tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post997712348579758082..comments2024-03-28T13:39:03.094-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Della Rocca on PSREdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger594125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7247896219360022562015-02-24T15:10:56.933-08:002015-02-24T15:10:56.933-08:00Professor Feser,
Thanks for your post. I'm ve...Professor Feser,<br /><br />Thanks for your post. I'm very sympathetic to the PSR, but had a question I was hoping you could answer.<br /><br />You write that a Thomistic understanding of the PSR does not require one to accept that "propositions are among the things [that] require an explanation." Would you mind explaining how this claim does not amount to a version of (1) — i.e., that only those EAs which are not attempting to explain propositions are legitimate?JoPohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15266945428217730988noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-43123304017902318962014-10-24T14:47:29.075-07:002014-10-24T14:47:29.075-07:00@Vincent Torley:
"I gave you links relating ...@Vincent Torley:<br /><br />"I gave you links relating to Boethius' actual views, to save you the trouble of searching for them, and I adduced a quote from Origen showing that he held the Boethian view of God's foreknowledge even if Boethius himself probably didn't. What are you complaining about?"<br /><br />[tap tap tap] Is this microphone on? I wasn't asking you what "Boethius' actual views" were. If I ever need a refresher on that, I'll get it from Boethius (by reaching to the bookshelf a foot to my left), not from someone who has repeatedly demonstrated an inability to present anyone's views other than his own without getting them wrong.<br /><br />No, my question was how you had managed to persuade yourself that Boethius agreed with <i>you</i> (and, especially, <i>rather than</i> with Bañez, as though there were a significant contrast between their views on the present subject). But now that you've discovered* he didn't, the question is settled as far as I'm concerned.<br /><br />I'm also not sure why you regard Origen as relevant. Here, too, I was already familiar with his views on this subject, but I'm fairly sure he never claimed to be "Boethian"; that would have been difficult, as he died a bit over two centuries before Boethius was born. (Nor do I admit that his view is irreconcilable with those of Aquinas, Bañez, and Garrigou-Lagrange, but that's another discussion.)<br /><br />As for your alleged mathematical rigor, perhaps the less said the better. But it doesn't look very much like the mathematical rigor I encountered while earning a master's degree in the subject.<br /><br />Nor does it surprise me that, if you're relying so heavily on your "familiar[ity] with the <i>mathematical notation</i> used to express propositions in modal logic" [my emphasis], you have so much trouble understanding what Fr. G-L meant by <i>non-necessitating predetermination</i>**. I'm pretty sure there's no handy mathematical symbol for <i>that</i> modal operator.<br /><br />Brand Blanshard once related that a teacher of his had told him it was wise to know enough mathematics not to be taken in by it. I think I (and a number of other regulars here) qualify; I'm fairly sure you don't, which is probably why you seem to think non-mathematical subjects should look like math.<br /><br />Now, I don't intend to reply further to you on this subject; as far as I'm concerned, you came here with an axe to grind and you've been thoroughly exposed as, frankly, not knowing what the hell you were talking about—first about Fr. G-L, and then about Boethius. That's the end of it for me. You keep saying you're resting your case, but if you want the last word, it's yours.<br /><br />----<br /><br />* Don't waste your time (or mine) by trying to tell me you already knew. If you had, you've had ample occassion to say so—most notably, perhaps, in reply to my initial question, "Where do you think Aquinas departs from Boethius on this subject?" and then in reply to my question, "Does Boethius somewhere deny or otherwise contradict Aquinas's view that God's will is the first cause of human will and makes the latter effective?" If you were aware at the outset that you were using "Boethian" to mean "in disagreement with Boethius," don't you think you should have mentioned it sooner?<br /><br />** The expression is his; he used it <i>e.g.</i> on p. 529 of the second volume of the work to which you initially made reference and over which you supposedly pored so hard that you left the Catholic Church—so hard, indeed, that you still understand it clearly (and assume you understood it in the first place) despite not having read it for thirty years.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-85822977102466024682014-10-24T10:03:13.213-07:002014-10-24T10:03:13.213-07:00('Efficacious' should be substituted for e...('Efficacious' should be substituted for each instance of 'efficient' in "...and both 'e' and 'E' pertain to efficient grace -- with lower case 'e' representing efficient grace not received and upper case 'E' representing efficient grace received.")Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29605743419944569372014-10-24T09:21:42.868-07:002014-10-24T09:21:42.868-07:00And, of course, since your gedankenspiel is not re...And, of course, since your <i>gedankenspiel</i> is not relevantly connected to P, P does not deny what your <i>gedankenspiel</i> asserts, i.e., P does not deny that "the same sufficient grace might be given by God to two men, Alex and Bob, in identical circumstances, and...Alex might resist this grace[,] while Bob might not resist it".<br /><br />(And, to pick a nit, even if it did -- which it clearly does not -- the denial would be an <i>implicit</i> denial rather then an explicit denial.)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6451171453623291142014-10-24T09:02:40.135-07:002014-10-24T09:02:40.135-07:00Vincent,
Me: The passage you quote has to do with...Vincent,<br /><br />Me: <i>The passage you quote has to do with efficacious grace, not sufficient grace.</i><br /><br />What I mean by that is that the passage you quote has to do with two men each of whom receive <i>efficacious</i> grace but only one of whom is not converted, whereas your <i>gedankenspiel</i> has to do with two men each of whom receive <i>sufficient</i> grace but only one of whom does not resist.<br /><br />That the kind of grace receiving primary attention differs in the passage and the <i>gedankenspiel</i> is enough to show that the passage and the <i>gedankenspiel</i> are not relevantly connected with respect to the point in dispute.<br /><br />Even though efficacious grace is not explicitly mentioned in the passage, we may know that it is efficacious grace which is the grace receiving primary attention in it:<br /><br /><b>1.</b> The title of the chapter containing the passage is EFFICACIOUS GRACE;<br /><br /><b>2.</b> from the beginning of that chapter up to and including the passage, sufficient grace is mentioned but once (and only briefly in a parenthetical comment), whereas efficacious grace is mentioned five times; and, finally,<br /><br /><b>3.</b> the passage constitutes the fourth paragraph of a section commencing with: "4. <i>St. Thomas.</i> We shall first cite the texts from the Summa in proper sequence so that it may appear how this doctrine of intrinsically efficacious grace is necessarily connected with all the principles of St. Thomas' doctrine with regard to the relations between God and creatures."<br /><br />If you'd like to see a more 'mathematical'-like approach showing that, how and why your <i>gedankenspiel</i> is not relevantly connected to the passage, then here it is:<br /><br /><b>1.</b> there are two men, Alex and Bob;<br /><br /><b>2.</b> there also are two basic kinds of grace, sufficient grace and efficacious grace;<br /><br /><b>3.</b> each of the two basic kinds of grace can be either received or not received; so that, given that the two men receive equal assistance,<br /><br /><b>4.</b> there are four possible cases as follows:<br /><br /><i>a)</i> Alex[s,e] and Bob[s,e]<br /><i>b)</i> Alex[s,E] and Bob[s,E]<br /><i>c)</i> Alex[S,e] and Bob[S,e]<br /><i>d)</i> Alex[S,E] and Bob[S,E]...<br /><br />...where both 's' and 'S' pertain to sufficient grace -- with lower case 's' representing sufficient grace not received and upper case 'S' representing sufficient grace received; and both 'e' and 'E' pertain to efficient grace -- with lower case 'e' representing efficient grace not received and upper case 'E' representing efficient grace received.<br /><br />If three of the four cases can be ruled out as not being relevantly connected to P, where P refers to the passage you quote, then the remaining case must be the case which is relevantly connected to P.<br /><br />Case <i>a)</i> can be ruled out in two ways: <i>i)</i> on the technicality that, since neither Alex nor Bob receive any grace, Alex and Bob do not receive equal assistance; and, <i>ii)</i> on the premise that no one can be converted without receiving efficacious grace.<br /><br />Case <i>b)</i> can be ruled out on the premise that no one can receive efficacious grace without also receiving sufficient grace.<br /><br />And case <i>c)</i> can be ruled out for the second reason case <i>a)</i> has been ruled out, i.e., on the premise that no one can be converted without receiving efficacious grace.<br /><br />This leaves case <i>d)</i> as the lone, sole, one and only of the four cases relevantly connected to P.<br /><br />What G-L says in P is that Alex[S,E] and Bob[S,E] -- when only one of the two is converted -- is not possible.<br /><br />Your <i>gedankenspiel</i> involves Alex[S,e] and Bob[S,E], which isn't one of the four possible cases, and, therefore, is not relevantly connected to P.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39909013564412387462014-10-23T21:46:21.409-07:002014-10-23T21:46:21.409-07:00("...in no way supports your contention that ...("...in no way supports your contention that it cannot be that..." s/b "...in no way supports your contention that, by that, G-L explicitly denied that...")Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69735589038377815902014-10-23T21:31:45.413-07:002014-10-23T21:31:45.413-07:00Vincent,
The passage you quote has to do with eff...Vincent,<br /><br />The passage you quote has to do with efficacious grace, not sufficient grace. <br /><br />However, G-L does turn his attention to sufficient grace later in the chapter, where, amongst other things, he writes:<br /><br />"[T]he will lacks efficacious grace because it resists sufficient grace; but if its resists sufficient grace, this is not because it lacks efficacious grace; its own deficiency suffices as a cause of such resistance." Cf. Ia IIae, q. 112, a. 3 ad 2: 'The first cause of this deficiency of grace is on our part, but the first cause of the conferring of grace is on the part of God, according to the words: "Destruction is thy own, O Israel: thy help is only in Me."'"<br /><br />That it cannot be that "of two men equally tempted and equally assisted, one should be converted and not the other" in no way supports your contention that it cannot be that "the same sufficient grace might be given by God to two men, Alex and Bob, in identical circumstances, and...Alex might resist this grace[,] while Bob might not resist it". <br /><br />Note that while the former case cannot obtain, the latter case can obtain; and that the reason for this difference is that -- as already indicated -- the former case has to do with efficacious grace, and the latter case with sufficient grace.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5970747309466284672014-10-23T19:27:47.582-07:002014-10-23T19:27:47.582-07:00Glenn,
Sorry, but your attempt to vindicate Garro...Glenn,<br /><br />Sorry, but your attempt to vindicate Garroigou-Lagrange is unconvincing. You argue that 'not resisting' and 'consenting' are not the same thing, and you further suggest that in order for efficacious grace to be bestowed on a man, he must first not resist the sufficient grace, adding that "if sufficient grace is given to the man, and the man resists it, then nothing more is given." What you're saying, then, is that the same sufficient grace might be given by God to two men, Alex and Bob, in identical circumstances, and that Alex might resist this grace (and because of this, God will withhold efficacious grace from him), while Bob might not resist it, and that consequently, God will bestow efficacious grace upon Bob, who will then make a good choice. But Garrigou-Lagrange explicitly denies this in the passages which I quoted above: <br /><br />"Question 14, On the knowledge of God, a.5: 'Since the divine power is extended to other things, inasmuch as it is itself the first effective cause of all being, it must be that God knows other things than Himself. He sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself.' BUT IF, OF TWO MEN EQUALLY TEMPTED AND EQUALLY ASSISTED, ONE SHOULD BE CONVERTED AND NOT THE OTHER, THIS DIFFERENCE WOULD NOT BE FROM GOD. Therefore God could not know it in Himself, in His own power, contrary to the principle of St. Thomas."<br /><br />Here, G-L categorically rejects the possibility of two men in identical circumstances (equally tempted and equally assisted) responding to God's grace in different ways (with one being converted and not the other), because then God would have no way of knowing "in Himself" [i.e. without the help of creatures] how any particular man would respond to His grace - that is, whether he would accept it or reject it.<br /><br />So I'm afraid your proposal to get the Banezian God off the hook and exonerate Him from responsibility for sin does not succeed.<br /><br />Scott:<br /><br />I gave you links relating to Boethius' actual views, to save you the trouble of searching for them, and I adduced a quote from Origen showing that he held the Boethian view of God's foreknowledge even if Boethius himself probably didn't. What are you complaining about? <br /><br />Goodbye.<br />Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-36951889440297607172014-10-23T01:18:50.668-07:002014-10-23T01:18:50.668-07:00Torley: In describing myself as a Boethian, I was ...Torley: <i>In describing myself as a Boethian, I was very careful not to say that this was Boethius' own view. Scholars continue to argue about that, and it seems that he probably wasn't one.</i><br /><br />You mean you are Boethian, but it seems Boethius wasn't Boethian? <br /><br />Just when I thought it can't get any better, or should I say worse...E.Seignernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58508376536995953802014-10-23T00:03:04.719-07:002014-10-23T00:03:04.719-07:00TaylorMWeaver: I like Santi. He is engaging and ge...TaylorMWeaver: <i>I like Santi. He is engaging and generally respectful, even if he can seem a bit sure of himself at times. I don't think it is malicious.</i><br /><br />But the fact is he isn’t respectful; he’s actually quite rude. His posts may not be laced with obscenities, but he does not pay attention when people reply to him, he does not make a meaningful attempt to find out what he’s talking about, he veers off-topic (and doesn’t even stick to his own topic(s)), and ends up drowning out thoughtful conversations in any thread by clogging it up with interminable maundering chatter. It’s rude to the people trying to converse with him, it’s rude to the people who are trying to follow the serious discussions, and it’s rude to Ed as host of this forum. <br /><br />I’m not immune to the temptation to respond to these sorts of comments myself, but I think it behooves us in general to give certain posters the lack of attention they deserve. Even whether someone is deliberately malicious or not is in many respects pragmatically irrelevant. If someone wants serious responses, he should act seriously.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-30484004475492053242014-10-22T23:10:14.983-07:002014-10-22T23:10:14.983-07:00Scott,
Just a short response to your query about ...Scott,<br /><br />Just a short response to your query about Boethius. In describing myself as a Boethian, I was very careful not to say that this was Boethius' own view. Scholars continue to argue about that, and it seems that he probably wasn't one. See here (especially the last paragraph of section 6): http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/boethius/#6 . One theologian who did uphold the Boethian view, however, was Origen in his "Contra Celsus" Book II chapter 20 ( http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/04162.htm ): "Celsus imagines that an event, predicted through foreknowledge, comes to pass because it was predicted; but we do not grant this, maintaining that he who foretold it was not the cause of its happening, because he foretold it would happen; but the future event itself, which would have taken place though not predicted, afforded the occasion to him, who was endowed with foreknowledge, of foretelling its occurrence." (See http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/04162.htm .)<br /><br />Re determinism, I might add that while modal logic is not my specialty, I do have a Ph.D. in philosophy and am quite familiar with the mathematical notation used to express propositions in modal logic. I don't know what your back ground is, but the fact that neither you nor Brandon attempted to formalize what you were trying to say in mathematical terms, or to provide any rigorous definitions for your terms, speaks for itself. <br /><br />And now I really must go. Bye.Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14191220567335642082014-10-22T08:59:02.119-07:002014-10-22T08:59:02.119-07:00Vincent,
You dramatize G-L's position as foll...Vincent,<br /><br />You dramatize G-L's position as follows: <i>God says: "Wicked man! You resisted my sufficient grace! Because you did that, I'm not going to give you any efficacious grace!"</i><br /><br />1. Rev 3:20: "Behold, I stand at the door, and knock: if any man hear my voice, and open the door, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he with me."<br /><br />2. G-L (Chapter 59 <a href="http://www.ewtn.com/library/theology/reality.htm#59" rel="nofollow">here</a>): "[I]f the sinner would not resist sufficient grace, he would receive the efficacious grace, which is offered in the preceding sufficient grace, as fruit is offered in the blossom. If he resists he merits privation of new aid."<br /><br />3. Observation: In light of how G-L's position has been dramatized above, perhaps Rev 3:20 ought to be dramatized as follows, "Wicked man! You resisted my voice and refused to open the door! Because you did that, I'm not going to sup with you, nor allow you to sup with me!" (For shame, for shame.)<br /><br />- - - - -<br /><br />As for 'not resisting' and 'consenting', the former and the latter are not one and the same. If it be thought that they are, then mustn't it likewise be thought that Jesus was telling us to consent to evil when He told us not to resist it? (For shame, for shame.)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-64808742708473476072014-10-22T07:17:26.800-07:002014-10-22T07:17:26.800-07:00@yaylormweaver
But, he obviously doesn't want...@yaylormweaver<br /><br /><i>But, he obviously doesn't want to put the time in that it takes to understand Thomism. And, he doesn't want to put the time in to see what the genuine disapprovals that the majority have here</i><br /><br />I do take issue with how badly his arguments are formed, that and they can be quite long. It makes a reply tiresome. <br /><br />I will agree he isn't as snarky as others even if he is more confident than justified.Irish Thomistnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-68881406854040520692014-10-21T23:14:49.793-07:002014-10-21T23:14:49.793-07:00Vincent,
Notice that G-L freely admits that "...Vincent,<br /><br /><i>Notice that G-L freely admits that "in order that a man may not sin, but consent to sufficient grace, efficacious grace is required."</i><br /><br />Technically, he granted it. But we'll let that slide. More pertinent is that non-resistance is prior to consent, and that if there is non-resistance, then the efficacious grace is given (i.e., not rendered sterile (see below)), and the sufficient grace is consented to.<br /><br /><i>Once again, he's acknowledging that if sufficient grace is given to the man, and nothing more, he will sin.</i><br /><br />If sufficient grace is given to the man, and the man resists it, then nothing more is given (so to speak).<br /><br /><i>In order for him not to sin, efficacious grace must be additionally bestowed.</i><br /><br />In order for that efficacious grace to be bestowed, he must first not resist the sufficient grace.<br /><br /><i>But then G-L tries to exonerate God from blame.</i><br /><br />What man (homo) who is a man (vir) would seek to exonerate the creature and blame God?<br /><br /><i>He writes that the man "is deprived of efficacious grace because by sinning he resists sufficient grace." But this is wholly unconvincing.</i><br /><br />Why? Think ye perhaps that sinning constitutes non-resistance to sufficient grace?<br /><br /><i>God bestows on the man sufficient grace and nothing more.</i><br /><br />God bestows both sufficient grace and efficacious grace -- "Doubt: 'How is efficacious grace offered to us in sufficient grace?' Reply: 'As the fruit is offered to us in the flower[.]" The latter, however, is rendered sterile through resistance to sufficient grace.<br /><br /><i>The man then resists it - as he certainly will, if he is given merely sufficient grace.</i><br /><br />It is not at all certain that the man will resist it. And if he doesn't resist it, then the efficacious grace does its thing.<br /><br /><i>God says: "Wicked man! You resisted my sufficient grace! Because you did that, I'm not going to give you any efficacious grace!"</i><br /><br />A shot in the dark: Perhaps some adult in your childhood 'reasoned' with you in such a manner, and you are now putting in God's mouth a paraphrasing of that chastisement.<br /><br /><i>And G-L has the hide to blame the man's defective will!</i><br /><br />Once again, "[T]he received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver."<br /><br /><i>Come on. That's a lame argument if ever I saw one.</i><br /><br />For the man (homo) who cares not about being a man (vir) it likely is.<br /><br /><i>So G-L was a theological determinist after all - he just wasn't very good at justifying his position.</i><br /><br />Yup, G-L did a poor job at justifying his position as a theological determinist--and so far you haven't done any better in attempting to rationalize it.<br /><br /><i>Would it be too much to ask for an apology?</i><br /><br />You're free to ask. But I think it would be premature for you to do so at this time.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61330767063517891332014-10-21T18:46:43.020-07:002014-10-21T18:46:43.020-07:00@Vincent Torley:
"I've found some more p...@Vincent Torley:<br /><br />"I've found some more passages in Garrigou-Lagrange which establish beyond all doubt that he was a theological determinist."<br /><br />This has grown well beyond tiresome.<br /><br />"Would it be too much to ask for an apology?"<br /><br />Yes. You're wrong yet again, for the very same reasons we've pointed out to you repeatedly.<br /><br />"What I maintain as a Boethian is that God's knowledge of human agents' choices is CAUSED BY those agents making those choices."<br /><br />I already know what you maintain; I asked you where Boethius maintained it. But you needn't bother replying, especially since I'm fairly confident that you can't.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29379297458318591292014-10-21T18:41:48.316-07:002014-10-21T18:41:48.316-07:00Scott writes:
"it's not at all clear to ...Scott writes:<br /><br />"it's not at all clear to me in what sense you claim to be a Boethian rather than a Bañezian." <br /><br />What I maintain as a Boethian is that God's knowledge of human agents' choices is CAUSED BY those agents making those choices. In other words, human agents make God (timelessly) aware of their decisions. Human agents thus have the power to determine God. To Banezians, such a doctrine is anathema: nothing, they say, can determine God, as He is Pure Act.<br /><br />I reply: there is nothing objectionable or contrary to God's dignity in Him freely choosing to confer upon His creatures the power to make Him (timelessly) aware of their free decisions. Also, the argument from motion (Aquinas' First Way) does not establish the existence of a Being Who is Pure Act. Rather, what it establishes is the existence of a Being Whose power to actualize things (by maintaining them in existence) is not derived from any other being. That's all. I could explain in more detail, but I've already done so in my post, "On not putting all your theological eggs into one basket" at http://www.uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/on-not-putting-all-your-theological-eggs-into-one-basket/ .<br /><br />Well, all good things must come to an end. It's about time for me to sign off now, I think. We have had a lively and vigorous discussion. Hopefully we all understand one another's views a little better now. All the best, Vincent.Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-712691412742171282014-10-21T18:27:33.078-07:002014-10-21T18:27:33.078-07:00Hi Glenn. Scott and Brandon,
Back again. In these...Hi Glenn. Scott and Brandon,<br /><br />Back again. In these passages, G-L clearly denies the possibility of God giving the same grace to two men in identical circumstances, and of one repenting (choice X) and the other not repenting (choice not-X). He also declares that efficacious grace produces virtuous choices "of itself and not from our consent."<br /><br />That's theological determinism. No two ways about it.<br /><br />Glenn, you quoted me the following passages in Garrigou-Lagrange:<br /><br />Objection: "I insist. To neglect or resist sufficient grace is not to consent to it or to sin at least by a sin of omission. But in order that a man may not neglect or resist sufficient grace, efficacious grace is required. Therefore man sins because he is deprived of efficacious grace, in other words, from an insufficiency of help."<br /><br />Refutation: "Reply. I grant the major, and the minor as well, but deny the conclusion, for the real conclusion is: 'therefore, in order that a man may not sin, but consent to sufficient grace, efficacious grace is required,' and this is true. (Cf. De malo, q. 3, a. I ad g.) But it is false to say that man sins because he is deprived of efficacious grace; rather, on the contrary, it should be said that he is deprived of efficacious grace because by sinning he resists sufficient grace. For a man to sin, his own defective will suffices..."<br /><br />(End of Quote)<br /><br />Notice that G-L freely admits that "in order that a man may not sin, but consent to sufficient grace, efficacious grace is required." Once again, he's acknowledging that if sufficient grace is given to the man, and nothing more, he will sin. In order for him not to sin, efficacious grace must be additionally bestowed.<br /><br />But then G-L tries to exonerate God from blame. He writes that the man "is deprived of efficacious grace because by sinning he resists sufficient grace." But this is wholly unconvincing. God bestows on the man sufficient grace and nothing more. The man then resists it - as he certainly will, if he is given merely sufficient grace. God says: "Wicked man! You resisted my sufficient grace! Because you did that, I'm not going to give you any efficacious grace!" And G-L has the hide to blame the man's defective will! Come on. That's a lame argument if ever I saw one.<br /><br />So G-L was a theological determinist after all - he just wasn't very good at justifying his position. <br /><br />Would it be too much to ask for an apology?Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-32909257932954235992014-10-21T18:25:34.226-07:002014-10-21T18:25:34.226-07:00Hi Glenn, Scott and Brandon,
Thank you for your c...Hi Glenn, Scott and Brandon,<br /><br />Thank you for your comments. I'd like to clear up the issue of determinism once and for all. <br /><br />Determinism, in a nutshell, is the view that it is not possible for identical causes in identical circumstances to have dissimilar effects. The effect we are talking about in this case is a human agent's choice to do X or not do X. Theological determinism is simply the view that if God acts in a particular way in circumstances C where a human agent is making a choice between X and not-X, and the agent chooses X, then it would not have been possible for God to have acted in the same way in the same circumstances on the same agent, and for that agent to have chosen not-X. <br /><br />I've found some more passages in Garrigou-Lagrange which establish beyond all doubt that he was a theological determinist. They can be found online at http://www.ewtn.com/library/Theology/grace1.htm and http://www.ewtn.com/library/Theology/grace7.htm , and are taken from his Commentary on the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas, Chapters One and Seven. <br /><br />In chapter one, G-L writes:<br /><br />"This principle of predilection presupposes that the divine decrees in regard to our future acts conducive to salvation are INFALLIBLY EFFICACIOUS OF THEMSELVES and not from a foreknowledge of our consent (Ia, q. 19, a. 8). Otherwise, OF TWO MEN EQUALLY LOVED AND ASSISTED BY GOD, ONE WOULD BE IN SOME RESPECT BETTER. He would be better of himself and not so far as preferred by God; and therefore the free determination in him to be saved would be something good which would not proceed from the source of all good, contrary to the words of St. Paul: 'For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?' (I Cor. 4:7.)"<br /><br />In chapter seven, G-L quotes a passage from Aquinas in an attempt to show that Aquinas held the same view as he did.<br /><br />"Question 14, On the knowledge of God, a.5: 'Since the divine power is extended to other things, inasmuch as it is itself the first effective cause of all being, it must be that God knows other things than Himself. He sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself.' BUT IF, OF TWO MEN EQUALLY TEMPTED AND EQUALLY ASSISTED, ONE SHOULD BE CONVERTED AND NOT THE OTHER, THIS DIFFERENCE WOULD NOT BE FROM GOD. Therefore God could not know it in Himself, in His own power, contrary to the principle of St. Thomas."<br /><br />Later, he quotes from the Summa Theologica, question 19, article 4:<br /><br />"'The will of God is the cause of goodness in things and so, on this account, some things are better, because God wills greater good to them. Hence it follows that He loves better things more.' BUT OF TWO MEN EQUALLY TEMPTED, IF ONE DOES NOT RESIST GRACE AND THE OTHER DOES, THE FIRST IS BETTER. Therefore he is better because God wills greater good to Him. In other words, THE PRINCIPLE OF PREDILECTION (nobody is better than another unless he is better loved by God) PRESUPPOSES GRACE TO BE EFFICACIOUS OF ITSELF AND NOT FROM OUR CONSENT. Likewise, De providentia, Ia, q. 22, a. 2 ad 4; a. 4."<br /><br />To be continued...Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29802439294173445082014-10-21T17:10:20.998-07:002014-10-21T17:10:20.998-07:00Santi tried to play the epistemic game of cool dis...Santi tried to play the epistemic game of cool dispassionate agnosticism.<br /><br />Then he decided that even though he does not believe there are any objective values (he ascribes the claim a probability of less than 1%), if there <i>were</i> objective values, then certainly 'gay marriage' would be among them, and it would be consistent with Thomism. (How someone who disbelieves in objective values and is unfamiliar with Thomistic metaethics or essentialism acquired this intuition remains obscure.) So he embarked upon a task of insisting that there is a way to integrate 'gay marriage' into Thomism. Ultimately there was some flexibility allowed in what 'integrating' would constitute. He neatly summarized his point: "Love. Orient to love. If that means upending certain premises underlying the old time metaphysics, you better start thinking about how to do it now." Start with the conclusion; fit the principles to the conclusion. (Justify this move by designating every conclusion you favor as "oriented to love.")<br /><br />Santi believes that this is what everyone else does when they do metaphysics. But what I think he has shown us is that it is not actually the case (as he earlier claimed) that one can derive whatever conclusions one wants from 'non-empirical' metaphysical speculation.Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12501379055563645462014-10-21T16:43:33.761-07:002014-10-21T16:43:33.761-07:00Taylor,
You are correct he is generally cordial a...Taylor,<br /><br />You are correct he is generally cordial and non-aggressive, but he does have many trolling characteristics which make it pointless to engage with him, such as an unwilling to learn about the positions he is critiquing; making self-assured statements about a wide variety of areas he clearly knows little about; committing numerous gross fallacies and not realising or carrying; and generally jumping from half-baked claim to half-baked claim. <br /><br />This type of troll, for want of a better name, is quite common. Alan Fox is similar, though he doesn't write as well as Santi. Jeremy Talylornoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46722333027889019742014-10-21T16:33:35.720-07:002014-10-21T16:33:35.720-07:00I like Santi. He is engaging and generally respect...I like Santi. He is engaging and generally respectful, even if he can seem a bit sure of himself at times. I don't think it is malicious. I think he believes he has Thomism figured out quite completely.<br /><br />He obviously cares, and isn't a troll in the usual sense. He doesn't snipe anyone, usually, and doesn't engage in ad hominems. <br /><br />But, he obviously doesn't want to put the time in that it takes to understand Thomism. And, he doesn't want to put the time in to see what the genuine disapprovals that the majority have here would do to the critiques he has concocted. Thus, his understanding isn't really subject to error or correction. This became particularly obvious to me when I googled his name and found a blog article he wrote on Thomism. <br /><br />Of course, it has the same arguments he has used here. What a shame. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-8283307390447232772014-10-21T12:37:49.292-07:002014-10-21T12:37:49.292-07:00@Santi
I lost interest in your 'argument'...@Santi<br /><br />I lost interest in your 'argument' now that you have changed your mind and embrace philosophy 'just not metaphysics' now. So changing ones position just to win is okay then. To me this all seems sophist.<br /><br /><i>But I think of metaphysics as akin to poetry. If you can't ground arguments in empiricism and experience, you can't really say with certainty whether what you're claiming is in fact true or merely clever.</i> I mean what? You must be new to Aquinas or at the very least misunderstand the entire Thomistic line.Irish Thomistnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42463378760118431952014-10-21T09:44:57.984-07:002014-10-21T09:44:57.984-07:00(Yikes, he did it again: "...another typo in ...(Yikes, he did it again: "...another typo in my 8:07 PM comment.." s/b "...another typo in my 8:06 PM comment.." Life is never dull.)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3960890843025995612014-10-21T09:26:46.365-07:002014-10-21T09:26:46.365-07:00I just noticed another typo in my 8:07 PM comment ...I just noticed another typo in my 8:07 PM comment of yesterday, located in: "Sufficient grace gives the power to go good..." Of course, that should be: "Sufficient grace gives the power to <i>do</i> good..." <br /><br />On further reflection, however, the typo proves to be an interesting one -- for: <br /><br /><i>a)</i> if it is a career criminal who is in reception of sufficient grace, then the sufficient grace gives him the power to go [straight]; and, <br /><br /><i>b)</i> if it is an inveterate sinner who is in reception of sufficient grace, then the sufficient grace does indeed give him the power to go good.<br /><br />Anyway...<br /><br />In chapter 6 of his <a href="http://www.ewtn.com/library/Theology/gracegarrlagr.HTM" rel="nofollow">Grace: Commentary on the <i>Summa Theologica</i> of St. Thomas</a>, G-L provides refutations for some of the objections against the Thomistic doctrine of sufficient grace. <br /><br />One of the objections refuted looks like a cousin -- a distant cousin, perhaps, but a cousin nonetheless -- of what another commenter has alleged G-L himself to have believed ("if [the will] receives a merely sufficient grace, it [freely] chooses to do the wrong thing"). <br /><br />Let's see how G-L refutes his (perhaps distant) cousin:<br /><br />Objection: "<b>I insist.</b> To neglect or resist sufficient grace is not to consent to it or to sin at least by a sin of omission. But in order that a man may not neglect or resist sufficient grace, efficacious grace is required. Therefore man sins because he is deprived of efficacious grace, in other words, from an insufficiency of help."<br /><br />Refutation: "<b>Reply.</b> I grant the major, and the minor as well, but deny the conclusion, for the real conclusion is: 'therefore, in order that a man may not sin, but consent to sufficient grace, efficacious grace is required,' and this is true. (Cf. <i>De malo</i>, q. 3, a. I ad g.) But it is false to say that man sins because he is deprived of efficacious grace; rather, on the contrary, it should be said that he is deprived of efficacious grace because by sinning he resists sufficient grace. For a man to sin, his own defective will suffices..."Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19937601234656955122014-10-20T20:15:08.907-07:002014-10-20T20:15:08.907-07:00@Vincent Torley:
"Um, I think I made it pret...@Vincent Torley:<br /><br />"Um, I think I made it pretty clear in my posts above that I'm not a Banezian, but a Boethian, and that I don't regard the Banezian view as compatible with true libertarian freedom. Cheers."<br /><br />Um, I think I've made it pretty clear that what you reject is not Bañezianism but your own misunderstanding of it. I also don't seem to recall that you answered my questions about where you think Aquinas, Bañez, or Garrigou-Lagrange departed specifically from Boethius's account of <i>free will</i> even though they shared his view of divine foreknowledge, so it's not at all clear to me in what sense you claim to be a Boethian <i>rather than</i> a Bañezian. Cheers.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.com