tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post7191383232878991766..comments2024-03-28T07:47:38.176-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Popper contra computationalismEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger265125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-1936861777581294322013-12-02T19:46:53.679-08:002013-12-02T19:46:53.679-08:00@Please explain
You are objecting to a materialis...@Please explain<br /><br />You are objecting to a materialist premise.<br /><br />Join the club.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-8299898797064305032013-11-30T20:07:05.469-08:002013-11-30T20:07:05.469-08:00That only works of you assume the meaning is intri...That only works of you assume the meaning is intrinsic to the matter, rather than supervening on it.<br /><br />And anyways, the behavior of a neuron depends on voltages and neurotransmitters, not meaning.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49889532755276384242013-09-25T04:33:40.199-07:002013-09-25T04:33:40.199-07:00'Similarly, neural processes that are in fact ...'Similarly, neural processes that are in fact associated with the thought that all men are mortal and the thought that Socrates is a man would still generate the neural process that is in fact associated with the thought that Socrates is mortal even if these neural processes had all been associated with some other meanings instead'<br />This seems unprovable, as well as nonsensical; these neural processes would refer to other neural processes to generate these conclusion; memories of the words themselves, the frontal cortex (which seems to be where we process logical thought), and if the associated neural processes were different, the meaning the brain interpreted from a simulated identical neural process would be different.Please explainnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27416397197273333782013-07-12T09:43:08.039-07:002013-07-12T09:43:08.039-07:00What some people dont realize is that this argumen...What some people dont realize is that this argument applies to any "materialist rational process" and not just the human brain. It applies to computers, other animals, logic machines, or any other "logic system." So attempting to use those in an effort to refute the argument merely begs the question.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-20094786146393777062013-06-26T16:00:04.999-07:002013-06-26T16:00:04.999-07:00"For one thing, it might not be true -- does ..."For one thing, it might not be true -- does "unicorns are typically portrayed as having healing powers" serve as an explanation for some medieval narwhal hunts?"<br /><br />No it doesn't, it is missing something: The medieval hunters thought that unicorns existed and mistakenly identified narwhals as unicorns due to their horns, which they thought had healing powers. The explanation appeals to the desires and incorrect beliefs about unicorns that the medievals held. Desires and beliefs existed. If we could appeal to things that do not exist for explanations, then an atheist could not object when a theist appealed to God in order to explain something.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-90402330919584786902012-03-16T10:23:05.076-07:002012-03-16T10:23:05.076-07:00Ben/Ed
Ray=djindra?
No, I'm not Ray. I'v...Ben/Ed<br /><br />Ray=djindra?<br /><br />No, I'm not Ray. I've told you in the past that I only use my real name DonJindra or initial/name: djindra. I don't hide behind false identities like you do.DonJindrahttp://donjindra.blogspot.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58116856683946863132012-03-10T18:05:58.234-08:002012-03-10T18:05:58.234-08:00Steve Ruble,
Unfortunately I don't think we a...Steve Ruble,<br /><br />Unfortunately I don't think we are getting anywhere. My responses to your post will essentially be re-iterations of what I have said already. My suggestion for you if you are serious in engaging with the problems of physical reductionism is to read Real Essentialism by David Oderberg, papers and books by Crawford Elder, and perhaps the new book by Kathrin Koslicki called The Structure of Objects. <br /><br />Anyway, thanks for the discussion - all the best.Andrew Thttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04019142680097397673noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-48163825533853230982012-03-08T16:27:36.857-08:002012-03-08T16:27:36.857-08:00>Ben's psycho wigging-out?
I prefer to cal...>Ben's psycho wigging-out?<br /><br />I prefer to call it rage-monkey behavior.<br /><br />But we will agree to disagree.BenYachovhttp://www.catholic.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-87561644238066282282012-03-08T14:27:59.474-08:002012-03-08T14:27:59.474-08:00Andrew T,
"I’m not sure what you take essenc...Andrew T,<br /><br />"I’m not sure what you take essence to be."<br /><br />Yah, I'm not sure what anyone takes essence to be.<br /><br />"Would you consider a decaying, non-operating object made up brain matter to be actually a brain?"<br /><br />Um, yes, I don't think that as soon as you die your skull is suddenly full of something <i>other than</i> a brain. Do you? What would it be?<br /><br />WRT to my poorly phrased response to your argument that conventionalism has internal contradictions: I was trying to say that there's no reason that a brain must <i>actually</i> be a "distinct entity" in any metaphysical way for it to do all the things that it does, so the fact that we conventionally refer to brains as distinct from other things has no bearing on the logical consistency of conventionalism.<br /><br />--------------------<br /><br />Yes, the cylindrical volume X is just that volume occupied by the piston, and the cubical volume Y is just that volume occupied by the diamond cube. I don't see why this is a problem; any description of the movements of sets of particles is going to require a specification of where those particles are to start with, obviously.<br /><br />"Because, for instance, the volume Y could be full of air molecules rather than carbon atoms, and therefore the distance these atoms travel will be substantially different to those of the diamond cube, and therefore, with the same cause, you will get a different effect (i.e. no invariance established)."<br /><br />Well, yes. And if I take away the window, varying the speed of the baseball won't change the force with which the window breaks, because the window won't break. If you think there's a need for the invariance relationship to persist across any arbitrary rearrangement of the entities involved in the relationship, then I guess I don't understand what you intend to refer to by "invariance relationship".<br /><br />-------------------<br /><br />Your analogy to Legos made perfect sense to me up to a point, and seems to nicely capture reductionism. What makes a bunch of Legos an X-wing rather than a castle is precisely the fact that they are arranged into what we call an X-wing rather than being arranged into what we call a castle. Each Lego has a certain number of possible relationships it can have with a certain number of other Legos (those which can be put into physical contact with it). When you place the Legos into certain relationships, you get an X-wing; when you assemble them with a different structure (a different set of relationships) you get a castle. Makes sense to me. Then you wrote this:<br /><br />"If you have the same number of blocks in both the X-wing and castle, you will need that something extra to be able to explain their difference."<br /><br />Something extra besides the fact that an X-wing and a castle are totally different configurations of Legos? I just don't know what you mean. There's nothing else there to be different besides the arrangement of the Legos.<br /><br />"And these structures, while still together, form a unified causal whole – if I throw a medieval castle made of lego blocks at a window hard enough, it will break. However, if I throw the same amount of blocks dissembled at the window, it won’t break."<br /><br />Try putting the disassembled blocks in a shotgun with a blank round in it and shooting them at the window - I'll bet it'll break then. (You did say "hard enough", after all). Shall we than say that "collections of high speed disassembled Legos" exist as distinct entities, because they have causal powers? In any case, I don't see how the fact that the separated parts of an object have different properties than the whole object is supposed to present a problem to the reductionist. We're totally fine with that idea.Steve Rublehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10354805604015803912noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26629597993681349392012-03-07T20:50:21.384-08:002012-03-07T20:50:21.384-08:00Anonymous said… Oh come on. Do you believe anyone ...<i>Anonymous said… Oh come on. Do you believe anyone can fall for these embarrassing theatrics of yours? </i><br /><br />Well, we fell for his stock "dumb atheist" routine! I did too, at first, but I've come to the conclusion he's just pretending, don't you think? He not only managed to cycle through every caricature in the book without the slightest shred of self-awareness, but with the same impenetrable defensiveness to replies ranging from serious attempts at discussion to Ben's psycho wigging-out. Now that he's used up all possible affronts to reason, I suppose he has run out of clichés. Impressive parody, though.Another Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39343577756881868272012-03-07T13:46:10.822-08:002012-03-07T13:46:10.822-08:00@Ray:
Anyway, seeing as the posters here are now g...@Ray:<br /><i>Anyway, seeing as the posters here are now gleefully imagining my death, perhaps I should take that as a signal to be on my way.</i><br /><br />Oh come on. Do you believe anyone can fall for these embarrassing theatrics of yours? <br />It is so obvious that you, after being repeatedly exposed as a total dilettante and sloppy thinker, are trying to find excuse for leaving the ring to escape further humiliation so you "interpret" a mocking remark directed at you to be the collective rejoicing at the prospect of your death.<br />PatheticAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-85515518554128919062012-03-06T20:01:29.910-08:002012-03-06T20:01:29.910-08:00cont.
“...and I don't think I understand the ...cont.<br /><br />“...and I don't think I understand the rest of that post either. In seems like part of what you're saying is that a thing must be structured in the way that things which are that kind of thing are structured if it is to be that kind of thing, but that seems so obvious that there must be something more that you mean. (Incidentally, I can see why Thomists have constructed their own arcane vocabulary, if the alternative was to write sentences like that one.)”<br /><br />To be honest, I’m not sure how you got that from what I was saying, but I’m probably not the greatest communicator. Let me try again anyway. Take a quark. It has a set number of possible interactions with other MPs – but none of these constrain or specify what molecules, for instance, the quark can be a part of. If you want to construct a scientific narrative of how a hydrocarbon molecule is formed, you can’t just appeal to the general laws of interaction between MPs, because these general laws of interaction are the same across all species of possible molecule. Rather, you need something extra – first, you need a narrative describing how quarks are assembled into hydrogen atoms, then these via fusion into higher order atoms such as carbon, then how these atoms are eventually united together in a structure under certain pressures. This narrative is information that is “contained” in the molecule, and represents the formal component of the form/matter composite. Also, the quarks now constituting the hydrocarbon molecule will be constrained by the meta-actions of the molecule. <br /><br />Here’s another way of looking at it. Say we have a bunch of lego blocks. We can see that there are various ways and combinations in which they can go together. But knowledge of these possible possible interactions isn’t enough to describe the construction of an X-wing star fighter out of them, or a medieval castle. No, something extra is required, and that is the formal component of the constructed object – its structure if you like. If you have the same number of blocks in both the X-wing and castle, you will need that something extra to be able to explain their difference. And these structures, while still together, form a unified causal whole – if I throw a medieval castle made of lego blocks at a window hard enough, it will break. However, if I throw the same amount of blocks dissembled at the window, it won’t break. Following Alexander’s dictum, to exist is to have causal powers, we can thereby say these unified objects have an existence of their own in addition to their constitutive elements. <br /> <br />That’s the best I can do, I hope it makes sense.Andrew Thttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04019142680097397673noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-82483858131936343302012-03-06T20:00:21.863-08:002012-03-06T20:00:21.863-08:00cont...
“In such a situation, it seems quite plau...cont...<br /><br />“In such a situation, it seems quite plausible to me that we can set up an "invariance relationship" between the force p of the piston and the distance g traveled by the cube when struck by the piston: if the force is increased to p', the atoms of the cube will all receive an increased impulse from the piston and distance will increase to g' in a predictable way. The whole thing can even be described in an object agnostic way: "if the atoms in cylindrical volume X each have velocity v, after time t the atoms previously in cubical volume Y will be found in cubical volume Z; however, if the atoms in X have velocity v' then the atoms of Y will be found in volume Z'" or something like that. “<br /><br />I disagree, you are implicitly assuming your medium sized objects in the above. What is the cylindrical volume X for starters? Does it include only the volume which contains the diamond piston? If not, presumably you will have other atoms within that volume (say, atoms in air molecules) which can potentially have a velocity substantially varied without a corresponding varied distance (hence no invariance relationship established). If you are considering the volume specifically around just the piston, then you are quantifying over just the atoms contained within what we would consider the medium sized object. Also, you could repeat the cause i.e. the atoms within X each having a velocity v, without the effect occurring at all – if we strictly limit ourselves to your supposedly reductionist explanation above. Because, for instance, the volume Y could be full of air molecules rather than carbon atoms, and therefore the distance these atoms travel will be substantially different to those of the diamond cube, and therefore, with the same cause, you will get a different effect (i.e. no invariance established). Do you see what the argument is getting at?Andrew Thttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04019142680097397673noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23229986665402200762012-03-06T19:58:57.506-08:002012-03-06T19:58:57.506-08:00Steve Ruble,
“On my position, brains will "o...Steve Ruble,<br /><br />“On my position, brains will "operate as brains" no matter how they are described. Our convention of differentiating the matter within the skull from the skull itself is something we do in order to pick out and talk about that stuff, but the only thing that a brain needs to operate as a brain is to be made of the right things put together in the right way so that it does what we call "operating". I don't think it needs some extra essence or "actual" distinctness to make it work. “<br /><br />I’m not sure what you take essence to be. The essence of the brain would surely include (among other things) notions regarding made of a certain kind of stuff and being “put together” in a certain way. It would also include “operating”, in that a dead brain is no longer a true brain. Would you consider a decaying, non-operating object made up brain matter to be actually a brain? If not, then “operating” is essential to the brain to actually be a brain.<br /> <br />“Insofar as it's correct that our conventions are generated by minds that run on a substrate of brain, I guess it is correct to say that the existence of brains is logically prior to the existence of conventions. But what does not seem to be logically prior is the idea (or convention) of the brain as a distinct entity. I think the matter that composes brains will act the same way no matter how it is conceptualized.”<br /><br />I’m having trouble with the sentence that starts with “But”. In the context of the sentence before it, it seems you are saying that the idea/convention of the brain as a distinct entity is not logically prior to the existence of conventions? Sorry, I’ve probably misread you but that seems like a tautology. I have no issue with the last sentence.<br /><br />Are you able to state your objections to my argument contra conventionalism another way, I apologise, I am having difficulty figuring out what your counter argument is?Andrew Thttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04019142680097397673noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-41488895991066135212012-03-06T19:47:09.462-08:002012-03-06T19:47:09.462-08:00I told Ray repeatedly what to go do with himself w...I told Ray repeatedly what to go do with himself with a liberal use of the word F***.<br /><br />Now he leaves because someone told him to commit Harikari because of his obvious ignorance and inability to fake it?<br /><br />Gnus! Gotta love em.BenYachovnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80861593336352141992012-03-06T16:18:29.377-08:002012-03-06T16:18:29.377-08:00Ray not donald:
"actual knowledge" and ...Ray not donald:<br /><br />"actual knowledge" and "empirical pursuits" rest on the principle of contradiction that you reject by holding that "Heraclitus was right."<br /><br /><i>"Heraclitus was right. change (physics) is more fundamental than the lack of change (metaphysics)."</i><br /><br />The above is much stronger than "Metaphysics is so uncertain that there is still no agreement on whether Heraclitus or Parmenides was correct;" given an hour or so I half-expect you to assert "Heraclitus was wrong!" But that would be you refuting your self.<br /><br />Which brings us to your assertion that no actual knowledge is produced outside of empirical pursuits - how do you know this? If true, will it "cease to be true with time" or as knowledge is an abstract like "truth" "being" and "change" are you "rather begging the question"? (Let's not even start on math as an empirical pursuit).<br /><br />From one poster mentioning harakiri it's a stretch to accuse poster*s* here of gleefully imagining your death; personally I'd have been too ashamed to leave that as my parting shot.Jack "Vaughn" Bodiehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08077819454982265896noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29013393554060208422012-03-06T16:15:25.482-08:002012-03-06T16:15:25.482-08:00Ray (if you're still around),
You said: The e...Ray (if you're still around),<br /><br />You said: <i>The explanation for the baseball is not part of the baseball. The map is not part of the territory.</i><br /><br />I was asking for a full explanation for the baseball. You claimed that the parts of a baseball offered "all we can know" about it. That, to me, is absurd. We obviously can know a lot more about the baseball than just what we see when we look at it. There is purpose behind the arrangement of the parts of the baseball that cannot be accounted for without reference to its design.<br /><br /> <i>The baseball is a bit of an extreme case, since we're dealing with probabilities that are so close to 1 as to make the distinction between near certainty and absolute certainty practically irrelevant. Try again with more doubtful cases. How do you tell a stone tool from a chipped rock? An earthen fortification from a glacial deposit? A pulsar from an alien signaling device? Mount Rushmore from the now defunct "old man in the mountain" in NH?</i><br /><br />Please stop trying to turn this into an ID discussion. This has absolutely <i>nothing</i> to do with ID!!<br /><br />We can (and do) know things about the baseball that have nothing to do with its constituent parts. According to you that's impossible. But it's reality. We not only know that it is round - we know <i>why</i> it is round. It was designed by a mind to be round. This mind is separate from the baseball and cannot be extracted from any of its parts - yet we <i>know</i> this mind exists (or existed) and that it is the cause behind the arrangement of the parts that makeup the baseball. We know this. So, in essence, the mind that designed the baseball has as much to do with the properties of the baseball as the parts of the baseball do.Daniel Smithhttp://thefoolishnessofgod.blogspot.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39699542704592072442012-03-06T15:21:29.768-08:002012-03-06T15:21:29.768-08:00Anyway, seeing as the posters here are now gleeful...Anyway, seeing as the posters here are now gleefully imagining my death, perhaps I should take that as a signal to be on my way. Daniel it was nice meeting you. Perhaps we shall meet again in a more civilized corner of the internet.Rayhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07345409714343072179noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-63378273399726505792012-03-06T15:09:01.666-08:002012-03-06T15:09:01.666-08:00All the comments phrased in terms of supposed abst...All the comments phrased in terms of supposed abstract objects such as "truth" "being" and "change" are rather begging the question. Many specific truths (i.e. true statements) cease to be true with time (e.g. "Socrates is a man.") That said, I could care less what is "ontologically prior" to what.<br /><br />None of you have demonstrated that any actual knowledge is produced outside of empirical pursuits (in which I include mathematics as well as history) nor have you demonstrated that such a position is self refuting, however much you insist that you have.Rayhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07345409714343072179noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6392925902717516212012-03-06T14:12:47.475-08:002012-03-06T14:12:47.475-08:00If it is true that change is ontologically absolut...If it is true that change is ontologically absolutely prior to everything else then this truth must yield to change too. But the only way a truth may change is to become untruth.<br /><br />T.H.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-82729902119650856982012-03-06T13:24:49.820-08:002012-03-06T13:24:49.820-08:00I think for Ray to, at least partially, save his f...I think for Ray to, at least partially, save his face he should commit harakiri.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88594460588305780372012-03-06T13:17:01.968-08:002012-03-06T13:17:01.968-08:00Metaphysics is so uncertain that there is still no...Metaphysics is so uncertain that there is still no agreement on whether Heraclitus or Parmenides was correct, but it claims to study "certainties." Physics studies uncertain things and yet is certain to 13 decimal places. This should tell you something.Rayhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07345409714343072179noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74232116433752596512012-03-06T13:13:24.774-08:002012-03-06T13:13:24.774-08:00Ray,
By your last post then it's clear you hav...Ray,<br />By your last post then it's clear you haven't a clue what Heraclitus was saying, let alone whether he was right or not.Jack "Vaughn" Bodiehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08077819454982265896noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80870465724037504372012-03-06T13:07:28.047-08:002012-03-06T13:07:28.047-08:00Ray, as far as I know the question, your question ...Ray, as far as I know the question, your question “does this change?” wasn’t posed to answer it. You introduced the question to show that it presupposes change. However your question also presupposes things, and so does the idea of change – this is terminal to your assertion that “Heraclitus was right. change (physics) is more fundamental than the lack of change (metaphysics).” <br /><br />I don’t dispute that things change, and if that wasn’t obvious before it should be now. I dispute that change is more fundamental than being and sketched why. You cannot have helped the strength or weakness of your position by your eagerness to talk about anything but the challenge to it. Really, I don’t see how focusing on “this” or “red bell pepper” or suggesting I need help has distracted anyone from the bigger point.Jack "Vaughn" Bodiehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08077819454982265896noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-34678554640841844792012-03-06T12:30:21.654-08:002012-03-06T12:30:21.654-08:00Also. I said "things that change" are mo...Also. I said "things that change" are more fundamental than "things that don't" not "change" is more fundamental than "thing"<br /><br />Show me a thing that doesn't change, either with time or when you change the definitions of the words you use to refer to it. I don't think you can (but I don't claim to be able to prove it.)Rayhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07345409714343072179noreply@blogger.com