tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post856532846170523367..comments2024-03-28T21:43:44.433-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Post-intentional depressionEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger401125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14204832627437232172016-02-10T16:47:02.036-08:002016-02-10T16:47:02.036-08:00Feser fanboy here checking in! I'm also a fan...Feser fanboy here checking in! I'm also a fan of those theists commenting on here as well. I learn so much from reading both Feser's work, and that of the posters substantiating their views in favor of the shared viewpoints!<br /><br />(If you can, put The Last Superstition in Bolinda guides audiobooks Feser, since I enjoyed the philosophy of mind and Aquinas one... (If it favors your happiness of course)...John Abadhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10433641055435630693noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12156692812517109802015-02-28T11:23:37.040-08:002015-02-28T11:23:37.040-08:00I wonder if Colin McGinn's The Subjective View...I wonder if Colin McGinn's <a href="http://www.amazon.com/The-Subjective-View-Secondary-Qualities/dp/0198246951" rel="nofollow">The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts</a> is relevant, here. Can one say anything about reality without having a subjective viewpoint? And can you have a subjective viewpoint without intentionality? In a sense I'm just reiterating the same thing as Greg, the first commenter said.Lukehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18395549142176242491noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23146243901001612002015-01-19T02:20:34.481-08:002015-01-19T02:20:34.481-08:00@John West:
Even if that were so in so far as a pl...@John West:<br /><i>Even if that were so in so far as a plan is carefully crafted and calculated, the act of speaking would still require the intention to speak.</i><br /><br />Yes, the intention to speak is implied in the speaking.<br /><br /><i>I'm not sure "plan" is what people here mean when they write of intentionality.</i><br /><br />No they don't, they're separate issues. My comments have been on ordinary language intention (per Ed's logical behavioral example) and not philosophical intentionality.Andrew Macdonaldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13198620706742483736noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80668171550443501082015-01-18T21:09:11.852-08:002015-01-18T21:09:11.852-08:00@ AM
I would throw in James Ross's Thought an...@ AM<br /><br />I would throw in James Ross's <i>Thought and World</i>. The book is very broad and a bit unconventional. Ross basically paints an Aristotelian picture that he believes emerges from the 20th century analytic tradition. There isn't a whole lot of direct argument against other authors though.<br /><br />Wolfgang Smith argues in <i>The Quantum Enigma</i> for a Thomistic interpretation of quantum mechanics. Smith has a physics background. (Smith has other books too, some a bit broader in focus.) I'd say it is sometimes apparent that Smith is a physicist and not a philosopher; the book isn't perfect, but it's worth reading if you're interested in the topic.Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-84071393629917457192015-01-18T15:54:55.507-08:002015-01-18T15:54:55.507-08:00@AM:
I echo John West's recommendations, but ...@AM:<br /><br />I echo John West's recommendations, but if you're looking for a good book specifically on Aristotle with no Thomism, I strongly recommend <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Aristotle-Desire-Understand-Jonathan-Lear/dp/0521347629" rel="nofollow">this</a>. It's not directly a response to "scientism/materialism," but it provides the raw material for one.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11388503063129312092015-01-18T15:45:13.427-08:002015-01-18T15:45:13.427-08:00AM,
Mr. Feser: What book(s) would you recommend a...AM,<br /><br /><i>Mr. Feser: What book(s) would you recommend as best for an understanding of the Aristotelian metaphysical answer to scientism/materialism? I've read your work on St. Thomas.</i><br /><br />I'm not Ed, but his <i>Scholastic Metaphysics</i> has an excellent chapter on scientism, and a thorough survey of Aristotelian-Scholastic metaphysics. I understand David Oderberg's <i>Real Essentialism</i> is also excellent, though my own copy just arrived.<br /><br />Also, if you're looking for an Aristotelian approach to science proper, you may like William Wallace's <i>The Modeling of Nature: Philosophy of Science</i>. Others may have other recommendations.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23686322830023254672015-01-18T15:25:09.495-08:002015-01-18T15:25:09.495-08:00Macdonald^ Apologies for mispelling your name.Macdonald^ Apologies for mispelling your name.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23928514568171630842015-01-18T15:22:18.786-08:002015-01-18T15:22:18.786-08:00Andrew Mcdonald,
I would define an action simply ...Andrew Mcdonald,<br /><br /><i>I would define an action simply as something that we do. My regress argument isn't about intentionality (the philosophical concept), but about intention (in the sense of "plan").</i><br /><br />Even if that were so in so far as a plan is carefully crafted and calculated, the act of speaking would still require the intention to speak.<br /><br /><i>For example, that Bob answered our question doesn't mean that he first had to plan to answer us before he could answer us. He could just spontaneously answer us.</i><br /><br />I'm not sure "plan" is what people here mean when they write of intentionality. But you did say you were defending logical behaviourism, not eliminativism.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16867584087195723472015-01-18T15:15:11.649-08:002015-01-18T15:15:11.649-08:00Timocrates,
Your bodily movement is a result of c...Timocrates,<br /><br /><i>Your bodily movement is a result of cause and effect relationships. But since every cause is necessarily directed towards its effect, then your being knocked to the ground still involves intentionality even if you didn’t desire the outcome or result or if it was against your will. Indeed, this holds true for the conscious intentionality of your opponent as well (will discuss this later). </i><br /><br />I left the intentionality of another out because it did not seem to me relevant to his point (I distinguished between one's own intentionality and another's in previous messages to him). You're quite right though, and thank you for pointing out.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42210057299310278702015-01-18T14:28:16.650-08:002015-01-18T14:28:16.650-08:00@ Scott
Yes, thank you. I forgot our audience her...@ Scott<br /><br />Yes, thank you. I forgot our audience here was likely to be broader and therefore uncomfortable with speaking of intentionality outside of deliberation or in the context of thinking. TY!Timocratesnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86081251675629589612015-01-18T14:10:57.237-08:002015-01-18T14:10:57.237-08:00@Timocrates:
"[S]ince every cause is necessa...@Timocrates:<br /><br />"[S]ince every cause is necessarily directed towards its effect, then your being knocked to the ground still involves intentionality[.]"<br /><br />And in case anyone objects to this use of "intentionality," please allow me to add here that the point can be rephrased entirely in terms of final causation. Without final causes, efficient causes don't make any sense either.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81789582689983044332015-01-18T14:04:40.461-08:002015-01-18T14:04:40.461-08:00@John West
(Cont'd).
Survival of the fittest...<br />@John West<br /><br />(Cont'd).<br /><br /><b>Survival of the fittest</b>, say, is a natural phenomenon that is directed toward (is a cause with the effect of) unhealthy or unsuitable living specimens being removed from a population (or even entire species) in certain environments. So if the climate is tending to become increasingly colder, then living things that need warmth to survive are liable to die off or even become extinct if they cannot or do not adapt or are not naturally constituted to survive in colder environs; and this, we say, happens by nature and so is a natural intention in (living, physical) things.<br />Timocratesnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91007119495429507732015-01-18T13:54:22.873-08:002015-01-18T13:54:22.873-08:00@ JohnWest
”(To elaborate, action seems to presup...@ JohnWest<br /><br /><i>”(To elaborate, action seems to presuppose intentionality. But if someone (say), knocks me on the ground, then though I didn't intend it, there is still physical movement.)”</i><br /><br />Yes. <br /><br />Your bodily movement is a result of cause and effect relationships. But since every cause is necessarily directed towards its effect, then your being knocked to the ground still involves intentionality even if you didn’t desire the outcome or result or if it was against your will. Indeed, this holds true for the conscious intentionality of your opponent as well (will discuss this later). <br /><br />The effect of being (e.g.) knocked-out in a fighting match is to drop to the ground. The physical blows (cause) naturally get the outcome of someone being knocked down to the ground (effect) even if the person attacking or administering the blows is unaware of this or does not even specifically desire or intend that result (perhaps he just wants to end the fight or be deemed the victor and your being knocked down/out is only secondary to this, say).Timocratesnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-31863619542243587812015-01-18T13:41:09.582-08:002015-01-18T13:41:09.582-08:00@ Brandon
“(1) The EMists position themselves as ...@ Brandon<br /><br /><i>“(1) The EMists position themselves as cutting-edge pro-science. But, paradoxically, actual scientific practices, and anything that gives us reason to scientific theories as reasons for anything (much less EM itself), vanishes completely. Almost everyone, including scientists doing science, interpret scientific practice in terms of intentionality. In the 1990s there was a vehement series of quarrels in philosophy of science that often get described as the Science Wars, between scientific realists and postmodernists. The latter got labeled as an anti-science view. But the postmodernists were doing with science exactly what the EMists think should be done with it: they eliminated all the intentionality-laden terms scientists like to use for what they are doing (<b>truth, consistency, prediction</b>), or else deflated them in various ways, and just talked about patterns of cause and effect.”</i><br /><br />But how can the postmodernist object to terms such as “consistency” and substitute them with talk of “patterns of cause and effect”? What makes something a pattern unless there is something common (i.e. <i>consistent</i>) underlying it? <br /><br />Indeed, the very patterns in question are ones that mark out “cause and effect” consistently. How can you have something that is a pattern but lacks any consistency whatsoever? <br /><br />Furthermore, if every effect has a cause and this is necessary, then surely we must say that effects at least <i>consistently</i> have causes! But if every effect has a cause, then can we not safely also <i>predict</i> (another taboo intentionality term) that any effect will have its cause?Timocratesnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-73591380441146328782015-01-18T12:42:59.204-08:002015-01-18T12:42:59.204-08:00Mr. Bakker: I'm a fan of your fiction, so it&#...Mr. Bakker: I'm a fan of your fiction, so it's great to see you discussing philosophy here. That said, I hope your new post-intentional worldview won't cause an upheaval in your work... ;)<br /><br />Mr. Feser: What book(s) would you recommend as best for an understanding of the Aristotelian metaphysical answer to scientism/materialism? I've read your work on St. Thomas.<br />Restitutor Orbishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05625086532637410710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-10159062212636438602015-01-18T06:49:41.345-08:002015-01-18T06:49:41.345-08:00It's really not a problem. If you trace your &...<i>It's really not a problem. If you trace your 'theory of truth' and 'reference' to their relation to the survival (short term or long) of an individual or individuals, it shows rather than having to adhere to the theory of truth in question, the theory of truth in question actually has to adhere to/enable survival.</i><br /><br />All I am saying is that if the governments of the Western world would listen to my plan and start inoculating students with <i>The Logical Investigations</i> at the begining of their academic lives then this sort of thing could be avoided.Daniel Corrickhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08892801745532756756noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-2406005205890408092015-01-18T06:31:48.833-08:002015-01-18T06:31:48.833-08:00@ Callan S.
Why? You seem to be treating it as a ...@ Callan S.<br /><br /><i>Why? You seem to be treating it as a hard binary - either one is absolutely capable of question, or one can't at all.<br /><br />Maybe that is the case. I'm just treating it as if it's somewhere in between, instead. Does that make you sad? The idea of it being inconveniently non absolute?</i><br /><br />So you can kind of question?<br /><br />This is really taking me out of my philosophical comfort zone!Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29909408790604592692015-01-18T05:39:43.066-08:002015-01-18T05:39:43.066-08:00@John West:
[on my regress argument]
I would defin...@John West:<br />[on my regress argument]<br />I would define an action simply as something that we do. My regress argument isn't about intentionality (the philosophical concept), but about intention (in the sense of "plan").<br /><br />The argument is that not every action can presuppose a prior plan to act. That's because a plan to act is itself also an action. But then we would have a plan to plan to act (and so on), hence the regress.<br /><br />For example, that Bob answered our question doesn't mean that he first had to plan to answer us before he could answer us. He could just spontaneously answer us.Andrew Macdonaldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13198620706742483736noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-2808656550051556852015-01-18T02:08:30.458-08:002015-01-18T02:08:30.458-08:00Anonymous, January 14, 2015 at 4:43 PM,
You have ...Anonymous, January 14, 2015 at 4:43 PM,<br /><br /><i>You have not understood the objection at all. If Bakker's claim is true, then everything you've just said here has no content. You are not entitled to talk about, among other things, "processing", "beneficial", "relevance" (even defined as you've stipulated), and many other important things beside.<br /><br />This is the problem: you cannot even articulate a scientific account on your own terms if you do not have at the least the logical-semantic resources provided by a theory of truth, reference, and some idea of what might entitle inferential moves.</i><br /><br />It's really not a problem. If you trace your 'theory of truth' and 'reference' to their relation to the survival (short term or long) of an individual or individuals, it shows rather than having to adhere to the theory of truth in question, the theory of truth in question actually has to adhere to/enable survival.<br /><br />Your position is that a theory of truth is it's own existant thing that must be adhered to - your position has me not entitled to talk about certain words if I don't follow the conducts of your theory of truth.<br /><br />Mine is that if your theory of truth is out of kilter with something upon which survival rests, then not only does anyone not have to adhere to your theory of truth, but doing so will actually jeopardize their survival. Why would adhering to your model of truth matter if it ends in extinction? Or are you saying your theory of truth could never be out of kilter with something like further survival?Callan S.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15373053356095440571noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91430944799094348742015-01-18T01:46:57.827-08:002015-01-18T01:46:57.827-08:00I don't know how to parse this - you've sa...<i>I don't know how to parse this - you've said the dust moving involves intentionality.<br /><br />So are you saying if we subtracted intentionality, the dust would not move? Or would not exist?<br /><br />If you're not saying that, then you're acknowledging the presence or absence of intentionality does not matter to the dust moving.<br /><br />Which runs counter to the notion of involvement. </i><br /><br />He is clearly referring to our perceiving the movement of the dust as involving intentionality. That was his example. <br /><br /><br /><i>If intentional words have a hidden side to them, someone using intentional words to describe that does not somehow mean that hidden side does not exist. But that is your primary refutation method, all the same.</i><br /><br />You are not entirely clear, but you seem to be saying that there is intentionality - it can just be reduced to the natural. You seem to admit the existence of intentionality (the intentional side of things) but imply it is not the only side. It seems that you, like so many supposed eliminativists commenting here, including Bakker, are not an eliminativist but a reductionist. Indeed, you might not even be a reductionist if these two sides you talk of don't involve a reduction. Then you'd be a non-reductionist naturalist. Jeremy Taylornoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71601594106947810572015-01-18T01:24:56.594-08:002015-01-18T01:24:56.594-08:00Georgy Mancz,
If the ability to question is lacki...Georgy Mancz,<br /><br /><i>If the ability to question is lacking, you cannot question.</i><br /><br />Why? You seem to be treating it as a hard binary - either one is absolutely capable of question, or one can't at all.<br /><br />Maybe that is the case. I'm just treating it as if it's somewhere in between, instead. Does that make you sad? The idea of it being inconveniently non absolute? Or when we bring up 'sad' are we entering into traditional intellectual turf war stuff? Oblique ad homenims, etc? Is your question about that really necessary? Or is this already the end of any actual discussion - I've been through this on many other subjects before. The other person gets sick of talking and starts just jabbing with remarks. And I'm genuinely asking if this is occuring, not saying it as if I definatley know.<br /><br /><i>You seeing dust being blown along the road certainly does involve intentionality - the act of you seeing being "about" the things seen.</i><br /><br />I don't know how to parse this - you've said the dust moving involves intentionality.<br /><br />So are you saying if we subtracted intentionality, the dust would not move? Or would not exist?<br /><br />If you're not saying that, then you're acknowledging the presence or absence of intentionality does not matter to the dust moving.<br /><br />Which runs counter to the notion of involvement.<br /><br /><i>Perhaps you'll find that odd, but there are even things that are self-evident, that cannot be coherently denied: like the principle of non-contradiction, or truth being attainable, for that matter, because you'll end up affirming the thing denied in the act denial. I do hope pointing that out does not constitute failing to keep up with the idea. Am I supposed to stay with it after it refutes itself, like EM arguably does?</i><br /><br />What I find is that you treat the apparent nature something as the entirely of it's nature.<br /><br />Then when the idea that it has two natures, one of them an expression of raw physics, you seem to treat it that if anyone uses more of the two natures thing to describe how it has two natures, to you that proves how it has one nature - the one you took it to have to begin with.<br /><br />If intentional words have a hidden side to them, someone using intentional words to describe that does not somehow mean that hidden side does not exist. But that is your primary refutation method, all the same.<br /><br /><i>Philosophy is about truth, reality. As I initially presumed this discussion to be. You, on the other hand, seem to think that both are about (heh) gaining a social outcome or surviving Darwinian trials or whatever. Which aren't the same as attaining truth.</i><br /><br />Maybe. But if your idea of truth is the way of an organism surviving, then you'd agree a Darwinian creature would evolve to achieve it simply to not die. Then the final step - just remove the idea of truth - it was just 'not dying' all along. It was just a perspective (a perspective based on survival)<br /><br />But I have to say you actually outlined my position in regards to social outcomes or surviving Darwinian trials - and I find not enough people are able to describe the other persons position (whether they agree with it or not). So I should take a moment to note this victory of good discussion - thanks! :) I'll try and reciprocate - your position is that nothing can be refered to without intentional words. Thus intentionality is inherant in everything, like light is inherent in everything (as much as it's hitting everything) in a room, exeept in the case of intentionality there is no darkness. No place without light. Is that a fair, if rough, outline of your position, Georgy?Callan S.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15373053356095440571noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27004370844634747412015-01-17T14:30:33.005-08:002015-01-17T14:30:33.005-08:00Bob,
Another poster mentioned, David Lewis, who h...Bob,<br /><br />Another poster mentioned, David Lewis, who has tried to do what you are describing, more or less. The difference is that he actually was prepared to say more "Oh you know, mathematical states and such like". I can understand not being bothered to write much, but that is going a little bit too far. You dismissed Dr. Feser's viewpoint but haven't really indicated you have any real idea about how mathematically expressed states can account for intentionality. <br /><br />And, more importantly, the discussion is about eliminativism, and you are referring to reductionism.Jeremy Taylornoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29622789893729047402015-01-17T11:57:24.837-08:002015-01-17T11:57:24.837-08:00https://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2015/01/17/12-t...https://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2015/01/17/12-theses-on-eliminativism/Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-43205269817868860472015-01-17T07:29:30.581-08:002015-01-17T07:29:30.581-08:00(To elaborate, action seems to presuppose intentio...(To elaborate, action seems to presuppose intentionality. But if someone (say), knocks me on the ground, then though I didn't intend it, there is still physical movement.)Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-79104038156663178932015-01-17T07:24:49.776-08:002015-01-17T07:24:49.776-08:00Also, could you define action for me? My ignorance...Also, could you define action for me? My ignorance of philosophy of mind may be getting in the way, here, but it seems to me there's a distinction between mere physical movement, and action. Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.com