tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post6726784755674330738..comments2024-03-28T21:43:44.433-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Nudge nudge, wink winkEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger897125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42886631414354958172016-01-25T17:36:29.415-08:002016-01-25T17:36:29.415-08:00Ah yes, sodomy bro us on the sexual act.Ah yes, sodomy bro us on the sexual act.Juliahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18257328380468542997noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16215890237119271872016-01-25T17:35:49.540-08:002016-01-25T17:35:49.540-08:00I am a female heterosexual. That is the way God ma...I am a female heterosexual. That is the way God made me. I know this, not because I look at my genital anatomy, but because I am attracted to men--emotionally, romantically and sexually. This is because of structures in my brain--not my genitals. Some persons who have the same genitals I do are attracted to other women. I happen to be lucky, ZnOT more virtuous than them. My brain orientation and my genitals match. This made it much easier for me to have a child by my spouse to whom I was sexually/romantically attracted. This is not possible--with present technology--for gay people. <br /><br />Gay people have a choice; follow their brains which orient them to same sex or their genitals which don't. I understand why most choose their brains. It is more fundamental to the self. And genitals are more, shall I say, flexible. Plus, which of us straights would volunteer to be married to a gay person who married us because they felt they "should". Granted some MOM (mixed orientation marriages) work, but it is taking a big risk--and often an unnessary one. <br /><br />I am a psychiatrist. I do listen to the pederasts--as you call them. I think now we call them pedophiles and ephebophiles. The fixated ones do indeed say what gay people say. They also say what straight people say. That is, for the fixated ones, their orientation may well be sui generis--like straights and gays. Many did not voluntarily choose to have this orientation. I do not condemn them for their orientation and desires.--because they are no more responsible got them than am I for my desires for sex with adult men. I would only condemn their actions. They cannot have sex with children because children cannot emotionally consent to sex with adults. it is essentially rape. This they cannot consulate their desires. In this they are unfortunate and unlucky. While I have trested pedophiles--in jail--who have had sex with children, I have treated one (and consulted on several others) who have never had sex with children--and in fact assiduously avoid children--choose jobs and social circles that allow them to avoid contact with kids. <br /><br />Your analogy doesn't hold. For pedophiles to act on their orientation hurts real persons (children) in real time. For gays to act on their orientstion--subject to similar rules to those straights have--not only doesn't hurt anyone, but can be life enhancing. I am thinking of three gay male couples I know-- one together 10 years (and practicing Christians, married in their church), another monogamous for 18 years before one of them had the courage to come out to his family of origin, who rose to the occasion and happily attended his wedding, and the third,two Jewish guys together for 35 years--in sickness and in health .<br /><br />Juliahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18257328380468542997noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46740597599352652092016-01-25T17:01:23.281-08:002016-01-25T17:01:23.281-08:00Often masturbation is helpful in the adolescent le...Often masturbation is helpful in the adolescent learning about himself as a sexual being without risking romantic/sexual involvements for which he is not yet ready. Juliahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18257328380468542997noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72473766431132762992015-10-08T17:50:46.183-07:002015-10-08T17:50:46.183-07:00Mr. Feser the contention is this, in which your wo...Mr. Feser the contention is this, in which your wording was vague. By in principle valid do you mean (1) CP was valid in the Dispensations of Noah, Moses and David, but not Christ or (2) that CP is valid in the dispensations of Noah, Moses, David and Christ? This contention you continually refuse to answer and strawman my argument as if I was saying something other than that. From what I have read, including your endorsement of the present use of CP, then you have a problem in that before Constantine all extant writings of the Church prohibited the “current use of CP”. To which you continually grandstand and give know answers. <br /><br />If I have misread you position in this regard I humbly apologize, but from your written work on CP on your blog and the Witherspoon Institute you seem to endorse (2) which is seriously problematic for a “unanimous” word from the Church. I wish you would apologize for misdirecting the question and making false accusations about me, since you have no actual knowledge of what I believe. If I was unclear in my accusation than I apologize for being opaque, but that is no reason to slander me.<br /><br />I wish you the best.<br /><br />Todd <br />Fingolfinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05485583407395860109noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-1222185436616635522015-10-08T16:56:11.451-07:002015-10-08T16:56:11.451-07:00Todd,
First, the reason your comments are taking ...Todd,<br /><br />First, the reason your comments are taking a while to appear is that all comments on posts over two or three weeks old are automatically moderated and end up in Blogger's filter until I have a chance to see and approve them. Since I teach for much of the day, this sometimes takes a while.<br /><br />Second, you write:<br /><br /><i>With all do respect I did read your paragraph on capital punishment and you claimed support for CP was unanimous amongst Church Fathers a demonstrably false claim. </i><br /><br />Again, you are <i>not</i> reading carefully, because, again, you are ignoring the distinction between (a) allowing that capital punishment is permissible <i>in principle</i>, and (b) endorsing its use <i>in practice</i>. Now, if I had attributed position (b) to the Fathers, then I would be guilty of saying something "demonstrably false." But that is <i>not</i> what I attributed to them. Indeed, I explicitly said that they were "were inclined toward leniency" rather than toward using CP in practice, and I explicitly spoke of "the inclination of some saints... strongly to prefer leniency over resort to the punishment." Rather, I attributed to them merely position (a), and that attribution is demonstrably correct -- and indeed, it is an attribution with which you now say you "would not necessarily disagree."<br /><br />Nor was I attributing to you any <i>moral</i> claim about the legitimacy in principle of CP -- that is a straw man of your own invention. Rather, I was addressing precisely your misrepresentation of my <i>historical</i> claim about the Fathers. Again, the historical claim I made is that the Fathers accepted position (a), whereas you wrongly attributed to me the claim that they accepted (b) -- even though I not only did not attribute position (b) to them, but explicitly denied that they held that position.<br /><br />So, as I say, you spoke without carefully reading what I wrote. That you did so even though my meaning should have been clear to a fair-minded reader is an indication that your emotions have gotten the best of you, as is your heated language to the effect that I "live in a bubble," that you are "appalled at [my] amateurish just so account," etc. -- and as is your refusal even now simply to admit that you spoke rashly.<br /><br />Third, the book should be out next year and I will make an announcement about the details in due course here on the blog when they are all finalized. As I say, far from ignoring what the Fathers say, we discuss them in detail in the book, and also address the other sorts of issues you raise.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29985371350388724982015-10-07T18:09:33.371-07:002015-10-07T18:09:33.371-07:00PS
1) Why is our conversation not appearing on y...PS <br /><br />1) Why is our conversation not appearing on your blog page<br />2) " not just what I wrote, but what the authors you are citing wrote." I do consider what the ante-nicene church fathers wrote, and what they wrote is a prohibition on the use of CP something that is not difficult to grasp but is often ignored by CP advocates like yourself. <br />Fingolfinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05485583407395860109noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57114454221452135402015-10-07T17:53:43.851-07:002015-10-07T17:53:43.851-07:00First thank you for responding.
“I have, however,...First thank you for responding.<br /><br />“I have, however, done so elsewhere in various articles and posts, and address it at greatest length in a forthcoming long book on the subject co-authored with political scientist Joseph Bessette. Among the many issues we discuss at length in the book are the writings of the Church Fathers on this topic.”<br /><br />Interesting (1) what is its title and (2) when will it be released?<br /><br />“Second, once you do so, perhaps you will be able to read more carefully.”<br /><br />With all do respect I did read your paragraph on capital punishment and you claimed support for CP was unanimous amongst Church Fathers a demonstrably false claim. <br />“Generally they did not approve of it, all things considered. What I said is that the Church, including the Fathers, agreed that it was legitimate in principle, even when they opposed using it in practice. And that is true, even of the one or two cases of Fathers (e.g. Tertullian) who some people think (erroneously) regarded capital punishment as immoral even in principle. (As we show in the book, and as even some opponents of capital punishment -- such as Christian Brugger -- admit, Tertullian did not in fact think that capital punishment was intrinsically immoral. Indeed, the Church fathers are all agreed that scripture itself affirms the legitimacy at least in principle of CP.”<br /><br />I would not necessarily disagree, if by in principle you mean that say Tertullian or Irenaeus thought that capital punishment was not intrinsically immoral in that Moses and David did not sin enforcing it, which is true. But Ireneaus argues that that was for the Mosaic dispensation and not to be practiced by Christians in the dispensation of Christ as do all the Ante-Nicene Church Fathers who speak on the subject. <br /><br />“The distinction between condemning something as immoral even in principle, and merely recommending against its use in practice is not difficult to grasp, and yet it is frequently ignored by opponents of CP, who, like you, seem too often to be swayed by emotion rather than careful thinking.”<br /><br />I would also argue that you carefully read what I said before hitting “Publish” next time. Such a distinction is one I am very familiar with and in principle do not reject. I would argue with Irenaeus that capital punishment was lawful for the people of God prior to the teachings of Christ, but not after. I would also argue with Irenaeus that while Christians should not use capital punishment it is not because CP is intrinsically evil, but forbidden in this dispensation. <br />In fact nowhere did I state that CP was evil or immoral only that it universally rejected by ante-Nicene church fathers, so nowhere does the morality or immorality of CP even come into play, it is a question of historical accuracy rather than moral validity. <br /><br />“Your failure to consider this basic and obvious distinction before ranting about what I wrote also makes it rather ironic that you should accuse me of a lack of rigor.”<br /><br />Dido for assuming I was making a moral claim rather than one of historical accuracy. Also any lack of logical rigor on my side perceived or otherwise in my argument does not invalidate any claim that you lack logical rigor. <br /><br />As a further question how do you interpret the adulterous woman in John 8 and the insestuous man in 1st Corinthians 5? In neither of those two cased did Jesus or Paul advocate CP even though according to the Law of Moses CP was the fate both deserved? <br /><br />But again, thanks for responding. I look forward to hear from you further.<br /><br />Sincerely,<br />Todd<br />Fingolfinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05485583407395860109noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81819064584731370282015-10-07T17:12:01.826-07:002015-10-07T17:12:01.826-07:00Mr. Lewis,
First, I'd recommend that you calm...Mr. Lewis,<br /><br />First, I'd recommend that you calm down, and think before clicking "Publish" next time. Second, once you do so, perhaps you will be able to read more carefully -- not just what I wrote, but what the authors you are citing wrote.<br /><br />This was not a post about capital punishment -- I mention it only in passing -- and so, naturally, I do not address every aspect of the issue here. I have, however, done so elsewhere in various articles and posts, and address it at greatest length in a forthcoming long book on the subject co-authored with political scientist Joseph Bessette. Among the many issues we discuss at length in the book are the writings of the Church Fathers on this topic.<br /><br />I did not say that the Church Fathers approved of capital punishment <i>full stop</i>. Generally they did not approve of it, all things considered. What I said is that the Church, including the Fathers, agreed that it was legitimate <i>in principle</i>, even when they opposed using it in practice. And that is true, even of the one or two cases of Fathers (e.g. Tertullian) who some people think (erroneously) regarded capital punishment as immoral even in principle. (As we show in the book, and as even some opponents of capital punishment -- such as Christian Brugger -- admit, Tertullian did not in fact think that capital punishment was <i>intrinsically</i> immoral. Indeed, the Church fathers are all agreed that scripture itself affirms the legitimacy at least in principle of CP.<br /><br />The distinction between condemning something as immoral even <i>in principle</i>, and merely recommending against its use <i>in practice</i> is not difficult to grasp, and yet it is frequently ignored by opponents of CP, who, like you, seem too often to be swayed by emotion rather than careful thinking. Your failure to consider this basic and obvious distinction before ranting about what I wrote also makes it rather ironic that you should accuse me of a lack of rigor.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-90548077587595137642015-10-07T12:18:46.737-07:002015-10-07T12:18:46.737-07:00“the Fathers and Doctors of the Church unanimously...“the Fathers and Doctors of the Church unanimously affirmed its legitimacy even when they were inclined toward leniency,”<br /><br />This statement here is as utterly astounding as it is bogus. Has Mr. Feser never read ante-nicean writings? Does he live in a bubble?<br /><br />This proposition is a universal affirmative and is as such needs only one example to refute it. But I can do better than that before Emperor Constantine there was a unanimous rejection of capital punishment. I will provide a non-exhaustive list of said Father’s and their view on capital punishment.<br /><br />Due to the word count limit I will not cite the Fathers directly, but link their there written work. <br /><br />Athenegoras: A Plea for the Christians Chapter XXXV “The Christians Condemn and Detest All Cruelty.”<br /><br /><br />Tertullian: On Idolatry Chapter XVII<br /><br />Origen: Contra Celsus Book VII: Chapter XXVII<br /><br />Cyprian: Epistle 56 Paragraph 2<br /><br />Hippolytus <br />Apostolic Constitution <br />Chapter 16:9 <br /><br />“A military man in authority must not execute men. If he is ordered, he must not carry it out. Nor must he take military oath. If he refuses, he shall be rejected.”<br /><br />If Mr. Feser had actually read the relevant material on the Early Church’s teachings on capital punishment such as Caesar and the Lamb: Early Christian Attitudes on War and Military Service by George Kalantzis and The Early Church on Killing: A Comprehensive Sourcebook on War, Abortion, and Capital Punishment by Ronald J. Sider he would have known that for the first three centuries of the church no theologian or father defended capital punishment. I suppose next will hear that since Jesus did not forbid the centurion to kill he could. I guess by that logic since Joshua did not tell Rahab to quit harlotry she could in good conscience have done so.<br /><br />“and such unanimity has always been regarded within Catholicism as a mark of infallible teaching”<br /><br />I guess Ambrose, Augustine, and Eusebius did not get the memo when they surreptitiously rewrote centuries of Christian dogma on capital punishment.<br /><br />As Ronald Sider states on page 178 of The Early Church on Killing: A Comprehensive Sourcebook on War, Abortion, and Capital Punishment: “First, up until the time of Constantine, there is not a single Christian writer known to use who says that it is legitimate for Christians to kill or join the military.” <br /><br />I respect Mr. Fesers work on philosophy and that is why I am so appalled at his amateurish just so account of the Church’s view on capital punishment he standards are usually much higher. <br /><br />Sincerely,<br /><br />Todd LewisFingolfinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05485583407395860109noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3213505496536715542014-12-03T20:08:46.091-08:002014-12-03T20:08:46.091-08:00Continuing: Solving the evolutionary ‘problem’ of...Continuing: Solving the evolutionary ‘problem’ of fertility, by the time the great apes were appearing on the landscape was trivial. Snails had solved that problem three hundred million years earlier. Apes use sex for social bonding, fertilization highly significant but almost a side effect. Female chimps seek sex with a wide selection of males to forge internal troop bonds and elicit protection from many males. Infant rearing is up to each mother, but a lot more sex happens than required for fertilization. Humans chose a very different habitat and social trajectory. Fairly isolated tight family bands and children who required many years of intensive care and feeding with the support of both parents. Very strong family bonds were essential. Only females who hid their fertility status and encouraged year round bonding and intimacy were successful. Even this resulted often in children beyond the capacity of the family to care for – one estimate found on wiki was for a typical infanticide rate of 30% among aboriginal tribes. Rational parents making hard decisions to protect the integrity of their (remaining) family. With domesticated food production, larger families were supportable and rates went down, but every human community known to history has practiced infanticide (as well as crude contraception). The problem for humans is we still have too much fertility, not too little. The below replacement rate fertility in modern developed societies can be tied pretty directly to their atheism. I’m perfectly fine with them not wanting children (or the ‘trouble’ children bring!). <br /><br />As succinctly stated earlier in this thread by Scott, the AT position holds that: ‘what's "immoral" about gay sex according to Thomism is exactly the same thing that's immoral about masturbation and contraception, namely that it frustrates or subverts the end of procreation.’<br />This is completely backwards! Frustrating or subverting the end of fertilization is necessarily deliberate for the unique form of man. Limiting procreation quantity was necessary to promote the focused child rearing that allowed for long childhoods and large brains. Frustrating the end of fertilization was the development that allows for the existence of man.Alannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-47038078912809233802014-12-03T20:07:53.390-08:002014-12-03T20:07:53.390-08:00Mr. Green said: .‘The catch is, I don’t think we a...Mr. Green said: .‘The catch is, I don’t think we are convinced that you have a solid grasp on what the natural-law position actually states.’ I thought myself clear about my disagreement, but I will try again. Let’s consider two concluding statements independently taken from the A-T Natural Law model for humans, one nominally true, one false:<br />Appropriate sex is between committed (ie: married) individuals.<br />Appropriate sex is open to fertilization.<br /><br />Understanding this next argument requires considering the human as a uniquely formed, unified whole. The two statements above lead to four choices and four options for a behavior model: Open (promiscuous sex) or closed (sex within marriage), and fertile (as a possibility) or fun (no chance of fertilization).<br />For the first ‘choice’, there are many representatives in the natural world among birds and mammals that make long term, even lifelong mating commitments. Clearly this works for some animals, but many are instead highly promiscuous, including chimps and bonobos, the animals most similar to man. There are also examples of promiscuous human females, who as a class, have children that underperform the norm. Promiscuity is demonstrated to not work so well for humans, making marriage a good rule on strictly natural/consequential grounds as well (without considering the multitude of other problems brought on by promiscuity).<br />For the second choice, human females hide their fertility status. The uniqueness of this phenomenon suggests a uniquely human requirement for fun sex far beyond fertility sex. A-T Natural Law fails to recognize, even attempts to deny this unique human form, the unique character that allowed humans to develop and thrive as a species. <br />Now let’s look at this from an evolutionary angle – there are four choices based on the two statements above for proto-human/chimp groups:<br />1) Open sex while fertile<br />2) Closed sex while fertile<br />3) Open sex just for fun (when not fertile, or fertility unknown)<br />4) Closed sex just for fun (when not fertile, or fertility unknown)<br />Female chimps and bonobos clearly broadcast their fertility status with a variety of visual clues and while in this state actively pursue encounters with a range of males within their troop, so the progenitors who adopted behavior strategy one evolved into chimps or bonobos.<br />Strategy two is that behavior proscribed by A-T Natural Law, but there are no surviving examples which follow this strategy, so I concluded it leads to extinction. There are a very small number of humans who attempt strategy two utilizing modern technology or some variety of folklore, but only within a much larger population of humans practicing strategy four.<br />I am not too familiar with research on bonobos, but I have heard some suggest they follow both strategies one and three. There are some humans following strategy three as well, but not with much success.<br />Strategy four appears to me unique to humans and the only strategy widely practiced among surviving, successful human communities. This behavior strategy most probably developed along with the relatively isolated family bands in the savanna habitat (verses the chimps in much larger troops in a forest habitat) millions of years back. It was only strategy four that led to the evolution of big brains and modern humans.Alannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67885248531031152832014-11-25T22:49:23.309-08:002014-11-25T22:49:23.309-08:00Alan: Games with words. Based on my post, I do not...Alan: <i>Games with words. Based on my post, I do not see how your comments are relevant.</i><br /><br />Funny, that is just the point I was making about your comment.<br /><br /><i>More to the point of Natural Law is the regulation/frustration and all other manner of confusion regarding sex.</i><br /><br />The catch is, I don’t think we are convinced that you have a solid grasp on what the natural-law position actually states. It’s been noted that the general points you are making are already covered by natural law, and indeed handled better by it. If it’s a question of confusion, it would seem you are confusing humans with, I dunno, chemical processes, whereas the natural-law view takes into account all these aspects but considers them as a unified whole; that is, as the unified faculty of a unified human nature. Of course it’s good to flesh out the multifarious details, but nothing you have said challenges that complete picture.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-22108311160076628122014-11-24T13:10:49.088-08:002014-11-24T13:10:49.088-08:00Mr. Green and Snails: This is not a confusion of ...Mr. Green and Snails: This is not a confusion of physics, of bodies, but of forms and ends. For all of the focus on the particular vocabulary and specific technical meanings of words, little attention is spared for the model or its significance to reality. <br /><br />By all means, correct me if I am wrong, but as I understand it, within the AT/Natural Law model, knowing that snails eat distinguishes them from inorganic forms and plant forms, but not from any other animal form.Alannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53039332028116238012014-11-21T20:36:21.827-08:002014-11-21T20:36:21.827-08:00Reply to Georgy Mancz, part 3:
Even with this kin...Reply to Georgy Mancz, part 3:<br /><br />Even with this kind of broad definition of "observable", I'm confused about what it means to say that immanent causation is "observable". Do you think you could describe criteria for what to look for to someone who didn't already understand the term? And if so, would these criteria be such that a cell artificially created from abiotic matter would <i>by definition</i> not fit the criteria for immanent causation, no matter what sensory impressions it gave or how we might describe its present behavior? Even if you or any other physical observer, using any combination of advanced instruments, were completely unable to tell the difference between artificial cells and natural cells in a "blind" test where you weren't told which was which, would you still say that learning one was artificially-created (by reviewing films showing where each cell had come from before it was brought to you, say) would <i>itself</i> be definitive observational evidence that this cell's matter did not have the trait of immanent causation?<br /><br />If you simply <i>define</i> immanent causation in a way that makes it impossible for an artificial cell's matter to have this trait, then it seems like it'd be pure circular reasoning to then use this to draw the metaphysical conclusion "and since the matter doesn't have the trait of immanent causation, we can conclude the cell is not a true substance." Unless, I suppose, you have made it a basic axiom of your system that artificially-created entities can't be substances, or have a purely deductive way of reaching this conclusion from more basic axioms. And if you don't define it in a way that makes it logically impossible for an artificial cell to have the trait of immanent causation, then I'm curious how you would describe what to look for to someone who wasn't familiar with the term, and what you would say if an artificial cell did in fact display all the traits you had told someone to look for.<br /><br /><i>I think that others who responded to you meant that two things that act in exactly the same way cannot be said to different. That's why your experimental world doesn't make sense.</i><br /><br />But does "act" just mean presently-observable structure and behavior, or does it include a thing's entire past? Again think of the hypothetical where we are unable to <i>presently</i> detect any difference between artificial cells and biological cells in any blind test where we aren't given knowledge of their past history, but after these blind tests we can review records of their history and see that one was artifically created. In this case, would the cells count as "acting" in exactly the same way or not?<br /><br /><i>A note on states: immanence is manifested in action (it involves states changing), namely pursuing the good, so if I just had an account of the total physicochemical state of my cat (without knowing it's about my cat) I really wouldn't be able to say it's actually my cat, an agent of immanent causality.</i><br /><br />And what if the Laplacian demon who knew the total physiochemical state could use basic physiochemical laws to accurately predict all the future motions of your cat's body parts, all the chemical changes in its body, and other sorts of changes which supervene on the way the total physiochemical state evolves over time? Would you take this as a disproof that your cat is actually an agent of immanent causality?JesseMhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09993568347649474812noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18602451143832117462014-11-21T20:35:53.173-08:002014-11-21T20:35:53.173-08:00Reply to Georgy Mancz, part 2:
Our knowledge of sp...Reply to Georgy Mancz, part 2:<br /><i>Our knowledge of specific natural substances is fallible, as it depends on observation, and we can discover that something once held to be a substance was merely and accidental form. But observation is not identical to physics or chemistry, say: these are specialised observation. </i><br /><br />When I talk about "observable properties" I'm not really talking about what can be observed in practice by us fallible humans, more like what could be observed <i>in principle</i> by some ideal physical observer with access to any conceivable physical measuring-instruments (including natural ones like sense organs). And suppose this ideal observer also has ideal knowledge (given to him directly by God or an angel, say) of the relationship between observable physical properties and metaphysical essences. If this ideal observer <i>still</i> might have some uncertainty about whether a particular physical entity (like an artificial cell) had the property of "immanent causality", then this would imply that that even if you wanted to label "immanent causality" to be a physical property, it isn't really a purely "observable" one according to what I mean by that term. And this would also imply that according to my meaning, you could have two possible worlds that were identical in all the observable properties, but differed in whether the matter making up a particular cell had this property of immanence.<br /><br /><i>What is said to distinguish living substances is immanence, which non-living substances do not manifest (and Dr. Oderberg proves that immanence cannot come from transience). And we do in fact observe it. Something not being measurable and quantifiable does not make it "invisible" in the relevant sense. </i><br /><br />I didn't specifically say it had to be quantifiable, since I included qualia among "observations" too. And while basic qualia like colors are somewhat indescribable, there are also plenty of examples of observable structures and behaviors that can be described, but in a more qualitative and verbal way rather than a purely mathematical way like whether a given entity is engaging in "reproduction" or "self-repair", whether a human face is "smiling" or "frowning", etc. Although I think these 'fuzzy' describable properties could be said to supervene on a purely mathematical description of the arrangement and motions of fundamental particles--if we imagine some sort of ideal visualization software that could take such an ultra-detailed mathematical description as input, and as output give color-coded 3D images and animations of the large-scale spatial variations in densities of different types of molecules, then from this output we could identify things like the body parts of organisms, the behaviors they were engaging in as these parts moved around in space over time, etc.JesseMhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09993568347649474812noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46044428390488907792014-11-21T20:34:41.721-08:002014-11-21T20:34:41.721-08:00Georgy, sorry for taking so long to get back to yo...Georgy, sorry for taking so long to get back to you, but I did want to respond to your last comment to me from Nov. 11:<br /><br /><i>Accidental form's properties are reducible to the properties of substances that are 'parts' (analogously) in their arrangement. <br />A substance is not, and it applies not only to living things, but to natural kinds like iron or gold on hylomorphism. </i><br /><br />Out of curiosity, did Aristotle make a claim like this about human-constructed forms like houses, that they were entirely reducible to their parts on a metaphysical level whereas organisms were not, even if he didn't use the term "accidental form"? Or was this an entirely new claim made by the Scholastics?<br /><br />Anyway, my main question about this would be, what is the <i>justification</i> for these metaphysical claims about which things are reducible to their parts and which are not? As I said earlier, I think that if one is going to make a metaphysical claim about particular real-world entities within the context of some rational metaphysical system, one has to start with some metaphysical principles one treats as "axioms" (i.e. metaphysical claims which aren't really derived from more fundamental claims in the system), then use some purely deductive argument based on these axioms to try to establish a statement like "in general, anything with empirically-observable properties X,Y must have metaphysical properties Z". Only after this deductive inference has been made does it really seem justifiable to point to any actual real-world empirical observations as evidence that some real-world entity really does have metaphysical properties Z. <br /><br />Would you disagree with these principles for justifying metaphysical claims? They would seem to imply that, in order to justify a statement like "metaphysically, iron is not reducible to the particles that make it up, it is a natural whole", one would have to <i>either</i> pick some empirically-observable properties of iron and deduce from "first principles" that such properties should imply iron is a substance rather than a collection of interacting smaller substances, <i>or</i> just say it's a basic axiom of A-T metaphysics that uniform types of material like iron are always substances. The latter seems kind of ad hoc and overly specific as a foundational metaphysical claim, but maybe A-T advocates would disagree. If not though, that would leave the first option--but what is the actual argument from first principles supposed to look like, in this case? Did Aquinas make such an argument himself? And likewise, is there supposed to be an argument from first principles that an artificially-created cell made from abiotic materials could never be a single substance, a natural whole?<br /><br />Finally, I wonder if you would say that the claim that ontological reductionism is false in the case or iron necessarily implies that predictive reductionism would be false too. Does this claim require that we could never perfectly predict all the empirically measurable behaviors and properties of collections of iron molecules just based on the arrangement of the smaller particles that physicists model them as being made up of? (even if on a metaphysical level these are only 'virtual' parts of iron molecules rather than real distinct substances)JesseMhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09993568347649474812noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-1767404482198421512014-11-21T14:08:03.244-08:002014-11-21T14:08:03.244-08:00Mr. Green said: ‘… I don’t think that follows.’ ...Mr. Green said: ‘… I don’t think that follows.’ Games with words. Based on my post, I do not see how your comments are relevant. <br />Granted, to the extent that snails form families and devote on their young, mine was a poor analogy.<br /><br /> ‘“Accident” … has a specific, technical meaning.’ As I noted, and to the extent that I was correct in recalling Dr. Feser’s distinction that within an accident, ‘the character of the brass that forms the gears and springs is unchanged when fitted into the mechanism.’ The designation ‘Accident’ does not apply to organic forms as all manner of environmental proximities changes their character. <br /><br />‘Regulation is not the same thing as frustration.’<br />More to the point of Natural Law is the regulation/frustration and all other manner of confusion regarding sex. For a queen ant, as an example, she may have sex once and go on to lay thousands of fertile eggs. Insemination with sex is clearly of high significance to an ant. Humans could couple hundreds of times for each fertilization. This appears unique in the animal kingdom pointing to a deliberate intent (evolved pattern) to encourage maximum coupling with minimal fertilization. Add to that the also unique phenomenon of human females hiding their fertility status to encourage coupling while fertilization is impossible. Frustrating the fertilization function of sex is a deliberate, evolved natural end for humans. Nature/evolution recognizes that strong family bonds and the devotion of attention to rearing and training a few offspring is of greater advantage to humans than maximizing the number of offspring. The end for man as designed within nature is to regulate fertilization while minimizing the frustration to sexual bonding.Alannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-85421724695234313432014-11-19T20:41:28.221-08:002014-11-19T20:41:28.221-08:00Alan: A family is not an artifact nor an accident,...Alan: <i>A family is not an artifact nor an accident, nor an accidental form.</i><br /><br />“Accident” is not an emotive term to describe how important one feels something is. It has a specific, technical meaning. And a family is assuredly not a substance.<br /><br /><i>To claim for sex ‘that procreation is it's teleology’ is to confuse humans with flowers or snails.</i><br /><br />Humans must eat; snails eat; therefore I am confusing humans with snails. Hm, I don’t think that follows.<br /><br /><i>Many of which it is appropriate to frustrate at any given time or situation.</i><br /><br />Regulation is not the same thing as frustration. <br /><br /><i>Arbitrary proscriptions are just that, arbitrary.</i><br /><br />Well, can’t argue with that.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-78371056707396780562014-11-18T18:56:38.722-08:002014-11-18T18:56:38.722-08:00@Alan:
"The teleology of sex is far more tha...@Alan:<br /><br />"The teleology of sex is far more than procreation."<br /><br />More, yes. Less, no.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-65362026474627755762014-11-18T14:05:14.782-08:002014-11-18T14:05:14.782-08:00@ Georgy Mancz: I don’t think I am making the err...@ Georgy Mancz: I don’t think I am making the error here, nor do I think I am the one equivocating. <br />My comment: ‘Within nature, humans experience a significant range of effects from sex as well as a variety of motivations and stimulations for sex.’ Was not equivocating but justifying the rejection of an accidental form characterization of bringing two humans together. Civil Society likewise fails the accidental form test as the character of a human must be changed before they can be integrated into one. <br />A watch is appropriately characterized as an accidental form as the character of the brass that forms the gears and springs is unchanged when fitted into the mechanism. Sex is not a meshing of gears that remain unchanged in character as they rotate.<br />Marriage is not some clockwork connection between wind-up dolls. A family is not an artifact nor an accident, nor an accidental form. It is something new, something unique. As are the individuals from which a family is composed. Like so many other human interactions, marriage violates the prescripts of an accidental form by modifying the character of those involved. Sex is central to (among many other things) facilitating the transformation of two individuals into husband and wife. Sex is also central to maintaining the structure and unity of the family. The teleology of sex is far more than procreation.<br />Arbitrary is favoring the relatively trivial purpose of procreation (flowers and snails are quite proficient at sexual procreation) over the far more difficult, uniquely human and essential for human survival purpose of facilitating marriage, forming and sustaining a family. To claim for sex ‘that procreation is it's teleology’ is to confuse humans with flowers or snails.Alannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75474456985875906282014-11-14T08:23:03.203-08:002014-11-14T08:23:03.203-08:00@ Alan
If you do understand it, why do you equivo...@ Alan<br /><br />If you do understand it, why do you equivocate (this last occurred, I think in your response to Mr. Green)?.. <br />You have not shown it to be artbitrary. Your argument that we cannot know the essences of things without knowing all the accidental forms of the manifestation of powers is, I think, flawed, because essences are simply different from accidents, again, as has been pointed out repeatedly, accidents are reducible to causal powers of substances and particular arrangements. Substances and their powers are not. That includes sex. <br />The fact that sexual behaviour of humans is "more nuanced" in no way changes that procreation is it's teleology. And if it is, frustrating this natural end when utilising the sexual power is immoral on natural law, regardless of the consequences thought to be good. G. Mancz 滿償喬治https://www.blogger.com/profile/15753680642571164788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-17346966364562629372014-11-14T07:49:05.486-08:002014-11-14T07:49:05.486-08:00@Georgy Mancz: I do understand the issues of voca...@Georgy Mancz: I do understand the issues of vocabulary, and hope that context is sufficient to sort out my meanings. I was not suggesting that it was illogical to distinguish between the two, but that it was being done arbitrarily. I was claiming it illogical to press the significance of an arbitrary determination. What Thomists claim to be the essence regarding sex is in error, that has been my argument all along.Alannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53897070615448836272014-11-14T07:11:49.951-08:002014-11-14T07:11:49.951-08:00@ Alan
I know you weren't replying to me, but...@ Alan<br /><br />I know you weren't replying to me, but still.<br /><br />What Thomists mean by "nature" here is essence, not nature in the sense of environmental conditions or whatever. <br />There's nothing illogical in natures/essences and indentifying natural ends, nor is it illogical to distinguish between essence and accident and maintain the fundamentality of the former. <br />G. Mancz 滿償喬治https://www.blogger.com/profile/15753680642571164788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83699236814193471562014-11-14T05:53:39.527-08:002014-11-14T05:53:39.527-08:00@DJ Jazzy Cornelius
So let us say for the sake of...@DJ Jazzy Cornelius<br /><br />So let us say for the sake of argument ones taste buds registered that what one had just eaten was poison (how you know this isn't important for the argument) - would you argue that it is acting against the body and its nature and saliva and the set of ends to which is directed to then spit it out?Irish Thomisthttp://irishthomist.blogspot.co.uk/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74694032689296727292014-11-13T19:24:03.675-08:002014-11-13T19:24:03.675-08:00Is there any webpage where I can find an outline/e...Is there any webpage where I can find an outline/explanation of Aristotelian realism with regards to forms? Are forms covered in detail in Feser's most recent book?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com