinite, for example shape.
How many potential shapes does a chunk of putty have, on the notion of real existent potentials assigned to macro objects?
Infinitely many, on the notion that movement is not quantized, rather, continuous through continuous space, which is also not quantized.
If motion through space is continuous (not quantized) and if macro objects posses within themselves real existent potentials for future states of being then a chunk of putty possesses real infinitely many potential states of being different potential shapes.
"And even if you can legitimately conflate the abstract with the real, or if division and distance are potentially actual states for substances, there is a difference between a potential infinite and an actual one." Now you are contradicting yourself, Bill.
If the potential states are only potentially infinite and not actually infinite then they are not existent.
Shape A, B, C...etc are said to really exist as potentials in the chunk of putty.
So, infinitely many of those potential states really exist in the chunk of putty.
Thus you say an infinity of real existent potential states exist in the chunk of putty.
"Thus, you’re conflating terms again." That would be you, Bill.
You keep talking about real existent potentials.
Existent potential is an incoherent term.
"Existent" and "Potential" are mutually exclusive. We say a thing is potential precisely because it is not actual, it does not exist, we only imagine that it could exist in the future.
Yet, you think it is somehow a mental block to not consider all those potentials as somehow being real existent features of the object.
Bill, you suffer from a chronic case of the reification fallacy. Take two atheist materialist pills and call me in the morning, you will feel much better, I am sure that potential exists in you...
That brings us back to square one: what is a thing?
It's not really square one for physicists. For them velocity is the change of location of an object from one location to another and a disturbance is a disturbance of something. It doesn't mean they are right and you are wrong, only that you have a different conception than physicists.
This was just some thought- experiment for something that cannot possibly be the case.
OK. I agree that it didn't make any sense.
Regarding the discussion of potentiality, possibility, real and actual. I agree that the statement of mine you quoted could be confusing.
Let me see where we agree and where we disagree.
If it is possible for "x" to happen but is impossible for "y" to happen, then is it "really" possibile for "x" to happen and "really" impossible for "y" to happen? If "x" is not "really" possible then isn't that saying that it is "really" impossible just like "y"?
I would say that it is possible for a normal man to learn to speak French (and remain a man) but impossible for a dog to learn to speak French (and remain a dog). Another way of saying this is that a man has a potential to learn French while a dog has no such potential. So a potential is just a special, more limited, case of a possibility. But if nothing is "really" possible it must mean that everything is "really" impossible and neither man nor beast "really" can learn French.
You're welcome. They are good reads. Lots of good information out there if one digs for it.
As good a writer as Ed is, there are some things I couldn't grasp without reading other sources. It partially exemplifies what Paul referred to as one planting, another watering, but God giving the increase.
That brings us back to square one: what is a thing? The answer is not straight-forward.
But to you it is straightforward. “Thing” is simply a label for “motion.” Everything that exists is simply motion. And that of course leaves your ontology bereft of anything coherent. There is no cogent accounting of change and permanence.
A “thing” is an essence/existence composite. In other words, it is a substance. Something must account for change, and something must account for permanence. Calling everything “motion” fails to do this.
The point is that thre can't be any information about something that doesn't exist. There cannot be just the information that it goes from A to B.
But the information you refer to is its motion. And if there cannot be any information about something that doesn’t exist, then there cannot be motion without something moving. You are saying the same thing as we and imagining you’re saying something different. Otherwise, the quoted sentence would read, “The motion is that there can’t be any motion about motion that doesn’t motion.” There is thus a real distinction between movement and what moves.
But a potential does actually exist. It isn't an actuality but it actually exists. It is, to borrow your definitions, a thing and it follows that there are an infinite number of separate things in the arrow.
They who do not like straw men should not be in the habit of constructing them. You are using a definition of actual discordant with our description of change. With respect to change, as in an acorn to an oak, actuality is a perfection—a reduction of potency to act. A capacity to be is not to be. A potency is a degree of reality (actual in the sense that it is a real feature of being) that is not a perfection.
To use the dictionary definition, which I am told I am abusing, "Actual, defined, is: existing in act or fact; real; existing now; present; current" The potential is real, existing now, present, current.
Amazing! You quote the definition of actual and deliberately ignore the definition of potential. Here it is again: “possible, as opposed to actual; capable of being or becoming.” You are deliberately “abusing” word definitions to deny the obvious. A potency is a real feature of being in that a being’s essence dictates the range of possible states of existence for said being.
Any created being’s potential is limited by its essence. There is thus a limited (necessarily finite) range of possibilities for any such being. Your insistence that addition and division pose a problem for us because they imbue a substance with infinite real potentialities is illegitimate, as shown above. And even if they did, that does not affect the act/potency distinction whatsoever (as Ed argues in the video).
It is not in act because of the very peculiar way Thomists define in act as completed.
To call this “peculiar” is inane. To perfect is to complete, and raising a capacity to actuality (perfection, completion) is the fundamental scientific principle of cause and effect. What is truly peculiar is your distaste for the obvious.
What you say comes down to potentailities are only potentially present in a thing, but in that case , they are not real features of a thing.
When your opponents keep telling you that you are misstating their views, you should state their views correctly, whether you are conversing with bmiller or myself. Potency is a real feature of being; the perfection the potency points to is not. The real feature is “can change.” Is that infinite? Again, that is impossible. Composite being is qualified by essence, which is by definition finite. Your “infinite real properties” is both demonstrably false and irrelevant.
But what exactly is an object or what is the "something" that is disturbed? There is no straight-forward answer to this. So, my two cents is that an object (in this case a fundamental particle) is a kind of movement or disturbance. Maybe a diturbance of the fabric of reality or something like that? At this stage there is no straight answer.
"If it is possible for "x" to happen but is impossible for "y" to happen, then is it "really" possible for "x" to happen and "really" impossible for "y" to happen? If "x" is not "really" possible then isn't that saying that it is "really" impossible just like "y"?"
Sure, (physical) reality has its limits. But, again, this is not straight-forward either. After the Big Bang, it was really possible for the initial conditions of the universe to become a star, a planet, a person, a dog, etc. Now, is it possible for a dog to evolve into an animal that is capable of learning French? It is highly unlikely, but I am not sure it is impossible. Would it still have the essence of a dog? (I don't really believe in essences, but let's agree on them for the sake of the argument). That would depend on what the essence of a dog is. Is it essential that a dog is furry? I don't think so. Is it essential that it barks? That it has a very advanced sense of smell? It is not easy to define an essence without begging the question. So, to answer your question. Lots of things are really possible because reality is basically mutable. I have never claimed that the capability to change does not exist. On the contrary,, it is a basic feature of reality. What doesn't exist, IMO, is a true completion of that capacity.
Walter, "So, my two cents is that an object (in this case a fundamental particle) is a kind of movement or disturbance. Maybe a diturbance of the fabric of reality or something like that? At this stage there is no straight answer." That sounds a bit like the notion of a particle as a wave packet of a field.
In your statement change "fabric of reality" to "field", and change "disturbance" to "oscillation".
So, may I suggest that you would express your position more understandably if you noted that a thing is not motion itself, rather, a disturbance of the fabric of reality.
"Disturbance" and "fabric of reality" sound rather vague, but then, nobody knows what really IS at the bottom, ontologically, so one placeholder term is about as good as any other placeholder term.
Inertial motion eliminates the argument for a necessary first mover.
You can say that inertial motion is compatible with a first mover, but so are an unbounded number of other idle speculations. It's plank scale fairies, dontchyaknow?
The First Way suffers from false dichotomy, begging the question, and a number of false premises.
Aristotle made the error that whatever we see in motion is being put in motion in the present moment, which is evidently not the case with inertial motion. Aquinas repeated that error.
The fundamental framework of causation used by Aristotle is also wrong. Causation is not linear, hierarchical, or one-way.
All real causation is mutual, multilateral, and thus fundamentally circular. There is no call for a first mover because a realistic causal regress analysis terminates in mutual causation.
Aquinas wasn’t aware of inertia, but he was aware of the heavenly bodies which he believed continued indefinitely in a perfect circle. They were also incorruptible. So if the First Way is not threatened by heavenly bodies, then a fortiori it is not threatened by inertia.
I don’t think all causation is mutual. When a bound electron is energized by a photon, is that mutual causation. It seems asymmetric to me. It’s not as if the electron in the chlorophyll in the plant is pushing back against the Sun that emitted the photon.
If Aquinas really believed that heavenly bodies continued indefinitely in a perfect circle, then he contradicted his own argument from motion. As to mutual causation, I don't know if there are countrexamples, but your example isn't one. The electron does 'push back' against the photon.
Why does something in motion stay in motion, Dusty? That it does doesn't explain WHY it does.
You been told a million times now why circular causation is incoherent. A can't cause B to exist if A doesn't exist, and B can't cause A to exist if B doesn't exist. Thus, A must already exist in order to cause B, and thus there is no reason for B to cause A to exist, because it already does.
If Aquinas really believed that heavenly bodies continued indefinitely in a perfect circle, then he contradicted his own argument from motion.
You say that because you don’t understand his argument from motion. Perdurance arises from the nature of a thing, but since a thing’s nature or essence must have its existence supplied (given that essence is distinct from existence), it remains in motion (perdures) via the Prime Mover, even if it is “eternal” (its necessity being suppositional rather than absolute). Existence in creatures is itself a movement since a thing’s essence is not the ground for its own existence.
I believe you have stated that you deny the essence/existence distinction, but that’s irrelevant to the claim that Aquinas contradicted himself here. He did not.
And I keep replying to you because even though you misunderstand a lot of Aquinas’ metaphysics, you’re not a troll like others who pollute this site (I do not reply to them at all, for it’s a total waste of time).
How does an electron “push” back against a photon? The photon ceases to exist after being absorbed by the electron.
And Aquinas does not contradict his own argument because he is making a metaphysical argument, not a physical argument. You have to read it in light of De Ente et Essentia.
"Why does something in motion stay in motion, Dusty?" Because a change in motion would be a change calling for a changer. Continued motion is no change in the state of motion so no changer is called for.
Aristotle realized that in his book IV of Physics, that absent an impeding medium motion would continue ad-infinitum.
All motion is in space. You are in space. Space, for motion, is a non-impeding medium.
"A can't cause B to exist if A doesn't exist" A cannot cause B to exist at all. Materials do not cause each other to exist.
All material in the cosmos already exists. No new material ever comes into existence. No material ever passes out of existence. The amount of material in existence in the cosmos is precisely static.
No first sustainer is called for to account for existential inertia because the transition from existing to non-existing would be a change calling for a changer.
To go from existing to existing is no change so no changer is called for to account for continued existence.
But the existence of a certain finite amount of matter is unintelligible. Ultimately that is going to lead to a denial of the PSR. One will have to say, “the matter just exists”.
Do you think the whole universe could be a single eternally existing red sphere?
"{But the existence of a certain finite amount of matter is unintelligible." On the contrary, conservation of material is what makes formulations in physics and chemistry intelligible.
Consider what is perhaps the most well known equation: E=mc^2
Note, there is no poof term. No new material begins to exist. No existent material ceases to exist. The LHS equals the RHS. Precisely, not approximately. There is exactly the same amount of material on both sides of the equation. That is why it is called an "equation". An "equation" is an expression of equality.
It is the fixity of the amount of material in the cosmos that makes our equations of physics and chemistry intelligible.
"One will have to say, “the matter just exists”." Then the assertion of god is a denial of the PSR, since god is said to just exist, that is, to simply be necessary, a brute fact, not explained in its existence by any reason outside of itself.
The origin of existence remains an unsolved riddle. All attempts lead back to an assertion of a primordial brute fact of some sort.
"Do you think the whole universe could be a single eternally existing red sphere?" I suppose you mean that somewhat metaphorically.
To explain the origin of existence we seem to have a choice between 2 irrational assertions, hence the fact that a solution to the problem has not been put into general circulation. 1.Creation from nothing. 2.A necessary being with an infinite past.
All attempts to justify either choice always lead to gibberish assertions.
But the Aristotelian argument does not attempt to answer that question, rather, the first lines of the First Way tell us the basic facts, that we observe motion here and now.
"I don’t think all causation is mutual." All causation is described at base by force equations.
Most of the forces of causation in our ordinary lives are due to the electrostatic force, the forces associated with positive and negative charges.
Gravitational force and magnetic force also account for noticeable effects.
The nuclear forces are always in effect but they are typically in balance within the nucleus of each atom so seem net neutral at our level of ordinary perception.
All the forces of nature act mutually. That was one of the key points Russell made in On the Notion of Cause. He used the example of gravitation, wherein the distinction between mover and moved, self moving versus moving the other, is arbitrary and therefore meaningless.
It is nonsense to speak of cause and effect such that somehow mass A caused mass B to move gravitationally, there is only the mutual attraction.
A classic Thomistic example is the rock, stick, hand example, perhaps inspired by the First Way staff hand example. That is supposedly an example that cannot go to infinity in a causal regress analysis, therefore a first mover is supposedly necessary.
Typically the analysis goes Rock Stick Hand Infinity, not possible, therefore god
The premature termination of that analysis is rather childish at best.
Rock Stick Hand Tendon Muscle Sliding filaments Mutual electrostatic forces
There is no call to regress to infinity because the regression analysis terminates finitely in mutual electrostatic forces in the muscles that are at the causal base of the sliding filaments.
In Thomistic linear one-way folk causality G is moved by E E is moved by D D is moved by C But this cannot go to infinity, therefore god.
In real causality D and C move each other mutually Done.
If you ask what moved D you could say C. If you then ask what moved C you can just as well say D. D moved C just as much as C moved D. They moved each other mutually. That terminates the causal regress finitely.
SP, All that you have done is split one cause into two parts using labels. Since "D and C" is one cause then we can substitute B for "D and C".
G is moved by E E is moved by B But this cannot go to infinity
In Thomistic terms, something actual must cause B to go from 'potentially moving E' to 'actually moving E'.
Mutual causation all the way down, even if it's circular in nature, cannot satisfy the argument because mutual causation is simply another link in the chain.
"It is nonsense to speak of cause and effect such that somehow mass A caused mass B to move gravitationally, there is only the mutual attraction"
What you are saying is the universe(s) moves and changes by itself through mutual causation. it's one giant perpetual motion machine and each of us are one of the cogs.
You sure have a strong belief going on there. TO me this resmbles blind religious faith because science doesn't lead to this conclusion at all. I don't think there's a coherent philosophical argument that can be made to support your view of reality. Do you know of one?
SP is saying the Aristotelian proof results in an always-moving mover that never began to exist, is eternal, has no potential to change or be changed from it's always-moving materialistic nature and because it has no potential to change, is pure act.
Well, no, that cannot be the conclusion since Aristotelian metaphysics is part of the proof as the foundation. You will need to develop a different metaphysic that will allow SP's conclusion and so far we haven't seen SP do that. All we've seen is SP make several claims without offering up a proof of his own. Has any philosopher done this?
"What you are saying is the universe(s) moves and changes by itself through mutual causation. it's one giant perpetual motion machine and each of us are one of the cogs." Correct.
"science doesn't lead to this conclusion at all." How so? Could you be specific? You don't name any aspects of science to support your claim.
" Do you know of one?" Yes, and I offer it in some detail, repeatedly, by the lights of some here, ad nauseum.
But, that's ok if you have not read those posts, there is nothing obligating you to read what I write.
Briefly, science supports just what I have described.
If we are in a perpetual motion system of mutual causation then we would expect material to never be created or destroyed, and for all material interactions to be mutual, and for all material interactions to be net lossless, and for there to be in existence such materials, and for there to be processes of interaction occurring through time.
That is just what science tells us, is it not?
Science supports every one of those conditions.
1.material to never be created or destroyed Science tells us E=mc^2, precisely, no poof in or out on the LHS or the RHS. All established science demonstrates that new materials are never observed to come into existence out of nothing, and existing materials never disappear from existence into nothing.
2.all material interactions to be mutual The force equations of physics are all formulated as mutual interactions wherein the designation of mover versus moved, or self moved versus moved by the other, is arbitrary and therefore meaningless and false.
Materials always move each other.
For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.
Those principles of mutuality are described in great detail in the formulations of physics.
All causation is mutual at base, as all physics formulations show at base.
3.all material interactions to be net lossless Motion through space is lossless. All motion is in space. You are in space. All material interactions obey the conservation of material, that is, conservation of matter/energy. The whole of science confirms these scientific facts with mountains of evidence available to you in myriad publications.
4.there to be in existence such materials, and for there to be processes of interaction occurring through time That is what we observe again and again. Aquinas begins the First Way with this very observation as a bedrock basis for further argument.
Thus, my view as you so correctly summarized it is supported by the whole of science and is available to you to learn in countless publications.
"G is moved by E E is moved by B But this cannot go to infinity" Right, because B is the terminus.
B is the necessary being.
The necessary being is all around you.
Everything you observe is the necessary being.
Why are you searching for an invisible necessary being? The necessity is all around you.
"In Thomistic terms, something actual must cause B to go from 'potentially moving E' to 'actually moving E'." That exposes the defectiveness of Thomistic terminology.
But you have a fair point in that the formulation of my example is simplified and unrealistic in its linear one-way causal regress aspect.
A linear one-way causal regress is an illusion, just an apparent regress, an abstraction, a human approximation.
I employed that unrealistic notion as a lead in to the realism of mutual causation. I admit that might be a sort of heuristic, an analogy that is imperfect.
In reality it is not mutuality all the way down, rather, mutuality everywhere all the time.
In simpler terms, everything just keeps bouncing off of everything else.
There is no linear hierarchical one-way causal series at all, ever.
God would not be a brute fact because His essence is identical to His existence. Contingent particles (with contingent attributes belonging to the ten categories) do not have an essence identical to their existence. That is why there is a certain number of them and not one. Even if you take the Parmenidean monist view, the whole universe itself has accidents in need of explanation, unlike God who has no accidents.
What are your thoughts on paragraphs 76 to 81 of De Ente et Essentia?
Several have been given already that you have ignored. The ladder is holding you up. You are not holding the ladder down. The stick moves the rock. The rock is not moving the stick. There are mutual causes involved in each of these examples, equal and opposite forces, but the above statements are the facts. This is all the disproof you need. A directional hierarchy exists. F=mA proves a directional hierarchy. Heat transfer proves a directional hierarchy.
Continue believing in your fantasy if that makes you happy. Realists want no part of your nonsense.
Anon, "WTF are you talking about?" Material is the necessary being. Everything you observe is material. Therefore everything you observe is the necessary being.
"you didn't exist then one day you did exist." The material presently arranged as what I call me existed before that arrangement was a state of affairs in the cosmos and will continue to exist after that arrangement is no longer a state of affairs in the cosmos.
"Your not a necessary being" We are all necessary beings. There is no need for a god to explain the cosmos because everything in the cosmos could not fail to be as it is.
"Get help. Get some therapy." Your concern for my well being is touching indeed. It is good to feel so loved. Is it the spirit of the season that is driving you toward such magnanimity, or are you always a person of such heartfelt generosity of spirit?
Anon, "God would not be a brute fact because His essence is identical to His existence." Incoherent.
"Even if you take the Parmenidean monist view, the whole universe itself has accidents in need of explanation," The material cosmos is necessary. All motions of all material are necessary.
No god is needed to explain such a cosmos.
"What are your thoughts on paragraphs 76 to 81 of De Ente et Essentia?" "Pure act" is incoherent nonsense. Actuality is of a thing.
"Existence itself" is an incoherent combination of disjoint words. Existence is of a thing. Things exist. Existence does not of itself exist.
"forms alone without matter" More incoherent combinations of words.
Matter and form are always coincident. Matter without form is incoherent. Form without matter is incoherent.
Anon, "The ladder is holding you up." No. The Earth, my body, and the ladder form a 3 body system held together by mutual gravitational attraction, and separated primarily by electrostatic forces, which act mutually at base.
"The rock is not moving the stick." The rock pushes on the stick just as much as the stick pushes on the rock.
Newton gave the example of a horse pulling a rock, in the Principia.
Newton explained that the rock pulls on the horse just as much as the horse pulls on the rock.
In simplified language, for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.
"There are mutual causes involved in each of these examples, equal and opposite forces, but the above statements are the facts." No, they are conventions of perspective and reference frame choices.
All causation is mutual at base. The choice of mover versus moved is arbitrary, and therefore meaningless.
"A directional hierarchy exists." There is no preferred reference frame. Choice of reference frame is arbitrary. All motion is in space. You are in space. All forces are applied mutually, equally, and net losslessly. Friction is an illusion. There are no net losses in apparent frictional losses.
"F=mA proves a directional hierarchy." F = GMm/r^2 An equal force is applied to M as it is to m. M and m will each accelerate according to F=mA (discounting other effects described in modern physics).
There is no directional hierarchy, or preference as to calling the position of M fixed while m moves, m fixed while M moves. Or perhaps one might choose some other reference frame relative to which both M and m move.
Such choices are arbitrary, and thus meaningless.
There is no objectively preferred reference frame in such choices.
"Heat transfer proves a directional hierarchy." Heat is an aggregate approximation of molecular or atomic motion. Heat transfer is the transfer of kinetic energy between colliding molecules or atoms.
In each such collision the interaction is mutual and net lossless. No new matter/energy is created out of nothing, and no existing , matter/energy passes out of existence into nothing.
All such collisions, transfers of kinetic energy, occur in space, and are mutual, are net lossless, with no preferred frame of reference.
All causality is mutual at base.
The examples you have provided are all examples of mutual causation at base.
So, I ask you, can you provide any examples of causality that are not mutual at base?
"All causality is mutual at base" you said elsewhere that stones move themselves, meaning that two stones in close proximity can cause themselves to move across a table. we don't see that happen so your theory is false and saying "mutual at base" 3 times in a loud voice doesn't make the stones move across the table so that reply changes nothing. Something else besids the two stones is required and that is what teh argument is saying.
For your sake I hope your not being serious when you said 'stones move each other'. If you are being serious then I would also recommend that you seek professional help. Merry Christmas
Stardust’s ‘The rock pushes on the stick just as much as the stick pushes on the rock’
Jeepers my dude you’re as dumb as a box of rocks and a box of sticks combined. The rock is pushing on the stick in the direction opposite of it’s motion. In summary the rock isn’t moving the stick it’s resisting the motion. I typed this slowly so you might be able to understand.
"you said elsewhere that stones move themselves, meaning that two stones in close proximity can cause themselves to move across a table." Not quite.
2 stones in close proximity to each other in space will cause themselves to move toward each other.
2 stones in close proximity to each other on a table will cause each other to have forces applied to each other in the direction of moving toward each other, but in that case there are other forces acting upon the rocks such that there is no net motion of the rocks toward each other.
"For your sake I hope your not being serious when you said 'stones move each other'."
Stones move each other.
Yes, obviously. How do you not know that? You have a modern Western education, don't you? You have enough education to use a device and enter English sentences into the combox.
"If you are being serious then I would also recommend that you seek professional help."
Your concern for the improvement of my mental health is heartwarming indeed, however, misplaced.
Stones move each other. Yes, of course.
Stones move each other by attracting each other mutually in space.
Stones that are in inertial motion will move each other mutually when the collide, primarily by electrostatic forces.
All causation is mutual and multidirectional at base.
But by all means, can you provide an example to the contrary?
So you're telling me that Y causes motion X? >> Not quite. I'm telling you that Y causes motion Z. Okay, then what causes motion X because that's the example I gave? >> *Crickets*
"Here's a quick summary:" Here where? I don't see a summary of what I said.
I see a goofy strawman you made up out of your imagination.
Material has existence and properties necessarily.
All the material in the cosmos is necessary. The properties of material are conjoined or coincident or intrinsic or inseparable with the existence of material.
Causation is material interaction.
All causation is mutual at base, multilateral, net lossless, multidirectional, and thus fundamentally circular.
Ideas about a linear hierarchical one-way causality are just simplistic folk causation.
"I see a goofy strawman you made up out of your imagination" Here's a less brief version of the 'quick summary', and as anyone can see it's not a strawman. --- So you're telling me that mutual causation causes 2 rocks in close proximity to move across the table?
>> Not quite. I'm telling you that mutual causation causes 2 rocks in close proximity to move in other ways.
Okay, then what causes 2 rocks in close proximity to move across the table because that's the example I gave?
Anon, "Okay, then what causes 2 rocks in close proximity to move across the table because that's the example I gave?" 2 rocks sitting on a table typically do not move much with respect to each other in the local reference frame as we ordinarily perceive it.
Perhaps one attaches rockets to each rock, ignites the rockets and then the rocks move closer to each other.
In that case there are mutual interactions at base that when we observed in the aggregate lead to our observation that rocks move toward each other.
All such causal processes are due to mutual interactions of materials at base.
You cannot name any causal process that is not due to mutual causation at base.
Examples about the father, son and grandfather are pointless stories of folk causation.
Aquinas did have at least 1 reasonable idea, to consider a regression that tends toward infinity. He made rather primitive and crude attempts, stopping at things like a hand or a piece of wood, so even though he had a reasonable idea he failed to follow through on that idea to a useful extent.
To understand an apparent causal process for the purpose of arguing for a necessary first mover it is rather primitive and crude, I would say childish, for a modern person to stop the analysis at the level of a hand or a piece of wood, or a rock for that matter.
A regression that tends toward infinity always leads us to the forces of nature Gravitation Electromagnetic Strong nuclear Weak nuclear
Those forces are all formulated as mutual interactions wherein the designation of mover or moved is arbitrary and therefore meaningless.
There is only the mutual interaction, which terminates every causal regress analysis finitely, making a first mover unnecessary, and thus making the First Way unsound.
All causal interactions have at least these features at base: Net lossless In the present moment Multilateral Multidirectional Mutual in action
In more generalized language, there is no need for a first mover because everything just keeps moving everything else. All materials are thus tied for first place, as it were.
Stardusty, You just said the rockets are moving the stones, not the stones themselves, so ALL materials are not tied for first place. The stones aren't in first place and you don't know what you're talkin about.
Anon, "You just said the rockets are moving the stones, not the stones themselves," Not exactly, but sort of, in a superficial sort of view.
"The stones aren't in first place and you don't know what you're talkin about." The material of the stone, the rocket, and the rocket fuel all move each other mutually.
At base the distinction between mover and moved is arbitrary and therefore meaningless, for all the material we consider of the stone, of the rocket, and of the fuel.
All of those materials move each other at base.
You seem to be locked in a macro scale human senses view of ordinary apparent objects. That sort or reasoning is doomed to failure when attempting to reason your way to a first mover.
Consider how all the bits of those apparent objects are bouncing off each other in space, then you can begin to understand that all causation is mutual at base and all materials are tied for first place in the sense then no particular materials or reference frames are preferred.
Anon, "Where does the casual power of the forces of nature (gravitational force, electromagnet, etc.) come from?" All material is necessary. The total amount of material in the cosmos is static. Materials have properties necessarily. There is no such thing as a property separated from the material it is a property of. There is no such thing as material lacking in properties.
Material is the necessary being and that necessity includes the necessity of its properties.
Why look for an invisible, undetectable, unevidenced necessary being? That solves nothing. All the same questions remain about that speculated being, but made much worse because they are being asked about a being that is speculated to be unobservable even in principle.
Inertial motion makes the unmoved mover unnecessary, and thus makes the First Way unsound, because the First Way is an argument for NECESSITY, not mere compatibility.
Sure, you can speculate that inertial motion is compatible with your invisible being, but so are an unbounded number of other unevidenced speculations.
Your arguments assume materialism, have you given any good reasons to believe this? Your posts would be more effective if you made more complete arguments. Just saying, please don't feel attacked...I want to be able to put it all together.
"Your arguments assume materialism, have you given any good reasons to believe this?" Good reasons to believe materialism?
Your apparent life and the material world you apparently inhabit.
If you consider this to all be some sort of dream, that idealism is the case, then by all means stop breathing, after all, air is not real material in that case.
Everybody who eats and breaths and moves about in all their bodily functions acts on the good reasons to believe that materialism is the case.
Is materialism the case, you ask? Really? All your bodily actions all day long all work on the reasons to believe materialism is the case.
"Your posts would be more effective if you made more complete arguments." There are no arguments against materialism, only idle speculations that I cannot prove this is not all just a dream of my idealistic imagination.
What else would there be other than material?
Every thing has to be some thing. If a thing is no thing then in what sense do you say it exists at all?
Your suggestion is like saying the meteorologist would be more effective if he included arguments for the reality of the sun.
"Just saying, please don't feel attacked" I don't feel attacked in the slightest, I am flabbergasted.
Right, it is true that I do not preface my arguments with recitations about why I think there really is a sun, and there really is air that I really breath, and the food I eat is real, not just a figment of my idealistic imagination.
"I want to be able to put it all together." Ok, fine. What is it that you do not have together?
Yes one can always speculate that there is some unseen, unknown, invisible realm somehow out there, that this is all a dream, or that I am god and you are all figments of my divine imagination. That is not an argument, it is just evidence free idle speculation.
The expression that something could somehow exist immaterially is an incoherent utterance. What would that even mean? Exist where? How? Made of what? With what structure? What organizational arrangement?
None at all? No place, no time, no structure, no arrangement? That amounts to a whole lot of nothing, absolutely nothing at all.
The only coherent alternative to materialism is absolutely nothing at all. But absolutely nothing at all cannot be the case because I am self aware. And whatever exists must be complex and differentiated and operate through time because I experience complexity and change through time.
How can something that is nothing and has no structure and no time and no place be taken at all seriously? You think I should somehow preface my arguments with arguments against such baseless incoherent idle speculations?
Well, I continue to be flabbergasted by your suggestion, but just to give you another way to look at this consider Aquinas in the First Way.
The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion
Aquinas took a materialist approach as the default. Materialism is the baseline for the First Way.
Aquinas recognized, apparently, that materialism is the obvious and pervasive state of affairs all around us. To argue for a first mover Aquinas started from materialism and tried to show that if you carry certain materialistic observations far enough one supposedly is forced to conclude there is an invisible being at work behind it all.
Materialism is the default baseline we all operate on moment to moment in our physical lives. Aquinas recognized that by starting from what is manifest and evident to our senses that there is a world and there are things in this world and some of those things are in motion.
Anon (December 28, 2023 at 6:01 AM) SP can't give you any details because he has reduced his argument down to "at base" where everything is the same. There is no distinction between substances, no distinction between mover and moved and he has jettisoned the principle of sufficient causation.
Whatever substance is "at base" he is saying it causes every kind of change and motion that there is. It's a very magical substance. Ironically, unbeknownst to our resident smartboi genius, it's as magical as the plank scale angels he has been mocking everyone about.
"SP ... has reduced his argument down to "at base"" Of course. Do you suppose you will find the answers to the structure of reality by thinking about your hand and a piece of wood without any scientific understanding of what those objects are composed of?
Even Aquinas recognized the philosophical need to engage in a regression analysis that tends toward infinity.
Unfortunately, Aquinas stopped at the level of his hand or burning wood without any scientific knowledge of what his hand or wood or fire are composed of.
"where everything is the same. There is no distinction between substances" If substances have spatial extent then there must be spatial distinctions between spatial regions of those substances.
Further, the most fundamental substances identified thus far seem to have a variety of properties.
So, your characterization of my position is a strawman, certainly not any position I have expressed.
"no distinction between mover and moved and he has jettisoned...the principle of proportionate causality"
You seem to be conflating "no distinction" with "arbitrary assignment".
Suppose 2 electrons repel each other. Is electron "a" the mover or is electron "b" the mover? The assignment of title "mover" and "moved" is arbitrary and therefore meaningless. There is only the mutual causal movement process.
However, "a" and "b" can be spatially distinct beings, or beables.
There is an existential distinction between "a" and "b". There is no causal assignment of "mover" or "moved" that can be coherently made to "a" versus "b".
"a" and "b" can be existentially distinct but they cannot be distinguished as "mover" versus "moved". There is only the mutual moving of each other.
Google AI returns: "The principle of proportionate causality (PPC) is a corollary of the principle of causality. It states that whatever is in an effect must in some way preexist in the total cause of that effect. According to Feser, the PPC says that every cause must contain its effect, either formally, eminently, or virtually. Feser uses the PPC to motivate the idea that there must be an intelligent first cause."
The PPC is merely the fallacy of composition.
There must be a wall, in some sense, in each grain of mineral in every bit of every block in the wall, the fallacy goes.
"Whatever substance is "at base" he is saying it causes every kind of change and motion that there is." OK, sounds reasonable.
"It's a very magical substance." You have that back to front. Magic would be some sort of poof term. Some sort of magic wherein the whole is not merely an aggregate of the parts, but some sort of magical something poofs in somehow to add to the parts in order to get the whole.
I say p1+p2+...+pn=Whole
you say p1+p2+...+pn+magic poof part=Whole
The substance is not magic. It is your speculated poof part that is magic.
The magic comes from these Plank scale angels, uh, I mean infinitely small bits of matter having the inherent power to create all of the order and all of the change that has ever occurred.
Just think, these magical dust bunnies have formed galaxies, moved planets and shifted continents around. When they are feeling playful the dust bunnies move people around a soccer field. We don't know why, we only know that they are creating the motion of the game for us to enjoy. There's nothing they can't do.
The magic comes from these Plank scale angels, uh, I mean infinitely small bits of matter having the inherent power to create all of the order and all of the change that has ever occurred.
Just think, these magical dust bunnies have formed galaxies, moved planets and shifted continents around. When they are feeling playful the dust bunnies move people around a soccer field. We don't know why, we only know that they are creating the motion of the game for us to enjoy. There's nothing they can't do.
"The magic comes from these Plank scale angels, uh, I mean infinitely small bits of matter having the inherent power to create all of the order and all of the change that has ever occurred." Why is that "magic"?
A very great deal is known about the forces of nature, 4 of which have been identified thus far.
They are, by all experiments, highly regular. That is why they can be described with equations.
"There's nothing they can't do." One can imagine a very great many things that cannot be realized.
I can imagine jumping over a tall building. I can't do that in real life, and the "magical dust bunnies" can't get me to do that, because such an action would be outside of the regularities of their actions that we describe with our physics equations.
Nature is not a causal free for all. When you educate yourself about causality you will find that the Aristotelian notions of a linear, hierarchical, one-way causation are nonsense.
To the human senses, superficially, it seems that all sublunary motion slows, stops, and is lost unless something keeps it moving.
That is what Aristotle thought. That is what Aquinas thought. Newton showed how they are wrong.
If motion slows and stops and is lost- And if we observe motion- Then it makes sense that there is a first mover.
That is the core reasoning of the Aristotelian argument.
Aquinas said: "Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another"
Aquinas meant that whatever we observe to be in motion right now is being put in motion right now by something else. Aristotle thought the same thing. They were both wrong. I find it somewhat shocking that a PhD teaching at a good California college clings to this fundamental error.
The argument for the NECESSITY of a first mover is utterly demolished by inertial motion.
Motion is never lost because all interactions of material are net lossless- Space, for motion, is a lossless medium- Therefore no first mover is NECESSARY.
Aquinas said" "Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover"
NECESSARY
The Aristotelian argument is destroyed by inertial motion because it eliminates the NECESSITY of a first mover.
Aristotle had inertial motion in his grasp. He understood that absent a lossy impeding medium motion would continue ad infinitum.
Aristotle did not understand that space, for motion, is the functional equivalent of the void.
Aristotle thought that sublunary motion was in a medium such that a moving object would slow and stop and its motion would be lost. If that were true then the argument for a first mover would make sense, by Aristotle was wrong about that.
But he was right about this passage in reference to motion in the void: 214 b PHYSICS IV.8 (4) Again, no one could say why something moved will come to rest somewhere; why should it do so here rather than there? Hence it will either remain at rest or must move on to infinity unless something stronger hinders it.
So, by Aristotle's own words in his Physics book 4 he eliminates his own argument for a first mover in the case of motion absent a lossy impeding medium.
What Aristotle failed to understand is that every medium is net lossless.
If you throw a ball it will seem to slow and stop and it will seem as if its motion is lost. That observation leads to the Aristotelian argument for a first mover, the First Way of Aquinas.
But the motion of the ball is not lost, only transferred to other motions of other material. That observation disproves the First Way because the First Way is an argument for NECESSITY.
A New Year, but plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose I suppose. Despite all our prayers SP is still broken and stupid.
He denies the fact of his own existence–and everyone else's I guess–but is nevertheless somehow compelled to pooh-pooh Aristotle and Aquinas (as if they existed) in philosophers' comboxes all over the web.
May I helpfully suggest that the act would be more convincing if you actually stopped popping up to spout poppycock altogether?
Appealing to things like formal thinking and motion that presuppose what you have explicitly denied, i.e. form, only make you look (a) like you believe you are real and really engaged in a debate with other real things; and (b) half-educated.
No, it does not. Logically, you cannot disprove a philosophical argument by inserting different metaphysics into it. That is what you are doing, and despite your propensity for verbal diarrhea you have not undermined the argument in the slightest. Anyway, Happy 2024 to you.
But the motion of the ball is not lost, only transferred to other motions of other material.
Oh I get it now! The money isn't gone from your back account, only transferred to the pockets of other individuals. You're still as rich as you ever were because the overall money supply hasn't changed.
"you cannot disprove a philosophical argument by inserting different metaphysics into it. That is what you are doing," The First Way is based on what is manifest and evident to our senses.
Aquinas provides that basis in the opening of the First Way.
Aquinas is wrong that it is manifest and evident to our senses that whatever is in motion is put in motion by another necessarily.
The observation of inertial motion disproves the First Way.
Inertial motion does not strictly disprove a first mover, or a googleplex movers, or any other fanciful idle speculation. You can make up any sort of fantasy invisible being you want.
Motion is actually caused by invisible magic pixies, dontchyaknow?
You cannot disprove the assertion that motion is caused by invisible magic pixies.
How much do you respect people who insist motion is caused by invisible magic pixies?
There is your first mover, reduced to inane speculation by the inertial motion that is manifest and evident to our senses.
"the overall money supply hasn't changed." Supposing that were true, that the supply of money does not change (ignoring printing of new money, the Fed, mining of precious materials, etc).
Fine, supposing the money supply does not change.
We observe, however, that there is change in the amount of money between individuals. Do we then require a first money changer, or can we account for all transactions of money by mutual transactions of money?
How many money changers are there in existence? Is that a countable number, in principle, or is the number of money changers infinite?
It is manifest and evident to our senses that in the world money changes. But does that require a first money changer, or can we account for all money changes with the mutual interactions of a finite number of money changers?
For every money action there is an equal and opposite money reaction, in the case of a fixed money supply.
There is no call for a first money changer because all money changers interact mutually with each other for no net change in the total money supply.
Money changes are real.
A first money changer is an unnecessary imaginary fantasy speculation in the case of a fixed money supply.
Thank you for your insightful analogy in disproving the First Way.
Zoe, "Despite all our prayers SP is still broken and stupid." Intercessory prayer is indeed irrational.
But as incoherent as intercessory prayer is on an unchanging god, thanks anyhow, it's the thought that counts, nice of you to try to save me, as nonsensical as your methodology is.
I mean, here I am, an incorrigible poppycock spoutter, and god was going to just let me continue in my broken stupidity, but then, you imagine, the unchanging god would change his mind and somehow timelessly and spacelessly and changelessly change me over time and space.
So, the changeless and timeless and spaceless god would change his mind and act over time and act through space to change me, all while remaining unchanged and outside of time and outside of space.
Whew, I am getting dizzy just thinking about intercessory prayer!!!
But nice of you anyhow, it's the thought that counts.
In the event the implication of the time stamps I placed up bracketting a section of the discussion is not clear, the matter being pointed to is not the concession the host made.
It is the important observation that certain kinds of objections depend for their force upon the importation of an inapplicable framework into the discussion.
In the particular instance, it shows up as the model of temporality; and the ensuing complications which appear to evolve while unconsciously assuming that picture; all while ostensibly referring to what is stipulated by prior definition as being, or existing within, an a-temporal context.
While not precisely a semantic issue, it points in the general direction of [what I regard as ] the importance of Feser's analytic background and his alertness to both how words are being deployed, and the making explicit of the senses and assumptions which accompany those uses.
According to the argument from motion, is it possible for the unmoved mover (God) to have potentials that are never actualized because no actual thing exists that can actualize them? In other words, God satisfies the argument in that the unmoved mover has the power in a non-derived way to keep everything in existence - here and now - but I'm not sure the argument leads to the conclusion that God is pure act. Thoughts?
The point of the argument is that every link in the chain having secondary or derivative causal efficacy necessitates an efficient or primary cause which is not derivative. A primary cause, by definition, does not derive causal efficacy from another; it has causal efficacy in itself, which translates to the absence of potency.
We can have proximate primary causes (e.g., a man is the proximate primary cause of moving a stick which moves a stone. But said man is also caused to be (moved) by an essentially ordered series, the ultimate primary cause of which exists in itself and not another. In other words, Pure Act.
Bill, I agree with all of what you have said, except I'm asking a question about your final statement where you conclude 'pure act'. I don't recall that being a necessary conclusion of the argument, but maybe I am wrong about that. Can the argument be satisified in every way without cause being pure act?
Can the argument be satisified in every way without cause being pure act?
No, because every essentially ordered causal chain merges with existence or actuality. Did you watch the entire video? Ed explains himself quite clearly, but let’s go over a few points. A stone cannot move itself, but it has the capacity (potency) to be moved by something else. In Aquinas’ illustration, it is moved by a stick. However, the stick is in the same situation as the stone. It too must be moved by another. Hence, the movement of the stick is derived from whatever is moving it, which gives it (the stick) causal efficacy to move the stone. Thus, both the stone and the stick have the capacity (potency) to be moved (raised to act) as a principle of their existence. If either has no capacity to change (be moved), then it would be devoid of potency. But anything that exists that is devoid of potency is pure actuality by definition.
Of course, that raises the question whether a thing can be fully actual as to some things while having the potency to do other things. However, that is precisely what the stick and the stone are. They are actual as to their stick-ness or stone-ness but are in potency as to their movement. For the stick/stone illustration, we also see that the hand which moves the stick is moved by its muscles, the muscles are moved by electronic signals in the nervous system, and the signals are moved by signals generated by the brain. We can thus see that the proximate primary cause is the brain. But we call this kind of efficient causality proximate because the brain itself is moved (caused to be—has its potency to be actualized) by its molecules, and its molecules are caused (its potencies actualized) by its atoms, etc. And this shows us how this kind of causal chain runs into existence itself as the basis for the movement. As Aquinas stated, this kind of movement cannot proceed to infinity. So long as each link in this chain of existence is caused to be (i.e., its potency to exist is actualized), we are required to see that the chain can only be terminated in something which does not have the potency to exist—its existence is in itself. And anything which has no potency to be is actual without any degree of potency—Pure Act.
"A stone cannot move itself, but it has the capacity (potency) to be moved by something else." Stones move each other.
"stone-ness" You realize, I hope, that a stone that seems to be motionless isn't, it just seems that way to us. Actually, a stone is a buzzing beehive of frenetic activity, continuously vibrating buzzing in a mad chaotic multitude of perpetual motions.
"the muscles are moved by electronic signals in the nervous system," Not quite. The motive force of the muscles comes from sliding filaments. The sliding filaments move due to mutual electrostatic forces.
All causation is mutual at base.
The Aristotelian analysis of causation is hopelessly crude and unrealistic, making the argument from motion just so much nonsense.
"And this shows us how this kind of causal chain runs into existence itself as the basis for the movement." No, the causal processes in your body are accounted for by mutual causation, primarily the mutual attraction of unlike charges and the mutual repulsion of like charges.
Causation is thus fundamentally circular and perpetual in a cosmos where the total amount of material is static and all causation proceeds ad-infinitum in net lossless interactions.
""As Aquinas stated, this kind of movement cannot proceed to infinity. " Which is what makes the First Way logically invalid.
The First Way suffers from the logical fallacy of false dichotomy, because Aquinas failed to account for the circular case.
Duns Scotus tried to patch that up by specifically addressing the circular case, but Scotus failed because he used a one-way analysis regarding anterior and posterior, whereas the real base of causation is multilateral mutuality, a multidirectional circularity.
"we are required to see that the chain can only be terminated in something which does not have the potency to exist" No, because again, the First Way is logically invalid, suffering from false dichotomy.
The third case, multilateral multidirectional circular causation terminates causal chains finitely.
A potential that cannot possibly be actualized by anything including God is incoherent. This is similar to the “Can God create a stone so big that even He cannot move it?” argument.
Thus a potential that cannot possibly be actualized is precisely nothing.
Great discussion. It seems to me, however, that particularly Mr. O'Conner was talking in generalities and probabilities. The real world is not about generalities and probabilities.Just like there is no general horse, only specific ones that come into existence and go out of existence. There are no general potentials are also specific. Therefore, it seems to me that the bast way to have this discussion is form the standpoint of the concept of “being” and the self-evident principles of being. these include Identity, Non-contradiction, Excluded-middle, Causality, and Sufficient-reason. There is also a law of the first-in-kind of every kind of being to exist, and in all cases the first-in-kind is a product of different kind of being except that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is also applicable to the Supreme Being also. All other beings, those that come into being and go out of being are contingent, but the first being of any kind, the Supreme Bering is not. In the real world neither humans of cups of coffee are infinite. each are contingent, having a first in kind. Therefore, to discuss them in the context of discussion infinite regression seems odd. I believe I am correct that Aristotle only discussed potential, actualization, and the need for an actualizing agent in association with discussion of the concept of being. If we first address this issue form the concept of being and the self-evident principles, then it seems to me the questions about infinity and infinite regression go away.
I think I have seen that statement before. Several times, before. With "at base" added sometimes, if I recall correctly.
Can this be related to the "level of reality" we inhabit on a daily basis?
Don't want to be too topical, but given the current situation in the Levant, I'll trying relating this to the famous Rachel Corrie activist incident of a couple decades ago.
So, she got out in the path of an Israeli bulldozer in order to interfere with its demolition project, and it ran over her or pushed dirt on her or something, and she was crushed or smothered.
Therefore are we to conclude she is the efficient cause or the coequal material cause of the bulldozer being there and subsequently crushing her?
If not, why not?
Maybe there is something to that theory. Or perhaps not and there was no "real causation". You know, stuff just happens.
Tough to figure.
Perhaps provocative framings of the question are much too upsetting to reflect on clearly, or are in this instance subject to some terminological confusion or lack of definition - as we are just working with the bare principle itself.
Let's try another less threatening more nostalgic example: Little Joey, purchases a Crooke's Radiometer at the souvenir shop in the museum.
Joey places it on the sill of the window at home and the vanes within the globe begin to spin. Has Joey under this theory, or have the positioning of the evacuated glass bulb and the spinning vanes themselves, caused, or contributed to causing, the sun to shine and perhaps the very process of star formation itself, to take place?
This seems a proposition difficult to justify.
Let's try simplifying with an illustration of real events, but as we have all seen them depicted through special effects in movies many times.
Los Angeles, or some other city experiences what we call an earthquake. A large crack opens up in the surface of the street, and a parked car tumbles down into the new crevasse in the earth.
"At base", wherever and whenever that is located, did the parked car cause the earth to quake and a crack to open up in the earth below the pavement?
Perhaps these causes and effects, are somehow not "real"...
There's only one commenter that uses that phrase. It's because he is ignorant of physics and thinks Newton's 3rd law implies. It seems he also chooses to remain ignorant.
Perhaps, per the idiot's theory that causal no hierarchy exists, the ladder isn't actually causing you to remain 5 feet off the floor. Maybe "at base" you are causing the ladder to remain stationary. Hmm...if only there was a way to test that theory.
"Perhaps these causes and effects, are somehow not "real"" I might have been wrong about you being a hopeless idiot, there might be some hope for you.
The assertion of Aristotle, Aquinas, and all the rest is that analysis of various sorts leads one to conclude a first mover, and in the the case of Aquinas, the application of the non-sequitur in the final phrase of the First Way-God.
Aquinas realized that merely considering a macro sized object such as a section of Earth or an object falling, would not be sufficient.
You seem to have a glimmer of hope in realizing that one must engage in a regression analysis tending toward infinity to find the answer.
One critical error made by Aristotle, Aquinas, Feser and the typical commenter here is to use a hierarchical one-way linear regress of apparent causal agents, with one thing causing another to do something else.
That is folk causality, just a sort of simple minded superficial rumination.
Russell famously explained many of the errors of such thinking over a century ago, in On Cause... He used the example of gravitation, a mutual multilateral force as formulated by Newton.
Modern physics has added a great deal to those early formulations by Newton, but one feature remains.
Real causation is always mutual, multilateral, and thus fundamentally circular, not hierarchical or linear as in the folk descriptions of Aristotle and Feser.
There is no call for a first mover because at base materials move each other in a manner such that the distinction between mover and moved, self moving and moving the other, is arbitrary and therefore meaningless.
It might seem awkward, but I guess if we accept certain dicta presented here, then we have an answer, provisionally at least to a question I asked. Old - in the sense she died years ago -Rachel Correy [ insofar as "she" was not just a completely determined material multiplicity with no agency whatsoever and to which we falsely attribute an unwarranted kind of reality] was the cause of her own death: not merely legally, nor morally, nor through obstinate contributory negligence, nor in some weird Karmic sense. But instead, quite literally and mechanistically. You know, at base, anyway.
How about that. What might all law look like in the future in light of that determinate, inescapable, wisdom?
Now, in respect of the pressing social ramifications of these discoveries, [as if proof of the non-existence of God was not enough] and painful as some might find it, let's at least consider turning our attention to events in Gaza, for yet still more topically challenging conceptual analysis scenarios concerning how we may there transcend the limits of folk physics causation, as those obsolete folk notions, are replaced with regard to ballistic and other impactful phenomena.
I say, "consider" since it may seem too unbearably indelicate to sensitive types, conditioned as they are, to looking at reality through comfortingly anthropocentric folk-morality tinted lenses.
But if Science requires it, then march forward we must. Always trusting in Science or its official spokespersons, to unerringly guide our steps. Science, or what passes for it, the same yesterday, today, and forevermore. Amen
"the ladder isn't actually causing you to remain 5 feet off the floor. Maybe "at base" you are causing the ladder to remain stationary." You are getting closer, there might be hope for you as well.
"at base" you, the ladder, and the floor are collections of quarks and electron whizzing about in a chaotic frenzy, continually interacting with each other.
The rest of the Earth is involved in this scene, as all the material of the Earth is gravitationally interacting with the matter of you, the ladder and the floor.
Further, none of this material is stationary, it is all moving. Everything on Earth is always moving. The quarks are vibrating, the electrons are whizzing about, the atoms and molecules are vibrating and bouncing off each other, the whole collection you call "you" "the ladder" "the floor" is moving at many thousands of miles per hour through space, with forces of motion in balance such that you typically remain oblivious to all this activity that is always going on "at base".
Talking about the father and the grandfather and the child, or considering the rock hand stick, and such examples are primitive and childishly superficial distractions that only reveal the ignorance and superficiality of one who thinks answers to the structure of the universe can be found by sitting around thinking about such inane examples.
Aquinas said "this cannot go on to infinity". A big problem with that assertion is that Aquinas had little idea of what really goes on as one tends toward the bottom infinity.
We know a very great deal more now. For example F = GMm/r^2 F = kQq/r^2
In these formulations the distinction between mover and moved is arbitrary and therefore meaningless.
Thus we find that the classical notion of cause and effect goes away "at base".
There is only the mutual interaction, not any classical cause and effect.
That is what we find when we do as Aquinas suggested, attempt to go on to infinity. Of course, we cannot go to infinity, but we can go a very great deal further than a staff and a hand, which is a rather childishly and primitively simplistic stopping point in a regression analysis that purports to demonstrate what can and cannot happen as one regresses toward infinity.
I provided you with 2 examples, the gravitational force equation and the electrostatic force equation.
All causation is formulated similarly at base.
You cannot name for me an example of causation that is not formulated as a mutual interaction at base.
"At base" is what is meant when Aquinas claims "this cannot go on to infinity", correct?
To determine what can and cannot occur as one tends toward an infinite regression one must go toward "at base", correct?
Aristotle was wrong. Aquinas was wrong. Feser is wrong. You are wrong.
The notions of a linear, one-way, hierarchical, cause and effect series are fundamentally mistaken.
All causation is mutual at base. I have provided you with 2 clear formulations of that fact. You cannot provide any counterexamples, can you?
Correct, they aren't matters of scientific fact. They are already assumed prior to any scientific inquiry. You couldn't do any scientific inquiry at all unless you have the potential to do so.
Tell me, are you actually reading this reply? Of course you are, but previously you weren't, but you could have. A ping pong ball can't read this reply. Why? Because you had the potential to read this reply (which became actual when you started reading it), but the ping pong ball doesn't.
You should really try to understand our terminology before commenting on it. Actuality is simply what exists here and now, whereas potentiality is the capacity in whatever exists here and now to change. Since these are observable on a consistent basis, and since science is in the business of observation, actuality and potentiality are most certainly "scientific fact."
Well, Bill, you should try to understand that A/T metaphysics is not widely accepted professional philosophers, and is not considered "scientific fact" except by its proponents.
"Since these are observable on a consistent basis, and since science is in the business of observation, actuality and potentiality are most certainly "scientific fact."
I guess you can have a lot of fun with this, and you even might be "forced" to once you start in on it.
It's been years since I took a course in "scholastic metaphysics" as it might have been taught - and in fact was taught by Catholics - on the basis of the Thomistic revival.
There, there was no real mention of Aristotle by name, but the concepts of act and potency, substance and accident, and various kinds of analogy, "of proportion" and "of proportionality" for example, were covered.
The courses in Greek and Medieval philosophy were taken just as long ago.
But one thing in the terminology of the old philosophical and new(er) scientific concepts that seemed to retain a core sense [even if for example "substance" or weight did not] was the idea of "potential"
Now although I am not sure in what modern senses "potential" might be construed so as to refer to the capacity to receive, be affected, or undergo a change, the term certainly retains popular scientific currency with regard to mechanics, and electrical power.
Some of that will be based on the notion of stored energy, as in a compressed spring, or a locked up counterbalance, but I am having difficulty seeing how the idea of the potential energy "stored" in a cart loaded with rocks on the top of an inclined ramp, does not bear some significant relation to at least one side of the Aristotelian potential equation, when that potential energy call it stored or configuration is transformed into kinetic energy capable of doing work.
I mean, kids in Jr. high school are still taught basic physics in the form of mechanics, and electricity, aren't they?
Has some term replaced "potential"?
Yes and no it seems.
You want to see people get worked up and some start shouting that forces and everything else don't matter in physics except the math? ... just dive into the subject of potential energy and work, over at Reddit once you have reviewed half a dozen papers or so readily available on the subject.
There's a lot of emotional investment in some of these supposedly value neutral questions. I wonder why. Perhaps the answer lies in the phrase "supposedly value neutral" itself.
For some, nothing really changes below the surface, and it is important in some way that it does not. And it's no use you stirring up trouble by asking what is behind it all, or exactly what it means: it's just Parmenides all the way down.
Well, Bill, you should try to understand that A/T metaphysics is not widely accepted professional philosophers, and is not considered "scientific fact" except by its proponents.
You said this in reply to make admonishment that you should understand our terminology before taking it upon yourself to critique it. It is thus irrelevant entirely whether A/T metaphysics isn’t widely accepted among philosophers.
As to science, every scientist either believes that the things he observes actually exist or he must act as if they exist. That’s what “actuality” means—something actually existing here and now. Thus, actuality is indisputably scientific unless you want to deny reality itself, in which case you’re not engaging in science. And as to potency, that is simply the real capacity for change. Acorns can become oaks, fingers can type, and water can evaporate. Capacity for change is thus a real feature of material existence. And since science is in the business of observing phenomena, science is in the business of observing change. Now, whether or not you call that potency is up to you, but it is no less scientific because you don’t like the word.
Bill, I earlier said many professional philosophers do not accept A/T metaphysics. One is William Lane Craig. I am sure you have heard of Craig. He is probably the foremost intellectual defender of Christianity. He has published countless prestigious philosophical books and articles, in addition to all his many debates. After a debate with Sean Carroll, an audience member asked him what he thought the Five Ways of St. Thomas. He replied:
Dr. Craig: Yes, I would say that Thomas Aquinas' own metaphysical principles are highly dubious and in doubt, and that therefore I have little confidence that his arguments are, as he claimed, demonstrations." https://www.reasonablefaith.org/media/debates/god-and-cosmology-the-existence-of-god-in-light-of-contemporary-cosmol
They are dubious indeed, but they have many stalwart defenders, like Prof. Feser. I think that Alex, even after his interview with Prof Feser (and a while back with Dr Craig himself), will continue to be the "Cosmic Skeptic."
I earlier said many professional philosophers do not accept A/T metaphysics. One is William Lane Craig.
Which is irrelevant to the point, as I earlier said.
I am sure you have heard of Craig.
Of course.
Dr. Craig: Yes, I would say that Thomas Aquinas' own metaphysical principles are highly dubious and in doubt, and that therefore I have little confidence that his arguments are, as he claimed, demonstrations."
Yes, I’ve both read and heard his arguments against classical theism in general and divine simplicity in particular. I’m not at all impressed. Although what I’m about to write is a common complaint from classical theists (to the exasperation of its critics), Craig exhibits a basic misunderstanding of key points. Moreover, much of his argumentation is based on its consequences, not on its validity and soundness considered apart from the consequences Craig wishes to avoid (of course, that’s the argumentum ad consequentiam fallacy). He thinks that because classical theism contradicts the Bible and/or suffers from modal collapse (untrue, but entirely irrelevant to the soundness of the argument itself), it should be dismissed as unviable. For somebody who’s quick to spot the fallacious arguments his opponents commit, he appears astoundingly unaware when he walks right into that one.
Nonetheless, all of this you write is irrelevant, and you should know it. You’re not engaging my argument; you’re rather continuing to appeal to what philosophers think. I’m not into repeating myself over and over. I’ll just do it one more time. Either you engage it or let it go. The word act in the classical theist sense means that which is actual (being). That this is a scientific concept is obvious. Science is in the business of studying reality, that is, what is actual (or at least acting like there’s a real world out there to study). And potency is merely the capacity to change, which is also what science is in the business of studying. Consequently, your claim that the act/potency distinction in beings that change is unscientific is plainly false. Change occurs in beings that can change. This is so obvious that its denial is truly remarkable.
doc, "Are there ANY major philosophical or metaphysical propositions that are universally accepted among philosophers?" A few, the very most basic.
1.There is an existence as opposed to absolutely nothing at all. Even on idealism, then the mental exists as opposed to absolutely nothing at all.
Even if I am god and you are a figment of my divine imagination, then my divinity exists, in that case.
2.I experience my experiences.
Even in the case that my concept of myself and the nature of reality is illusory, still, I must be experiencing the experiences that that I experience myself experiencing.
It is obvious to some people. Look at the Miracle of the Sun and Our Lady of Fatima if you want obvious evidence of a miracle.
Many philosophers have discussed the problem of Divine Hiddenness before. It is not immediately evident that it is best for God to make Himself undoubtably known. Adam and Eve walked in the garden with God and still fell. The Israelites saw the Red Sea parted and still worshipped a golden calf. Judas Iscariot saw most of Christ’s miracles and still betrayed him.
Knowing God exists does not extinguish sin, so perhaps God has a good reason for making us do some philosophical work. I know it has helped me immensely in my life in a way I might have otherwise been deprived of if I had been given all of the answers with no effort on my part.
You might think the evil of slavery is obvious too or that abortion is clearly evil. Historically and presently these matters aren’t so clear. Even some have believed murder and rape are acceptable. Some believe the world is an illusion. Plenty believe that the literal colours and feelings they see do not actually exist due to their interpretation of modern science. And some look at the stars and intuit God exists, yet others mock them all the while saying this kind of thing is what you’d expect if God exists. Interesting don’t you think? God’s existence can actually be a very obvious fact that doesn’t require any argument at all. The mind can immediately grasp the vastness of the night sky along with its contingency and intuit that an incredible and almighty Creator exists. It is only when we darken our minds through materialistic thinking that we become unable to see this, or at least unable to trust our own mental processes. This is my interpretation of the state of things, meaning I don’t think much of yours. So it goes without saying I think you’re putting forth a bad argument. Perhaps, as a wise man once explained, if your point was true it should be a little more obvious to me.
If God truly existed, no debate should be necessary. It would be obvious to us.
It would indeed be obvious to the right kind of mind, with the right kind of input. For example, it is obvious to the angels. The technical term might be "manifest" to them. The truth is before their minds in a manner that cannot be avoided or denied.
Our minds work differently, and we can indeed (a) not receive sufficient evidence; (b) not consider the evidence under the needed framework or not pursue it to the extent of reaching conclusions; or (c) make an error of reasoning.
St. Thomas points out that God's existence is indeed "self-evident" but notes also that it is self-evident only to a mind capable of the required pre-requisites, which we are not.
Here are my thoughts on this discussion with Alex O’Connor:
I think Feser answered his second two objections well. I think a lot of the points Feser made about the first objections, the fact that the analysis of act and potency vis-a-vis change leads to the possibility that objects possess infinite sets of real potential attributes, were well stated as well.
Here are three points I would have liked to have seen him make more explicit (I understand it’s easy to miss these things when thinking on the fly):
The analysis of act and potency doesn’t necessarily lead to the belief in infinite sets of potencies. This is a matter of philosophy of nature. If someone had independent reasons for thinking that this was impossible, then he could simply deny that a coffee cup, for example, really does have the potential to be 140.5555… degrees Fahrenheit. One could appeal to quantum physics or some other such phenomena and say that maybe there really are discreet available temperatures after all, even if there are so many that they seem to be infinite to us. So it isn’t clear that this is a knockdown argument to the act/potency distinction even if infinite sets of potencies are problematic.
The second point which was not really addressed is: What is the motivation for avoiding infinite sets of potencies in the first place? The motivation for avoiding actual infinities is to avoid contradiction. For example, to have a sphere with infinite volume means to have an unbounded volume, but the definition of a sphere is a bounded volume where each point on its surface is equidistant from its center. So a sphere of infinite volume is an unbounded bounded volume, which of course violates the Law of Non-Contradiction. Similar analogies might be made with other attributes. However, the Law of Non-Contradiction is never violated with an infinite set of potencies. For example, to have an infinite set of potential sizes is not to have a potential for infinite size because each and every potential size in the infinite set is itself finite. And so such contradictions are avoided. Likewise a hotel may have an infinite set of potential rooms, but that does not mean Hilbert’s Hotel potentially exists, for each renovation of the hotel will have a finite number of rooms.
Nice response. I thought something similar in that is seems like there is a category mistake going on, applying actual existence to potential existence, which are mutually exclusive. Potency is indeterminateness in material beings (bracketing off consideration of angels) and excludes the notion of actuality (form). So, while we can think certain things, it may be an error to apply actuality in any way to potency in reality, saying there can be an actual set of infinite potencies in a thing at a given time. No, there is in reality just an indeterminateness in things for taking on new actualities under various circumstances in keeping with the limitations of things' essences. At any given time, there is only a finite set of actualities (accidental forms) in a thing.
That said, there may not be any problem granting the existence of an actual set of infinite potentialities. The problem, as you say, is with an actual set of infinite actualities, which is not the same thing.
Regardless, the objection just leaves the objector in the position of Parmenides with being and nothingness, denying the existence of change and multiplicity - a much bigger problem which the ancient Greek world really had no good answer for until Aristotle. The objector should provide an alternative metaphysical account for the reality of change in the world or admit he is good with Parmenides’ position that change is an illusion.
Regardless, the objection just leaves the objector in the position of Parmenides wth being and nothingness, denying the existence of change and multiplicity - a much bigger problem which the ancient Greek world really had no good answer for until Aristotle. The objector should provide an alternative metaphysical account for the reality of change in the world or admit he is good with Parmenides’ position that change is an illusion.
I should have read your prior-to-mine time stamped comment, or read it through if it had actually posted up, before I tossed out my reference to Parmenides.
But then, that apparent antinomy which develops out of any attack on the reality of change or motion as a distinct causal relation, has been the more or less prominent background - and sometimes foreground - of these discussions.
As distinctions are analyzed away into a monistic - possibly undifferentiated something - what does remain?
You can see the desperation of the average ardent materialist - especially those with socialist or politically progressive leanings - to apply just enough deconstructive "scientific" acid to their social opponents' grounding to delegitimate them socially, while somehow avoiding an acidic backflow which undermines their own ability to pronounce authoritatively as coherent beings in a fundamentally intelligible world exhibiting real and subsistent categories.
They are always trying to figure out how much debunking they can in fact promote before they inevitably debunk themselves.
Thus avoiding in these cases, so they hope, the phenomenon of manifesting as a self-relativising relativizer, to once again borrow a formulation from Peter Berger and his sociology of knowledge theories.
The objector should provide an alternative metaphysical account for the reality of change in the world or admit he is good with Parmenides’ position that change is an illusion.
Even if one were inclined to try such an assertion (he is good with Parmenides' position 'change is an illusion, it merely appears to be real'), it is immediately self-defeating: there are the changing illusions. The illusions apparently undergo change. Calling them illusions doesn't eradicate the changing appearances that thus remain unaccounted for.,
This brings me to my final point. A more explicit reductio ad absurdum might be made regarding the concept of potency. That is that if potency is real, then it seems that a thing possesses realities which contradict each other. For example a a ball of clay has the potency to be square at 4:00 PM and circle (not-square) at 4:00 PM. One could make an assortment of similar contradictions involving all of the ten categories. Therefore, it would seem to the objector that the notion of potency leads to hopeless contradiction. The response to this claim would be that potencies are disjunctive because they refer back to the substance which is in act and not to each other. This reference back to the substance means that their opposition to each other is not a violation of the Law of Non-contradiction. A substance may not both be and not be in the same respect and at the same time, and the potencies referring back to the substance ensures that they do not exist at the same time and in the same respect. The only way to make the potencies refer to each other is if one does so explicitly in which case they can no longer have this opposition. So for example, while a ball of clay has the potential to be square at 4:00 PM and the potential to be circle (not-square) at 4:00 PM, it does not have the potential to be square AND not-square at 4:00 PM. “And” is the operative word that conjoins the two otherwise disjunctive properties. Actualities on the other hand do refer to each other which is why they must never be mutually opposed. For example, actual rectangularity is referred to actual skinniness (in a piece of metal say) by virtue of the fact that such a piece of metal is actually a skinny rectangle. That is why skinny rectangles are possible and oftentimes actual. However, actual rectangularity would also be referred to actual triangularity, which is impossible. And that is why you will never find a triangular rectanglular piece of metal (prisms notwithstanding). So the notion of potency does not violate the Law of Non-Contradiction even if it may seem to at a first glance.
Potential is defined as "having or showing the capacity to become or develop into something in the future.” Every specific physical identity has the potential to change, but our experience indicates that it is also constrained by its nature to only change within certain parameters. In fact, I argue that any identity only has the potential to change in predetermined ways. Two of those parameters are its identity and its nature. Any specific identity has the potential “to be,” only that which is within “its nature to be.” And things can only be a single “being/identity” at any moment of time. Notice how many times both parties in this discussion used the term “to be,” “is,” or some other form of the verb “to be.” Even in their referenced “cup of coffee.” (a specific identity) a specific cup of coffee does not have the nature “to be” a million degrees F. Also, when the exact temperature is specified, that particular cup of coffee is that specific identity and not any other identity. We humans do not have any experience to suggest that any physical being has the potential “to be” actualized to infinity. Even God, who would have to be infinite to exist, does not have the potential to be, or to do, anything which is not within his nature “to be,” or “to do.” That is not a contradiction—that is simply a constraint that we have leaned through observation of our physical world, and intellectually abstracting that learned information into conceptual information. None of this takes anything away from Aristotle’s or Dr Feser’s discussions of potential, actualization, and the necessity of an actualizing agent who possesses the nature of the actualizer.
"a specific cup of coffee does not have the nature “to be” a million degrees F." Cups of coffee do not have natures, that is just an ancient abstraction, a human projection, a reification of your imagination.
Real causation is mutual, multilateral, differential, and in the present moment at the fundamental level.
There is no call for a first mover to account for observed change because at base materials change each other mutually.
Stardusty, I'm a little surprised that you're a realist about causation. I would've figured you would consider it just an 'abstraction', which is a typical escape hatch for you (that, and calling everything 'material' 😉).
Well, Doc, materials interact, so that can be called causation.
Most of folk causation, such as Aristotelian causation, are just abstractions, and typically rather poorly formed ones at that.
Russell wanted to eliminate "cause" as a word from our lexicon, believing it had become so polluted as a word, so attached to nonsense assertions, that it was no longer salvageable as a meaningful word.
I share Russell's view that "cause" has become deeply polluted with associated misconceptions. But, I think the term "causation" or "causal process" is salvageable in terms of mutual causation.
And yes, every thing is material. What else would a thing be other than material?
Stardusty: Materials interact, therefore causation? How profound. But Aristotelian causation? 'Just abstractions'. Amazing. Let's eliminate cause from our lexicon, because it isn't meaningful. Oops, I just wrote 'because', so that's gotta go. Except that 'mutual causation' is salvageable. Whew.
And everything is 'material'. Well, I prefer the term flibbertigibbet. Everything is 'flibbertigibbet'. That's better!
HolyKnowing: Men grow? I suppose....Of course, growth is a causal word. Wonder if they do it mutually?
@DrYogami : Perhaps SD will soon realize he exists, and perhaps that Ari & Aqui's views are quite true.
Until then, as it was mentionned multiple times, why do people engage SD? I mean, he clearly stated he thinks Feser is wrong, he misconstrued his arguments, he offers no defense for his view (and he doesn't express them coherently)... and he clearly doesn't believe he exists.
Aristotle once said : you don't argue with a vegetable, so... don't? :D
Merry Christmas to all of us, including SD when he'll be back to the real world. Let's rejoice in the birth of our Lord!
Doc, "Stardusty: Materials interact, therefore causation? How profound." Material interaction is causation. Causal processes are the interactions of material. I don't find that especially profound, do you?
"I prefer the term flibbertigibbet. Everything is 'flibbertigibbet'. That's better!" Ok, there is no god of language. The words you make up are as good as any other words. One disadvantage is that most people will not recognize "flibbertigibbet", but now that you have mentioned it I will known you mean material whenever you write flibbertigibbet.
I just think it'd be more consistent if you regarded causation as an illusion. But whatever floats your boat.
Of course I didn't make up flibbertigibbett. Though it's possible that most people wouldn't recognize the term. As it seemed you didn't...though you accepted use of the word. How interesting.
Well, doc, you got me on that one! Yes, I thought you made it up. To me it sounded like one of those goofy words one makes up on the spot that are intended to sound made up and arbitrarily unique.
Thanks for the reference, I realize now that word is somewhat archaic but has a long history of widespread use.
But if you had made it up, fine. I mean, why not? All words are made up. Your made up words are as valid as anybody else's made up words.
But. lacking a conventional use, the words we make up are likely to be of little use in communicating with others. But who knows? Maybe you will coin a new word that catches on and becomes useful more broadly.
Then instead of being a kook who mutters unintelligible sounds you will be hailed as a linguistic trailblazer, a literary creative genius, a brilliant inventor of new and wonderful modes of communication.
There may be a fine line between genius and insanity, although by the lights of the typical poster here I am squarely in the realm of the latter.
The objection based upon potentialities allowing actual infinites does not hold much force for me. We can use an analogy from computer science to illustrate why the objection is not compelling.
A variable of type integer, in a strongly typed language, can potentially have a range of values, often represented as constants: MAX_VALUE (231-1) and MIN_VALUE (-231). It is not difficult to imagine MIN_VALUE being -∞ and MAX_VALUE being ∞. In fact, languages such as Java have a "BigInteger" class to represent "Immutable arbitrary-precision integers". In this example, an integer variable can have an infinite number of potential values, but only one actual value at any point in time, T. The integer variable's value may be -500, -10, 0, 50, 9000, etc., but what it cannot be, unless it undergoes a substantial change, is the string "Hello, world!" because the variable is of type "integer" and not of type "String". In an analogous way, a ball may actually be the color red at time T, then be the color white at time T+1, but at no time can the ball have legs because things of type "ball" can not have legs.
"a ball may actually be the color red at time T, then be the color white at time T+1" A ball cannot ever be a color.
Color is a hallucinatory experience of an animal with color vision. Color is an internally manufactured qualia process, not a property of external objects.
Which is another example of why one will not find the answers to the structure of the underlying reality, including the root of causality, motion, and change, by sitting around thinking and talking about macro objects.
Aquinas said "this cannot go on to infinity". He was wrong in his further analysis, logically invalid by arguing a false dichotomy as well as employing other defects in his arguments, but he was on the right track in that respect.
To discover the true nature of the underlying reality one must regress toward the infinitely small. Aquinas failed to regress any further than his hand or a piece of wood, so he made a rather crude attempt, but the idea of a regression that tends toward infinity was reasonable.
Stories about a father, son, and grandfather are irrelevant and provide no useful insight into causality.
The rock-stick-hand example is pointless.
Stories about a locomotive pulling train cars are of no analytical value.
To understand causality you will need to regress toward infinity. There you will find that all causation is: mutual at base in the present moment differential net lossless fundamentally circular multidirectional
There is no such thing a linear, hierarchical, one-way causal series. Such ideas are mere abstractions of folk causality.
Folk causality is what Aristotle, Aquinas, Feser, and all the rest consider. It is a rather crude, simplistic, unscientific way of attempting to reason a way toward causality by thinking about ordinary perceptions. Such an analytical process is doomed to failure.
Russell clearly showed many of the false notions of causality more than 100 years ago in On the Notion of Cause https://www.hist-analytic.com/Russellcause.pdf
Dr. Feser is well aware of this publication and has published comments on it, much to the discredit of Dr. Feser, given the shallow strawman approach that was taken in those responses.
Russell expressed the opinion that the word "cause" has been so polluted with misconceptions that it should no longer be used in this context. I disagree with that approach, rather, I prefer to refer to causation as the interaction of materials.
Very obviously Aristotelian causation is nonsense. There is only the mutual interaction.
No individual at that link, here, or any other location has any displayed capacity to defend against my disproofs of A-T on the merits.
Inertial motion falsifies the NECESSITY of a first mover.
All causation is mutual at base, which is fundamentally the circular case Duns Scotus addressed but Aquinas failed to address, making the First Way logically invalid by false dichotomy.
The last phrase in the First Way is a non-sequitur, what Koons calls "the gap problem".
You have no demonstrated capability to show how my disproofs are themselves wrong, but by all means, do correct me, specifically, on the merits.
Refuting strawmen isn't a requirement. You keep saying inertia and mutual causation is a solution to the AT argument, but it isn't. Your response is a solution to an argument that AT isn't making. Your house of straw appears to bring you great comfort so rest easy and take pride in the fact that you built it yourself.
I wonder if there is a concept of potencies playing out here which is too focused on our *concept* of potencies rather than potencies *themselves* and thus becomes almost Platonic.
I mean, it is agreed that potency cannot be known per se but only by reference to the actuality it is the potency for. That being said, does it need to be the case that any enumerable potency (e.g. temperature) exists as a set of units exactly parallel to what we see in actuality or could it be different? Could there be an aspect of a unified continuum in potency that is only actualized as discrete quantities? Perhaps the mind defines and enumerates potencies which themselves exist in a less defined and continuous way because we are only able to conceptualize actualities. Thus the definition and enumeration which leads to Alex’s objections applies to the concept, not the object.
I say the alternative to this can lean Platonic in the sense that potencies are often spoken about as if they were invisible and (almost) independently existing entities that are in some “third realm” yet connected to the object. Joe Schmid once referred to potencies as “spooky” or “ghostly” I do recall, and now Alex speaks of them as “properties.” However, all potencies of a physical object exist in the matter itself and are brought out of that matter. Something in me wants to say that the better way to conceive of an object’s potentiality is to simply say an object is made of matter, and this one clump of matter contains all potency, rather than enumerating potential qualities as individual properties.
The suggestion that coffee might have qualitative change that could approximate the hottest possible temperature (i.e. "infinitely hot") shouldn't be granted. What coffee actually is limits it's qualitative potentiality. Being coffee does not admit being as hot as the sun. In other words, all accidents cannot inhere in all substances. If there were a qualitative change of temperature to a certain degree, this would destroy the substance. Just as humans can't have infinite qualitative change (i.e. become as hot as the Sun), nor can coffee.
What O'Connor is pointing toward is just a variation of Zeno's point about infinitely dividing something (e.g. infinitely dividing some distance and then proclaiming the movement is not possible). We both know that locomotion is possible and that coffee cannot be infinitely hot without a change in substance, so we also know that either the reasoning or the premises that lead to the conclusion that we cannot move or that coffee could be infinitely hot have gone wrong.
Alex's example of the father-son chain suspended in mid-air was a helpful illustration. The son does not need the father's continued existence to procreate, but would need his continued existence to be held in mid air. More than this, there must be some beginning to the "father-son mid-air chain" whose power to hold up is inherent and who does not require being held up. The early portion of the dialogue reflected that Alex was tracking with the arguments. However, he shifted usage of "actual" and "potential" in his critique which would entail equivocation if he depended on that shift to make it appear as though he were refuting Feser's arguments. Even if equivocation did not occur, shifting to his own usage without offering a definition or distinction between his usage and Feser's simply leads to confusion.
There also should have been a definition of infinity. Understanding infinity as "not finite" would lead to greater precision. Once that was introduced and it was recognized that coffee as such cannot get "infinitely hot" because the heat would eventually break down the substance of coffee, then the discussion could move on from that sticking point for Alex (If the coffee breaks down at 10,000 degrees--fahrenheit, celsius, kelvin, etc, then it has not gotten infinitely hot; it can't after all become 100,000 degrees). The key metaphysical point is that what something actually is limits the potentiality of accidents for contingent beings (i.e. beings with accidents).
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ReplyDeleteI'm not shocked. Alex had William L Craig on a while back. He also interviewed Peter Hitchens. He is friendly with Trent Horn. Why would you think Alex wouldn't have Feser on the show?
DeleteI might be missing something but I am confused by the first objection that Alex gave against potency being a real feature of things? If temperature really is infinitely divisible in the way he proposed, then how is it a problem if the coffee cup can have an infinite number of potencies with regards to temperature? We can't say that the coffee cup has a real number of infinite properties unless we have already established the existence of a real infinity that exists outside the coffee cup (temperature or infinite space to follow the examples he gave). If this is the case though, then Alex undermines his own argument because he fails to realize that he has basically granted the possibility of a real infinity at the beginning of his argument.
ReplyDeleteYes, I also thought it was a rather silly argument. I don't think O'Connor understands the distinction between actuality and potentiality. Both exist, but not in the same way. So the fact that there are an infinite number of temperatures the coffee could be is perfectly compatible with the impossibility that there are an infinite number of temperatures the coffee is. Also, potentiality is limited by the nature of the substance. The coffee can be any temperature, but it cannot potentially get up and walk away or the coffee potentially turn into tea. I don't see why he thinks that argument has any force at all.
DeleteUnder atomic theory / quantum theory, there are actually a (high but) finite number of temperatures a finite object can be, as there are a finite quanta of energy states possible, there are "smallest" energy state change amounts possible. The possible number of averages of those finite possible states for each particle is also finite.
DeleteI think the issue is how to conceive of potentiality. The way I think of it is to say that potency is prefigured in the actual in that the potency of a thing is the possibility of the relevant causal factors to be in any one place or state of change.
DeleteTake the coffee example, the coffee is potentially temperature C (T.C.), the realness of the potential of the coffee to be T.C. is prefigured in the relevant causal factors. It may be that world is made of a high number of potencies that are being actualized at a rapid-fire pace, hence a web of potencies being actualized. Going back to the coffee example, it may be the case that we ought to think of potency in terms of the relevant causal factors, that when micro potencies are actualized result in macro potencies being actualized, that then we can deem potencies to be a real feature of the world. It seems strange to me, to say relevant causal factor X having the possibility to be at place C is not a real feature of the world.
Not sure if this adds anything to your question, I am working out all this myself.
@Tony:
Delete"Under atomic theory / quantum theory, there are actually a (high but) finite number of temperatures a finite object can be, as there are a finite quanta of energy states possible, there are "smallest" energy state change amounts possible. The possible number of averages of those finite possible states for each particle is also finite. "
True, but virtually in every realistic case, the state spaces of quantum systems are infinite-dimensional.
Not that I think this poses any sort of problem (and there are other assumptions smuggled in, e.g. in the counting of potentialities), it is just that this type of answer will only get you so far.
Will
ReplyDeleteThe problem is that the whole potential/actual distinction fades away because potentialities really exist, But if potentialities really exist, there is no reason why they can't actulaize themselves. It is not a matter of something coming from nothing because potentialities are not nothing.
Alex is not undermining his own argument because he is not a priori treating potentials as real features of things.
An objection that Alex doesn't seem to raise is this: Ed seems to treat creation of things as actualizing a potential, but that entails that God is not the creator of everything, because if God were the creator of the potential of, let's say angels, to exist, He would have to be the creator of the potential of the potential of angels to exist, which would lead to an infinite regress of essentially ordered causes.
One of the main problems with Thomism is that it cannot account for the existence of potentials.
Walter, you're conflating the terms. Actuality in created beings is a perfection, whereas a potency is a capacity to a perfection. The capacity to a different state of being is really present in something actual, but since it lacks perfection, it has no efficacy to produce the effect. Only something actual can produce that.
DeleteWalter
DeleteI think Bill answered your first objection well so I will leave it at that.
With regards to your second objection, I don't think saying that God is the creator of the potential for angels to exist is something that most Thomists would accept. The potential for angels to exist is something that pre exists in the Divine Intellect by God's knowledge of himself and the possible ways for being to exists in a limited way.
Finally, I don't think that you have actually responded to what my original problem with Alex's argument is (which could very well be my fault for not being clear enough). My problem is rather that if we want to say that real infinites can't exist, therefore if you hold that potentials are real features of the world then you have to accept the existence of real infinites (coffee cup temperature or infinite space example) we run into a problem. Taking the coffee cup example, we have to first allow for either the existence of infinite divisibility of temperature or the infinite range of temperature to be real features of the world before we can say that the coffee cup has an infinite number of real potentials for temperature. This is a problem though because we can no longer say that the infinite number of real potentials poses any kind of problem for the A/T position as we have already been forced to accept a real infinity to make the objection. Hopefully that might be more clear.
Bill
DeleteI know that's what Tomists and Aristoteleans claim, but it is, to say the least, controversial that the efficacy to produce an effect requires perfection.
I see no reason to believe that. I do believe, however, that ex nihilo nihil fit, but since potentials are not nothing, that doesn't in itself raise any problem.
Will
DeleteThe potential for angels to exist is something that pre exists in the Divine Intellect by God's knowledge of himself and the possible ways for being to exists in a limited way.
If I resall correctly, Ed says that the potential of angels to exist must be actualized. If what you say is true, God actualizes a potential in Himself to 'create' angels. But God cannot have any potentials.
Hence, creation must be something entirely different from actualizing a potential.
As to your second point, there are things that most people agree are potentially infinite. If the universe keeps on expanding, then that is a potential infinity. If we don't treat potentials as really existing (in whatever mode), then that is not a problem. But if potentail are real, the universe really has an infinite number of potentials. So, no, Alex is not forced to accept a real infinity to make the objection, because if potentials are not real features of the world, there is no real infinity.
Walter writes:
DeleteI know that's what Tomists and Aristoteleans claim, but it is, to say the least, controversial that the efficacy to produce an effect requires perfection.
If it’s controversial, it shouldn’t be. Since a potency isn’t an actuality, it doesn’t have the same degree of being or reality. For example, let’s say you’re in Boston right now (i.e., you are actually in Boston). However, you are in potency to Dallas (or anyplace else in the universe). Walter in Dallas is a real capacity for Walter in Boston, but Walter in Dallas does not exist in actuality (only in potency). So, how can Walter in Dallas be realized? Walter in Dallas cannot actualize itself because Walter isn’t in Dallas at the moment. Walter in Dallas can only be raised to actuality by Walter in Boston. Thus, potency can be reduced to act only by that which is in act.
We see this same pattern in all instances of change. The stick does not move itself to push a stone. The finger does not move itself to press a button. What has the capacity to be actualized or perfected is perfected by something which is itself perfect. This is rather obvious, Walter.
I have no problem with the claim that something must exist in order to moe something else. That's pretty obvious. But I don't believe in perfections.
DeleteBeing in Boston mis not a perfection.
Accidentally pushed the publish button. Just to add. Being in Dallas isn't a perfection, so my being in Boston may be changed to being in Dallas, but it isn't perfected. Boston seems nice to me.
DeleteMoreover, I do not see why it can't be the case that everything is necessarily both act and potency.
The "act" is simply a way of stating what is the case at an instant, the "potency" is what happens/can happen over time. No need for a real disntinction.
Existing is moving. Something that doesn't move does jnot exist.
Walter writes,
DeleteI have no problem with the claim that something must exist in order to moe something else. That's pretty obvious. But I don't believe in perfections.
If you have no problem with that claim, then you have no problem with the claim that potencies cannot be reduced to act except by something in act. That’s saying the same thing. And if you don’t believe in perfections, then you don’t believe in change, because perfection is the completion of change.
Being in Dallas isn't a perfection, so my being in Boston may be changed to being in Dallas, but it isn't perfected.
You’re missing the point, Walter. If you’re in potency to Dallas, by definition you’re not actually in Dallas. Your body has the capacity to move to Dallas, and once you’re there, the capacity or potency to move to a particular spatial coordinate is fully actualized or perfected. Perfection is merely the termination of a causal series or change.
Moreover, I do not see why it can't be the case that everything is necessarily both act and potency.
All created beings are in act and potency. Who told you otherwise? They are simply not in act in the same respect as they are in potency. Your vocal chords actually exist (they are in act), but they can potentially vibrate. These principles of being are features of every creature or thing. You keep repeating criticisms of the argument without comprehending what the argument is.
The "act" is simply a way of stating what is the case at an instant, the "potency" is what happens/can happen over time. No need for a real disntinction.
Then why do you assert a distinction? On your own terms, there is a difference between what is and what can be.
Existing is moving. Something that doesn't move does jnot exist.
Of course, but you’re conflating terms again. Anything that moves is in act with respect to its presently moving, but the thing in question is also in potency to either continued movement or the cessation of movement. Potency accounts for the capacity of a subject to change. So, in one sense, existence in created things is movement because existence is continually being added to essence in order for a subject to continue existing, just like your vocal chords need air in order to keep vibrating. Vibrating vocal chords are clearly in act, but they also clearly have the capacity or potency to stop moving. They are thus in act in one sense and in potency in another sense.
Act and potency are merely ways of describing the limitation of being. Being simpliciter (unqualified being) has no restrictions (obviously, since it is unqualified). “Being” applies to all states of reality, so if there is such a thing as Pure Being, no further actuality could be added to or taken away from it. Since creatures do not have unqualified existence, terminology was developed to describe these limited states of being. We have a qualified existence which is limited by our essences, which is our capacity to acquire or lose states of reality. Act and potency are not like Lego blocks. They are principles of being which describe our creaturely status. We can change only because we have the potency or capacity to change. That’s a real feature of anything that changes, which I consider rather self-evident. It truly is baffling to me why this is even controversial.
Of course we change because we have the capacity to change, but we don't change because we are not perfect and move to perfection. Change is simply the capacity to become something else, not the capacity to become something better. There is no "better" or "worse". No state of being is "limited".
DeleteI "assert" a distinction between act and potency for the sake of the discussion, but there is no real distinction. The Morning Star is the Evening Star seen in the morning.
I think that you need to keep clear on the distinction between possible and potential. A potential is a readiness for some being, and readiness for implies already a KIND of being as such. "Possible" doesn't imply that. Before God created, it was possible for him to create or not create other beings. But there was no thing to be ready for receiving creation. Nothingness is not readiness for being. And God's mind knowing the kind of thing he may create is not properly a potential of some thing.
DeleteAlso, a real created being has a possibility of ceasing to exist , i.e. if God stops sustaining it, (which would result in annihilation of it, not merely death or change - even angels can cease if God stops sustaining their being), but this is not a potentiality of the created being. Ceasing to have any actuality at all cannot be described as a potentiality, only a possibility. Potential has to do with taking on some other condition of being, (whether you call it a perfection or not), and ceasing all being isn't going to some other condition of being, it is non-being altogether.
Walter, you write:
DeleteChange is simply the capacity to become something else, not the capacity to become something better. There is no "better" or "worse". No state of being is "limited".
You’ve been told multiple times that a perfection is the actualization of a potency. It is a realized capacity. Causal efficacy may result in good or evil, but that has nothing to do with the definition of the term. A knife is supposed to cut. Thus, when a knife is used to cut something, its capacity to cut is perfected when it cuts, even if it illegitimately cuts someone’s throat. Now, you may have your own definition of perfection, but that bears no relevance to the Thomist version. If you take it upon yourself to criticize A/T metaphysics, you have to use its terminology, not what you prefer as a substitute, else you’re skewering scarecrows.
Walter, it’s quite obvious that you know little of A/T metaphysics, even after all this time commenting on these boards. It seems that you hear or read something, spin it according to your presuppositions, and then condemn it in ignorance.
I "assert" a distinction between act and potency for the sake of the discussion, but there is no real distinction.
No, you didn’t assert the distinction for sake of discussion. You said:
The "act" is simply a way of stating what is the case at an instant, the "potency" is what happens/can happen over time. No need for a real disntinction.
What is really (not conceptually) is distinct from what can be. If what can be is not really distinct from what is, then an acorn is not really distinct from an oak tree. Sitting is not really distinct from standing. Sleeping is not really distinct from being awake.
The Morning Star is the Evening Star seen in the morning.
You’re using Venus to illustrate nominal distinctions, but surely you are aware that that’s not the only kind of distinction. Moreover, there is a real distinction between the Morning Star (MS) and the Evening Star (ES). In the morning, we are viewing one spatiotemporal orbit of Venus, and in the evening, we are viewing another spatiotemporal thereof. We are then viewing different sides of Venus, depending on when we are viewing them. And how is it that we are able to view different sides of Venus? That is explained by the causal powers perfected in rotation. Thus, there is a real distinction between the MS and the ES. This is really pretty basic stuff, Walter.
Billy
Delete"It is a realized capacity." I know that's what you think, and what Thomists in general think, but I reject it, because I don't believe that things are "supposed to" do anything.
That's our main point of disagreement, I think, and all the rest follows from it.
I don't believe in teleology and you obviously do, which is fine, but that doesn't in itself mean that I am wrong. To show me I am wrong, you 'll have to come up with some real arguments. But the problem is that you seem to be stuck in your Thomistic framework so that you cannot even begin to comprehend anything that questions the very basis of that framework. And that's what I am doing.
Before you draw the "you don't understand Thomism" card, you should first try to understand what I really say, instead of knocking down strawman. For example, I have never said anything about good or evil, I am saying that things "become" different and that's all.
Your reply about Venus is a good illustration. The Morning Star and the Evening Star are not real distinctions of Venus. Even if Venus was completely changeless, we would still see it as the Evenning Star and the Morning Star, because move. The Earth rotates and that is the main reason why we draw the distinction between the Morning Star and the Evening Star. But it is not because there is a real distinction. Nobody is talking about "Venus at 8 p.m." and "Venus at 8.01 p.m." as distinct planets, although its position has slightly changed.
You can find distinctions everywhere if you want, but my question is: do they denote a real feature of the thing described or not. You assert that they do, I say that they don't.
For my, "actuality" is simply a different way of looking at something than "potentiality", we see it from a different angle, that's all.
Bill
DeleteI confused you with another poster, so my apologies for calling you "Billy".
Tony
DeleteI am not sure your comment was addressed to me, but I do not think that the distinction between possible and potential is really meaningful, unless you are merely talking about logical possibility.
I do not believe for a moment that things can come into existence or go out of existence. Ex nihilo nihil fit.
Walter writes,
DeleteI know that's what you think, and what Thomists in general think, but I reject it [that change is a realized capacity], because I don't believe that things are "supposed to" do anything. That's our main point of disagreement, I think, and all the rest follows from it.
If you know that’s what we think, then why do you write about it the way you do (whether perfections are something “better”)? You couldn’t have written that if you “know what we think.” Moreover, what in the world is “supposed to do” supposed to mean in this context? Do you mean teleology by an intelligent agent? All Thomists say at this point is that there is a real capacity in things to different states of being pursuant to their nature. A heart has the capacity to pump blood, not to make ice cream. A ping-pong ball has the capacity to bounce, not to digest acorns. Water has the capacity to freeze, not to build lawnmowers. And why can’t water build lawnmowers? And why in the world does this need to be explained if you know what we think?? It is not within the range of causal capacities of water to build lawnmowers, skyscrapers or rockets. This kind of dialog gives every impression that you’re not arguing in good faith.
I don't believe in teleology and you obviously do, which is fine, but that doesn't in itself mean that I am wrong. To show me I am wrong, you 'll have to come up with some real arguments. But the problem is that you seem to be stuck in your Thomistic framework so that you cannot even begin to comprehend anything that questions the very basis of that framework. And that's what I am doing.
Oh, you want me to rewrite Aquinas or Scholastic Metaphysics? You’ve been commenting on these boards for some time. I simply assumed that you at the very least did some background research before running your keyboard. If you haven’t read the necessary material, then you have no business popping off about who hasn’t offered “real arguments.” And if you have read the material and didn’t recognize the plethora of “real arguments” therein, then nothing I write will help you further. I full well comprehend legitimate questions to the Thomistic framework. I wasn’t born into classical theism, and I questioned plenty when it was presented to me.
Your comment about not believing in teleology is telling. It appears that you’re so intent on denying teleology that you reflexively deny every aspect of an argument that might lead to it. Actuality is simply what is real here and now. Potentiality is the capacity to become something else. Change is the process by which a potential becomes actual. A perfection is what results from change. And we see examples of change everywhere we look in the universe. This is our common experience and is the basis for the scientific method. You’re just denying the obvious.
Continuation...
DeleteBefore you draw the "you don't understand Thomism" card, you should first try to understand what I really say, instead of knocking down strawman. For example, I have never said anything about good or evil, I am saying that things "become" different and that's all.
Are you the pot or the kettle? Are you so caught up with the mere words good and evil that you entirely missed the point I was making? Why don’t YOU try to understand your interlocutor’s words as much as you’d like others to understand yours? I was replying to your point that “[c]hange is simply the capacity to become something else, not the capacity to become something better.” My reply referencing good and evil is illustrative only that regardless of any alleged betterment of an actualization, a perfection is merely the termination of change in a particular respect. Your comment betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of what you’re criticizing. You don’t even know what a perfection is. I was pointing out that a perfection is precisely the “something else” that something has the capacity to realize. You cannot consistently say that you disagree with something when that something is exactly what you say you believe.
You can find distinctions everywhere if you want, but my question is: do they denote a real feature of the thing described or not. You assert that they do, I say that they don't.
You said this in reference to my comments about the MS and the ES (Venus). This is just plain silly. One side of Venus is materially different from the other side of Venus. When we view Venus in the morning, we are looking at one side of it. When we view it in the evening, we are looking at another side thereof. There is thus a real difference between the two, even though we’re referencing the same planet. There is a real distinction between your right hand and your left hand, even though we’re referencing the same person (Walter). If you’re speaking of Venus collectively, then, yes, MS & ES is a nominal distinction. But if speaking more precisely, we’re looking a different parts of Venus, depending on when we look at it. You’re conflating collectives and particulars.
Bill
DeleteIf all Thomist's really mean is that things can change because they can change, then I am OK with that. I believe that too, and so does everybody who thinks change is real.
But you said that "perfection is the completion of change", and I don't agree with that. IMO, there is no such thing as the completion of change. There is change, and that's it. At some time, X is X and at another time it is Y, but , unless time is discrete, and we can stop the time at the exact moment in which Y is the case, there is no such thing as an actual Y. But there is no "termination".
As to Venus, my point is that not every distinction is a real feature of a thing. Some distinctions are nominal. The Morning Star and the Evening Star are examples of such nominal distinctions. Even if we always saw one side of Venus, we couild still refer to it as The MS or the ES, depending on our view of it. So, we can call a thing 'potential' or 'actual' depending on our view of it, but they, IMO, do not refer to actual features of that thing. That's it. Now you claim I should refer to them as really distinct features, but you have given me no argument as to why I should do so. I haven't found a convincing argument in Aristotle or Aquinas either, but of course, I can be mistaken. In any case, it is not "obvious" in any way.
Merry Christmas, BTW.
Tony
Delete"But there was no thing to be ready for receiving creation. Nothingness is not readiness for being. And God's mind knowing the kind of thing he may create is not properly a potential of some thing."
That's what I thought was the Thomist way of looking at creation, but, to my surprise, Ed Feser, in his discussion with Alex O'Connor, between 1.15:56 and 1.16:03 says the following, "They (angels) stil have to be created, because they are merely contingent things, and that means they have to go from potentiality to actuality".
"They (angels) stil have to be created, because they are merely contingent things, and that means they have to go from potentiality to actuality".
DeleteThis is just a way of saying that essence is in potency *with respect* to existence, where essence is now just the archetypes in God's mind for creation (or more precisely, the ways in which finite being can participate in the unlimited, infinite being of God, that God knows through knowing Himself perfectly) not that there are some unrealized potentials absolutely speaking, either in God or in some sort of Platonic heaven. It would be better to speak of possible being to avoid confusion.
Walter writes:
DeleteIf all Thomist's really mean is that things can change because they can change, then I am OK with that. I believe that too, and so does everybody who thinks change is real.
Well, that’s not “all” they believe, and you know it. With respect to change, why does it take post after post to own up to it? Anything that changes has the real capacity to change, but folks somehow want to dig in their heels and argue every single point as if their lives depended on denying the obvious. They’re so obsessed with validating their bias against either Catholicism (I’m not Catholic) or theism, they have to convince themselves and anybody who’ll listen that all of it is false from top to bottom. This is something we should never have argued about.
But you said that "perfection is the completion of change", and I don't agree with that. IMO, there is no such thing as the completion of change. There is change, and that's it. At some time, X is X and at another time it is Y, but , unless time is discrete, and we can stop the time at the exact moment in which Y is the case, there is no such thing as an actual Y. But there is no "termination".
And you’re again using terms differently than we’re using them. Why do you keep doing this? One reason is your fundamental misunderstanding of our arguments. Whether you like it or not, that’s a fact. And why are you posting on these boards unless you want to be taken seriously with your objections? Nobody here will take you seriously when you don’t even know what they believe. If you want to prove we’re wrong, at least get our arguments right.
There is accidental change and substantial change (know what that means?). If you’re sitting, you have the potential to stand. The proximate efficient cause of your standing is your will which actualizes a chain of secondary or derivative causes which terminates in your standing. Once you’re actually standing the causal chain in that regard ends. That does not mean that you lack the potency to sit back down or do myriad other things. Your standing is actual, yet you are in potency as to other things. The same goes with substantial change. An acorn becomes an oak. Once it’s actually an oak, the changing process in that regard terminates. Again, that does not imply that the oak lack potential for other perfections. The proof of causal termination is everywhere you look.
As to Venus, my point is that not every distinction is a real feature of a thing.
Nobody said it is. I already mentioned nominal distinctions, so why are we traipsing around that point again? Want some more repetition? Your left hand isn’t your right hand. That’s not a nominal distinction; it’s a real distinction. One side of Venus isn’t the other side of Venus. They are different portions of matter which compose said planet. Thus, there is a real difference between them. If you’re referring to the planet collectively, then we can agree that MS & ES is a nominal distinction. But when speaking particularly, it’s a real distinction. Why are we going around this again? Is it your position that the left hand is materially the same as the right hand (the same portions of matter?). Please.
Bill
DeleteI am afraid we'll have to agree to disagree on this. You obviously do not understand what I am arguing for, and that may be because I failed to make it clear to you.
Anyway, I don't feel like going into too many details on my view. That would take up more space than this combix allows for.
Just one thing. We 'are going around this ( Venus) again' because you claimed that I was asserting a distinction. I wasn't asserting a real distinction, only a nominal
one for the sake iof the argument, which is that there is no real distinction between potentiality and actuality.
Merry Christmas.
Walter writes:
DeleteYou obviously do not understand what I am arguing for, and that may be because I failed to make it clear to you.
Well, it would help matters if you understood what you’re trying to criticize. You never answered whether you’ve read Aquinas or Scholastic Metaphysics. You never answered whether you think “left hand” and “right hand” is a nominal distinction. And you typically “agree to disagree” and disappear when you can’t answer questions like that.
We 'are going around this ( Venus) again' because you claimed that I was asserting a distinction.
I claimed that you asserted a nominal distinction between MS & ES (which you acknowledge in the very next sentence). A nominal distinction IS a distinction, but it isn’t a real one. I agreed that if speaking collectively, it is a nominal distinction. But on deeper analysis, it is obviously a real distinction. Venus is a composite being, and the matters on one side of Venus is different from the matter on the other side (just like the carbon that’s in you is really distinct from the carbon that is in me).
Walter, I feel like I’m trying to explain these things to a second-grader. These things are so obvious, you have to try really, REALLY hard to miss them. At this point, I have to conclude that you’re just being obstinate.
...there is no real distinction between potentiality and actuality.
Of course there is, and I’ve demonstrated that with multiple examples. If you’re going to make a claim, don’t hide behind the combox’s size to avoid defending it. Define “real” and show why that definition is different from the classical definition of the term. Please explain why standing isn’t really distinct from sitting, why speaking isn’t really distinct from being silent, and why takeoff isn’t really distinct from landing. Unless you’re advocating an unproved B-theory of time, your position is absurd.
Bill
DeleteI have, from the beginning, said that there is "no need for a real disntinction." That means that I consider the distinction between potential and actual as merely nominal. The MS and the ES are nominal distinctions because they do not refer to any real feature of the planet Venus. That Venus does have real distinct features, like any physical thing, is not relevant, because, as I have explained (and you never reponded), even if Venus did not have real distinct features, we could still speak of the Morning Star and The Evening Star.
And FYI, there is a real difference between speaking and being silent, I have never claimed ther wasn't.
So, if you truly want to continue this discussion, stop strawmanning and address what I actually wrote.
Walter, you write:
DeleteI have, from the beginning, said that there is "no need for a real disntinction." That means that I consider the distinction between potential and actual as merely nominal.
And I have, from the beginning, supplied you with numerous examples of real distinctions between potency and actuality. And your proofs by assertion are still fallacious.
The MS and the ES are nominal distinctions because they do not refer to any real feature of the planet Venus.
What part of “collective” and “particular” confuses you?
That Venus does have real distinct features, like any physical thing, is not relevant, because, as I have explained (and you never reponded), even if Venus did not have real distinct features, we could still speak of the Morning Star and The Evening Star.
If Venus didn’t have “real distinct features,” then what in the world are we looking at, an illusion? And I’ve told you more than once that MS & ES can certainly be a nominal distinction. But since we know that Venus is a planet, and since we know that we are looking a different sides of the same planet, MS & ES isn’t a nominal distinction when considering Venus’ different spatiotemporal orbits. If I see Walter’s left side in the morning and Walter’s right side in the evening, I can legitimately say that “left side” is really distinct from “right side.” This isn’t rocket science, Walter.
And all of that is irrelevant to the main point that there are real distinctions in substances, whether or not Venus is an illusion.
And FYI, there is a real difference between speaking and being silent, I have never claimed ther wasn't.
If there is a real difference between speaking and being silent, then there is a real difference between act and potency, because that’s what I’ve been saying all along! Speaking is the actualizing of the vocal chords’ potency to vibrate. On your terms, then, there is a real difference between the two. This is true of accidental change and substantial change. You seem to be arguing that the vocal chords remain the same whether or not they’re moving (which amounts to making “vibration” and “at rest” nominal distinctions), but since that a clear straw man of our arguments, and since you’re very sensitive to straw men, you certainly can’t be arguing that.
I haven’t “straw-manned” one thing, Walter. The onus is on you when you come to a classical theist site to criticize arguments you don’t understand. I’ve told you more than once that if you want to be taken seriously, you need to first understand what you’re criticizing and state precisely where you think the argument goes astray. If you’ve got a problem with the act/potency real distinction, then lay out your argument. Don’t take potshots and then accuse your critics of not presenting arguments that merit your approval. I ask you again, did you read Aquinas and/or Scholastic Metaphysics? Did you read The Last Superstition. How about Five Proofs? Did you even watch the linked video?? If not, then what in the world are you doing here?
Walter,
DeleteI'm confused.
First you say:
That means that I consider the distinction between potential and actual as merely nominal.
And then you say:
And FYI, there is a real difference between speaking and being silent, I have never claimed ther wasn't.
How can a real difference be nominal.
bmiller
DeleteA real difference can't be merely nominal, speaking and bei!ng silent are really different, but I do not consider one of them potential and the other actual.
My view is that existence is motion. So, motion exists, and we can indeed say that someone is speaking at a certain moment and being silent at another, but that is no a matter of any potential being actualized.
It's much more complex than that, but in my view 'potentiality' is fundamental while actuality is not a real feature of the world. I don't like to call it 'potentiality', though. I prefer 'capacity to change' or even 'motion'.
When I take a highway between two cities, then I really am in all the towns in between, but that is not because my being in, say Cleveland, is actualized, but because my motion happens to bring me in the Cleveland area.
The main difference is, as I have tried in vain to explain to Bill, is that there is no a priori teleology towards an actuality, it is merely because of the motion that we can, a posteriori, distinguish between stages.
Now, it is more complex than that, because obviously, there is some kind of teleology in living creatures.
Walter writes,
DeleteA real difference can't be merely nominal, speaking and bei!ng silent are really different, but I do not consider one of them potential and the other actual.
What you personally consider is irrelevant to Thomism. You have to show why, on Thomist terms, its conclusions do not follow. Merely stating another view is not a rebuttal. Moreover, speaking and silence are different states of actuality. Neither state is a potency as to the state itself. It is the person who is silent, and it is the person who is speaking. Since the person exists, the person is actual (that’s what actual (real) means). If said person is silent, he is in potency to speaking. And if said person is speaking, he is in potency to silence. And said person is in potency to what you’ve called really distinct states because his substance has the potency to realize those states. Potency is thus a real feature of his existence.
My view is that existence is motion. So, motion exists, and we can indeed say that someone is speaking at a certain moment and being silent at another, but that is no a matter of any potential being actualized.
Again, your view is irrelevant unless you show why it’s superior to the Thomist explanation. Existence is actuality with the potency for continued actuality. Every created thing is actual in that it exists (if not, then what is it?) and is simultaneously in potency to continued existence and other states of reality. Existence is actuality, so if you believe that some things exist, then on Thomist terms, some things are actual (not imaginary or illusory).
but in my view 'potentiality' is fundamental while actuality is not a real feature of the world.
Sigh. The word actual, defined, means: existing in act or fact; real; existing now; present; current
So, if actuality is not a real feature of the world, then nothing is real.
I don't like to call it 'potentiality', though. I prefer 'capacity to change' or even 'motion'.
And you’ve been told over and over that’s how we define potentiality as well. The question is WHAT has the capacity to change?
The main difference is, as I have tried in vain to explain to Bill, is that there is no a priori teleology towards an actuality, it is merely because of the motion that we can, a posteriori, distinguish between stages.
But since you don’t believe that actuality is a real feature of the world, then nothing is real. Your view is nonsensical. What are the “stages” that the motion is between? More motion? An acorn’s nature is to become an oak, not a computer or a plastic sandwich bag. While it is really an acorn, it isn’t an oak. In other words, the oak is not actual. It only becomes actual or existing when the potential (“capacity to change”) inherent in the acorn is initiated by other actualities which result in an actually existing oak. You’re again conflating terms and misapplying the sense in which they’re used.
Finally, you still haven’t answered my questions, though you’ve been asked multiple times. Have you read the material I listed or even watched the linked video? If not, then what are you doing here?
Bill
DeleteI offer an Alternative to Thomism, so I don't have to show why the conclusion doesn't follow. I simply don't agree with all the premises.
So.either you show me why my view is wrong or you admit that Thomism is only one of the possibilties alongside others. So far, you have been attacking straw-men and begging the question.
And, not that it is any of your business, I have read plenty on Thomism and I have watched the video.
Just to answer your question. Of course the stages the motion is between is more motion, since motion is all that exists.
DeleteWalter,
DeleteI'm interested in your alternative view.
If you "really" are in all the towns on your way to Cleveland then are you "really" in them at once? Or are you "really" there sequentially in time?
I'm tryng to understand if you are advocating a b-theory of time. If not, then I don't get your distinction between potency/act and 'capacity to change'/being located in a actual location at an actual time. Is your argument merely that we can see what is going on only by observation and not via some innate knowledge? I didn't get that Bill was making that assertion. If I remember correctly, Aristotle came to this distinction a posteriori and so Thomists would too, presumably.
Regardless, wouldn't you agree that we recognize that some things change always or for the most part in the same way under certain circumstances? Isn't that called teleology whether we know it a priori or a posteriori?
bmiller
DeleteNo, I am not advocating a
b-theory. On my way to Cleveland I am in all the other towns sequentially, just like an arrow is at one metre and later at two metres from me. The point is that the arrow doesn't stop there. In fact, it doesn't stop anywhere unless some force acts upon it.
Everything is always in motion.
That some things change in the same way is not teleology. It has to do with restrictions due to different forces. It is a very complex issue.
Walter writes:
DeleteI offer an Alternative to Thomism, so I don't have to show why the conclusion doesn't follow. I simply don't agree with all the premises.
Yes, you do. Simply offering an alternative without an argument means nothing. Moreover, since you know that this is a Thomist site, blathering about your not believing the obvious has zero effect. If the conclusions follow, then harping about your having another theory is meaningless.
So.either you show me why my view is wrong or you admit that Thomism is only one of the possibilties alongside others. So far, you have been attacking straw-men and begging the question.
Actually, you’ve got plenty of straw men in your barn, as evidenced by your trotting some of them out in this thread. I don’t know what your overall epistemology is, so I can only go on what you’ve written here. And so far, it’s a jumbled mass of confusion. Part of the problem is that you run or go silent when pinned down. If you’d bother to address my objections, perhaps progress can be made. You won’t do that because you’ve not been arguing in good faith. If you had a viable alternative, you wouldn’t mind addressing my objections.
And, not that it is any of your business, I have read plenty on Thomism and I have watched the video.
It is certainly my business because you’ve chosen to interact with me. You’ve come here asking for full-blown arguments, so my questions are directly relevant to your request. If you’re clueless what classical theist arguments are, then I might be compelled to provide detailed argumentation (although it would make you look foolish to comment on material you haven’t read). However, if you are adequately informed, then your request for arguments makes no sense.
You claim to have “read plenty on Thomism,” but thus far, you’ve exhibited no retention of what you’ve read. You repeatedly make false claims about what we believe, and you repeatedly show that you lack adequate knowledge of the most elementary aspects of classical theism. Let’s do some basic arithmetic:
Actual, defined, is: existing in act or fact; real; existing now; present; current
Potential, defined, is: possible, as opposed to actual; capable of being or becoming
Thus, “our” terms are not some secret club code-speak that few can understand. They are what everybody who can understand English (or whatever other language equivalents exist) grasp when they’re written or spoken. What exists is actual and what can exist is potential. You, on the other hand, turn language on its head and apply potential to what’s actual while denying that anything is actual (that all reality is movement). But since “reality” is the state or quality of being real, then reality is actuality. Yet, you deny actuality, so then nothing is real. And if this is somehow a straw man, then please by all means try to unravel your contradictions.
Just to answer your question. Of course the stages the motion is between is more motion, since motion is all that exists.
And this is an additional helping of confusion. If the stages the motion is between is motion, then “stages” is just another word for motion. There is thus no stage at all; it’s all just motion. But what then is moving? You cannot have movement without something to move. And if there is a concrete something that moves, then something has a degree of actuality, else your argument reduces to nothing moving, which is absurd.
Bill,
DeleteDefinitions are generally a good starting point.
Too often arguments depend on equivocation or the parties simply have differing definitions for the terms employed.
"Actual, defined, is: existing in act or fact; real; existing now; present; current"
Ok, so actual is real, a beable, a being, a feature of the cosmos with existential realization.
"Potential, defined, is: possible, as opposed to actual; capable of being or becoming"
Ok, so existentially possible, a state of affairs that can actually be the case of real beables in the real cosmos.
Important to distinguish between existentially possible as opposed to logically possible.
A logical possibility is any hypothetical state of affairs that does not violate an axiom of logic.
A logical possibility does not necessarily entail an existential possibility.
One can express a logically possible state of affairs that is impossible to realize in the actual cosmos.
However an existential possibility must entail a logical possibility. If a state of affairs in the cosmos is actually the case and really exists then it must necessarily be logically possible.
It is impossible for an actual existence to be logically impossible. If actuality violates an asserted axiom of logic then the asserted axiom of logic is invalid and was never a true axiom of logic.
*all reality is movement*
(attribution unknown)
I don't know if that statement is rightly attributed to anybody, but I disagree with the plain text of that phrase.
"But since “reality” is the state or quality of being real, then reality is actuality."
That seems tautologically true, which is not a pejorative criticism, just sayin...
"If the stages the motion is between is motion, then “stages” is just another word for motion. There is thus no stage at all; it’s all just motion. But what then is moving?"
Fair question, assuming the premise is fairly stated.
"You cannot have movement without something to move."
Agreed.
You also cannot have existence without something to exist.
Does movement move?
Does existence exist?
No and No.
"...which is absurd."
Agreed.
Movement itself is absurd.
Existence itself is absurd.
Thus,
Pure Act is absurd.
Bill
Delete"Actual, defined, is: existing in act or fact; real; existing now; present; current
Potential, defined, is: possible, as opposed to actual; capable of being or becoming"
Yes, I know that those are the Thomists definitions of actual and potential. But I reject the distinction between them. There are no actual things tyhat can be defined like this. There are, however, things that can be defined as permanent motion. At some moment this motion is 1 metre from me, and at another moment it is 1.5 metres from me, and then we can describe this as "the arrow is at 1.5 metres now", which is in fact inaccurate because we cannot freeze time at an exact moment. But there is no intrinsic difference between the arrow at 1 metre and the arrow at 1.5 metres. It is simply moving and it will go on moving for infinity.
That is what is true about the arrow, and you could describe it as "the arrow is actually moving". That's why the distinction between actual and potential fades away into one system of motion.
So, "stages" is indeed just another word for motion.
As to "you can't have movement without something to move". If existence is motion then of course you can have movement without something to move. Absurd? at first glance it may looik that way, but then there are people who claim that existence exists, but then, I could reply, "you can't have existence without something to exist". I could, but I don't.
Stardusty
Delete"All reality is movement" can be atributed to me. It can also be atributed to Heraclitus and, in a way, even to Socrates. You disagree with it, but you also think, IIRC, that material is energy. Material is not some very tiny block that gets thrown around by forces, material is those forces.
As to your conclusion, I agree that someone who thinks that it is absurd to say that movement does not require something to move should at least understand that some people think it's absurd to say that existence does nor require something to exist.
My idea about it is that both statements can be defended.
Walter,
DeleteOK. So if I understand correctly, you can be said to occupy certain locations at certain times on your way to Cleveland. As I mentioned, that seems indistinguishable from what a Thomist would say. Also the fact that something else is required to change the state of somethings motion is seems equally indistinguishable.
Do you think that Thomists assert that everything or at least somethings that we observe never change? I've never heard that. I've heard it said that a motion can be completed. So for instance if you are making a trip to Cleveland, there is a beginning to the trip, a middle part and the end of the trip when you have reached Cleveland. Of course that doesn't mean you turn to stone upon arriving at Cleveland, it just means that particular motion is over.
That some things change in the same way is not teleology.
That is my understanding of teleology. It's not very complex at all. Do deny that some things change always or for the most part in the same way under certain circumstances?
Walter writes:
DeleteYes, I know that those are the Thomists definitions of actual and potential. But I reject the distinction between them.
Correction: They are not merely how Thomists define those words, as you’ve been told. They are the standard definitions of said terms, as the links to the dictionary demonstrate. You are defining those words discordant with their definitions. If something exists, then it’s actual. If it doesn’t exist, then it isn’t actual.
There are, however, things that can be defined as permanent motion. At some moment this motion is 1 metre from me, and at another moment it is 1.5 metres from me, and then we can describe this as "the arrow is at 1.5 metres now", which is in fact inaccurate because we cannot freeze time at an exact moment.
Are you defining the word things as permanent motion, or are you saying that there are some things that are permanently in motion? The former is unintelligible because motion is movement (or change), but without something moving, there is no motion. The latter affirms what we say since it acknowledges a distinction between the moved and the movement.
You then supply an example of a thing as an arrow. But if the arrow isn’t actual (real), then it cannot be measured. You must presuppose its existence before you can intelligently analyze its distance from you. And an arrow’s being in local motion is really distinct from its substantial existence as an arrow. Its movement away from you doesn’t exist until it is actualized (moved) by something other than the arrow. The fact that whatever moves the arrow is itself moved as to its substantial existence is irrelevant because its movement isn’t in the same respect as the movement in question. Since what is actual is what is real (by definition), your position again reduces to the affirmation that nothing real is moving.
That is what is true about the arrow, and you could describe it as "the arrow is actually moving". That's why the distinction between actual and potential fades away into one system of motion.
And you again betray a fundamental misunderstanding of what you criticize. I gave you a similar example with moving vocal chords. The potency for vocal chords to vibrate is actualized by the air in your lungs. When they vibrate the vibration is in actuality (the chords are actually vibrating), but they are in potency to continued vibration. There is nothing in the “nature” of vocal chords to vibrate on their own. They are thus always in potency to vibration and continued vibration. It’s the same with an arrow. Its movement away from you is actualized by the propulsion of a bow, and its continued movement is temporarily sustained by kinetic energy and gravity. Thus, its local motion is actual, whereas it remains in potency to continued motion. If there is no actuality, then there is no reality. Thus, you have no arrow at all.
If existence is motion then of course you can have movement without something to move. Absurd? at first glance it may looik that way, but then there are people who claim that existence exists, but then, I could reply, "you can't have existence without something to exist". I could, but I don't.
Yes, it remains absurd. Playing tu quoque (which doesn’t work, but we’ll go with it for now) is a transparent attempt at deflection. Movement is synonymous with action, and action presupposes an actor (as motion presupposes a mover or something moved). Your system is gibberish. What is motion? Well, it’s movement? What is movement? Well, it’s motion. What is moving? Well, movement is moving. What is movement? Well, it’s motion. What is moving? Well, motion is moving. This is what your epistemology reduces to.
As to existence existing, existence is the state of existence (a noun), whereas exist is to have actual being (a verb). They are not synonymous. Your system reduces to an arrow’s being synonymous with its local motion, which, as shown, is incoherent.
bmiller
Delete"So if I understand correctly, you can be said to occupy certain locations at certain times on your way to Cleveland. As I mentioned, that seems indistinguishable from what a Thomist would say."
The difference is that my being in those locations isn't a completion. It is simply a slice of time in which I happen to be at a certain location. The same goes for Cleveland. "That particular motion is over" is also the case the moment I am in Delaware on my way to Cleveland. The Thomist claims that motion is the actualization of a potency, that means the motion from Montreal to Delaware in my way to Cleveland is also the actualization of a potential, which means that, depending on the way we can divide distances, there are a very high numebr or even infinitely many potencies in me.
My alternative is much simpler. I am existing, which is the same as I am moving.
And it is true in the case of me flying an aeroplane or taking a train to go to Cleveland, something else is required to change my motion and for complex systems, you can always point to something else because the things around us influence us. But my view that existence is motion is to be understaood at the very basic level. There are no little "chunks" being thrown around by various forces, the chunks are those forces. And the forces of one "chunk" influence the others.
bmiller
Delete(continued)
"Do (you) deny that some things change always or for the most part in the same way under certain circumstances?"
No, I don't deny that. But it is, IMO, not the result of some pre-existing teleology. it has to do with complex systems in which the "parts" influence each other and from certain patterns.
Bill
DeleteMovement is the state of movement (a noun) whereas to move is to have movement (a verb). They are not synonymous.
I am not playing tu quoque. As I explained to SP, I think "existence exists" can be defended, an so can "movement moves" .
"If something exists, then it’s actual. If it doesn’t exist, then it isn’t actual.
The problem is that, according to you and other Thomists, potentials do exist, which means that , according to your own definition here, they are actual. And that, my friend, has been my point all along. Potentialities do not need to be actualized because they are actual and they are the only actual "things".
So, of course the arrow is actual, because it moves. Suppose it did not move, I challenge you to measure it in that case. You can only measure it because it moves.
The local motion of the arrow is simply an analogy to show that, even if there is no real distinction between potentality and actuality, we can still say that the arrow was at 1 metre at one "moment" and at 1.5 metres at another "moment". It is not an example of something moving itself. Macro-objects do not simply move themselves because their motion is complex. Fundamental motion is self-motion, AKA existence. "Unmoving existence" is a contradiction in terminis. There is no such things as "chunks" that do absolutely nothing, because they would be nothing.
And now, unless you really have some argument other than "I find it absurd", I am going to bow out.
If you want to call this running out or going silent because I am pinned down, then so be it. If it makes you happy, then that's fine with me.
Happy New Year.
Walter,
Delete"Material is not some very tiny block that gets thrown around by forces, material is those forces."
Is it?
Is energy the force itself? I don't think so.
One definition of energy is the capacity to do work. But a static force does no work.
"Exist" and "move" are verbs, not nouns.
A verb is descriptive of some thing or some process, and a process is always of a thing not of itself.
I suggest you are conflating the description with the thing itself.
"My idea about it is that both statements can be defended."
I am not aware of a sound defense that the verb is the noun.
Your contention, then, seems to be:
Existence exists.
Motion moves.
Does running run?
Does speech speak?
What would "running itself" even mean?
Can there be speech without a speaker?
What would "pure speech" be?
You lost me here, Walter. I don't see how any of that works.
Motion itself is incoherent.
Existence itself is incoherent.
Ok, consider this, if you will.
Absolutely nothing at all, just supposing, no space, no time, no material, nothing at all in any sense, just philosophical absolutely nothing at all.
To nothing add motion.
What is moving in that case?
Where is this motion moving to and from?
Just pure motion? What does that even mean?
Alternatively, instead of pure motion, what happens to nothing when pure existence is added?
What is existing in that case? Just existence existing? Just a circle of verbs? Descriptions of descriptions that do not describe anything except descriptions? What is doing all this describing? Nothing? A description without a describer? Again, what does that even mean?
Bill,
Delete"The fact that whatever moves the arrow is itself moved as to its substantial existence is irrelevant because its movement isn’t in the same respect as the movement in question."
Irrelevant to your immediate point, perhaps, but highly relevant to the subject of the OP, the Aristotelian argument for a first mover.
If the apparent mover of the arrow was not itself moved equally then there would be a one-way causal regress called for.
Arrow, moved by hand, which was moved by x which was moved by y which was moved by z and so forth ad infinitum, which is impossible, therefore a first mover.
But supposing A and H move each other.
What moved A? H.
What moved H? A.
The linear one-way causal regress is over before it begins, in that case, and no additional movers are called for at all, much less a regress of movers terminating in a first mover.
Oh, but A and H are not moved in the same respect, you say. At base they are, but that is difficult for a human being to observe.
To simplify that realization consider the primary motive force in this case, the sliding filaments in the muscles. There you find molecular forces at work, equal and opposite forces primarily of electrostatic attraction and repulsion.
There is no call for a first mover because at base all causation is mutual and net lossless.
The appearance that change is in a different respect, that change is somehow one-way or linear, is only superficial and due to the limits of human perception.
Walter,
DeleteMy alternative is much simpler. I am existing, which is the same as I am moving.
I'm not following from your example why you think your alternative is simpler unless you mean that you are providing less information by saying that you are simply existing. I suppose that is simpler than saying you have completed a trip to Cleveland, but it doesn't explain your trajectory. It seems to be less an alternative than an under-explanation.
There are no little "chunks" being thrown around by various forces, the chunks are those forces. And the forces of one "chunk" influence the others.
So there there is no matter in your system? Only forces? If so, then what do you mean by forces? In physics, force is defined as the mass of an object multiplied by its acceleration. How is your definition different?
No, I don't deny that. But it is, IMO, not the result of some pre-existing teleology. it has to do with complex systems in which the "parts" influence each other and from certain patterns.
I'm not sure who you think you are disagreeing with. Aristotle contrasted things happening in nature in predictable ways "always or for the most part" with things happening randomly or by chance as do Thomists. So if you recognize patterns in nature, it seems you are recognizing the teleology of Aristotle and the Thomists. What do you think I'm missing?
Oh. And Happy New Year.
Walter writes:
DeleteMovement is the state of movement (a noun) whereas to move is to have movement (a verb). They are not synonymous.
I never said they were. Can’t you keep track of your own argument? Your system reduces to the terms being synonymous. Recall your words:
…the distinction between actual and potential fades away into one system of motion. So, "stages" is indeed just another word for motion. As to "you can't have movement without something to move". If existence is motion then of course you can have movement without something to move.
You acknowledge that this sounds absurd and for good reason—it is absurd. If stage is just another word for motion, and if the motion between stages is motion (of course), then all you have is motion, not the “state of movement” and “movement.” All you have is one continuous motion. And whether or not we have a state of movement or to move, you are forced (if you want to be understood) to tell us what is moving. Indeed, in order to explain yourself, you cited an arrow’s movement. But if “arrow” is synonymous with “motion,” then we still don’t know what is moving. If everything is moving in the same respect, and if that’s reality, and if you further state that it’s essentially synonymous with actuality, then you can equally say that everything is actuality. But regardless the term you use, you are verbally handicapped in properly describing the transition from one state of actuality to another. As you’ve been told, any standard dictionary supplies the terms that anybody can understand. And as you’ve also been told, actualities are in potency to other actualities, but not in the same respect as the actuality in question.
As I explained to SP, I think "existence exists" can be defended, an so can "movement moves" .
Of course they can, but not under your alleged system (you’re still avoiding presenting us an argument, while at the same time demanding that we supply ours). And while I’m at it, your, “I’ve read plenty on Thomism,” doesn’t answer whether you’ve read the books I listed, and at this point I have to assume that you didn’t. So, your “plenty” of reading could just as well be from critics as opposed to true believers. That of course explains why you goof up Thomism almost every time you write about it.
There is a state of existence because something exists, so “existence exists” in the sense that it affirms that something exists. And “movement moves” can be defended if one presupposes something moving. It is incoherent otherwise. Otherwise it’s the state of moving that moves, which tells us nothing.
(continued in next post)
The problem is that, according to you and other Thomists, potentials do exist, which means that , according to your own definition here, they are actual.
DeleteYour ignorance is on display again. Potencies do not have actuality. They are real capacities in actualities for different states of being (again, as you’ve been told repeatedly). An arrow has the real capacity, right now, to be shot from a bow (or thrown). The actuality of shooting does not exist but the capacity does. In order for your criticisms to work, you have to address the arguments your opponents make, not one you wish they made.
So, of course the arrow is actual, because it moves. Suppose it did not move, I challenge you to measure it in that case. You can only measure it because it moves.
I must confess that I have no idea what this is supposed to mean. A stationary arrow is not moving in the sense of its moving away from me. I can therefore walk up to it and stretch out a measuring tape to my heart’s content. In that sense, the arrow isn’t moving at all; I am moving.
even if there is no real distinction between potentality and actuality, we can still say that the arrow was at 1 metre at one "moment" and at 1.5 metres at another "moment".
Well, no. If the arrow didn’t have actuality, then we couldn’t measure it. Actuality is reality (by definition). Hence, if the arrow isn’t real, then there’s nothing to measure. You’re again changing word definitions.
Fundamental motion is self-motion, AKA existence. "Unmoving existence" is a contradiction in terminis. There is no such things as "chunks" that do absolutely nothing, because they would be nothing.
This has been directly addressed. You don’t get to ignore a rebuttal and repeat yourself as if it wasn’t addressed. Of course, “chunks” are in motion, but not in the sense of becoming something else. They are actual in one sense and potential in another sense.
And now, unless you really have some argument other than "I find it absurd", I am going to bow out.
I’ve provided plenty, but you typically ignore them to repeat yourself. You're bowing out due to your bypassing arguments which demonstrate your incoherence. You're bowing out due to your changing the definition of words to fit your philosophy. You are turning language on its head to fit your system. Why one would deny the obvious is anybody's guess.
"Movement is the state of movement (a noun) whereas to move is to have movement (a verb). They are not synonymous."
DeleteNouns don't necessarily exist.
We have arrived at another limitation of using the dictionary to do philosophy. The dictionary can be a source to clarify terms, maybe, or the dictionary definition might be in some sense detrimental.
A noun is a person, place, or thing, I was told many years ago. Consider a mathematical point, which seems like a place, but does not exist.
A triangle does not exist, yet it is listed as a noun.
A dictionary lists the part of speech for that reason, that is where people put the word in a typical sentence. Nouns tend to be placed where nouns typically go in typical sentences. That does not mean that all nouns exist. It just means that people commonly speak of non-existent concepts as if they are existent things.
"Movement" and "Existence" are nouns that do not exist.
Terms like these are all incoherent:
movement itself
pure motion
existence itself
pure existence
pure act
bmiller
DeleteMy alternative is simpler because it doesn't call for an unmoved mover. If motion is existence, there is no need for such a vague concept. Something that doesn'tv move can't move anything else.
Matter and forces are the same. What do you think the little chucks of matter are made from? There is, basically no real difference between movement and matter. Something that doesn't move cannot possibly influence anything else. I am not, BTW, using "forces" in the strict physical sense.
The difference between my "teleology" and yours is that mine is not a priori. There is no real distinction between things happening in nature in predictable ways "always or for the most part" with things happening randomly or by chance.
Stardusty
DeleteI don't think there are static forces. Forces are always dynamic. As I told bmiller, I am not using forces in the strict physical sense.
If there are "chunks that move" then we have to account for both the chunks and the movement of those chunks.
"Pure Movement" is dynamic, while "Pure Existence" or "Pure Act" is static.
Walter,
DeleteWell, I confess I have never encountered quite this set of metaphysical, ontological, physical, or existential claims. A quick search of your assertions turned up references to -Platonic self motion- and a dialectical materialism reference that -Motion is the mode of existence of matter. To be means to be in motion-.
Not that I am asking you to defend what somebody else said, just considering what you are asserting.
I suppose when Einstein asserted matter/energy equivalence and then later gravitation/acceleration equivalence there might have been some skepticism. But, he derived those equivalences mathematically whereas you seem to just be making some general conceptual claims. I have not been able to find any arguments, experiments, or mathematics to support your claims, so I remain skeptical to say the least.
----------
"motion is existence"
"Matter and forces are the same"
"I don't think there are static forces. Forces are always dynamic. I am not using forces in the strict physical sense."
"There is no real distinction between things happening in nature in predictable ways "always or for the most part" with things happening randomly or by chance."
""Pure Movement" is dynamic, while "Pure Existence" or "Pure Act" is static."
----------
It may be that all existent things are moving, it certainly seems that way, I know of no identified exceptions, but that in no way entails that existence=motion, that existence IS motion.
All people consume oxygen. That does not entail that a person IS the consumption of oxygen.
You also say that matter IS forces, that matter and forces are the same. Yet you do not use "forces" in the strict physical sense. Is this some sort of idealism? What is a force if not a physical phenomena?
You say that all forces are dynamic, never static. There is a brick stacked on top a brick. There seem to be equal and opposite static forces between them. Perhaps you are referring to the continual vibrations and disturbances that even the most static seeming objects are in fact undergoing?
There is no distinction between things happening in predictable ways versus randomly or by chance? That seems demonstrably wrong.
No difference between determinism and indeterminism?
D=~D
?
Things happen in nature by in predictable ways due to deterministic mechanisms. On this site they talk about the PSR, that things happen for sufficient reasons, always. That makes sense to me.
Things happening randomly would be the opposite, just poof any old which way by no cause, for no reason, by no mechanism, just alakazam presto changeo discontinuous jump.
That is why the PSR rules out free will.
Free will is impossible on the PSR.
The PSR mandates determinism.
Determinism mandates the absence of free will.
Yet you say regularity and randomness are the same?
Well, apparent randomness is regularity at base, the PSR is sound, randomness is impossible, determinism is required, therefore free will is impossible.
Walter,
DeleteIf motion is existence, there is no need for such a vague concept.
Regardless of whether the Unmoved Mover is a vague concept or not, I'm having a difficult time following your proposal. For instance:
I am not, BTW, using "forces" in the strict physical sense.
OK. Then what sense are you using the term? Can I find it in the dictionary? Or are you proposing something like Luke Skywalker's "The Force"? Does your system contradict science?
The difference between my "teleology" and yours is that mine is not a priori.
Walter, I already mentioned that Thomists do not arrive at teleology "a priori". Where did you get that idea?
There is no real distinction between things happening in nature in predictable ways "always or for the most part" with things happening randomly or by chance.
That is a pretty bold assertion. It seems you are saying that one can both predict how things work and can not predict how things work in the same respect at the same time. If so that is a good example of a a contradiction.
bmiller
DeleteI am using "forces" without specifically referring to physics because my alternative is not scientific, it's philosophical or metaphysical. I don't think it contradicts science in any way, but then I am not a scientist.
If it does contradict science, I'll drop it.
And it is not like the force of Luke Skywalker, because that force is clearly teleological.
As to teleology, ,it's not a matter of arriving a priori or not, it's a matter of the teleology beion g present a priori or posterior to the existence of complex systems. I don't deny that complex systems may develop what looks like teleology. Evolution would be an example. Most eveolutionists do not believe there is any prior teleology that "guides" evolution.
Hence, it is possible to predict how things work at the macro level.
So, I maintain that my alternative is much simpler, not only because it doesn't need an at fits glance contradictory concept like unmoved movers, but because it doesn't require a huge number of potentialities and actualities.
Let's look at an analogy agian. Suppose an arrow starts at A and moves to its target F. In doing so, it passes B, C, D and E on its way.
Now, we can say that at a certain time, the arrow is at B. If there really are such things as potentialities that must be actualized, once the arrow is at B, its potential to be there is actualized. But it still has a separate potentail to go to C etc. So, that means the arriow has at least five potentials and five actualities. Now, we can add lots of stages in between, each of which requires a different potential to be actualized and all those potentials are the result of the "actualizition" of the arrow by the bow.
It gets even worse, because the arrow does not stop until some other force acts upon it. So, it has the "potential" to go on forever. But that means it has an infinite number of potentials, that, somehow, already exist in the action of the bow.
On my alternative, there is only one thing, motion. So, it is not just a bit simpler, it is infinitely simpler.
Stardusty
DeleteAs I told bmiller, I am not proposing a strictly scientific alternative.
I leave room for some indeterminism and hence, for some random processes at least at the micro-level. That doesn't mean that at the macro-level, things are not for the most part predictable by followng the rules.
BTW
DeleteA Happy New Year to all of you.
Walter,
DeleteIf it does contradict science, I'll drop it.
Well since physics is the study of matter and energy and since your scheme claims there is no matter then yes it contradicts the basic assumptions of science. But why would that concern you?
As to teleology, ,it's not a matter of arriving a priori or not, it's a matter of the teleology beion g present a priori or posterior to the existence of complex systems.
I don't understand the way you are using the terms "a priori" and "a posteriori". These were terms used by Aristotle to distinguish ways of knowing things. I can't even guess what you think the terms mean in this statement.
Most eveolutionists do not believe there is any prior teleology that "guides" evolution. Hence, it is possible to predict how things work at the macro level.
How do you think evolutionists can make predictions if evolutionary processes are random. The term random means unpredictable. If some process is predictable it normally means one can look at the intial conditions and narrow down the range of possible outcomes "always or for the most part" which is just how Thomists distinguish between random events and predictable events. If evolutionists think that there is no need for an occasionalist God, then Thomists will happily agree.
There is nothing contradictory about a mover not moving but I'll leave that aside.
Your concern about infinite potentialities is just one of Zeno's paradoxes repackaged but at least Zeno thought arrows existed. One can never walk across a room because he would first have to go half the way, but before he could go half the way he would have to go half of the half, but before that, half the half of the half and so on. Therefore no one can ever go anywhere. No motion at all is infinitely simple than only motion...as long as you aren't concerned about your actual experience of reality. That seems to me to be a major problem with your alternative.
@bmiller, you write:
DeleteI don't understand the way you are using the terms "a priori" and "a posteriori". These were terms used by Aristotle to distinguish ways of knowing things. I can't even guess what you think the terms mean in this statement.
As Walter’s been told, this is a major part of his problem. He doesn’t know what terms mean, and he applies whatever spin he puts on them arbitrarily. He claims that he doesn’t have to show where Thomism goes astray, but he spends a considerable amount of time here trying to convince us that we’re wrong by “offering an alternative” that he never lays out an argument for (while demanding that we produce a full-blown argument, which of course has been done myriad times). It’s clear that he doesn’t understand Thomism, but he wants to criticize it anyway. Just remarkable.
However, as I said, I don’t view him as a troll on par with some others here. Perhaps he is and I’m just not seeing it. Maybe he can be helped, but when he’s finally cornered, he turns tails and runs. Hope springs eternal.
There is nothing contradictory about a mover not moving but I'll leave that aside.
This too has been explained to him previously, but he just disappeared without a response, only to return and repeat himself. Of course, that’s not how rebuttals work.
Finally, although you probably know this, I am not reading posts from certain individuals because they’re obvious trolls. Ed can put up with them all he wants, but I’m having no part of them.
Walter writes:
DeleteI don't deny that complex systems may develop what looks like teleology. Evolution would be an example. Most eveolutionists do not believe there is any prior teleology that "guides" evolution.
Hence, it is possible to predict how things work at the macro level.
This is just more confusion. Walter thinks that teleology is exclusively intelligence directed, so he’s got to deny that because he wants to deny that God’s existence can be proved by the order we observe in the universe. But at this point, all that’s argued (as he should know if he’s “read plenty” of Thomism) is that things (“chunks”) have natures with a limited range of potencies toward other states of being (states of chunkiness), and this is what enables the kinds of predictions he concedes.
But his theory doesn’t get off the ground because “chunks” is synonymous with “motion,” so adding the word “chunk” does nothing to help us understand what he’s arguing. If I equate the word steel with Jello, then I’ll have to say that the dessert is made of Jello and the hammer head is made of Jello. But even that’s too charitable, because the “dessert” is just motion. I’ll thus have to say that the motion is made of motion, and the motion is made of motion. There is no real hammer head, there is no real dessert, and there is no real Jello. It’s all just motion. Walter has in effect said nothing intelligible. He wants to borrow intelligibility from realism while denying its viability.
It gets even worse, because the arrow does not stop until some other force acts upon it. So, it has the "potential" to go on forever. But that means it has an infinite number of potentials, that, somehow, already exist in the action of the bow.
Walter imagines that his previous scenario of a motion passing motion motions (an arrow (chunk) passing multiple points (chunks)), presents us with a problem when we happily acknowledge that actualities remain in potency to other actualities inherent with their nature. That’s not a problem at all.
The alleged problem he raises here has been addressed both in this thread and in others. He’s either forgotten or he’s typically repeating himself without bothering to address the replies. The oak doesn’t “already exist” in the acorn. The acorn has the capacity to become an oak. Water has the capacity to become liquified. Liquidity is not the current state of ice, so there’s no such thing as its “already” existing in the ice. So long as the acorn remains an acorn, there will be no oak. The oak will only appear when the potencies in the acorn are actualized by other actualities.
As bmiller points out, Walter is intentionally or unintentionally raising a kind of Zeno’s Paradox that substances, as Thomists understand them, are actual infinite states of being at present. This again betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the act/potency distinction. In created beings, their natures possess a limited range of potencies (as Ed notes, a ping-pong ball has the potency to bounce but not to digest food). There are thus no infinite states of being in potency in a created substance.
bmiller
DeleteMy 'scheme' does not claim there is no matter. It's just not clear what exactly 'matter' is. There is, at this moment, no scientific consensus on that.
I use a prior for 'from the beginning' or 'fundamentally'. There is in my scheme no teleology at the fundamental level. There may be some teleology further down the path but it is not so that from the very beginning, things are moving towards something. They are moving, that's all.
Zeno's paradox van be solved by not treating potentials as real features of reality. And that's what you are doing here, without realizing it.
And yes. no existence at all is infinitely simple than only existence.
And I have never claimed that arrows don't exist.
Bill,
DeleteI think Walter just wants to defend his atheism and so wants to criticize theism. It looks like he finds Thomism challenging and so an interesting discussion to have.
He is polite and tries to constructively engage with the people he doesn't agree with. He tries to avoid arguing fallaciously. I don't fault him for not being an top expert on Thomism but it seems he has some of the concepts down.
If he has a different system than Thomism then I find that interesting. I think in some cases he is not in disagreement with Thomism but maybe doesn't realize that.
"He claims that he doesn’t have to show where Thomism goes astray, but he spends a considerable amount of time here trying to convince us that we’re wrong by “offering an alternative” that he never lays out an argument for"
DeleteLucky for you that I show you exactly where Thomism goes astray. For example,
1.Aquinas uses a false premise that whatever is in motion now must necessarily be put in motion by another now. Inertial motion makes that premise false.
2.Aquinas uses invalid logic, committing the fallacy of false dichotomy, by neglecting the mutual causation case that is fundamentally circular. Scotus recognized that error and made a failed attempt to fix that error of Aquinas.
3.Aquinas uses invalid logic by the fallacy of non sequitur in the final phrase of the First Way. The attribution to god has no logical connection to the rest of the argument, which Koons calls "the gap problem".
" It’s clear that he doesn’t understand Thomism, but he wants to criticize it anyway. Just remarkable."
Lucky for you as well that I understand Thomism in great detail such that my criticisms are remarkably sound.
"I am not reading posts from certain individuals because they’re obvious trolls."
Ha ha ha. Sounds like a typical snowflake crying "racist" when his nonsense arguments get called out.
The Aristotelian "proof" is unsound.
Aquinas uses invalid logic and false premises.
Dr. Feser fails to defend NECESSITY, merely retreating to compatibility of an idle speculation.
I have stated specifically why in 1, 2, and 3 above which you have no demonstrated capability to rationally address.
@bmiller,
DeleteI agree that he's more congenial, but many of the statements he's made about act/potency require no level of expertise to see how awful they are. By my lights, he's almost completely in the dark about it, which has led to his making some truly bizarre comments.
Walter,
DeleteYou mentioned above that:
Matter and forces are the same.
Modern physics assumes they are different and have diffent properties. So whatever matter is, it is not force. Maybe you have the correct answer and physicists are wrong.
Thanks for clearing up your use of the term "a priori". What do you mean "at the fundamental level"? Does that mean at that level it is unpredictable that things are moving or not? Because if you can predict they are going to be moving, then that is indeed predictable always and for the most part.
There may be some teleology further down the path but it is not so that from the very beginning, things are moving towards something. They are moving, that's all.
I don't understand this concept. To my way of thinking if something has moved, it has moved from location A to location B. From A to B. That's how I can tell it moved. Are you saying at the fundamental level things are moving but not from place to place? How does that work?
Zeno's paradox van be solved by not treating potentials as real features of reality. And that's what you are doing here, without realizing it.
I didn't provide a solution to Zeno's paradox so you must be thinking of something else. But I'm interested in your solution. BTW, it occurred to me that one of the paradoxes was the Arrow Paradox. Wouldn't it be more appropriate to use this one rather the runner paradox?
In the arrow paradox, Zeno states that for motion to occur, an object must change the position which it occupies. He gives an example of an arrow in flight. He states that at any one (durationless) instant of time, the arrow is neither moving to where it is, nor to where it is not.[16] It cannot move to where it is not, because no time elapses for it to move there; it cannot move to where it is, because it is already there. In other words, at every instant of time there is no motion occurring. If everything is motionless at every instant, and time is entirely composed of instants, then motion is impossible.
bmiller
DeleteIt is true that in some cases I am not in disagreement with Thomism. But I do realize that.
I have, e.g.no problem with macrosystems that are predictable. I
Walter writes:
DeleteAnd I have never claimed that arrows don't exist.
I don't think you've claimed that they do exist either, other than to say that motion exists. To exist means to be actual, as opposed to imaginary or potential (having the capacity to exist---look it up in any dictionary). You're just obsessed with avoiding the word actual, even though that’s what that word means.
But it gets worse. Since the “chunk” arrow is simply motion, it's a meaningless term. It's meaningless because every noun (house, tree, dolphin, meteor, etc.) is nothing but “motion.” Instead of, “I'm going to drive the car to the store to buy some groceries,” you're really saying, “motion is motioning the motion to the motion to motion some motions.” It's just senseless drivel. To rescue such absurdity with “chunk” epistemology (that Chunk 1 is “I” and Chunk 2 is a “car,” etc.), one must ask, “What is a chunk?” Of course, the answer is...motion!
So, if Walter is telling the truth that there is real existence to an arrow, and the term “arrow” isn't merely a nominally distinct chunk, then he is affirming the actuality of an arrow—that the label “arrow” represents a material existence really distinct from other material existences. Otherwise, Walter is just playing a shell game with words.
"I didn't provide a solution to Zeno's paradox so you must be thinking of something else. But I'm interested in your solution."
DeleteThere is no paradox, just misunderstandings of infinity, mathematical infinite series, and conflation between a human process and the concept of infinity.
Suppose I go .5m in .5s on the way to my 1m goal in 1s.
No problem, I still have .5s to go the next .5m.
Well, suppose I go another .25m in another .25s.
No problem, I still have .25s to go .25m.
So, it stands to reason, that at any particular division, I will always have just the right amount of time needed to get to my 1m destination in the allotted 1s, no problem, no paradox.
The confusion is a psychological conflation in that one typically tends to think about how long it takes to stop and consider each division, and if we do that infinitely many times it will take infinitely many such time consuming divisions and therefore infinitely many seconds to get to the 1m goal.
That sort of thinking is just fuzzy headed confusion, and has nothing to do with the concept of an infinite series of fractions.
Infinity is a concept, not a number. All those fractions do not exist. There are no objects in the cosmos with existential realization such that all those fractions must somehow be traversed and accounted for, each consuming some amount of time.
Infinity is just an abstraction that requires zero time.
When one considers an infinite number of divisions there is no physical realization of those divisions.
There is simply the motion through space. Any particular motion takes some amount of time, done, no paradox to be solved.
There is no upper bound on the finite number of divisions one can abstractly consider in our 1s journey to go 1m. For any particular number for n in a series of 1/2^n there is always that last fraction of 1/2^n that takes just the right amount of time to complete the journey in the expected 1s. Again, there simply is no paradox to be solved.
The only problem to be solved is the psychological misconceptions about infinity, division processes, time required for a human being to consider each division, and the rather fuzzy thinking that commonly accompanies such division problems.
bmiller
DeleteEver heard of virtual particles? You amy not believe they exist but they are taken serious by lots of scientists. now, what matter are those VPs made from?
I do not claim to know all the answers but I, together with lots of professional philosophers and scientists (and I am neither), wonder what exatly matter is. It is not some very tiny "rock" or something. What it really is, is a mystery to which I offer my two cents by suggesting it may be some sort of force or motion, or a string. In any case, if there is no motion at all, there is no meaningful way in which something exists.
Xhen i say they are not moving towards something, I mean that, at the very basic level, if something is at A, we cannot at that moment say where it is heading. Sure, if we have no reference frame, we can call any "other" place it will be "B", but it's not that A's motion is in any way completed at B.
Now, if only one thing exists, it is indeed impossible to tell it moves from place to place, but if we can tell it exists, it does move or vibrate or whatever.
As to Zeno's paradox, I have stated from the beginning that if time is discrete, there is no motion or change at a particular moment. So maybe there is no such thing as an instant of time and time is simply continuous.
I really don't know.
But, in any case, my infinite potentialities is not just one of Zeno's paradoxes repackaged. If potentials are somehow real feutures of a thing and we can say that those potentials are "completed", then it follows that, since an arrow once moved stays in motion for eternity if no other force is applied to it, it follows that the arrow is given an infinite number of different potetialities by the bow because it has the potentiality to go to A, B, C ....
Walter,
DeleteYes I've heard of virtual particles. I haven't heard anyone claim they were a force or energy.
Are you claiming that nothing can exist unless it is in motion? I ask because this seems more encompassing than the claim that motion is existence.
Now, if only one thing exists, it is indeed impossible to tell it moves from place to place, but if we can tell it exists, it does move or vibrate or whatever.
This sounds contradictory to me. If motion is existence and we can't tell if it is moving, then since you've stated we can't tell if it is moving it follows that we can't tell if it exists.
Regarding the arrow. What do you mean by those potentials are "completed"?
Your handling of infinite potentials reminds me of Zenos paradoxes since he seemed to treat the possiblity of dividing a magnitude in half recursively as creating something infinite from something that is really finite. I can divide a 1 inch length into an infinite number of smaller lengths, but it is still really 1 inch, not an infinite number of real lengths. Just like an actual substance can have a infinite number of potentials but still really be a finite actual substance.
According to classical physics, the bow imparts kinetic engergy to the arrow wrt to the bow. The energy does not change unless something else adds or removes that kinetic energy as you say. If 2 arrows were shot from the same bow at the same time with the same kinetic energy and direction, both arrows would perceive (if they could perceive) the other as being motionless. So they would be in motion wrt to the bow but motionless wrt each other. If something must be in motion to exist, would the arrows cease to exist since they are motionless wrt each other or would they exist since they are in motion wrt the bow?
Walter writes:
DeleteEver heard of virtual particles? You amy not believe they exist but they are taken serious by lots of scientists. now, what matter are those VPs made from?
Actually, they’re not particles at all. They’re ripples or disturbances in the electromagnetic fields of two electrons as they pass each other. A good read is Virtual Particles: What are they?
I do not claim to know all the answers but I, together with lots of professional philosophers and scientists (and I am neither), wonder what exatly matter is.
David Oderberg, who wrote Real Essentialism, wrote an interesting paper analyzing the theory that classical theism’s prime matter is energy (see Is Prime Matter Energy?).
In any case, if there is no motion at all, there is no meaningful way in which something exists.
For created beings, yes. All created beings are being moved to exist moment-to-moment (as you’ve been told repeatedly). But one must exist (be in actuality) in order to move something else. It is thus the principle of actuality that explains motion (or the effect). If it were not actual, it would at best be in potency and would thus have no causal efficacy. Again, since the oak does not exist, it has no causal efficacy to draw water from the soil, provide shade or produce acorns. It must exist before it can produce effects.
if something is at A, we cannot at that moment say where it is heading. Sure, if we have no reference frame, we can call any "other" place it will be "B", but it's not that A's motion is in any way completed at B.
We can most certainly say where it is going if it our intention to move it there. And you’re again conflating terms. A’s potency to arrive at B is most certainly completed when it arrives at B (e.g., when Walter moves from Boston (A) to Denver (B). Walter’s motion as to other things is not completed because those series or chains are not contemplated or referenced. My potency to walk in the park with my wife is actualized when my wife and I go to the park and walk together, but my “motion” as to looking at the trees or waiving at somebody I know isn’t terminated merely by my walking with my wife. One type of completed motion doesn’t necessarily terminate other types of motion (as you’ve been repeatedly told).
Now, if only one thing exists, it is indeed impossible to tell it moves from place to place, but if we can tell it exists, it does move or vibrate or whatever.
This is again incoherent. What is a “thing”? Well, if you’re consistent, a thing is a chunk, which is motion. It’s only a nominally distinct label for motion. If not, then there is a “thing” that actually exists (has actuality) that is really distinct from the fact that it moves.
Mathematical infinities do not imbue matter with infinite states of existence. The mathematician’s infinity is an abstract construct. If A is 10 feet from B, I can move from A to B in a moment because I’m under no obligation to proceed at an abstract pace (half, then half, then half). This confuses potential infinites with actual infinites (not to be further confused with the metaphysical act/potency construct). And the obvious scientific proof of that is our myriad movements to points of destination. When Walter says that we cannot move from A to B because an actual infinite cannot be crossed and we move from A to B in moments, the hypothesis is disproved.
Apologies, I forgot to provide links to what I referenced:
DeleteVirtual Particles: What are they?
and...
Is Prime Matter Energy?
Turning on the way-back machine:
Delete"If something exists, then it’s actual. If it doesn’t exist, then it isn’t actual.
"The problem is that, according to you and other Thomists, potentials do exist, which means that , according to your own definition here, they are actual. And that, my friend, has been my point all along. Potentialities do not need to be actualized because they are actual and they are the only actual "things"."
Yes, the assertion that potentialities exist leads to self contradiction.
Exist=Actual
Potential=Exist
therefore
Potential=Actual
Thus, there is no distinction between potential and actual, potentials are actuals, in that case.
Potentials are not what could exist because that already exist, but if they already exist then then they can't later exist even more.
So, on existent potentials there is no such thing as actualization of a potential because potentials are already actual.
As usual, A-T is a confused mess.
But, oh happy day, I can fix this for you real easy.
Potentials do not exist.
Potentials are abstractions.
Potentials are imagined future states.
bmiller
Delete"Yes I've heard of virtual particles. I haven't heard anyone claim they were a force or energy."
Well, I don't know what VPs are made from. Some say they are disturbances. But what is a disturbance if not a movement. In any case, they are not lottle "chunks".
Are you claiming that nothing can exist unless it is in motion? I ask because this seems more encompassing than the claim that motion is existence."
Yes, that is also what I am claiming. And indeed, if we can't tell whether something is moving we cannot tell it exists. If the only possible information about the arrow is that it is moving from A to B (or whatever), then we cannot tell it exists. In order for us to tell something exists, it has to "do" something.
A "stationary" arrow can be said to exist because it absorbes and reflects photons etc.
Zeno's paradox is about subdividing a finite thing into infinitely many parts. If those parts are somehow real, that is a genuine problem of an infinity of real things.
I don't treat potentialities are real features of a thing, so that's not a problem for my scheme. But Thomists do treat those potentials as real features of a thing, and that's why things can have a real infinite number of potentialities if Thomism is true.
A potential is completed when it becomes an actuality. So, when the arrow is at 1 metre from me, its potential to move 1 metre is completed or actualized, but it still has a potential to go to 2 metres etc. That cannot be the same potential because that is completed. Now the arrow can go on for infinity, so it has to have an infinite number of different potentialities.
DeleteWalter,
But what is a disturbance if not a movement.
A disturbance is generally considered a disturbance of a thing. If there is no thing the can be no disturbance of it.
If the only possible information about the arrow is that it is moving from A to B (or whatever), then we cannot tell it exists. In order for us to tell something exists, it has to "do" something.
How can there be any information about anything that doesn't exist? Especially its velocity. And isn't moving from A to B "doing" something?
I don't treat potentialities are real features of a thing, so that's not a problem for my scheme. But Thomists do treat those potentials as real features of a thing, and that's why things can have a real infinite number of potentialities if Thomism is true.
Zeno is correct that a continuous thing can potentially be subdivided recursively an infinite number of times. It really can be. But that is not a problem, because although the potentiality of doing that exists, it does not actually exist. The line is actually 1 inch in length. It is the nature of a continuum to be potentially infinitely divisible although it is an actual length with a finite magnitude. Perhaps confounding the term real with only with what is actual is causing the problem. A real possibility doesn't mean the same thing as an actual existing state.
A potential is completed when it becomes an actuality....
Thanks for the explanation. Seems it captures the idea but in different terms.
Looking forward to the other answers.
Walter,
Delete"Now the arrow can go on for infinity,"
Can it?
Supposing the arrow travels at 1m/s, and supposing it never runs out of space to travel in and that it never gets stopped and it never ceases to exist.
The arrow just keeps going and going without end.
Will the arrow ever get to infinity of time or distance?
No. No real process can achieve infinity.
Infinity is not a number one can count up to, or something that eventually happens if a process continues without end.
At any particular time the arrow will always have traveled some finite distance and will always have been traveling some finite time.
An actual infinite is incoherent.
Infinity is just concept, an abstraction, that might be crudely described as instantly boundlessly everything.
Infinity requires zero time to achieve.
That's why there were no paradoxes posited by Zeno, only malformed questions based on false concepts of infinity and the relationship between humanly made or considered divisions versus the concept of infinite divisions.
Walter writes:
DeleteYes, that is also what I am claiming [that nothing can exist unless it is in motion].
And what is your argument for this? You follow that up with:
And indeed, if we can’t tell whether something is moving we cannot tell it exists.
But the fact that you cannot perceive something does not mean that it doesn’t exist. Yet, your claim is stronger than agnosticism over what you cannot perceive. You state categorically that nothing can exist unless it is in motion. I think you need to defend that statement.
I don't treat potentialities are real features of a thing, so that's not a problem for my scheme.
Then what is the oak to the acorn? If the acorn doesn’t have the potential to become an oak, how does it become an oak?
But Thomists do treat those potentials as real features of a thing…
If the potency to become an oak isn’t a real feature of an acorn, then an acorn could never become an oak. What is the conceptual roadblock in your mind from understanding this, despite being told numerous times? Becoming a watermelon isn’t a real feature of a ping-pong ball. There is nothing in the nature of a ping-pong ball that will allow it to become a watermelon, but it is a real feature of the stationary ping-pong ball to bounce. You continue to treat potency as an actuality when it has no actuality at all. It is the actual thing that has the capacity toward a different state of existence. Capacity is synonymous with potency.
…and that’s why things can have a real infinite number of potentialities if Thomism is true.
You cannot legitimately state that without addressing the objections. If proof by assertion is true, then Thomism is true because it’s been asserted. All created things are limited by their natures as to the states of being they can realize. And even if you can legitimately conflate the abstract with the real, or if division and distance are potentially actual states for substances, there is a difference between a potential infinite and an actual one. The former never achieves the latter by definition, but you are leaping to the latter in describing the former. Thus, you’re conflating terms again.
bmiller
Delete"If there is no thing there can be no disturbance of it."
That brings us back to square one: what is a thing? The answer is not straight-forward.
"How can there be any information about anything that doesn't exist? Especially its velocity. And isn't moving from A to B "doing" something?"
The point is that thre can't be any information about something that doesn't exist. There cannot be just the information that it goes from A to B. This was just some thought- experiment for something that cannot possibly be the case.
"But that is not a problem, because although the potentiality of doing that exists, it does not actually exist."
But a potential does actually exist. It isn't an actuality but it actually exists. It is, to borrow your definitions, a thing and it follows that there are an infinite number of separate things in the arrow.
To use the dictionary definition, which I am told I am abusing, "Actual, defined, is: existing in act or fact; real; existing now; present; current" The potential is real, existing now, present, current. It is not in act because of the very peculiar way Thomists define in act as completed.
What you say comes down to potentailities are only potentially present in a thing, but in that case , they are not real features of a thing.
You conflate a possibility with a potentiality. Possibilities are abstractions, potententialities as defined by Thomism, are not.
If a potentiality is completed when it's actualized, we have an infinite number of incomplete real properties of a thing.
If we treat potentailities and actualities as abstractions, we do not encounter this problem.
Now, maybe you don't think an actual infinity is problematic?
Stardusty
DeleteByb "The arrow can go on for infinity" I do not mean that it will ever reach infinity, but if, potentialities are real, it has a real infinite number of potentialities, which, if infinity is an abstraction, is impossible.
Bill,
DeleteThanks so much for the 2 articles you linked. I hadn't seen them before and they were well written.
Walter,
DeleteIs there a generally recognized name for this view, that existence IS motion? Not that a label makes it right or wrong, just wondering if further arguments are out there under some searchable term.
"Yes, that is also what I am claiming [that nothing can exist unless it is in motion]."
All existent things DO move, as far as anybody has observed, but that is entirely different than saying existence IS motion.
Or perhaps your are stating that motion is necessary but not sufficient for existence? In that view motion would be a co-joined necessity of existent material.
Do you then rule out a real absolute zero temperature, even in principle? By your view, then, even in principle, one could only asymptotically approach absolute zero temperature from above?
Bill,
"Then what is the oak to the acorn?"
Nothing. For an acorn there is no oak, there is only the acorn.
"If the acorn doesn’t have the potential to become an oak, how does it become an oak?"
Chemical reactions, which are physics interactions in the aggregate.
"If the potency to become an oak isn’t a real feature of an acorn, then an acorn could never become an oak."
Sure it can, all it has to do is interact in the present moment with adjacent materials.
It turns out that some interactions do occur and other interactions do no occur.
There is no necessity for aggregate descriptions of whole collections of interactions through time to somehow be stored in the acorn.
The only thing in the acorn is its present structure at the fundamental level. That's all the acorn ever possesses and that is all that is necessary for us to observe its eventual change into animal food or a tree.
"What is the conceptual roadblock in your mind from understanding this,"
The fact that the assertion of real existent tree potentials in the acorn is false.
I, and apparently Walter, have a mental block against accepting your falsehoods.
"but it is a real feature of the stationary ping-pong ball to bounce."
You are just imagining that. A stationary ball just sits there, it is not attempting to bounce in any sense.
It's all in your head.
Just your imagination, runnin away with you...
"All created things are limited by their natures as to the states of being they can realize."
DeleteWhich are infinite, for example shape.
How many potential shapes does a chunk of putty have, on the notion of real existent potentials assigned to macro objects?
Infinitely many, on the notion that movement is not quantized, rather, continuous through continuous space, which is also not quantized.
If motion through space is continuous (not quantized)
and if macro objects posses within themselves real existent potentials for future states of being
then a chunk of putty possesses real infinitely many potential states of being different potential shapes.
"And even if you can legitimately conflate the abstract with the real, or if division and distance are potentially actual states for substances, there is a difference between a potential infinite and an actual one."
Now you are contradicting yourself, Bill.
If the potential states are only potentially infinite and not actually infinite then they are not existent.
Shape A, B, C...etc are said to really exist as potentials in the chunk of putty.
So, infinitely many of those potential states really exist in the chunk of putty.
Thus you say an infinity of real existent potential states exist in the chunk of putty.
"Thus, you’re conflating terms again."
That would be you, Bill.
You keep talking about real existent potentials.
Existent potential is an incoherent term.
"Existent" and "Potential" are mutually exclusive. We say a thing is potential precisely because it is not actual, it does not exist, we only imagine that it could exist in the future.
Yet, you think it is somehow a mental block to not consider all those potentials as somehow being real existent features of the object.
Bill, you suffer from a chronic case of the reification fallacy. Take two atheist materialist pills and call me in the morning, you will feel much better, I am sure that potential exists in you...
Walter,
DeleteThat brings us back to square one: what is a thing?
It's not really square one for physicists. For them velocity is the change of location of an object from one location to another and a disturbance is a disturbance of something. It doesn't mean they are right and you are wrong, only that you have a different conception than physicists.
This was just some thought- experiment for something that cannot possibly be the case.
OK. I agree that it didn't make any sense.
Regarding the discussion of potentiality, possibility, real and actual. I agree that the statement of mine you quoted could be confusing.
Let me see where we agree and where we disagree.
If it is possible for "x" to happen but is impossible for "y" to happen, then is it "really" possibile for "x" to happen and "really" impossible for "y" to happen? If "x" is not "really" possible then isn't that saying that it is "really" impossible just like "y"?
I would say that it is possible for a normal man to learn to speak French (and remain a man) but impossible for a dog to learn to speak French (and remain a dog). Another way of saying this is that a man has a potential to learn French while a dog has no such potential. So a potential is just a special, more limited, case of a possibility. But if nothing is "really" possible it must mean that everything is "really" impossible and neither man nor beast "really" can learn French.
@bmiller,
DeleteYou're welcome. They are good reads. Lots of good information out there if one digs for it.
As good a writer as Ed is, there are some things I couldn't grasp without reading other sources. It partially exemplifies what Paul referred to as one planting, another watering, but God giving the increase.
Walter writes:
DeleteThat brings us back to square one: what is a thing? The answer is not straight-forward.
But to you it is straightforward. “Thing” is simply a label for “motion.” Everything that exists is simply motion. And that of course leaves your ontology bereft of anything coherent. There is no cogent accounting of change and permanence.
A “thing” is an essence/existence composite. In other words, it is a substance. Something must account for change, and something must account for permanence. Calling everything “motion” fails to do this.
The point is that thre can't be any information about something that doesn't exist. There cannot be just the information that it goes from A to B.
But the information you refer to is its motion. And if there cannot be any information about something that doesn’t exist, then there cannot be motion without something moving. You are saying the same thing as we and imagining you’re saying something different. Otherwise, the quoted sentence would read, “The motion is that there can’t be any motion about motion that doesn’t motion.” There is thus a real distinction between movement and what moves.
But a potential does actually exist. It isn't an actuality but it actually exists. It is, to borrow your definitions, a thing and it follows that there are an infinite number of separate things in the arrow.
They who do not like straw men should not be in the habit of constructing them. You are using a definition of actual discordant with our description of change. With respect to change, as in an acorn to an oak, actuality is a perfection—a reduction of potency to act. A capacity to be is not to be. A potency is a degree of reality (actual in the sense that it is a real feature of being) that is not a perfection.
To use the dictionary definition, which I am told I am abusing, "Actual, defined, is: existing in act or fact; real; existing now; present; current" The potential is real, existing now, present, current.
Amazing! You quote the definition of actual and deliberately ignore the definition of potential. Here it is again: “possible, as opposed to actual; capable of being or becoming.” You are deliberately “abusing” word definitions to deny the obvious. A potency is a real feature of being in that a being’s essence dictates the range of possible states of existence for said being.
Any created being’s potential is limited by its essence. There is thus a limited (necessarily finite) range of possibilities for any such being. Your insistence that addition and division pose a problem for us because they imbue a substance with infinite real potentialities is illegitimate, as shown above. And even if they did, that does not affect the act/potency distinction whatsoever (as Ed argues in the video).
It is not in act because of the very peculiar way Thomists define in act as completed.
To call this “peculiar” is inane. To perfect is to complete, and raising a capacity to actuality (perfection, completion) is the fundamental scientific principle of cause and effect. What is truly peculiar is your distaste for the obvious.
What you say comes down to potentailities are only potentially present in a thing, but in that case , they are not real features of a thing.
When your opponents keep telling you that you are misstating their views, you should state their views correctly, whether you are conversing with bmiller or myself. Potency is a real feature of being; the perfection the potency points to is not. The real feature is “can change.” Is that infinite? Again, that is impossible. Composite being is qualified by essence, which is by definition finite. Your “infinite real properties” is both demonstrably false and irrelevant.
bmiller
DeleteBut what exactly is an object or what is the "something" that is disturbed? There is no straight-forward answer to this. So, my two cents is that an object (in this case a fundamental particle) is a kind of movement or disturbance. Maybe a diturbance of the fabric of reality or something like that? At this stage there is no straight answer.
"If it is possible for "x" to happen but is impossible for "y" to happen, then is it "really" possible for "x" to happen and "really" impossible for "y" to happen? If "x" is not "really" possible then isn't that saying that it is "really" impossible just like "y"?"
Sure, (physical) reality has its limits. But, again, this is not straight-forward either.
After the Big Bang, it was really possible for the initial conditions of the universe to become a star, a planet, a person, a dog, etc.
Now, is it possible for a dog to evolve into an animal that is capable of learning French? It is highly unlikely, but I am not sure it is impossible. Would it still have the essence of a dog? (I don't really believe in essences, but let's agree on them for the sake of the argument). That would depend on what the essence of a dog is. Is it essential that a dog is furry? I don't think so. Is it essential that it barks? That it has a very advanced sense of smell? It is not easy to define an essence without begging the question.
So, to answer your question. Lots of things are really possible because reality is basically mutable.
I have never claimed that the capability to change does not exist. On the contrary,, it is a basic feature of reality. What doesn't exist, IMO, is a true completion of that capacity.
Walter,
Delete"So, my two cents is that an object (in this case a fundamental particle) is a kind of movement or disturbance. Maybe a diturbance of the fabric of reality or something like that? At this stage there is no straight answer."
That sounds a bit like the notion of a particle as a wave packet of a field.
In your statement change "fabric of reality" to "field", and change "disturbance" to "oscillation".
So, may I suggest that you would express your position more understandably if you noted that a thing is not motion itself, rather, a disturbance of the fabric of reality.
"Disturbance" and "fabric of reality" sound rather vague, but then, nobody knows what really IS at the bottom, ontologically, so one placeholder term is about as good as any other placeholder term.
Loved this Discussion!
ReplyDeleteKid seems a bit long-winded. Nice conversation though.
ReplyDeleteInertial motion eliminates the argument for a necessary first mover.
ReplyDeleteYou can say that inertial motion is compatible with a first mover, but so are an unbounded number of other idle speculations. It's plank scale fairies, dontchyaknow?
The First Way suffers from false dichotomy, begging the question, and a number of false premises.
Aristotle made the error that whatever we see in motion is being put in motion in the present moment, which is evidently not the case with inertial motion. Aquinas repeated that error.
The fundamental framework of causation used by Aristotle is also wrong. Causation is not linear, hierarchical, or one-way.
All real causation is mutual, multilateral, and thus fundamentally circular. There is no call for a first mover because a realistic causal regress analysis terminates in mutual causation.
Aquinas wasn’t aware of inertia, but he was aware of the heavenly bodies which he believed continued indefinitely in a perfect circle. They were also incorruptible. So if the First Way is not threatened by heavenly bodies, then a fortiori it is not threatened by inertia.
DeleteI don’t think all causation is mutual. When a bound electron is energized by a photon, is that mutual causation. It seems asymmetric to me. It’s not as if the electron in the chlorophyll in the plant is pushing back against the Sun that emitted the photon.
Anonymous
DeleteIf Aquinas really believed that heavenly bodies continued indefinitely in a perfect circle, then he contradicted his own argument from motion.
As to mutual causation, I don't know if there are countrexamples, but your example isn't one. The electron does 'push back' against the photon.
Why does something in motion stay in motion, Dusty? That it does doesn't explain WHY it does.
DeleteYou been told a million times now why circular causation is incoherent. A can't cause B to exist if A doesn't exist, and B can't cause A to exist if B doesn't exist. Thus, A must already exist in order to cause B, and thus there is no reason for B to cause A to exist, because it already does.
Walter writes,
DeleteIf Aquinas really believed that heavenly bodies continued indefinitely in a perfect circle, then he contradicted his own argument from motion.
You say that because you don’t understand his argument from motion. Perdurance arises from the nature of a thing, but since a thing’s nature or essence must have its existence supplied (given that essence is distinct from existence), it remains in motion (perdures) via the Prime Mover, even if it is “eternal” (its necessity being suppositional rather than absolute). Existence in creatures is itself a movement since a thing’s essence is not the ground for its own existence.
I believe you have stated that you deny the essence/existence distinction, but that’s irrelevant to the claim that Aquinas contradicted himself here. He did not.
And I keep replying to you because even though you misunderstand a lot of Aquinas’ metaphysics, you’re not a troll like others who pollute this site (I do not reply to them at all, for it’s a total waste of time).
Dusty : "I'M RIGHT BECAUSE I'M RIGHT! AND AQUINAS IS WRONG! SCIENCE SHOWS IT! REEEEEEEEEEEE!"
Delete*never proceeds to give an argument to justify his madness*
Walter,
DeleteHow does an electron “push” back against a photon? The photon ceases to exist after being absorbed by the electron.
And Aquinas does not contradict his own argument because he is making a metaphysical argument, not a physical argument. You have to read it in light of De Ente et Essentia.
"How does an electron “push” back against a photon? The photon ceases to exist after being absorbed by the electron." You answer your own question.
Delete"Why does something in motion stay in motion, Dusty?"
DeleteBecause a change in motion would be a change calling for a changer. Continued motion is no change in the state of motion so no changer is called for.
Aristotle realized that in his book IV of Physics, that absent an impeding medium motion would continue ad-infinitum.
All motion is in space. You are in space. Space, for motion, is a non-impeding medium.
"A can't cause B to exist if A doesn't exist"
A cannot cause B to exist at all. Materials do not cause each other to exist.
All material in the cosmos already exists.
No new material ever comes into existence.
No material ever passes out of existence.
The amount of material in existence in the cosmos is precisely static.
No first sustainer is called for to account for existential inertia because the transition from existing to non-existing would be a change calling for a changer.
To go from existing to existing is no change so no changer is called for to account for continued existence.
Feser has the situation back to front.
Stardust,
DeleteBut the existence of a certain finite amount of matter is unintelligible. Ultimately that is going to lead to a denial of the PSR. One will have to say, “the matter just exists”.
Do you think the whole universe could be a single eternally existing red sphere?
"{But the existence of a certain finite amount of matter is unintelligible."
DeleteOn the contrary, conservation of material is what makes formulations in physics and chemistry intelligible.
Consider what is perhaps the most well known equation:
E=mc^2
Note, there is no poof term. No new material begins to exist. No existent material ceases to exist.
The LHS equals the RHS.
Precisely, not approximately.
There is exactly the same amount of material on both sides of the equation.
That is why it is called an "equation".
An "equation" is an expression of equality.
It is the fixity of the amount of material in the cosmos that makes our equations of physics and chemistry intelligible.
"One will have to say, “the matter just exists”."
Then the assertion of god is a denial of the PSR, since god is said to just exist, that is, to simply be necessary, a brute fact, not explained in its existence by any reason outside of itself.
The origin of existence remains an unsolved riddle. All attempts lead back to an assertion of a primordial brute fact of some sort.
"Do you think the whole universe could be a single eternally existing red sphere?"
I suppose you mean that somewhat metaphorically.
To explain the origin of existence we seem to have a choice between 2 irrational assertions, hence the fact that a solution to the problem has not been put into general circulation.
1.Creation from nothing.
2.A necessary being with an infinite past.
All attempts to justify either choice always lead to gibberish assertions.
But the Aristotelian argument does not attempt to answer that question, rather, the first lines of the First Way tell us the basic facts, that we observe motion here and now.
"I don’t think all causation is mutual."
DeleteAll causation is described at base by force equations.
Most of the forces of causation in our ordinary lives are due to the electrostatic force, the forces associated with positive and negative charges.
Gravitational force and magnetic force also account for noticeable effects.
The nuclear forces are always in effect but they are typically in balance within the nucleus of each atom so seem net neutral at our level of ordinary perception.
All the forces of nature act mutually. That was one of the key points Russell made in On the Notion of Cause. He used the example of gravitation, wherein the distinction between mover and moved, self moving versus moving the other, is arbitrary and therefore meaningless.
It is nonsense to speak of cause and effect such that somehow mass A caused mass B to move gravitationally, there is only the mutual attraction.
A classic Thomistic example is the rock, stick, hand example, perhaps inspired by the First Way staff hand example. That is supposedly an example that cannot go to infinity in a causal regress analysis, therefore a first mover is supposedly necessary.
Typically the analysis goes
Rock
Stick
Hand
Infinity, not possible, therefore god
The premature termination of that analysis is rather childish at best.
Rock
Stick
Hand
Tendon
Muscle
Sliding filaments
Mutual electrostatic forces
There is no call to regress to infinity because the regression analysis terminates finitely in mutual electrostatic forces in the muscles that are at the causal base of the sliding filaments.
In Thomistic linear one-way folk causality
G is moved by E
E is moved by D
D is moved by C
But this cannot go to infinity, therefore god.
In real causality
D and C move each other mutually
Done.
If you ask what moved D you could say C.
If you then ask what moved C you can just as well say D.
D moved C just as much as C moved D.
They moved each other mutually.
That terminates the causal regress finitely.
No god necessary.
SP,
DeleteAll that you have done is split one cause into two parts using labels. Since "D and C" is one cause then we can substitute B for "D and C".
G is moved by E
E is moved by B
But this cannot go to infinity
In Thomistic terms, something actual must cause B to go from 'potentially moving E' to 'actually moving E'.
Mutual causation all the way down, even if it's circular in nature, cannot satisfy the argument because mutual causation is simply another link in the chain.
"It is nonsense to speak of cause and effect such that somehow mass A caused mass B to move gravitationally, there is only the mutual attraction"
DeleteWhat you are saying is the universe(s) moves and changes by itself through mutual causation. it's one giant perpetual motion machine and each of us are one of the cogs.
You sure have a strong belief going on there. TO me this resmbles blind religious faith because science doesn't lead to this conclusion at all. I don't think there's a coherent philosophical argument that can be made to support your view of reality. Do you know of one?
SP is saying the Aristotelian proof results in an always-moving mover that never began to exist, is eternal, has no potential to change or be changed from it's always-moving materialistic nature and because it has no potential to change, is pure act.
DeleteWell, no, that cannot be the conclusion since Aristotelian metaphysics is part of the proof as the foundation. You will need to develop a different metaphysic that will allow SP's conclusion and so far we haven't seen SP do that. All we've seen is SP make several claims without offering up a proof of his own. Has any philosopher done this?
"What you are saying is the universe(s) moves and changes by itself through mutual causation. it's one giant perpetual motion machine and each of us are one of the cogs."
DeleteCorrect.
"science doesn't lead to this conclusion at all."
How so? Could you be specific? You don't name any aspects of science to support your claim.
" Do you know of one?"
Yes, and I offer it in some detail, repeatedly, by the lights of some here, ad nauseum.
But, that's ok if you have not read those posts, there is nothing obligating you to read what I write.
Briefly, science supports just what I have described.
If we are in a perpetual motion system of mutual causation then we would expect material to never be created or destroyed, and for all material interactions to be mutual, and for all material interactions to be net lossless, and for there to be in existence such materials, and for there to be processes of interaction occurring through time.
That is just what science tells us, is it not?
Science supports every one of those conditions.
1.material to never be created or destroyed
Science tells us E=mc^2, precisely, no poof in or out on the LHS or the RHS.
All established science demonstrates that new materials are never observed to come into existence out of nothing, and existing materials never disappear from existence into nothing.
2.all material interactions to be mutual
The force equations of physics are all formulated as mutual interactions wherein the designation of mover versus moved, or self moved versus moved by the other, is arbitrary and therefore meaningless and false.
Materials always move each other.
For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.
Those principles of mutuality are described in great detail in the formulations of physics.
All causation is mutual at base, as all physics formulations show at base.
3.all material interactions to be net lossless
Motion through space is lossless.
All motion is in space.
You are in space.
All material interactions obey the conservation of material, that is, conservation of matter/energy.
The whole of science confirms these scientific facts with mountains of evidence available to you in myriad publications.
4.there to be in existence such materials, and for there to be processes of interaction occurring through time
That is what we observe again and again. Aquinas begins the First Way with this very observation as a bedrock basis for further argument.
Thus, my view as you so correctly summarized it is supported by the whole of science and is available to you to learn in countless publications.
Do you have any specific counterexamples?
"G is moved by E
DeleteE is moved by B
But this cannot go to infinity"
Right, because B is the terminus.
B is the necessary being.
The necessary being is all around you.
Everything you observe is the necessary being.
Why are you searching for an invisible necessary being? The necessity is all around you.
"In Thomistic terms, something actual must cause B to go from 'potentially moving E' to 'actually moving E'."
That exposes the defectiveness of Thomistic terminology.
But you have a fair point in that the formulation of my example is simplified and unrealistic in its linear one-way causal regress aspect.
A linear one-way causal regress is an illusion, just an apparent regress, an abstraction, a human approximation.
I employed that unrealistic notion as a lead in to the realism of mutual causation. I admit that might be a sort of heuristic, an analogy that is imperfect.
In reality it is not mutuality all the way down, rather, mutuality everywhere all the time.
In simpler terms, everything just keeps bouncing off of everything else.
There is no linear hierarchical one-way causal series at all, ever.
I really appreciate your thoughtful reply.
Stardust,
DeleteGod would not be a brute fact because His essence is identical to His existence. Contingent particles (with contingent attributes belonging to the ten categories) do not have an essence identical to their existence. That is why there is a certain number of them and not one. Even if you take the Parmenidean monist view, the whole universe itself has accidents in need of explanation, unlike God who has no accidents.
What are your thoughts on paragraphs 76 to 81 of De Ente et Essentia?
https://isidore.co/aquinas/DeEnte&Essentia.htm
"Do you have any specific counterexamples?"
DeleteSeveral have been given already that you have ignored. The ladder is holding you up. You are not holding the ladder down. The stick moves the rock. The rock is not moving the stick. There are mutual causes involved in each of these examples, equal and opposite forces, but the above statements are the facts. This is all the disproof you need. A directional hierarchy exists. F=mA proves a directional hierarchy. Heat transfer proves a directional hierarchy.
Continue believing in your fantasy if that makes you happy. Realists want no part of your nonsense.
"Everything you observe is the necessary being"
DeleteWTF are you talking about? you didn't exist then one day you did exist. Your not a necessary being. Get help. Get some therapy.
Anon,
Delete"WTF are you talking about?"
Material is the necessary being.
Everything you observe is material.
Therefore everything you observe is the necessary being.
"you didn't exist then one day you did exist."
The material presently arranged as what I call me existed before that arrangement was a state of affairs in the cosmos and will continue to exist after that arrangement is no longer a state of affairs in the cosmos.
"Your not a necessary being"
We are all necessary beings.
There is no need for a god to explain the cosmos because everything in the cosmos could not fail to be as it is.
"Get help. Get some therapy."
Your concern for my well being is touching indeed. It is good to feel so loved. Is it the spirit of the season that is driving you toward such magnanimity, or are you always a person of such heartfelt generosity of spirit?
Anon,
Delete"God would not be a brute fact because His essence is identical to His existence."
Incoherent.
"Even if you take the Parmenidean monist view, the whole universe itself has accidents in need of explanation,"
The material cosmos is necessary.
All motions of all material are necessary.
No god is needed to explain such a cosmos.
"What are your thoughts on paragraphs 76 to 81 of De Ente et Essentia?"
"Pure act" is incoherent nonsense.
Actuality is of a thing.
"Existence itself" is an incoherent combination of disjoint words. Existence is of a thing. Things exist. Existence does not of itself exist.
"forms alone without matter"
More incoherent combinations of words.
Matter and form are always coincident.
Matter without form is incoherent.
Form without matter is incoherent.
Anon,
Delete"The ladder is holding you up."
No.
The Earth, my body, and the ladder form a 3 body system held together by mutual gravitational attraction, and separated primarily by electrostatic forces, which act mutually at base.
"The rock is not moving the stick."
The rock pushes on the stick just as much as the stick pushes on the rock.
Newton gave the example of a horse pulling a rock, in the Principia.
Newton explained that the rock pulls on the horse just as much as the horse pulls on the rock.
In simplified language, for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.
"There are mutual causes involved in each of these examples, equal and opposite forces, but the above statements are the facts."
No, they are conventions of perspective and reference frame choices.
All causation is mutual at base. The choice of mover versus moved is arbitrary, and therefore meaningless.
"A directional hierarchy exists."
There is no preferred reference frame.
Choice of reference frame is arbitrary.
All motion is in space.
You are in space.
All forces are applied mutually, equally, and net losslessly.
Friction is an illusion.
There are no net losses in apparent frictional losses.
"F=mA proves a directional hierarchy."
F = GMm/r^2
An equal force is applied to M as it is to m.
M and m will each accelerate according to F=mA (discounting other effects described in modern physics).
There is no directional hierarchy, or preference as to calling the position of M fixed while m moves, m fixed while M moves. Or perhaps one might choose some other reference frame relative to which both M and m move.
Such choices are arbitrary, and thus meaningless.
There is no objectively preferred reference frame in such choices.
"Heat transfer proves a directional hierarchy."
Heat is an aggregate approximation of molecular or atomic motion. Heat transfer is the transfer of kinetic energy between colliding molecules or atoms.
In each such collision the interaction is mutual and net lossless. No new matter/energy is created out of nothing, and no existing , matter/energy passes out of existence into nothing.
All such collisions, transfers of kinetic energy, occur in space, and are mutual, are net lossless, with no preferred frame of reference.
All causality is mutual at base.
The examples you have provided are all examples of mutual causation at base.
So, I ask you, can you provide any examples of causality that are not mutual at base?
"All causality is mutual at base"
Deleteyou said elsewhere that stones move themselves, meaning that two stones in close proximity can cause themselves to move across a table. we don't see that happen so your theory is false and saying "mutual at base" 3 times in a loud voice doesn't make the stones move across the table so that reply changes nothing. Something else besids the two stones is required and that is what teh argument is saying.
For your sake I hope your not being serious when you said 'stones move each other'. If you are being serious then I would also recommend that you seek professional help. Merry Christmas
Stardust’s
Delete‘The rock pushes on the stick just as much as the stick pushes on the rock’
Jeepers my dude you’re as dumb as a box of rocks and a box of sticks combined. The rock is pushing on the stick in the direction opposite of it’s motion. In summary the rock isn’t moving the stick it’s resisting the motion. I typed this slowly so you might be able to understand.
"you said elsewhere that stones move themselves, meaning that two stones in close proximity can cause themselves to move across a table."
DeleteNot quite.
2 stones in close proximity to each other in space will cause themselves to move toward each other.
2 stones in close proximity to each other on a table will cause each other to have forces applied to each other in the direction of moving toward each other, but in that case there are other forces acting upon the rocks such that there is no net motion of the rocks toward each other.
"For your sake I hope your not being serious when you said 'stones move each other'."
Stones move each other.
Yes, obviously. How do you not know that? You have a modern Western education, don't you? You have enough education to use a device and enter English sentences into the combox.
"If you are being serious then I would also recommend that you seek professional help."
Your concern for the improvement of my mental health is heartwarming indeed, however, misplaced.
Stones move each other. Yes, of course.
Stones move each other by attracting each other mutually in space.
Stones that are in inertial motion will move each other mutually when the collide, primarily by electrostatic forces.
All causation is mutual and multidirectional at base.
But by all means, can you provide an example to the contrary?
Here's a quick summary:
DeleteSo you're telling me that Y causes motion X?
>> Not quite. I'm telling you that Y causes motion Z.
Okay, then what causes motion X because that's the example I gave?
>> *Crickets*
Merry Christmas everyone. Jesus Christ is King!
"Here's a quick summary:"
DeleteHere where? I don't see a summary of what I said.
I see a goofy strawman you made up out of your imagination.
Material has existence and properties necessarily.
All the material in the cosmos is necessary.
The properties of material are conjoined or coincident or intrinsic or inseparable with the existence of material.
Causation is material interaction.
All causation is mutual at base, multilateral, net lossless, multidirectional, and thus fundamentally circular.
Ideas about a linear hierarchical one-way causality are just simplistic folk causation.
"I see a goofy strawman you made up out of your imagination"
DeleteHere's a less brief version of the 'quick summary', and as anyone can see it's not a strawman.
---
So you're telling me that mutual causation causes 2 rocks in close proximity to move across the table?
>> Not quite. I'm telling you that mutual causation causes 2 rocks in close proximity to move in other ways.
Okay, then what causes 2 rocks in close proximity to move across the table because that's the example I gave?
>> *Crickets*
Anon,
Delete"Okay, then what causes 2 rocks in close proximity to move across the table because that's the example I gave?"
2 rocks sitting on a table typically do not move much with respect to each other in the local reference frame as we ordinarily perceive it.
Perhaps one attaches rockets to each rock, ignites the rockets and then the rocks move closer to each other.
In that case there are mutual interactions at base that when we observed in the aggregate lead to our observation that rocks move toward each other.
All such causal processes are due to mutual interactions of materials at base.
You cannot name any causal process that is not due to mutual causation at base.
Examples about the father, son and grandfather are pointless stories of folk causation.
Aquinas did have at least 1 reasonable idea, to consider a regression that tends toward infinity. He made rather primitive and crude attempts, stopping at things like a hand or a piece of wood, so even though he had a reasonable idea he failed to follow through on that idea to a useful extent.
To understand an apparent causal process for the purpose of arguing for a necessary first mover it is rather primitive and crude, I would say childish, for a modern person to stop the analysis at the level of a hand or a piece of wood, or a rock for that matter.
A regression that tends toward infinity always leads us to the forces of nature
Gravitation
Electromagnetic
Strong nuclear
Weak nuclear
Those forces are all formulated as mutual interactions wherein the designation of mover or moved is arbitrary and therefore meaningless.
There is only the mutual interaction, which terminates every causal regress analysis finitely, making a first mover unnecessary, and thus making the First Way unsound.
All causal interactions have at least these features at base:
Net lossless
In the present moment
Multilateral
Multidirectional
Mutual in action
In more generalized language, there is no need for a first mover because everything just keeps moving everything else. All materials are thus tied for first place, as it were.
Stardusty,
DeleteYou just said the rockets are moving the stones, not the stones themselves, so ALL materials are not tied for first place. The stones aren't in first place and you don't know what you're talkin about.
Where does the casual power of the forces of nature (gravitational force, electromagnet, etc.) come from?
DeleteAnon,
Delete"You just said the rockets are moving the stones, not the stones themselves,"
Not exactly, but sort of, in a superficial sort of view.
"The stones aren't in first place and you don't know what you're talkin about."
The material of the stone, the rocket, and the rocket fuel all move each other mutually.
At base the distinction between mover and moved is arbitrary and therefore meaningless, for all the material we consider of the stone, of the rocket, and of the fuel.
All of those materials move each other at base.
You seem to be locked in a macro scale human senses view of ordinary apparent objects. That sort or reasoning is doomed to failure when attempting to reason your way to a first mover.
Consider how all the bits of those apparent objects are bouncing off each other in space, then you can begin to understand that all causation is mutual at base and all materials are tied for first place in the sense then no particular materials or reference frames are preferred.
Anon,
Delete"Where does the casual power of the forces of nature (gravitational force, electromagnet, etc.) come from?"
All material is necessary.
The total amount of material in the cosmos is static.
Materials have properties necessarily.
There is no such thing as a property separated from the material it is a property of.
There is no such thing as material lacking in properties.
Material is the necessary being and that necessity includes the necessity of its properties.
Why look for an invisible, undetectable, unevidenced necessary being? That solves nothing. All the same questions remain about that speculated being, but made much worse because they are being asked about a being that is speculated to be unobservable even in principle.
Inertial motion makes the unmoved mover unnecessary, and thus makes the First Way unsound, because the First Way is an argument for NECESSITY, not mere compatibility.
Sure, you can speculate that inertial motion is compatible with your invisible being, but so are an unbounded number of other unevidenced speculations.
It's Plank scale angels nudging everything along, a googleplex Plank scale angels, dontchyaknow.
Such angels are compatible with inertial motion.
Where does the causal power of your unevidenced speculation come from?
Your arguments assume materialism, have you given any good reasons to believe this? Your posts would be more effective if you made more complete arguments. Just saying, please don't feel attacked...I want to be able to put it all together.
Delete"Your arguments assume materialism, have you given any good reasons to believe this?"
DeleteGood reasons to believe materialism?
Your apparent life and the material world you apparently inhabit.
If you consider this to all be some sort of dream, that idealism is the case, then by all means stop breathing, after all, air is not real material in that case.
Everybody who eats and breaths and moves about in all their bodily functions acts on the good reasons to believe that materialism is the case.
Is materialism the case, you ask?
Really? All your bodily actions all day long all work on the reasons to believe materialism is the case.
"Your posts would be more effective if you made more complete arguments."
There are no arguments against materialism, only idle speculations that I cannot prove this is not all just a dream of my idealistic imagination.
What else would there be other than material?
Every thing has to be some thing. If a thing is no thing then in what sense do you say it exists at all?
Your suggestion is like saying the meteorologist would be more effective if he included arguments for the reality of the sun.
"Just saying, please don't feel attacked"
I don't feel attacked in the slightest, I am flabbergasted.
Right, it is true that I do not preface my arguments with recitations about why I think there really is a sun, and there really is air that I really breath, and the food I eat is real, not just a figment of my idealistic imagination.
"I want to be able to put it all together."
Ok, fine. What is it that you do not have together?
Yes one can always speculate that there is some unseen, unknown, invisible realm somehow out there, that this is all a dream, or that I am god and you are all figments of my divine imagination. That is not an argument, it is just evidence free idle speculation.
The expression that something could somehow exist immaterially is an incoherent utterance. What would that even mean? Exist where? How? Made of what? With what structure? What organizational arrangement?
None at all? No place, no time, no structure, no arrangement? That amounts to a whole lot of nothing, absolutely nothing at all.
The only coherent alternative to materialism is absolutely nothing at all. But absolutely nothing at all cannot be the case because I am self aware. And whatever exists must be complex and differentiated and operate through time because I experience complexity and change through time.
How can something that is nothing and has no structure and no time and no place be taken at all seriously? You think I should somehow preface my arguments with arguments against such baseless incoherent idle speculations?
Well, I continue to be flabbergasted by your suggestion, but just to give you another way to look at this consider Aquinas in the First Way.
The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion
Aquinas took a materialist approach as the default. Materialism is the baseline for the First Way.
Aquinas recognized, apparently, that materialism is the obvious and pervasive state of affairs all around us. To argue for a first mover Aquinas started from materialism and tried to show that if you carry certain materialistic observations far enough one supposedly is forced to conclude there is an invisible being at work behind it all.
Materialism is the default baseline we all operate on moment to moment in our physical lives. Aquinas recognized that by starting from what is manifest and evident to our senses that there is a world and there are things in this world and some of those things are in motion.
Anon (December 28, 2023 at 6:01 AM)
DeleteSP can't give you any details because he has reduced his argument down to "at base" where everything is the same. There is no distinction between substances, no distinction between mover and moved and he has jettisoned the principle of sufficient causation.
Whatever substance is "at base" he is saying it causes every kind of change and motion that there is. It's a very magical substance. Ironically, unbeknownst to our resident smartboi genius, it's as magical as the plank scale angels he has been mocking everyone about.
* should be "he has jettisoned the principle of proportionate causality" in the comment above.
Delete"SP ... has reduced his argument down to "at base""
DeleteOf course. Do you suppose you will find the answers to the structure of reality by thinking about your hand and a piece of wood without any scientific understanding of what those objects are composed of?
Even Aquinas recognized the philosophical need to engage in a regression analysis that tends toward infinity.
Unfortunately, Aquinas stopped at the level of his hand or burning wood without any scientific knowledge of what his hand or wood or fire are composed of.
"where everything is the same. There is no distinction between substances"
If substances have spatial extent then there must be spatial distinctions between spatial regions of those substances.
Further, the most fundamental substances identified thus far seem to have a variety of properties.
So, your characterization of my position is a strawman, certainly not any position I have expressed.
"no distinction between mover and moved and he has jettisoned...the principle of proportionate causality"
You seem to be conflating "no distinction" with "arbitrary assignment".
Suppose 2 electrons repel each other. Is electron "a" the mover or is electron "b" the mover? The assignment of title "mover" and "moved" is arbitrary and therefore meaningless. There is only the mutual causal movement process.
However, "a" and "b" can be spatially distinct beings, or beables.
There is an existential distinction between "a" and "b". There is no causal assignment of "mover" or "moved" that can be coherently made to "a" versus "b".
"a" and "b" can be existentially distinct but they cannot be distinguished as "mover" versus "moved". There is only the mutual moving of each other.
Google AI returns:
"The principle of proportionate causality (PPC) is a corollary of the principle of causality. It states that whatever is in an effect must in some way preexist in the total cause of that effect.
According to Feser, the PPC says that every cause must contain its effect, either formally, eminently, or virtually. Feser uses the PPC to motivate the idea that there must be an intelligent first cause."
The PPC is merely the fallacy of composition.
There must be a wall, in some sense, in each grain of mineral in every bit of every block in the wall, the fallacy goes.
"Whatever substance is "at base" he is saying it causes every kind of change and motion that there is."
OK, sounds reasonable.
"It's a very magical substance."
You have that back to front.
Magic would be some sort of poof term.
Some sort of magic wherein the whole is not merely an aggregate of the parts, but some sort of magical something poofs in somehow to add to the parts in order to get the whole.
I say
p1+p2+...+pn=Whole
you say
p1+p2+...+pn+magic poof part=Whole
The substance is not magic.
It is your speculated poof part that is magic.
The magic comes from these Plank scale angels, uh, I mean infinitely small bits of matter having the inherent power to create all of the order and all of the change that has ever occurred.
DeleteJust think, these magical dust bunnies have formed galaxies, moved planets and shifted continents around. When they are feeling playful the dust bunnies move people around a soccer field. We don't know why, we only know that they are creating the motion of the game for us to enjoy. There's nothing they can't do.
The magic comes from these Plank scale angels, uh, I mean infinitely small bits of matter having the inherent power to create all of the order and all of the change that has ever occurred.
DeleteJust think, these magical dust bunnies have formed galaxies, moved planets and shifted continents around. When they are feeling playful the dust bunnies move people around a soccer field. We don't know why, we only know that they are creating the motion of the game for us to enjoy. There's nothing they can't do.
"The magic comes from these Plank scale angels, uh, I mean infinitely small bits of matter having the inherent power to create all of the order and all of the change that has ever occurred."
DeleteWhy is that "magic"?
A very great deal is known about the forces of nature, 4 of which have been identified thus far.
They are, by all experiments, highly regular. That is why they can be described with equations.
"There's nothing they can't do."
One can imagine a very great many things that cannot be realized.
I can imagine jumping over a tall building. I can't do that in real life, and the "magical dust bunnies" can't get me to do that, because such an action would be outside of the regularities of their actions that we describe with our physics equations.
Nature is not a causal free for all. When you educate yourself about causality you will find that the Aristotelian notions of a linear, hierarchical, one-way causation are nonsense.
To the human senses, superficially, it seems that all sublunary motion slows, stops, and is lost unless something keeps it moving.
That is what Aristotle thought.
That is what Aquinas thought.
Newton showed how they are wrong.
If motion slows and stops and is lost-
And if we observe motion-
Then it makes sense that there is a first mover.
That is the core reasoning of the Aristotelian argument.
Aquinas said:
"Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another"
Aquinas meant that whatever we observe to be in motion right now is being put in motion right now by something else. Aristotle thought the same thing. They were both wrong. I find it somewhat shocking that a PhD teaching at a good California college clings to this fundamental error.
The argument for the NECESSITY of a first mover is utterly demolished by inertial motion.
Motion is never lost because all interactions of material are net lossless-
Space, for motion, is a lossless medium-
Therefore no first mover is NECESSARY.
Aquinas said"
"Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover"
NECESSARY
The Aristotelian argument is destroyed by inertial motion because it eliminates the NECESSITY of a first mover.
Aristotle had inertial motion in his grasp. He understood that absent a lossy impeding medium motion would continue ad infinitum.
Aristotle did not understand that space, for motion, is the functional equivalent of the void.
Aristotle thought that sublunary motion was in a medium such that a moving object would slow and stop and its motion would be lost. If that were true then the argument for a first mover would make sense, by Aristotle was wrong about that.
But he was right about this passage in reference to motion in the void:
214 b PHYSICS IV.8
(4) Again, no one could say why something moved will come to rest somewhere;
why should it do so here rather than there?
Hence it will either remain at rest or must move on to infinity unless something stronger hinders it.
So, by Aristotle's own words in his Physics book 4 he eliminates his own argument for a first mover in the case of motion absent a lossy impeding medium.
What Aristotle failed to understand is that every medium is net lossless.
If you throw a ball it will seem to slow and stop and it will seem as if its motion is lost. That observation leads to the Aristotelian argument for a first mover, the First Way of Aquinas.
But the motion of the ball is not lost, only transferred to other motions of other material. That observation disproves the First Way because the First Way is an argument for NECESSITY.
A New Year, but plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose I suppose. Despite all our prayers SP is still broken and stupid.
DeleteHe denies the fact of his own existence–and everyone else's I guess–but is nevertheless somehow compelled to pooh-pooh Aristotle and Aquinas (as if they existed) in philosophers' comboxes all over the web.
May I helpfully suggest that the act would be more convincing if you actually stopped popping up to spout poppycock altogether?
Appealing to things like formal thinking and motion that presuppose what you have explicitly denied, i.e. form, only make you look (a) like you believe you are real and really engaged in a debate with other real things; and (b) half-educated.
"That observation disproves the First Way"
DeleteNo, it does not. Logically, you cannot disprove a philosophical argument by inserting different metaphysics into it. That is what you are doing, and despite your propensity for verbal diarrhea you have not undermined the argument in the slightest. Anyway, Happy 2024 to you.
But the motion of the ball is not lost, only transferred to other motions of other material.
DeleteOh I get it now! The money isn't gone from your back account, only transferred to the pockets of other individuals. You're still as rich as you ever were because the overall money supply hasn't changed.
"you cannot disprove a philosophical argument by inserting different metaphysics into it. That is what you are doing,"
DeleteThe First Way is based on what is manifest and evident to our senses.
Aquinas provides that basis in the opening of the First Way.
Aquinas is wrong that it is manifest and evident to our senses that whatever is in motion is put in motion by another necessarily.
The observation of inertial motion disproves the First Way.
Inertial motion does not strictly disprove a first mover, or a googleplex movers, or any other fanciful idle speculation. You can make up any sort of fantasy invisible being you want.
Motion is actually caused by invisible magic pixies, dontchyaknow?
You cannot disprove the assertion that motion is caused by invisible magic pixies.
How much do you respect people who insist motion is caused by invisible magic pixies?
There is your first mover, reduced to inane speculation by the inertial motion that is manifest and evident to our senses.
"the overall money supply hasn't changed."
DeleteSupposing that were true, that the supply of money does not change (ignoring printing of new money, the Fed, mining of precious materials, etc).
Fine, supposing the money supply does not change.
We observe, however, that there is change in the amount of money between individuals. Do we then require a first money changer, or can we account for all transactions of money by mutual transactions of money?
How many money changers are there in existence? Is that a countable number, in principle, or is the number of money changers infinite?
It is manifest and evident to our senses that in the world money changes. But does that require a first money changer, or can we account for all money changes with the mutual interactions of a finite number of money changers?
For every money action there is an equal and opposite money reaction, in the case of a fixed money supply.
There is no call for a first money changer because all money changers interact mutually with each other for no net change in the total money supply.
Money changes are real.
A first money changer is an unnecessary imaginary fantasy speculation in the case of a fixed money supply.
Thank you for your insightful analogy in disproving the First Way.
Zoe,
Delete"Despite all our prayers SP is still broken and stupid."
Intercessory prayer is indeed irrational.
But as incoherent as intercessory prayer is on an unchanging god, thanks anyhow, it's the thought that counts, nice of you to try to save me, as nonsensical as your methodology is.
I mean, here I am, an incorrigible poppycock spoutter, and god was going to just let me continue in my broken stupidity, but then, you imagine, the unchanging god would change his mind and somehow timelessly and spacelessly and changelessly change me over time and space.
So, the changeless and timeless and spaceless god would change his mind and act over time and act through space to change me, all while remaining unchanged and outside of time and outside of space.
Whew, I am getting dizzy just thinking about intercessory prayer!!!
But nice of you anyhow, it's the thought that counts.
Clueless about prayer also, SP.
DeleteBut is your description of it as incoherent as:
*you* (non-existent and existing by your account)
*bothering* to defend materialism by appealing to formal thinking to cause a *real change* (which you haven’t figured out admits form)
my (again, by your account, non-existent but also physically determined) mind?
1:18 through 1:20:37
ReplyDeleteIn the event the implication of the time stamps I placed up bracketting a section of the discussion is not clear, the matter being pointed to is not the concession the host made.
ReplyDeleteIt is the important observation that certain kinds of objections depend for their force upon the importation of an inapplicable framework into the discussion.
In the particular instance, it shows up as the model of temporality; and the ensuing complications which appear to evolve while unconsciously assuming that picture; all while ostensibly referring to what is stipulated by prior definition as being, or existing within, an a-temporal context.
While not precisely a semantic issue, it points in the general direction of [what I regard as ] the importance of Feser's analytic background and his alertness to both how words are being deployed, and the making explicit of the senses and assumptions which accompany those uses.
According to the argument from motion, is it possible for the unmoved mover (God) to have potentials that are never actualized because no actual thing exists that can actualize them? In other words, God satisfies the argument in that the unmoved mover has the power in a non-derived way to keep everything in existence - here and now - but I'm not sure the argument leads to the conclusion that God is pure act. Thoughts?
ReplyDeleteThe point of the argument is that every link in the chain having secondary or derivative causal efficacy necessitates an efficient or primary cause which is not derivative. A primary cause, by definition, does not derive causal efficacy from another; it has causal efficacy in itself, which translates to the absence of potency.
DeleteWe can have proximate primary causes (e.g., a man is the proximate primary cause of moving a stick which moves a stone. But said man is also caused to be (moved) by an essentially ordered series, the ultimate primary cause of which exists in itself and not another. In other words, Pure Act.
Bill,
DeleteI agree with all of what you have said, except I'm asking a question about your final statement where you conclude 'pure act'. I don't recall that being a necessary conclusion of the argument, but maybe I am wrong about that. Can the argument be satisified in every way without cause being pure act?
@SteveK, you ask:
DeleteCan the argument be satisified in every way without cause being pure act?
No, because every essentially ordered causal chain merges with existence or actuality. Did you watch the entire video? Ed explains himself quite clearly, but let’s go over a few points. A stone cannot move itself, but it has the capacity (potency) to be moved by something else. In Aquinas’ illustration, it is moved by a stick. However, the stick is in the same situation as the stone. It too must be moved by another. Hence, the movement of the stick is derived from whatever is moving it, which gives it (the stick) causal efficacy to move the stone. Thus, both the stone and the stick have the capacity (potency) to be moved (raised to act) as a principle of their existence. If either has no capacity to change (be moved), then it would be devoid of potency. But anything that exists that is devoid of potency is pure actuality by definition.
Of course, that raises the question whether a thing can be fully actual as to some things while having the potency to do other things. However, that is precisely what the stick and the stone are. They are actual as to their stick-ness or stone-ness but are in potency as to their movement. For the stick/stone illustration, we also see that the hand which moves the stick is moved by its muscles, the muscles are moved by electronic signals in the nervous system, and the signals are moved by signals generated by the brain. We can thus see that the proximate primary cause is the brain. But we call this kind of efficient causality proximate because the brain itself is moved (caused to be—has its potency to be actualized) by its molecules, and its molecules are caused (its potencies actualized) by its atoms, etc. And this shows us how this kind of causal chain runs into existence itself as the basis for the movement. As Aquinas stated, this kind of movement cannot proceed to infinity. So long as each link in this chain of existence is caused to be (i.e., its potency to exist is actualized), we are required to see that the chain can only be terminated in something which does not have the potency to exist—its existence is in itself. And anything which has no potency to be is actual without any degree of potency—Pure Act.
"A stone cannot move itself, but it has the capacity (potency) to be moved by something else."
DeleteStones move each other.
"stone-ness"
You realize, I hope, that a stone that seems to be motionless isn't, it just seems that way to us. Actually, a stone is a buzzing beehive of frenetic activity, continuously vibrating buzzing in a mad chaotic multitude of perpetual motions.
"the muscles are moved by electronic signals in the nervous system,"
Not quite. The motive force of the muscles comes from sliding filaments. The sliding filaments move due to mutual electrostatic forces.
All causation is mutual at base.
The Aristotelian analysis of causation is hopelessly crude and unrealistic, making the argument from motion just so much nonsense.
"And this shows us how this kind of causal chain runs into existence itself as the basis for the movement."
No, the causal processes in your body are accounted for by mutual causation, primarily the mutual attraction of unlike charges and the mutual repulsion of like charges.
Causation is thus fundamentally circular and perpetual in a cosmos where the total amount of material is static and all causation proceeds ad-infinitum in net lossless interactions.
""As Aquinas stated, this kind of movement cannot proceed to infinity. "
Which is what makes the First Way logically invalid.
The First Way suffers from the logical fallacy of false dichotomy, because Aquinas failed to account for the circular case.
Duns Scotus tried to patch that up by specifically addressing the circular case, but Scotus failed because he used a one-way analysis regarding anterior and posterior, whereas the real base of causation is multilateral mutuality, a multidirectional circularity.
"we are required to see that the chain can only be terminated in something which does not have the potency to exist"
No, because again, the First Way is logically invalid, suffering from false dichotomy.
The third case, multilateral multidirectional circular causation terminates causal chains finitely.
A potential that cannot possibly be actualized by anything including God is incoherent. This is similar to the “Can God create a stone so big that even He cannot move it?” argument.
DeleteThus a potential that cannot possibly be actualized is precisely nothing.
Great discussion. It seems to me, however, that particularly Mr. O'Conner was talking in generalities and probabilities. The real world is not about generalities and probabilities.Just like there is no general horse, only specific ones that come into existence and go out of existence. There are no general potentials are also specific. Therefore, it seems to me that the bast way to have this discussion is form the standpoint of the concept of “being” and the self-evident principles of being. these include Identity, Non-contradiction, Excluded-middle, Causality, and Sufficient-reason. There is also a law of the first-in-kind of every kind of being to exist, and in all cases the first-in-kind is a product of different kind of being except that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is also applicable to the Supreme Being also. All other beings, those that come into being and go out of being are contingent, but the first being of any kind, the Supreme Bering is not.
ReplyDeleteIn the real world neither humans of cups of coffee are infinite. each are contingent, having a first in kind. Therefore, to discuss them in the context of discussion infinite regression seems odd.
I believe I am correct that Aristotle only discussed potential, actualization, and the need for an actualizing agent in association with discussion of the concept of being. If we first address this issue form the concept of being and the self-evident principles, then it seems to me the questions about infinity and infinite regression go away.
"All real causation is mutual
ReplyDeleteI think I have seen that statement before. Several times, before. With "at base" added sometimes, if I recall correctly.
Can this be related to the "level of reality" we inhabit on a daily basis?
Don't want to be too topical, but given the current situation in the Levant, I'll trying relating this to the famous Rachel Corrie activist incident of a couple decades ago.
So, she got out in the path of an Israeli bulldozer in order to interfere with its demolition project, and it ran over her or pushed dirt on her or something, and she was crushed or smothered.
Therefore are we to conclude she is the efficient cause or the coequal material cause of the bulldozer being there and subsequently crushing her?
If not, why not?
Maybe there is something to that theory. Or perhaps not and there was no "real causation". You know, stuff just happens.
Tough to figure.
Perhaps provocative framings of the question are much too upsetting to reflect on clearly, or are in this instance subject to some terminological confusion or lack of definition - as we are just working with the bare principle itself.
Let's try another less threatening more nostalgic example: Little Joey, purchases a Crooke's Radiometer at the souvenir shop in the museum.
Joey places it on the sill of the window at home and the vanes within the globe begin to spin. Has Joey under this theory, or have the positioning of the evacuated glass bulb and the spinning vanes themselves, caused, or contributed to causing, the sun to shine and perhaps the very process of star formation itself, to take place?
This seems a proposition difficult to justify.
Let's try simplifying with an illustration of real events, but as we have all seen them depicted through special effects in movies many times.
Los Angeles, or some other city experiences what we call an earthquake. A large crack opens up in the surface of the street, and a parked car tumbles down into the new crevasse in the earth.
"At base", wherever and whenever that is located, did the parked car cause the earth to quake and a crack to open up in the earth below the pavement?
Perhaps these causes and effects, are somehow not "real"...
There's only one commenter that uses that phrase. It's because he is ignorant of physics and thinks Newton's 3rd law implies. It seems he also chooses to remain ignorant.
DeletePerhaps, per the idiot's theory that causal no hierarchy exists, the ladder isn't actually causing you to remain 5 feet off the floor. Maybe "at base" you are causing the ladder to remain stationary. Hmm...if only there was a way to test that theory.
Delete"Perhaps these causes and effects, are somehow not "real""
DeleteI might have been wrong about you being a hopeless idiot, there might be some hope for you.
The assertion of Aristotle, Aquinas, and all the rest is that analysis of various sorts leads one to conclude a first mover, and in the the case of Aquinas, the application of the non-sequitur in the final phrase of the First Way-God.
Aquinas realized that merely considering a macro sized object such as a section of Earth or an object falling, would not be sufficient.
You seem to have a glimmer of hope in realizing that one must engage in a regression analysis tending toward infinity to find the answer.
One critical error made by Aristotle, Aquinas, Feser and the typical commenter here is to use a hierarchical one-way linear regress of apparent causal agents, with one thing causing another to do something else.
That is folk causality, just a sort of simple minded superficial rumination.
Russell famously explained many of the errors of such thinking over a century ago, in On Cause... He used the example of gravitation, a mutual multilateral force as formulated by Newton.
Modern physics has added a great deal to those early formulations by Newton, but one feature remains.
Real causation is always mutual, multilateral, and thus fundamentally circular, not hierarchical or linear as in the folk descriptions of Aristotle and Feser.
There is no call for a first mover because at base materials move each other in a manner such that the distinction between mover and moved, self moving and moving the other, is arbitrary and therefore meaningless.
DeleteIt might seem awkward, but I guess if we accept certain dicta presented here, then we have an answer, provisionally at least to a question I asked. Old - in the sense she died years ago -Rachel Correy [ insofar as "she" was not just a completely determined material multiplicity with no agency whatsoever and to which we falsely attribute an unwarranted kind of reality] was the cause of her own death: not merely legally, nor morally, nor through obstinate contributory negligence, nor in some weird Karmic sense. But instead, quite literally and mechanistically. You know, at base, anyway.
How about that. What might all law look like in the future in light of that determinate, inescapable, wisdom?
Now, in respect of the pressing social ramifications of these discoveries, [as if proof of the non-existence of God was not enough] and painful as some might find it, let's at least consider turning our attention to events in Gaza, for yet still more topically challenging conceptual analysis scenarios concerning how we may there transcend the limits of folk physics causation, as those obsolete folk notions, are replaced with regard to ballistic and other impactful phenomena.
I say, "consider" since it may seem too unbearably indelicate to sensitive types, conditioned as they are, to looking at reality through comfortingly anthropocentric folk-morality tinted lenses.
But if Science requires it, then march forward we must. Always trusting in Science or its official spokespersons, to unerringly guide our steps. Science, or what passes for it, the same yesterday, today, and forevermore. Amen
"the ladder isn't actually causing you to remain 5 feet off the floor. Maybe "at base" you are causing the ladder to remain stationary."
DeleteYou are getting closer, there might be hope for you as well.
"at base" you, the ladder, and the floor are collections of quarks and electron whizzing about in a chaotic frenzy, continually interacting with each other.
The rest of the Earth is involved in this scene, as all the material of the Earth is gravitationally interacting with the matter of you, the ladder and the floor.
Further, none of this material is stationary, it is all moving. Everything on Earth is always moving. The quarks are vibrating, the electrons are whizzing about, the atoms and molecules are vibrating and bouncing off each other, the whole collection you call "you" "the ladder" "the floor" is moving at many thousands of miles per hour through space, with forces of motion in balance such that you typically remain oblivious to all this activity that is always going on "at base".
Talking about the father and the grandfather and the child, or considering the rock hand stick, and such examples are primitive and childishly superficial distractions that only reveal the ignorance and superficiality of one who thinks answers to the structure of the universe can be found by sitting around thinking about such inane examples.
Aquinas said "this cannot go on to infinity". A big problem with that assertion is that Aquinas had little idea of what really goes on as one tends toward the bottom infinity.
We know a very great deal more now.
For example
F = GMm/r^2
F = kQq/r^2
In these formulations the distinction between mover and moved is arbitrary and therefore meaningless.
Thus we find that the classical notion of cause and effect goes away "at base".
There is only the mutual interaction, not any classical cause and effect.
That is what we find when we do as Aquinas suggested, attempt to go on to infinity. Of course, we cannot go to infinity, but we can go a very great deal further than a staff and a hand, which is a rather childishly and primitively simplistic stopping point in a regression analysis that purports to demonstrate what can and cannot happen as one regresses toward infinity.
I provided you with 2 examples, the gravitational force equation and the electrostatic force equation.
All causation is formulated similarly at base.
You cannot name for me an example of causation that is not formulated as a mutual interaction at base.
"At base" is what is meant when Aquinas claims "this cannot go on to infinity", correct?
To determine what can and cannot occur as one tends toward an infinite regression one must go toward "at base", correct?
Aristotle was wrong.
Aquinas was wrong.
Feser is wrong.
You are wrong.
The notions of a linear, one-way, hierarchical, cause and effect series are fundamentally mistaken.
All causation is mutual at base.
I have provided you with 2 clear formulations of that fact.
You cannot provide any counterexamples, can you?
Actuality and potentiality are matters of speculation, not scientific fact.
ReplyDeleteCorrect, they aren't matters of scientific fact. They are already assumed prior to any scientific inquiry. You couldn't do any scientific inquiry at all unless you have the potential to do so.
DeleteTell me, are you actually reading this reply? Of course you are, but previously you weren't, but you could have. A ping pong ball can't read this reply. Why? Because you had the potential to read this reply (which became actual when you started reading it), but the ping pong ball doesn't.
You should really try to understand our terminology before commenting on it. Actuality is simply what exists here and now, whereas potentiality is the capacity in whatever exists here and now to change. Since these are observable on a consistent basis, and since science is in the business of observation, actuality and potentiality are most certainly "scientific fact."
Delete
DeleteWell, Bill, you should try to understand that A/T metaphysics is not widely accepted professional philosophers, and is not considered "scientific fact" except by its proponents.
"Since these are observable on a consistent basis, and since science is in the business of observation, actuality and potentiality are most certainly "scientific fact."
DeleteI guess you can have a lot of fun with this, and you even might be "forced" to once you start in on it.
It's been years since I took a course in "scholastic metaphysics" as it might have been taught - and in fact was taught by Catholics - on the basis of the Thomistic revival.
There, there was no real mention of Aristotle by name, but the concepts of act and potency, substance and accident, and various kinds of analogy, "of proportion" and "of proportionality" for example, were covered.
The courses in Greek and Medieval philosophy were taken just as long ago.
But one thing in the terminology of the old philosophical and new(er) scientific concepts that seemed to retain a core sense [even if for example "substance" or weight did not] was the idea of "potential"
Now although I am not sure in what modern senses "potential" might be construed so as to refer to the capacity to receive, be affected, or undergo a change, the term certainly retains popular scientific currency with regard to mechanics, and electrical power.
Some of that will be based on the notion of stored energy, as in a compressed spring, or a locked up counterbalance, but I am having difficulty seeing how the idea of the potential energy "stored" in a cart loaded with rocks on the top of an inclined ramp, does not bear some significant relation to at least one side of the Aristotelian potential equation, when that potential energy call it stored or configuration is transformed into kinetic energy capable of doing work.
I mean, kids in Jr. high school are still taught basic physics in the form of mechanics, and electricity, aren't they?
Has some term replaced "potential"?
Yes and no it seems.
You want to see people get worked up and some start shouting that forces and everything else don't matter in physics except the math? ... just dive into the subject of potential energy and work, over at Reddit once you have reviewed half a dozen papers or so readily available on the subject.
There's a lot of emotional investment in some of these supposedly value neutral questions. I wonder why. Perhaps the answer lies in the phrase "supposedly value neutral" itself.
For some, nothing really changes below the surface, and it is important in some way that it does not. And it's no use you stirring up trouble by asking what is behind it all, or exactly what it means: it's just Parmenides all the way down.
So shut up and quit looking for a way "out".
Anonymous writes:
DeleteWell, Bill, you should try to understand that A/T metaphysics is not widely accepted professional philosophers, and is not considered "scientific fact" except by its proponents.
You said this in reply to make admonishment that you should understand our terminology before taking it upon yourself to critique it. It is thus irrelevant entirely whether A/T metaphysics isn’t widely accepted among philosophers.
As to science, every scientist either believes that the things he observes actually exist or he must act as if they exist. That’s what “actuality” means—something actually existing here and now. Thus, actuality is indisputably scientific unless you want to deny reality itself, in which case you’re not engaging in science. And as to potency, that is simply the real capacity for change. Acorns can become oaks, fingers can type, and water can evaporate. Capacity for change is thus a real feature of material existence. And since science is in the business of observing phenomena, science is in the business of observing change. Now, whether or not you call that potency is up to you, but it is no less scientific because you don’t like the word.
What exactly is speculative about them?
DeleteBill,
DeleteI earlier said many professional philosophers do not accept A/T metaphysics. One is William Lane Craig.
I am sure you have heard of Craig. He is probably the foremost intellectual defender of Christianity. He has published countless prestigious philosophical books and articles, in addition to all his many debates. After a debate with Sean Carroll, an audience member asked him what he thought the Five Ways of St. Thomas. He replied:
Dr. Craig: Yes, I would say that Thomas Aquinas' own metaphysical principles are highly dubious and in doubt, and that therefore I have little confidence that his arguments are, as he claimed, demonstrations."
https://www.reasonablefaith.org/media/debates/god-and-cosmology-the-existence-of-god-in-light-of-contemporary-cosmol
They are dubious indeed, but they have many stalwart defenders, like Prof. Feser.
I think that Alex, even after his interview with Prof Feser (and a while back with Dr Craig himself), will continue to be the "Cosmic Skeptic."
Are there ANY major philosophical or metaphysical propositions that are universally accepted among philosophers?
Delete"Actuality and potentiality are matters of speculation, not scientific fact."
DeleteI think it's humorous, and should be reworded as :
"Scientific facts are matters of speculation, not actuality and potentiality."
And pessimistic induction plus Popperian way of seeing topples the scales towards this view, actually.
Anonymous writes:
DeleteI earlier said many professional philosophers do not accept A/T metaphysics. One is William Lane Craig.
Which is irrelevant to the point, as I earlier said.
I am sure you have heard of Craig.
Of course.
Dr. Craig: Yes, I would say that Thomas Aquinas' own metaphysical principles are highly dubious and in doubt, and that therefore I have little confidence that his arguments are, as he claimed, demonstrations."
Yes, I’ve both read and heard his arguments against classical theism in general and divine simplicity in particular. I’m not at all impressed. Although what I’m about to write is a common complaint from classical theists (to the exasperation of its critics), Craig exhibits a basic misunderstanding of key points. Moreover, much of his argumentation is based on its consequences, not on its validity and soundness considered apart from the consequences Craig wishes to avoid (of course, that’s the argumentum ad consequentiam fallacy). He thinks that because classical theism contradicts the Bible and/or suffers from modal collapse (untrue, but entirely irrelevant to the soundness of the argument itself), it should be dismissed as unviable. For somebody who’s quick to spot the fallacious arguments his opponents commit, he appears astoundingly unaware when he walks right into that one.
Nonetheless, all of this you write is irrelevant, and you should know it. You’re not engaging my argument; you’re rather continuing to appeal to what philosophers think. I’m not into repeating myself over and over. I’ll just do it one more time. Either you engage it or let it go. The word act in the classical theist sense means that which is actual (being). That this is a scientific concept is obvious. Science is in the business of studying reality, that is, what is actual (or at least acting like there’s a real world out there to study). And potency is merely the capacity to change, which is also what science is in the business of studying. Consequently, your claim that the act/potency distinction in beings that change is unscientific is plainly false. Change occurs in beings that can change. This is so obvious that its denial is truly remarkable.
doc,
Delete"Are there ANY major philosophical or metaphysical propositions that are universally accepted among philosophers?"
A few, the very most basic.
1.There is an existence as opposed to absolutely nothing at all. Even on idealism, then the mental exists as opposed to absolutely nothing at all.
Even if I am god and you are a figment of my divine imagination, then my divinity exists, in that case.
2.I experience my experiences.
Even in the case that my concept of myself and the nature of reality is illusory, still, I must be experiencing the experiences that that I experience myself experiencing.
What is the point of all these debates about the existence of God? If God truly existed, no debate should be necessary. It would be obvious to us.
ReplyDeleteIt is obvious to some people. Look at the Miracle of the Sun and Our Lady of Fatima if you want obvious evidence of a miracle.
DeleteMany philosophers have discussed the problem of Divine Hiddenness before. It is not immediately evident that it is best for God to make Himself undoubtably known. Adam and Eve walked in the garden with God and still fell. The Israelites saw the Red Sea parted and still worshipped a golden calf. Judas Iscariot saw most of Christ’s miracles and still betrayed him.
Knowing God exists does not extinguish sin, so perhaps God has a good reason for making us do some philosophical work. I know it has helped me immensely in my life in a way I might have otherwise been deprived of if I had been given all of the answers with no effort on my part.
You might think the evil of slavery is obvious too or that abortion is clearly evil. Historically and presently these matters aren’t so clear. Even some have believed murder and rape are acceptable. Some believe the world is an illusion. Plenty believe that the literal colours and feelings they see do not actually exist due to their interpretation of modern science. And some look at the stars and intuit God exists, yet others mock them all the while saying this kind of thing is what you’d expect if God exists. Interesting don’t you think? God’s existence can actually be a very obvious fact that doesn’t require any argument at all. The mind can immediately grasp the vastness of the night sky along with its contingency and intuit that an incredible and almighty Creator exists. It is only when we darken our minds through materialistic thinking that we become unable to see this, or at least unable to trust our own mental processes. This is my interpretation of the state of things, meaning I don’t think much of yours. So it goes without saying I think you’re putting forth a bad argument. Perhaps, as a wise man once explained, if your point was true it should be a little more obvious to me.
DeleteIf God truly existed, no debate should be necessary. It would be obvious to us.
DeleteIt would indeed be obvious to the right kind of mind, with the right kind of input. For example, it is obvious to the angels. The technical term might be "manifest" to them. The truth is before their minds in a manner that cannot be avoided or denied.
Our minds work differently, and we can indeed (a) not receive sufficient evidence;
(b) not consider the evidence under the needed framework or not pursue it to the extent of reaching conclusions; or
(c) make an error of reasoning.
St. Thomas points out that God's existence is indeed "self-evident" but notes also that it is self-evident only to a mind capable of the required pre-requisites, which we are not.
Here are my thoughts on this discussion with Alex O’Connor:
ReplyDeleteI think Feser answered his second two objections well. I think a lot of the points Feser made about the first objections, the fact that the analysis of act and potency vis-a-vis change leads to the possibility that objects possess infinite sets of real potential attributes, were well stated as well.
Here are three points I would have liked to have seen him make more explicit (I understand it’s easy to miss these things when thinking on the fly):
The analysis of act and potency doesn’t necessarily lead to the belief in infinite sets of potencies. This is a matter of philosophy of nature. If someone had independent reasons for thinking that this was impossible, then he could simply deny that a coffee cup, for example, really does have the potential to be 140.5555… degrees Fahrenheit. One could appeal to quantum physics or some other such phenomena and say that maybe there really are discreet available temperatures after all, even if there are so many that they seem to be infinite to us. So it isn’t clear that this is a knockdown argument to the act/potency distinction even if infinite sets of potencies are problematic.
The second point which was not really addressed is: What is the motivation for avoiding infinite sets of potencies in the first place? The motivation for avoiding actual infinities is to avoid contradiction. For example, to have a sphere with infinite volume means to have an unbounded volume, but the definition of a sphere is a bounded volume where each point on its surface is equidistant from its center. So a sphere of infinite volume is an unbounded bounded volume, which of course violates the Law of Non-Contradiction. Similar analogies might be made with other attributes. However, the Law of Non-Contradiction is never violated with an infinite set of potencies. For example, to have an infinite set of potential sizes is not to have a potential for infinite size because each and every potential size in the infinite set is itself finite. And so such contradictions are avoided. Likewise a hotel may have an infinite set of potential rooms, but that does not mean Hilbert’s Hotel potentially exists, for each renovation of the hotel will have a finite number of rooms.
Nice response. I thought something similar in that is seems like there is a category mistake going on, applying actual existence to potential existence, which are mutually exclusive. Potency is indeterminateness in material beings (bracketing off consideration of angels) and excludes the notion of actuality (form). So, while we can think certain things, it may be an error to apply actuality in any way to potency in reality, saying there can be an actual set of infinite potencies in a thing at a given time. No, there is in reality just an indeterminateness in things for taking on new actualities under various circumstances in keeping with the limitations of things' essences. At any given time, there is only a finite set of actualities (accidental forms) in a thing.
DeleteThat said, there may not be any problem granting the existence of an actual set of infinite potentialities. The problem, as you say, is with an actual set of infinite actualities, which is not the same thing.
Regardless, the objection just leaves the objector in the position of Parmenides with being and nothingness, denying the existence of change and multiplicity - a much bigger problem which the ancient Greek world really had no good answer for until Aristotle. The objector should provide an alternative metaphysical account for the reality of change in the world or admit he is good with Parmenides’ position that change is an illusion.
Regardless, the objection just leaves the objector in the position of Parmenides wth being and nothingness, denying the existence of change and multiplicity - a much bigger problem which the ancient Greek world really had no good answer for until Aristotle. The objector should provide an alternative metaphysical account for the reality of change in the world or admit he is good with Parmenides’ position that change is an illusion.
DeleteI should have read your prior-to-mine time stamped comment, or read it through if it had actually posted up, before I tossed out my reference to Parmenides.
But then, that apparent antinomy which develops out of any attack on the reality of change or motion as a distinct causal relation, has been the more or less prominent background - and sometimes foreground - of these discussions.
As distinctions are analyzed away into a monistic - possibly undifferentiated something - what does remain?
You can see the desperation of the average ardent materialist - especially those with socialist or politically progressive leanings - to apply just enough deconstructive "scientific" acid to their social opponents' grounding to delegitimate them socially, while somehow avoiding an acidic backflow which undermines their own ability to pronounce authoritatively as coherent beings in a fundamentally intelligible world exhibiting real and subsistent categories.
They are always trying to figure out how much debunking they can in fact promote before they inevitably debunk themselves.
Thus avoiding in these cases, so they hope, the phenomenon of manifesting as a self-relativising relativizer, to once again borrow a formulation from Peter Berger and his sociology of knowledge theories.
It's quite a show.
The objector should provide an alternative metaphysical account for the reality of change in the world or admit he is good with Parmenides’ position that change is an illusion.
DeleteEven if one were inclined to try such an assertion (he is good with Parmenides' position 'change is an illusion, it merely appears to be real'), it is immediately self-defeating: there are the changing illusions. The illusions apparently undergo change. Calling them illusions doesn't eradicate the changing appearances that thus remain unaccounted for.,
@anonymous 12-18 7:30
DeleteGreat response.
ReplyDeleteThis brings me to my final point. A more explicit reductio ad absurdum might be made regarding the concept of potency. That is that if potency is real, then it seems that a thing possesses realities which contradict each other. For example a a ball of clay has the potency to be square at 4:00 PM and circle (not-square) at 4:00 PM. One could make an assortment of similar contradictions involving all of the ten categories. Therefore, it would seem to the objector that the notion of potency leads to hopeless contradiction. The response to this claim would be that potencies are disjunctive because they refer back to the substance which is in act and not to each other. This reference back to the substance means that their opposition to each other is not a violation of the Law of Non-contradiction. A substance may not both be and not be in the same respect and at the same time, and the potencies referring back to the substance ensures that they do not exist at the same time and in the same respect. The only way to make the potencies refer to each other is if one does so explicitly in which case they can no longer have this opposition. So for example, while a ball of clay has the potential to be square at 4:00 PM and the potential to be circle (not-square) at 4:00 PM, it does not have the potential to be square AND not-square at 4:00 PM. “And” is the operative word that conjoins the two otherwise disjunctive properties. Actualities on the other hand do refer to each other which is why they must never be mutually opposed. For example, actual rectangularity is referred to actual skinniness (in a piece of metal say) by virtue of the fact that such a piece of metal is actually a skinny rectangle. That is why skinny rectangles are possible and oftentimes actual. However, actual rectangularity would also be referred to actual triangularity, which is impossible. And that is why you will never find a triangular rectanglular piece of metal (prisms notwithstanding). So the notion of potency does not violate the Law of Non-Contradiction even if it may seem to at a first glance.
ReplyDeletePotential is defined as "having or showing the capacity to become or develop into something in the future.” Every specific physical identity has the potential to change, but our experience indicates that it is also constrained by its nature to only change within certain parameters. In fact, I argue that any identity only has the potential to change in predetermined ways. Two of those parameters are its identity and its nature. Any specific identity has the potential “to be,” only that which is within “its nature to be.” And things can only be a single “being/identity” at any moment of time. Notice how many times both parties in this discussion used the term “to be,” “is,” or some other form of the verb “to be.” Even in their referenced “cup of coffee.” (a specific identity) a specific cup of coffee does not have the nature “to be” a million degrees F. Also, when the exact temperature is specified, that particular cup of coffee is that specific identity and not any other identity. We humans do not have any experience to suggest that any physical being has the potential “to be” actualized to infinity. Even God, who would have to be infinite to exist, does not have the potential to be, or to do, anything which is not within his nature “to be,” or “to do.” That is not a contradiction—that is simply a constraint that we have leaned through observation of our physical world, and intellectually abstracting that learned information into conceptual information.
None of this takes anything away from Aristotle’s or Dr Feser’s discussions of potential, actualization, and the necessity of an actualizing agent who possesses the nature of the actualizer.
"a specific cup of coffee does not have the nature “to be” a million degrees F."
DeleteCups of coffee do not have natures, that is just an ancient abstraction, a human projection, a reification of your imagination.
Real causation is mutual, multilateral, differential, and in the present moment at the fundamental level.
There is no call for a first mover to account for observed change because at base materials change each other mutually.
Stardusty
DeleteYou need your blog.
Even though l usually disagree with you, you need a wider audience. I wouldn't say that about anyone else here.
Stardusty, I'm a little surprised that you're a realist about causation. I would've figured you would consider it just an 'abstraction', which is a typical escape hatch for you (that, and calling everything 'material' 😉).
DeleteWell, Doc, materials interact, so that can be called causation.
DeleteMost of folk causation, such as Aristotelian causation, are just abstractions, and typically rather poorly formed ones at that.
Russell wanted to eliminate "cause" as a word from our lexicon, believing it had become so polluted as a word, so attached to nonsense assertions, that it was no longer salvageable as a meaningful word.
I share Russell's view that "cause" has become deeply polluted with associated misconceptions. But, I think the term "causation" or "causal process" is salvageable in terms of mutual causation.
And yes, every thing is material. What else would a thing be other than material?
@DrYogami Men grow.
DeleteStardusty: Materials interact, therefore causation? How profound. But Aristotelian causation? 'Just abstractions'. Amazing. Let's eliminate cause from our lexicon, because it isn't meaningful. Oops, I just wrote 'because', so that's gotta go. Except that 'mutual causation' is salvageable. Whew.
DeleteAnd everything is 'material'. Well, I prefer the term flibbertigibbet. Everything is 'flibbertigibbet'. That's better!
HolyKnowing: Men grow? I suppose....Of course, growth is a causal word. Wonder if they do it mutually?
@DrYogami : Perhaps SD will soon realize he exists, and perhaps that Ari & Aqui's views are quite true.
DeleteUntil then, as it was mentionned multiple times, why do people engage SD? I mean, he clearly stated he thinks Feser is wrong, he misconstrued his arguments, he offers no defense for his view (and he doesn't express them coherently)... and he clearly doesn't believe he exists.
Aristotle once said : you don't argue with a vegetable, so... don't? :D
Merry Christmas to all of us, including SD when he'll be back to the real world. Let's rejoice in the birth of our Lord!
Doc,
Delete"Stardusty: Materials interact, therefore causation? How profound."
Material interaction is causation. Causal processes are the interactions of material. I don't find that especially profound, do you?
"I prefer the term flibbertigibbet. Everything is 'flibbertigibbet'. That's better!"
Ok, there is no god of language. The words you make up are as good as any other words. One disadvantage is that most people will not recognize "flibbertigibbet", but now that you have mentioned it I will known you mean material whenever you write flibbertigibbet.
Stardusty,
DeleteI don't find that especially profound, do you?
I just think it'd be more consistent if you regarded causation as an illusion. But whatever floats your boat.
Of course I didn't make up flibbertigibbett. Though it's possible that most people wouldn't recognize the term. As it seemed you didn't...though you accepted use of the word. How interesting.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flibbertigibbet
Well, doc, you got me on that one! Yes, I thought you made it up. To me it sounded like one of those goofy words one makes up on the spot that are intended to sound made up and arbitrarily unique.
DeleteThanks for the reference, I realize now that word is somewhat archaic but has a long history of widespread use.
But if you had made it up, fine. I mean, why not? All words are made up. Your made up words are as valid as anybody else's made up words.
But. lacking a conventional use, the words we make up are likely to be of little use in communicating with others. But who knows? Maybe you will coin a new word that catches on and becomes useful more broadly.
Then instead of being a kook who mutters unintelligible sounds you will be hailed as a linguistic trailblazer, a literary creative genius, a brilliant inventor of new and wonderful modes of communication.
There may be a fine line between genius and insanity, although by the lights of the typical poster here I am squarely in the realm of the latter.
Very well said.
ReplyDelete
ReplyDeleteThe objection based upon potentialities allowing actual infinites does not hold much force for me. We can use an analogy from computer science to illustrate why the objection is not compelling.
A variable of type integer, in a strongly typed language, can potentially have a range of values, often represented as constants: MAX_VALUE (231-1) and MIN_VALUE (-231). It is not difficult to imagine MIN_VALUE being -∞ and MAX_VALUE being ∞. In fact, languages such as Java have a "BigInteger" class to represent "Immutable arbitrary-precision integers". In this example, an integer variable can have an infinite number of potential values, but only one actual value at any point in time, T. The integer variable's value may be -500, -10, 0, 50, 9000, etc., but what it cannot be, unless it undergoes a substantial change, is the string "Hello, world!" because the variable is of type "integer" and not of type "String". In an analogous way, a ball may actually be the color red at time T, then be the color white at time T+1, but at no time can the ball have legs because things of type "ball" can not have legs.
"a ball may actually be the color red at time T, then be the color white at time T+1"
DeleteA ball cannot ever be a color.
Color is a hallucinatory experience of an animal with color vision. Color is an internally manufactured qualia process, not a property of external objects.
Which is another example of why one will not find the answers to the structure of the underlying reality, including the root of causality, motion, and change, by sitting around thinking and talking about macro objects.
Aquinas said "this cannot go on to infinity". He was wrong in his further analysis, logically invalid by arguing a false dichotomy as well as employing other defects in his arguments, but he was on the right track in that respect.
To discover the true nature of the underlying reality one must regress toward the infinitely small. Aquinas failed to regress any further than his hand or a piece of wood, so he made a rather crude attempt, but the idea of a regression that tends toward infinity was reasonable.
Stories about a father, son, and grandfather are irrelevant and provide no useful insight into causality.
The rock-stick-hand example is pointless.
Stories about a locomotive pulling train cars are of no analytical value.
To understand causality you will need to regress toward infinity. There you will find that all causation is:
mutual at base
in the present moment
differential
net lossless
fundamentally circular
multidirectional
There is no such thing a linear, hierarchical, one-way causal series. Such ideas are mere abstractions of folk causality.
Folk causality is what Aristotle, Aquinas, Feser, and all the rest consider. It is a rather crude, simplistic, unscientific way of attempting to reason a way toward causality by thinking about ordinary perceptions. Such an analytical process is doomed to failure.
Russell clearly showed many of the false notions of causality more than 100 years ago in On the Notion of Cause
https://www.hist-analytic.com/Russellcause.pdf
Dr. Feser is well aware of this publication and has published comments on it, much to the discredit of Dr. Feser, given the shallow strawman approach that was taken in those responses.
Russell expressed the opinion that the word "cause" has been so polluted with misconceptions that it should no longer be used in this context. I disagree with that approach, rather, I prefer to refer to causation as the interaction of materials.
Very obviously Aristotelian causation is nonsense. There is only the mutual interaction.
If you're wondering why interacting with SP and a loss of time : https://classicaltheism.boardhost.com/viewtopic.php?id=927
DeleteHe's just repeating the same nonsense, ad nauseam.
Anon,
DeleteYet you have no specific refutations.
No individual at that link, here, or any other location has any displayed capacity to defend against my disproofs of A-T on the merits.
Inertial motion falsifies the NECESSITY of a first mover.
All causation is mutual at base, which is fundamentally the circular case Duns Scotus addressed but Aquinas failed to address, making the First Way logically invalid by false dichotomy.
The last phrase in the First Way is a non-sequitur, what Koons calls "the gap problem".
You have no demonstrated capability to show how my disproofs are themselves wrong, but by all means, do correct me, specifically, on the merits.
Can you?
"Yet you have no specific refutations."
DeleteRefuting strawmen isn't a requirement. You keep saying inertia and mutual causation is a solution to the AT argument, but it isn't. Your response is a solution to an argument that AT isn't making. Your house of straw appears to bring you great comfort so rest easy and take pride in the fact that you built it yourself.
I wonder if there is a concept of potencies playing out here which is too focused on our *concept* of potencies rather than potencies *themselves* and thus becomes almost Platonic.
ReplyDeleteI mean, it is agreed that potency cannot be known per se but only by reference to the actuality it is the potency for. That being said, does it need to be the case that any enumerable potency (e.g. temperature) exists as a set of units exactly parallel to what we see in actuality or could it be different? Could there be an aspect of a unified continuum in potency that is only actualized as discrete quantities? Perhaps the mind defines and enumerates potencies which themselves exist in a less defined and continuous way because we are only able to conceptualize actualities. Thus the definition and enumeration which leads to Alex’s objections applies to the concept, not the object.
I say the alternative to this can lean Platonic in the sense that potencies are often spoken about as if they were invisible and (almost) independently existing entities that are in some “third realm” yet connected to the object. Joe Schmid once referred to potencies as “spooky” or “ghostly” I do recall, and now Alex speaks of them as “properties.” However, all potencies of a physical object exist in the matter itself and are brought out of that matter. Something in me wants to say that the better way to conceive of an object’s potentiality is to simply say an object is made of matter, and this one clump of matter contains all potency, rather than enumerating potential qualities as individual properties.
Thoughts?
The kid is way too long winded
ReplyDeleteThe suggestion that coffee might have qualitative change that could approximate the hottest possible temperature (i.e. "infinitely hot") shouldn't be granted. What coffee actually is limits it's qualitative potentiality. Being coffee does not admit being as hot as the sun. In other words, all accidents cannot inhere in all substances. If there were a qualitative change of temperature to a certain degree, this would destroy the substance. Just as humans can't have infinite qualitative change (i.e. become as hot as the Sun), nor can coffee.
ReplyDeleteWhat O'Connor is pointing toward is just a variation of Zeno's point about infinitely dividing something (e.g. infinitely dividing some distance and then proclaiming the movement is not possible). We both know that locomotion is possible and that coffee cannot be infinitely hot without a change in substance, so we also know that either the reasoning or the premises that lead to the conclusion that we cannot move or that coffee could be infinitely hot have gone wrong.
Alex's example of the father-son chain suspended in mid-air was a helpful illustration. The son does not need the father's continued existence to procreate, but would need his continued existence to be held in mid air. More than this, there must be some beginning to the "father-son mid-air chain" whose power to hold up is inherent and who does not require being held up. The early portion of the dialogue reflected that Alex was tracking with the arguments. However, he shifted usage of "actual" and "potential" in his critique which would entail equivocation if he depended on that shift to make it appear as though he were refuting Feser's arguments. Even if equivocation did not occur, shifting to his own usage without offering a definition or distinction between his usage and Feser's simply leads to confusion.
ReplyDeleteThere also should have been a definition of infinity. Understanding infinity as "not finite" would lead to greater precision. Once that was introduced and it was recognized that coffee as such cannot get "infinitely hot" because the heat would eventually break down the substance of coffee, then the discussion could move on from that sticking point for Alex (If the coffee breaks down at 10,000 degrees--fahrenheit, celsius, kelvin, etc, then it has not gotten infinitely hot; it can't after all become 100,000 degrees). The key metaphysical point is that what something actually is limits the potentiality of accidents for contingent beings (i.e. beings with accidents).