tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post6792099626263418298..comments2024-03-28T13:39:03.094-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: An exchange with Keith Parsons, Part IIIEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger85125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-34957694685005869092014-03-21T08:27:27.654-07:002014-03-21T08:27:27.654-07:00DavidM,
Ah. Thanks for clarifying.DavidM,<br /><br />Ah. Thanks for clarifying.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-45898569401173693562014-03-20T14:06:43.252-07:002014-03-20T14:06:43.252-07:00...still with the caveat: sleazy is as sleazy does......still with the caveat: sleazy is as sleazy does (but also: 'is sleazy' doesn't imply 'is <i>essentially</i> sleazy')DavidMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26571973387322399362014-03-20T14:03:12.041-07:002014-03-20T14:03:12.041-07:00@Glenn: I didn't mean to imply that I agreed w...@Glenn: I didn't mean to imply that I agreed with Hivemaker on <i>that</i> point. (And to return to my point: Hivemaker's objectively sleazy argument on that point doesn't - <i>pace</i> Hivemaker - mean that he is <i>essentially</i> sleazy, and this is true regardless of any 'sociological' points about his inclination to interpret stuff in a philosophically inept way, e.g., being personally insulted when someone critiques his argument.)DavidMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86279886300571778352014-03-20T13:56:35.335-07:002014-03-20T13:56:35.335-07:00(s/b "...has little to do with 'intellect...(s/b "...has little to do with 'intellectual seriousness'.")Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81435362009823518132014-03-20T13:51:49.998-07:002014-03-20T13:51:49.998-07:00David M,
I'm sympathetic to Hivemaker: stupid...David M,<br /><br /><i>I'm sympathetic to Hivemaker: stupid is as stupid does; but still, no one is essentially sleazy, slimy, and contemptible, even if their arguments sometimes are.</i><br /><br />I myself don't feel sympathetic to Hivemaker. "The sole topic of [the] comment was [not] whether certain words with quotation marks around them were in fact quotations", but whether the quoted words applied to a human being who made an utterance, or to an utterance made by a human being. Hivemaker clearly quoted the words in such a way as to insinuate that they applied to a human being, even though it is quite clear from the context from which they were taken that they did not. Having been educated as to the correct referent of those quoted words, Hivemaker now insinuates that getting the referent right hasn't anything to do with "intellectual seriousness".Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91627587200574214282014-03-20T09:00:13.268-07:002014-03-20T09:00:13.268-07:00(...Feser's deprecating remarks about the inte...(...Feser's deprecating remarks about the intellectual seriousness of Rosenhouse, for example: how are those not fully justified?)DavidMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-32443706427770187602014-03-20T08:56:29.800-07:002014-03-20T08:56:29.800-07:00I'm sympathetic to Hivemaker: stupid is as stu...I'm sympathetic to Hivemaker: stupid is as stupid does; but still, no one is <i>essentially</i> sleazy, slimy, and contemptible, even if their arguments sometimes are. (A lot of so-called 'philosophers' (especially those damned atheists!) seem to be 'essentially' rather <i>stupid</i>, and this leads to them making arguments that are rather contemptible.)DavidMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-87984535921160675962014-03-15T12:07:32.402-07:002014-03-15T12:07:32.402-07:00One wonders what the criteria for "intellectu...One wonders what the criteria for "intellectual seriousness" are when the sole topic of a comment was whether certain words with quotation marks around them were in fact quotations. As they were. And as they would be even if I had linked to Mad Magazine or one of John Loftus's sockpuppet twitter accounts. <br /><br />I am morally certain that Russell and Parsons offer true disjunctions (the truth tables for which neither entail the truth of particular disjuncts nor attribute belief in particular disjuncts to one's interlocutor), just as I am morally certain that when Le Poidevin says "no one says this", it does not entail "there exist lots of people who say this".<br /><br />Obviously, I wasn't trying to get people who disagree with me on this to fall down like ninepins on the underlying fact of the matter (although I would certainly be suspicious if I found myself saying that almost <i>everyone</i>, even some highly philosophically literate people, not buying my argument was committing the exact same trivial error.) The more limited goal was simply to add my voice to the chorus telling ATites that many people are sincerely interested in what you have to say, but find it irritating to have to constantly shovel through this weird strawman accusation to get to the argument. You can still sincerely believe both that the CA is sound and that its opponents routinely make this mistake, but still agree with me on the sociological point that harping on this accusation creates an avoidable annoyance.<br /><br />(As to the Eucharistic metaphysics according to which a person can have all the accidents of being sleazy, slimy, and contemptible, without being <i>essentially</i> sleazy, slimy and contemptible, I guess I can just chalk my misunderstanding up to my own philosophical ignorance. But again the sociological point remains: irrespective of its truth, people insufficiently schooled in Thomism are highly likely to misunderstand this kind of rhetoric as insulting.)Hivemakernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49020375050476391812014-03-12T12:22:17.021-07:002014-03-12T12:22:17.021-07:00I don't think we have to adopt S's metaphy...<i>I don't think we have to adopt S's metaphysics in order to adapt his thought to the present argument. When we talk about ultimate reality, or the beginning of the universe, or the underlying metaphysical nature of causation, we are talking about areas in which it should not be obvious that our normal everyday concepts apply. Take the Big Bang, for example. Why should we think that, once we are dealing with a reality in which the notion of matter, time, and space, break down, that our notion of cause is still going to be applicable? </i><br /><br />I don't see why it would matter. There is no positing of "ultimate reality, or the beginning of the universe, or the underlying metaphysical nature of causation" at all except on rational grounds; if those rational grounds are causal, we've already established that causality extends that far, and if they aren't, why they make it impossible for causal reasoning to extend that far needs to be established. Otherwise one is simply positing ad hoc assumptions in order to avoid conclusions.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-20265143329930307292014-03-12T11:46:26.277-07:002014-03-12T11:46:26.277-07:00"[W]hy would you expect them to apply univoca..."[W]hy would you expect them to apply univocally to the first cause (a.k.a. God)?"<br /><br />. . . as opposed, not to "equivocally," but to "analogically"?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26693666792242528162014-03-12T11:19:03.963-07:002014-03-12T11:19:03.963-07:00@Jason:
"Planets have a different kind of ex...@Jason:<br /><br />"Planets have a different kind of explanation than rabbits. But the words 'reason' and 'cause' mean the same in both kinds of explanation."<br /><br />Could you expand on what you mean here? What are the respective 'reasons' and 'causes' of planets and rabbits that you have in mind here, and why would you expect them to apply univocally to the first cause (a.k.a. God)?DavidMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-82136866174970099312014-03-12T08:09:56.790-07:002014-03-12T08:09:56.790-07:00David M,
The issue is this: Does the first cause ...David M,<br /><br />The issue is this: Does the first cause have a reason for its existence or not ? If it does, then 'reason' better be univocal because if it isn't then we don't know what we mean.<br /><br />Feser says that God has a different kind of explanation. But it is still an explanation; there is still a reason. Planets have a different kind of explanation than rabbits. But the words 'reason' and 'cause' mean the same in both kinds of explanation.Jason Thibodeauhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04031407028220844179noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51416225238302422922014-03-12T07:42:33.177-07:002014-03-12T07:42:33.177-07:00@Jason Thibodeau:
David M has already addressed t...@Jason Thibodeau:<br /><br />David M has already addressed this, but I'll just add that univocity and equivocity aren't the only two alternatives. Are you rejecting the Thomistic idea of analogical terms and predication? If so, why?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15139533732825543242014-03-12T05:21:41.092-07:002014-03-12T05:21:41.092-07:00When you understand the argument, you understand t...When you understand the argument, you understand that a first cause (along with the reason for its existence) is necessarily <i>sui generis</i>. You can't then turn around and say, "well I guess that means that the whole argument was based on equivocation." How is that supposed to follow?David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51889910705083828322014-03-12T05:17:04.052-07:002014-03-12T05:17:04.052-07:00I see Jason snuck in before me there. My "Rig...I see Jason snuck in before me there. My "Right" was directed to Scott's remark.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81305800441720854292014-03-12T05:15:25.447-07:002014-03-12T05:15:25.447-07:00Right. To quote Feser's second last paragraph,...Right. To quote Feser's second last paragraph, above:<br /><br />"Now, other objections might be raised against these sorts of arguments and the metaphysics that underlies them. But they are simply not guilty either of contradicting themselves, or of making an arbitrary exception in God’s case to a general demand that things must have explanations, or of <i>failing to give a reason for saying that God has a kind of explanation that other things do not</i>."David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61656571277748207642014-03-12T05:14:19.588-07:002014-03-12T05:14:19.588-07:00Scott,
If 'reason' cannot univocally be ap...Scott,<br />If 'reason' cannot univocally be applied to God and contingent objects, then any argument that uses the PSR to "prove" that God exists (and that his reason for his existence is contained in his nature) is guilty of an equivocation fallacy. <br /><br />In addition, if 'reason' as applied to God means something different than it does as applied to contingent objects, then we need an account of what it means when applied to God.Jason Thibodeauhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04031407028220844179noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33825721789780384782014-03-11T16:21:04.997-07:002014-03-11T16:21:04.997-07:00@Jason Thibodeau:
David M didn't say "re...@Jason Thibodeau:<br /><br />David M didn't say "reason" doesn't apply to God; he said it doesn't apply <i>univocally</i> (in precisely the same way/sense in which it applies to creatures).<br /><br />God's nature doesn't merely "contain" but <i>is</i> the reason for His existence; His essence just <i>is</i> His "act of existing." That the argument shows that God, unlike any creature, is His own "reason" is the "integral feature" in question.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-1465346188368640622014-03-11T12:20:22.203-07:002014-03-11T12:20:22.203-07:00"You're right in a sense: neither 'ca..."You're right in a sense: neither 'cause' nor 'reason' are notions that apply (univocally) to 'ultimate' (a.k.a. God). But that's an integral feature of the argument, not a counter-argument! So your position sounds to me like neither obscurantism nor humility, but confusion, missing the point."<br /><br />I don't understand. The conclusion of the CA (Aquinas' version) is that there exists a being whose nature contains the reason for its existence. Feser has been arguing that everything is subject to the PSR. If so, then of course, there is a reason that God exists. So, how can it be an integral feature of the CA that 'reason' does not apply to god?Jason Thibodeauhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04031407028220844179noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91390178522608491462014-03-11T09:18:03.293-07:002014-03-11T09:18:03.293-07:00@Jason:
"Take the Big Bang, for example. Why ...@Jason:<br />"Take the Big Bang, for example. Why should we think that, once we are dealing with a reality in which the notion of matter, time, and space, break down, that our notion of cause is still going to be applicable?"<br /><br />Obviously *if* our notion of causation <i>depends upon</i> notions/things that 'break down' when dealing with a particular 'reality,' then <i>that</i> notion of causation will break down in that situation. But what makes you think that 'our' notion of causation (as opposed to yours or Schopenhauer's) is tied to anything that 'breaks down' at any given point? (Just because S's PSR doesn't apply to asking why the Will exists, doesn't mean that we can't ask why the Will exists, or that there is no reason for its existence - does it?)<br /><br />"The point is that neither 'cause' nor 'reason' may not be notions that applies to ultimate. This may sound like obscurantism, but I think it is just humility."<br /><br />You're right in a sense: neither 'cause' nor 'reason' are notions that apply (univocally) to 'ultimate' (a.k.a. God). But that's an integral feature of the argument, not a counter-argument! So your position sounds to me like neither obscurantism nor humility, but confusion, missing the point.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86792188621349211462014-03-11T07:05:52.697-07:002014-03-11T07:05:52.697-07:00Brandon,
Thank you very much for your comments. I ...Brandon,<br />Thank you very much for your comments. I appreciate it and I apologize for the late reply.<br /><br />Just a couple of points, one relatively minor, one more important. First, the minor point: You subtly criticize Schopenhauer for claiming that there is one PSR and suggest that Aristotle would have wondered whether there were several different, but related, kinds of PSR. In fact (as you know), Schopenhauer, while asserting that there is a PSR, also claimed that it has four roots. I am not certain that he hasn't done precisely what you though Aristotle would do, namely consider whether there are distinct kinds of reasons and thus distinct kinds of PSR. That S calls them roots of one Principle rather than distinct principles doesn't seem to matter much. In any event, it is simply a consequence of his following the law of homogeneity.<br /><br />Second, and more importantly, it is relevant that even though Schopenhauer accepted and relied upon (a version of) the PSR, he also claimed that its application was limited to the phenomenal realm (appearance/representation). PSR does not apply to the thing-in-itself. Thus, we cannot meaningfully ask why the Will exists or why it is as it is, according to Schopenhauer. The Will, as the thing-in-itself, is not subject to the PSR.<br /><br />So, like Aquinas, S argued for the existence of something that makes sense of the realm of appearance (Aquinas would not put it like that, but the thoughts are very similar). But, unlike Aquinas, S did not think that the ultimate reality (thing-in-itself/Will) had its reason for existence in its own nature. Rather, he believed that it is nonsense to suppose that there must be a reason for it to exist. The PSR does not apply here.<br /><br />I don't think we have to adopt S's metaphysics in order to adapt his thought to the present argument. When we talk about ultimate reality, or the beginning of the universe, or the underlying metaphysical nature of causation, we are talking about areas in which it should not be obvious that our normal everyday concepts apply. Take the Big Bang, for example. Why should we think that, once we are dealing with a reality in which the notion of matter, time, and space, break down, that our notion of cause is still going to be applicable? <br /><br />The point is that neither 'cause' nor 'reason' may not be notions that applies to ultimate. This may sound like obscurantism, but I think it is just humility.Jason Thibodeauhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04031407028220844179noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9099672577137053892014-03-05T20:49:10.542-08:002014-03-05T20:49:10.542-08:00Hi, Jason,
Put simply: Aristotle's account of...Hi, Jason,<br /><br />Put simply: Aristotle's account of causation is very pluralistic: he does not attempt, and thinks it would be absurd to attempt, to reduce all causes to one kind. Every change is capable of having many, many, many causes. These are organized in terms of the famous four causes, but a change could have many causes of one kind (they usually do, in fact). There are other distinctions that cross this basic classification, however, one of which is the distinction between per se and per accidens causation, which is the foundation for the idea of 'essentially ordered' vs 'incidentally or accidentally ordered' causal chains. What Schopenhauer calls causes, Aristotelians would consider to belong to one very particular kind of cause, namely, per accidens moving causes, and what goes for them couldn't automatically be assumed to apply even to other kinds of moving causes. There are lots of others. Schopenhauer's four kinds of applications for the principle of sufficient reason are clearly derived from Aristotle's four causes (although strained through the kinds of arguments you note), but he doesn't have anything, as far as I know, like a per se / per accidens distinction.<br /><br />Further, since Aristotle's account of causation is based on the distinction between the actual and the potential, not, as Schopenhauer's is, on the distinction between subject and object, Aristotle thinks different kinds of causes can be combined into unified explanations, and for some things must be -- Schopenhauer's sealing-off of the four kinds of applications of the PSR from each other is probably one of the biggest ways in which his approach differs from Aristotle. <br /><br />Further, it's foreign to Aristotle's thought to try to derive causes from a single principle of sufficient reason the way Schopenhauer does; one of Aristotle's most famous discoveries was establishing that some things could not be given a univocal classification. Thus (to take just an example) a serious Aristotelian would ask whether there might not be several different but related kinds of principle of sufficient reason, and would hesitate to endorse a single principle covering everything unless it were established that it did.<br /><br />Whether or not causal chains have to have beginnings in an Aristotle-style account, then, will depend simply on the nature of the particular causal chain in question. Some kinds of cause that Aristotle identifies are such that it can be shown to imply a contradiction if assumed to regress infinitely -- something would have to be both caused and uncaused, for instance -- while others don't. Aristotle himself, of course, argued that the world never began, and that for every change there is a prior change, and did so on causal principles. But he also argued for first causes. Different causes, different results.<br /><br />I'm not sure what you're looking for in evidence. There are certainly things Schopenhauer claims directly follow from his account that are highly controversial -- to take one example, Schopenhauer holds simultaneous causation to be impossible, while Aristotle takes it to be possible, and it's not difficult to find arguments, Aristotelian or otherwise, that simultaneous causation sometimes occurs. I don't know Schopenhauer well enough to know how he would handle cases like these. Plus, it's a little difficult to compare precisely because they each take a different distinction to be fundamental. An Aristotelian would argue that actual/potential is a better starting point than subject/object, perhaps by arguing that the former can explain the latter better than vice versa. But that gets into very fundamental metaphysics. It's not the sort of thing that could be easily hashed out in a comment box.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14051569491860530562014-03-05T17:20:14.039-08:002014-03-05T17:20:14.039-08:00Brandon,
Thank you for your posts. I would like to...Brandon,<br />Thank you for your posts. I would like to discuss this more, if you are willing. Can you be more specific concerning the aspects of Aristotle's account of causation that Schopenhauer's account leaves out. Also, can you explain how this more expansive account allows for a causal chain with a beginning? Finally, what evidence is there that favors Aristotle over Schopenhauer here?<br /><br />I know this is asking a lot, but pretend that you are dealing with an Aristotelian moron (which isn't too far from the truth). I cannot find a thorough discussion of Schopenhauer's view of causation vs. Aristotle's. I find that somewhat odd give that S takes A to task in the Fourfold Root for, among other things, confusing reason and cause.<br /><br />I understand if you don't have time to respond to my questions.Jason Thibodeauhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04031407028220844179noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53041592494584652832014-03-05T17:19:54.991-08:002014-03-05T17:19:54.991-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.Jason Thibodeauhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04031407028220844179noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6587239078032092552014-03-04T13:01:58.269-08:002014-03-04T13:01:58.269-08:00In fairness to Schopenhauer, he is presupposing ar...In fairness to Schopenhauer, he is presupposing arguments given in Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The building progression in the passage is very interesting, though:<br /><br />(1) <i>cause</i> depends on <i>time</i><br />(2) no possible simultaneity of cause and effect<br />(3) all causation is a temporal relation between changes<br />(4) no cosmological argument<br /><br />Historically (1) and (2) are highly controversial, as Schopenhauer to his credit recognizes here. Aristotelians, Platonists, most early modern rationalists, and a significant portion of nineteenth century physicists (who often read Newton's Third Law as a causal principle) denied (2); even Kant paused long enough to reflect on the puzzle of a ball continually causing a dent in a mattress. Schopenhauer's argument for (2) is interesting, but it's difficult to see what it actually establishes.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00475433359202518234noreply@blogger.com