tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post8556453204401920263..comments2024-03-19T00:20:18.049-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Vallicella on existence-entailing relations and presentismEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger171125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-60108337040739544992019-04-28T10:38:08.509-07:002019-04-28T10:38:08.509-07:00Vincent,
this will be my last comment as well. A ...Vincent,<br /><br />this will be my last comment as well. A few quick points:<br /><br />First, I have never said that God engages in no acts. I have only said that he engages in no acts that are prior to the existence of the universe. Just like when God or anyone else forms an intention, I do not deny that they perform an act. I deny that in order to form an intention the agent must first perform some other act of intention forming which in turn produces the intention.<br /><br /> Many people believe that a necessary God can form a contingent intention without first intending to form an intention. I believe that a necessary God can form a contingent universe without first intending to form a contingent universe. <br /><br />Second, I have always affirmed that God brings about the universe. In fact I have clearly stated that he brings it about in the same way that agents bring about intentions (and I have left open whether or not this entails that the universe just is an intention...which btw would not make it unreal). If you define efficient causality to include any instance where an agent brings about a state of affairs, then God is in fact an efficient cause. If you think that this is not a good definition of efficient cause, or that it requires that the agent first engage in some act of "bringing about" before the agent brings about the effect, then you need an argument and it will not suffice to quote a scholastic textbook. <br /><br />Now that you claim that God is not a necessary being, a lot of what we could say to one another will not be convincing. I enjoyed the discussion<br /><br />Tomhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07838482665489703825noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-34421911924508288492019-04-27T08:17:55.489-07:002019-04-27T08:17:55.489-07:00Your third alternative is the proposal we have bee...Your third alternative is the proposal we have been disagreeing about, which I am reducing to one of the two alternatives. Your fourth alternative is no alternative: it doesn't address the question/problem, and it is an attempt to explain the more evident by the less evident. Fundamentally, your unwillingness even to consider causality in non-mechanist terms (i.e., as belonging to living things as agents) makes your account untenable as a general theory of causality. TChttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07677053301442420833noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-22796503329474723402019-04-25T15:15:11.176-07:002019-04-25T15:15:11.176-07:00Hi Tom,
I'll sign off here, I think. I'l...Hi Tom, <br /><br />I'll sign off here, I think. I'll keep my comments very brief.<br /><br />1. My definition of efficient cause as involving some act is not question-begging; it's standard. Any textbook of Scholastic textbook says pretty much the same thing: an efficient cause is a cause which produces or brings about some state of affairs, whereas a final cause is the goal of that state of affairs. Producing or bringing about is a "doing" word: it involves an act.<br /><br />2. Yes, I think your position does entail that the world is just an intention of God. I can't see how you could say it's any more real than that. But even if you can live with that, there's still a problem. An intention is still distinct from its Necessary Author. It's contingent: God didn't have to create this world or any other world, so He didn't have to have the specific intention He had, as the Creator of the world we live in.<br /><br />3. I agree that theological compatibilism is problematic for the same reason that your account is, and I reject both for that reason.<br /><br />4. Finally, I think you were right after all in arguing that Grisez's account doesn't work. If D alone [the Necessary Being] can't explain C (the contingent creation), then it can't explain Dc (God's contingent choice as Creator) either. I now believe it is a mistake to regard God as a Necessary Being. God is neither necessary nor contingent; He is beyond both. The two are mutually exclusive but not mutually exhaustive. What is necessary has to be the way it is; what is contingent doesn't have to be the way it is. Both are defined, however, with respect to rules or norms. God, as Author of Creation and as the Ultimate Rule-maker, isn't bound by any of these rules. In other words, Agency is prior to both necessity and contingency. I'll have to think some more about this, but that's the direction in which my metaphysics thoughts are leading me, right now. Cheers. Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-65128183753383381532019-04-24T06:44:20.504-07:002019-04-24T06:44:20.504-07:00@Cogniblog
Ok, so you relate dt to delta t as part...@Cogniblog<br />Ok, so you relate dt to delta t as part of a limit expression.<br /><br />Thus, dt does not simply equal 0, else all we would ever get out of an integral would be 0.<br /><br />But how big is dt, if it is not 0? You included a symbol for the concept of infinity in your limit expression. In this context we are considering going to an infinity of divisions, as opposed to an infinity of extent. How much time is the limit as delta t goes to zero?<br /><br />10^-1s is easy to perceive<br />10^-6s is imperceptible<br />10^-9s is about 1 clock period of your computer<br />10^-42s after the big bang first banged we still have no established science<br /><br />So, only 2 digits in the exponent and we are already down to almost incomprehensibly short times. <br /><br />How about<br />10^-100000000000000<br />How little time is that?<br />Consider<br />10^-n where n is a 1 followed by as many zeros as we could fit in the observable universe if each character were fit into a 1mm cube. Did we get to the limit as delta t goes to 0? Nope, not even close.<br /><br />Of course, there is no human end to this sort of process. Infinity is a concept, not a number.<br /><br />Newton and Leibniz did not provide a rigorous foundation for the Calculus, rather, only some incompletely defined notions of dx, dy, dt, etc. After centuries of further work calculus is generally considered to now be rigorously well founded, but maybe you disagree, and that’s OK if you do.<br /><br />So, even if one attempts to cite some particular time period as the minimum needed for cause and effect, it is trivial to provide a counter example that is vastly shorter still.<br /><br />Thus, the limit as delta t goes to zero is, in my view, a valid definition of the present, and one that is the foundation of the Calculus, generally considered as rigorously sound mathematically.<br /><br />The present is, in some sense, where past and future touch, where cause pushes on effect, as it were. The present is the boundary between past and future and is always moving through time.<br />StardustyPsychehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12493629973262220492noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12914516312263397392019-04-23T16:52:02.188-07:002019-04-23T16:52:02.188-07:00Vincent
(1) You define efficient cause in such a ...Vincent<br /><br />(1) You define efficient cause in such a way that requires the existence of an act separate from the effect, but this definition is question begging since it assumes the truth of your conclusion, namely, that mine and Brower's view is incompatible with the thesis that God causes the world as an efficient cause.<br /><br />As you know, begging the question does not show that you are wrong, but it is hardly convincing since I see no reason to accept your definition of efficient cause. More importantly, lets suppose that I concede your definition. Then it follows that God is not the efficient cause of the world on the model of divine action that I have been defending. But so what? Traditional theological language has used the term "efficient cause" to describe God's relationship to the world. But this is a semantics issue since my view is still that God is the explanation for the world even though he is not the explanation as an efficient cause, according to one particular definition of "efficient cause." <br /><br />Building off of this point, while I agree that God explains the existence of the cosmos, I deny that God's act explains the existence of the cosmos since I have said that God's act is not prior to the cosmos.<br /><br />(2) I do not deny that God performs some act in creating us. I deny that he performs an act that is prior to the world. As I have said, I think God explains the existence of the world in the same way that you think he explains the existence of his intentions. But I would assume that you think when God forms an intention, he is performing an act, even though you would deny (correctly in my view) that he must engage in some other voluntary act prior to forming his intention, in order to form his intention. Likewise, I think God performs an action while creating the universe even though i would deny that he must engage in some other voluntary action prior to the existence of the world which in turn explains the world.<br /><br />Does this mean that creation <i>just is</i> an intention (voluntary act, etc.) of God? Maybe.I am not committed to that claim, I leave it as a possibility.<br /><br /> Creation is the direct result of a rational being and it exists in virtue of its desirable properties. If this is sufficient for something being an intention of an agent, then yes, the universe is an agent. That much I have conceded in the above comments. However, I think this is a relatively benign claim and does not entail anything unorthodox. <br /><br />(3) You ask what becomes of sin if humans are acts of God. I would say that it carries with it all sorts of potential problems and issues. It does not however carry with it any additional problems than the ones that theological compatibilism would otherwise carry with it however. <br /><br />I should again note (I pointed this out above) that my view of divine causality <i>does not</i> require that we see human choices as caused by God. It merely gives us the resources to say that God causes our choices without determining them. <br />Tomhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07838482665489703825noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75645717339351943562019-04-23T15:02:13.828-07:002019-04-23T15:02:13.828-07:00Hi Tom,
Thanks for your response. Very briefly: I...Hi Tom,<br /><br />Thanks for your response. Very briefly: I define an efficient cause of X as something whose action explains the being (or coming to be) of X. I define the final cause of X as the goal of X.<br /><br />God is (we agree) the efficient cause of the cosmos: He is the Creator of heaven and earth. His creative act explains the existence (and coming into existence) of the cosmos.<br /><br />I define the voluntary effect of an agent A as anything for which the efficient cause is a voluntary mental act of A, and I define a voluntary act as an act performed immediately by A, when reasoning (or deliberating) about the achievement of some goal.<br /><br />Re stories: I agree that in the creation of a story, there is not some first act of imagining the story which in turn causes there to be a story. But as I understand it, you deny that God performs any mental act in creating us, which I find puzzling, given that you liken Him to an author. And if you were to simply equate humans with mental acts of God, what becomes of the notion of sin?<br /><br />Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-82080410928060767782019-04-23T13:29:54.248-07:002019-04-23T13:29:54.248-07:00Gale’s Criticism of McTaggart: A-Theory and B-Theo...Gale’s Criticism of McTaggart: A-Theory and B-Theory<br /><br />http://www.arcaneknowledge.org/philtheo/temporal/temporal2.htm#ch10Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75711776522315110842019-04-23T13:28:34.442-07:002019-04-23T13:28:34.442-07:00Can we all admit both Presentism and Eternalism ar...Can we all admit both Presentism and Eternalism are ill define and nebulous concepts? They are also often confused with A-Theory and B-theory time as well.<br /><br /><br /> I find most people who use Eternalism as a stick to deny the existence of the Act/Potency distinction and thus deny change is real, merely are using the term as a place holder for Parmendianism. <br /><br />Also claiming Relativity mandates either Eternalism or B-theory is daft as well.<br /><br />http://www.arcaneknowledge.org/philtheo/temporal/temporal.htmSon of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-56651282654550650532019-04-23T13:19:54.908-07:002019-04-23T13:19:54.908-07:00In case you don't realize it I am Jim the Scot...In case you don't realize it I am Jim the Scott from over at Strange Notions. I see you Rand.<br /><br />You have nothing interesting or intelligent to say.<br /><br />Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35782523687178558702019-04-23T10:16:25.280-07:002019-04-23T10:16:25.280-07:00Knowing and Observing are distinct. One is passiv...<i>Knowing</i> and <i>Observing</i> are distinct. One is passive the other active.<br /><br />So, you are wrong <b>Son of Ya'Kov</b>.<br /><br />You <i>see</i> but do not <i>observe</i>.Philip Randhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09143527524267821692noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42714455234282973282019-04-23T05:47:37.399-07:002019-04-23T05:47:37.399-07:00@Vincent,
(1) Your response requires a distinctio...@Vincent,<br /><br />(1) Your response requires a distinction between voluntary effects acts. <br />I would submit that there is no way to consistently distinguish between the two in such a way that is robust enough to actually counter mine and Brower's view but also does not beg the question. So how do you distinguish between voluntary acts and voluntary effects?<br /><br />If you say that effects are caused by acts, then you beg the question since in that case, I would not call the universe a voluntary effect at all. <br /><br />I know this is somewhat of a semantics issue, but I see voluntary acts as a species of voluntary effects (in fact, as the paradigmatic case of voluntary effects). Put another way, Dc is, in my view, a voluntary effect since it is a state of affairs freely brought about by God.<br /><br />The other issue with your first paragraph is how you may define "efficient cause." I see agents as efficient causes of their intentions. You may disagree. You claim that mine and Brower's view renders it unintelligible to say God is the efficient cause of the world. My challenge to you is to define efficient cause in such a way that (i) does in fact show that our model of divine causality is incompatible with the view that God efficiently causes the world and (ii) is not ad hoc, but independently plausible. <br /><br />(2) Regarding your author analogy: I am not speaking for other proponents of this model of divine causality here, but I have <i>not</i> claimed that God would have done nothing different when creating this world than what he would have done had he created another world. I have claimed that God would have nothing different <i>prior to </i> the existence of this world. But this is an important distinction. First of all, I have allowed for the possibility that we identify the world with a divine action itself. Second of all, even if we do not make this identity claim, I have always argued that God explains the world in the same way (more or less) that you and many others think God explains his own intentions/actions to create the world. To go back to the symbols from earlier, God explains the world the way Grisez thinks D explains Dc (you may think this isn't efficient causality, but then refer to the above). <br /><br />Since we both agree that voluntary acts do not require voluntary acts as causes, then we agree that, even on your understanding of divine activity, God would have "done nothing different" <i>prior to</i> his willing to create the world even if he had created a different world or none at all. But this is exactly what I am arguing, the only difference is that I think the thing directly brought about by God is the world whereas you think it is a divine intention or state of affairs in which God is willing to create.<br /><br />Finally, as I say above, I do not agree with your objection to my view based on your analogy since I deny that God wouldn't have been doing anything different had he not created the world. But I do want to point out that the author analogy actually plays into my view more than yours. If we think of the Harry Potter story as that which is in JK Rowling's imagination (i.e. distinct from a novel written on paper), then it is true to say that it is not a result of something JK Rowling does. There is no action by which she says "and now let Harry cast a spell." She simply decides that the story should be that way, and the <i>decision itself</i> is the story. <br /><br />Granted, this is only an analogy and human authors can change stories since they are fictional. But this is not essential to the analogy. What matters here is that the <i>story</i> just is what the author imagines it to be, there is not some first act of imagining the story which in turn causes there to be a story. Likewise, creation just is what God voluntarily brings about. There is not some first act which he engages in which subsequently causes the world to exist.<br />Tomhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07838482665489703825noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40731267517698251642019-04-22T20:37:08.785-07:002019-04-22T20:37:08.785-07:00@TC
“You denied that causes act over time”
I have ...@TC<br />“You denied that causes act over time”<br />I have said zero causation occurs over zero time. <br /><br />“But no increment of time, no matter how small, exists, since only moments, viz., the present, exist. So then causality would only occur in the moment, not in any increment. So which is it?”<br />You neglect at least a 3rd choice I have stated above, as well as a 4th choice I will sate below, making your dichotomy false.<br /><br />The 3rd choice is the concept of the limit, alternatively, the concept of the infinitesimal. Leibniz did not define his infinitesimal with sufficient rigor, nor did Newton his fluxions. It has, in fact, required centuries of progress by a number of mathematicians to arrive at a sound basis for continuity and the Calculus. It really is an expansive subject beyond the scope of a combox, but I quite enjoyed this article on the history of the subject<br />https://www.iep.utm.edu/zeno-par/<br /><br />A 4th alternative is due to the storage, as it were, of causal propagation delay, allowing, in some sense, past and future to coexist. <br /><br />A telescope is somewhat whimsically called a time machine. But, we do see things through the telescope as they were in the past, not as they are right now. So, in reality, a past event affects us now, due to propagation delay. A cause in the past will produce its effect in the future due to propagation delay of causal influences.<br /><br />Since current theory holds that causal influences can propagate no faster than the speed of light in a vacuum, about 1 foot per nanosecond, the propagation delay of causal influences can be a real physical solution to how presentism can account for causation.<br /><br />A time period of causation in the past can result in a time period of effect in the future due to the propagation delay of the causal influence, thereby eliminating the problem of discontinuity between a past time period and a future time period.<br />StardustyPsychehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12493629973262220492noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44381503961386324632019-04-22T15:34:30.239-07:002019-04-22T15:34:30.239-07:00Hi Tom,
You write: "I would 100% agree that ...Hi Tom,<br /><br />You write: "I would 100% agree that it is a myth that a voluntary act requires a voluntary act as its cause. But if that is the case, then it follows that an agent can bring about a state of affairs voluntarily without some prior act of will. But in that case, it is perfectly intelligible to say that God voluntarily created the universe, without invoking some further, prior, act of will."<br /><br />I agree that a voluntary <i>act</i> (such as an act of will) does not require a voluntary act as its cause, but I do insist that a voluntary <i>effect</i> (such as the world which God has made) requires an act of bringing it about. Otherwise nothing remains of the notion of an efficient cause: one might as well say that God is merely the final cause of the cosmos. Such a position is quite different to the Christian view of God as Creator of heaven and earth.<br /><br />Regarding Brower's model: suppose J.K. Rowling were to tell you that she knows herself as the author of Harry Potter and not Wuthering Heights, but at the same time adamantly denies that she ever had a plot in her head when composing Harry Potter, or that she did anything different when writing Harry Potter from what she would have done when writing Wuthering Heights. I think an incredulous stare and a look of complete puzzlement would be the only appropriate reaction. Don't you?Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49152560576483767992019-04-22T15:24:44.978-07:002019-04-22T15:24:44.978-07:00Hi Anon,
The whole point of the author-book analo...Hi Anon,<br /><br />The whole point of the author-book analogy was to explain how (a) God could know our choices without having to depend on creatures for such information (Divine aseity) and (b) how creatures could still be said to be free. But in the end, the analogy explains neither. <br /><br />An author knows what his characters choose to do by knowing his own mental acts as the author of the plot, which he himself has composed. But Thomists deny that there is any plot: they deny that God performs any mental act in creating us. Fine; but without a plot or an act of composing one, introspection won't help the author know what the characters are up to. The analogy fails.<br /><br />And while characters in the plot could be said to be free vis-a-vis each other, they are not free vis-a-vis the author, for they cannot resist his will. God, on the other hand, is said to blame and to punish sinners who resist his will. Once again, the analogy fails.<br /><br />Anthony Flew coined an apt term for an analogy like this one: it dies the death of a thousand qualifications.<br /> Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3311178109930711042019-04-22T11:59:10.616-07:002019-04-22T11:59:10.616-07:00I would be interested to know your understanding o...<b>I would be interested to know your understanding of the meaning of dt in the integral from a to b of f(t) dt.</b><br /><br />The meaning of dt varies if you are talking about the Riemann integral or the lebesgue integral.<br /><br />1. The dt of the Riemann integral is the Δx in this expression<br /><br />lim_{n->∞} Σ_{k=1}^n f(a + kΔx)Δx<br /><br />where Δx = (b - a)/n<br /><br />2. In the lebesgue measure, it is the measure you are multiplying the function with in order to obtain a new measure.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33180629933701186712019-04-22T11:51:18.889-07:002019-04-22T11:51:18.889-07:00What has Feser said? Let us get on the same page ...What has Feser said? Let us get on the same page people.<br /><br />Quote:<br /><br />Don't "[treat] eternity as if it were some perspective which is simultaneous with all points in time, from which God knows all those points. That is precisely what it is not. That effectively makes it temporal, when the whole point is that it is not temporal.<br /><br />Don't "mistakenly modele divine knowledge as a kind of observation by which God learns what is happening in the world. That is not what it is at all, and God doesn't "learn" anything, not successively and not even in a single timeless act."<br /><br /> Rather, "God knows the world by virtue of knowing himself as its cause. And what he causes is a world in which things happen successively."<br /><br />" It doesn't follow that he knows it via some sort of succession of observations or the like." <br /><br />"Nor does it follow that he is observing all moments of time at once. He is not observing it at all, any more than an author knows his novel by observing the characters and events in it."<br /><br />I would add:<br />Stop equivocating between God Knowing and God observing.<br /><br />Carry on people.Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-59513089249169340402019-04-22T11:43:22.492-07:002019-04-22T11:43:22.492-07:00>So wouldn't it be more logical for you to ...>So wouldn't it be more logical for you to simply say that God does not know what time it is now, and leave it at that? <br /><br />That would be technically accurate but vague and subject to different interpretations. Some of which are heretical and erronous.<br /><br />For example: I can say with Brian Davies God is not Morally Good. But what I mean is God is not morally good in the unequivocal way a virtuous rational creature is morally good. I don't mean God is amoral like a wicked human person might be amoral.<br /><br />>Likewise, God does not know what color an apple is, since He is incapable of experiencing qualia. <br /><br />Rather he doesn't know it by sense experience. Or he doesn't know it the way we do.<br /><br />But given the divine incomprehensibility we can by philosophy know that God knows but we cannot concieve it or imagine how he knows. <br /><br />>But in that case, you are committed to the very odd position that God can cause things which He does not know.<br /><br />Rather saying He "doesn't know" in this case is trivial and given His nature it is incoherent. <br /><br />Like saying God doesn't know what it is like to not exist. Well He doesn't but.....<br /><br />>Is that what you maintain?<br /><br />No. I think you need to go re-read Brian Davies and get yourself up to speed.<br /><br />More Davies less Craig.Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-47389411048869980702019-04-22T10:33:32.600-07:002019-04-22T10:33:32.600-07:00Zeno went wrong in assuming that the potentially i...Zeno went wrong in assuming that the potentially infinite is actually infinite. Aristotle pointed this out long ago.<br /><br />You are not answering the question. You denied that causes act over time, but then said that what is summed are increments of time. But no increment of time, no matter how small, exists, since only moments, viz., the present, exist. So then causality would only occur in the moment, not in any increment. So which is it?<br /><br />Aristotle's four causes were not made obsolete: they were rejected out of hand by those seeking power over nature via mathematizing physics, in much the same way that a foolish blind man denies the existence of colors. Without them, science cannot pretend to give anything like a sufficient account of the material world.TChttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07677053301442420833noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-407026045013655462019-04-22T07:22:39.438-07:002019-04-22T07:22:39.438-07:00@TC
“Moment:time :: point:line. Moments are points...@TC<br />“Moment:time :: point:line. Moments are points in time, as it were: the present is a moment. They are, in the realm of time, that which has no part (to use Euclid's words). “<br />Ok, so you are using a definition that is different than a dictionary definition of the word “moment”. <br /><br />A point is dimensionless. A point is of 0 size in any axis. But I explicitly excluded change in zero time. Zero change occurs in zero time. We agree on that.<br /><br />But what is the smallest possible increment of time? Can 2 points in time be consecutive? That lands us right back to the ancient problems, such as Zeno’s paradoxes, based on infinite divisions, “proving” one cannot ever cross the finish line.<br /><br />Where do you say that Zeno went wrong? What is your solution to the problem of infinite divisions of time and motion?<br /><br />“But you are missing the point, it appears. If each of the things summed is an increment of time, it is not and never was the pure present but an admixture of present and past, so that causality is occurring, in each, over a period of time, viz., the length of time of the increment.”<br />In calculus that problem is solved by defining operations in terms of the limit. How do you solve this ancient problem?<br /><br />“Do not forget to respond to my second, and more basic, point.”<br />The erroneousness of Aristotle’s 4 causes? I am not sure that is on the topic of presentism, and it will take me a bit of time to do the subject justice, but in short, those notions were obsoleted by science centuries ago and thus are absent from modern science.<br />StardustyPsychehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12493629973262220492noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52752357492683010162019-04-22T03:31:22.320-07:002019-04-22T03:31:22.320-07:00I don't see why God would need to know each mo...I don't see why God would need to know each moment as it arises as 'now' in order to know that moment. If He is timeless, then He cannot know any moment as 'now' or 'then', but that us just like saying that God cannot swim, although He causes people to be able to swim. Sri Naharhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17331851104846456479noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49254866772883722192019-04-21T23:15:52.763-07:002019-04-21T23:15:52.763-07:00Moment:time :: point:line. Moments are points in t...Moment:time :: point:line. Moments are points in time, as it were: the present is a moment. They are, in the realm of time, that which has no part (to use Euclid's words). But you are missing the point, it appears. If each of the things summed is an increment of time, it is not and never was the pure present but an admixture of present and past, so that causality is occurring, in each, over a period of time, viz., the length of time of the increment.<br /><br />Do not forget to respond to my second, and more basic, point.TChttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07677053301442420833noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-22106129482501082062019-04-21T20:40:51.471-07:002019-04-21T20:40:51.471-07:00Vincent,
Regarding D-Dc, whatever explanation you...Vincent,<br /><br />Regarding D-Dc, whatever explanation you would give for D bringing about a state of affairs in which Dc, I think can also be given for God bringing it about that the universe exists. We can call this explanation "causation" or something else, but that is just a semantics issue. See I would 100% agree that it is a myth that a voluntary act requires a voluntary act as its cause. But if that is the case, then it follows that an agent can bring about a state of affairs <i>voluntarily</i> without some prior act of will. But in that case, it is perfectly intelligible to say that God voluntarily created the universe, without invoking some further, prior, act of will.<br /><br />Regarding Brower's model: the causal relationship that obtains between God and p and God and q are not the same. They are the same <i>intrinsic to God</i> but they are not the same full stop since the difference between p and q grounds the difference in the two relationships. You can of course argue that this difference is not sufficient to ground the difference in God's knowledge of p vs his knowledge of q. But to avoid begging the question, you would need an argument in support of this thesis. It is not enough to merely point out that God is intrinsically the same whether or not he knows p or q.<br /><br />I don't know how Thomists would feel about everything I am saying. But regardless, one can agree with Thomists on certain principles (e.g. that God is not really related to his effects) while also disagreeing with the traditional implications those Thomists saw in said principles. Tomhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07838482665489703825noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-2075933485753893442019-04-21T19:05:35.797-07:002019-04-21T19:05:35.797-07:00@TC
“If the "moments" that are summed ar...@TC<br />“If the "moments" that are summed are increments of time within which causation occurs, then there is causality over time.”<br />Agreed. There are net causalities over various definite time periods. <br /><br />“ If they are not increments of time but true moments”<br />What is a “true moment”?<br /><br />Please provide a mathematical expression of a “true moment”, or at least a very specific and detailed verbal description of it using recognized logical and scientific terms.<br /><br />Also, again mathematically or at least using detailed logical and scientific terms, please define “the present” and “the present moment”.<br />StardustyPsychehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12493629973262220492noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83715821108805081412019-04-21T18:49:50.750-07:002019-04-21T18:49:50.750-07:00 @Cogniblog
“ the FToC is a relationship between t... @Cogniblog<br />“ the FToC is a relationship between two limit functions (the derivative and the Riemann integral), not a limit function itself.”<br /><br />Distinction without a difference.<br /><br />Principles of Mathematics<br />Bertrand Russell, 1903<br />Just as the derivative of a function is the limit of a fraction, so the definite<br />integral is the limit of a sum. p334<br /><br />308. As in the case of the derivative, there is only one important remark<br />to make about this definition. The definite integral involves neither the infinite<br />nor the infinitesimal, and is itself not a sum, but only and strictly the limit<br />of a sum. All the terms which occur in the sum whose limit is the definite<br />integral are finite, and the sum itself is finite. If we were to suppose the limit<br />actually attained, it is true, the number of intervals would be infinite, and the<br />magnitude of each would be infinitesimal; but in this case, the sum becomes<br />meaningless. Thus the sum must not be regarded as actually attaining its<br />limit. But this is a respect in which series in general agree. Any series which<br />always ascends or always descends and has no last term cannot reach its limit;<br />other infinite series may have a term equal to their limit, but if so, this is a<br />mere accident. p335<br /><br />But, maybe you have other sources or your own analysis, which is fine, a lot has happened in the last 116 years. No single individual is the ultimate authority in science, or mathematics, or philosophy. All such assertions are provisional and subject to later modification or rejection.<br /><br />I would be interested to know your understanding of the meaning of dt in the integral from a to b of f(t) dt.<br /><br />Also, how do you define “the present” and “the present moment”?<br />StardustyPsychehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12493629973262220492noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74534713060963632682019-04-21T17:12:39.934-07:002019-04-21T17:12:39.934-07:00Vincet, I think you may be missing the parenthetic...Vincet, I think you may be missing the parenthetical info Feser put the in the second paragraph. <br /><br />I also fail to see why God grasping the concept of "now" would be a contradiction with presentism anyhow; perhaps there are some assumptions of yours unstated here that make it more explicable. Anonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11122746359465351676noreply@blogger.com