tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post9078695449700865621..comments2024-03-28T21:43:44.433-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Accept no imitationsEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger151125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91421546231749603922017-02-21T15:12:00.794-08:002017-02-21T15:12:00.794-08:00The other frustrating thing is the changing defini...The other frustrating thing is the changing definition of the singularity. Originally it meant technology advancing so quickly that human beings could not keep up. By that definition, we've already achieved that. The definition you found, that involves computer "sentience" is the first I've heard of it in that form. It is both amusing and frustrating that these compelling concepts develop a life of their own and develop almost mystical powers of expansion. Makes having a rational argument even more challenging. Talithahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00609037188135802885noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52209292205863998932015-04-20T02:23:49.005-07:002015-04-20T02:23:49.005-07:00Recognition, labeling, etc. will be problems once ...Recognition, labeling, etc. will be problems once humanoid robots are indistinguishable from human-borns and clinic-borns.<br /><br />And then there's the problem of increasingly mechanized humans because of injuries or whatever, especially those who have command arrays as well as memory arrays interfaced to their brains. This technology is surely headed for deeper and more comprehensive proxy capabilities in or in place of the brain.<br /><br />But there's a kind of self-reference problem as well. If a machine behaves in ways that require being described as intelligence, thinking, deliberation, reflection, or even being upset, confused, or in pain, then there's no justification for denying that the machine has consciousness, because that behavior is the only evidence we have for saying that humans have consciousness.<br />machinephilosophyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07715878687266064548noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40024477246612827922015-03-12T07:17:14.628-07:002015-03-12T07:17:14.628-07:00>Whether pyrite might be taken by someone to be...>Whether pyrite might be taken by someone to be gold and whether pyrite is in fact gold are just two different questions<br /><br />Holy cow! Mr. Feser, you need to read more lesswrong.com<br /><br />"Gold" is a category of observable properties. "Pyrite" is also a category of observable properties. Some of these overlap, hence the untrained eye can mistake one for the other.<br /><br />However enough investigation always tells the difference, because if no observable properties whatsoever would differ, "gold" and "pyrite" would be synonymous categories, same ways a "gold" and "aurum" are.<br /><br />There is no "in fact". This is just the fallacy of thinking things have an essence, the fallacy of thinking things-as-such exist, when things are just categories for properties occuring together.<br /><br />Really please read this: http://lesswrong.com/lw/no/how_an_algorithm_feels_from_inside/DVHnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-68717514996326197292015-03-10T11:59:25.773-07:002015-03-10T11:59:25.773-07:00Greetings from Finland. This is a great blog. ;)
...Greetings from Finland. This is a great blog. ;)<br /><br />Maybe someone (if Ed is busy) could help me fill out a Scholastic hole that was left glaring in the original post -- at least in my thinking:<br /><br /><i>Left to themselves, metal bits don’t display time, and stones don’t fly. And left to themselves, machines don’t converse. So, that we can make them converse no more shows that they are intelligent than throwing stones or making watches shows that stones have the power of flight or that bits of metal qua metal can tell time.</i><br /><br />Well, left to "themselves", atoms don't photosynthesize, either. The supposedly substantial form of chlorophyll's power of photosynthesis comes from information in DNA -- information that orders the atoms into molecules that, when combined properly, will create sugars and oxygen from water and carbon dioxide using light energy.<br /><br />This organizing information comes originally from an outside source, the Mind that has a teleological purpose in view for these molecules.<br /><br />I fail to see why a watch lacks the substantial form of telling time or a computer lacks the substantial form of conversing, if an outside mind with a teleological purpose in view has given the information and arranged the metal bits or electronic components in such a configuration that telling time or conversing is possible.<br /><br /><b>Why</b>, from a Scholastic point of view, <b>is it not an accidental form of atoms to photosynthesize</b>, if, left to themselves (without God's teleology), they would do no such thing?raapustushttp://raapustus.net/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75163678750471643262015-02-27T07:55:56.888-08:002015-02-27T07:55:56.888-08:00Thanks again for yet another excellent essay on th...Thanks again for yet another excellent essay on the meaning of intelligence. There is one thing I would like tackled directly, though.<br /><br />Can the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technological_singularity" rel="nofollow">Singularity</a> even happen? I know that computers cannot think from the article, but do they necessarily have to? All they have to do is modify their own source code to improve themselves at modifying their source code...<br /><br />Wait a second.<br /><br />Define "improve".*<br /><br />*And no, I'm not British.AlKhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08485372690554353162noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49155167106212796132015-02-26T09:31:26.303-08:002015-02-26T09:31:26.303-08:00Alan,
The process appears to me to be the same fo...Alan,<br /><br /><i>The process appears to me to be the same for man or beast, as I stated earlier.</i><br /><br />Nonetheless, you believe that humans alone are capable of rational thought, and are uncomfortable with birds and beasts possessing intellect.<br /><br />So, perhaps we can wind up this discussion by agreeing to each of three things:<br /><br />1. At least most of the regulars here would agree that humans alone are capable of rational thought;<br /><br />2. none of them has suggested that birds and beast possess intellect; and,<br /><br />3. no orthodox Thomist would suggest that intellect is possessed by either bird or beast.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27874435313342160652015-02-26T08:00:13.949-08:002015-02-26T08:00:13.949-08:00Glenn: ‘The object is seen, and its form understo...Glenn: ‘The object is seen, and its form understood’ – Seeing triggers the recollection in an instant, the knowledge has been acquired over a lifetime. The process appears to me to be the same for man or beast, as I stated earlier.<br />I explained earlier how wolves demonstrate their understanding. And perhaps it is wisdom that keeps them from domesticating rabbits - Jared Diamond (of Guns Germs and Steel fame) on the domestication of food by humans: ‘The Worst Mistake in the History of the Human Race’<br />http://discovermagazine.com/1987/may/02-the-worst-mistake-in-the-history-of-the-human-race<br /><br />Through both acquaintances and anecdotes across all history, men seem to find hunting more fulfilling than hardship.Alannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-30051401199928579092015-02-26T04:30:47.128-08:002015-02-26T04:30:47.128-08:00Alan,
The object is seen, and its form understood...Alan,<br /><br /><i>The object is seen, and its form understood.</i><br /><br />You earlier had 'form' as a something which took a lifetime to learn, and now have it as a something which can be understood simply by seeing an object in which it is.<br /><br />You also had 'form' as a term signifying 'extreme complexity', so I'd like to ask how a human might understand -- never mind how a wolf might 'understand' -- the extreme complexity of a thing merely by looking at it.<br /><br /><i>How do you differentiate the wolf’s ability to understand rabbits from what a Thomist means by a form being received into an intellect.</i><br /><br />It isn't clear to me that wolves do actually 'understand' rabbits.<br /><br />(If they did, why don't they 'realize' that it would be more efficacious to capture rabbits and let them breed rather than to constantly hunt them? Wouldn't a steady supply of readily available meals be more conducive to survival than intermittent meals obtainable only via the hardships of a hunt?)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61726712312816035542015-02-25T14:39:51.537-08:002015-02-25T14:39:51.537-08:00"However, there is good reason to think that ..."However, there is good reason to think that many of our most cherished concepts, like truth, freedom, knowledge, and rationality, are defective in the sense that the rules for using them are inconsistent."<br /><br /><br />That, with provisos, seems unobjectionable enough.<br /><br />However, I am not sure why any given concept itself, would necessarily be defective, if the problem lay in sloppy use or lack of discrimination of senses.<br /><br />I suppose you could misuse the term "tree" if you were ignorant enough, much as children amusingly do, not having a clear idea of what the concept means to adults who use it.<br /><br />Keeping the political pot stirred here, and adverting to the mention of "freedom" we might take as an example of a misused concept, the left or left-fascist concept of "liberty" as conceived of by our own Chief Executive. <br /><br />That would of course be "positive liberty": that is to say, an enabling environment which ensures one a smorgasbord of politically constructed social options and choices, guaranteed to ensure the partaker of a maximally satisfying experience of self-actualization.<br /><br />Now of course, others formerly at liberty, may have to be harnessed against their will to provide this experience. But all they have really lost is their old fashioned negative liberty. That is to say, their supposed right to be left alone to their own devices, while peaceable.<br /><br />What they subjectively feel they have lost is, however, more than gained back by the exchange - at least when viewed through a properly abstract utilitarian, or even distributive justice, lens.<br /><br />Some, may of course, try to argue that endlessly pulling at the oars under a government mandate and penalty, is a clear loss of liberty to them. <br /><br />But those who truly feel the attraction of distributive justice, or the pull of utility, will quickly recognize that the complaint of some that they have been against their will harnessed to others and damned to a shared fate much more intrusive and unreasonable than the mere political, merely represents a failure of their imagination and sympathy. They - these negative liberty lovers - suffer from an inability to appreciate how their bondage, to use Garry Wills loving term, is in fact, their real self-actualization. <br /><br />According to expert opinion, and so forth and so on ....DNWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25912687912235024382015-02-25T14:39:24.383-08:002015-02-25T14:39:24.383-08:00Glenn: Nice shot, but no, and no. The object is ...Glenn: Nice shot, but no, and no. The object is seen, and its form understood. Form uniquely differentiates objects, the wolf uniquely differentiates a wide range of objects and demonstrates a significant understanding of many of them. The issue is not differentiating human from non-human in this thread. The issue is differentiating the capabilities. How do you propose to differentiate the capabilities of a wolf from intellect. How do you differentiate the wolf’s ability to understand rabbits from what a Thomist means by a form being received into an intellect.Alannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28794792003350640162015-02-25T12:39:40.984-08:002015-02-25T12:39:40.984-08:00Alan,
I was making my way down a very large hill ...Alan,<br /><br />I was making my way down a very large hill in Denali National Park one dreary, overcast day, when I heard what sounded like the cry of an animal. <br /><br />The sound came from about 9 o'clock (assuming I was facing 12 o'clock), and, looking in that direction, I saw a bird appear from behind a large mound. The mound was about 200 yards away, and at a much lower elevation. The bird headed towards what would be my 12 o'clock, then dipped and banked to the right. When the bird got somewhere between 10 and 11 o'clock, I had an eery feeling, and thought, "Holy smokes, it's coming over to check me out." <br /><br />That thought could have been the product of wishful thinking or maybe a sudden realization that, being in an unfamiliar environment and clueless as to how wildlife might react to the presence of a human, I was justified in being mildly concerned that the bird might attack with claws and beak. <br /><br />Who knows. <br /><br />At any rate, I had a camera with me, so quickly plotted what I thought the flight path of the bird would be, were it indeed 'coming over to check me out', picked out a point along that path, pointed the camera at that point, and began clicking the shutter button quickly as I could.<br /><br />From my point of view, I had not, with one exception, done anything that a non-human animal cannot do. <br /><br />My attention was drawn to a sound, I saw an object that seemed to be associated with that sound, recognized that it was moving through the air, anticipated its course, and made a judgment (or several judgments) as to how it might be intercepted. <br /><br />The one exception, of course, was that I could not intercept the moving object by running, flying or leaping high in the air, so had to pretend I could make competent use of the technological device I was carrying.<br /><br />With a healthy dose of luck the attempted interception turned out to be rather successful, as may be seen <a href="http://s296.photobucket.com/user/mwhaggard/media/IMG_0590_zpsb223321e.jpg.html" rel="nofollow">here</a>.<br /><br />Now, I'll say that I'm one of those people to whom that result quite suspiciously looks like the form of a bird. <br /><br />But I'll also say that I'm also one of those people who would say that that form isn't quite the form that is meant when a Thomist speaks of a form being received into an intellect.<br /><br />So, if it is to be said that "by demonstrating a comprehension of form, the Thomist accepts that birds and beasts possess intellect", and if by 'demonstrating a comprehension of form' is meant, e.g., that an object is seen (and, perhaps, its movement anticipated or worked out), then I would have to politely disagree, as well as point out that it would be rather silly to think that Thomists suggest that it is something a human has in common with a non-human animal that serves to differentiate the two.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15145328426077107492015-02-25T08:14:03.515-08:002015-02-25T08:14:03.515-08:00Glenn: All I am getting from your repeated deline...Glenn: All I am getting from your repeated delineation of cognitive powers is that a Thomist draws somewhat arbitrary lines between grades of thought, imagination being the most trivial. However, that still leaves through neglect that by demonstrating a comprehension of form, the Thomist accepts that birds and beasts possess intellect. A position I am not comfortable with.<br /><br />Glenn said: Now, you may disagree that to 'think' of something is to receive its form into the intellect, but you cannot credibly disagree that that is so from a Thomist point of view without providing some credible evidence that the Thomist point is otherwise than as was stated.<br /><br />I was making no challenge as to what the Thomist point of view was, but pointing out the significance of that particular statement: Intellect is not denied to bird nor beast.Alannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-21152665429555293472015-02-24T15:42:06.732-08:002015-02-24T15:42:06.732-08:00Glenn: Thanks for the response. To your lesser p...Glenn: Thanks for the response. To your lesser point, I think just a slip of the pen - form as I take it, represents the object, independent of any observer. Model refers to our mental representation, our understanding of the object. I could have been more careful. To your larger point I appear to be blatantly, deliberately (if unwittingly) guilty. I must consider the significance of that.Alannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3121808425576485472015-02-24T15:27:51.565-08:002015-02-24T15:27:51.565-08:00Dr Kevin Scharp Wednesday, Feb. 25, 2015
Kevin Sch...Dr Kevin Scharp Wednesday, Feb. 25, 2015<br />Kevin Scharp, Philosophy<br />"Philosophy and Defective Concepts"<br /><br />From familiar concepts like tall and table to exotic ones like gravity and genocide, they guide our lives and are the basis for how we represent the world. However, there is good reason to think that many of our most cherished concepts, like truth, freedom, knowledge, and rationality, are defective in the sense that the rules for using them are inconsistent. This defect leads those who possess these concepts into paradoxes and absurdities. Indeed, I argue that many of the central problems of contemporary philosophy should be thought of as having their source in philosophical concepts that are defective in this way. If that is right, then we should take a more active role in crafting and sculpting our conceptual repertoire. We need to explore various ways of replacing these defective concepts with ones that will still do the work we need them to do without leading us into contradictions. RSVP HereAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75075690567780114352015-02-22T04:55:38.033-08:002015-02-22T04:55:38.033-08:00Alan,
Returning to:
So to ‘think of an object’ w...Alan,<br /><br />Returning to:<br /><br /><i>So to ‘think of an object’ would involve incorporating that object[']s model or form into a dream. You may choose to explore that object by freezing the simulation and running a series of scenarios focused on that object, interacting with it in various ways.</i><br /><br />There is little reason to doubt that one may choose to explore an object in the manner described.<br /><br />For example, Nikola Tesla, after stating that he "turned seriously to invention" at about the age of seventeen, wrote in <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=yi_hCzJAbtoC&pg=PT22&lpg=PT22&dq=%22Then+I+observed+to+my+delight+that+I+could+visualize+with+the+greatest+facility%22&source=bl&ots=8zcbtwpleq&sig=DSlk4K9VcZ2jzvGdORtkjzyEGAk&hl=en&sa=X&ei=V9HpVOzfN_aBsQSMz4DQBw&ved=0CDYQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=%22Then%20I%20observed%20to%20my%20delight%20that%20I%20could%20visualize%20with%20the%20greatest%20facility%22&f=false" rel="nofollow"><i>My Inventions</i></a>: <br /><br />"Then I observed to my delight that I could visualize with the greatest facility. I needed no models, drawings or experiments. I could picture them all as real in my mind. Thus I have been led unconsciously to evolve what I consider a new method of materializing inventive concepts and ideas, which is radically opposite to the purely experimental and is in my opinion ever so much more expeditious and efficient... My method is different. I do not rush into actual work. When I get an idea I start at once building it up in my imagination. I change the construction, make improvements and operate the device in my mind. It is absolutely immaterial to me whether I run my turbine in thought or test it in my shop. I even note if it is out of balance. There is no difference whatever, the results are the same. In this way I am able to rapidly develop and perfect a conception without touching anything. When I have gone so far as to embody in the invention every possible improvement I can think of and see no fault anywhere, I put into concrete form this final product of my brain."<br /><br />On a Thomist account, each of imagination, reason and intellect is a cognitive power, although the immaterial intellect is above the lower, more organic-based levels of imagination and reason. <br /><br />What you and Tesla write about -- the visualization, the running of scenarios, the performance of tests, the making of corrections or improvements, etc. -- primarily have to do with the imagination and reason.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-60818785931337056532015-02-22T03:15:43.650-08:002015-02-22T03:15:43.650-08:00I hope you can see what is going on:
the Thomist...I hope you can see what is going on: <br /><br />the Thomist point of view as an instance of the generic pattern is more metaphysical and less non-metaphysical, while your arguments as instances of the generic pattern are more non-metaphysical and less metaphysical.<br /><br />And I hope you also can see that non-metaphysical arguments against a metaphysical position do not, as you have said to Daniel that they do, constitute an intellectual challenge but constitute an intellectual mistake.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57093587198333103212015-02-22T03:14:41.407-08:002015-02-22T03:14:41.407-08:00Alan,
You equate, or at least synonymize, 'fo...Alan,<br /><br />You equate, or at least synonymize, 'form' with 'model' ("to 'think of an object' would involve incorporating that objects model or form into a dream"). <br /><br />This, however, does not lend support to the earlier claim that you understand Scott's usage of the term 'form'.<br /><br />Form, as Scott used the term, is both a something intrinsic to the object and a something whose existence is neither dependent upon nor a function of the perception of a conscious agent (such as humans or other animals), and also is neither constructed nor generated by that agent. <br /><br />Form, as you have used the term, is not a something intrinsic to the object but instead an extrinsic representation of the object, the existence of which is both dependent upon and a function of the perception of a conscious agent, and also is either constructed or generated by that agent.<br /><br />So, not only does there exist a 'disconnect' between Scott's usage of the term and your understanding of his usage of the term, the 'disconnect' which exists between the two is huge.<br /><br />(It may be true that you do indeed understand his usage of the term, but nonetheless use the term in a way which is obviously different. Upon the removal of a single, unelaborated claim (that you do understand his usage of the term), however, your comments on the whole strongly suggest otherwise.)<br /><br />It will be recalled that Scott did not merely say that to 'think' of something is to receive its form into the intellect, but that that is so from a Thomist point of view.<br /><br />Now, you may disagree that to 'think' of something is to receive its form into the intellect, but you cannot credibly disagree that that is so from a Thomist point of view without providing some credible evidence that the Thomist point is otherwise than as was stated.<br /><br />You have said that the adult mind recalls "to conscious attention a mental model of that something that has been created in memory across a lifetime of experiences", and that "to 'think of an object' would involve incorporating that object[']s model or form into a dream." A mental model is received into conscious attention in the former case, and an object's model or form (in your sense of the term) is received into a dream in the latter case.<br /><br />From these two cases there may be abstracted a generic pattern, that of: "to 'think' is to receive one thing into another thing".<br /><br />But that is the same generic pattern which may be abstracted from the Thomist point of view.<br /><br />That is, although the Thomist point of view may be specifically stated as "to 'think' of something is to receive its form into the intellect", the Thomist point of view also may be generically stated as "to 'think' of something is to receive one thing into another thing".<br /><br />It now may be said that though you disagree with the Thomist point of view (that to 'think' of something specifically is to receive its form into the intellect), not only are you not antagonistic, hostile, resistant or unwelcoming to the generic pattern which may be abstracted from that point of view, you actually depend on it. That is, not only do not disagree that 'to 'think' of something is to receive one thing into another thing', you have made two statements the value of which would be lost to you were that not the case.<br /><br />A further instance of both your lack of resistance to the generic pattern and your actual embracing of it may be found in a third statement of yours -- to wit, that a person "may choose to explore that object by freezing the simulation and running a series of scenarios focused on that object, interacting with it in various ways." The running of a series of scenarios on the object, and other various interactions with it, entails the shuttling of ancillary things in and out of conscious attention, the 'dream', working memory, etc.<br /><br />(cont)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52630258803705523452015-02-21T16:41:21.634-08:002015-02-21T16:41:21.634-08:00Apologies for commenting off-topic
@ DNW
It woul...Apologies for commenting off-topic<br /><br />@ DNW<br /><br />It would seem that both of your comments under the previous post failed to appear in time, as I only just read them.<br /><br />I'm not aware of an online text of Krylenko's work, nor of any substantial translation. I'm going to have to ask around the university (incidentally, we still have surviving pockets of 'Socialist legal awareness').G. Mancz 滿償喬治https://www.blogger.com/profile/15753680642571164788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-8997648477338781772015-02-21T10:23:23.893-08:002015-02-21T10:23:23.893-08:00Glenn said...
DNW,
Thanks for the rejoin...Glenn said...<br /><br /> DNW,<br /><br /> Thanks for the rejoinders.<br /><br />" Here's something I'm wondering (seriously): if thought and consciousness are nothing more than or are reducible to mere epiphenomenalism, would the targets of your delightfully trenchant critiques then get a 'free pass' for being the disordered lot that they are?<br /><br /> February 20, 2015 at 9:57 PM"<br /><br /><br />Strictly speaking, if I were willing to cross that threshold, yes: insofar as how we think of moral responsibility vis-a-vis properly ordered operations in the usual sense, and as including internal psychological phenomena as central to it all.<br /><br />That would represent the classic idea of moral action within a framework which presumes and preserves the psychic and other unity of mankind, and does not allow for the emergence of competing moral species. <br /><br />"Moral", then in the lesser sense wherein "disordered" would lose much of its universal meaning, would imply only the accepted customs of more or less natural allies as they deal with and suffer one another.<br /><br />But that does not mean that "disordered" as it conditions "moral" would have no application anywhere or at all; just not the universal one.<br /><br />This second and lesser framework, which "allow(s) for the emergence of competing moral species" would still permit a kind of objective disorder to be conceived, while reducing moral questions to the behaviors of natural subtypes within larger unnatural or conventional aggregates: behaviors, either noxious or beneficial to the well-being of X and its natural or like kind, versus behaviors beneficial or antithetical to the well-being of Y and its natural or like kind.<br /><br />In this scenario the outright bad guy becomes not so much wrongheaded, as an existential enemy to the core.<br /><br />And I think that this latter idea, is actually the take most progressives now have adopted for all intents and purposes, save for one aspect that is basically rhetorical. <br /><br />The aspect which they are for now frantic to rhetorically promote, while simultaneously edging away from the idea in practice, is the unity of the species taken on traditional terms. They do this by expanding the notion of tolerance beyond its carrying capacity concerning skin tone or ethnicity, to an "inclusiveness" which comprehends extreme and de-structive behavioral aberrations within what are supposedly beneficial social arrangements.<br /><br />In other words they are trying to change predicate horses, before the mass of the population notices them doing it.<br /><br />For now, under the waning impulse of natural law, we officially have one humankind: X, in which the agent is conceived of as having free will and choice and so forth.<br /><br />But that is not-so-subtly changing on the political scale.<br /><br />This becomes clear, as we all have by now noticed, if you take the "we are all God's children and all the same behaviorally under the skin" claim structure advanced for civil rights in the 1950s and 60's, and compare it with the bases for staking claims to the rightness of homosexual unions now.<br /><br />It's one thing to say that you should treat Johnny well, because it is unjust to assume that he is a catty, treacherous, and untrustworthy sissy boy, just on the basis of his hair color or skin tone.<br /><br />It is logically quite another to say that in a meaningless universe with no intrinsic rules, you should accommodate Johnny to your own cost, because while he is all of those obnoxious things right down to his double helix, it is just something you have to put up with ... because ... it's the world someone or another envisions, or finds comforting.<br /><br />So, yes: to "not their fault" on the one hand. And also, assuming the same premises: "so what if it is not their fault ... it buys them nothing anyway", on the other hand.<br /><br />It's not their fault; yet they don't get a free pass.DNWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14015947031846259822015-02-21T07:17:16.035-08:002015-02-21T07:17:16.035-08:00Glen: As suggested above, the foundation of thoug...Glen: As suggested above, the foundation of thought as I see it are dreams, aka: simulations, action scenarios, rehearsals or mental training. So to ‘think of an object’ would involve incorporating that objects model or form into a dream. You may choose to explore that object by freezing the simulation and running a series of scenarios focused on that object, interacting with it in various ways.Alannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-60438030856457414662015-02-20T22:03:40.228-08:002015-02-20T22:03:40.228-08:00(I don't mean to say that I'm wondering ab...(I don't mean to say that I'm wondering about something which is of great concern to me, only that I'm serious in saying that I wonder about that.)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81856013520600714392015-02-20T21:57:13.869-08:002015-02-20T21:57:13.869-08:00DNW,
Thanks for the rejoinders.
Here's somet...DNW,<br /><br />Thanks for the rejoinders.<br /><br />Here's something I'm wondering (seriously): if thought and consciousness are nothing more than or are reducible to mere epiphenomenalism, would the targets of your delightfully trenchant critiques then get a 'free pass' for being the disordered lot that they are?<br /><br />Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72986372238147331852015-02-20T21:31:28.311-08:002015-02-20T21:31:28.311-08:00Alan,
Thanks for expanding on your ideas.
In doi...Alan,<br /><br />Thanks for expanding on your ideas.<br /><br />In doing so, you have:<br /><br />1. agreed that a human does not become the object it thinks of;<br /><br />2. agreed that the object itself is not received in the intellect when a human thinks of it;<br /><br />3. agreed that a human thinking of an object entails more than a retrieval and assembly of prior sense impressions into a cognitive effigy; and,<br /><br />4. denied that an object's form is received in the intellect when a human thinks of the object. **<br /><br />What, then, do you think happens when a human thinks of an object?Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-30416124473295088162015-02-20T15:50:39.166-08:002015-02-20T15:50:39.166-08:00Apologies for: "an evolutionary hybrid "...<br /><br />Apologies for: "an evolutionary hybrid "<br /><br />Not sure why I used that term other than some preoccupation as I rewrote the sentence.<br /><br />A 'stepping stone' toward ... would express the idea of an emergent thinking device not quite there but plainly identifiable as such in principle, more accurately.<br /><br />Have a good weekend.DNWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-17283320955173912322015-02-20T14:53:29.626-08:002015-02-20T14:53:29.626-08:00Consider this – a dream is a simulation of a situa...Consider this – a dream is a simulation of a situation that may be close to a situation that you may face in real life. A mind that dreams is a mind that runs simulations. Birds and mammals appear to dream. The hunting and fleeing behavior of birds and mammals appear to anticipate a behavior in the foe. I don’t think my caribou scenario is a stretch at all, but stick with the rabbit if you don’t like it. Either case requires comprehension of form.Alannoreply@blogger.com