tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post8805559932382218301..comments2024-03-28T13:39:03.094-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Stoljar on intentionalityEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-48634633475650225152010-07-03T14:52:23.704-07:002010-07-03T14:52:23.704-07:00"But that is a gigantic topic of its own. Suf...<i>"But that is a gigantic topic of its own. Suffice it for present purposes to note that with respect to Thomistic dualism no less than the Cartesian version, contemporary physicalists would do well to try better to “know their enemy” before dismissing him."</i><br /><br />Generally speaking only, admittedly, but it would seem the dismissiveness in question is the primary intention, while the rationale/argument follows. Iow, the lack of rigor and conscientiousness, the lack of probity, typically <i>appears</i> to be premeditated and conscious, not a mere absentminded lacuna.<br /><br />The lack of probity and conscientiousness alluded to is so often on evidence that it's difficult (imo) to draw a more charitable conclusion.Michael Bhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04046677690934254475noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-68122545463682709232010-06-25T18:22:59.168-07:002010-06-25T18:22:59.168-07:00Tony: My point is that common sensibles like numbe...Tony: <i>My point is that common sensibles like number and shape are not primary objects of the sense at all. </i><br /><br />Thanks for the reply. I understand what you're saying, and perhaps I expressed myself poorly — what I don't see is how to explain the connection between physical and mental qualities. Number (shape, etc.) are clearly not objects of sight in that if you put the platonic number Two itself in front of me (or the platonic Circle, etc.) I couldn't see it — they're not visible things. But when I see two patches of colour, there really is twoness there; if I saw <i>only</i> colour, then I could never distinguish two bits of red from one bit of red. A red circle participates in roundness as well as colouredness, and the image on my retina participates in roundness, and so on, so I really am "sensing" the roundness, or the twoness, and am able to abstract it from the redness to understand that there are two of whatever it is.<br /><br />(To be precise, it's really the form(s) as processed by my sense organs; so as you point out, if two red things are too close or too identical in intensity for my eye to distinguish, that means that in fact the image on my retina would just be one red patch, thus having the forms of oneness and redness, so that is what my mind would abstract. And of course there are further opportunities inside my brain for the signal to be processed or altered or degraded in some way, but for simplicity we can stick to examples that aren't too fuzzy or too ambiguous.)<br /><br />Anyway, my point is that when there are two (visible) objects, and I come to know in my mind that there are two of them, there's an obvious connection. (Perhaps God could have constructed me so that when I saw two things, I experienced "three(ness)" — but even if that behaviour were completely consistent in me, it would in some obvious sense be "wrong"; or at least, my thoughts would obviously disagree with reality.) So far so good.<br /><br />But when I see a visual frequency of 700nm there is no obvious "right" colour I should experience. If God had designed humans to experience "blueness" when their senses perceived 700nm light, how could you say that disagreed with reality? Or if God made us experience middle C when we experienced 700nm light? Not only which colour, but even whether we mentally experience colour or sound seems completely contingent. <br /><br />The only way it could be "wrong" is if the object participated in the form of Redness but we did not come to abstract redness in our minds. But then it's contingent that the apple has the form of Redness in the first place; if the apple participated in Squareness instead of Roundness, then it's physical construction would have to be different. The same atoms couldn't be in a round configuration if the apple is square; that's what roundness is, having parts arranged in a certain way. But the pure platonic form of Redness is not tied to the reflection and absorption of photons in that way. That's the form of Photoreflectivitiness, which is a very different thing. So if we can't abstract redness from "EMF wavelength of 700nm", then how do we get the red experience in our minds?Davidnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-10508879058832142692010-06-24T19:13:29.617-07:002010-06-24T19:13:29.617-07:00David, even if the situation in the apply under wh...David, even if the situation in the apply under which the frequency that the apply reflects is a frequency that our brain apparatus reports as "red" needn't "BE" red in the apple in and of itself (in some fashion) the physical foundation for its reflecting some specific frequency is a real physical attribute of the apple. This real attribute of the apple can be called "red" without distortion of language or meaning. <br /><br />Let's go back a minute: when we hear a doorbell, the hearing reports first A, and then F. The brain interprets, in addition to simply the sound alone, also "two," separated by time. Two can come from senses other than sight. <br /><br />Properly speaking, the eye's (and the ocular center of the brain) primary report is only of color, not of size, nor of shape as such, nor of distance, nor even of number. If you were out in space and were in a large sphere made of semi-translucent red glass, and behind the glass were about 1 million tiny lights, all you would see is color, namely red. Without any variation. Without variation, you could not distinguish any of the OTHER sensibles, like distance, etc. Although you can tell that this part of the red is not the same part of the red that that part is (i.e. part outside of part), there are no shapes to report. And no number. If an object were inserted half the distance between you and the wall, which had exactly the same intensity of red light to your eye, you could not distinguish it as a distinct object at all, even though you would see its redness perfectly well. So you could not state it's position in the least. <br /><br />My point is that common sensibles like number and shape are not primary objects of the sense at all. The "shape" that your brain signifies about the apple is a product of, first, the color of the apple, and color of the other things that are not apple, received in such a way that the one color is not where the other color is. The apprehension that the differences in color imply a distinct object, (rather than, say, just 2 colors side by side on the same object) and further that the object has a certain recognized attribute "round" are, actually, additional operations beyond the simple reporting of the multiple colors.Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-21223790451515889052010-06-19T18:05:53.575-07:002010-06-19T18:05:53.575-07:00Prof. Feser: Nor did they argue from “qualia” [......Prof. Feser: <i>Nor did they argue from “qualia” [...] ancients and medievals focused instead on such features of our thoughts as their universality and determinacy</i><br /><br />I reckon those aren't completely independent; after all, something is a quality rather than a quantity because it's not, well, quantifiable, not here or there, not this much or that much — which is of course what universals are. But there still is something interesting about qualities because they can't work the same way quantities can. <br /><br />I can see two apples, and get the two-ness in my mind, easy. (Well, not so easy, since the information is encoded in light and in signals in my brain, which have to be decoded — but the point is, the two-ness is out there, so it can end up abstracted in my mind.) Similarly with the roundness of the apples: physical stuff (molecules, etc.) has actual position, and shape is just a certain positioning of the apple's matter, and those relative positions (albeit encoded in some way) can reach my mind where that form of roundness is intelligible, and I can perceive that the apples are round. <br /><br />But the apple's redness is different. Position and number are quantities which I can perceive through my physical senses, but "redness" does not seem to be. What I perceive with my sense of sight is light of a certain frequency, and while that is the direct and natural result of the light's interacting with the nature of the apple, it's not <i>colouredness</i>. The transmission via light via my retina via synaptic signals, etc. isn't the point; that happens with the size or shape of the apple, but in those cases, the transmission is carrying the right kind of in-form-ation. In the case of colour, it isn't. The apple may really be red after all (i.e. participating in the form of redness), but there doesn't seem to be any way for that information to be communicated to my senses. Augustinian illumination or Leibnizian pre-harmony could explain it, but it seems more direct to conclude that the redness isn't in the apple itself; or if it is it's a coincidence. (The apple could participate in blueness, but we'd still see red because it's not really the blueness that we're "seeing".)<br /><br />This isn't to say that the colour is arbitrary or subjective (other than the obvious sense that it is a sensation in a <b>subject</b>); presumably God simply constituted our minds so that certain physical frequencies would appear to us as colours, and certain other kinds of physical frequencies as sounds, and so on. That would be part of human nature, and He could have given us a different nature just as much as He could have given us eight fingers each or twelve. But no matter what kind of nature God gave us, two would still be two and round would still be round.Davidnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-45628770344196510892010-06-18T17:56:38.273-07:002010-06-18T17:56:38.273-07:00Hello Crude,
What they'd have is certain caus...Hello Crude,<br /><br />What they'd have is certain causal powers, and causal powers entail final causality insofar as an efficient cause is "directed toward" its characteristic effect(s). But they would not intrinsically have any sort of <i>linguistic</i> meaning.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23169613718425073582010-06-18T14:52:40.829-07:002010-06-18T14:52:40.829-07:00Hey Ed,
Great post as ever. One question I have. ...Hey Ed,<br /><br />Great post as ever. One question I have. You say...<br /><br /><i>The set of splotches looks like the word, but it isn’t. The word has meaning, the splotches do not. <br /><br />(...)<br /><br />But what is true of ink splotches and sounds seems no less true of all other physical phenomena. They all seem obviously devoid of meaning until someone decides to use them to convey meaning. </i><br /><br />Fair enough. Later you say...<br /><br /><i>For the Scholastics, efficient causes in the natural order inherently “point to” or are “directed at” their effects, and in sweeping aside immanent final causality the moderns rejected the claim that any natural phenomenon inherently and irreducibly “points to” or is “directed at” anything at all. </i><br /><br />Doesn't this mean that those "ink blots on the page", under the Scholastic view, actually could/would have some kind of meaning? Maybe not explicit 'intentionality' - but what about some other kind of 'aboutness' or 'proto-intentionality', so to speak?Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.com