tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post8882398127984997399..comments2024-03-28T21:43:44.433-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Around the netEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger53125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5142678776329711472013-02-15T06:01:01.591-08:002013-02-15T06:01:01.591-08:00Typo, I meant "Existential Inertia"Typo, I meant "Existential Inertia"Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19100328813054964212013-02-15T06:00:02.891-08:002013-02-15T06:00:02.891-08:00"Unless I am wrong, AT holds that God does no..."Unless I am wrong, AT holds that God does not actively interact in the material world (with the exception of infrequent miracles), so I hereby restrict MP #3 to the post-creation situation and excluding any miracle situations."<br /><br />I'm not an expert, but I think A-T would argue that God is always "interacting" or "doing" in some way because God is maintaining the existence of things. Feser might have blogged about it before, and I know he has a paper on "Existential Intertia." I also think he provided a link where it could be read for free, but I can't remember the details. "Keeping things real" sounds like a "full-time job."Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80421988635944594732013-02-15T02:24:56.457-08:002013-02-15T02:24:56.457-08:00God's interaction is just different in A-T.
...God's interaction is just different in A-T. <br /><br />This is even more complicated XD, then the rest I think.Eduardonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51436818904041260422013-02-14T22:46:57.378-08:002013-02-14T22:46:57.378-08:00@Eduardo,
I noticed your post just as I was gettin... @Eduardo,<br />I noticed your post just as I was getting ready to shut down. Your comment about MP #3 I can accept, by restricting MP #3 to <i>after</i> the (AT postulated) creation event. Unless I am wrong, AT holds that God does not actively interact in the material world (with the exception of infrequent miracles), so I hereby restrict MP #3 to the post-creation situation and excluding any miracle situations.<br /><br />I must think about your comment about MP #2 awhile. If the potency for REDness can be in the object that forms as a result of two objects coming together without that potency existing in the two objects prior to that, then that seems like a form of 'emergence' all by itself - ie, emergence of the potency rather than emergence of the now visible property. [I will ponder that; must sign-off, but thnx for the post].c emersonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04148726859110510447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25486436720012226682013-02-14T22:27:01.049-08:002013-02-14T22:27:01.049-08:00I think MP#1 is correct.
MP#2 seems incorrect, th...I think MP#1 is correct.<br /><br />MP#2 seems incorrect, the potential doesn't have to exist outside, it can exist just in the object that will change. Like object A has potential A, B and unkown potential C. This also seems to talk about virtual properties that I have no idea where to begin talking about it man XD.<br /><br />MP#3 seems incorrect too, because all the potencies exist in God's mind, hence the basis of all being.<br /><br />MP#4 seems to be within A-T I think...<br /><br />----------------------------------------------------<br /><br />I think this has something to do with the metaphysical work aquinas and aristotle did, the reason must be there.Eduardonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-65071840471188526572013-02-14T22:22:27.289-08:002013-02-14T22:22:27.289-08:00Just for clarity, in my hypothetical Non-AT MP #5 ...Just for clarity, in my hypothetical Non-AT MP #5 (which replaces AT MP #2 thru 4), the phrase "All such causes" refers only to the 'emergence' of 'never-before-seen' properties of material objects (such as my REDness example). It does not refer to any other cause (like gravity or billiard ball collisions, etc, where no new properties 'emerge'. That was probably obvious but I just want to limit my hypothetical out-of-this-world non-AT metaphysical system to just so-called 'emergent' properties. [Must travel all day tomorrow by car, so will respond to any posts as soon as I can later]. Peacec emersonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04148726859110510447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-87726268790910656572013-02-14T22:03:05.885-08:002013-02-14T22:03:05.885-08:00@anon, Eduardo & Scott,
> If you don't...@anon, Eduardo & Scott,<br />> If you don't accept the existence of real causal powers, then your own account of emergent properties may be non-causal. But either way, the argument is metaphysical.<br /><br />Yes, either way the sudden, never-seen-before appearance of REDness would seem to require a metaphysical proposition (MP). (This would be true, of course, even if there was a testable scientific theory that tested positive as an explanation for REDness in this situation, but bear with me for a moment).<br /><br />AT metaphysics:<br />MP #1. ALL never-before-seen properties of material objects have causes outside of that which is changing. <br />MP #2. For any property of a material object to come into being, the potential for that property to come into being already exists outside of that which is changing.<br />MP #3. All such causes and said potential will be located within the existing material world and not outside of it.<br />MP #4. Such causes and potential may be the result of combining more than one cause and more than one potential (principle of proportionate causality).<br /><br />Do I have that right? If not, let me know. Now ....<br /><br />Non-AT metaphysics:<br />MP #1. ALL never-before-seen properties of material objects have causes outside of that which is changing. <br />MP #5. All such causes will be located outside of the existing material world and not within it.<br /><br />Now tell me, what <i>logic</i> defeats the Non-AT metaphysics and requires the AT metaphysics to be true? <br /><br />[Note: I am avoiding the question of uncaused events for now to simplify the distinction].c emersonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04148726859110510447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51766374769966144592013-02-14T12:12:01.904-08:002013-02-14T12:12:01.904-08:00Moreover, I would say that no matter where the red...Moreover, I would say that no matter where the red ball "comes from" causally, redness itself must have existed at least as a possibility, even before the interaction occurred. There may well have been some object that was really and truly the first "red" object in the entire history of the physical universe. But I don't know how to deny that in that case, <i>some</i>. sort of potential or potency for redness must have been there all along; it just hadn't been expressed or actualized yet.<br /><br />Even if I wanted to deny the existence of causal powers altogether (which I don't), I'd probably still think it existed as some sort of abstract or timeless logical possibility.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54757021555167263882013-02-14T12:06:40.023-08:002013-02-14T12:06:40.023-08:00"Where's the potency? And if you decide t..."Where's the potency? And if you decide to say the 'potency' was hidden from view, or was some kind of 'hidden variable', then kindly tell me how you know that?"<br /><br />I honestly don't see what could possibly be unclear about this. If a big red ball genuinely emerges <i>causally</i> from the interaction of two blue balls, then the two balls were <i>able</i> to combine to make one red ball, and whatever that "ability" consists of, they must have had it before they were combined; the ability to generate redness, and therefore the potency/potentiality of redness. must already have been part of their nature. Were that not the case, the cause of the red ball would be, or at least involve, something other than just the two blue balls and the causal power to produce the big red ball would lie at least partly elsewhere.<br /><br />We're talking about <i>causal powers</i> here, of course, not a secret redness "hidden" inside of blue balls. If you don't accept the existence of real causal powers, then your own account of emergent properties may be non-causal. But either way, the argument is metaphysical.<br /><br />"And, oh, btw, how might you describe the whole event, especially if the blue balls were scattered out VERY FAR. from each other and two came together only once in a blue moon by 'chance': wouldn't you call that 'an unlikely accident'?"<br /><br />I might call their encountering one another at all an unlikely accident, but I probably wouldn't describe the causal generation of the red ball that way.<br /><br />If I did, it would be in some context other than the present discussion, where the metaphysical point at issue is why <i>naturalists</i> can't "easily bite the bullet and claim that development of consciousness was a freak accident" and nothing else. In the sense required by this response, I don't think it is.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88178823383433018132013-02-14T11:46:39.726-08:002013-02-14T11:46:39.726-08:00Well if that is the case then there was the potenc...Well if that is the case then there was the potencial toget red balls by getting two blue balls together.<br /><br />Well yeah the potency was hidden because let's I might have never seen two balls together XD. Probably A-T would call it a formal cause the appearing of the red ball.<br /><br />Now onto the hidden potential XD, A-T defends as far as I have understood here, that knowledge about these things comes primarily from experience. So the potential of the blue balls may not be known because of our limitations even we know they have potential.<br /><br />..... That last part.... I have no idea how to respond, because I feel like you are talking about something I don know hahaahahahahh so sorry.Eduardonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-68279819262825700282013-02-14T10:49:42.272-08:002013-02-14T10:49:42.272-08:00I would call that process as something that has th...I would call that process as something that has the same likelihood of occurring as a two-dimensional universe suddenly and accidentally to sprout a third spatial dimension out of nowhere and nothing.<br /><br />Heck, even virtual particles come from something. Virtual particles are disturbances/fluctuations in quantum fields. Obviously, you can't have a disturbance in a quantum field if there is no quantum field to begin with.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-31046082081111435452013-02-14T09:53:22.157-08:002013-02-14T09:53:22.157-08:00@Eduardo,
& Scott,
Thanks for posting.
Let m...@Eduardo,<br />& Scott,<br />Thanks for posting. <br /><br />Let me pose this scenario: Take two of Eduardo's blue balls and put them together (ouch) - and - presto - you get ONE large RED ball. <br /><br />What would you call this process, and what you call this new thing? I know I would be comfortable calling the process a 'chemical' process; and I would be comfortable calling RED (the new thing) an 'emergent' property. <br /><br />Where's the potency? And if you decide to say the 'potency' was hidden from view, or was some kind of 'hidden variable', then kindly tell me how you know that? <br /><br />And, oh, btw, how might you describe the whole event, especially if the blue balls were scattered out VERY FAR. from each other and two came together only once in a blue moon by 'chance': wouldn't you call that 'an unlikely accident'? Cheers.<br />c emersonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04148726859110510447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28255537940802119942013-02-14T07:05:35.254-08:002013-02-14T07:05:35.254-08:00"Could you elaborate here?"
As Eduardo ..."Could you elaborate here?"<br /><br />As Eduardo correctly explains, I was disagreeing with emergentism. (just as Nagel does elsewhere on the same grounds).<br /><br />My statement was in reply to the suggestion that the emergence of consciousness could be regarded as a perhaps very unlikely accident. Basically I was saying that in a world that didn't have any consciousness (or the potency thereof) in it in the first place, it's no more <i>possible</i> for consciousness to "emerge" than it would be for a two-dimensional universe suddenly and accidentally to sprout a third spatial dimension out of nowhere and nothing. The appearance of consciousness in a world/universe/cosmos initially without it is, in my view (and in Nagel's, though I don't know whether he expressly reiterates that view in his new book), not merely unlikely but impossible.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29063999447579904532013-02-13T23:43:07.348-08:002013-02-13T23:43:07.348-08:00Imagine a box with only blue balls... There are no...Imagine a box with only blue balls... There are no red balls and no way to change the color of the balls. Within that system and because of the lack of the potential to turn things red, you will never get a red ball. Got it?Eduardonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7748342551966392282013-02-13T23:31:12.094-08:002013-02-13T23:31:12.094-08:00@Scott,
> The problemm is that it's not jus...@Scott,<br />> The problemm is that it's not just "unlikely" but <i>impossible</i> in a world that doesn't already contain even the potency of consciousness.<br /><br />Could you elaborate here? Not sure if you are accepting that there is such potency and therefore are objecting to "unlikely" in some way ... that is, you italicized "impossible" but then qualified it with a "that doesn't already contain ... potency of ... " I'm not picking, just don't get your meaning.c emersonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04148726859110510447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49975619213882346962013-02-13T23:09:25.416-08:002013-02-13T23:09:25.416-08:00@Dianelos,
To add a bit of grist to your mill, con...@Dianelos,<br />To add a bit of grist to your mill, consider Ernst Mayr's 1987 analysis of the very low probability that 'genuine intelligence' would evolve on even one planet (ours) let alone in a relevant way in a relevant time period on more than one planet (the SETI debate). Part of his <a href="http://books.google.com/books?id=EH86AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA24&lpg=PA23&ots=YkxPmSSYro&dq=ernst+mayr+probability+extraterrestrial&output=html_text" rel="nofollow">essay as first published is here</a>:<br /><br />http://books.google.com/books?id=EH86AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA24&lpg=PA23&ots=YkxPmSSYro&dq=ernst+mayr+probability+extraterrestrial&output=html_text<br /><br />The relevant pages are from bottom of page 25 to bottom of 27. You might think Mayr was laying the groundwork for an argument for fine-tuning, but his primary purpose (besides objecting to SETI expenditures) is to engage in battle against 'naive' determinism, as advanced by physicists vis a vis evolutionary indeterminism. Mayr says, bottom of p.24: "Why are those biologists, who have the greatest expertise on evolutionary probabilities, so almost unanimously skeptical of the probability of extraterrestial intelligence? It seems to me that this is to a large extent due to the tendency of physical scientists to think deterministically, whereas organismic biologists know how opportunistic and unpredictable evolution is."<br /><br />Now Mayr, an admirer of Aristotle (as one of the first biologists), distinguishes Aristotelian teleology from evolutionary teleonomy on the grounds that natural selection looks backwards historically for its cause rather than forward towards a natural end. See Mayr's <i>Toward a New Philosophy of Biology</i> (1988: p.24-65). That is, living organisms, through the operation of natural selection, <i>preserve</i> unplanned fruitful changes, rather than being goal-directed toward them. Yet, here Mayr clearly lays out his view showing how low a probability he believes there actually was for a genuinely intelligent animal to have evolved.<br /><br />[I'm road tripping in case I don't respond further. Cheers]<br />c emersonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04148726859110510447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52143091335421287962013-02-12T17:04:01.780-08:002013-02-12T17:04:01.780-08:00Thanks BLS.Thanks BLS.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35393466921094779212013-02-12T10:52:39.615-08:002013-02-12T10:52:39.615-08:00"I have not read Nagel's book or past pub..."I have not read Nagel's book or past publications, but he should just flat out say what you have quoted, instead of opting for an EAAN style argument."<br /><br />He does, in a famous paper called "Panpsychism." It's been years since I read it, but it was specifically offered as an argument against emergentism.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91668663315725638962013-02-12T08:47:19.638-08:002013-02-12T08:47:19.638-08:00"What about thoughts though? What would be th..."What about thoughts though? What would be the material cause of a thought?<br /><br />I understand that the brain operates as a substratum of the intellect, but I'm not so sure if that can be appealed to as a material cause for thought."<br /><br />Although this is more of an A-T approach rather than a purely Aristotelian approach, you could give Oderberg's paper a look to see if it clarifies some issues for you.<br /><br />http://www.davidsoderberg.co.uk/<br /><br />Look for 26. 'Hylemorphic Dualism'<br /><br />Also, try the search bar to see if Feser has any posts on this form of dualism. If he does, it will probably be an easier read.BLSnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28663948408108955082013-02-12T07:01:09.366-08:002013-02-12T07:01:09.366-08:00Crude,
Reading the article I really cannot tell w...Crude,<br /><br />Reading the article I really cannot tell where he stands. <br /><br />With respect to the reality and knowability of natural law per se, he seems to argue against the possibility of deriving an *is* from an *ought*, irrespective of whatever metaphysical picture of nature applies, for he appeals to Hume against the is/ought distinction and says (paraphrasing) "Nature tells us nothing . . .". Yet, in other parts of the article (which you probably have in mind) he says "so far so good" respecting the metaphysical argument chain that reaches to final causes. He also writes that IF we happened to live in a culture committed to a Platonic, Aristotelian, or Christian metaphysic, then natural law arguments might be persuasive (but even so he brings up the case of the radical moralist who, while recognizing final causality, responds: "so what, I'm going to rage against the machine” - so to speak). So maybe I am reading him insufficiently, but he seems to take away with one hand what he grants with the other. He does not seem to be arguing that is worth engaging modernity’s metaphysical mechanism in order to breathe new life into traditional natural law theory.<br /><br />With respect to the practical *usefulness* of natural law theory, he does seem to argue that it has no useful appeal within modern culture. Rather, he seems in favor some broader appeal to a more comprehensive religious vision as the most useful way to approach morality within modernity. While the best approach to moral dialogue within modernity may certainly depend upon the particular audience with which one is conversing; surely it is at least as difficult to establish the grounds of religion (of whatever variety) as a prelude to moral dialogue, as it is to refute the epistemological and ontological errors which undermine a natural law basis for morality. The advantage to the later approach, of course, is its reliance upon epistemic and ontic grounds which may be dialectically championed on grounds which are ostensibly open to all, without recourse to the data of any purported revelation.<br /><br />I read through it once last evening just before midnight, so perhaps I am misconstruing his overall point. I will give it another run through this evening.<br /><br />-Pax <br />monk68https://www.blogger.com/profile/02718257273640738688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-10639387962322512562013-02-11T21:31:16.473-08:002013-02-11T21:31:16.473-08:00monk86,
Are you sure? Hart doesn't seem to be...monk86,<br /><br />Are you sure? Hart doesn't seem to be knocking final causes, but talking about the modern view.Crudehttp://crudeideas.blogspot.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-65646332619061952152013-02-11T21:22:38.006-08:002013-02-11T21:22:38.006-08:00"Perhaps this may be a reason why our friend ..."Perhaps this may be a reason why our friend yair is a panpsychist."<br /><br />I can't speak for Yair, of course, but it's certainly one reason why <i>I'm</i> a panpsychist.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80471661418398075312013-02-11T21:21:12.597-08:002013-02-11T21:21:12.597-08:00"What about thoughts though? What would be th..."What about thoughts though? What would be the material cause of a thought?"<br /><br />I don't think a "thought" would count as an entity to Aristotle. Again, his fourfold account of causation applies to <i>things</i>.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52017290297057938602013-02-11T20:46:16.641-08:002013-02-11T20:46:16.641-08:00Anyone else see David Hart's dissing of Natura...Anyone else see David Hart's dissing of Natural Law theory in the last few pages of the most recent edition of "First Things" magazine? I usually like Hart, but this article seems to me a jumble of arguments with little coherence. monk68https://www.blogger.com/profile/02718257273640738688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-68138137744240137672013-02-11T18:18:23.369-08:002013-02-11T18:18:23.369-08:00Another question for the students of Aristotle,
I...Another question for the students of Aristotle,<br /><br />I have been reading several conflicting commentaries about Aristotle's view on God as the cause of the universe. Some say he is only the Final Cause while others say that he is both the Efficient and Final cause. The ones who maintain that he was not the Efficient cause claim that Aristotle believed it was the case because for God to be the Efficient Cause he had to be in movement. Did Aristotle truly believe that? If anyone has a direct citation from Physics or Metaphysics I would really appreciate it.<br /><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com